Cruz vs.

Civil Service Commission

Facts:On September 9, 1994, the
Chairperson of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC), received a letter from a
private individual, Carmelita B. Esteban,
claiming that, during the examinations for
non-professional in the career civil service,
given by the Civil Service Commission, on
July 30, 1989 in Quezon City, Zenaida C.
Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of
Norzagaray, Bulacan, falsely pretending to
be the examinee, Gilda Cruz, a co-employee
in the said office, took the examinations for
the latter. Carmelita Esteban requested the
CSC to investigate the matter, appending to
said letter, pictures purporting to be those of
Gilda Cruz and Zenaida Paitim.
On September 20, 1994, Erlinda A. Rosas,
Director IV of the Commission, issued a
Memorandum to Eliseo Gatchalian, the
Director of the Management Information
Office of the Commission, requesting the
latter to furnish her with the picture seat plan
of the room where Gilda G. Cruz was during
the said examination, to ascertain the
veracity of the letter-complaint. Eliseo S.
Gatchalian did furnish Erlinda Rosas with
certified true copies of the picture seat plans
of the rooms where Gilda G. Cruz was
assigned not only in the 1989 but also in the
1987 and 1988 career service (subprofessional) examinations. On November 8,
1994, Erlinda Rosas thereby wrote a
Memorandum to Civil Service
Commissioner Thelma P. Gaminde, dated
November 8, 1994, declaring that based on
the record, she found a prima facie case
against Zenaida Paitim and Gilda G. Cruz.

On the basis of said memorandum, a fact

finding investigation was conducted. On
March 31, 1995, a "Formal Charge" for
"Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, and
Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of
the Service" signed by Bella Amilhasan,
Director IV of the Civil Service Commission
Regional Office No. 3 was filed against
Gilda Cruz and Zenaida C. Paitim, with the
Civil Service Commission,
The petitioners filed their Answer to the
charge entering a general denial of the
material averments of the "Formal Charge."
They also declared that they were electing a
formal investigation on the matter. The
petitioners subsequently filed a Motion to
Dismiss averring that if the investigation
will continue, they will be deprived of their
right to due process because the Civil
Service Commission was the complainant,
the Prosecutor and the Judge, all at the same
time.
On July 17, 1995, Director Bella A.
Amilhasan issued an order denying the
motion. 2 The subsequent motion for
reconsideration of said order was likewise
dismissed.
Dulce J. Cochon, Attorney III of the CSC
was thereby directed to conduct the formal
administrative investigation of petitioners'
case.
On November 16, 1995, Dulce J. Cochon
issued an "Investigation Report and
Recommendation" finding the Petitioners

guilty of "Dishonesty" and ordering their

dismissal from the government service.
On July 1, 1998, the Civil Service
Commission issued Resolution No. 981695
finding the petitioners guilty of the charges
and ordered their dismissal from the
government service.
On November 29, 1999, the Court of
Appeals dismissed the petition before it. The
motion for reconsideration was, likewise,
denied on August 9, 2000. Hence this
petition
Issue: 1. THE COURT OF APPEALS
GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS'
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS WAS NOT VIOLATED IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. D3-95-052
WHERE RESPONDENT COMMISSION
ACTED AS THE INVESTIGATOR, THE
COMPLAINANT, THE PROSECUTOR,
AND THE JUDGE, ALL AT THE SAME
TIME, AGAINST PETITIONERS. IN SO
DOING, RESPONDENT COMMISSION
COMMITTED A MOCKERY OF
ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE AND THE
COURT OF APPEALS SANCTIONED IT.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY
AND SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING
THAT RESPONDENT COMMISSION
HAS ORIGINAL JURISDICTION TO
HEAR AND DECIDE A COMPLAINT OR
CHARGE WHETHER FILED BY A
PRIVATE CITIZEN OR BY THE CIVIL
SERVICE COMMISSION ITSELF. THE

LAW VESTS IN RESPONDENT

COMMISSION ONLY APPELLATE, NOT
ORIGINAL, JURISDICTION IN ALL
ADMINISTRATIVE CASES AGAINST A
PUBLIC OFFICIAL OR EMPLOYEE
INVOLVING THE IMPOSITION OF A
PENALTY OF REMOVAL OR
DISMISSAL FROM OFFICE WHERE THE
COMPLAINT THEREFORE WAS NOT
FILED BY A PRIVATE CITIZEN AS IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. D3-95-052
OF RESPONDENT COMMISSION
Ruling: The petition is denied.
There is no question that petitioner Zenaida
Paitim, masquerading herself as petitioner
Gilda Cruz, took the civil service
examinations in her behalf. Gilda Cruz
passed the examinations. On the basis of a
tip-off that the two public employees were
involved in an anomalous act, the CSC
conducted an investigation and verified that
the two employees were indeed guilty of
dishonesty. Thus, in accordance with the
CSC law, the petitioners merited the penalty
of dismissal.
Petitioners maintain that the CSC did not
have original jurisdiction to hear and decide
the administrative case. Allegedly, in
accordance with Section 47(1), Chapter 7,
Subtitle A, Title 1, Book V, Administrative
Code of 1987, the CSC is vested with
appellate jurisdiction only in all
administrative cases where the penalty
imposed is removal or dismissal from the
office and where the complaint was filed by

a private citizen against the government

employee.
Petitioners' invocation of the law is
misplaced. The provision is applicable to
instances where administrative cases are
filed against erring employees in connection
with their duties and functions of the office.
This is, however, not the scenario
contemplated in the case at bar. It must be
noted that the acts complained of arose from
a cheating caused by the petitioners in the
Civil Service (Subprofessional)
examination. The examinations were under
the direct control and supervision of the
Civil Service Commission. The culprits are
government employees over whom the Civil
Service Commission undeniably has
jurisdiction. Thus, after the petitioners were
duly investigated and ascertained whether
they were indeed guilty of dishonesty, the
penalty meted was dismissal from the office.
Section 28, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Civil
Service Rules and Regulations explicitly
provides that the CSC can rightfully take
cognizance over any irregularities or
anomalies connected to the examinations
Petitioners' contention that they were denied
due process of law by the fact that the CSC
acted as investigator, complainant,
prosecutor and judge, all at the same time
against the petitioners is untenable. The CA
correctly explained that the CSC is
mandated to hear and decide administrative
case instituted by it or instituted before it
directly or on appeal including actions of its
officers and the agencies attached to it

pursuant to Book V, Title 1, Subtitle A,

Chapter 3, Section 12, paragraph 11 of the
Administrative Code of 1987.
The fact that the complaint was filed by the
CSC itself does not mean that it could not be
an impartial judge. As an administrative
body, its decision was based on substantial
findings. Factual findings of administrative
bodies, being considered experts in their
field, are binding on the Supreme Court. 8
The records clearly disclose that the
petitioners were duly investigated by the
CSC.
Javier v Comelec
Facts: The petitioner and the private
respondent were candidates in Antique for
the Batasang Pambansa in the May 1984
elections. The former appeared to enjoy
more popular support but the latter had the
advantage of being the nominee of the KBL
with all its perquisites of power. On May 13,
1984, the eve of the elections, the bitter
contest between the two came to a head
when several followers of the petitioner
were ambushed and killed, allegedly by the
latter's men. Seven suspects, including
respondent Pacificador, are now facing trial
for these murders. The incident naturally
heightened tension in the province and
sharpened the climate of fear among the
electorate. Conceivably, it intimidated voters
against supporting the Opposition candidate
or into supporting the candidate of the ruling
party.
It was in this atmosphere that the voting was
held, and the post-election developments

were to run true to form. Owing to what he

claimed were attempts to railroad the private
respondent's proclamation, the petitioner
went to the Commission on Elections to
question the canvass of the election returns.
His complaints were dismissed and the
private respondent was proclaimed winner
by the Second Division of the said body. The
petitioner thereupon came to this Court,
arguing that the proclamation was void
because made only by a division and not by
the Commission on Elections en banc as
required by the Constitution. Meanwhile, on
the strength of his proclamation, the private
respondent took his oath as a member of the
Batasang Pambansa.
The case was still being considered by this
Court when on February 11, 1986, the
petitioner was gunned down in cold blood
and in broad daylight. The nation, already
indignant over the obvious manipulation of
the presidential elections in favor of Marcos,
was revolted by the killing, which flaunted a
scornful disregard for the law by the
assailants who apparently believed they
were above the law. This ruthless murder
was possibly one of the factors that
strengthened the cause of the Opposition in
the February revolution that toppled the
Marcos regime and installed the present
government under President Corazon C.
Aquino.
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and
the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private
respondent both of whom have gone their
separate ways could be a convenient

justification for dismissing this case. But

there are larger issues involved that must be
resolved now, once and for all, not only to
dispel the legal ambiguities here raised. The
more important purpose is to manifest in the
clearest possible terms that this Court will
not disregard and in effect condone wrong
on the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the
case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest
arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen
comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the
same. There are times when we cannot grant
the latter because the issue has been settled
and decision is no longer possible according
to the law. But there are also times when
although the dispute has disappeared, as in
this case, it nevertheless cries out to be
resolved. Justice demands that we act then,
not only for the vindication of the outraged
right, though gone, but also for the guidance
of and as a restraint upon the future.
Antique in 1984 hewed to the line and
equaled if it did not surpass the viciousness
of elections in other provinces dominated by
the KBL. Terrorism was a special feature, as
demonstrated by the killings previously
mentioned, which victimized no less than
one of the main protagonists and implicated
his rival as a principal perpetrator.
Opposition leaders were in constant peril of
their lives even as their supporters were
gripped with fear of violence at the hands of
the party in power. LLjur

What made the situation especially

deplorable was the apparently indifferent
attitude of the Commission on Elections
toward the anomalies being committed. It is
a matter of record that the petitioner
complained against the terroristic acts of his
opponents. All the electoral body did was
refer the matter to the Armed Forces without
taking a more active step as befitted its
constitutional role as the guardian of free,
orderly and honest elections. A more
assertive stance could have averted the
Sibalom election eve massacre and saved the
lives of the nine victims of the tragedy.
Public confidence in the Commission on
Elections was practically nil because of its
transparent bias in favor of the
administration. This prejudice left many
opposition candidates without recourse
except only to this Court.
Alleging serious anomalies in the conduct of
the elections and the canvass of the election
returns, the petitioner went to the
Commission on Elections to prevent the
impending proclamation of his rival, the
private respondent herein. 1 Specifically, the
petitioner charged that the elections were
marred by "massive terrorism, intimidation,
duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and
falsification of election returns under duress,
threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot
boxes perpetrated by the armed men of
respondent Pacificador." 2 Particular
mention was made of the municipalities of
Caluya, Cabate, Tibiao, Barbaza, Laua-an,
and also of San Remigio, where the
petitioner claimed the election returns were

not placed in the ballot boxes but merely

wrapped in cement bags or manila paper.

proclaiming the private respondent the

winner in the election?

On May 18, 1984, the Second Division of

the Commission on Elections directed the
provincial board of canvassers of Antique to
proceed with the canvass but to suspend the
proclamation of the winning candidate until
further orders. 3 On June 7, 1984, the
same Second Division ordered the board to
immediately convene and to proclaim the
winner without prejudice to the outcome of
the case before the Commission. 4 On
certiorari before this Court, the proclamation
made by the board of canvassers was set
aside as premature, having been made
before the lapse of the 5-day period of
appeal, which the petitioner had seasonably
made. 5 Finally, on July 23, 1984, the
Second Division promulgated the decision
now subject of this petition which inter alia
proclaimed Arturo F. Pacificador the elected
assemblyman of the province of Antique.

