Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-630

November 15, 1947

ALEXANDER A. KRIVENKO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
THE REGISTER OF DEEDS, CITY OF MANILA, respondent and appellee.
Gibbs, Gibbs, Chuidian and Quasha of petitioner-appellant.
First Assistant Solicitor General Reyes and Solicitor Carreon for respondent-appellee.
Marcelino Lontok appeared as amicus curies.
MORAN, C.J.:
Alenxander A. Kriventor alien, bought a residential lot from the Magdalena Estate, Inc., in December
of 1941, the registration of which was interrupted by the war. In May, 1945, he sought to accomplish
said registration but was denied by the register of deeds of Manila on the ground that, being an
alien, he cannot acquire land in this jurisdiction. Krivenko then brought the case to the fourth branch
of the Court of First Instance of Manila by means of a consulta, and that court rendered judgment
sustaining the refusal of the register of deeds, from which Krivenko appealed to this Court.
There is no dispute as to these facts. The real point in issue is whether or not an alien under our
Constitution may acquire residential land.
It is said that the decision of the case on the merits is unnecessary, there being a motion to withdraw
the appeal which should have been granted outright, and reference is made to the ruling laid down
by this Court in another case to the effect that a court should not pass upon a constitutional question
if its judgment may be made to rest upon other grounds. There is, we believe, a confusion of ideas in
this reasoning. It cannot be denied that the constitutional question is unavoidable if we choose to
decide this case upon the merits. Our judgment cannot to be made to rest upon other grounds if we
have to render any judgment at all. And we cannot avoid our judgment simply because we have to
avoid a constitutional question. We cannot, for instance, grant the motion withdrawing the appeal
only because we wish to evade the constitutional; issue. Whether the motion should be, or should
not be, granted, is a question involving different considerations now to be stated.
According to Rule 52, section 4, of the Rules of Court, it is discretionary upon this Court to grant a
withdrawal of appeal after the briefs have been presented. At the time the motion for withdrawal was
filed in this case, not only had the briefs been prensented, but the case had already been voted and
the majority decision was being prepared. The motion for withdrawal stated no reason whatsoever,
and the Solicitor General was agreeable to it. While the motion was pending in this Court, came the
new circular of the Department of Justice, instructing all register of deeds to accept for registration all
transfers of residential lots to aliens. The herein respondent-appellee was naturally one of the
registers of deeds to obey the new circular, as against his own stand in this case which had been
maintained by the trial court and firmly defended in this Court by the Solicitor General. If we grant the
withdrawal, the the result would be that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not
by a decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice, issued while
this case was pending before this Court. Whether or not this is the reason why appellant seeks the
withdrawal of his appeal and why the Solicitor General readily agrees to that withdrawal, is now

immaterial. What is material and indeed very important, is whether or not we should allow
interference with the regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions, and
whether or not after having held long deliberations and after having reached a clear and positive
conviction as to what the constitutional mandate is, we may still allow our conviction to be silenced,
and the constitutional mandate to be ignored or misconceived, with all the harmful consequences
that might be brought upon the national patromony. For it is but natural that the new circular be
taken full advantage of by many, with the circumstance that perhaps the constitutional question may
never come up again before this court, because both vendors and vendees will have no interest but
to uphold the validity of their transactions, and very unlikely will the register of deeds venture to
disobey the orders of their superior. Thus, the possibility for this court to voice its conviction in a
future case may be remote, with the result that our indifference of today might signify a permanent
offense to the Constitution.
All thse circumstances were thoroughly considered and weighted by this Court for a number of days
and the legal result of the last vote was a denial of the motion withdrawing the appeal. We are thus
confronted, at this stage of the proceedings, with our duty, the constitutional question becomes
unavoidable. We shall then proceed to decide that question.
Article XIII, section 1, of the Constitutional is as follows:
Article XIII. Conservation and utilization of natural resources.
SECTION 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, water, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inaguration of the
Government established uunder this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of
public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no licence, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to
water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water "power" in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant.
The scope of this constitutional provision, according to its heading and its language, embraces all
lands of any kind of the public domain, its purpose being to establish a permanent and fundamental
policy for the conservation and utilization of all natural resources of the Nation. When, therefore, this
provision, with reference to lands of the public domain, makes mention of only agricultural, timber
and mineral lands, it means that all lands of the public domain are classified into said three groups,
namely, agricultural, timber and mineral. And this classification finds corroboration in the
circumstance that at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, that was the basic classification
existing in the public laws and judicial decisions in the Philippines, and the term "public agricultural
lands" under said classification had then acquired a technical meaning that was well-known to the
members of the Constitutional Convention who were mostly members of the legal profession.
As early as 1908, in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175, 182), this Court said
that the phrase "agricultural public lands" as defined in the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, which
phrase is also to be found in several sections of the Public Land Act (No. 926), means "those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither mineral for timber lands." This definition has been
followed in long line of decisions of this Court. (SeeMontano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil., 593;

Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159; Ramosvs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil., 175;
Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, 39 Phil., 560; Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines, 40 Phil.,
10.) And with respect to residential lands, it has been held that since they are neither mineral nor
timber lands, of necessity they must be classified as agricultural. In Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular
Government (13 Phil., 159, 163), this Court said:
Hence, any parcel of land or building lot is susceptible of cultivation, and may be converted
into a field, and planted with all kinds of vegetation; for this reason, where land is not mining
or forestal in its nature, it must necessarily be included within the classification of agricultural
land, not because it is actually used for the purposes of agriculture, but because it was
originally agricultural and may again become so under other circumstances; besides, the Act
of Congress contains only three classification, and makes no special provision with respect
to building lots or urban lands that have ceased to be agricultural land.
In other words, the Court ruled that in determining whether a parcel of land is agricultural, the test is
not only whether it is actually agricultural, but also its susceptibility to cultivation for agricultural
purposes. But whatever the test might be, the fact remains that at the time the Constitution was
adopted, lands of the public domain were classified in our laws and jurisprudence into agricultural,
mineral, and timber, and that the term "public agricultural lands" was construed as referring to those
lands that were not timber or mineral, and as including residential lands. It may safely be presumed,
therefore, that what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the
Constitution was this well-known classification and its technical meaning then prevailing.
Certain expressions which appear in Constitutions, . . . are obviously technical; and where
such words have been in use prior to the adoption of a Constitution, it is presumed that its
framers and the people who ratified it have used such expressions in accordance with their
technical meaning. (11 Am. Jur., sec. 66, p. 683.) Also Calder vs. Bull, 3 Dall. [U.S.], 386; 1
Law. ed., 648; Bronson vs. Syverson, 88 Wash., 264; 152 P., 1039.)
It is a fundamental rule that, in construing constitutions, terms employed therein shall be
given the meaning which had been put upon them, and which they possessed, at the time of
the framing and adoption of the instrument. If a word has acquired a fixed, technical meaning
in legal and constitutional history, it will be presumed to have been employed in that sense in
a written Constitution. (McKinney vs. Barker, 180 Ky., 526; 203 S.W., 303; L.R.A., 1918 E,
581.)
Where words have been long used in a technical sense and have been judicially construed
to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted by the legislature as having a certain
meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are used, the rule of construction requires
that the words used in such statute should be construed according to the sense in which they
have been so previously used, although the sense may vary from strict literal meaning of the
words. (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.)
Therefore, the phrase "public agricultural lands" appearing in section 1 of Article XIII of the
Constitution must be construed as including residential lands, and this is in conformity with a
legislative interpretation given after the adoption of the Constitution. Well known is the rule that
"where the Legislature has revised a statute after a Constitution has been adopted, such a revision
is to be regarded as a legislative construction that the statute so revised conforms to the
Constitution." (59 C.J., 1102.) Soon after the Constitution was adopted, the National Assembly
revised the Public Land Law and passed Commonwealth Act No. 141, and sections 58, 59 and 60
thereof permit the sale of residential lots to Filipino citizens or to associations or corporations

controlled by such citizens, which is equivalent to a solemn declaration that residential lots are
considered as agricultural lands, for, under the Constitution, only agricultural lands may be alienated.
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141, "alienable or disposable public lands"
which are the same "public agriculture lands" under the Constitution, are classified into agricultural,
residential, commercial, industrial and for other puposes. This simply means that the term "public
agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning. Under its broad or general meaning,
as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that are neither timber nor mineral. This broad
meaning is particularized in section 9 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public
agricultural lands" for purposes of alienation or disposition, into lands that are stricly agricultural or
actually devoted to cultivation for agricultural puposes; lands that are residential; commercial;
industrial; or lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable
under Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino citizens, is a conclusive indication of their
character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution.
It must be observed, in this connection that prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of Public Land
Act No. 2874, aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential puposes,
but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of aliens to
acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuance of the constitutional
limitation. And, again, prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of Public Land Act No. 2874, land of
the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could be sold or leased to aliens, but
after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, such land may only be
leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be valid while the land is used for the
purposes referred to. The exclusion of sale in the new Act is undoubtedly in pursuance of the
constitutional limitation, and this again is another legislative construction that the term "public
agricultural land" includes land for residence purposes.
Such legislative interpretation is also in harmony with the interpretation given by the Executive
Department of the Government. Way back in 1939, Secretary of Justice Jose Abad Santos, in
answer to a query as to "whether or not the phrase 'public agricultural lands' in section 1 of Article XII
(now XIII) of the Constitution may be interpreted to include residential, commercial, and industrial
lands for purposes of their disposition," rendered the following short, sharp and crystal-clear opinion:
Section 1, Article XII (now XIII) of the Constitution classifies lands of the public domain in the
Philippines into agricultural, timber and mineral. This is the basic classification adopted since
the enactment of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, known as the Philippine Bill. At the
time of the adoption of the Constitution of the Philippines, the term 'agricultural public lands'
and, therefore, acquired a technical meaning in our public laws. The Supreme Court of the
Philippines in the leading case of Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 175, held that the
phrase 'agricultural public lands' means those public lands acquired from Spain which are
neither timber nor mineral lands. This definition has been followed by our Supreme Court in
many subsequent case. . . .
Residential commercial, or industrial lots forming part of the public domain must have to be
included in one or more of these classes. Clearly, they are neither timber nor mineral, of
necessity, therefore, they must be classified as agricultural.
Viewed from another angle, it has been held that in determining whether lands are
agricultural or not, the character of the land is the test (Odell vs. Durant, 62 N.W., 524;
Lorch vs. Missoula Brick and Tile Co., 123 p.25). In other words, it is the susceptibility of the
land to cultivation for agricultural purposes by ordinary farming methods which determines
whether it is agricultural or not (State vs. Stewart, 190 p. 129).

