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MATIENZO vs.

ABELLERA
G.R. No. L-45839 - June 1, 1988
FACTS:
The petitioners and private respondents are all authorized taxicab operators in Metro Manila.
The respondents, however, admittedly operate colorum or kabit taxicab units. On or about
the second week of February, 1977, private respondents filed their petitions with the respondent
Board of Transportation (BOT) for the legalization of their unauthorized excess taxicab units
citing PD 101, promulgated on January 17, 1973, to eradicate the harmful and unlawful trade of
clandestine operators, by replacing or allowing them to become legitimate and responsible
operators. Within a matter of days, the respondent Board promulgated its orders setting the
application for hearing and granting applicants provisional authority to operate their excess
taxicab units for which legalization was sought.
Opposing the applications and seeking to restrain the grant of provisional permits or authority,
as well as the annulment of permits already granted under PD 101, the petitioners allege that
the BOT acted without jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the petitions for legalization and
awarding special permits to the private respondents. Citing Section 4 of PD 101, the petitioners
argue that neither the BOT chairman nor any member thereof had the power, at the time the
petitions were filed (i.e. in 1977), to legitimize the clandestine operations under PD 101 as such
power had been limited to a period of six (6) months from and after the promulgation of the
Decree on January 17, 1973. They state that, thereafter, the power lapses and becomes functus
officio.
ISSUE:
Whether or not BOT can still legalize clandestine and unlawful taxicab operations under Section
1 of PD 101 despite the lapse of six (6) months after the promulgation of the Decree.
RULING:
Yes.
A reading of Section 1, PD 101, shows a grant of powers to the respondent Board to issue
provisional permits as a step towards the legalization of colorum taxicab operations without the
alleged time limitation. There is nothing in Section 4, cited by the petitioners, to suggest the
expiration of such powers six (6) months after promulgation of the Decree. Rather, it merely
provides for the withdrawal of the States waiver of its right to punish said colorum operators for
their illegal acts. In other words, the cited section declares when the period of moratorium
suspending the relentless drive to eliminate illegal operators shall end. Clearly, there is no
impediment to the Boards exercise of jurisdiction under its broad powers under the Public
Service Act to issue certificates of public convenience to achieve the avowed purpose of PD 101
(Sec. 16a, Public Service Act, Nov. 7, 1936).
It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain
power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it
was created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative
intent should be upheld as germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the
appropriate means are deemed given.

ABLO CATURA and LUZ SALVADOR, petitioners,


vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and CELESTINO TABANIAG, et al., respondents.
FACTS
- A complaint was lodged against Catura and Salvador, the President and Treasurer,
respectively, of the Philippine Virginia Tobacco Administration Employees Association, a
legitimate labor organization.
- The principal complainants are respondent Tabaniag as well as other employees constituting
more than ten percent of the entire membership of such labor organization.
- It was charged that during the tenure of office of petitioners, they were responsible for
"unauthorized disbursement of union funds".
- Complainants filed a case with the DOLE.
- Associate Judge Salvador of the CIR required and directed Catura and Salvador to deliver and
deposit to the Court all the said Association's book of accounts, bank accounts, pass books,
union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to the finances of the said labor
union at the hearing.
- There was a motion for reconsideration by petitioners on the ground that they were not heard
before such order was issued, which moreover in their opinion was beyond the power of the
CIR. With Associate Judge Paredes dissenting, the order was sustained in a resolution by the
Court en banc.
ISSUE: WON the CIR had the power to issue such Order. YES.
RULING:
- Paragraphs (b), (h), and (l) of Section 17 of the Industrial Peace Act provide:
"The members shall be entitled to full and detailed reports from their officers and
representatives of all financial transactions as provided in the constitution and by-laws of the
organization." ... "The books of accounts and other records of the financial activities of a
legitimate labor organization shall be open to inspection by any officer or member thereof."
- All that the challenged order did was to require petitioners, as President and Treasurer of the
labor organization, to "deliver and deposit" with respondent Court all of its book of accounts,
bank accounts, pass books, union funds, receipts, vouchers and other documents related to its
finances at the hearing of the petition
- On its face, it cannot be said that such a requirement is beyond the statutory power conferred.
If it were otherwise, the specific provisions of law allegedly violated may not be effectively
complied with. The authority to investigate might be rendered futile.
- To paraphrase Justice Laurel, the power to investigate, to be conscientious and rational at the
very least, requires an inquiry into existing facts and conditions. The documents required to be
produced constitutes evidence of the most solid character as to whether or not there was a
failure to comply with the mandates of the law.
- It is not for this Court to whittle down the authority conferred on administrative agencies to
assure the effective administration of a statute, in this case intended to protect the rights of
union members against its officers.
- The matter was properly within its cognizance and the means necessary to give it force and
effectiveness should be deemed implied unless the power sought to be exercised is so arbitrary.
No such showing has been made; no such showing can be made. To repeat, there should be no
question about the correctness of the order herein challenged.