Ruling: The petition is moot and

academic

This decision was signed by Chairman

Victoriano Savellano and Commissioners
Jaime Opinion and Froilan M. Bacungan.
Previously asked to inhibit himself on the
ground that he was a former law partner of
private respondent Pacificador, Opinion had
refused.
The petitioner then came to this Court,
asking us to annul the said decision.
Issue: Was the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections authorized to
promulgate its decision of July 23, 1984,

The applicable provisions are found in

Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973
Constitution.
Section 2 confers on the Commission on
Elections the power to:
"(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns and qualifications of
all member of the Batasang Pambansa and
elective provincial and city officials."
Section 3 provides:
"The Commission on Elections may sit en
banc or in three divisions. All election cases
may be heard and decided by divisions
except contests involving members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard
and decided en banc. Unless otherwise
provided by law, all election cases shall be
decided within ninety days from the date of
their submission for decision."
While both invoking the above provisions,
the petitioner and the respondents have
arrived at opposite conclusions. The records
are voluminous and some of the pleadings
are exhaustive and in part even erudite. And
well they might be, for the noble profession
of the law despite all the canards that
have been flung against it exerts all
efforts and considers all possible viewpoints
in its earnest search of the truth.

The former Solicitor General makes much of

this argument and lays a plausible
distinction between the terms "contests" and
"cases" to prove his point. 8 Simply put, his
contention is that the pre-proclamation
controversy between the petitioner and the
private respondent was not yet a contest at
that time and therefore could be validly
heard by a mere division of the Commission
on Elections, consonant with Section 3. The
issue was at this stage still administrative
and so was resoluble by the Commission
under its power to administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections, 9 not its
authority as sole judge of the election
contest.
A contest, according to him, should involve
a contention between the parties for the
same office "in which the contestant seeks
not only to oust the intruder but also to have
himself inducted into the office." 10 No
proclamation had as yet been made when the
petition was filed and later decided. Hence,
since neither the petitioner nor the private
respondent had at that time assumed office,
there was no Member of the Batasang
Pambansa from Antique whose election,
returns or qualifications could be examined
by the Commission on Elections en banc.
In providing that the Commission on
Elections could act in division when
deciding election cases, according to this
theory, the Constitution was laying down the
general rule. The exception was the election
contest involving the members of the
Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard

and decided en banc. 11 The en

bancrequirement would apply only from the
time a candidate for the Batasang Pambansa
was proclaimed as winner, for it was only
then that a contest could be permitted under
the law. All matters arising before such time
were, necessarily, subject to decision only
by division of the Commission as these
would come under the general heading of
"election cases."
As the Court sees it, the effect of this
interpretation would be to divide the
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
into two, viz.: (1) over matters arising before
the proclamation, which should be heard and
decided by division in the exercise of its
administrative power; and (2) over matters
arising after the proclamation, which could
be heard and decided only en banc in the
exercise of its judicial power. Stated
otherwise, the Commission as a whole could
not act as sole judge as long as one of its
divisions was hearing a pre-proclamation
matter affecting the candidates for the
Batasang Pambansa because there was as yet
no contest; or to put it still another way, the
Commission en banc could not do what one
of its divisions was competent to do, i.e.,
decide a pre-proclamation controversy.
Moreover, a mere division of the
Commission on Elections could hear and
decide, save only those involving the
election, returns and qualifications of the
members of the Batasang Pambansa, all
cases involving elective provincial and city
officials from start to finish, including preproclamation controversies and up to the
election protest, In doing so, it would

exercise first administrative and then

judicial powers. But in the case of the
Commission en banc, its jurisdiction would
begin only after the proclamation was made
and a contest was filed and not at any time
and on any matter before that, and always in
the exercise only of judicial power.
This interpretation would give to the part
more powers than were enjoyed by the
whole, granting to the division while
denying to the banc. We do not think this
was the intention of the Constitution. The
framers could not have intended such an
irrational rule.
We believe that in making the Commission
on Elections the sole judge of all contests
involving the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial
and city officials, the Constitution intended
to give it full authority to hear and decide
these cases from beginning to end and on all
matters related thereto, including those
arising before the proclamation of the
winners
It is worth observing that the special
procedure for the settlement of what are now
called "pre-proclamation controversies" is a
relatively recent innovation in our laws,
having been introduced only in 1978,
through P.D. No. 1296, otherwise known as
the 1978 Election Code. Section 175
Before that time all proceedings affecting
the election, returns and qualifications of
public officers came under the complete

jurisdiction of the competent court or

tribunal from beginning to end and in the
exercise of judicial power only. It therefore
could not have been the intention of the
framers in 1935, when the Commonwealth
Charter was adopted, and even in 1973,
when the past Constitution was imposed, to
divide the electoral process into the preproclamation stage and the postproclamation stage and to provide for a
separate jurisdiction for each stage,
considering the first administrative and the
second judicial.
Besides, the term "contest" as it was
understood at the time Article XII-C,
Section 2(2) was incorporated in the 1973
Constitution did not follow the strict
definition of a contention between the
parties for the same office. Under the
Election Code of 1971, which presumably
was taken into consideration when the 1973
Constitution was being drafted, election
contests included the quo warranto petition
that could be filed by any voter on the
ground of disloyalty or ineligibility of the
contestee although such voter was himself
not claiming the office involved.
The word "contests" should not be given a
restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it
should receive the widest possible scope
conformably to the rule that the words used
in the Constitution should be interpreted
liberally. As employed in the 1973
Constitution, the term should be understood
as referring to any matter involving the title
or claim of title to an elective office, made
before or after proclamation of the winner,

whether or not the contestant is claiming the

office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term
should be given a consistent meaning and
understood in the same sense under both
Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C
of the Constitution.
The phrase "election, returns and
qualifications" should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting
the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the
casting and counting of the votes; "returns"
to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the
board of canvassers and the authenticity of
the election returns; and "qualifications" to
matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility
or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy
All these came under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections
insofar as they applied to the members of the
defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under
Article XII-C, Section 3, of the 1973
Constitution, could be heard and decided by
it only en banc.
We interpret "cases" as the generic term
denoting the actions that might be heard and
decided by the Commission on Elections,
only by division as a general rule except

where the case was a "contest" involving

members of the Batasang Pambansa, which
had to be heard and decided en banc.
As correctly observed by the petitioner, the
purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases
involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc was to insure the most
careful consideration of such cases.
Obviously, that objective could not be
achieved if the Commission could act en
banconly after the proclamation had been
made, for it might then be too late already.
We are all-too-familiar with the grab-theproclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy
of many unscrupulous candidates which has
resulted in the frustration of the popular will
and the virtual defeat of the real winners in
the election. The respondent's theory would
make this gambit possible for the preproclamation proceedings, being summary
in nature, could be hastily decided by only
three members in division, without the care
and deliberation that would have otherwise
been observed by the Commission en banc.
After that, the delay. The Commission en
banc might then no longer be able to rectify
in time the proclamation summarily and not
very judiciously made by the division.
While in the end the protestant might be
sustained, he might find himself with only a
Phyrric victory because the term of his
office would have already expired.
It may be argued that in conferring the initial
power to decide the pre-proclamation
question upon the division, the Constitution

did not intend to prevent the Commission en

banc from exercising the power directly, on
the theory that the greater power embraces
the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it
could also allow the division to act for it.
That argument would militate against the
purpose of the provision, which precisely
limited all questions affecting the election
contest, as distinguished from election cases
in general, to the jurisdiction of the
Commission en banc as sole judge thereof.
"Sole judge" excluded not only all other
tribunals but also and even the division of
the Commission. A decision made on the
contest by less than the Commission en banc
would not meet the exacting standard of care
and deliberation ordained by the
Constitution.
Incidentally, in making the Commission the
"sole judge" of pre-proclamation
controversies in Section 175, supra, the law
was obviously referring to the body sitting
en banc. In fact, the pre-proclamation
controversies involved in Aratuc vs.
Commission on Elections, 13 where the said
provision was applied, were heard and
decided en banc.
Another matter deserving the highest
consideration of this Court but accorded
cavalier attention by the respondent
Commission on Elections is due process of
law, that ancient guaranty of justice and fair
play which is the hallmark of the free
society. Commissioner Opinion ignored it.
Asked to inhibit himself on the ground that
he was formerly a law partner of the private
respondent, he obstinately insisted on

participating in the case, denying he was

biased
Given the general attitude of the
Commission on Elections toward the party
in power at the time, and the particular
relationship between Commissioner Opinion
and MP Pacificador, one could not be at
least apprehensive, if not certain, that the
decision of the body would be adverse to the
petitioner. As in fact it was. Commissioner
Opinion's refusal to inhibit himself and his
objection to the transfer of the case to
another division cannot be justified by any
criterion of propriety. His conduct on this
matter belied his wounded protestations of
innocence and proved the motives of the
Second Division when it rendered its
decision.
This Court has repeatedly and consistently
demanded "the cold neutrality of an
impartial judge" as the indispensable
imperative of due process. 15 To bolster that
requirement, we have held that the judge
must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial as an added assurance
to the parties that his decision will be just.
16 The litigants are entitled to no less than
that. They should be sure that when their
rights are violated they can go to a judge
who shall give them justice. They must trust
the judge, otherwise they will not go to him
at all. They must believe in his sense of
fairness, otherwise they will not seek his
judgment. Without such confidence, there
would be no point in invoking his action for
the justice they expect.

Due process is intended to insure that

confidence by requiring compliance with
what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments
of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice.
There cannot be equal justice where a suitor
approaches a court already committed to the
other party and with a judgment already
made and waiting only to be formalized
after the litigants shall have undergone the
charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and
also extrajudicial) proceedings are not
orchestrated plays in which the parties are
supposed to make the motions and reach the
denouement according to a prepared script.
There is no writer to foreordain the ending.
The judge will reach his conclusions only
after all the evidence is in and all the
arguments are filed, on the basis of the
established facts and the pertinent law.
The relationship of the judge with one of the
parties may color the facts and distort the
law to the prejudice of a just decision.
Where this is probable or even only
possible, due process demands that the judge
inhibit himself, if only out of a sense of
delicadeza. For like Caesar's wife, he must
be above suspicion. Commissioner Opinion,
being a lawyer, should have recognized his
duty and abided by this well-known rule of
judicial conduct. For refusing to do so, he
divested the Second Division of the
necessary vote for the questioned decision,
assuming it could act, and rendered the
proceeding null and void.
Since this case began in 1984, many
significant developments have taken place,
not the least significant of which was the