Furthermore, as said by the Director of Lands, no reason is seen why a piece of land, which
may be sold to a person if he is to devote it to agricultural, cannot be sold to him if he intends
to use it as a site for his home.
This opinion is important not alone because it comes from a Secratary of Justice who later became
the Chief Justice of this Court, but also because it was rendered by a member of the cabinet of the
late President Quezon who actively participated in the drafting of the constitutional provision under
consideration. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 598.) And the opinion of the
Quezon administration was reiterated by the Secretary of Justice under the Osmea administration,
and it was firmly maintained in this Court by the Solicitor General of both administrations.
It is thus clear that the three great departments of the Government judicial, legislative and
executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural,
mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots.
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be aliented," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation
is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may
alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is
included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred
or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources
may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural
lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 is intended to
insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1. Both sections must, therefore, be read
together for they have the same purpose and the same subject matter. It must be noticed that the
persons against whom the prohibition is directed in section 5 are the very same persons who under
section 1 are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." And the
subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the non-transferability of "agricultural land" to
aliens. Since "agricultural land" under section 1 includes residential lots, the same technical meaning
should be attached to "agricultural land under section 5. It is a rule of statutory construction that "a
word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute, unless a
different intention appears." (II Sutherland, Statutory Construction, p. 758.) The only difference
between "agricultural land" under section 5, is that the former is public and the latter private. But
such difference refers to ownership and not to the class of land. The lands are the same in both
sections, and, for the conservation of the national patrimony, what is important is the nature or class
of the property regardless of whether it is owned by the State or by its citizens.
Reference is made to an opinion rendered on September 19, 1941, by the Hon. Teofilo Sison, then
Secretary of Justice, to the effect that residential lands of the public domain may be considered as
agricultural lands, whereas residential lands of private ownership cannot be so considered. No
reason whatsoever is given in the opinion for such a distinction, and no valid reason can be adduced
for such a discriminatory view, particularly having in mind that the purpose of the constitutional
provision is the conservation of the national patrimony, and private residential lands are as much an
integral part of the national patrimony as the residential lands of the public domain. Specially is this
so where, as indicated above, the prohibition as to the alienable of public residential lots would

become superflous if the same prohibition is not equally applied to private residential lots. Indeed,
the prohibition as to private residential lands will eventually become more important, for time will
come when, in view of the constant disposition of public lands in favor of private individuals, almost
all, if not all, the residential lands of the public domain shall have become private residential lands.
It is maintained that in the first draft of section 5, the words "no land of private ownership" were used
and later changed into "no agricultural land of private ownership," and lastly into "no private
agricultural land" and from these changes it is argued that the word "agricultural" introduced in the
second and final drafts was intended to limit the meaning of the word "land" to land actually used for
agricultural purposes. The implication is not accurate. The wording of the first draft was amended for
no other purpose than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties. The words "no land" of the first
draft, unqualified by the word "agricultural," may be mistaken to include timber and mineral lands,
and since under section 1, this kind of lands can never be private, the prohibition to transfer the
same would be superfluous. Upon the other hand, section 5 had to be drafted in harmony with
section 1 to which it is supplementary, as above indicated. Inasmuch as under section 1, timber and
mineral lands can never be private, and the only lands that may become private are agricultural
lands, the words "no land of private ownership" of the first draft can have no other meaning than
"private agricultural land." And thus the change in the final draft is merely one of words in order to
make its subject matter more specific with a view to avoiding the possible confusion of ideas that
could have arisen from the first draft.
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and
that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses,
playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words,
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor General's Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit
of the Constitution is beyond question.
One of the fundamental principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution and
which was embodied in the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands
and other Natural Resources of the Constitutional Convention, is "that lands, minerals, forests, and
other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino nation. They should,
therefore, be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of that nation and for their posterity."
(2 Aruego, Framing of the Filipino Constitution, p. 595.) Delegate Ledesma, Chairman of the
Committee on Agricultural Development of the Constitutional Convention, in a speech delivered in
connection with the national policy on agricultural lands, said: "The exclusion of aliens from the
privilege of acquiring public agricultural lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the
Public Land Laws of the Philippines to keep pace with the idea of preserving the Philippines for the
Filipinos." (Emphasis ours.) And, of the same tenor was the speech of Delegate Montilla who
said: "With the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources it is to be understood that
our God-given birthright should be one hundred per cent in Filipino hands . . .. Lands and natural
resources are immovables and as such can be compared to the vital organs of a person's body, the
lack of possession of which may cause instant death or the shortening of life. If we do not completely
antionalize these two of our most important belongings, I am afraid that the time will come when we
shall be sorry for the time we were born. Our independence will be just a mockery, for what kind of
independence are we going to have if a part of our country is not in our hands but in those of
foreigners?" (Emphasis ours.) Professor Aruego says that since the opening days of the
Constitutional Convention one of its fixed and dominating objectives was the conservation and
nationalization of the natural resources of the country. (2 Aruego, Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, p 592.) This is ratified by the members of the Constitutional Convention who are now
members of this Court, namely, Mr. Justice Perfecto, Mr. Justice Briones, and Mr. Justice

Hontiveros. And, indeed, if under Article XIV, section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even
operate a small jitney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to own
a pieace of land.
This constitutional intent is made more patent and is strongly implemented by an act of the National
Assembly passed soon after the Constitution was approved. We are referring again to
Commonwealth Act No. 141. Prior to the Constitution, there were in the Public Land Act No. 2874
sections 120 and 121 which granted aliens the right to acquire private only by way of reciprocity.
Said section reads as follows:
SEC. 120. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act; to corporations organized in the Philippine Islands authorized
therefor by their charters, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to
citizens of countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same
right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land, or permanent
improvements thereon, or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, only in the manner
and to the extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force but not thereafter.
SEC. 121. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former
Public Land Act or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other
provision of law formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public
lands, terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or
presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent
improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations, or associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; to
corporate bodies organized in the Philippine Islands whose charters may authorize them to
do so, and, upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of the
countries the laws of which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to
acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land or pemanent improvements
thereon or any interest therein, as to their own citizens, and only in the manner and to the
extent specified in such laws, and while the same are in force, but not thereafter:Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts, nor
to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used
for such purposes:Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands and
improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding section being transferred
by judicial decree to persons,corporations or associations not legally capacitated to acquire
the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons, corporations, or associations shall
be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the precise
period of five years, under the penalty of such property reverting to the Government in the
contrary case." (Public Land Act, No. 2874.)
It is to be observed that the pharase "no land" used in these section refers to all private lands,
whether strictly agricultural, residential or otherwise, there being practically no private land which
had not been acquired by any of the means provided in said two sections. Therefore, the prohibition
contained in these two provisions was, in effect, that no private land could be transferred to aliens
except "upon express authorization by the Philippine Legislature, to citizens of Philippine Islands the
same right to acquire, hold, lease, encumber, dispose of, or alienate land." In other words, aliens
were granted the right to acquire private land merely by way of reciprocity. Then came the
Constitution and Commonwealth Act No. 141 was passed, sections 122 and 123 of which read as
follows:

SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of this Act, nor any
permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred,
except to persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may acquire lands of the
public domain under this Act or to corporations organized in the Philippines authorized
thereof by their charters.
SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous
Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in
any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire
land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines
whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided, however, That this prohibition shall not be
applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession duly
acknowledged and legalized by competent courts: Provided, further, That in the event of the
ownership of the lands and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last preceding
section being transferred by judicial decree to persons, corporations or associations not
legally capacitated to acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporations, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said lands or improvements to
others so capacitated within the precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall
revert to the Government.
These two sections are almost literally the same as sections 120 and 121 of Act No. 2874, the only
difference being that in the new provisions, the right to reciprocity granted to aliens is completely
stricken out. This, undoubtedly, is to conform to the absolute policy contained in section 5 of Article
XIII of the Constitution which, in prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural lands to aliens,
grants them no right of reciprocity. This legislative construction carries exceptional weight, for
prominent members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act had been members of the
Constitutional Convention.
It is said that the lot question does not come within the purview of sections 122 and 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, there being no proof that the same had been acquired by one of the
means provided in said provisions. We are not, however, diciding the instant case under the
provisions of the Public Land Act, which have to refer to land that had been formerly of the public
domain, otherwise their constitutionality may be doubtful. We are deciding the instant case under
section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the
sense that it prohibits the transfer to alien of any private agricultural land including residential land
whatever its origin might have been.
And, finally, on June 14, 1947, the Congress approved Republic Act No. 133 which allows mortgage
of "private real property" of any kind in favor of aliens but with a qualification consisting of expressly
prohibiting aliens to bid or take part in any sale of such real property as a consequence of the
mortgage. This prohibition makes no distinction between private lands that are strictly agricultural
and private lands that are residental or commercial. The prohibition embraces the sale of private
lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear implementation and a legislative
interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. Had the Congress been of opinion that private
residential lands may be sold to aliens under the Constitution, no legislative measure would have
been found necessary to authorize mortgage which would have been deemed also permissible
under the Constitution. But clearly it was the opinion of the Congress that such sale is forbidden by
the Constitution and it was such opinion that prompted the legislative measure intended to clarify
that mortgage is not within the constitutional prohibition.

It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the
Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to
preclude aliens, admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites where they may build their
homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it
even in the name of amity or equity. We are satisfied, however, that aliens are not completely
excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential purposes. Since their residence in
the Philippines is temporary, they may be granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is
not forbidden by the Constitution. Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes
and misfortunes, Filipino citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or public
agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed, without costs.
Feria, Pablo, Perfecto, Hilado, and Briones, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinion
PERFECTO, J., concurring:
Today, which is the day set for the promulgation of this Court's decision might be remembered by
future generations always with joy, with gratitude, with pride. The failure of the highest tribunal of the
land to do its duty in this case would have amounted to a national disaster. We would have refused
to share the responsibility of causing it by, wittingly or unwittingly, allowing ourselves to act as tools
in a conspiracy to sabotage the most important safeguard of the age-long patrimony of our people,
the land which destiny of Providence has set aside to be the permanent abode of our race for
unending generations. We who have children and grandchildren, and who expect to leave long and
ramifying dendriform lines of descendants, could not bear the thought of the curse they may fling at
us should the day arrive when our people will be foreigners in their fatherland, because in the crucial
moment of our history , when the vision of judicial statemanship demanded on us the resolution and
boldness to affirm and withhold the letter and spirit of the Constitution, we faltered. We would have
prefered heroic defeat to inglorious desertion. Rather than abandon the sacred folds of the banner of
our convictions for truth, for justice, for racial survival. We are happy to record that this Supreme
Court turned an impending failure to a glorious success, saving our people from a looming
catastrophe.
On July 3, 1946, the case of Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, (43 Off. Gaz., 866), was submitted for
our decision. The case was initiated in the Court of First Instance of Tayabas on January 17, 1940,
when an alien, Oh Cho, a citizen of China, applied for title and registration of a parcel of land located
in the residential district of Guinayangan, Tayabas, with a house thereon. The Director of Lands
opposed the application, one of the main grounds being that "the applicant, being a Chinese, is not
qualified to acquire public or private agricultural lands under the provisions of the Constitution."
On August 15, 1940, Judge P. Magsalin rendered decision granting the application. The Director of
Lands appealed. In the brief filed by Solicitor General Roman Ozaeta, afterwards Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court and now Secretary of Justice, and Assistant Solicitor General Rafael Amparo,
appellant made only two assignments of error, although both raised but one question, the legal one
stated in the first assignment of error as follows:

The lower court erred in declaring the registration of the land in question in favor of the
applicant who, according to his own voluntary admission is a citizen of the Chinese Republic.
The brief was accompanied, as Appendix A, by the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos
who, while Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, suffered heroic martyrdom at the hands of the
Japanese addressed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce on July 15, 1939, supporting
the same theory as the one advanced by the Director of Lands. The same legal question raised by
appellant is discussed, not only in the brief for the appellee, but also in the briefs of the several amici
curiae allowed by the Supreme Court to appear in the case.
As a matter of fact, the case has been submitted for final decision of the Supreme Court since July
of 1941, that is, six years ago. It remained undecided when the Pacific War broke out in December,
1941. After the Supreme Court was recognized in the middle of 1945, it was found that the case was
among those which were destroyed in February, 1945, during the battle for the liberation of Manila.
The case had to be reconstituted upon motion of the office of the Solicitor General, filed with this
Court on January 14, 1946, in which it was also prayed that, after being reconstituted, the case be
submitted for final adjudication. The case was for the second time submitted for decision on July 3,
1946.
After the last submission, it took the Supreme Court many days to deliberate on the case, especially
on the legal question as to whether an alien may, under the Constitution, acquire private urban
lands. An overwhelming majority answered no. But when the decision was promulgated on August
31, 1946, a majority resolved to ignore the question, notwithstanding our efforts to have the
question, which is vital, pressing and far-reaching, decided once and for all, to dispel definitely the
uncertainty gnawing the conscience of the people. It has been out lot to be alone in expressing in
unmistakable terms our opinion and decision on the main legal question raised by the appellant. The
constitutional question was by-passed by the majority because they were of opinion that it was not
necessary to be decided, notwithstanding the fact that it was the main and only legal question upon
which appellant Director of Lands relied in his appeal, and the question has been almost
exhaustively argued in four printed briefs filed by the parties and the amici curiae. Assurance was,
nevertheless, given that in the next case in which the same constitutional question is raised, the
majority shall make known their stand on the question.
The next case came when the present one submitted to us for decision on February 3, 1947. Again,
we deliberated on the constitutional question for several days.
On February 24, 1947, the case was submitted for final vote, and the result was that the
constitutional question was decided against petitioner. The majority was also overwhelming. There
were eight of us, more than two-thirds of the Supreme Court. Only three Justices dissented.
While the decision was being drafted, somehow, the way the majority had voted must have leaked
out. On July 10, 1947, appellant Krivenko filed a motion for withdrawal of his appeal, for the evident
purpose of preventing the rendering of the majority decision, which would settle once and for all the
all-important constitutional question as to whether aliens may acquire urban lots in the Philippines.
Appellant chose to keep silent as to his reason for filing the motion. The Solicitor General's office
gave its conformity to the withdrawal of the appeal. This surprising assent was given without
expressing any ground at all. Would the Supreme Court permit itself to be cheated of its decision
voted since February 24, 1947?
Discussion immediately ensued as to whether the motion should be granted or denied, that is,
whether this Court should abstain from promulgating the decision in accordance with the result of the