- Nor is the validity of the order in question to be impugned by the allegation that there was a
denial of procedural due process. If the books and records were the private property of
petitioners, perhaps the allegation of the absence of due process would not be entirely lacking
in plausibility. Such is not the case however.
- The pertinent section of the Industrial Peace Act makes clear that such books of accounts and
other records of the financial activities are open to inspection by any member of a labor
organization.
- For the court to require their submission at the hearing of the petition is, as above noted,
beyond question, and no useful purpose would be served by first hearing petitioners before an
order to that effect can be issued. Moreover, since as was shown in the very brief of petitioners,
there was a motion for reconsideration, the absence of any hearing, even if on the assumption
purely for argument's sake that there was such a requirement, has been cured.
- What the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice, but the absolute absence thereof
and lack of opportunity to be heard.
- The hearing on a motion for reconsideration meets the strict requirement of due process.
EVANGELISTA v. JARENCIO
G.R. No. L-29274 November 27, 1975
FACTS: This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of respondent Judge,
the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled "Fernando Manalastas vs. Sec. Ramon D.
Bagatsing, etc
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised Administrative Code,
the President of the Philippines created the Presidential Agency on Reforms and Government
Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order No. 4 of January 7, 1966. Purposedly, he charged
the Agency with the following functions and responsibilities:

To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and


corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other activities
which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to submit proper
recommendations to the President of the Philippines.

To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos.
1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft and
acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth ... .

To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn


complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee and to file
and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency.
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all the powers
of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised Administrative Code,
including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, administer
oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the investigation.
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the Agency,
issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service Officer of Manila, a
subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear as witness at the Office of the
PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS ... then and
there to declare and testify in a certain investigation pending therein."
ISSUE: Whether the Agency, acting thru its officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in
its conduct of fact-finding investigations.

HELD: YES. It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of
fact, the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. Investigations are useful for
all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and licensing, but also for
prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining general policy, for recommending,
legislation, and for purposes no more specific than illuminating obscure areas to find out what if
anything should be done. An administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations,
not only in proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or judicial nature may
be taken and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings of a purely investigatory
nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for correction, and to report findings to
appropriate bodies and make recommendations for actions.
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power from
Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to "summon
witness, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the investigation" with the authority "to
require the production of documents under a subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all
respects to the same restrictions and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar
character." Such subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid
out in the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b),(e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely
exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function under subparagraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h) interlink or
intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting the very purpose of the creation of
the Agency, which is to forestall and erode nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service.
To hold that the subpoena power of the Agency is confined to mere quasi-judicial or adjudicatory
functions would therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under
sub-paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order No. 4,
para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena power be exercised.
Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule that forbids differentiation when
the law itself makes none.
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency upon sworn
statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of Manila in anomalous
transactions fall within the Agency's sphere of authority and that the information sought to be .

WALTER E. OLSEN & CO., INC., petitioner,


vs.
VICENTE ALDANESE, as Insular Collector of Customs of the Philippine Islands, and W.
TRINIDAD, as Collector of Internal Revenue, respondents.
Gibbs, McDonough & Johnson for petitioner.
Attorney-General Villa-Real for respondents.
Araneta & Zaragoza (amici curiae) for "Manila Tobacco Association."