February revolution of "people power" that

dislodged the past regime and ended well
nigh twenty years of travail for this captive
nation. The petitioner is gone, felled by a
hail of bullets sprayed with deadly purpose
by assassins whose motive is yet to be
disclosed. The private respondent has
disappeared with the "pomp of power" he
had before enjoyed. Even the Batasang
Pambansa itself has been abolished, "an
iniquitous vestige of the previous regime"
discontinued by the Freedom Constitution. It
is so easy now, as has been suggested not
without reason, to send the records of this
case to the archives and say the case is
finished and the book is closed.
WHEREFORE, let it be spread in the
records of this case that were it not for the
supervening events that have legally
rendered it moot and academic, this petition
would have been granted and the decision of
the Commission on Elections dated July 23,
1984, set aside as violative of the
Constitution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; COMMISSION
ON ELECTIONS; GIVEN FULL
AUTHORITY TO HEAR AND DECIDE
CASES FROM BEGINNING TO END
AND ALL MATTERS RELATED
THERETO. We believe that in making
the Commission on Elections the sole judge
of all contests involving the election, returns
and qualifications of the members of the
Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial
and city officials, the Constitution intended
to give it full authority to hear and decide
these cases from beginning to end and on all

matters related thereto, including those

arising before the proclamation of the
winners.
CONTEST"; SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN A
RESTRICTIVE MEANING. The word
"contests" should not be given a restrictive
meaning; on the contrary, it should receive
the widest possible scope conformably to the
rule that the words used in the Constitution
should be interpreted liberally. As employed
in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be
understood as referring to any matter
involving the title or claims as title to an
elective office, made before or after
proclamation of the winner, whether or not
the contestant is claiming the office in
dispute. Needless to stress, the term should
be given a consistent meaning and
understood in the same sense under both
Section 2(2) and Section 3 of Article XII-C
of the Constitution.
PHRASE "ELECTION RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATION," DEFINED IN THE
SAME SENSE UNDER SEC. 2(2) AND
SEC. 3, ART. XII-C, CONSTITUTION.
The phrase "election, returns and
qualifications" should be interpreted in its
totality as referring to all matters affecting
the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is
necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the
polls, including the listing of voters, the
holding of the electoral campaign, and the
casting and counting of the votes; "returns"
to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including
questions concerning the composition of the

board of canvassers and the authenticity of

the election returns; and "qualifications" to
matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed
winner, such as his delivery or ineligibility
or the inadequacy of his certificate of
candidacy.
ISSUED ON ELECTION, RETURNS AND
QUALIFICATIONS; TO BE HEARD AND
DECIDED ONLY BY SITTING EN BAND
INSOFAR AS THEY APPLIED TO
MEMBERS OF B.P. All these came
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections insofar as they
applied to the members of the defunct
Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XIIC, Section 3, of the 1973 Constitution, could
be heard and decided by it only en banc.
CASES INVOLVING MEMBERS OF B.P.
TO BE HEARD AND DECIDED BY
SITTING EN BANC; PURPOSE. As
correctly observed by the petitioner, the
purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases
involving members of the Batasang
Pambansa be heard and decided by the
Commission en banc was to insure the most
careful consideration of such cases.
Obviously, that objective could not be
achieved if the Commission could act en
banc only after the proclamation had been
made, for it might then be too late already.
We are all-too-familiar with the grab-theproclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy
of many unscrupulous candidates which has
resulted in the frustration of the popular will
and the virtual defeat of the real winners in
the election. The respondent's theory would

make this gambit possible for the preproclamation proceedings, being summary
in nature, could be hastily decided by only
three members in division, without the cause
and deliberation that would have otherwise
been observed by the Commission en banc.
After that, the delay. The Commission en
banc might then no longer be able to rectify
in time the proclamation summarily and not
very judiciously made by the division.
While in the end the protestant might be
sustained, he might find himself with only a
Phyrric victory because the term of his
office would have already expired.
BILL OF RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS
GUARANTY; VIOLATED IN CASE AT
BAR. Another matter deserving the
highest consideration of this Court but
accorded cavalier attention by the
respondent Commission on Elections is due
process of law, that ancient guaranty of
justice and fair play which is the hallmark of
the free society. Commissioner Opinion
ignored it. Asked to inhibit himself on the
ground that he was formerly a law partner of
the private respondent, he obstinately
insisted on participating in the case, denying
he was biased.
COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL
JUDGE; INDISPENSABLE IMPERATIVE
OF DUE PROCESS. This Court has
repeatedly and consistently demanded "the
cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the
indispensable imperative of due process. To
bolster that requirement we have held that
the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial as an added

assurance to the parties that his decision will

be just. The litigants are entitled to no less
than that. They should be sure that when
their rights are violated they can go to a
judge who shall give them justice. They
must trust the judge, otherwise they will not
go to him at all. They must believe in his
sense of fairness, otherwise they will not
seek his judgment. Without such confidence,
there would be no point in invoking his
action for the justice they expect.
DUE PROCESS; INTENDED TO INSURE
COMPLIANCE WITH RUDIMENTS OF
FAIR PLAY. Due process is intended to
insure that confidence by requiring
compliance with what Justice Frankfurter
calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play
calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal
justice where a suitor approaches a court
already committed to the other party and
with a judgment already made and waiting
only to be formalized after the litigants shall
have undergone the charade of a formal
hearing. Judicial (and also extra-judicial
proceedings are not orchestrated plays in
which the parties are supposed to make the
motions and reach the denouement
according to a prepared script. There is no
writer to foreordain the ending. The judge
will reach his conclusions only after all the
evidence is in and all the arguments are
filed, on the basis of the established facts
and the pertinent law.
DEMANDS THAT THE JUDGE INHIBIT
HIMSELF OUT OF A SENSE OF
DELICADEZA. The relationship of the
judge with one of the parties may color the

facts and distort the law to the prejudice of a

just decision. Where this is probable or even
only possible, due possible, due process
demands that the judge inhibit himself, if
only out of a sense of delicadeza. For like
Caesar's wife, he must be above suspicion.
Commissioner Opinion, being a lawyer,
should have recognized his duty and abided
by this well-known rule of judicial conduct.
For refusing to do so, he divested the
Second Division of the necessary vote for
the questioned decision, assuming it could
act, and rendered the proceedings null and
void.
Libanan vs. Sandiganbayan
Facts: Petitioner Marcelino C, Libanan, the
incumbent Vice-Governor of Eastern Samar,
was a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of that province prior to the 11
May 1992 elections. He was among those
charged before the Sandiganbayan, on 25
May 1992, with having violated Section 3(e)
of Republic Act No. 3019 in an information,
docketed Criminal Case No. 17756
On motion of the prosecution for the
suspension of the accused public officials
pendente lite, and finding that said accused
were charged under a valid information, the
Second Division of the Sandiganbayan
issued a resolution, dated 26 July 1993
suspending from their respective public
positions, or from any other public office
that they may be holding, the same to
commence upon their receipt hereof and for
a period of ninety (90) days thereafter
Issue:

I. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION IF

EXECUTED WOULD CONSTITUTE AN
AFFRONT ON PETITIONER('S)
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE
PROCESS.
II. THE ORDER OF SUSPENSION ONCE
IMPLEMENTED WOULD AMOUNT TO
AN ASSAULT OF THE SACRED
COVENANT REPOSED ON PETITIONER
VICE-GOVERNOR, MARCELINO C.
LIBANAN BY THE PEOPLE OF
EASTERN SAMAR.
III. THE REASONS SOUGHT TO BE
PREVENTED BY THE SUSPENSION
ORDER PENDENTE LITE NO LONGER
EXIST.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
The amendatory provision of Section 13,
Republic Act No. 3019, here applicable,
provides:
"Sec. 13. Suspension and Loss of Benefits.
Any incumbent public officer against
whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under
title 7, book II of the Revised Penal Code or
for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense
and in whatever stage of execution and
mode of participation, is pending in court,
shall be suspended from office. . . ."
In Deloso vs. Sandiganbayan, 3 this Court
rejected a similar argument advanced by
Governor Deloso who, at the time of
issuance of the suspension order, was
already occupying the office of governor

and not the position of municipal mayor that

he held previously when charged with
having violated the Anti-Graft Law.
Prior to Deloso, in Bayot vs.Sandiganbayan,
the suspension of then Cavite mayor Bayot
was also sustained even as he was charged
for acts committed as a government auditor
of the Commission on Audit. In both
instances, this Court ruled that the term
"office" used in the law could apply to any
office which the officer charged might
currently be holding and not necessarily the
particular office under which he was
charged.
Obviously, the suspension order cannot
amount to a deprivation of property without
due process of law. Public office is "a public
agency or trust," and it is not the property
envisioned by the Constitutional provision
which petitioner invokes.
Libanan's second contention neither holds
water. His so-called "covenant" with the
people of Eastern Samar is far from being
synonymous to, or the equivalent of, license,
and it is not one that can cut athwart the long
arm of the law. In Oliveros vs. Villaluz, 7 we
have said:
"Since the criminal prosecution against
petitioner-accused is concededly not abated
by the fact of his reelection, the pendency of
such criminal case under a valid
information under Republic Act 3019 may
clearly be and supplies the legal basis for
his suspension from office in a subsequent
term in the event of his reelection by virtue
of the provisions of Section 13 of the Act."

The third assigned error raised by petitioner

need not be delved into. When the statute is
clear and explicit, there is hardly room for
any extended court ratiocination or
rationalization of the law. Republic Act No.
3019 unequivocally mandates the
suspension of a public official from office
pending a criminal prosecution against him.
This Court has repeatedly held that such
preventive suspension is mandatory, 8 and
there are no "ifs" and "buts" about it.
NOT DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
RATIONALE THEREFOR. Obviously,
the suspension order cannot amount to a
deprivation of property without due process
of law. Public office is "a public agency or
trust," and it is not the property envisioned
by the Constitutional provision which
petitioner invokes.
LEGAL BASIS FOR SUSPENSION FROM
OFFICE IN SUBSEQUENT TERM.
Petitioner's so-called "covenant" with the
people of Eastern Samar is far from being
synonymous to, or the equivalent of, license,
and it is not one that can cut athwart the long
arm of the law. In Oliveros vs. Villaluz, (57
SCRA 163) we have said: "Since the
criminal prosecution against petitioneraccused is concededly not abated by the fact
of his reelection, the pendency of such
criminal case under a valid information
under Republic Act 3019 may clearly be and
supplies the legal basis for his suspension
from office in a subsequent term in the event
of his reelection by virtue of the provisions
of section 13 of the Act."

IMPOSITION THEREOF MANDATORY.

When the statute is clear and explicit,
there is hardly room for any extended court
ratiocination or rationalization of the law.
Republic Act No. 3019 unequivocally
mandates the suspension of a public official
from office pending a criminal prosecution
against him. This Court has repeatedly held
that such preventive suspension is
mandatory, and there are no "ifs" and "buts"
about it.
Lim v CA
Facts: On December 7, 1992 Bistro filed
before the trial court a petition 5 for
mandamus and prohibition, with prayer for
temporary restraining order or writ of
preliminary injunction, against Lim in his
capacity as Mayor of the City of Manila.
Bistro filed the case because policemen
under Lim's instructions inspected and
investigated Bistro's license as well as the
work permits and health certificates of its
staff. This caused the stoppage of work in
Bistro's night club and restaurant operations.
6 Lim also refused to accept Bistro's
application for a business license, as well as
the work permit applications of Bistro's
staff, for the year 1993
In its petition, Bistro argued that Lim's
refusal to issue the business license and
work permits violated the doctrine laid down
this Court in De la Cruz vs. Paras,
"Municipal corporations cannot prohibit the
operation of nightclubs. They may be

regulated, but not prevented from carrying

on their business."
Acting on Bistro's application for injunctive
relief, the trial court issued the first assailed
temporary restraining order on December
29, 1992 mandating the petitioner to refrain
from inspecting or inferring in Bistros
establishment.
However, despite the trial court's order, Lim
still issued a closure order on Bistro's
operations effective January 23, 1993, even
sending policemen to carry out his closure
order.

Article II of the Revised Charter of the City

of Manila and in Section 455, paragraph 3
(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991.
The trial court denied Lim's motion to
dissolve the injunction and to dismiss the
case in an order dated March 2, 1993,
On March 10, 1993, Lim filed with the
Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against Bistro
and Judge Wilfredo Reyes. Lim claimed that
the trial judge committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
in issuing the writ of prohibitory preliminary
injunction.

On January 25, 1993, Bistro filed an "Urgent

Motion for Contempt" against Lim and the
policemen who stopped Bistro's operations
on January 23, 1993. At the hearing of the
motion for contempt on January 29, 1993,
Bistro withdrew its motion on condition that
Lim would respect the court's injunction.

On March 25, 1993, the Court of Appeals

rendered the assailed decision. 12 In a
resolution dated July 13, 1993, the Court of
Appeals denied Lim's motion for
reconsideration.