vote taken on February 24, 1947, as if, after more than six years during which the question has been
submitted for the decision of the highest tribunal of the land, the same has failed to form a definite
opinion.
After a two-day deliberation, the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hontiveros, Mr. Justice
Padilla and and Mr. Justice Tuason voted to grant the motion for withdrawal. Those who voted to
deny the motion were Mr. Justice Feria, Mr. Justice Pablo, ourselves, Mr. Justice Hilado and Mr.
Justice Bengzon. The vote thus resulted in a tie, 5-5. The deadlock resulting from the tie should
have the effect of denying the motion, as provided by section 2 of Rule 56 to the effect that "where
the Court in banc is equally divided in opinion . . . on all incidental matters, the petition or motion
shall be denied." And we proposed that the rule be complied with, and the denial be promulgated.
Notwithstanding this, as Mr. Justice Briones was then absent, our brethren resolved to give him the
opportunity of casting his vote on the question, although we insisted that it was unnecessary. Days
later, when all the members of the Court were already present, a new vote was taken. Mr. Justice
Briones voted for the denial of the motion, and his vote would have resulted, as must be expected, in
6 votes for the denial against 5 for granting. But the final result was different. Seven votes were cast
for granting the motion and only four were cast for its denial.
But then, by providential design or simply by a happy stroke of luck or fate, on the occasion of the
registration by the register of deeds of Manila of land purchases of two aliens, a heated public
polemic flared up in one section of the press, followed by controversial speeches, broadcast by
radio, and culminating in the issuance on August 12, 1947, of Circular No. 128 of the Secretary of
Justice which reads as follows:
TO ALL REGISTER OF DEEDS:
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, dated August 25, 1945, is hereby amended so as to read as follows:
5"(a). Instruments by which private real property is mortgaged in favor of any individual,
corporation, or association for a period not exceeding five years, renewable for another five
years, may be accepted for registration. (Section 1, Republic Act No. 138.)
"(b). Deeds or documents by which private residential, commercial, industrial or other
classes of urban lands, or any right, title or interest therein is transferred, assigned or
encumbered to an alien, who is not an enemy national, may be registered. Such classes of
land are not deemed included within the purview of the prohibition contained in section 5,
Article XIII of the Constitution against the acquisition or holding of "private agricultural
land" by those who are not qualified to hold or acquire lands of the public domain. This is in
conformity with Opinion No. 284, series of 1941, of the Secretary of Justice and with the
practice consistently followed for nearly ten years since the Constitution took effect on
November 15, 1935.
"(c). During the effectivity of the Executive Agreement entered into between the Republic of
the Philippines and the Government of the United States on July 4, 1946, in pursuance of the
so-called Parity Amendment to the Constitution, citizens of the United States and
corporations or associations owned or controlled by such citizens are deemed to have the
same rights as citizens of the Philippines and corporations or associations owned or
controlled by such are deemed to have the same rights as citizens of the Philippines and
corporations or associations owned or controlled by citizens of the Philippines in the
acquisition of all classes of lands in the Philippines, whether of private ownership or
pertaining to the public domain."

ROMAN OZAETA
Secretary of Justice
Paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14 dated August 25, 1945, amended by the above is as follows:
Deeds or other documents by which a real property, or a right, or title thereto, or an interest
therein, is transferred, assigned or encumbered to an alien, who is not enemy national, may
be entered in the primary entry book; but, the registration of said deeds or other documents
shall be denied unless and/or until otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or
order of a competent court and the party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so
that he could avail himself of the right to appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section
200 of the Revised Administrative Code. The denial of registration of shall be predicated
upon the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the
Constitution of the Philippines, and sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the
former as amended by the Commonwealth Act No. 615.
The polemic found echo even in the Olympic serenity of a cloistered Supreme Court and the final
result of long and tense deliberation which ensued is concisely recorded in the following resolution
adopted on August 29, 1947:
In Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, City of Manila, L-630, a case already submitted for
decision, the appellant filed a motion to withdraw his appeal with the conformity of the
adverse party. After full discussion of the matter specially in relation to the Court's discretion
(Rule 52, section 4, and Rule 58), Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Hilado, Mr. Justice
Bengzon, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice Tuazon voted to grant, while the Chief Justice,
Mr. Justice Feria, Mr,. Justice Pablo, Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice Briones voted to
deny it. A redeliberation was consequently had, with the same result. Thereupon Mr. Justice
Paras proposed that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to sit and break the tie; but in view of
the latter's absence due to illness and petition for retirement, the Court by a vote of seven to
three did not approve the proposition. Therefore, under Rule 56, section 2, the motion to
withdraw is considered denied.
Mr. Justice Padilla states that in his opinion the tie could not have the effect of overruling the
previous vote of seven against four in favor of the motion to withdraw.
Mr. Justice Paras states: Justice Hontiveros is aware of and conversant with the controversy.
He has voted once on the motion to withdraw the appeal. He is still a member of the Court
and, on a moment's notice, can be present at any session of the Court. Last month, when all
the members were present, the votes on the motion stood 7 to 4. Now, in the absence of one
member, on reconsideration, another changed his vote resulting in a tie. Section 2 of Rule 56
requires that all efforts be exerted to break a deadlock in the votes. I deplore the inability of
the majority to agree to my proposition that Mr. Justice Hontiveros be asked to participate in
the resolution of the motion for withdrawal. I hold it to be fundamental and necessary that the
votes of all the members be taken in cases like this.
Mr. Justice Perfecto stated, for purposes of completeness of the narration of facts, that when
the petition to withdraw the appeal was submitted for resolution of this Court two days after
this petition was filed, five justices voted to grant and five others voted to deny, and
expressed the opinion that since then, according to the rules, the petition should have been
considered denied. Said first vote took place many days before the one alluded to by Mr.
Justice Padilla.

Mr. Justice Tuason states: The motion to withdraw the appeal was first voted upon with the
result that 5 were granting and 5 for denial. Mr. Justice Briones was absent and it was
decided to wait for him. Some time later, the same subject was deliberated upon and a new
voting was had, on which occasion all the 11 justices were present. The voting stood 7 for
allowing the dismissal of the appeal and 4 against. Mr. Justice Perfecto and Mr. Justice
Briones expressed the intention to put in writing their dissents. Before these dissents were
filed, about one month afterwards, without any previous notice the matter was brought up
again and re-voted upon; the result was 5 to 5. Mr. Justice Hontiveros, who was ill but might
have been able to attend if advised of the necessity of his presence, was absent. As the
voting thus stood, Mr. Justice Hontiveros' vote would have changed its result unless he
changed his mind, a fact of which no one is aware. My opinion is that since there was no
formal motion for reconsideration nor a previous notice that this matter would be taken up
once more, and since Mr. Justice Hontiveros had every reason to believe that the matter was
over as far as he was concerned, this Justice's vote in the penultimate voting should, if he
was not to be given an opportunity to recast his vote, be counted in favor of the vote for the
allowance of the motion to withdraw. Above all, that opportunity should not have been denied
on grounds of pure technicality never invoked before. I counted that the proceeding was
arbitrary and illegal.
The resolution does not recite all the reasons why Mr. Justice Hontiveros did not participate in that
last two votings and why it became unnecessary to wait for him any further to attend the sessions of
the Court and to cast his vote on the question.
Appellant Krivenko moved for the reconsideration of the denial of his withdrawal of appeal, alleging
that it became moot in view of the ruling made by the Secretary of Justice in circular No. 128, thus
giving us a hint that the latter, wittingly or unwittingly, had the effect of trying to take away from the
Supreme Court the decision of an important constitutional question, submitted to us in a pending
litigation. We denied the motion for reconsideration. We did not want to entertain any obstruction to
the promulgation of our decision.
If the processes had in this case had been given the publicity suggested by us for all the official
actuations of this Supreme Court, it should have been known by the whole world that since July,
1946, that is, more than a year ago, the opinion of the members of this Court had already been
crystallized to the effect that under the Constitution, aliens are forbidded from acquiring urban lands
in the Philippines, and it must have known that in this case a great majority had voted in that sense
on February 24, 1947.
The constitutional question involved in this case cannot be left undecided without jeopardizing public
interest. The uncertainty in the public mind should be dispelled without further delay. While the doubt
among the people as to what is the correct answer to the question remains to be dissipated, there
will be uneasiness, undermining public morale and leading to evils of unpredictable extent. This
Supreme Tribunal, by overwhelming majority, already knows what the correct answer is, and should
not withhold and keep it for itself with the same zealousness with which the ancient families of the
Eumolpides and Keryces were keeping the Eleusinian mysteries. The oracle of Delphus must speak
so that the people may know for their guidance what destiny has in store for them.
The great question as to whether the land bequeathed to us by our forefathers should remain as one
of the most cherished treasures of our people and transmitted by inheritance to unending
generations of our race, is not a new one. The long chain of land-grabbing invasions, conquests,
depredations, and colonial imperialism recorded in the darkest and bloodiest pages of history from
the bellicose enterprises of the Hittites in the plains of old Assyria, irrigated by the waters of the
Tigris and Euphrates, and the invasion of Egypt by the Hyksos, up to the conquests of Hernan

Cortes and Pizarro, the achievements of Cecil Rhodes, and the formation of the Spanish,
Portuguese, Dutch, French and German colonial empires, had many of its iron links forged in our soil
since Magellan, the greatest navigator of all history, had set foot at Limasawa and paid, for his
daring enterprises, with his life at the hands of Lapulapu's men in the battle of Mactan.
Since then, almost four centuries ago, our people have continuously been engaged in an
unrelentless struggle to defend the national patrimony against the aggressive onslaughts of
foreigners bent on grabbing our lands. First came the Spanish encomenderos and other gratuitous
concessioners who were granted by the Spanish crown immense areas of land. Immediately came
the friars and other religious corporations who, notwithstanding their sacred vow of poverty, felt their
greed whetted by the bountiful opportunities for easy and unscrupulous enrichment. Taking
advantage of the uncontrollable religious leadership, on one side, and of the Christian virtues of
obedience, resignation, humility, and credulity of a people who, after conversion to Catholicism,
embraced with tacit faith all its tenets and practiced them with the loyalty and fidelity of persons still
immune from the disappointments and bitterness caused by the vices of modern civilization, the
foreign religious orders set aside all compunction to acquire by foul means many large estates.
Through the practice of confession and other means of moral intimidation, mostly based on the
eternal tortures of hell, they were able to obtain by donation or by will the lands of many simple and
credulous Catholics who, in order to conquer the eternal bliss of heaven, renounced all their property
in favor of religious orders and priests, many under the guise of chaplaincies or other apparently
religious purposes, leaving in destitute their decendants and relatives. Thus big religious landed
estates were formed, and under the system unbearable iniquities were committed. The case of the
family of Rizal is just an index of the situation, which, under the moral leadership of the hero, finally
drove our people into a national revolution not only against the Spanish sovereignty under which the
social cancer had grown to unlimited proportions.
Profiting from the lessons of history, the Delegates to our Constitutional Convention felt it their duty
to insert in the fundamental law effective guarantees for conserving the national patrimony, the
wisdom of which cannot be disputed in a world divided into nations and nationalities. In the same
way that scientists and technicians resorted to radar, sonars, thermistors and other long range
detection devices to stave off far-away enemy attacks in war, said Delegates set the guarantees to
ward off open inroads or devious incursions into the national patrimony as a means of insuring racial
safety and survival.
When the ideal of one world should have been translated into reality, those guarantees might not be
needed and our people may eliminate them. But in the meantime, it is our inescapable devoir, as the
ultimate guardians of the Constitution, never to neglect the enforcement of its provisions whenever
our action is called upon in a case, like the one now before us.
One of the fundamental purposes of the government established by our Constitution is, in its very
words, that it "shall conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation." That mandate is addressed
to all departments and branches of our government, without excluding this Supreme Court. To make
more specific the mandate, Article XIII has been inserted so as to avoid all doubt that all the natural
resources of the country are reserved to Filipino citizens. Our land is the most important of our
natural resources. That land should be kept in the hands of our people until, by constitutional
amendment, they should decide to renounce that age-long patrimony. Save by hereditary
succession the only exception allowed by the Constitution no foreigner may by any means
acquire any land, any kind of land, in the Philippines. That was the overwhelming sentiment
prevailing in the Constitutional Convention, that was the overpowering desire of the great majority of
the Delegates, that was the dominating thought that was intended to be expressed in the great
document, that was what the Committee on Style the drafter of the final text has written in the
Constitution, and that was what was solemnly ratified in the plebiscite by our people, who then were
rankling by the sore spot of illegally Japanized Davao.

