Critical Factors Affecting Success of CBIS:

Cases from Africa

By Mayuri Odedra-Straub
Dept. of Information Systems & Computer Science
National University of Singapore
Lower Kent Ridge Road
Singapore 0511

Abstract

There is very little understanding about the key factors which influence success (or failure)
of computer-based information systems (CBIS) in organisations, especially those in Africa.
Poor infrastructures, lack of foreign exchange to buy spare parts, poor supplier service,
scarce education and training facilities, and therefore lack of skilled personnel,
management commitment and cooperation are generally believed to affect success (or
failure). This paper, based on research conducted by the author in a number of public
sector organisations in Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe, shows, using case studies, that it is
a combination of factors which play a role in success (or failure), and that it is difficult, and
inappropriate, to isolate a few specific factors as being the ones influencing all
organisations in all countries; factors vary from organisation to organisation and from
country to country.

Keywords: Computer based information systems, critical success factors, organisations,

Africa.

Introduction

Few doubt the significance of information technology (IT) for African economic and
social development (only sub-Saharan African countries are analyzed here; north African
states and South Africa are not considered). IT is widely preached as having the power to
narrow the gap between the developed and the developing countries (DCs), as having the
capabilities which will allow the DCs to "leap-frog" development, and as having the
potential to tackle many development problems. Yet, very few African countries have
succeeded in exploiting this developmental potential. Although no comprehensive surveys
or research has been done to prove the latter, there is extensive under-utilisation (and
non-utilisation) of equipment and failure of major computer-based information system
(CBIS) projects (Avgerou & Land, 1992; Moussa & Schware, 1992; Odedra, 1990a,b,
1993; Walsham, 1992); signs which may indicate why IT has played little role in African
development.
There has been substantial growth in the number of computers acquired in the past
few years, upto 10 per cent annual growth in places such as Kenya, Zimbabwe, Nigeria
and Ivory Coast (although, on average, spending on computerisation in 1988 - as a
percentage of GDP - was six times higher in industralised countries than in Africa), but
much of the spread of computers that has taken place has not been need-based.
Hard-selling from manufacturers and vendors, the urge to keep up with the latest
technology, management self-interests, and pressure from computer professionals have
all contributed to the spread. Many have accepted the technology in a blind-folded manner
and few have questioned its need. No policies or clear strategic buying plans exist which
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clearly identify the needs that are likely to bring overall benefit to the nation, and those that
are possible to achieve within the available resources. Nor is there an environment that
would promote widespread and effective application of IT.
One can say that there have been many negative consequences inflicted by this
technology on Africa. Scarce foreign currency has been spent on equipment which is
under-utilised, the dependency on multinational corporations and expatriate personnel has
increased, and socio-cultural conflicts introduced. Moreover, what Africa has experienced
so far is not IT transfer but "transplantation", the dumping of "boxes" without the necessary
know-how.
In this paper, computerisation at five public sector organisations in Kenya, Zambia
and Zimbabwe - two banks, an insurance company and two government computer centres
- is described and analyzed to illustrate some of the above issues and, most importantly, to
make an attempt at identifying factors which may have influenced success (or failure) of
CBIS in these organisations. Very little work has been done in this area in Africa and we
therefore have little understanding of these factors. The general impression is one of
relative failure rather than relative success in the implementation of CBIS in DCs. It is not
sufficiently clear why some of the technology adopted by DCs has failed to achieve its
intended economic benefits (Waema & Walsham, 1988). Poor infrastructures, lack of
foreign exchange to buy spare parts, poor supplier service, scarce education and training
facilities, and therefore lack of skilled personnel, management commitment and
cooperation, are generally believed to affect success (or failure). However, the case
studies below, from research conducted by the author between 1987 and 1990, show that
it is a combination of several factors which play a role and that it is difficult, and
inappropriate, to isolate a specific set of factors as being the one influencing all
organisations in all countries (Odedra, 1990b). Whilst these findings refer to selected
countries, it is believed that these cases are representative of the difficulties and
challenges encountered in implementing CBIS in other African and developing countries.
The next section analyses some of the existing literature which has identified some
of the factors, at both national and organisational level, which are thought to influence
success (or failure) of CBIS. The section following this describes the case studies and
briefly analyses them. An overall analysis of the cases is then carried out to identify factors
which may have influenced success (or failure) of CBIS. Finally, some conclusions and
suggestions for future research are provided.

Factors Influencing Success (or Failure) of CBIS

Before proceeding to look at the five case studies, it is important to examine some
of the existing literature and identify key issues which are said to influence success (or
failure) of a CBIS. The literature - based on work done in both the developed and the
developing countries - has identified a number of issues which can be broadly categorised
as national and organisational level factors, as below, although there is a great deal of
overlap between them:

A. National level factors:
Infrastructure (telecommunications,
education & training facilities)
Governmental policies:
Socio-cultural:
Technical (availability of
suitable equipment):
Economic and financial:
Political:
Availability of skilled (Cane, 1992; Moussa & Schware, 1992;
personnel:
Current state of knowledge:
Obsolescence of computing
hardware and software:
B. Organisational level factors:
Socio-cultural:
Structure, norms, and decision
making:
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(Aiyku, 1989; Avgerou & Land, 1992;
Cane, 1992; Davis, 1992;
Moussa & Schware, 1992; Okot-Uma, 1992;
Okoye, 1989; Palvia, et al, 1992; Samaranayake,
1987; Suwandi, et al, 1989; Walsham, et al, 1988;
Wong, 1992)
(Aiyku, 1989; Gilbert & Motiwalla, 1987;
Mody & Dahlman, 1992; Okot-Uma, 1992;
Okoye, 1989; Suwandi, et al, 1989;
Torres, et al, 1987; Walsham et al, 1988;
Wong, 1992)
(Aiyku, 1989; Avgerou & Land, 1992;
Waema & Walsham, 1988;
Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)
(Moussa & Schware, 1992; Palvia, et al, 1992;
Waema & Walsham, 1988; Walsham, et al, 1988;
Walsham, 1989)
(Aiyku, 1989; Waema & Walsham, 1988;
Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)
(Keen, 1981; Waema & Walsham, 1988;
Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)
Palvia, et al, 1992; Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham,
1989)
(Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)
(Palvia et al, 1992)
(Avgerou & Land, 1992; Davis, 1992;
Mohan, et al, 1990; Romm et al., 1991;
Walsham, et al, 1988; Walsham, 1989)
(Avgerou & Land, 1992;
Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991;
Walsham et al, 1988)
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Information technology (Mohan, et al, 1990; Palvia, et al, 1992)

infrastructure:

Political: (Keen, 1981; Walsham et al, 1988;

Walsham, 1989)

Education and Training: (Avgerou & Land, 1992; Medsker & Medsker, 1987;
Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Management support (Cane, 1992; Mody & Dahlman, 1992;

and commitment: Moussa & Schware, 1992; Samek, 1986)

IS development approach: (Moussa & Schware, 1992; Paddock, 1986)

Planning: (Mody & Dahlman, 1992;

Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Strategies: (Mohan, et al, 1990)

Size of the organisation: (Gurbaxani & Whang, 1991)

Skilled Personnel: (Sanwal, 1989)

Funding: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Technology and (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

information changes:

We can see from the above that there is a great deal of connection between the various
factors. For instance, the availability of skilled personnel is related to the availability of
education and training facilities nationally. Although the literature analyzed above is in no
way complete, it shows that different authors have identified various and varying factors as
being ones which influence success (or failure) of CBIS. If we concentrate on the literature
from the DCs (all except Case, Gurbaxani & Whang, Keen, Medsker & Medsker, and
Paddok), it would appear that political, economical, social, technical, and infrastructure
related factors play a more prominent role at the national level, and "human factors" at the
organisational level. This latter issue is more apparent when we examine some of the
existing case studies in the area, as below:

C. Factors apparent from Case Studies

Management support (Bhatnagar, 1989; Galliers, 1987;

and commitment: Han & Render, 1988; Mohan, et al., 1990;
Moussa & Schware, 1992; Patel, 1987;
Pawar, 1991; Peat Marwick, 1989; Rab, 1989;
Tan, et al, 1992)
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Skilled personnel: (Lorchirachoonkul, et al, 1987; Madon, 1991;

Patel, 1987; Rab, 1989; Sanday, 1989;
Tan, et al, 1992; Tikasingh, et al, 1989;
Wong, 1992)

User participation: (Bhatnagar, 1991; Han & Render, 1989;

Madon, 1992; Rodrigues, et al, 1989;
Yusof, et al, 1987)

Political: (Grover, et al, 1988; Jain & Raghuram, 1992;

Madon, 1992; Rodrigues & Waema, 1992)

Socio-cultural: (Ayiku, 1989; Madon, 1992; Robey, at al, 1990;

Rodrigues & Waema, 1992)

Staff motivation: (Bhatnagar, 1991; Madon, 1992;

Samaranayake, 1987)

Awareness of the potential (Bhatnagar, 1989; Madon, 1991;

of IT: Moussa & Schware, 1992;
Tikasingh, et al, 1989)

Interest groups: (Madon, 1992; Patel, 1987; Smith & McKeen, 1992)

Process of computerisation: (Bhatnagar, 1989; Robey, at al, 1990;

Samaranayake, 1987)

Planning: (Bhatnagar, 1989 & 1991; Quarshie, 1990;

Tan, et al, 1992)

Availability of data: (Madon, 1992; Moussa & Schware, 1992;

Samaranayake, 1987)

Education and Training: (Bhatnagar, 1989; N'Jie, 1989; Patel, 1987)

Self interest: (Grover, et al, 1988; Madon, 1992)

Support & maintenance of (Madon, 1991; Moussa & Schware, 1992)

equipment:

IS development approach: (Walsham, 1992)

Role of consultants: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Management turnover: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

Site preparation: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

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Organisation's absorptive capacity: (Moussa & Schware, 1992)

From the above, human factors - user participation, management support and
commitment, skilled personnel - appear to be more prominent in the respective
organisations (only the cases of Galliers, Grover, Peat Marwick, and Smith & McKeen are
from the developed world). However, as the literature surveyed is in no way complete, it
may be premature to reach such conclusions as yet. (The problem with most case studies
is that each author writes a case with an aim of identifying particular factors. This makes
identification of other factors difficult.)
Some of the factors identified above from the case studies are more specific in
nature, while other factors are more organisational and national in nature. These factors
help highlight some of the issues which have influenced CBIS utilisation. We are no way
near highlighting or "pin-pointing" a group of factors which would appear to influence
success (or failure) of CBIS in organisations. In fact, what is more apparent is that maybe
some of these factors are unique to an organisation or a nation (for example, role of
consultants, site preparation, etc), and maybe some problems are more universal (for
example, role of management). Moussa and Schware's recent work on Africa - one of the
very few detailed pieces of work done on Africa and which is more relevant to this paper -
also makes this observation (1992). From their analysis of 76 World Bank projects in
Africa, they identified 5 "core" factors which influence success of CBIS in Africa: (i)
institutional weaknesses; (ii) human resources; (iii) funding; (iv) the local environment; and
(v) technology and information changes. These issues will be refered to again later in the
paper.
Before we examine the five case studies to see if any of the above issues are
apparent in the organisations, it would be right to provide a brief introduction to the
"national infrastructure" in the three countries under review. National and organisational
issues are directly or indirectly related to each other, as well as the social, economic and
political conditions in the country. Governments influence the use of IT by either approving
of the technology, and in-turn investing in the necessary infrastructure to cater for it, or
disapproving of the technology and enforcing restrictions on its importation and use.
Although the governments of Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe do not disapprove of the
technology openly any longer, they have enforced certain restrictions on its importation
and utilisation due to lack of funds to import the equipment (most HW and SW is
imported). All three countries depend heavily on foreign assistance to acquire the
technology and develop the infrastructure.
Lack of funds has also meant that the infrastructure, especially education and
training facilities and telecommunications links - necessary to support the technology -
have not been developed. In general, telecommunications networks and services all over
Africa are grossly inadequate in terms of unmet demand, low penetration nationwide, and
poor quality and reliability of service (Moussa & Schware, 1992). All three countries face a
severe problem in the education and training area. The lack of education and training
facilities has hindered the development of skills through the learning process, and meant
that only a limited number of people can have access to them. This has led to scarcity of
computer skilled personnel to utilise the existing systems. Only Zimbabwe offers a degree
course in computer science; diploma courses are available in Kenya and Zambia. A
number of private training centres exist in these countries, which try to meet some of the
demand, but few are catering to the needs of senior personnel and management. Although
computers were first installed in these countries in the late 1950s and early 1960s, their
use is not as widespread as in the developed countries. This has meant that computer
 7/25

literacy and awareness at a national level is minimal. Some of these problems will be
apparent in the case studies below.