However, on February 12, 13, 15, 26 and 27,

and on March 1 and 2, 1993, Lim, acting
through his agents and policemen, again
disrupted Bistro's business operations.

On July 1, 1993, Manila City Ordinance No.

7783 14 took effect. On the same day, Lim
ordered the Western Police District
Command to permanently close down the
operations of Bistro, which order the police
implemented at once

Meanwhile, on February 17, 1993, Lim filed

a motion to dissolve the injunctive order of
January 20, 1993 and to dismiss the case.
Lim insisted that the power of a mayor to
inspect and investigate commercial
establishments and their staff is implicit in
the statutory power of the city mayor to
issue, suspend or revoke business permits
and licenses. This statutory power is
expressly provided for in Section 11 (1),

2. "DID RESPONDENT COURT OF

APPEALS COMMIT REVERSIBLE
ERRORS IN RENDERING ITS
ASSAILED DECISION OF MARCH 25,
1993 AND ITS ASSAILED RESOLUTION
OF JULY 13, 1993?"
3. "DID SAID CIVIL CASE NO. 92-63712
AND SAID CA-G.R. SP NO. 30381
BECOME MOOT AND ACADEMIC
WHEN THE NEW BANGKOK CLUB
AND THE EXOTIC GARDEN
RESTAURANT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT WERE CLOSED ON JULY
1, 1993 PURSUANT TO ORDINANCE
NO. 7783?"
Ruling: The petition is denied.

Issue: 1. "DID RESPONDENT JUDGE

COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING HIS SAID ASSAILED ORDERS
OF DECEMBER 29, 1992, JANUARY 20,
1993 AND MARCH 2, 1993?"

Considering that the constitutionality of

Ordinance No. 7783 was not raised before
the trial court or the Court of Appeals, and
this issue is still under litigation in another
case, 17 the Court will deal only with the
first two issues raised by petitioner.
Validity of the Preliminary Injunction
Bistro's cause of action in the mandamus
and prohibition proceedings before the trial
court is the violation of its property right
under its license to operate. The violation
consists of the work disruption in Bistro's
operations caused by Lim and his
subordinates as well as Lim's refusal to issue
a business license to Bistro and work
permits to its staff for the year 1993. The
primary relief prayed for by Bistro is the
issuance of writs of mandatory and
prohibitory injunction. The mandatory

injunction seeks to compel Lim to accept

Bistro's 1993 business license application
and to issue Bistro's business license. Also,
the mandatory injunction seeks to compel
Lim to accept the applications of Bistro's
staff for work permits. The writ of
prohibitory injunction seeks to enjoin Lim
from interfering, impeding or otherwise
closing down Bistro's operations.
The trial court granted only the prohibitory
injunction. This enjoined Lim from
interfering, impeding or otherwise closing
down Bistro's operations pending resolution
of whether Lim can validly refuse to issue
Bistro's business license and its staffs work
permits for the year 1993.
On the other hand, Bistro asserts that the
legal provisions relied upon by Lim do not
apply to the instant case. Bistro maintains
that the Local Government Code and the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila do not
expressly or impliedly grant Lim any power
to prohibit the operation of night clubs. Lim
failed to specify any violation by Bistro of
the conditions of its licenses and permits. In
refusing to accept Bistro's business license
application for the year 1993, Bistro claims
that Lim denied Bistro due process of law.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the prohibitory preliminary
injunction.
We uphold the findings of the Court of
Appeals.

From the language of the two laws, it is

clear that the power of the mayor to issue
business licenses and permits necessarily
includes the corollary power to suspend,
revoke or even refuse to issue the same.
However, the power to suspend or revoke
these licenses and permits is expressly
premised on the violation of the conditions
of these permits and licenses. The laws
specifically refer to the "violation of the
condition(s)" on which the licenses and
permits were issued. Similarly, the power to
refuse to issue such licenses and permits is
premised on non-compliance with the
prerequisites for the issuance of such
licenses and permits. The mayor must
observe due process in exercising these
powers, which means that the mayor must
give the applicant or licensee notice and
opportunity to be heard.
True, the mayor has the power to inspect and
investigate private commercial
establishments for any violation of the
conditions of their licenses and permits.
However, the mayor has no power to order a
police raid on these establishments in the
guise of inspecting or investigating these
commercial establishments. Lim acted
beyond his authority when he directed
policemen to raid the New Bangkok Club
and the Exotic Garden Restaurant. Such act
of Lim violated Ordinance No. 7716 18
which expressly prohibits police raids and
inspections,
"Section 1. No member of the Western
Police District shall conduct inspection of
food and other business establishments for

the purpose of enforcing sanitary rules and

regulations, inspecting licenses and permits,
and/or enforcing internal revenue and
customs laws and regulations. This
responsibility should be properly exercised
by Local Government Authorities and other
concerned agencies."
These local government officials include the
City Health Officer or his representative,
pursuant to the Revised City Ordinances of
the City of Manila, 19 and the City
Treasurer pursuant to Section 470 of the
Local Government Code.
Lim has no authority to close down Bistro's
business or any business establishment in
Manila without due process of law. Lim
cannot take refuge under the Revised
Charter of the City of Manila and the Local
Government Code. There is no provision in
these laws expressly or impliedly granting
the mayor authority to close down private
commercial establishments without notice
and hearing, and even if there is, such
provision would be void. The due process
clause of the Constitution requires that Lim
should have given Bistro an opportunity to
rebut the allegations that it violated the
conditions of its licenses and permits.
The regulatory powers granted to municipal
corporations must always be exercised in
accordance with law, with utmost
observance of the rights of the people to due
process and equal protection of the law. 21
Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically. In
the instant case, we find that Lim's exercise

of this power violated Bistro's property

rights that are protected under the due
process clause of the Constitution.
Lim did not charge Bistro with any specific
violation of the conditions of its business
license or permits. Still, Lim closed down
Bistro's operations even before the
expiration of its business license on
December 31, 1992. Lim also refused to
accept Bistro's license application for 1993,
in effect denying the application without
examining whether it complies with legal
prerequisites.
Lim's zeal in his campaign against
prostitution is commendable. The
presumption is that he acted in good faith
and was motivated by his concern for his
constituents when he implemented his
campaign against prostitution in the ErmitaMalate area. However, there is no excusing
Lim for arbitrarily closing down, without
due process of law, the business operations
of Bistro. For this reason, the trial court
properly restrained the acts of Lim
Marohombsar v Adiong
Facts: This is a complaint filed against
Judge Santos B. Adiong of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Marawi City, Lanao
del Sur, charging him with gross ignorance
of law, abuse of discretion and conduct
unbecoming of a judge in connection with
his issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and a preliminary restraining order in
Civil Case No. 1670-99
Complainant Marohombsar was the
defendant in Civil Case No. 1670-99 for

"injunction with prayer for preliminary

injunction." The case was filed on March 17,
1999 by Yasmira Pangadapun, daughter of
Judge Yusoph Pangadapun of RTC Branch
10, Marawi City. In the said complaint,
Pangadapun questioned the legality of
Marohombsar's appointment by DSWD
Regional Secretary Salic-Malna as
provincial social welfare officer V of the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development Autonomous Region for
Muslim Mindanao (DSWD-ARMM). Prior
to Marohombsar's appointment, Pangadapun
used to occupy said position as officer-incharge.
Upon the filing of the said complaint,
respondent judge issued a TRO and set the
hearing on the application for the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction on April
6, 1999. Summons, together with a copy of
the complaint and a notice indicating that a
preliminary conference would be held on
March 22, 1999, was also served on both
parties.
During the hearing on the application for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
on April 5, 1999, none of the lawyers
appeared. Hence, respondent considered it
submitted for resolution and issued the
preliminary injunction the following day.
In his partial Comment dated November 13,
2000, respondent denied that: (1) he issued
the TRO in favor of Pangadapun without
benefit of a hearing; (2) in his order dated
March 22, 1999, he made it appear that a
preliminary conference was held where the
parties agreed to waive the raffle of the case,

when in fact there was none; (3) he falsified

the records of the case and (4) he granted the
preliminary injunction without a hearing. He
alleged that the complaint was purely a
harassment case filed by a disgruntled party
because of the latter's failure to obtain a
favorable resolution from him. Although
respondent judge admitted that Judge
Yusoph Pangadapun and Judge Abdulhakim
Ibrahim were his distant relatives and
townmates, he stressed that "never in our
careers in the judiciary have we interfered
nor influenced one another on any pending
case before our courts."
During the preliminary hearing of the
complaint on April 18, 2002 before Justice
Labitoria, the parties agreed to have the case
decided based on the pleadings presented.
Respondent submitted the following
additional evidence and exhibits to
strengthen his case:
a) partial Comment on the Complainant's
Affidavit-Complaint;
b) 2nd Indorsement dated December 11,
2000 in OCA IPI No. 00929-RTJ executed
by Judge Abdulhakim A.R. Ibrahim showing
that the complainant likewise filed an
administrative case against him involving
the same parties and cause of action, and
c) Supreme Court resolution dated
September 11, 2001 dismissing the
administrative case against Judge Ibrahim.
On the other hand, complainant filed her
"comment/objection to respondent's formal
offer of exhibits" on the ground that all the

documents were irrelevant and immaterial to

the instant case.
In his final report and recommendation,
Justice Labitoria recommended that
respondent judge be absolved of all the
charges against him.
We find the recommendation of Justice
Labitoria to be supported by the evidence
and we approve the same.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
Respondent judge was justified in issuing
the TRO ex parte due to his assessment of
the urgency of the relief sought. Rule 58,
Section 5 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure
Complainant also contends that respondent
issued an order dated March 22, 1999
making it appear that a preliminary
conference was held and the parties agreed
to waive the raffle of the case when, in truth
and in fact, no conference was held.
We are not persuaded. The order of March.
22, 1999 stated in part:
In the preliminary conference scheduled this
morning, counsels of both parties jointly
agreed to waive the raffling of the case and
for this court to continue further
proceedings considering that the plaintiff is
the daughter of Hon. Yusoph Pangadapun,
Presiding Judge of RTC-Branch 10 and per
manifestation of Atty. Tingcap Mortaba,
counsel for the plaintiff, should the case be

raffled to Branch 9, the Presiding Judge,

Hon. Amer R. Ibrahim will voluntarily
inhibit himself from hearing the case.
In the summary hearing that followed for
the purpose of determining whether the TRO
previously issued on March 17, 1999 shall
be extended or not, the counsels is (sic)
submitting the same for resolution on the
basis of the pleading.
We agree with the finding of Justice
Labitoria who accepted respondent judge's
explanation:
Because of the many number of cases
calendared daily and other related works
being attended to, all this paper works take
a little time to finish until finally attach (sic)
to the records of the cases. This explains the
little delay sometimes in sewing or attaching
some orders or other Court processes to the
records. All of this is always under the strict
and direct supervision of the Branch Clerk
of Court
Finally, complainant's assertion that she was
denied due process because the preliminary
injunction was issued without hearing is
likewise untenable
Finally, complainant's assertion that she was
denied due process because the preliminary
injunction was issued without hearing is
likewise untenable.
In applications for preliminary injunction,
the dual requirement of prior notice and
hearing before injunction may issue has
been relaxed to the point that not all
petitions for preliminary injunction need

undergo a trial-type hearing, it being

doctrinal that a formal or trial-type hearing
is not, at all times and in all instances,
essential to due process. 2 The essence of
due process is that a party is afforded a
reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
present any evidence he may have in support
of his defense. In the present case,
complainant was able to move for a
reconsideration of the order in question,
hence her right to due process was not in
anyway transgressed. We have ruled that a
party cannot claim that he has been denied
due process when he has availed of the
opportunity to present his position
Even assuming for the sake of argument that
respondent judge erred in ordering the
issuance of the writ of preliminary
injunction, we ruled in Equatorial Realty vs.
Anunciacion, Jr. 4 that, as a matter of public
policy, the acts of a judge in his official
capacity are not subject to disciplinary
action even though such acts are erroneous,
provided he acts in good faith and without
malice. Respondent judge, or any other
member of the bench for that matter, is
presumed to have acted regularly and in the
manner that preserves the ideal of the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge implicit in
the guarantee of due process.
USA v Purganan
Facts: Pursuant to the existing RP-US
Extradition Treaty, 6 the United States
Government, through diplomatic channels,
sent to the Philippine Government Note
Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999,
supplemented by Note Nos. 0597, 0720 and

0809 and accompanied by duly

authenticated documents requesting the
extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known
as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of
the Notes and documents, the secretary of
foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the
secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate
action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1069, also known as the
Extradition Law.