STATEMENT
On March 29, 1922, respondents' demurrer to the petition was overruled; on April 3, an answer
was duly filed; and on April 21, the petitioner filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings.
The facts are fully stated in the former opinion.1
Paragraph 4 of the petition contains certain subdivisions of section 6 of Act No. 2613 of the
Philippine Legislature, passed February 4, 1916, entitled "an act to improve the methods of
production and the quality of tobacco in the Philippine and to develop the export trade therein."
They empower the Collector of Internal Revenue to establish certain general and local rules
respecting the classification, marking and parking of tobacco for domestic sale or for exportation
to the United States, and, among other things, provide:
No leaf tobacco or manufactured tobacco shall be exported from the Philippine Islands
to the United States until it shall have been inspected by the Collector of Internal
Revenue or his duly authorized representative and found to be standard for export ...
In order to facilitate the free entry of tobacco products from the Philippine Islands into the
United States, the Collector of Internal Revenue is authorized to act as stamp agent for
the Untied States Commissioner of Internal Revenue, and to certify to the Insular
Collector of Customs that the standard tobacco exported is the growth and product of
the Philippine Islands. The Insular Collector of Customs upon certificate from the
Collector of Internal Revenue as aforesaid, shall issue such certificate of origin as may
be necessary to insure the speedy admission of the standard tobacco into the United
States free of customs duties.
Paragraph 5 of the petition alleges that under clause B of section 6 of the Act, the Collector of
Internal Revenue promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspection
Regulations," in which it is said:
To be classed as standard, cigars must be manufactured under sanitary conditions from
good, clean, selected tobacco, properly cured and seasoned, of a crop which has been
harvested at least six months, exclusively the product of the provinces of Cagayan,
Isabela, or Nueva Vizcaya. The cigars must be well made, with suitable spiral wrapper
and with long filler, etc.
Paragraph 6 pleads the provisions of section 1 of article 1 of the Constitution of the United
States, and paragraph 7 pleads section 10 of the "Jones Law."
The answer admits paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the petition.
Paragraph 6 of the answer says:
They admit the facts alleged in Paragraph XI of the petition in so far as they refer to the
Insular Collector of Customs, but they deny that the acts performed by the said officer
are wrongful or illegal; and they also deny the others facts alleged in the same
paragraph except as they may hereinafter be impliedly admitted, that is, that on or about
February 6, 1922, the petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a
certificate of origin covering a consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San

Francisco, and as the petitioner himself stated on making such application that the
cigars sought to be exported must have been manufactured from short-filler tobacco
which was not the product of the provinces of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva Vizcaya, the
Collector of Internal Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual examination
and inspection of said cigars and stated to the petitioner that he did not see his ways
clear to the granting of petitioner's request, in view of the fact that the cigars which the
petitioner's request, in view of the fact that the cigars which the petitioner was seeking to
export were not made with long-filler nor were they made from tobacco exclusively the
product of any of the three mentioned provinces, and the said cigars were neither
inspected nor examined by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
As a special defense, the respondents allege that under section 11 of Act No. 2613 and section
5 of the Administrative Code of 1917, the Collector of Internal Revenue has discretionary power
to decide whether the manufactured tobacco that the petitioner seeks to export to the United
States fulfills the requisites prescribed by Administrative Order No. 35. That it is not within the
jurisdiction of this court to order the Collector of Internal Revenue to issue a certificate to the
petitioner to the effect that the manufactured tobacco that the petitioner seeks to export is a
product of the Philippine Islands, but it is for the Collector of Internal Revenue to exercise the
power of issuing said certificate if after an inspection of said tobacco, he should find that "it
conforms to the conditions required by Administrative order No. 35 with the exclusion of those
conditions which, according to the said decision of the Supreme Courts, the Collector of Internal
Revenue is not authorized to required under Act No. 2613."
That the cigars which petitioner seeks to export to the United States have not as yet
been examined or inspected by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
Wherefore, the defendants pray that the petition be dismissed, with costs.
The question presented is whether under the facts admitted, the answer is a good defense to
the petition.