Case Studies
Below, five case studies - an insurance company and a bank from Zambia, a bank
and a government IS department from Kenya, and a government computer centre in
Zimbabwe - are presented and a brief analysis is undertaken at the end of each case;
more details on these cases can be found in Odedra 1990b. To preserve the identity of the
organisations, no names will be mentioned, including those of people who revealed some
of the information, to avoid prosecution.

Case A: An Insurance Company

A sole insurance company operating in Zambia, with over 2 million clients in 1989,
introduced its first computer, an IBM System 3, in 1978 when it became difficult to process
data manually. The company soon realised that this machine could not cope with the
workload and further expansion was considered. In 1979, a computer steering committee
was formed to direct computerisation in the company. The committee encountered
difficulty in forming an IS strategy without a corporate plan. Therefore, in late 1979, a
corporate planning division was set up to formulate the corporate plan. The steering
committee, largely under the direction of an expatriate consultant, developed the IS
strategy in 1984.
In late 1986, two more IBM machines, an IBM System 36 and IBM 4361 at a cost of
US$700,000, were acquired with the aim of moving away from batch processing to on-line
systems. Two machines were bought, one each for the company's two sites, with the
intention of linking them. Lack of foreign exchange to acquire more equipment, however,
meant that applications development was hampered and the machine at the two sites
could not be linked, largely due to the overall poor telecommunications infrastructure in the
country.
IBM, the supplier, lacked skilled computer personnel who could train or undertake
maintenance for the company. Some staff from the insurance company were sent abroad
for training, as such facilities were lacking locally. After successful training, unfortunately,
such skilled personnel were immediately lost to the private sector where salaries and
career paths were better. The lack of skilled computer personnel at the company,
therefore, hindered the computerisation process to a large extent. The average
employment was two years. In 1990, the company only had half the required computer
staff; there were over 60 computer vacancies at the time, including those at senior
positions. The machines were underutilised as problems were encountered in operating
and developing applications in-house.
Despite the lack of computer skilled staff, the company decided to become the first
organisation in the country to write applications in-house using the SSADM (Structured
Systems Analysis and Design Methodology), and make use of a wide variety of software
packages and languages. The company thought it would be cheaper to write the
applications in-house than to buy a software package which would require customisation
anyway. By late 1989, only half of the applications had been developed, largely with the
help of expatriates who had been with the company until mid-1989.
The management was supportive of the computerisation process but lacked the
necessary computer awareness for decision making. Many also lacked business
experience having been given their positions for reasons other than business skills. The
only computer literate person in the computer committee was the head of the computer
 8/25

centre. His task was to explain technical issues to other members although he did not
always succeed since he had no right to "teach" management. By force of cultural norms,
the managers are supposed to know everything and make the decision themselves. Until
1987, a management awareness seminar was conducted once a year by the head of the
computer centre. However, by 1988, it became difficult for him to give a seminar and talk
of the problems with the project as management blamed his incompetence for all the
problems. Outsiders were therefore recruited to conduct the seminar.
It appeared from the IS strategy developed that the consultant, who played a major
role in forming the strategy, had little knowledge about the local environment. Many of the
organisational, social, cultural and financial problems of the country were not taken into
account when preparing the strategy. The strategy was very ambitious, considering the
local circumstances, and difficult to meet in many organisations. The management
nevertheless gave a go ahead to such a strategy. They under-estimated the task of
teaching people SSADM skills and developing the applications in-house. They either did
not care, their job positions being secure, or were unaware of the consequences of a
different decision.
In 1989, top management decided to recruit a group of managers to undertake
different tasks related to computerisation, to improve the functioning of the computer
centre, and to meet the IS strategy of the company. The management hoped the various
"task leaders" would help achieve the set goals. However, by 1991, many of the posts
were still vacant.

Case Analysis
The insurance company faced some of the most common problems faced by many
organisations in Africa: lack of skilled personnel, lack of foreign currency to import
equipment, and poor telecommunications infrastructure. Since the country lacks the
necessary education and training facilities, there is lack of computer skilled personnel
nationally. The insurance company, therefore, had problems recruiting and retaining local
personnel - expatriates were becoming too expensive to hire. However, their problems
were further aggravated by the organisation choosing to use a systems development
methodology which was not only far too complicated and time consuming but in which
skills were lacking. Skills in SSADM are scarce everywhere and the situation is worse in
Zambia. Skilled managerial staff are even harder to find. Yet, the management had an
illusion that an increase in management personnel at the computer centre would solve
some of the problems. But even if these posts are filled, it is difficult to say what role they
will be able to play when the skills needed are those at the systems development level.
The availability of foreign exchange was also a hindrance to the computerisation process.
The organisation had the necessary funds but had to wait for its foreign exchange
allocation to import more equipment. The poor telecommunications infrastructure in the
country did not help either.
One interesting thing to notice at this organisation was that IS strategies and long
term planning do not seem to help much in countries where such plans depend on the
availability of foreign exchange and personnel among other things. The internal
organisation of the company was well planned with a corporate planning division and a
computer steering committee but their effectiveness cannot be predicted under the
financial and personnel constraints. The corporate plan, which was prepared after the IS
development strategy was in the pipeline, was constantly changed to suit the
circumstances and this made it difficult to follow. Such plans can be helpful as a guide but
are difficult to adhere to under constraints faced by many African organisations. However,
 9/25