Finding no more legal obstacle, the

Government of the United States of
America, represented by the Philippine DOJ,
filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the
appropriate Petition for Extradition

Upon learning of the request for his

extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted
a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) by
the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. 7 The TRO
prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ)
from filing with the RTC a petition for his
extradition. The validity of the TRO was,
however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition
before this Court in the said GR No. 139465.
Initially, the Court by a vote of 9-6
dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered
to furnish private respondent copies of the
extradition request and its supporting papers
and to grant the latter a reasonable period
within which to file a comment and
supporting evidence

The warrant had been issued in connection

with the following charges1) conspiracy to
defraud the United States and to commit
certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US
Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in
violation of Title 26 US Code Section 7201;
(3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US
Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violation of Title 18 US Code
Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal
campaign contributions, in violation of Title
2 US Code Sections 441b, 441f and 437g(d)
and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to
prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition
prayed for the issuance of an order for his
"immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of
PD No. 1069.

Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration

filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its
October 17, 2000 Resolution. 9 By an
identical vote of 9-6 after three justices
changed their votes it reconsidered and
reversed its earlier Decision. It held that
private respondent was bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. This
Resolution has become final and executory.

The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez

was the subject of an arrest warrant issued
by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida

In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC

granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the
case for hearing on June 5, 2001. In that
hearing, petitioner manifested its
reservations on the procedure adopted by the
trial court allowing the accused in an
extradition case to be heard prior to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest.

After the hearing, the court a quo required

the parties to submit their respective
memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez
sought an alternative prayer: that in case a
warrant should issue, he be allowed to post
bail in the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also
set for hearing on June 15, 2001. Thereafter,
the court below issued its questioned July 3,
2001 Order, directing the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his
temporary liberty at one million pesos in
cash. 11 After he had surrendered his
passport and posted the required cash bond,
Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via
the challenged Order dated July 4, 2001
Hence, this Petition
Issue:
(1) whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and
hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be
issued,
(2) whether he is entitled to bail and to
provisional liberty while the extradition
proceedings are pending. Preliminarily, we
shall take up the alleged prematurity of the
Petition for Certiorari arising from
petitioner's failure to file a Motion for
Reconsideration in the RTC and to seek
relief in the Court of Appeals (CA), instead
of in this Court.
Ruling: The petition is granted.
Preliminary Matters Alleged Prematurity of
Present Petition

Petitioner submits the following

justifications for not filing a Motion for
Reconsideration in the Extradition Court:
"(1) the issues were fully considered by such
court after requiring the parties to submit
their respective memoranda and position
papers on the matter and thus, the filing of a
reconsideration motion would serve no
useful purpose; (2) the assailed orders are a
patent nullity, absent factual and legal basis
therefor; and (3) the need for relief is
extremely urgent, as the passage of
sufficient time would give Jimenez ample
opportunity to escape and avoid extradition;
and (4) the issues raised are purely of law."
For resorting directly to this Court instead of
the CA, petitioner submits the following
reasons: "(1) even if the petition is lodged
with the Court of Appeals and such appellate
court takes cognizance of the issues and
decides them, the parties would still bring
the matter to this Honorable Court to have
the issues resolved once and for all [and] to
have a binding precedent that all lower
courts ought to follow; (2) the Honorable
Court of Appeals had in one case 17 ruled
on the issue by disallowing bail but, the
court below refused to recognize the
decision as a judicial guide and all other
courts might likewise adopt the same
attitude of refusal; and (3) there are pending
issues on bail both in the extradition courts
and the Court of Appeals, which, unless
guided by the decision that this Honorable
Court will render in this case, would resolve
to grant bail in favor of the potential
extraditees and would give them opportunity
to flee and, thus, cause adverse effect on the

ability of the Philippines to comply with its

obligations under existing extradition
treaties."
As a general rule, a petition for certiorari
before a higher court will not prosper unless
the inferior court has been given, through a
motion for reconsideration, a chance to
correct the errors imputed to it. This rule,
though, has certain exceptions: (1) when the
issue raised is purely of law, (2) when public
interest is involved, or (3) in case of urgency
As a fourth exception, the Court has also
ruled that the filing of a motion for
reconsideration before availment of the
remedy of certiorari is not a sine qua non,
when the questions raised are the same as
those that have already been squarely argued
and exhaustively passed upon by the lower
court. 20 Aside from being of this nature, the
issues in the present case also involve pure
questions of law that are of public interest.
Hence, a motion for reconsideration may be
dispensed with.

First, extradition treaties are entered into for

the purpose of suppressing crime by
facilitating the arrest and the custodial
transfer of a fugitive 29 from one state to the
other.
2 . The Requesting State Will Accord Due
Process to the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes
that both parties thereto have examined, and
that both accept and trust, each other's legal
system and judicial process. More pointedly,
our duly authorized representative's
signature on an extradition treaty signifies
our confidence in the capacity and the
willingness of the other state to protect the
basic rights of the person sought to be
extradited. 35 That signature signifies our
full faith that the accused will be given,
upon extradition to the requesting state, all
relevant and basic rights in the criminal
proceedings that will take place therein;
otherwise, the treaty would not have been
signed, or would have been directly attacked
for its unconstitutionality.

Five Postulates of Extradition

The Proceedings Are Sui Generis
A cardinal rule in the interpretation of a
treaty or a law is to ascertain and give effect
to its intent. 25 Since PD 1069 is intended as
a guide for the implementation of extradition
treaties to which the Philippines is a
signatory, 26 understanding certain
postulates of extradition will aid us in
properly deciding the issues raised here.
1 . Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the
Suppression of Crime.

Third, as pointed out in Secretary of Justice

v. Lantion
An extradition [proceeding] is sui generis. It
is not a criminal proceeding which will call
into operation all the rights of an accused
as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin
with, the process of extradition does not
involve the determination of the guilt or
innocence of an accused. His guilt or

innocence will be adjudged in the court of

the state where he will be extradited. Hence,
as a rule, constitutional rights that are only
relevant to determine the guilt or innocence
of an accused cannot be invoked by an
extraditee . . . .
"There are other differences between an
extradition proceeding and a criminal
proceeding. An extradition proceeding is
summary in nature while criminal
proceedings involve a full-blown trial. In
contradistinction to a criminal proceeding,
the rules of evidence in an extradition
proceeding allow admission of evidence
under less stringent standards. In terms of
the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a
criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a
fugitive may be ordered extradited 'upon
showing of the existence of a prima facie
case.' Finally, unlike in a criminal case
where judgment becomes executory upon
being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an
individual extraditable but the President has
the final discretion to extradite him. The
United States adheres to a similar practice
whereby the Secretary of State exercises
wide discretion in balancing the equities of
the case and the demands of the nation's
foreign relations before making the ultimate
decision to extradite."
Given the foregoing, it is evident that the
extradition court is not called upon to
ascertain the guilt or the innocence of the
person sought to be extradited.Such
determination during the extradition

proceedings will only result in needless

duplication and delay. Extradition is merely
a measure of international judicial assistance
through which a person charged with or
convicted of a crime is restored to a
jurisdiction with the best claim to try that
person. It is not part of the function of the
assisting authorities to enter into questions
that are the prerogative of that jurisdiction.
38 The ultimate purpose of extradition
proceedings in court is only to determine
whether the extradition request complies
with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the
person sought is extraditable
4 . Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branch of government
voluntarily entered into the Extradition
Treaty, and our legislative branch ratified it.
Hence, the Treaty carries the presumption
that its implementation will serve the
national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations under the
Extradition Treaty promotes comity 40 with
the requesting state. On the other hand,
failure to fulfill our obligations thereunder
paints a bad image of our country before the
world community. Such failure would
discourage other states from entering into
treaties with us, particularly an extradition
treaty that hinges on reciprocity.
Verily, we are bound by pacta sunt servanda
to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty. 42 This principle requires
that we deliver the accused to the requesting
country if the conditions precedent to

extradition, as set forth in the Treaty, are

satisfied. In other words, "[t]he demanding
government, where it has done all that the
treaty and the law require it to do, is entitled
to the delivery of the accused on the issue of
the proper warrant, and the other
government is under obligation to make the
surrender." 43 Accordingly, the Philippines
must be ready and in a position to deliver
the accused, should it be found proper.
There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight
Fifth, persons to be extradited are presumed
to be flight risks. This prima facie
presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience of the executive branch: nothing
short of confinement can ensure that the
accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their
extradition to the requesting state.
The present extradition case further
validates the premise that persons sought to
be extradited have a propensity to flee.
Indeed, extradition hearings would not even
begin, if only the accused were willing to
submit to trial in the requesting country. 45
Prior acts of herein respondent (1)
leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings
there; and (2) remaining in the requested
state despite learning that the requesting
state is seeking his return and that the crimes
he is charged with are bailable eloquently
speak of his aversion to the processes in the
requesting state, as well as his predisposition
to avoid them at all cost

First Substantive Issue: Is Respondent

Entitled to Notice and Hearing Before the
Issuance of a Warrant of Arrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedure
adopted by the RTC informing the
accused, a fugitive from justice, that an
Extradition Petition has been filed against
him, and that petitioner is seeking his arrest
gives him notice to escape and to avoid
extradition. Moreover, petitioner pleads that
such procedure may set a dangerous
precedent, in that those sought to be
extradited including terrorists, mass
murderers and war criminals may invoke
it in future extradition cases
On the other hand, Respondent Jimenez
argues that he should not be hurriedly and
arbitrarily deprived of his constitutional
right to liberty without due process. He
further asserts that there is as yet no specific
law or rule setting forth the procedure prior
to the issuance of a warrant of arrest, after
the petition for extradition has been filed in
court; ergo, the formulation of that
procedure is within the discretion of the
presiding judge.
Does this provision sanction RTC Judge
Purganan's act of immediately setting for
hearing the issuance of a warrant of arrest?
It is significant to note that Section 6 of PD
1069, our Extradition Law, uses the word
"immediate" to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be
rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing

entails sending notices to the opposing

parties, 46 receiving facts and arguments
47from them, 48 and giving them time to
prepare and present such facts and
arguments. Arrest subsequent to a hearing
can no longer be considered "immediate."
The law could not have intended the word as
a mere superfluity but, on the whole, as a
means of imparting a sense of urgency and
swiftness in the determination of whether a
warrant of arrest should be issued.
By using the phrase "if it appears,"' the law
further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage. The
trial court is not expected to make an
exhaustive determination to ferret out the
true and actual situation, immediately upon
the filing of the petition. From the
knowledge and the material then available to
it, the court is expected merely to get a good
first impression a prima facie finding
sufficient to make a speedy initial
determination as regards the arrest and
detention of the accused.
It is evident that respondent judge could
have already gotten an impression from
these records adequate for him to make an
initial determination of whether the accused
was someone who should immediately be
arrested in order to "best serve the ends of
justice." He could have determined whether
such facts and circumstances existed as
would lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent person to believe that the extradition
request was prima facie meritorious. In point
of fact, he actually concluded from these
supporting documents that "probable cause"
did exist. In the second questioned Order