The urgency of settling once and forever the constitutional question raised in this case
cannot be overemphasized. If we should decide this question after many urban lots have
been transferred to and registered in the name of alien purchasers, a situation may be
created in which it will be hard to nullify the transfers and the nullification may create
complications and problems highly distasteful to solve. The Georgia case is an objective
lesson upon which we can mirror ourselves. From pages 22 and 23 of the book of Charless
P. Curtiss, Jr. entitled "Lions Under the Throne," we quote the following:
It is of interest that it seems to have happened chiefly in important cases. Fletcher vs. Peck,
in 1810, is the stock example. That was the first case in which the Court held a state statute
void. It involved a national scandal. The 1795 legislature of Georgia sold its western lands,
most of Alabama and Mississippi, to speculators. Perhaps it was the greatest real estate
steal in our history. The purchase price was only half a million dollars. The next legislature
repealed the statute for fraud, the bribery of legislator, but not before the land companies had
completed the deal and unloaded. By that time, and increasingly soon afterwards, more and
more people had bought, and their title was in issue. Eleven million of the acres had been
bought for eleven cents an acre by leading citizens of Boston. How could they clear their
title? Alexander Hamilton gave an opinion, that the repeal of the grant was void under the
Constitution as an impairment of the obligation of a contract.
But could they not get a decision from the Supreme Court? Robert Fletcher of Anhirst, New
Hampshire, had bought fifteen thousand acres from John Peck of Boston. He sued Peck,
and he won. Fletcher appealed. Plainly it was a friendly suit. Marshall was nobody's fool. He
told Cranch that the Court was reluctant to decide the case "as it appeared manifestly made
up for the purpose of getting the Court's judgment." John Quincy Adams so reports in his
diary. Yet Marshall decided it, and he held the repeal void, just as Hamilton said it was. "The
fact that Marshall rendered an opinion, under the circumstances," says Beveridge, "is one of
the finest proofs of his greatness. A weaker man than John Marshall, and one less wise and
courageous, would have dismissed the appeal." That may be, but it was the act of a
stateman, not of a judge. The Court has always been able to overcome its judicial diffidence
on state occasions.
We see from the above how millions of acres of land were stolen from the people of Georgia and
due to legal technicalities the people were unable to recover the stolen property. But in the case of
Georgia, the lands had fallen into American hands and although the scandal was of gigantic
proportions, no national disaster ensued. In our case if our lands should fall into foreign hands,
although there may not be any scandal at all, the catastrophe sought to be avoided by the Delegates
to our Constitutional Convention will surely be in no remote offing.
We conclude that, under the provisions of the Constitution, aliens are not allowed to acquire the
ownership of urban or residential lands in the Philippines and, as consequence, all acquisitions
made in contravention of the prohibitions since the fundamental law became effective are null and
void per se and ab initio. As all public officials have sworn, and are duty bound, to obey and defend
the Constitution, all those who, by their functions, are in charge of enforcing the prohibition as laid
down and interpreted in the decision in this case, should spare no efforts so that any and all
violations which may have taken place should be corrected.
We decide, therefore, that, upon the above premises, appellant Alexander A. Krivenko, not being a
Filipino citizen, could not acquire by purchase the urban or residential lot here in question, the sale
made in his favor by the Magdalena Estate, Inc. being null and void ab initio, and that the lower court
acted correctly in rendering the appealed decision, which we affirm.

HILADO, J., concurring:

Upon appellant's motion to withdraw his appeal herein with the conformity of the Solicitor General in
behalf of appellee, indulging, at that time, all possible intendments in favor of another department, I
ultimately voted to grant the motion after the matter was finally deliberated and voted upon. But the
votes of the ten Justices participating were evenly divided, and under Rule 52, section 4, in relation,
with Rule 56, section 2, the motion was denied. The resolution to deny was adopted in the exercise
of the court's discretion under Rule 52, section 4, by virtue of which it has discretion to deny the
withdrawal of the appeal even though both appellant and appellee agree upon the withdrawal, when
appellee's brief has been filed. Under the principle that where the necessary number have concurred
in an opinion or resolution, the decision or determination rendered is the decision or determination of
the court (2 C.J.S., 296), the resolution denying the motion to withdraw the appeal was the resolution
of the court. Pursuant to Rule 56, section 2, where the court in banc is equally divided in opinion,
such a motion "shall be denied." As a necessary consequence, the court as to decide the case upon
the merits.
After all, a consistent advocate and defender of the principle of separation of powers in a
government like ours that I have always been, I think that under the circumstances it is well for all
concerned that the Court should go ahead and decide the constitutional question presented. The
very doctrine that the three coordinate, co-equal and independent departments should be
maintained supreme in their respective legitimate spheres, makes it at once the right and duty of
each to defend and uphold its own peculiar powers and authority. Public respect for and confidence
in each department must be striven for and kept, for any lowering of the respect and diminution of
that confidence will in the same measure take away from the very usefulness of the respective
department to the people. For this reason, I believe that we should avert and avoid any tendency in
this direction with respect to this Court.
I am one of those who presume that Circular No. 128, dated August 12, 1947, of the Secretary of
Justice, was issued in good faith. But at the same time, that declaration in sub-paragraph (b) of
paragraph 5 of Circular No. 14, which was already amended, to the effect that private residential,
commercial, industrial or other classes of urban lands "are not deemed included within the purview
of the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution", made at a time when the
self-same question was pending decision of this Court, gives rise to the serious danger that should
this Court refrain from deciding said question and giving its own interpretation of the constitutional
mandate, the people may see in such an attitude an abandonment by this Court of a bounden duty,
peculiarly its own, to decide a question of such a momentous transcedence, in view of an opinion,
given in advance of its own decision, by an officer of another department. This will naturally detract
in no small degree from public respect and confidence towards the highest Court of land. Of course,
none of us the other governmental departments included would desire such a situation to
ensue.
I have distinctively noticed that the decision of the majority is confined to the constitutional question
here presented, namely, "whether or not an alien under our Constitution may acquire residential
land." (Opinion, p. 2) Leases of residential lands, or acquisition, ownership or lease of a house or
building thereon, for example, are not covered by the decision.
With these preliminary remarks and the statement of my concurrence in the opinion ably written by
the Chief Justice, I have signed said decision.
BRIONES, M., conforme:

Estoy conforme en un todo con la ponencia, a la cual no e puede aadir ni quitar nada, tal es su
acabada y compacta elaboracion. Escribo, sin embargo, esta opinion separada nada mas que para
unas observaciones, particularmente sobre ciertas fases extraordinarias de este asunto harto
singular y extraordinario.
I. Conforme se relata en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto, despues de laboriosas
deliberaciones este asunto se puso finalmente a votacion el 24 de Febrero de este ao,
confirmandose la sentencia apelada por una buena mayoria. En algunos comentarios adelantados
por cierta parte de la prensa impaciencia que solo puede hallar explicacion en un nervioso y
excesivo celo en la vigilancia de los intereses publicos, maxime tratandose, como se trata, de la
conservacion del patrimonio nacional se ha hecho la pregunta de por que se ha demorado la
promulgacion de la sentencia, habiendose votado el asunto todavia desde case comienzos del ao.
A simple vista, la pregunta tiene justificacion; pero bien considerados los hechos se vera que no ha
habido demora en el presente caso, mucho menos una demora desusada, alarmante, que autorice
y justifique una critica contra los metodos de trabajo de esta corte. El curso seguido por el asunto ha
sido normal, bajo las circunstancias. En realidad, no yan en esta Corte ahora, sino aun en el
pasado, antes de la guerra, hubo mas lentitud en casos no tan dificiles ni tan complicados como el
que nos ocupa, en que las cuestiones planteadas y discutidas no tenian la densidad constitucional y
juridica de las que se discuten en el presente caso. Hay que tener en cuenta que desde el 24 de
Febrero en que se voto finalmente el asunto hasta el 1.0 de Abril en que comenzaron las
vacaciones judiciales, no habian transcurrido mas que 34 dias; y cuando se reanudaron
formalmente las sesiones de esta Corte en Julio se suscito un incidente de lo mas extraordinario
incidente que practicamente vino a impedir, a paralizar la pronta promulgacion de la sentencia. Me
refiero a la mocion que el 10 de Julio persentaron los abogados del apelante pidiendo permiso para
retirar su apelacion. Lo sorpredente de esta mocion es que viene redactada escuetamente, sin
explicar el por que de la retirada, ni expresar ningun fundamento. Pero lo mas sorpredente todavia
es la conformidad dada por el Procurador General, tambien escueta e inceremoniosamente.
Digo que es sorprendente la retirada de la apelacion porque pocos casos he visto que hayan sido
arguidos con tanta energiaa, tanto interes y tanto celo por la parte apelante como este que nos
ocupa. Los abogados del apelante no solo presentaron un alegato concienzudo de 34 paginas, sino
que cuando se llamo a vista el asunto informaron verbalmente ante esta Corte argumentando
vigorosa y extensamente sobre el caso. El Procurador General, por su parte, ha presentado un
alegato igualmente denso, de 31 paginas, en que se discuten acabadamente, hasta el punto
maximo de saturacion y agotamiento, todos los angulos de la formidable cuestion constitutional
objeto de este asunto. Tambien informo el Procurador General verbalmente ante esta Corte,
entablando fuerte lid con los abogados del apelante.
Con la mocion de retirada de la apelacion se hubo de retardar necesariamente la promulgacion de
la sentencia, pues trabajosas deliberaciones fueron necesarias para resolver la cuestion,
dividiendose casi por igual los miembros de la Corte sobre si debia o no permitirse la retirada. Habia
unanimidad en que bajo la regla 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales teniamos absoluta
discrecion para conceder o denegar la mocion, toda vez que los alegatos estaban sometidos desde
hacia tiempo, el asunto estaba votado y no faltaba mas que la firma y promulgacion de la decision
juntamente con las disidencias. Sin embargo, algunos Magistrados opinaban que la discrecion debia
ejercitarse en favor de la retirada en virtud de la practica de evitar la aplicacion de la Constitucion a
la solucion de un litigio siempre que se puede sentenciarlo de otra manera. (Entre los Magistrados
que pensaban de esta manera se incluian algunos que en el fundo del asunto estaban a favor de la
confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, creian que la Constitucion prohibe a los extranjeros
la adquisicion a titulo dominical de todo genero de propiedad inmueble, sin excluir los solares
residenciales, comerciales e industriales.) Pero otros Magistrados opinaban que en el estado tan
avanzado en que se hallaba el asunto los dictados del interes publico y de la sana discrecion