even in organisations where some constraints are not hindrances to implementation, such
strategies and plans are hardly adhered to and money is often wasted on hiring
consultants to develop them. The usefulness of such plans is, therefore, controversial.
Case B: A National Bank
This bank in Zambia holds thousands of accounts, including those of the
government and the personal accounts of the leader of the country. The need for efficiently
managed accounts was, therefore, great since these accounts may be used to "monitor"
the overall economic situation of the country. The bank was managed by a large number
of civil servants, many having been with the bank for over twenty years. Against this
background, computers were introduced in some departments to help with data
processing. The banking office first introduced Epsom microcomputers which were only
able to perform certain operations. The system was ineffective overall since the data
stored was usually out of date. When competitors started automating, the bank decided to
computerise all its banking activities by acquiring larger machines.
Consultants were hired to carry out a feasibility study and suggest a system which
should be bought. They suggested NCR machines which were used by most financial
institutions. However, their recommendations were not followed. The problems
encountered by the banking office were not examined to see if there was anything the
bank could learn from their computerisation experience. The management, through lack of
computer literacy and awareness, personal motives, or maybe due to colonial links,
decided to buy four ICL System 25's in mid 1980's for each of its banking activities;
decision makers, with no technical background, had attended ICL System 25
demonstrations abroad, at ICL's expense. No air-conditioned room was prepared for the
machines and neither were skilled computer personnel recruited to operate the equipment
when the machines arrived. Within two years, the machines were moved to three different
locations. The first computer manager was hired two years after the machines had arrived!
It was hoped that these machines could be linked into a network so that all the
different sectors of the bank could share data. However, this was not possible when the
machines arrived. ICL supplied machines which could not be linked and which were faulty,
and provided a software package for which no local customisation skills existed. Moreover,
they had highly under quoted the price of the machines. The banking office, because of
the weaknesses in the Epsom system, resisted introduction of the ICL machines. On top of
all these problems, the supplier insisted the bank hire a project manager recommended by
them. The expatriate manager knew nothing about the banking environment or the
software package he had to customise and manage. He spent two years customising part
of the package. By late 1989, only one of the four machines was being used. The bank
had less than half the computer staff needed at the time. The staff turn-over was high and
most of those who were hired when the machines arrived had already left.
In general, the benefits of computerisation were not realised at the bank. Some of
the top managers who made the decision to acquire the equipment have either left the
bank, or they acquired the machines because they were personally gaining from them (a
percentage in foreign exchange to keep), and no longer cared what happened to the
machines. Decision making was also made difficult because of the large number of
officials in the hierarchy with little computer literacy and awareness. Changes in the
leadership, which was frequent, also affected the operation at all levels. A person made
plans to initiate a project, and just before implementation, he would be moved to a different
post, or resign. The new person came in and started from scratch. The general manager
for projects, who was in charge of the computer project, did not pay full attention to events
in the data centre and never demanded to know what was happening. It was well known at
 10/25

the bank that he did not know much about the technology and therefore did not like to
discuss the project with anyone.

Case Analysis
It appears that there was lack of awareness at management level with regards to
what the computers were capable of doing and lack of organisation regarding
responsibilities. This could be largely due to their lack of computer awareness or literacy.
They either had no idea or did not care about the consequences of buying hardware which
may have not been suitable for the bank or of not having found air-conditioned room to
store the equipment and skilled personnel to use the machines. Overall, the bank had no
strategic focus as to where it should heading and this was reflected in their attitude to
acquire and use computers. There was very little commitment to improve things at the
bank. Management's own concern appeared to be in securing their own personal
positions; the future of the back was not important. Even the general manager of projects
at the bank, who had the responsibility of the computerisation project, did not care whether
the machines were being used or not.
The supplier, knowing the weaknesses in the bank, appears to have taken
advantage of the situation. They supplied equipment which was faulty and could not be
linked; decentralisation of operations and sharing of data between the different
departments was not going to be possible. Their support was very poor and requests were
not always met on time. They insisted the bank hire one of their consultants, who was
probably not one of the most suitable for the job, to manage the project. This, together with
the general lack of computer skilled personnel in the organisation further aggravated the
situation.

Case C: A Commercial Bank

This bank is the largest commercial bank in Kenya and contributes highly to
economic development. It was financially well established and was the second most
profitable bank in the country by 1990. It controlled 50 per cent of the banking outlets and
had over 64 full time branches in 38 districts by 1989. The bank had been using ICL
computers since 1968.
By early 1980's, the existing ICL computers could not cope with the increase in
workload created by the growth in customers over the past 10-15 years. Moreover, ICL did
not provide much support for the existing equipment and had been manipulating
maintenance contracts and exploiting the technological ignorance of the bank's personnel.
The risks involved in physically transferring documents from the bank's different sites to
the head office were also increasing; documents were being lost or stolen, or vehicles
breaking down. Other banks were computerising and competition was growing. The
country's economy had improved and the political opinion about computers had changed.
All this led to the bank's decision to expand its computer use to link-up all the branches
using a network. None of the potential users at the branches were consulted.
The chairman of the bank decided to update the bank's computing facilities in early
1984. The information processing division manager assigned to look into the computer
needs of the bank suggested upgrading to another ICL machine. The chairman rejected
this as the manager did not produce strong reasons as to why ICL machines should be
bought. The manager, who was British, resigned. A year later, the chairman formed a
computer strategy committee, of senior managers, which was supposed to produce a
strategy outlining the bank's computer needs for the next ten years. This committee
produced a statement of requirements instead and suggested the bank buys IBM, NCR
 11/25