We stress that the prima facie existence of

probable cause for hearing the petition and,
a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant was
already evident from the Petition itself and
its supporting documents. Hence, after
having already determined therefrom that a
prima facie finding did exist, respondent
judge gravely abused his discretion when he
set the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez.
Moreover, the law specifies that the court
sets a hearing upon receipt of the answer or
upon failure of the accused to answer after
receiving the summons. In connection with
the matter of immediate arrest, however, the
word "hearing" is notably absent from the
provision. Evidently, had the holding of a
hearing at that stage been intended, the law
could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary 52 in nature.
Hence, the silence of the Law and the Treaty
leans to the more reasonable interpretation
that there is no intention to punctuate with a
hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings.
On the Basis of the Constitution
Even Section 2 of Article III of our
Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez,
does not require a notice or a hearing before
the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
To determine probable cause for the
issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution
itself requires only the examination under
oath or affirmation of complainants and

the witnesses they may produce. There is no

requirement to notify and hear the accused
before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In the present case, validating the act of
respondent judge and instituting the practice
of hearing the accused and his witnesses at
this early stage would be discordant with the
rationale for the entire system. If the accused
were allowed to be heard and necessarily to
present evidence during the prima facie
determination for the issuance of a warrant
of arrest, what would stop him from
presenting his entire plethora of defenses at
this stage if he so desires in his effort
to negate a prima facie finding? Such a
procedure could convert the determination
of a prima facie case into a full-blown trial
of the entire proceedings and possibly make
trial of the main case superfluous
That the case under consideration is an
extradition and not a criminal action is not
sufficient to justify the adoption of a set of
procedures more protective of the accused.
If a different procedure were called for at
all, a more restrictive one not the
opposite would be justified in view of
respondent's demonstrated predisposition to
flee.
Second Substantive Issue: Is Respondent
Entitled to Bail?
Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is
worded as follows:
"Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is

strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable

by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ ofhabeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required."
Respondent Mark B. Jimenez maintains that
this constitutional provision secures the right
to bail of all persons, including those sought
to be extradited. Supposedly, the only
exceptions are the ones charged with
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua,
when evidence of guilt is strong. He also
alleges the relevance to the present case of
Section 4 59 of Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court which, insofar as practicable and
consistent with the summary nature of
extradition proceedings, shall also apply
according to Section 9 of PD 1069.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that
there is no provision in the Philippine
Constitution granting the right to bail to a
person who is the subject of an extradition
request and arrest warrant
Extradition Different from Ordinary
Criminal Proceedings
We agree with petitioner. As suggested by
the use of the word "conviction," the
constitutional provision on bail quoted
above, as well as Section 4 of Rule 114 of
the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for
violation of Philippine criminal laws. It does
not apply to extradition proceedings,

because extradition courts do not render

judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail
"flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be
subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter
he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It
follows that the constitutional provision on
bail will not apply to a case like extradition,
where the presumption of innocence is not at
issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating that
the "right to bail shall not be impaired even
when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended" does not detract from
the rule that the constitutional right to bail is
available only in criminal proceedings. It
must be noted that the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus finds
application "only to persons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in
or directly connected with invasion." 61
Hence, the second sentence in the
constitutional provision on bail merely
emphasizes the right to bail in criminal
proceedings for the aforementioned
offenses. It cannot be taken to mean that the
right is available even in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is
sought to be extradited are bailable in the
United States is not an argument to grant
him one in the present case. To stress,
extradition proceedings are separate and
distinct from the trial for the offenses for

which he is charged. He should apply for

bail before the courts trying the criminal
cases against him, not before the extradition
court.
No Violation of Due Process
Respondent Jimenez cites the foreign case
Paretti 62 in arguing that, constitutionally,
"[n]o one shall be deprived of . . . liberty . . .
without due process of law."
Contrary to his contention, his detention
prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation
of his right to due process. We iterate
the familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard 63
but, at the same time, point out that the
doctrine does not always call for a prior
opportunity to be heard. 64 Where the
circumstances such as those present in an
extradition case call for it, a subsequent
opportunity to be heard is enough. 65 In the
present case, respondent will be given full
opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Hence, there is no violation of
his right to due process and fundamental
fairness.
Contrary to the contention of Jimenez, we
find no arbitrariness, either, in the
immediate deprivation of his liberty prior to
his being heard. That his arrest and detention
will not be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured
by (1) the DOJ's filing in court the Petition
with its supporting documents after a
determination that the extradition request

meets the requirements of the law and the

relevant treaty; (2) the extradition judge's
independent prima facie determination that
his arrest will best serve the ends of justice
before the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is
under the court's custody, to apply for bail as
an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting that before the US
government requested the extradition of
respondent, proceedings had already been
conducted in that country. But because he
left the jurisdiction of the requesting state
before those proceedings could be
completed, it was hindered from continuing
with the due processes prescribed under its
laws. His invocation of due process now has
thus become hollow. He already had that
opportunity in the requesting state; yet,
instead of taking it, he ran away.
The denial of bail as a matter of course in
extradition cases falls into place with and
gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since
this practice would encourage the accused to
voluntarily surrender to the requesting state
to cut short their detention here. Likewise,
their detention pending the resolution of
extradition proceedings would fall into place
with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on
the summary nature of extradition cases and
the need for their speedy disposition.

placed under the custody of the law, bail

may be applied for and granted as an
exception, only upon a clear and convincing
showing (1) that, once granted bail, the
applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling
circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court
in the requesting state when it grants
provisional liberty in extradition cases
therein.
Since this exception has no express or
specific statutory basis, and since it is
derived essentially from general principles
of justice and fairness, the applicant bears
the burden of proving the above two-tiered
requirement with clarity, precision and
emphatic forcefulness. The Court realizes
that extradition is basically an executive, not
a judicial, responsibility arising from the
presidential power to conduct foreign
relations. In its barest concept, it partakes of
the nature of police assistance amongst
states, which is not normally a judicial
prerogative.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that there
are special circumstances that are
compelling enough for the Court to grant his
request for provisional release on bail. We
have carefully examined these
circumstances and shall now discuss them

Exceptions to the "No Bail" Rule

Alleged Disenfranchisement
Accordingly and to best serve the ends of
justice, we believe and so hold that, after a
potential extraditee has been arrested or

While his extradition was pending,

Respondent Jimenez was elected as a

member of the House of Representatives.

On that basis, he claims that his detention
will disenfranchise his Manila district of
600,000 residents. We are not persuaded. In
People v. Jalosjos, the Court has already
debunked the disenfranchisement argument
It must be noted that even before private
respondent ran for and won a congressional
seat in Manila, it was already of public
knowledge that the United States was
requesting his extradition. Hence, his
constituents were or should have been
prepared for the consequences of the
extradition case against their representative,
including his detention pending the final
resolution of the case. Premises considered
and in line with Jalosjos, we are constrained
to rule against his claim that his election to
public office is by itself a compelling reason
to grant him bail.
Anticipated Delay
Respondent Jimenez further contends that
because the extradition proceedings are
lengthy, it would be unfair to confine him
during the pendency of the case. Again we
are not convinced. We must emphasize that
extradition cases are summary in nature.
They are resorted to merely to determine
whether the extradition petition and its
annexes conform to the Extradition Treaty,
not to determine guilt or innocence. Neither
is it, as a rule, intended to address issues
relevant to the constitutional rights available
to the accused in a criminal action.
Not a Flight Risk?

Jimenez further claims that he is not a flight

risk. To support this claim, he stresses that
he learned of the extradition request in June
1999; yet, he has not fled the country. True,
he has not actually fled during the
preliminary stages of the request for his
extradition. Yet, this fact cannot be taken to
mean that he will not flee as the process
moves forward to its conclusion, as he hears
the footsteps of the requesting government
inching closer and closer. That he has not
yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken
to mean that he will stand his ground and
still be within reach of our government if
and when it matters; that is, upon the
resolution of the Petition for Extradition
Brief Refutation of Dissents
The proposal to remand this case to the
extradition court, we believe, is totally
unnecessary; in fact, it is a cop-out. The
parties in particular, Respondent Jimenez
have been given more than sufficient
opportunity both by the trial court and this
Court to discuss fully and exhaustively
private respondent's claim to bail. As already
stated, the RTC set for hearing not only
petitioner's application for an arrest warrant,
but also private respondent's prayer for
temporary liberty. Thereafter required by the
RTC were memoranda on the arrest, then
position papers on the application for bail,
both of which were separately filed by the
parties.
A remand would mean that this long, tedious
process would be repeated in its entirety.
The trial court would again hear factual and

evidentiary matters. Be it noted, however,

that, in all his voluminous pleadings and
verbal propositions, private respondent has
not asked for a remand. Evidently, even he
realizes that there is absolutely no need to
rehear factual matters. Indeed, the
inadequacy lies not in the factual
presentation of Mr. Jimenez. Rather, it lies
in his legal arguments. Remanding the case
will not solve this utter lack of persuasion
and strength in his legal reasoning.
Thus, a remand will not serve any useful
purpose; it will only further delay these
already very delayed proceedings, 74 which
our Extradition Law requires to be summary
in character. What we need now is prudent
and deliberate speed, not unnecessary and
convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm
decision on the merits, not a circuitous copout.
POLITICAL LAW; INTERNATIONAL
LAW; EXTRADITION TREATY;
PERSONS TO BE EXTRADITED ARE
PRESUMED TO BE FLIGHT RISKS;
CASE AT BAR. Persons to be extradited
are presumed to be flight risks. This prima
facie presumption finds reinforcement in the
experience of the executive branch: nothing
short of confinement can ensure that the
accused will not flee the jurisdiction of the
requested state in order to thwart their
extradition to the requesting state. The
present extradition case further validates the
premise that persons sought to be extradited
have a propensity to flee. Indeed, extradition
hearings would not even begin, if only the
accused were willing to submit to trial in the

requesting country. Prior acts of herein

respondent (1) leaving the requesting
state right before the conclusion of his
indictment proceedings there; and (2)
remaining in the requested state despite
learning that the requesting state is seeking
his return and that the crimes he is charged
with are bailable eloquently speak of his
aversion to the processes in the requesting
state, as well as his predisposition to avoid
them at all cost: These circumstances point
to an ever-present, underlying high risk of
flight. He has demonstrated that he has the
capacity and the will to flee. Having fled
once, what is there to stop him, given
sufficient opportunity, from fleeing a second
time?
NEITHER TREATY NOR THE
EXTRADITION LAW REQUIRE A
HEARING BEFORE ISSUING A
WARRANT OF ARREST OF PROBABLE
EXTRADITEE; REASONS; CASE AT
BAR. It is significant to note that Section
6 of PD 1069, our Extradition Law, uses the
word "immediate" to qualify the arrest of the
accused. This qualification would be
rendered nugatory by setting for hearing the
issuance of the arrest warrant. Hearing
entails sending notices to the opposing
parties, receiving facts and arguments from
them, and giving them time to prepare and
present such facts and arguments. Arrest
subsequent to a hearing can no longer be
considered "immediate." The law could not
have intended the word as a mere superfluity
but, on the whole, as a means of imparting a
sense of urgency and swiftness in the
determination of whether a warrant of arrest