requerian imperiosamente que la cuestion se atacase y decidiese frontalmente; que si una mayoria
de esta Corte estaba convencida, como al parecer lo estaba, de que existia esa interdiccion
constitucional contra la facultad adquisitiva de los extranjeros, nuestro claro deber era apresurarnos
a dar pleno y positivo cumplimiento a la Constitucion al presentarse la primera oportunidad; que el
meollo del asunto, la lis mota era eso la interdiccion constitucional ; por tanto, no habia otra
manera de decidirlo mas que aplicando la Constitucion; obrar de otra manera seria desercion,
abandono de un deber jurado.
Asi estaban las deliberaciones cuando ocurre otro incidente mucho mas extraordinario y
sorprendente todavia que la retirada no explicada de la apelacion con la insolita conformidad del
Procurador General; algo asi como si de un cielo sereno, sin nubes, cayera de pronto un bolido en
medio de nosotros, en medio de la Corte: me refiero a la circular num. 128 del Secretario de Justicia
expedida el 12 de Agosto proximo pasado, esto es, 32 dias despues de presentada la mocion de
retirada de la apelacion. Esa circular se cita comprensivamente en la ponencia y su texto se copia
integramente en la concurrencia del Magistrado Sr. Perfecto; asi que me creo excusado de
transcibirla in toto. En breves terminos, la circular reforma el parrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 del
mismo Departamento de Justicia de fecha 25 de Agosto, 1945, y levanta la prohibicion o interdiccion
sobre el registro e inscripcion en el registro de la propiedad de las "escrituras o documentos en
virtud de los cuales terrenos privados residencias, comerciales, industriales u otras clases de
terrenos urbanos, o cualquier derecho, titulo o interes en ellos, se transfieren, ceden o gravan a un
extranjero que no es nacional enemigo." En otras palabras, el Secretario de Justicia, por medio de
esta circular dejaba sin efecto la prohibicion contenida en lacircular num. 14 del mismo
Departamento la prohibicion que precisamente ataca el apelante Krivenko en el asunto que
tenemos ante Nos y authorizaba y ordenaba a todoslos Registradores de Titulos en Filipinas para
que inscribiesen las escrituras o documentos de venta, hipoteca o cualquier otro gravamen a favor
de extranjeros, siempre que no se tratase de terrenos publicos o de "terrenos privados agricolas," es
decir, siempre que los terrenos objeto de la escritura fuesen "residenciales, comerciales e
industriales."
La comparacion de esa circular con un bolido caido subitamenteen medio de la Corte no es un
simple tropo, no esuna mera imagen retorica; refleja una verdadera realidad.Esa circular, al derogar
la prohibicion decretada en elparrafo 5 de la circular num. 14 prohibicion que, comoqueda dicho,
es precisamente el objeto del presente asunto venia practicamente a escamotear la cuestion
discutida, lacuestion sub judice sustrayendola de la jurisdiccion de lostribunales. Dicho crudamente,
el Departamento de Justiciavenia a arrebatar el asunto de nuestras manos, delas manos de esta
Corte, anticipandose a resolverlo por simismo y dando efectividad y vigor inmediatos a su
resolucionmediante la correspondiente autorizacion a los Registradoresde Titulos.
A la luz de esa circular queda perfectamente explicadala mocion de retirada de la apelacion
consentida insolitamentepor el Procurador General. Para que esperar ladecision de la Corte
Suprema que acaso podria ser adversa? No estaba ya esa circular bajo la cual podian
registrarseahora la ventas de terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales a extranjeros? Por
eso no es extrao quelos abogados del apelante Krivenko, en su mocion de 1.0 de Septiembre,
1947, pidiendo la reconsideracion de nuestroauto denegando la retirada de la apelacion, dijeran
porprimera vez como fundamento que la cuestion ya era simplemente academica ("question is now
moot") en vista deesa circular y de la conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada de la
apelacion. He aqui las propias palabras de la mocion del apelante Krivenko:
In view of Circular No. 128 of the Department of Justice, dated August 12, 1947, which
amends Circular No. 14 by expressly authorizing the registration of the sale of urban lands to
aliens, and in view of the fact that the Solicitor General has joined in the motion for
withdrawal of the appeal, there is no longer a controversy between the parties and the
question is now moot. For this reason the court no longer has jurisdiction to act on the case.1

Lo menos que se puede decir de esa accion del Departamentode Justicia atravesandose en el
camino de los tribunalesmientras un asunto esta sub judice, es que ello no tieneprecedentes, que yo
sepa, en los anales de la administracionde justicia en Filipinas en cerca de medio siglo que
llevamosde existencia bajo un gobierno constitucional y sustancialmente republicano. Ni aun en los
llamados dias del Imperio, cuando la soberania americana era mas propensa a manejar el baston
grueso y afirmar vigorosamente losfueros de su poder y autoridad, se vio jamas a un departamento
de Justicia o a alguna de sus dependencias entrometerseen el ejercicio ordenado por los tribunales
de sujurisdiccion y competencia. Era una tradicion firmamenteestablecida en las esfersas del Poder
Ejecutivo tradicioninviolada e inviolable maxime en el Departamento de Justicia y en la
Fiscalia General, el inhibirse de expresar algunaopinion sobre un asunto ya sometido a los
tribunales, excepto cuando venian llamados a hacerlo, en representaciondel gobierno, en los
tramites de un litigio, civil o criminal,propiamente planteado ante dichos tribunales. Fuera deestos
casos, la inhibicion era tradicionalmente absoluta,observada con la devocion y la escrupulosidad de
un rito.Y la razon era muy sencilla: hamas se queria estorbar nientorpecer la funcion de los
tribunales de justicia, loscuales, bajo la carta organica y las leyes, tenian absolutoderecho a actuar
con maximo desembarazo, libres de todaingerencia extraa. Esto se hizo bajo la Ley Cooper;
estose hizo bajo la Ley Jones; y esto se hizo bajo la Ley Tydings-McDuffie, la ley organica del
Commonwealth. Creo que el pueblo filipino tiene derecho a que eso mismo se haga bajo el gobierno
de la Republica, que es suyo, que es de su propia hechura. No faltaba mas que los hombres de su
propia raza le nieguen lo que no le negaron gobernantesde otra raza!
No se niega la facultad de supervision que tiene el Departamento de Justicia sobre las oficinas y
dependenciasque caen bajo su jurisdiccion, entre ellas las varias oficinasde registro de la propiedad
en Manila y en las provincias.Tampoco se niega la facultad que tiene dicho Departamentopara
expedir circulares, ya de caracter puramente administrativo,ya de caracter semijudicial, dando
instrucciones,vgr., a los registradores acerca de como deben desempenarsus funciones. De hecho
la circular num. 14 de 25 deAgosto, 1945, es de esta ultima naturaleza: en ella seinstruye y ordena
a los registradores de titulos que noregistren ni inscriban ventas de propiedad inmueble
aextranjeros, asi sean terrenos residenciales, comerciales oindustriales. Pero la facultad llega solo
hasta alli; fuerade esas fronteras el campo ya es pura y exclusivamentejudicial. Cuando una
determinada circular del Departamentoa los registradores es combatida o puesta en telade juicio
ante los tribunales, ora por fundamentosconstitucionales, ora por razones meramente legales, ya no
esel Departamento el que tiene que determinar o resolverla disputa, sino que eso compete en
absoluto a los tribunalesde justicia. Asi lo dispone terminantemente el articulo200 del Codigo
Administrativo. Segun este articulo, elasunto o disputa debe elevarse en forma de consulta a la Sala
Cuarta del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de Manila.La ley no confiere ninguna facultad al
Departamento deJusticia para enjuiciar y decidir el caso. Y cuando unaparte no estuviere conforme
con la decision de la SalaCuarta, ella puede alzarse de la sentencia para ante laCorte Suprema. He
aqui el texto integro del articulo 200 del Codigo Administrativo:
SEC. 200. Reference of doubtful matter to judge of fourth branch of Court of First Instance at
Manila. When the register of deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken
or memorandum to be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument
presented for registration or where any party in interest does not agree with the register of
deeds with reference to any such matter, the question shall be referred to the judge of the
fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District either on the
certificate of the register of deeds stating the question upon which he is in doubt or upon the
suggestion in writing of the party in interest; and thereupon said judge, upon consideration of
the matter as shown by the record certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after
notice to the parties and hearing, shall enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or
memorandum to be made.

Tal es lo que ha ocurrido en el presente caso. Krivenkopresento su escritura de compraventa al

Registrador de laPropiedad de Manila. Este denego la inscripcion solicitadaen virtud de la
prohibicion contenida en la circular num.14. Que hizo Krivenko entonces? Elevo acaso el asuntoal
Departamento de Justicia? No. Lo que hicieron susabogados entonces fue presentar una demanda
el 23 de Noviembre, 1945, contra el Registrador de Titulos ante laSala Cuarta del Juzgado de
Primera Instancia de Manila,numerandose dicha demanda como consulta num. 1289; ycuando esta
Sala decidio el asunto confirmando la acciondel Registrador, Krivenko trajo a esta Corte la
apelacionque estamos considerando. Tan elemental es esto que enla misma circular num. 14 se
dice que la prohibicion quedadecretada hasta que los tribunales resuelvan lo contrario. He aqui la
fraseologia pertinente de dicha circularnum. 14:
. . . the registration of said deeds or other documents shall be denied, unless and /or until
otherwise specifically directed by a final decision or order of a competent court and the
party in interest shall be advised of such denial, so that he could avail himself of the right to
appeal therefrom, under the provisions of section 200 of the Revised Administrative Code.
La posicion de la Corte Suprema ante este caso claro ypositivo de intromision (interference) en sus
funciones esde lo mas peculiar. Tenemos en el Reglamento de losTribunales algunas disposiciones
que proveen sancion pordesacato para ciertos actos de intromision en el ejercicio de lasfunciones
judiciales.2 Pero se preguntara naturalmente;son aplicables estas disposiciones cuando la
intromisionprocede de un ramo del poder ejecutivo, el cual, como sesabe, en la mecanica de los
poderes del Estado, es usandoun anglicismo-coigual y coordinado con el poder judicial,maxime
si esa intromision se ha realizado so capa de unacto oficial? Cualquiera, pues, puede imaginarse la
situaciontremendamente embarazosa, inclusive angustiosa enque esta Corte ha quedado colocada
con motivo de esa intromision departamental, exponiendose a chocar con otropoder del Estado. En
casos recientes en que estaban envueltos otros poderes, esta Corte, estimando dudosa suposicion
constitucional, prefirio adoptar una actitud deelegante inhibicion, de "manos fuera" (hands-off), si
bienhay que hacer constar que con la fuerte disidencia dealgunos Magistrados, entre ellos el
opinante.3 Tenemos, portanto, un caso de verdadera intromision en que siendo, porlo menos,
dudosa la facultad de esta Corte para imponeruna sancion por desacato de acuerdo con el
Reglamento delos Tribunales, le queda el unico recurso decente, ordenado:registrar su excepcion
sin ambages ni eufemismos contrala intromision, y reafirmar con todo vigor, con toda firmezasu
independencia.
Se arguye con tenaz persitencia que debiamos de haberconcedido la mocion de retirada de la
apelacion, por dosrazones: (a) porque el Procurador General estaba conformecon dicha retirada; (b)
para evitar la resolucion delpunto constitucional envuelto, en virtud de la practica,segun se dice, de
soslayar toda cuestion constitucionalsiempre que se pueda. Respecto de la primera razon
serasuficiente decir que el Procurador General es libre de entraren cualquiera transaccion sobre un
asunto en que interviene,pero es evidente que su accion no ata no obliga aesta Corte en el ejercicio
de la discrecion que le confierela regla, 52, seccion 4, del Reglamento de los Tribunales,que reza
como sigue:
Rule 52, SEC. 4 An appeal may be withdrawn as of right at any time before the filing of
appelle's brief.After that brief is filed the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in its
discretion. . . . (Las cursivas son nuestras.)
Como se ve, nuestra discrecion es absoluta:no estacondicionada por la conformidad o
disconformidad de una delas partes. Y la incondicionalidad de esa discrecion es masabsoluta e
imperativa alli donde el litigio versa sobre unamateria queno afecta solo a un interes privado, sino
quees de interes publico, como el caso presente en que el Procurador General ha transigido no
sobre un asunto suyopersonal o de un cliente particular, sino de un cliente demucha mayor monta y