JOHNS, J.:
The defendants are public officers of the Philippine Islands, and the acts of which the petitioner
complains are their official acts.
In paragraph 11 of the petition, among other things, it is alleged:
That on the 6th day of February the said respondent Collector of Internal Revenue
wrongfully and unlawfully refused and neglected and still unlawfully refuses and neglects
to issue such certificate of origin on the ground that said cigars were not manufactured
of long-filler tobacco produced exlusively in the provisions of Cagayan, Isabela, or
Nueva Vizcaya.
Paragraph 6 of the answer says:

"The petitioner applied to the Collector of Internal Revenue for a certificate of origin covering a
consignment of 10,000 machine-made cigars to San Francisco," and represented that the cigars
were made from short-filler tobacco which was not the product of Cagayan, Isabela, and Nueva
Vizcaya. The Collector of Internal Revenue did not deem it necessary to make an actual
examination and inspection of said cigars, and stated to the petitioner that he did not see his
way clear to the granting of petitioner's request, in view of the fact that the cigars which the
petitioner was seeking to export were not made with long-filler nor were they made from tobacco
exclusively the product of any of the three provinces, and the said cigars were neither inspected
nor examined by the Collector of Internal Revenue.
In its final analysis, this is an admission by the defendants the cigars in question were rejected
by the Collector of Internal Revenue, for the specified reason that they were not long-filler cigars
manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces. That the Collector accepted
and treated the statement to the petitioner as true, and, relying thereon, refused to use the
certificate of origin, for the sole reason that the cigars in question were not long-filler cigars, and
were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces.
If, when the cigars were presented, the Collector of Internal Revenue had simply refused to
issue the certificate of origin and had not specified any grounds for such refusal he would then
have a legal right to plead and rely upon any and all grounds of refusal. But where, as in the
instant case, it is alleged in the petition, and, in legal effects, admitted in the answer, that the
cigars were rejected because they were not long-filler and were not manufactured from tobacco
grown in one of the three provinces, then, under the authorities and rule of construction, the
defendants are confined and limited to the specified grounds of refusal, and cannot be heard to
say that the cigars were rejected upon any other or different grounds than those specified in the
refusal.
Again, it appears from the whole purport and tenor of the answer that, in their refusal, the
defendant were acting under, and relying upon, those portions of Administrative Order No. 35,
known as "Tobacco Inspection Regulations," which this court held to be null and void in its
former opinion.
Although in this class of cases, as a general rule, a demand and refusal is prerequisite to the
granting of a writ, it is not necessary where it appears from the record that the demand, if made,
would have been refused.
Merrill on Mandamus, section 225, says:
The law never demands a vain thing, and when the conduct and action of the officer is
equivalent to a refusal to perform the duty desired, it is not necessary to go through the
useless formality of demanding its performance. Anything showing that the defendant
does not intend to perform the duty is sufficient to warrant the issue of a mandamus.
Cyc., vol. 26, p. 182, says:
Where it appears that a demand would be unavailing it need not be made, as where the
course and conduct of officers is such as to show a settled purpose not to perform the
imposed duty.
In the case of Chicago, K. & W. R. Co. vs. Harris (30 Pac., 456), on page 459, the court says:

The action of the officers before and since the commencement of this action clearly
shows that a formal demand would have been unavailing. The commencement of this
proceeding was at least a sufficient demand; and the defendants, instead of indicating a
willingness to execute the bonds, expressly denied the right of the plaintiff to the bonds,
and denied the existence of any obligation or duty to issue and deliver them. Having
distinctly manifested their purpose not to perform this duty, the question of a formal
demand is no longer important. It appears that it would have been useless and foolish,
and the law rarely requires the doing of a useless act. (Citing a number of authorities.)
In United States vs. Auditors of Town of Brooklyn (8 Fe. Rep., 473), the court says:
But while it is generally true that a court will not issue a mandamus to compel the
performance of an act which it is merely anticipated the defendant will not perform, still if
the defendant has shown by his conduct that he does not intend to perform the act, and
that fact is apparent to the court, it would be a work of supererogation to require that a
demand should be made for its performance.
The facts in this case are peculiar.
Under the provisions of Act No. 2613, the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippine Islands
promulgated Administrative Order No. 35, known as "Tobacco Inspections Regulations." Such
rules and regulations, having been promulgated by that officer, we have a right to assume that
he was acting under such rules and regulations when he refused to issue the certificate of
origin.
It appears from the record that the cigars in question were not long-filler cigars, and that they
were not manufactured from tobacco grown in one of the three provinces.
By the express terms and provisions of such rules and regulations promulgated by the Collector
of Internal Revenue, it was his duty to refuse petitioner's request, and decline the certificate or
origin, because the cigars tendered were not of the specified kind, and we have a right to
assume that he performed his official duty as the understood it. After such refusal and upon
such grounds, it would indeed, have been a vain and useless thing for the Collector of Internal
Revenue to his examined or inspected the cigars.
Having refused to issue the certificate of origin for the reason above assigned, it is very
apparent that a request thereafter made examine or inspect the cigars would also have been
refused.
The motion for judgment on the pleadings is sustained, and the writ will issue, as prayed for in
the petition, without costs. So ordered.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION vs AGRAVA