should be issued. By using the phrase "if it

appears," the law further conveys that
accuracy is not as important as speed at such
early stage. The trial court is not expected to
make an exhaustive determination to ferret
out the true and actual situation,
immediately upon the filing of the petition.
From the knowledge and the material then
available to it, the court is expected merely
to get a good first impression a prima
facie finding sufficient to make a speedy
initial determination as regards the arrest
and detention of the accused. Moreover, the
law specifies that the court sets a hearing
upon receipt of the answer or upon failure of
the accused to answer after receiving the
summons. In connection with the matter of
immediate arrest, however, the word
"hearing" is notably absent from the
provision. Evidently, had the holding of a
hearing at that stage been intended, the law
could have easily so provided. It also bears
emphasizing at this point that extradition
proceedings are summary in nature. Hence,
the silence of the Law and the Treaty leans
to the more reasonable interpretation that
there is no intention to punctuate with a
hearing every little step in the entire
proceedings
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW; RIGHTS OF AN ACCUSED;
NOTICE AND HEARING NOT
REQUIRED BEFORE ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT OF ARREST. Even Section
2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is
invoked by Jimenez, does not require a
notice or a hearing before the issuance of a
warrant of arrest. To determine probable

cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the

Constitution itself requires only the
examination under oath or affirmation
of complainants and thewitnesses they may
produce. There is no requirement to notify
and hear the accused before the issuance of
warrants of arrest.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; RIGHTS OF
AN ACCUSED; RIGHT TO BAIL;
APPLIES ONLY TO ORDINARY
CRIMINAL CASES AND NOT TO
EXTRADITION PROCEEDINGS. As
suggested by the use of the word
"conviction," the constitutional provision on
bail quoted above, as well as Section 4 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only
when a person has been
arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition
courts do not render judgments of conviction
or acquittal. Moreover, the constitutional
right to bail "flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who
should not be subjected to the loss of
freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to
acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt." It follows that the
constitutional provision on bail will not
apply to a case like extradition, where the
presumption of innocence is not at issue.
EXCEPTION. The rule, we repeat, is that
bail is not a matter of right in extradition
cases. However, the judiciary has the
constitutional duty to curb grave abuse of
discretion and tyranny, as well as the power
to promulgate rules to protect and enforce

constitutional rights. Furthermore, we

believe that the right to due process is broad
enough to include the grant of basic fairness
to extraditees. Indeed, the right to due
process extends to the "life, liberty or
property" of everyperson. It is "dynamic and
resilient, adaptable to every situation calling
for its application." Accordingly and to best
serve the ends of justice, we believe and so
hold that, after a potential extraditee has
been arrested or placed under the custody of
the law, bail may be applied for and granted
as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing (1) that, once granted
bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or
a danger to the community; and (2) that
there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a
matter of reciprocity, those cited by the
highest court in the requesting state when it
grants provisional liberty in extradition
cases therein.
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS;
SUFFICIENCY OF A SUBSEQUENT
OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ONCE
EXTRADITEE IS PLACED UNDER THE
EXTRADITION COURT'S CUSTODY,
EXPLAINED; CASE AT BAR. Contrary
to the contention, of Jimenez his detention
prior to the conclusion of the extradition
proceedings does not amount to a violation
of his right to due process. We reiterate the
familiar doctrine that the essence of due
process is the opportunity to be heard but, at
the same time, point out that the doctrine
does not always call for a prior opportunity
to be heard. Where the circumstances
such

as those present in an extradition case

call for it, a subsequent opportunity to be
heard is enough. In the present case,
respondent will be given full opportunity to
be heard subsequently, when the extradition
court hears the Petition for Extradition.
Hence, there is no violation of his right to
due process and fundamental fairness.
Contrary to his contention, we find no
arbitrariness, either, in the immediate
deprivation of his liberty prior to his being
heard. That his arrest and detention will not
be arbitrary is sufficiently ensured by (1) the
DOJ's filing in court the Petition with its
supporting documents after a determination
that the extradition request meets the
requirements of the law and the relevant
treaty; (2) the extradition judge's
independent prima facie determination that
his arrest will best serve the ends of justice
before the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest; and (3) his opportunity, once he is
under the court's custody, to apply for bail as
an exception to the no-initial-bail rule.
Uy v Office of the Ombudsman
Facts: The Ombudsman filed on 4 April
2001 with the Sandiganbayan an
Information 5 charging former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, together with Jose
"Jinggoy" Estrada, Charlie "Atong" Ang,
Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma
Alfaro, Eleuterio Tan a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos
Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas,
John Does and Jane Does, with the crime of
Plunder, defined and penalized under
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7080, as amended
by Section 12 of R.A. NO. 7659. The
Ombudsman moved to amend the

Information twice initially, to introduce

changes in the Information (including a
change in the appellation of the accused
Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy to John Doe a.k.a. as Eleuterio Tan or
Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy), and
thereafter, to include Jaime C. Dichaves as
accused; the Sandiganbayan granted the
motions
The case, which originated from OMB-0-001720 (entitled National Bureau of
Investigation v. Luis "Chavit" Singson, et.
al.) and OMB-0-00-1756 (entitled Romeo T.
Capulong, et. al., v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada,
et. al.), was docketed in the Sandiganbayan
as Criminal (Crim.) Case
In the course of the proceedings, the
Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan
an Omnibus Motion dated 8 January 2002 8
seeking, among others, the issuance of a
warrant of arrest against Victor Jose Tan Uy
alias Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or
Mr. Uy. The Ombudsman alleged that no
warrant of arrest had been issued against the
accused John Doe who was designated in
the Information as Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy; and that, in order not
to frustrate the ends of justice, a warrant of
arrest should issue against him after he had
been identified to be also using the name
Victor Jose Tan Uy with address at 2041 M.
J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City. Allegedly, a
positive identification had been made
through photographs, as early as the Senate
Impeachment Trial against former President
Joseph Ejercito Estrada, that John Doe a.k.a.
Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.

Uy and VICTOR JOSE TAN UY are one

and the same person.
The Ombudsman further filed a
Manifestation and Motion dated 5 March
2002 9 asking for the manual insertion in the
Amended Information of the name
VICTOR JOSE TAN UY; it relied on
Section 7, Article 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
SEC. 7. Name of the accused. The
complaint or information must state the
name and surname of the accused or any
appellation or nickname by which he has
been or is known. If his name cannot be
ascertained, he must be described under a
fictitious name with a statement that his true
name is unknown.
If the true name of the accused is thereafter
disclosed by him or appears in some other
manner to the court, such true name shall
be inserted in the complaint or information
and record
The petitioner's response was a Petition to
Conduct Preliminary Investigation 10 filed
with the Ombudsman. The petitioner argued
that: (1) he was not subjected to a
preliminary investigation or to any previous
inquiry to determine the existence of
probable cause against him for the crime of
plunder or any other offense, as: (a) he was
not included as respondent in either of the
two Ombudsman cases bases of the
criminal proceeding; (b) neither his name
nor his address at No. 2041 M.J. Cuenco
Avenue, Cebu City was mentioned at any

stage of the preliminary investigation

conducted in the criminal cases; (c) the
preliminary investigation in the cases that
led to the filing of Crim. Case No. 26558
was conducted without notice to him and
without his participation; (d) he was not
served any subpoena, whether at his address
at No. 2041 M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City
or at any other address, for the purpose of
informing him of any complaint against him
for plunder or any other offense and for the
purpose of directing him to file his counteraffidavit;
(2) dictates of basic fairness and due process
of law require that petitioner be given the
opportunity to avail himself of the right to a
preliminary investigation since the offense
involved is non-bailable in character.
The petitioner additionally alleged that he
filed a complaint with the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City docketed as CEB-25990
against a certain Eleuterio Tan for maligning
him by using his picture, address, and other
personal circumstances without his consent
or authority, which acts led to his alleged
involvement in the tobacco excise tax
scandal. 11 He also claimed that he
personally visited then Senate President
Aquilino Pimentel at the height of the
impeachment trial to dispute his
identification as Eleuterio Tan; he then
expressed his willingness to testify before
the Impeachment Court and subsequently
wrote Senator Pimentel a letter about these
concerns. 12 He claimed further that he
submitted the signatures appearing on the
signature cards supposedly signed by

Eleuterio Tan and the two (2) company

identification cards supposedly presented by
the person who opened the Land Bank
account for examination by a handwriting
expert; the result of the handwriting
examination disclosed that the signatures
were not his
In a parallel Manifestation and Motion 14
dated 11 April 2002 filed with the
Sandiganbayan, the petitioner asked for the
suspension of the criminal proceedings
insofar as he is concerned; he likewise
moved for a preliminary investigation
The Ombudsman opposed 15 the petitioner's
Manifestation and Motion with a refutation
of the petitioner's various claims. Among
others, it claimed that it served, in the
preliminary investigation it conducted, the
subpoena at the purported address of
Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr.
Uy at Bagbaguin, Valenzuela City as
indicated in the complaint-affidavits. It
posited that it was the petitioner's fault that
his true name was not ascertained, the
petitioner having made clever moves to
make it difficult to identify him with his
nefarious deeds. It also argued that the
petitioner could not ask for any affirmative
relief from the Sandiganbayan which had
not acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner's
person.
The petitioner reiterated in his Reply to
Opposition 16 (filed with the
Sandiganbayan) the points he raised before
the Ombudsman. He additionally stressed
that: (1) the fundamental issue is whether or

not a preliminary investigation was

conducted with respect to him; as the
records show, he was
never subjected to any preliminary
investigation; (2) he was never given by the
prosecution the opportunity to prove in any
preliminary investigation that he is not
Eleuterio Tan; had he been given such
opportunity, petitioner would have shown
that he wasted no time and took immediate
steps to establish his innocence shortly after
the illegal use and submission of his photo
and usurpation of his identity surfaced at the
impeachment proceedings; (3) he timely
invoked his right to a preliminary
investigation, as motions or petitions for the
conduct of preliminary investigation may be
entertained by the Sandiganbayan even
before the movant or petitioner is brought
under its jurisdiction under the rule that any
objection to a warrant of arrest or procedure
in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused must be made
before plea; (4) while the invalidity of the
preliminary investigation does not affect the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, it should
however suspend the proceedings and
remand the case for the holding of a proper
preliminary investigation; and (5) a
preliminary investigation is imperative
because the offense involved is non-bailable.
The Ombudsman denied in an Order dated
10 May 2002 17 the petition for the conduct
of a preliminary investigation. It rejected the
petitioner's claims, reasoning out that the
petitioner's requested preliminary
investigation had long been terminated and
the resulting case had already been filed

with the Sandiganbayan in accordance with

the Rules of Criminal Procedure; hence, the
petitioner's remedy is to ventilate the issues
with the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan, on the other hand,
granted in a Resolution dated 19 June 2002
18 the petitioner's motion and directed the
Ombudsman to conduct a preliminary
investigation with respect to the petitioner. It
also held in abeyance until after the
conclusion of this preliminary investigation
action on the Ombudsman's motion to
amend the Information to insert the
petitioner's name and to issue a warrant for
his arrest
In compliance with the Sandiganbayan
Resolution, the Ombudsman issued an Order
19 requiring the petitioner to file his
counter-affidavit, the affidavits of his
witnesses, and other supporting documents
The Ombudsman thereafter issued an order
requiring the attendance of Rodenas and the
petitioner in a clarificatory hearing. 21 The
petitioner filed aManifestation and Motion,
arguing that considering the thrust of his
counter-affidavit, there is no need for a
hearing because there is nothing that would
require clarification as to matters stated in
his counter-affidavit and there is also no
point for a clarificatory hearing on the
complaints-affidavits given the patent want
of probable cause as against him. The
petitioner did not personally attend the
clarificatory hearing. Rodenas did not also
show up. The petitioner then filed a Motion
to Resolve the case.