significacion el pueblo filipino ysiendo materia del litigio la propiedad del suelo, parte, vitalisima
del patrimonio nacional que nuestro pueblo hacolocado bajo la salvaguardia de la Constitucion.
Respecto del segundo fundamento, o se que debiamospermitir la retirada dela apelacion para no
tener queresolver la cuestion constitucional disputada, bastara decirque la practica, prinsipio o
doctrina que se invoca, llevaconsigo una salvedad o cualificacion y es que el litigio se pueda
resolver de otra maera. Podemos soslayar elpunto constitucional discutido en el pleito que nos
ocupa? Podemos decidirlo bajo otra ratio decidendi, esto es, queno sea la constitucionalidad o
inconstitucionalidad de laventa del inmueble al apelante Krivenko, en virtud desucondicion de
extranjero? Indudablemente que no: la lis mota, la unica, es la misma constitucionalidad de la
compraventa de que se trata. Para decidir si al recurrido apelado, Registrador de Titulos de la
Ciudad de Manila,le asiste o no razon para denegar la inscripcion solicitada por el recurrente y
apelante, Krivenko, la unica disposicionlegal que se puede aplicar es el articulo XIII, seccion 5, dela
Constitucion de Filipinas, invocado por el Registrador como defensa e inserto en el parrafo 5 de la
circular num.14 como fundamento de la prohibicion o interdiccion contrael registro de las ventas de
terreno a extranjeros. Nohay otra ley para el caso.
El caso de Oh Cho contra el Director de Terrenos43 Gac. Of., No. 3 pag. 866), que se cita en unade
las disidencias, es completamente diferente. Es verdadque alli se planteo tambien la cuestion
constitucional de quese trata, por cierto que el que lo planteaba en nombre delGobierno era el
actual Secretario de Justicia que entoncesera Procurador General, y lo pleantaba en un sentido
absolumente concorde con la circular num. 14. Pero esta Corte, con la disidencia de algunos
Magistrados, opto porsoslayar el punot constitucional denegando el registro solicitadopor Oh Cho,
por fundamento de que bajo la LeyNo. 2874 sobre terrenos de dominio publico los extranjerosestan
excluidos de dichos terrenos; es decir, que el terrenosolicitado se considero como terreno publico.
Podemos hacer la misma evasion en el presente caso, acogiendonosa la ley No. 2874 o a cualquier
otra ley? Indudablemente que no porque ningun Magistrado de esta Corte, muchomenos los
disidentes, consideran el terreno reclamado por Krivenko como terreno publico. Luego todos los
caminosestan bloqueados para nosotros, menos el camino constitucional.Luego el segundo
fundamento alegado paracubrir la evasiva tambien debe descartarse totalmente.
Se insinua que no debiamos darnos prisa en resolver constitucionalmente el presente asunto,
puesto que puedenpresentarse otros de igual naturaleza en tiempo no remoto,y en efecto se cita el
caso de Rellosa contraGaw Chee Hun(49 Off. Gaz., 4345), en que los alegatos de ambas partesya
estan sometidos y se halla ahora pendiente de decision.Es evidente que esto tampoco arguye en
favor de la evasiva,en primer lugar, porque cuando se le somete el deber de iraveriguando en su
Escribania si hay casos de igual naturaleza, sino que los casos se someten por orden de prelaciony
prioridad de tiempo a medida que esten preparados paracaso debe decidirse por sus propios
meritos y conforme ala ley pertinente. La salvedad o cualificacion de la doctrinao practica que se
invoca no dice: "hay qoe soslayar la cuestionconstitucional siempre que se pueda resolver
deotra manera, reservando dicha cuestion constitucional para otro caso; la salvedad es dentro del
mismo caso. De otro modono seria un simple soslayo legal, sino que seria unsub terfugio impropio,
indebido, ilegal. En el presente caso no ha habido ninguna prisa, excesivo celo, como se
insinua;desde luego no mayor prisa que en otros asuntos. Elcurso, el ritmo de los tramites ha sido
normal; en realidad,si ha habido algo, ha sido un poco de parsimonia, lentitud.
Habia justificacion para demorar el pronto, rapido pronunciamento de nuestro veredicto sobre la
formidablecuestion constitucional debatida, por lo menos, tan pronto como fuese posible? Habia
alguna razon de interespublico para justificar una evasiva? Absolutamenteninguna. Por el contrario,
nuestro deber ineludible, imperioso,era formular y promulgar inmediatamente ese veredicto. Lo
debiamos a nuestras conciencias; lo debiamos, sobretodo, al pais para la tranquilidad y
conveniencia de todos del pueblo filipino y de los extranjeros residentes o quetuvieren voluntad
de residir o negociar en estas Islas. Asicada cual podria hacer su composicion de lugar,

podriaorientarse sin zozobras ni miedo a la incertidumbre. Tantonacionales como extranjeros

sabrian donde invertir sudinero. Todo lo que necesitabamos era tener dentro de esta Corte una
provee la interdiccion de que se trata. Tuvimosesa mayoria cunado se voto por primera vez este
asuntoen Febrero de este ao (8 contra 3); la tuvimos cuandodespues de laboriosas deliberaciones
quedo denegada lamocion de retirada de la mayoria haya cambiado de opinionsobre el fondo de la
cuestion; la tenemos ahora naturalmente.Por tanto, nada hace falta ya para que se de lasenal de
"luz verde" a la promulgacion de la sentencia.Toda evasiva seira neglignecia, desidia. Es mas:
seriaabandono de un deber jurado, como digo en otra parte deesta concurrencia; y la Corte
Suprema naturalmente npha de permitir que se la pueda proferir el cargo de queha abandonado su
puesto privilegiado de vigia, de centinela avanzado de la Constitucion.
No es que la Corte Suprema, con esto, pretenda tener"un monopolio de la virtud de sostener y
poner en vigor,o de suplir una deficiencia en la Constitucion," o que segobierno, como se insinua en
una de las disidencias. Nohay tal cosa. El principio de la supremacia judicial no esuna pretension ni
mucho menos un ademan de inmodestiao arrogancia, sino que es una parte vital de
nuestrasinstutuciones, una condicion peculiarisima de nuestro sistema de gobierno en que la
judicatura, como uno de lostres poderes del Estado, corresponde la facultad exclusivade disponer
de los asuntos judiciales. Con respecto a losasuntos de registro particularmente esa facultad
exclusivano solo se infiere del principio de la supremacia judicial, sino que, como ya se ha dicho en
otra parte de esta concurrencia,se halla especificamente estutuida en el articulo 200del Codigo
Administrativo transcrito arriba. Este articuloconfiere jurisdiccion exclusiva a los tribunales de
justiciapara decidir las cuestiones sobre registro, y esto lo ha reconocido el mismo Departamento de
Justicia en su circularnum. 14 al referir tales cuestiones a la determinacion oarbitrio judicial en casos
de duda o litigio.
Es injustificada la insinuacion de que, al parecer, la mayoria denego la retirada de la apelacion no
tanto para resolver el asunto en su fondo o por sus meritos, como paraenrvar los efectos de la
circular num. !28 del Departamentode Justicia, pues Krivenko, el apelante, habriaganado entonces
su pleito no en virtud de una sentenciajudicial, sino pasando por la puerta trasera abierta por
esacircular. Tampoco hay tal cosa. Ya repetidas veces seha dicho que el presente asunto se habia
votado muchoantes de que se expidiese esa circular. Lo que mascorrectamente podria decirse es
que antes de la expedicion deesa desafortunada circular poderosas razones de interespublico
aconsejaban que se denegase la retirada de la apelacion y se diese fin al asunto mediante una
sentencia enel fondo, despues de la expidicion esas razones quedaroncentuplicadas. La explicacion
es sencilla: nuestra aquiescenciaa la reirada hubiera podico interpretarse entoncescomo que
nuestra jurisdiccion. Es mas: hubiera podidointerpretarse como una abyecta rendicion en la pugna
porsostener los fueros de cada ramo coigual y coordinado del gobierno.
Es todavia mas injustificada la insinuacion de que ladenegacion de la retirada de la apelacion
equivale "a asumir queel solicitante-apelante y el Procurador General sehan confabulado con el
Departamento de Justicia no solopara ingerirse en las funciones de esta Corte, sino paraenajenar el
patrimonio nacional a los extranjeros." Estoes inconcebible. La corte presume que todos han
obradode buena fe, de acuerdo con los dictados de su conciencia.Se ha denegado la retirada de la
apelacion por razonespuramente juridicas y objectivas, sin consideracion a losmotivos de nadie.
Por ultimo, estimo que debe rectificarse la asercion de queel Magistrado Hontiveros fue excluido de
la votacion queculmino en un emmpate y que determino el rechazamientode la retirada de la
apelacion, a tenor de la regla 56, seccion2, Reglamento de los Tribunales. El Magistrado
Hontiverosno estaba presente en la sesion por estar enfermo;pero estaban presentes 10
Magistrados, es decir, mas queel numero necesario para formar quorum y para despacharlos
asuntos. La rueda de la justicia en la Corte Supremajamas ha dejado de rodar por la ausencia de
uno o dosmiembros, siempre que hubiese quorum. A la votacionprecedieron muy laboriosas y vivas
deliberaciones. Ningun Magistrado Ilamo la atencion de la Corte hacia la ausencia del Sr.

Hontiveros. Ningun Magistrado pidio que se leesperase o llamase al Sr. Hontiveros. Todos se
conformaroncon que se efectuase la votacion, no obstante la ausencia del Sr. Hontiveros. En
efecto, se hace la votaciony resulta un empate, es decir, 5 contra 5. De acuerdo conla regla 56,
quedaba naturalmente denegrada la mocion deretirada. Donde esta, pues, la "ilegalidad", donde
la"arbitrariedad"?
Algunos dias despues se presento una mocion de reconsideracion,la misma en que ya se alegaba
como ndamentoel hecho de que la cuestion era simplemente academica (moot question) por la
conformidad del Procurador Generalcon la retirada y por la circular num. !28 del Departamento de
Justicia. Tampoco estaba presente el Sr. Hontiverosal someterse la mocion, la cual fue de nuevo
denegada.Pregunto otra vez: donde esta la "arbitrariedad"? Queculpa tenia la Corte de que el Sr.
Hontiveros no pudieraestar presente por estar enfermo? Iba a detenerse larueda de la justicia por
eso? Conviene, sin embargo, hacerconstar que sobre el fondo de la cuestion el Sr. Hontiverosera
uno de los 8 que habian votado en favor de la confirmacion de la sentencia apelada, es decir, en
favor delveredicto de que la Contitucion excluye a los extrajerosde la propiedad de bienes raices en
Filipinas.
II. No queda casi nada decir sobre el fondo de lacuestion. Todos los angulos y fases de la misma
estanacabadamente tratados y discutidos en la ponencia. Melimitare, por tanto, a hacer unas
cuantas observaciones,unas sobre hermeneutica legal, y otra sobre historia
nacionalcontemporanea, aprovachando en este ultimo respectomis reminiscencias y mi experiencia
como humilde miembroque fui de la Asamblea Constituyente que redacto y arobola Constitucion de
Filipinas.
Toda la cuestion, a mi juicio, se reduce a determinar einterpretar la palabra "agricola" (agricultural)
usada enel articulo XIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion. He aqui eltexto completo de la seccion:
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Incluye la palabra "agricultural" aqui empleada los terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e
industriales? Tal es lacuestion: la mayoria de esta Corte que si; los disidentesdicen que no.
Es indudable que por razones sanas de hermenuetica legalel articulo XIII de que se trata debe
interpretarse como untodo homogeneo, simetrico. En otras palabras, los cocablosalli empleados
deben interpretarse en el sentido de quetienen un mismo significado. Es absurdo pensar o
suponerque en el texto de una ley, sobre todo dentro del estrechomarco de un articulo, un vocablo
tenga dos o mas significadosdistintos, a menos que la misma ley asi to diga expresamente.
Lapresuncion es que el legislador sigue y seatiene a las reglas literarias elementales.
Ahora bien: el articulo XIII consta de dos partes laprimera, que trata de los terrenos agricolas de
dominiopublico, y la segunda, que se a los terrenos agricolaprivados o partuculares.
La primera parte se compone de las secciones 1 y 2que vinculanla propiedad de los terrenos
publicos enel Estado y disponen que solo se pueden enajenar a favorde ciudadanos filipinos, o de
corporaciones o asociacionesen que el 60 por ciento del cacital, por lo menos, pertenecea tales
ciudadanos. En secciones se emplea literalmentela frase "public agricultural land."
La segunda parte la componen las secciones 3 y 5: laseccion 3 perceptua que "the Congress may
determine bylaw the size of private agricultural land which individuals,coporations, or associations
may acquire and hold, subjectto rights existing prior to the enactment of such law"4 ;y la seccion 5 es