and Olivetti equipment. This was again rejected by the chairman who instead asked them
to produce a terms of reference document. This was ready at the end of 1986. But the
chairman did not approve of it either, and instead hired a technical consultant, not known
to anyone at the bank, who had no banking experience and knew little about the country. It
had been realised that the committee members lacked technical skills, that the original
terms of reference were not good enough, that the committee members could not defend
their strategy and that since the capital involved was so high, an independent assessment
was necessary.
Since no explicit corporate strategy existed, the hired consultant formed a
committee which would be involved in developing the corporate strategy. This committee
was approved by the general manager of the bank but the chairman rejected it as it
superseded the committee he had already formed. He therefore formed a different
committee altogether. The new committee needed to know the bank's strategic objectives
before they could start formulating a computer strategy. To find this out, they interviewed
management on the future plans for the bank, its priorities and its mission. The results of
these interviews showed that there were marked differences about the objectives of the
bank at different levels of the hierarchy and also that there was no clear picture of where it
should be heading. The consultant continued to develop the IS strategy despite these
disagreements.
The next stage was to establish information requirements of the banking operations
by interviewing present and potential users but here again problems were encountered.
Most managers and users lacked the knowledge about the potential use of computers and
resisted their introduction. The information collected was therefore not comprehensive
enough. But the consultant formulated a strategy based on this. Some senior management
approved the strategy whilst others rejected it. With support from the chairman, a tender
was put out for computers. Only the consultant was to carry out the evaluation of the
tender documents; various individuals objected to this. In the meantime, the chairman
continued to visit vendor sites abroad to view what was available and to look for funding
for the project. In late 1989, he decided to buy an IBM machine for the head office and
NCR computers for the regional offices (Waema & Walsham, 1990).

Case Analysis
The events which led to the formation of the IS strategy and the acquisition of new
machines at the bank are typical of many organisations in Africa and some of the conflict
in the hierarchy may also exist in more advanced countries. The inheritance of a monopoly
equipment supplier, the lack of technical skills and computer literate managers (despite the
bank having used computers since 1968), the history of previous attempts to form an IS
strategy, the lack of strategic focus and the lack of integration of the IS function into the
mainstream of the bank's business led to the delay in IS strategy formation (took four
years, 1984-1988, to form the strategy) and in turn the acquisition of the machines.
As is typical of many organisations in Africa, the management was highly
hierarchical at the bank. It consisted of non-technical people who did not directly resist the
computer technology but delayed the introduction process by having conflicts and
disagreeing with each other. The management had no idea as to where the bank should
be heading in the future and therefore resisted the formation of a corporate strategy as this
might have forced them to think about it and make decisions. The organisational problems
encountered in simply formulating a strategy and choosing a machine were so numerous
that there may be many more to come in making effective use of the technology (few
attempts were being made to recruit new skilled staff or train existing ones). The work
 12/25

carried out by the different committees and the consultant appears to have contributed
little to the chairman's decision to buy the IBM and NCR systems.

Case D: I.S. Department in a Ministry

Computerisation at this IS department in Kenya started with microcomputers
donated to the ministry in early 1983. The microcomputers were used initially for
word-processing to prepare the district development plans before their use was extended
to prepare the national budget. Their use was resisted by various government officials but
the development plans were developed successfully and the opinion about the machines
changed slightly. In May 1984, the government was donated some Kaypro machines. At
the same time, the government requested USAID (United States Agency for International
Development) to help them acquire a number of IBM microcomputers to be used for the
budget production.
In 1985, USAID accepted the ministry's request and contracted consultants to
assist in the installation, applications development, training, maintenance, and efforts to
rationalise the budget using microcomputer-based management information systems. The
budget production process at the ministry had usually been chaotic. Finance officers used
hand calculators to add the many figures in the budget. A great deal of time was
consumed in calculating and recalculating to obtain accurate figures. The documents had
to be re-typed several times. People had to work 12 hours or more a day to balance the
figures, and budget officers often slept at the government printing press during the final
days.
Despite these problems, most finance and budget officers did not support the
introduction of microcomputers into the budget production process. One exception was
that microcomputers would facilitate the mechanics of producing the budget and would
reduce the amount of time budget officers had to spend proof-reading and correcting
budget documents, helping them to deliver the budget on time. Another anticipated impact
was on the substance of the budget allocation process. Usually, budget supply officers
arbitrarily cut the ministry budget submissions and gave them only a brief opportunity to
look over the results before the budget was printed. As a result, allocations often failed to
reflect the priorities of each ministry. Sometimes the cuts impaired projects or the
ministry's basic operations. Without the use of microcomputers, it was clear that existing
problems at the ministry were likely to intensify.
Despite some objections, the budget production using computers proceeded. But
with time, it became clear that there were serious problems related to human rather than
technical factors. Most important was the resistance to microcomputers by many budget
supply officers who were reluctant to change the way they had prepared the budget in the
past. The main problem was the officers inadequate understanding of microcomputer
operations. Initially there were plans to hold information-cum-training sessions for the
officers but top ministry officials decided that the budget officers would inevitably oppose
the new system, and that microcomputer training for those officers would be a wasted
effort. They felt that the officers would eventually support the new system as its benefits
became clear. Despite these problems, the 1986 budget was produced and ready ahead
of schedule; the budget was presented to the Parliament earlier than ever before in the
history of the country. It was acclaimed for its accuracy and timeliness by the political
establishment. The success of this project is thought to have changed the government's
perception of IT, and the use of microcomputers in other application areas was
encouraged.
The ministry had serious problems, however, in recruiting and retaining skilled
 13/25