At this point, the Ombudsman issued the

first of the orders assailed in the present
petition; it found probable cause to charge
the petitioner before the Sandiganbayan. The
basis for the finding runs:
It has to be emphasized that during the
investigation conducted by the Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB), this Office,
and referred to on page 2 of the Resolution
of the Sandiganbayan dated June 19, 2002,
granting the motion for preliminary
investigation of respondent Victor Jose Tan
Uy, Ma. Caridad Manahan-Rodenas of the
Land Bank of the Philippines identified the
picture bearing the name Victor Jose Tan Uy
as Eleuterio Tan who presented to her two
identification cards (IDs), which were found
to exactly match the picture of the said
respondent with his LTO license. Verily, the
identification made by Rodenas based on
pertinent documents which respondent
presented when he opened the account at
Land Bank remains credible, and that Victor
Jose Tan Uy was the same person who
appeared and introduced himself as
Eleuterio Tan or Eleuterio Ramos Tan to Ma.
Caridad A. Manahan-Rodenas of the Land
Bank, thereby establishing his true identity
Faced with the Ombudsman's rulings, the
petitioner filed the present petition based on
grounds that are rehashes of the issues
already ventilated below. For clarity, the
petitioner alleged grave abuse of discretion
in the Ombudsman's finding of probable
cause on the grounds that:
(a) he was not among the respondents
named or included in either OMB-0-00-

1720 or OMB-0-00-1756; neither has there

been any mention of his name in the
respective complaint-affidavits or in any of
their supporting documents; neither
has any allegation been made in the
respective complaint-affidavits or in any of
their supporting documents that he had been
identified as being among the named
respondents; and there has been no
allegation linking him to any criminal act for
any of the offenses charged or any other
criminal offense;
(b) The Ombudsman relied on evidence and
findings that were never part of the
complaints-affidavits or their supporting
documents served upon the petitioner and
were never adduced or presented in the
course of the preliminary investigation
conducted with respect to the petitioner
The petitioner's supporting arguments
essentially center on the irregularity of the
Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary
investigation and the worth and efficacy of
the evidence the complainants presented
with respect to his identification as Eleuterio
Tan, Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy. He
questions the regularity of the preliminary
investigation for having been attended by
shortcuts and for being a sham proceeding
that violates his right to due process.
Specifically, he claims that the duty of the
Ombudsman is to determine the existence of
probable cause based on the evidence
presented, not to fill up the deficiencies of
the complaint, nor to remedy its weaknesses.
He objects to the use of the FFIB
investigation results to support the finding of

probable cause since these investigation

results were never presented at the
preliminary investigation of OMB-0-001720 and OMB-0-00-1756, and reliance
thereon violates his due process rights. He
adds that the FFIB was never a complainant
heard in either of these cases. He
emphasizes that the Rodenas sworn
statement in the FFIB investigation
identifying him as Eleuterio Tan is a mere
scrap of paper that does not constitute
evidence in the preliminary investigation
since it was never presented therein, and that
the burden of proving at the preliminary
investigation that he is Eleuterio Tan rests
with the complainants.
The respondent posits further that the issue
of the validity of the first preliminary
investigation with respect to the petitioner
has been rendered academic by the
subsequent reinvestigation that the
Sandiganbayan ordered. At this subsequent
investigation, the complaint-affidavits were
duly furnished the petitioner who merely
alleged general denials in the counteraffidavit he filed. The petitioner failed to
attend the clarificatory hearing where he
could have controverted the identification
made by Rodenas in the FFIB investigation;
he likewise had at least seven opportunities
in the totality of the proceedings to
controvert his identification as Eleuterio Tan
Ruling: The petition is meritorious.
We clarify at the outset that the present
petition is filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of
the Revised Rules of Court whose scope of

review is limited to the question: was the

order by the tribunal, board or officer
exercising judicial or quasi judicial
functions rendered without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of or excess of
jurisdiction? The "grave abuse of discretion"
that the petitioner alleges in this case is
defined by jurisprudence to be a "capricious
and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction, or [an]
exercise of power in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, or an exercise of
judgment so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a
virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined,
or to act in a manner not at all in
contemplation of law.
A preliminary investigation is held before an
accused is placed on trial to secure the
innocent against hasty, malicious, and
oppressive prosecution; to protect him from
an open and public accusation of a crime, as
well as from the trouble, expenses, and
anxiety of a public trial. It is also intended to
protect the state from having to conduct
useless and expensive trials. While the right
is statutory rather than constitutional, it is a
component of due process in administering
criminal justice. The right to have a
preliminary investigation conducted before
being bound for trial and before being
exposed to the risk of incarceration and
penalty is not a mere formal or technical
right; it is a substantive right. To deny the
accused's claim to a preliminary

investigation is to deprive him of the full

measure of his right to due process

facts material and relevant to the

controversy

A preliminary investigation is subject to the

requirements of both substantive and
procedural due process. We held in
Cojuangco, Jr. v. PCGG, et al

Mindful of these considerations, we hold

that the petitioner's right to due process has
been violated.

And we commonly recognize the need for

the observance of due process. We likewise
fully agree with Cojuangco in terms of the
level of scrutiny that must be made we do
not expect the rigorous standards of a
criminal trial, but "[s]ufficient proof of the
guilt of the accused must be adduced so that
when the case is tried, the trial court may not
be bound as a matter of law to order an
acquittal."
In light of the due process requirement, the
standards that at the very least assume great
materiality and significance are those
enunciated in the leading case of Ang Tibay
v. Court of Industrial Relations. This case
instructively tells us in defining the basic
due process safeguards in administrative
proceedings that the decision (by an
administrative body) must be rendered on
the evidence presented at the hearing, or at
least contained in the record and disclosed to
the parties affected; only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence
disclosed to the parties, can the latter be
protected in their right to know and meet the
case against them; it should not, however,
detract from the tribunal's duty to actively
see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of

We firstly note that the question of the

petitioner's entitlement to a preliminary
investigation apart from the earlier
preliminary investigation conducted by the
Ombudsman in OMB-0-00-1720 and OMB0-00-1756 has been fully settled by the
Sandiganbayan Resolution of June 19, 2002.
We quote this ruling as it contains the
premises that justified the holding of the
Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary
investigation specifically for the petitioner.
To restate the Sandiganbayan reasoning in
simple terms: the petitioner was never
identified in the previous preliminary
investigation to be the person identified by
assumed names or aliases in the supporting
complaint-affidavits; hence, a new
preliminary investigation should be
conducted to identify him as the person who,
using the aliases Eleuterio Tan, Eleuterio
Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, opened and withdrew
from the Landbank account in the course of
a series of acts collectively constituting the
crime of plunder.
The critical evidence linking the petitioner
to the plunder case is his identification
through the identification documents. This
notwithstanding and quite inexplicably,
theidentification documents despite the
fatal infirmity the Sandiganbayan found in

the first preliminary investigation were

once again not given to the petitioner in the
subsequent Sandiganbayan-ordered
preliminary investigation to inform him of
his alleged links to the charges under the
complaint-affidavits.
How and why this happened was never
satisfactorily explained in the parties'
various submissions. Based on the records
of what actually transpired at the
Sandiganbayan-ordered preliminary
investigation, we can glean the
Ombudsman's intent to either confront and
identify the petitioner through Ma. Caridad
Manahan-Rodenas, or at least to introduce
the Rodenas sworn statement and the
identification documents into the
preliminary investigation records through
her own personal appearance. For these
purposes, the Ombudsman specifically
called the petitioner and Rodenas to a
clarificatory hearing that unfortunately did
not result in either of these possibilities; the
petitioner did not personally attend the
hearing and Rodenas herself failed to show
up. At the same time, the Ombudsman was
forced, upon the insistence of the petitioner's
counsel, to consider the inquiry submitted
for resolution based on the records then
existing. 36 Thus, the Ombudsman still
failed to establish in the Sandiganbayanordered preliminary investigation the direct
link between the individual identified by
aliases and the petitioner
Unfortunately for the Ombudsman, the
holding of the clarificatory hearing, in which
Rodenas and the petitioner were the invitees,

is replete with implications touching on the

existence of probable cause at that stage of
the proceedings. To be sure, the prosecutor
(Ombudsman) cannot be faulted for calling
the clarificatory hearing as it is within his
authority to do so. As a rule, however, no
clarificatory hearing is necessary if the
evidence on record already shows the
existence of probable cause; conversely, a
clarificatory hearing is necessary to establish
the probable cause that up to the time of the
clarificatory hearing has not been shown.
This implication becomes unavoidable for
the present case, given the reason for the
Sandiganbayan's order to conduct another
preliminary investigation for the petitioner,
and in light of the evidence so far then
presented which, as in the first preliminary
investigation, did not link the petitioner to
the assumed names or aliases appearing in
the Information
Under the above circumstances, the
respondent Ombudsman could only fall back
on the simple response that due process
cannot be compartmentalized; the court
proceedings participated in by the accusedmovant (the petitioner) form part and parcel
of such due process in the same manner that
the further preliminary investigation is
inseparable from the said court proceedings.
38 We do not however find this response
sufficiently compelling to save the day for
the respondent. That the petitioner may have
actual prior knowledge of the identification
documents from proceedings elsewhere is
not a consideration sufficiently material to
affect our conclusion. Reasonable

opportunity to controvert evidence and

ventilate one's cause in a proceeding
requires full knowledge of the relevant and
material facts specificto that proceeding.
One cannot be expected to respond to
collateral allegations or assertions made, or
be bound by developments that transpired,
in some other different although related
proceedings, except perhaps under situations
where facts are rendered conclusive by
reason of judgments between the same
parties 39 a situation that does not obtain
in the present case. Otherwise, surprise
which is anathema to due process may
result together with the consequent loss of
adequate opportunity to ventilate one's case
and be heard. Following Ang Tibay, a
decision in a proceeding must be rendered
based on the evidence presented at the
hearing (of the proceeding), or at least
contained in the record (of the proceeding)
and disclosed to the parties affected (during
or at the proceeding).
Thus, we cannot agree with the
Ombudsman's position that the petitioner
should controvert the identification
documents because they already form part of
the records of the preliminary investigation,
having been introduced in various incidents
of Crim. Case No. 26558 then pending with
the Sandiganbayan. The rule closest to a
definition of the inter-relationship between
records of a preliminary investigation and
the criminal case to which it relates is
Section 8 (b), Rule 112 of the Revised Rules
of Court which provides that the record of
the preliminary investigation, whether

conducted by a judge or a prosecutor, shall

not form part of the record of the case; the
court, on its own initiative or on motion of
any party, may order the production of the
record or any of its parts when necessary in
the resolution of the case or any incident
therein, or when it is introduced as an
evidence in the case by the requesting party.
This rule, however, relates to the use of
preliminary investigation records in the
criminal case; no specific provision in the
Rules exists regarding the reverse situation.
We are thus guided in this regard by the
basic due process requirement that the right
to know and to meet a case requires that a
person be fully informed of the pertinent and
material facts unique to the inquiry to which
he is called as a party respondent. Under this
requirement, reasonable opportunity to
contest evidence as critical as the
identification documents should have been
given the petitioner at the Sandiganbayanordered preliminary investigation as part of
the facts he must controvert; otherwise,
there is nothing to controvert as the burden
of evidence lies with the one who asserts
that a probable cause exists. The
Ombudsman's failure in this regard tainted
its findings of probable cause with grave
abuse of discretion that effectively nullifies
them. We cannot avoid this conclusion under
the constitutional truism that in the hierarchy
of rights, the Bill of Rights takes precedence
over the right of the State to prosecute, and
when weighed against each other, the scales
of justice tilt towards the former