la que queda transcrita mas arriba y esobjeto del presente litigio. En ambas secciones se
emplealiteralmente la frase "private agricultural land."
No hay ninguna cuestion de que la frase "public agriculturalland" empleada en la primera parte
comprende terrenosresidenciales, comerciales e industriales; lo admitenlos mismos abogados del
apelante y los Sres. Magistradosdisidentes. Y por que lo admiten? Sera porque en laConstitucion
se define la palabra "agricultural" aplicadaa terrenos publicos, en el sentido de incluir
solaresresidenciales, comerciales e industriales? Indudablementeque no, porque en ninguna parte
de la Constitucion se datal definicion. Lo admiten porque en esta jurisdicciontenemos una serie
consistente de sentencias de esta CorteSuprema en que es jurisprudencia firmamente establecidala
doctrina de que la palabra "agricultural" usada en laLey del Congreso de los Estados Unidos de
1902 (LeyCooper) y en nuestras leyes de terrenos publicos comprendey abarca solares
residenciales, comerciales, industriales yqualquier otra clase de terrenos, excepto forestales
yminerales.5 Es decir, que se aplica a la actual Constitucion deFilipinas una interpretacion clasica,
tradicional, embebidaen nuestra jurisprudencia de cerca de medio siglo.
Ahora bien, pregunto: si la palabra "agricultural" empleadaen la primera parte del articulo XIII tiene
talsignificado y lo tiene porque la Constitucion no da otrodiferente por que esa misma palabra
empleada en lasegunda parte, unas cuantas lineas mas adelante, no hade tener el mismo
significado? Da acaso la Constitucionuna definicion de la palabra "agricultural" cuandose refiere a
terreno privado? Donde esta esa definicion? O es que se pretende que la diferenciacion opera no
envirtud de la palabra "agricultural", sino en virtud delvocablo "public" o "private", segun que se trate
de terrenopublico o privado?
Si la intencion de la Asemblea Constituyente fuera eldar a la palabra "agricultural" aplicada a terreno
privadoun significado distinto de cuando se refiere a terreno publico, lo hubiese hecho constar asi
expresamente en elmismo texto de la Constitucion Si, como se admite, laAsemblea opto por no
definir la palabra "agricultural"aplicada a terreno poblico porque contaba para ello con ladefinicion
clasica establecida en la jurisprudencia, cuandola misma Asemblea tampoco definio la palabra con
relaciona terreno privado, es logico inferir que tuvo la mismaintencion, esto es, aplicar la definicion
de la jurisprudenciaa ambos tipos de terreno el publico y el privado. Pensarde otra manera podria
ser ofensivo, insultante; podriaequivaler a decir que aquella Asemblea estaba compuestade
miembros ignorantes, desconocederos de las reglas elementalesen la tecnica de redaccion
legislativa.
Tuve el honor de partenecer a aquella Asemblea comouno de los Delegados por Cebu. Tambien me
cupo elhonor de partenecer al llamado Comite de Siete elcomite encargado finalmente de
redactar la ponencia dela Constitucion. No digo que aquella Asemblea estabacompuesta de sabios,
pero indudablemente no era inferiora ninguna otra de su tipo en cualquiera otra partedel mundo. Alli
habia un plantel de buenos abogados,algunos versados y especialistas en derecho
constitucional.Alli estaba el Presidente de la Universidad de FilipinasDr. Rafael Palma; alli estaba el
propio Presidentede la Asemblea Constituyente Hon. Claro M. Recto, conlos prestigios de su
reconocida cultura juridica y humanista; alli estaba tambien el Dr. Jose P. Laurel, considerado
comouna de las primeras autoridades en derecho constitucionaly politico en nuestro pais. En el
Comite de Siete o dePonencia figuraban el actual Presidente de Filipinas Hon.Manuel Roxas; el exSenador de Cebu Hon. Filemon Sotto;el Hon. Vicente Singson Encarnacion, lider de la minoria en la
primera Asemblea Filipina, ex-miembro de la Comisionde FIlipinas, ex-Senador y ex-Secretario de
Gabinete;el ex-Magistrado de la Corte Suprema Hon. NorbertoRomualdez; el actual Secretario de
Hacienda Hon. MiguelCuaderno; y el ex-Decano del Colegio de Artes Liberalesde la Universidad de
Filipinas, Hon. Conrado Benitez.

No se puede concebir como bajo la inspiracion y guiade estas personas pudiera redactarse el texto
de un articuloenque un vocablo el vocablo "agricultural" tuviera dosacepciones diferentes: una,
aplicada a terrenos publicos;y otra, aplicada a terrenos privados. Menos se concibeque, si fuese
esta la intencion, se incurriese en una comisionimperdonable: la omision de una definicion
especifica, diferenciadora, que evitase caos y confusion en la mente delos abogados y del publico.
Teniendo en cuenta la innegablecompetencia de los Delegados a la Asemblea Constituyentey de
sus liders, lo mas logico pensar es que alno definir la palabra "agricultural" y al no diferenciarsu
aplicacion entre terrenos publicos y privados, lo hicierondeliberamente, esto es, conla manifiesta
intencion dedejar enteramente la interpretacion de la palabra a la luzde una sola comun definicin
la establecida en la jurisprudenciadel asunto tipico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular y otrossimilares
(supra); es decir, que la palabra "agricultural",aplicada a terrenos privados, incluye tambien
solaresresidenciales, comerciales, e industriales.
A word or phrase repeated in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statute,
unless a different intention appears. . . . Where words have been long used in a technical
sense and have been judicially construed to have a certain meaning, and have been adopted
by the legislature as having a certain meaning prior to a particular statute in which they are
used, the rule of construction requires that the words used in such statute should be
construed according to the sense in which they have been so previously used, although that
sense may vary from the strict literal meaning of the words." (II Sutherland, Stat.
Construction, p. 758.)
Pero acaso se diga que la Asemblea Constituyente hadejado sin definir la palabra "agricultural"
referente aterreno particular, dando a entendar con su silencio queendosaba la definicion al
diccionario o a la usanza popular.La suposicion es igualmente insostenible. ?Por queen un caso se
entrega la definicion a la jurisprudencia,y por que en otro al diccionario, o al habla popular?Aparte
de que los miembros y dirigentes de la AsembleaConstituyente sabian muy bien que esto causaria
unatremenda confusion. Ni los diccionarios, ni mucho menosel lenguaje popular, ofrecen apoyo
seguro para una fiely autorizada interpretacion. Si el texto mismo de la ley,con definiciones
especificas y casuisticas, todavia ofrecedudas a veces como no el lexico vulgar, con su
infinitavariedad de matices e idiotismos?
Ahora mismo no estamos presenciando una confusionn,una perplejidad? Hay acaso uniformidad
en la definicionde lo que es un terreno privado agricola? No; cadacual lo define a su manera. Uno
de los disidentesel Magistrado Sr. Tuason toma su definicion de la palabra "agricultural " del
Diccionario Internacional de Webster que dice . . . "of or pertaining to agricultural connected with, or
engaged in, tillage; as the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages etc." Tambien
hacereferncia el mismo Magistrado al concepto popular. Otrodisidente el Magistrado Sr. Padilla dice
que "the termprivate agricultural land means lands privately owneddevoted to cultivation, to the
raising of agriculturalproducts." El Magistrado Sr Paras no da ninguna definicion;da por definida la
palabra "agricultural", al parecer, segunel concepto popular.
Pero, sobre todo, los abogados del apelante definen elvocablo de una manera distinta. Segun ellos,
"land spoken of as `agricultural' naturally refers to land not only susceptible of agricultural or
cultivation but more valuable for such than for another purpose, say residential,commercial or
educational. . . . The criterion is notmere susceptibility of conversion into a farm but its
greater value when devoted to one or the other purpose." Demode que, segun esta definicion, lo que
determina la calidaddel terreno es su valor relativo, segun que se dedique alcultivo, o a residencia, o
al comercio, o a la industria.Los autores de esta definicion indudablemente tienen encuenta el
hecho de que en las afueras de las ciudades existenterrenos immensos que desde tiempo
inmemorial se handedicado a la agricultura, pero que se han convertido ensubdivisiones
multiplicandose su valor en mil por cientosi no mas. De hecho esos terrenos son agricolas;
comoque todavia se ven alli los pilapiles y ciertas partes estancultivadas; pero en virtud de su mayor

valor para residencia,comercio e industria se les aquiere colocar fuera dela prohibicion
constitucional. En verdad, el criterio nopuede ser mas elastico y convencional, y denota cuanincierta
y cuan confusa es la situacion a que da lugar latesis del apelante y de los que le sostienen.
Si hubieramos de hacer depender la definicion de loque es un terreno agricola del concepto popular
y de losdiccionarios, asi sean los mejores y mas cientificamente elaborados que normas claras,
concretas y definitivasde diferenciacion podrian establecerse? Podrian trazarsefronteras
inconfundibles entre lo que es agricola y lo quees residencial, comercial e industrial? Podria
hacerseuna clasificacion que no fuese arbitraria? Indudablementeque no. El patron mas usual de
diferenciacion es lanaturaleza urbana o rural del terreno; se considera comoresidencial, comercial e
industrial todo lo que esta dentrode una urbe, ciudad o poblacion. Pero resolveria esto la
dificultad? Proporcionaria un patron exacto, cientifico,no arbitrario? Tampoco. Por que dentro de
una ciudado poblacio puede haber y hay terrenos agricolas. Comodijo muy bien el Magistrado Sr.
Willard en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno Insular, "uno de los inconvenientes de la
adopcion de este criterio es que es tanvago e indeterminado, que seria muy dificil aplicarlo enla
practica. Que terrenos son agricolas por naturaleza? l mismo Fiscal General, en su alegato
presentado en este asunto, dice: 'La montaa mas pedregosa y el suelo mas pobre son susceptible
de cultivo mediante la mano del hombre'" (Mapa contra Insular, 10 Jur. Fil.,183). Y Luego el Sr.
Willard aade las siguietes observacionessumamente petinentes e ilustratives para una correctare
solucion del asunto que nos ocupa, a saber:
. . . Tales terrenos (agricolas, quiere decir) se pueden encontrar dentro de los limites de
cualquier ciudad. Hay dentrode la ciudad de Manila, y en la parte densamente poblada de
lamisma, una granja experimental. Esta es por su naturaleza agricola. Contigua a la Luneta,
en la misma ciudad, hay una gran extension de terreno denominado Camp Wallace,
destinada a sports. El terreno que circuda los muros de la ciudad de Manila, situado entre
estos y el paseo del Malecon por el Sur y Este contiene muchas hectareas de extension y es
de naturaleza agricola. La Luneta misma podria en cualquier tiempo destinarse al cultivo.
La dificultad es mayor tratanndose de diferenciar unterreno agricola de un terreno industrial. En este
respectoes preciso tener en cuenta que un terreno industiralno tienee que ser necesariamente
urbano; en realidad,la tendencia moderna es a situar las industrias fuera deas ciudades en vastas
zonas rurales. Verbigracia; anpredor de la famosa cascada de Maria Cristina en Lanao existen
grandes extensiones de terreno agricola, algunasde propiedad particular. Cuando, se industrialice
aquellaformidable fuerza hidraulica bajo el llamado Plan Beyster que normas segfuras se podrian
establecer para poner envigor la prohibicion constitucional fuese burlada enajenandosetierras
agricolas de propiedad privada a favorde extranjeros, ya sean individuos, ya sean corporacioneso
asociaciones, so pretexto de ser industriales?
Resulta evidence de lo expueto que los redactores denuetra Constitucion no pudienron haber tenido
la idea deque el articulo XIII fuera interpretado a la luz de ese criterio vago e indeterminado que
llama el Sr. Willard. Es mas logico pensar que el criterio que ellos tenian enla mente era el criterio
establicido en la jurisprudencia sentada en el asunto clasico de Mapa contra Gobierno y otros
asuntos concomitantes citados criterio mas frime, mas seguro, menos expuesto a confusion y
arbitrariedad, y sobre todo, "que ofrece menos inconvenientes", parafraseando otra vez al
Magistrado Sr. Willard, (supra, p. 185).
Otro serio inconveniente, La seccion 3, articulo XIIIde;la Constitucion, dispone que "el Congreso
puedo determinarpor ley l;a eextension superficial del terrenoprivado agricola que los individous,
corporaciones o asociaciones pueden adquirir y poseer, sujeto a los derechos existentes antes de la
aprobacion de dicha ley." Si seinterpretase que la frase "private agricultural land" noincluye terrenos
residenciales, comerciales e industriales,entonces estas ultimas clases de yterreno quedarian