personnel. For instance, a programmer who had then just graduated from university was
chosen to become the deputy head of the department, and a programmer from a
neighbouring country acted as a consultant, advisor, trainer and programmer. Neither of
these men had the skills and experience to manage such a project. The expatriate
consultants, therefore, played a big role in the introduction of microcomputers at the
ministry. The problems for which the donated computers could be used were largely
perceived by the consultants and advisors who were computer literate. They not only
managed the project but programmed and documented the applications and gave
instructions. The government computer centre had the necessary skills but they were
against the ministry making use of microcomputers. They did not want competition and,
therefore, resisted the introduction, not allowing any of their experienced personnel to help
out.
The lack of computer awareness and literacy at management level led them to be
largely against computer introductions early on. Over the years, the resistance lessened,
with computer awareness growing in the government and with the success of a few
projects. However, the management made little effort to institutionalise the projects and
improve the infrastructure to make technology transfer successful. The department was
still treated by some officials as a "USAID department". Very little decision making was
based on the output from the machines, largely as there were few incentives to do so.
Automation represented a threat, as previously, a great deal of autonomous authority was
used for decision making.
The most important objectives of the budget production was to strengthen the
financial and planning information systems of the ministry. There were two budget
production goals. One was to facilitate the physical production of the budget by improving
the speed and accuracy of calculations, permitting corrections to be made more easily,
and eliminating many of the routine proofreading and retyping tasks. This goal was
achieved with the introduction of microcomputers.
The second goal was to improve the substance of budget allocations. Time
constraints usually forced budget officers to cut ministry budget submissions with little
information from ministries about project priorities and requisite resources. With the
computer system, the early completion of the budget gave officers considerably more time
to analyze the financial issues reflected in the budget but although they did some routine
checks to ensure that ministry submissions were within their ceilings, they conducted
virtually no substantive analysis. Nor did they spend more time conferring with the
ministries. Readier access to information merely meant that the officers made the same
decision more quickly than they would have made without the use of the computer system.

Case Analysis
In this project, management systems and structures, rather than technical issues
emerged as being key to determining the response to microcomputer adoption in the
ministry. One of the problems was the lack of communication between the budget officers
and the computer staff, and among the computer professionals themselves; no formal
meetings or discussions were held to discuss what was happening and where they should
be heading. The computer staff thought the officers were going to reject the system
anyway and it was not worth their while speaking to them.
 14/25

Another related problem was the lack of involvement, and training, of the officers
from early on. Such involvement may have solved part of the resistance problem. Another
problem was that roles and responsibilities of all those involved in the project were very
superficial. Management roles and responsibilities often changed during the project
life-cycle and this caused tension. The project has been managed by people with widely
different backgrounds which has had contrary effects on personnel involved.
The power structure in the organisation also affected the initial use of
microcomputers. Those with power over resources, budget officers, were critical of the
effective use and adoption of microcomputers. Since many important decisions in the
ministry were commonly made on basis other than financial data, computer based financial
systems would change the system they were used to. There was also lack of formal
incentives for them to conduct analysis. The ministry's formal systems offered no positive
incentive for learning to use the microcomputers or analyzing the information they provide.
Nor were there any sanctions for failing to do so. As a result, the lack of incentives
obstructed the use of computers to improve decision-making among the professional staff.
Management was initially opposed to the use of the microcomputers for a number
of reasons which made the successful use of the machines difficult. Computers were
politically sensitive at the time because important Kenyan politicians and civil servants
believed that computers would displace workers and that they were too sophisticated.
When the political opinion about the technology changed, after the successful completion
of the budget, the machines were more readily acceptable.
The experience of the IS department again points to the lack of computer literacy
and awareness at all levels in the organisation. No attempt was made to familiarise users
of the potential of computers. The department had little success in recruiting skilled
computer personnel from outside. Therefore, their dependency on the consultants had
increased over the years. Moreover, the consultants were a third party and they therefore
had the power to communicate with senior management and users; a civil servant lower
down in the hierarchy would not have been able do so. The consultants, many of whom
had been with the department for 7-8 years, had succeeded in helping automate the
budget process and had developed a few other financial applications but the skills
transferred to their local counterparts had been minimal.

Case E: A Government Computer Centre

This government computer centre undertakes data processing activities for all
government ministries and departments in Zimbabwe. In 1989, it served over thirty
departments and processed over a hundred computer applications. The centre's effective
and efficient functioning was therefore very important as many of the applications
processed influenced the everyday operations of the government. The centre introduced
its first computer, an ICT, in 1962 for data processing. This was replaced in 1972 by an
NCR machine which was upgraded by another NCR machine in 1982. In the same year, a
sister organisation, which later merged with the computer centre, acquired a Data General
machine and also received a donation of Perkin Elmer (Concurrent) machines; machines
which could not be locally serviced or maintained. All these machines were incompatible
and therefore worked in isolation undertaking different tasks. Most of the workload was
carried out on the NCR machine whilst the others ran on average one application each. By
1989, the centre alone had over US$10 million worth of equipment. All other government
ministries and departments together had over 200 machines of various sizes and of 14
different makes/brands!
 15/25

By mid-1980s, the centre was facing severe shortage of skilled personnel and the
management decided to solve the problem of underutilisation of the existing equipment,
the non-compatibility of the systems and the lack of personnel, by introducing a system
which would standardise everything and where fewer programming skills would be
required. The management wanted to acquire packages wherever possible and phase out
the use of NCR machines by transferring all the existing applications to a new system.
As a formality, a computer committee was formed to look into the acquisition of the
machines; most members had little or no computer literacy or awareness. These
committee members attended vendor presentations and made decisions largely based on
instincts rather than expertise. A senior programmer was recruited to prepare the
requirements specification document. The users he interviewed had little knowledge of
what their true needs were, largely because of their lack of computer awareness. Their
manual systems were also in a mess. Based on these poor user requirements, the
programmer formulated a requirements specification document which the centre submitted
with the tender.
In 1986, management decided to buy six Data General machines - two MV20,000
super minis and four MV2000 minicomputers. This caused a great deal of controversy in
the ministry as some users would have preferred NCR machines again; NCR machines
were then being used by the centre. It appeared that some senior management had
already made up their minds, before the tender was put out, about which vendor to select
and did not care about much else. The management was accused of taking bribes from
one of the two suppliers involved (NCR and Data General). The director of the sister
organisation, which by then had merged with the centre, resigned and later became the
marketing manager for NCR; one of the bidders.
The Data General machines lay idle for a year while the management searched for
software packages. Personnel problems restricted the centre from developing their own
applications or customising packages; outside help was not sought. It took nearly three
years to customise half of the applications which required converting. No plans had been
made as to which applications should receive development priority; no explicit strategies
existed either. Most of the Data General machines were still underutilised in late 1989;
three years after installation. The staff morale was low in making use of these machines
and personnel turn-over high. Staff who had been working on the old machines did not find
the Data General machines appropriate and resisted their use. They would have preferred
NCR machines because they were familiar with them and also thought the file transfer
would have been easier between the old and the new machines. The skills acquired from
the training courses, given by the suppliers, were lost to the private sector.
Management turn-over was very high and this affected everyday operations. There
was either no director to manage the operation or there was one who was unaware of the
plans made by the previous management, and therefore started planning all over again.

