A Progressives Resource Guide to the Trump Election

(An Underwrought Response to Donald J. Trumps Inauguration)

Jonathan Andrew
Nov. 20, 2017
I.

Received wisdom Trump won because the white working class (WWC) has been
losing

The conventional wisdom is that across the Rust Belt, the White Working Class flipped on the
Democrats in an expression of economic anxiety and a spasm of anti-elitism, handing Trump
the Electoral Victory no one expected. In a literal sense, its true: a bloc of white voters who
traditionally voted for the Democrats voted for Trump in a region-specific manner that tipped
the Electoral College.
For a taste of the many versions of this received wisdom, read here and here. To give
this view a fair shake, read this article, which draws on two studies to show that the
counties that voted for Trump by and large did not experience job growth over the postGFC years of economic expansion (although much of that analysis is subsumed in the
urban-rural dynamic). For an academic, more nuanced look at anti-urban and anti-elite
sentiment, see this fantastic article, the result of a longitudinal study of attitudes among
Wisconsins White Working Class.
According to the conventional media narrative, in essence, Clinton lost by writing off the White
Working Class (WWC). A hall of fame lineup of Clinton surrogates spent the last weeks of the
campaign unsuccessfully whipping up minority and urban-suburban support in places like
Jacksonville and Philadelphia when the election was ultimately decided by places like
Nelsonville and Scranton. Clintons wonkish plan to attack structural inequality lost out to the
immediate-term concerns of the WWC left out of the recovery outgoing manufacturing jobs,
the meth epidemic, and the economic competition engendered by shifting demographics.
II.

Problematizing WWC economic insecurity as the primary driver for the Trump flip

By way of response, it is important to begin by noting that the (concerns of) the White Working
Class (WWC) cannot be conflated with the (concerns of the) working class more generally the
first dint in the idea of economic anxiety as unalloyed driver of the Trump flip. More specifically,
while the economic concerns of the African-American and Hispanic working class are
comparable to those of the WWC, their voting patterns, obviously, are not.
Secondly, as a general principle, the White Working Class (WWC) is much less aggregated a
group than we expect it to be.
For a description of WWC as a very broad, frequently misunderstood, term, read here
(while progressives often think of WWC as the poor, the WWC self-identifies as solidly

middle class, with a median income north of 60k) and here (Most of the WWC, defined
as whites without a college degree, do not work in blue collar jobs).
Perhaps by extension but still surprisingly, given the dominant media narrative income is a
poor predictor of Trump support, meaning there is no consistent WWC voting behavior based
on income (second dint in economic anxiety as primary--or at least unalloyed) driver of the
Trump flip.
This analysis is, however, multi-layered:

A majority of voters making under $50k supported Clinton over Trump.

However, Clintons share of this voting bloc fell by approximately 16 points, representing
significant attrition to a key Democratic constituency, and seeming to point to economic
dissatisfaction.
On the other hand, on a county-by-county level, recent economic performance (from
2006 onwards) makes little sense of the voting pattern shifts between Romney and
Trump, as outlined here and here, pushing back on the Trump flip as a protest vote by
the economically marginalized.
Further to that, when exit polls asked voters to identify issues about which they were
primarily concernedpicking between foreign policy, immigration, the economy, and
terrorism, Clinton won voters who ranked the economy as their primary concern by
10 points. Trump voters ranked immigration and national security as primary items of
concern, each 20 points higher than concern for the economy.

What to make of all this? This analysis suggests at the very least a bundling or narrativization of
economic concerns into broader terms of political economy other demographics getting
ahead, law and order, etc. However, this is getting ahead of ourselves. If income isnt a strong
predictor of Trump voters, what is? If economic anxiety cant adequately describe the Trump
flip, what can?
Three strong correlations show amongst Trump voters:
i.

Whiteness We are, by now, all familiar with the exit polling 63% white men and 53%
white women voted for Trump, for a total of 58% of the white vote (and 81%
evangelicals, which strongly correlates with whiteness).
Now, there is probably a propensity to overblow or sensationalize the level of white
support Trump received. Both Mitt Romney and Ronald Reagan won 57% of the white
vote Romney in a losing effort. In 1972, Nixon won 68% of the white vote, surpassing
Trumps level of support amongst whites.
So, fine. White folks have always tended to vote Republican in greater numbers. But in
either case, the overall numbers obscure meaningful demographic shifts. In Nixons
case, the numbers dont properly compare (although Nixons Southern Strategy,

intended to build on white resentment against civil rights legislation, does compare as
an instructive historical moment). In 1971, non-hispanic whites represented 85% of the
population. In 2016, non-hispanic whites represent 61.6% of the population, according
to the census bureau. In terms of punching above their demographic weight, the
difference is significant.
In a more contemporary example, Romney received similar levels of white support, but
the nature of white support shifted dramatically. Movement conservativism (the small
government, erstwhile Republican brand) tended to rely on strong support amongst
suburban and college educated whites. Obama upended that calculus to a degree by
winning a majority of both college educated and non-college educated voters. In 2016,
Trump won college educated whites at approximately the same rate as had John
McCain, and at a rate slightly less than Mitt Romney. In stark contrast, however, Trump
won 2/3 of non-college educated whites, a gap wider than any since education became
a trackable factor.
ii.