G.R. No. L-12426
February 16, 1959
FACTS:
Herein petitioner filed for prohibition and injunction against respondent Agrava, the Director of
Philippines Patent Office due to a circular the latter issued scheduling an examination for
determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines Patent
Office.
Petitioner contended that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the
Supreme Court to practice law in the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to
practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and that Agrava is in excess of his jurisdiction and
is in violation of the law for requiring such examination as condition precedent before members
of the bar may be allowed to represent applicants in the preparation and prosecution of
applications for patents. Undaunted, Agrava argued that that the prosecution of patent cases
does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law and that the Rules of Court do not prohibit
the Patent Office from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would wish to
handle cases before the Patent Office.
ISSUE:
Whether appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and the prosecution of patent
applications, etc., constitutes or is included in the practice of law
HELD:
Yes. The practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation
of applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent,
their oppositions thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. Although the
transaction of business in the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and
scientific knowledge and training, still, all such business has to be rendered in accordance with
the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. All these things involve the applications of laws, legal

principles, practice and procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for
which a member of the bar has been prepared.

As
stated
in
5
Am.
Jur,
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and social proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law corporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions.
The Supreme Court ruled that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized
by the Supreme Court to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession
before the Patent Office, since much of the business in said office involves the interpretation
and determination of the scope and application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as
well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the
Patent director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decisions are, taken to the Supreme Court.

PRIMITIVO LOVINA, and NELLY MONTILLA,


plaintiffs-appelleesvs.
HON. FLORENCIO MORENO, as Secretary of Public Works and Communications, and
BENJAMINYONZON,
defendants-appellantsFacts:Numerous residents of Macabebe, Pampanga complained that
appellees had blocked the "Sapang Bulati", a
navigable river in the same municipality and asked that the obstructions be ordered removed,
under the provisions of Republic Act No. 2056. After notice and hearing to the parties, the said
Secretary of Public Works andCommunications found the constructions to be a public nuisance
in navigable waters, and ordered the land owners,spouses Lovina, to remove five (5) closures of
Sapang Bulati. After receipt of the decision, the appellees filed a
petition in CFI of Manila to restrain the Secretary from enforcing his decision.The trial court,
after due hearing, granted a permanent injunction. It held that Republic Act No. 2056
isunconstitutional and that Sapang Bulati is not a navigable river but a private stream.The
appellees
contention
is that Republic Act No. 2056 is unconstitutional because it invests the Secretary of PublicWorks
and Communications with sweeping, unrestrained, final and unappealable authority to pass