Case Analysis
The strategies the management had set out before acquiring the Data General
machines, namely buying packages wherever possible and phasing out the use of NCR
machines by transferring all applications to the new machines, were reasonable but too
ambitious. Foreign exchange is required to acquire packages developed abroad; packages
which may be difficult to customise without the skills. Both skilled personnel and foreign
exchange were lacking in the country. It appears from the way the acquisition process was
handled that the management had their own interests in buying the Data General
machines; whether these machines would have been appropriate for the centre or not, in
 16/25

any case, is a separate issue.

The case also illustrates the decision making process in organisations in Africa
where decisions are made by those not directly in touch with the technology or those who
have little background and experience to back their decision. Lack of commitment and
computer awareness was obvious amongst the management when they allowed a tender
to be put out with incomplete user specification. The machines were acquired using weak
user requirements and little planning was done about the applications which needed
priority. The suppliers appear to have taken advantage of the situation by selling six
machines when the job could have been done on fewer. Staff morale was overall low
which affected the use of the machines. They did not find Data General machines
appropriate and felt the centre was paying a high price for them. The wide variety of
equipment the centre used also caused problems in recruiting and retaining staff with the
relevant skills, not considering the poor salaries in the government. The high turnover at
managerial level did not help either. The lack of planning at the government level largely
led to underutilisation of equipment at the centre and in other ministries; most ministries
had their own equipment and did not need to use the services of the centre any more.
Most of the problems, however, appear to have been caused by lack of computer literacy
and awareness at all levels in the organisation.

Overall Analysis
It is difficult to judge from the above five cases whether the systems implemented
were successes or failures, as to some a CBIS may have been a failure but to the
management it may have been a success. As the depth and detail of each of the cases
differs, such an analysis would be difficult. Moreover, this issue is beyond the scope of this
paper. A number of factors, however, appear to have influenced the introduction and
utilisation of CBIS in the organisations studied:

Lack of management support and commitment: Case A, B, C, D, E

Lack of skilled personnel: Case A, B, D, E
Role of consultants: Case B, C, D, E
Structure, norms, decision making: Case B, C, D, E
User resistance: Case B, D, E
Lack of strategic focus, planning: Case B, D, E
Lack of awareness of potential of IT: Case B, C, D
Management turnover: Case B, D, E
Lack of user education and training: Case B, D
Poor supplier support: Case A, B
Lack of funds: Case A, E
Lack of telecommunications infrastructure: Case A
Inappropriate IS development approach: Case A
Site preparation: Case B

It was apparent from the cases that management attitudes, commitment,

cooperation, and support towards computerisation, their motives for acquiring a particular
brand of machine and not another, and their computer literacy and awareness played a
major role in the success with which computers were introduced and used by
organisations. Lack of management commitment was also identified as one of the key
factors in the research conducted Moussa and Schware in 76 organisations in Africa
 17/25

(1992). The second major factor which appears to have influenced utilisation was the
availability of skilled computer personnel, and in general computer literacy and awareness
at all levels. Although these two issues had different consequences on different
organisations, they appear to be more prominent than some of other the factors outlined
above.
The insurance company (case A) lacked computer skilled staff to develop
applications in-house using SSADM methodology which led to underutilisation of
equipment and reliance on consultants to develop some of the initial applications. The lack
of computer literacy and awareness at the national bank (case B) and supplier
manipulation led to the bank acquiring ICL machines which were inappropriate for the
organisation. At the commercial bank (case C), it took four years to formulate an
information systems strategy due lack of computer skills and management conflict.
The situation was similar at the IS department in the ministry (case D) which also lacked
computer skills and awareness. Lack of computer skilled personnel and lack of computer
aware management had led the government computer centre (case E) to acquire a wide
range of equipment, much of which was underutilised.
The problem of skills shortage is especially evident in the public sector in Africa.
Government bureaucracies are slow to recruit, train and/or retain IT personnel, or pay
them wages comparable to those in the private sector. This has resulted in very high staff
and management turnover in the public sector. The government organisations are
currently used as a training ground by new graduates who leave for greener pastures as
soon as they have acquired sufficient experience. This has put a big strain on the training
resources available in the public sector. The private sector is benefiting at the expense of
the government.
Most of the organisations studied were highly hierarchical, management
responsibility and accountability was totally missing, and there was lack of strategic focus
or direction as to where the organisation should be heading. The problem is that many of
the public sector organisations in Africa are managed by those who may have held their
positions for many years; positions which they may have secured for reasons other than
business/management skills. Such managers' encounter with computers, at educational
institutions or elsewhere, is usually minimal and this has resulted in lack of computer
literacy and awareness. Senior management, therefore, either resists the technology or
are not cooperative in the process of automation. For various reasons, few Africans in the
public sector feel responsible for their actions and even fewer are committed to their
organisations. The economic situation in these countries and the poor salaries managers
receive has also increased corruption and bribery. Managers appreciate some
"sweeteners" from vendors whose equipment they may decide to buy. This has often led
to acquisition of inappropriate equipment which is underutilised. Competition is fierce
among the many suppliers because of the small computer market and they therefore lure
managers into buying equipment by bribing them.
Some of the other factors outlined above, such as the role of consultants, user
resistance, lack of potential of IT, lack of strategic focus and planning are all related to lack
of computer literacy and awareness in organisations, whereas as other factors such as
management turnover and the structures, norms, decision making, etc. are more to do
with the organisational structure. For instance, the lack of knowledge about what IS can do
for their business and lack of integration of the IS function into the mainstream business
were both a result of lack of computer literacy and awareness at senior levels in many
organisations. The dependency on foreign consultants is also due to lack of skills at the
local level, as seen in most of the cases. In Africa, successful implementation of
 18/25