Education Its touchy to talk about education without seeming to make a rash of
judgements, or precipitating a backlash against elitism. But - the data show that the
single biggest predictor of Trump support was education. The data are clear; the
conclusions to be drawn from this correlation are more dicey.
Nate Silver shows in a couple of different ways that lower income counties were no
more likely to vote for Trump, once you control for education levels. To be sure, income
and education levels are often strongly correlated. But when Silver identified counties in
which education levels were high and income levels were average or below average,
Clinton improved on Obamas performance in almost all of them.
Pew cites the 39 point advantage Trump had amongst non-college educated whites, as
opposed to a much narrower 4 point advantage amongst college-educated whites.
The Resolution Foundation found education to be more important than income, to the
point where it entirely cancels out incomes role
See another useful breakdown here.

iii.

Rural vs. Urban No shock here. This bullet point is a bit of an addendum. For the
outsized political power wielded by rural America, thank historical compromises, such as
the Electoral College, the Constitution (e.g. rules for electing Senate), and path
dependency. For a good read on this version of American exceptionalism, read here.

Education, whiteness, rural-ness as tenets of the Trump vote problematize the received
wisdom that the Dems have to work to recover, re-convince the WWC that they are the party
concerned with economic inequality.

III.

Beyond economic insecurity

These results suggest that the Trump flip is driven at least as much by cultural backlash as by
economic insecurity.
Caveats
This is not to say that economic insecurity played no role in the outcome of the election.
An oft-repeated talking point amongst Democrats since the election surrounds the
failed opportunity to capitalize on populist discontent. Nor should any of us pretend
that the downward mobility of the working class generally has not taken its toll on
traditional party alliances. Relative to productivity, real wages have stagnated for 40
years. That should be warning enough.

But wait, you say, this cant be properly a whitelashbased on white nationalism,
receding political advantage, and racial animus because many Trump voters pulled the
lever for Obama (which is probably the civics equivalent of saying Im not racist because
I have a black friend). Put another way, its not that Trump brought out (many) new
voters; the Democrats lost supporters in regions of the rust belt, as laid out in this
argument.

Its touchy talking about education. The education factor, first and foremost, speaks to
the WWCs frustration with political, urban overseers (disproportionately educated
policy makers, bureaucrats, academics, lifetime politicians), and the political
disenfranchisement they feel.

These considerations SHOULD cause the Democrats pause. But the narrative that Trumps
support grew solely, or even primarily, from economic anxiety is borne out neither by numbers
nor by our collective lived experience of the election campaign. By extension, then, winning
back the WWC class vote is not necessarily about having better policy propositions for growing
out the middle class (of course it is partly about that. It is about winning a moral argument.
i.

The timing of the WWC defection is not coincidental.

a. Organized labor lost its rank and file for the first time in 60 years.
This Harold Meyerson quote is worth considering at length:
Perhaps the unions greatest contribution has been their success at keeping their
own white working-class members voting Democratic. Ever since the mid-1960s,

when Democrats supported laws and programs to help African Americans, white
working-class voters began to turn away from the party. Only the unions kept them
in the Democratic fold. In exit polls dating back to the early 1970s, white workingclass union members have voted Democratic at a rate 20 percent to 30 percent
higher than their nonunion counterparts; among white working-class men, the
margin is even higher. Unions election-time messages, whether conveyed by
mail, e-mail, phone, or at the worksite, offer a persuasive counter-narrative to
the Rush Limbaughs and Bill OReillys, who also focus their attention on white
working-class men.
Obviously, unions have been in decline for decades, thanks to the Republican-led
charge.
However, Hillary won the support of major labor unions across the board. Yet,
despite a massive voter mobilization effort, Clintons support amongst union
households dropped by 10-15 points relative to Obamas.
b. The WWC found a champion
Whitelash
Obama ran against McCain. And then he ran against Romney. Neither came close
to offering Trumps white nationalist alternative to the Democratic Party platform.
Trump offered a rallying cry not heard in decades a bundling of economic anxiety
with racial anxiety, xenophobia, and misogyny.
And then theres the issue of timing. Between 2012 and 2016, the issue of race
while never absent asphyxiated America. Think about it. #BLM. Black Lives Matter
vs. All Lives Matter/Blue Lives Matter. Race roiled America, and Trump feasted on
the backlash the whitelash.
For some of the many thoughtfulsometimes searinginterventions on race in the
election, consider the articles below.
If they have a center, it might be this:
The sets of questions that we see royalling the Trump campaign around the
folks who feel they have been left out or ignored are inseparable from a
superintending sense that they are the people who most deserve to be
included. That is inextricable from the question of race and gender identity.
When you start to feel crazy, or distraught, read these:

Jamelle Bouie, Why Did Some White Obama Votes Go for Trump? (Byline - Trump
gave them a choice between multiracial democracy and white primacy)
Arun Kundnani, Recharging the Batteries of Whiteness: Trumps New Racial Identity
Politics.
William J. Barber, II, We Are Witnessing the Birth Pangs of a Third Reconstruction.
Ainsley LeSure, The Significance of Overt Racism.
Misogyny
And then theres sexism the aggregation of white men, of maleness to the
misogyny of Trump.
How many of Clintons perceived weaknesses were wrapped in sexism?
When you start to feel crazy, or distraught, read here.
Pablo K, When White Men Rule the World.
Max Weiss, The Things I Blame for Hillarys Loss, Ranked.
c. We are not (quite) so different
Culture, rather than economics, is generally considered the driver of the European
right (read here, here, and here) yet we have trouble vesting that same
conclusion in the US context.
Zak Beauchamp, White Riot (Byline How racism and immigration gave us Trump,
Brexit, and a whole new kind of politics).
Ronald Inglehart & Pippa Norris, Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Populism.
d. If you have any further doubt, look to the alt-right superheroes of the Trump
administration. Read here and here.