upon the issues ofwhether a river or stream is public and navigable, whether a dam
encroaches upon such waters and is constitutive asa public nuisance, and whether the law
applies to the state of facts, thereby Constituting an alleged unlawfuldelegation of judicial power
to the Secretary of Public Works and Communications.Issue: Whether or not there is
an unlawful delegation of judicial power.Held:The contentions of the appellees are not tenable.
R.A. 2056 merely empowers the Secretary to remove unauthorized
obstructions or encroachments upon public streams, constructions that no private person was
anyway entitled tomake, because the bed of navigable streams is public property, and
ownership thereof is not acquirable by adversepossession.It is true that the exercise of
the Secretary's power under the Act necessarily involves the determination of somequestions of
fact, such as the existence of the stream and its previous navigable character; but these
functions,whether judicial or quasi-judicial, are merely incidental to the exercise of the power
granted by law to clear navigablestreams of unauthorized obstructions or encroachments, and
authorities are clear that they are, validly conferableupon executive officials provided the party
affected is given opportunity to be heard, as is expressly required byRepublic Act No. 2056,
section 2.The mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire the existence of certain facts
and to apply the law thereto inorder to determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact
that these acts may affect private, rights do notconstitute an exercise of judicial powers.
Accordingly, a statute may give to non-judicial officers the power to declarethe existence of facts
which call into operation its provisions, and similarly may grant to commissioners and
othersubordinate officer, power to ascertain and determine appropriate facts as a basis for
procedure in the enforcementof particular laws.It is noteworthy that Republic Act 2605
authorizes removal of the unauthorized dikes either as "public nuisances or asprohibited
constructions" on public navigable streams, and those of appellees clearly are in the latter
class.In fine, it is held that Republic Act No. 2056 does not constitute an unlawful delegation of
judicial power to theSecretary of Public Works; that the findings of fact of the Secretary of Public
Works under Republic Act No. 2056should be respected in the absence of illegality, error of law,
fraud, or imposition, so long as the said, findings aresupported by substantial evidence
submitted to him.The decision appealed from is reversed, and the writs of injunction issued
therein are annulled and set aside.

PHILEX MINING CORPORATION v ZALDIVIA


G.R. No. L-29669
February 29, 1972
FACTS:
In a registered deed of assignment, dated 24 September 1955, George T. Scholey, as locator of
the aforesaid mining claim, sold, transferred and assigned all his rights, title and interest therein
to Milagros Yrastorza; on 7 December 1959, Yrastorza filed Lode Lease Application No. V-4671
covering the said mining claim, but on 15 October 1963, she sold, transferred and conveyed all
her rights and interest in the claim to herein respondent Luz Zaldivia. The transfer approved by
the Director of Mines on 29 December 1966; hence, Lode Lease Application No. V-4671 was
recorded in Zaldivia's name and given due course.

Upon publication of the lease application, herein petitioner Philex Mining Corporation interposed
an adverse claim to the lease application, alleging that it is the beneficial and equitable owner of
the mining claim; that it was located on 9 December 1955 by the petitioner corporation's then
general manager for the benefit of the corporation; that when Scholey transferred the claim to
Yrastorza, Scholey was still the general manager, while Yrastorza was also employed by the
company; and that Yrastorza and respondent Zaldivia, who had also been an employee of the
corporation, merely acted as agents of Scholey, so that, despite the transfers, petitioner
remained the equitable owner.
Respondent Zaldivia moved to dismiss the adverse claim on three (3) grounds, namely: late
filing of the adverse claim, lack of jurisdiction of the Director of Mines to resolve the question of
ownership raised by herein petitioner, and the alleged defect of the adverse claim for noncompliance with certain requirements of the Mining Act, as amended. In the course of an oral
argument on the motion to dismiss, only the question of jurisdiction was submitted for resolution.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS: * Director of Mines: Bureau had no jurisdiction to resolve the
question of ownership, because the question was judicial in character and should be ventilated
before the courts. * DENR Secretary: affirmed the order of the Director of Mines.
ISSUE: Is the Director of Mines vested with the jurisdiction over the controverted issues?
HELD: NO.
The issue is one to be resolved in conformity with legal rules and standards governing the
powers of an agent, and the law's restrictions upon the latter's right to act for his own exclusive
benefit while the agency is in force. Decision of such questions involves the interpretation and
application of laws and norms of justice established by society and constitutes essentially an
exercise of the judicial power under the Constitution is exclusively allocated to the Supreme
Court and such courts as the Legislature may establish and one that mining officials are illequipped to deal with.
As already shown, petitioner's adverse claim is not one grounded on overlapping of claims nor
is it a mining conflict arising out of mining locations (there being only one involved) but one
originating from the alleged fiduciary or contractual relationship between petitioner and locator
Scholey and his transferees Yrastorza and respondent Zaldivia. As such, the adverse claim is
not within the executive or administrative authority of the mining director solve, but in that of the
courts.

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