computers often depends on the performance of outside consultants (Moussa and

Schware, 1992). Their performance, however, also depends on other organisational and
national factors and one cannot blame them for all the unsuccessful projects in Africa.
Moussa and Schware's research also identifies some of the above factors, namely, lack of
strategic focus or planning, management turnover, poor supplier support, funding, and site
preparation, as influencing success of a project.
Although, apart from case A and E, no direct reference is made to the funding
situation in the cases, all five organisations faced problems with funds, especially the
availability of foreign currency to import hardware and software, and to hire consultants.
The insurance company did not have the funds to buy further equipment and software
packages, the chairman of the bank in Kenya went around looking for funds for the
computerisation project, and the IS department had to depend on donor agencies for its
microcomputers.
From the five cases studied, we see that apart from the bank in Kenya (case C),
which took 4 years to develop its IS strategy, and the insurance company (case A), none
of the other organisations had any plans or strategies as such. Work done by Moussa and
Schware also shows that a large percentage of the 76 projects they reviewed had serious
planning problems (1992). They found that many organisations had rushed into projects
without sufficient planning. However, the case of the insurance company (case A) shows
that IS planning on its own is not always effective when such plans cannot be put into
action due to other factors beyond the organisation's control. This is not to say that
organisation's should not plan, planning is very important and may lead to a success of a
project, but to emphasise that all plans should take national and organisational factors into
account to make them implementable.
We can see that some of the factors listed above from the five case studies have
also been identified by other authors, as outlined in earlier. Apart from the national and
organisational level factors, there is a great deal of overlap between some factors
identified above and those identified in other authors' case studies. As the national and
organisational infrastructure varies from case to case, and country to country, we can see
that some factors are a hindrance to successful application of CBIS in certain
organisations and not other. For example, poor telecommunications infrastructure in
Zambia resulted in the insurance company (case A) having problems in making use of
their computers whilst at the bank (case B) this problem was not as yet apparent. Again,
lack of user training, supplier support, funds, etc. were a problem in some organisations
but not in other. We can deduct from this that maybe each organisation is unique and,
apart from management support and commitment and the availability of skilled personnel,
in other words the human factors, all other factors influencing introduction and utilisation of
CBIS vary from organisation to organisation, let alone country to country, and that it is a
combination of factors and no single group of factors which influence success (or failure).
However, it should be noted that all these factors are highly inter-related to each
other and one would have an impact on the other. The national level factors are going to
influence those at the organisational level and vice versa. Also that the availability of
skilled computer personnel is not going to solve all the problems unless management
commitment exists and also other factors are supportive. The existing situation would
improve if management support and commitment and skilled personnel existed but only if
it is supported by other national and organisational conditions. For instance, at the bank in
Kenya (case C), even if management support and commitment improves and the bank
manages to recruit skilled personnel, the goal of linking up all the 64 branches, some
located in remote parts of the country, may not be fulfilled if the telecommunications
 19/25

infrastructure does not support it.

Conclusions and further research

The case studies, which included important organisations such as national banks
and government computer centres, showed that management commitment and support,
and the availability of skilled computer personnel influenced the success with which
computers were introduced and utilised by public sector organisations in Africa. Although
these two factors were much more prominent than other factors in all the five cases
studied, this is not to say that all CBIS's introduced in Africa would be successes if these
two factors were present. These two factors would certainly play a major role but there are
other national and organisational level factors which also play a role in the success (or
failure) of CBIS. In other words, it is a combination of factors which influence success (or
failure) and no particular group of factors. Factors vary from organisation to organisation
and country to country.
However, some of the existing problems of underutilisation of equipment, due to
lack of skilled personnel, the problem of "misinvestment" due to lack of computer literacy
and awareness at management level, the supplier manipulation, dependency of foreign
consultants, etc. can be solved by an intelligent development of human resources.
Education and training facilities need to be improved and increased in number so that
more people can gain computer literacy and awareness at all levels. Such facilities should
be geared not just for the training of computer professionals but also for the training of the
managers, the users, and the policy makers. Such computer awareness is necessary so
that an effort can be made to improve the infrastructure that is required for successful
transfer and utilisation.
Finances are scarce in Africa and one cannot afford to waste them in acquiring
equipment which is going to be underutilised because of lack of skilled personnel. The
governments, as well as the private sector, have to take the initiative of making education
and training one of its development priorities, and invest in human resource development.
Personnel have to be trained if they are to absorb skills, they have to be given incentives
to work, their working conditions have to be improved and their salaries raised to
reasonable level to reduce the brain drain to the private sector and, last but not least,
personnel have to be made to feel part of the organisation by involving them in the
decision making process.
The potential of further research in the area of information systems and
computerisation in DCs is great. Work presented in this paper has highlighted a number of
areas in which further research is required. National and organisational conditions in DCs
are very different to those found in the developed world and, therefore, it is often
inappropriate to apply existing experiences and research from the developed nations.
There is an urgent need for further IS research in DCs, done from the DCs' perspective.
There is certainly a need for further research to identify factors which may influence
success (or failure) of CBIS in DCs; to identify factors which may be unique to a nation or
a region. There is a also a need for more detailed case studies from DCs which focus not
just on the technical issues but also on the social, organisational and political dimensions.
 20/25

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Biography

After completing her PhD on the "Transfer of Information Technology to Developing

Countries" at the London School of Economics in 1990, Mayuri Odedra-Straub worked as
a consultant with the Management Development Programme of the Commonwealth
Secretariat. In early 1991, she joined IDG to help launch a new computer magazine for
Africa - PC World Africa. She worked as an editor and research associate for the
magazine until June 1992 when she moved to Singapore to join Dept. of Information
Systems and Computer Science at the National University of Singapore, where she
lectures in information systems.