excluidas de la facultad reguladora concedida por la Constitucion al Congreso mediante dicha

seccion 3. Entoncesun individuo o una corporacion podrian ser dueos de todoslos terrenos de una
ciudad; no habria limite a las adquisicionesy posesiones en lo tocante a terrenos
residenciales,comerciales e industriles. Esto parece absurdo, peroseria obligada consecuencia de la
tesis sustentada por elapelante.
Se hace hincapie en el argumento de que el el procesode tamizacion del articulo XIII durante las
deliberacionesde la Asamblea Constituyente y de los Comites de Ponnnnenciay de estilo al principio
no figuraba el adjetivo "agricola"en la seccion 5, diciendose solo "terreno privado" y quesolo mas
trade se aadio la palabra calificativa agricola"private agricultural land" De este se quiere inferir
quela adicion de la palabra "agricultural" debio de ser poralgun motivo y este no podia ser mas que
el de que sequiso excluir los terrenos residenciales comerciales e industriales, limitandose el
precepto a los propia o estrictamenteagricolas.
La deduccion es incorrecta y sin fundamento. No cabedecir que la adicion de la plabra "agricultural"
en estecaso equivale a excuir los terrenos residenciales, comercialese industriales, por la sencilla
razon de que la Constitucion no solo no define lo que es residencial comercial e industrial, comercial
e industrial. En cambio ya hemosvisto que la palabra "agricultral" tiene una
significaciontradicionalmente bien establecida en nuestra jurisprudenciay en nuestro vocabulario
juridico: incluye no solo terrenoscultivados o susceptibles fe cultivo, sino tambien
residencialescomerciales e industriales. Se admite por todo elmundo que la palabra tiene tal
significacion en el articuloXIII, seccion 5, de la Constitucion, en cuanto se refierea terreno publico.
Ahora bien; que diferencia hay, despuesde todo, entire un terreno publico agricolo y uno sea a la
calidad de agricola, absolutamente ninguna.Uno no es mas menois agricola que el otro. La
unicadiferencia se refiere a la propiedad, al titulo dominical en que el uno es del Estado y el otro
es de un particular.
En realidad, creo que la diferencia es mas bien psicologica,subjetiva en que vulgarmente
hablando pareceque los conceptos de "agricola" y "residencial" se repelen.No se debe
menospreciar la influencia del vulgo en algunascosas; en la misma literatura el vulgo juega su
papel; digasi no la formacion popular del romancero. Pero es indudable que cietas cosas estan por
encima del conceptovulgar una de estae la interpretacion de la leyes, lahermeneutica legal. Esto
no es exagerar la importancia de la tecnica sino que es simplemente colocar las cosasensu
verdadero lugar. La interpretacion de la ley es unafuncion de minoria los abogados. Si no fuera
asi paraque los abogados? Y para que las escuelas de dercho,y para que los exmenes, cada vez
mas rigidos, para de purar el alma de la toga, que dijo un gran abogado espaol?6 Asi que cuando
decimos que el precepto constitucional en cuestion debe interpretatarse tecnicamente, a la luz de la
jurisprudencia, por ser ello el metodo mas seguro para hallar la verdad judicial, no importa que ello
repugne al concepto vulgar a simple vista, no ponemos,en realidad, nionguna pica en Flandes, sino
que propugnamos una cosa harto elememntal por lo sabida.
Por tanto no es necesario especular o devanarse lossesos tratando de inquirir por que en la
tamizacion delprecepto se aadio el adjetivo 'agricultural" a las palabras"private land" en vez de
dejarlas solas sin cualificacion.Algunos diran que fue por razon de simentria para hacer"pendant
diran que fue por razon de simetria para hacer"pendant" con la frase "public agricultural land"
puestamas arriba. Pero esto np tiene ninguna importancia. Loimportante es saber que la aadidura,
tal como esta jurisdiccion, de la palbra "agricultural" empleada en dicho texto. Eso es todo; lo demas
creo que es puro bizantinis mo.
III. Cero que una examen de los documentos y debatesde la Asamblea Constituyente para ver de
inquirir la motivacion y finalidad del precepto constitucional que nos ocupapuede ayudar
grandemente y arrojar no poca luz en lainterpretacion de la letra y espiritu de dicho precepto.Este

genero de inquisicion es perfectamente propio y permisible en hermeneutica constitucional, y se ha

hechosiempre, segun las majores autoridades sobre la materia. Cooley, en su authorizado tratado
sobre Limitaciones Constitucionales (Constitutional Limitations) dice a este efectolo sigiuente:
When the inquiry is directedto ascertaining the mischief designed to be remedied, or
the purpose sought to be accomplished by a particular provision, it may be proper to
examine the proceedings of the convention which framed the instrument. Where the
proceedings clearly point out the purpose of the provision, the aid will be valuable and
satisfactory; but where the question is one of abstract meaning, it will be difficult to derive
from this source much reliable assistance in interpretation. (1 Cooley on Constitutional
Limitations [8th ed.], p. 142.)
Que atmosfera prevalecia en la Asamblea sobre elproblema de la tierra en general sobre el
problema capitalismo de los terrenos naturales? Cual era la tendenciapredominante entre los
Delegados? Y como era tambienel giro de la opinion, del sentimiento publico es decir comoera el
pulso del pueblo mismo del cual la Asamblea despuesde todo no era mas que organo e interprete?
Varios discursos sobre el particular se pronounciaronen la Asamblea Constituyente. El tono
predomionante entodos ellos era un fuerte, profundo nacionalismo. Tanto dentro como fuera de la
Asamblea Constituyente era evidente, acusado, el afan unanime y decidido de conservar el
patrimonio nacional no solo para las presentes generaciones filipinas, sino tambien para la
posteridad. Y patrimonio nacional tenia, en la mente de todos un significadocategorio e indubitable;
significion de si es dedominio publico o privado. Muestras tipicas y representativas de este tono
pecular y dominantes de la ideologiaconstituyente son ciertas m,anifestaciones que constanen el
diario de serines has en el curso de los debateso en el proceso de la redaccion del proyecto
constitucionalpor Delegados de palabra autorizadam bien por su significacion personal bein por el
papel particula que desempeaban en las treas constituyentes. Por ejemplo el Delegado Montilla
por Negros Occidental, conspicuo representante del agro, usando del privilegio de madia
horaparlamentaria dijo en parte lo siguinte:
. . . Con la completa nacionnalization de nuestras tierras y recursos natural debe entenderse
que nuetro patrimonio nacional debe estar vinculado 100 por 100 en manos
filipinas. Tierras y recursos naturales son inm,uebles y como tales pueden compararse con
los organos vitales del cuerpo de una persona: la falta de posesion de los mismo puede
caussar la muete instantannea o el abreviamiento de la vida (Diario de Sesiones Asamblea
Constituyente, inedita, "Framing of the Constitution," tit. 2 0 pag. 592 Libro del Profesor
Aruego).
Como se ve el Delegado Montilla habla de tierras sin adjetivacion, es decir sin difenciar entre
propiedad publica y privada.
El Delgado Ledesma, por Iloilo, otro conspicuo representante del agro presidente del comte de
agricultura de la Asamblea que los extramnjeros no podian ser mismas palabras:
La exclusion de los extranjeros del privilegio de adquirir terrenos publicos agricolas y de
poder se dueos de propiedades inmuebles (real estate) es una parte necesaria de las leyes
de terrenos publicos de Filipinas para mantener firme la idea de conservar Filipinaspara los
filipos' (Diario de Sesiones, id.; Libro de Aruego, supra, pag. 593.)
Es harto significtativo que en el informe del Colite de Nacionalizacion y Conservacion de Recursos
Naturales de la Asamblea Constituyente la plabra tierra (land) se usa generricamente sin
cualificacion de publica o privada. Dice el Comite:

Que la tierra, los minerales los bosques y otros recursos naturalesconstituyen la herencia
exclusiva de la nacion filipina. Deben,por tanto, ser conservados para aquellos que se halian
bajo la autoridad soberana de esa nacion y para su posteridad. (Libro de
Aruego, supra, pag. 595.)
La conservacion y fomento del patrimonio nacional fue una verdadera obsesion en la Asamblea
Constituyente. Sus mienbros que todavia viven recordaran l;a infinita paciencia, el esmero de orfe
breria con que se trabajo el preambulo de la Constitucion. Cada frase, cada concepto se sometio a
un rigido proceso de seleccion y las gemas resultans es la labor benedictina una de las gemas redel
patrimonio nacional. He aqui el preambulo:
The Filipino people, imploring the aid of Divene Providence,in order to establish a
government that shall enbody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,
promote the general welfare, and secure to themslves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty, and democracy, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
El espiritu fuertemente nacionalista que saturaba la Asamblea Constituyente con respecto a la tierre
y recursosnaturales es de facil explicacion. Estabamos escribiendouna Constitucion no solo para el
Commonwealth, sino tambien para la republica que advendria despues de10 aos. Querianos,
puesd asegurar firmemente las basesde nuestra nacionalidad. Que cosa major para ello quebildar
por los cuatro costrados el cuerpo dela mnacion delcual parodiando al Delegado Montilla la
tierra y losresoursos naturales son como organos vitales cuya perdidapuede causar la muerte
instantanea o el abreviamiento dela vida?
Para aprociar el pulso de la nacion en aquel memontohistorico es preciso tener en cuenta las
cirucmstancias.Nos debamos perfecta cuenta de nuetra posicion geografica,asi como tambien de
nuestras limitaciones demograficas.Se trataba, por ciento de una conciencia
agudamenteatormentadora y alarmante. Estabamos roodeadosde enormes mesas humanas
centenares de milliones economica y biologicamente agresivas, avidad de desbordarsepor tadas
partes, poir las areas del Pafico particularmente,en busca de espacio vitales. China, Japon-Japon,
sobretodo que estaba entonces en el apogeo de su delirio deengrandecimiento economico y
militarista. Teniamos apantadoal mismo corazon, como espada rutilante de Samurrai,el pavoroso
problema de Davao, donde, por errores incialesdel Gobierno, Japon tenia el control de la tierra,
instituyendos alli una especie de Japon en miniatura, con todaslas amenasas y peligros que ello
implicaba para la integridadde nuestra existancia nacional. Como que Davaoya se llamaba popular
y sarcasticamente Davaoko, entragica rima con Manchuko.
Tambien nos obsesionaban otras lecciones dolorosas dehistoria contemporanea. Texas, Mejico,
Cuba y otraspaises del Mar Caribe y de la America Latina que todaviaexpiaban, como una terrible
maldicion el error de susgobernantes al permitir la enajenacion del suelo a extranjeros.
Con el commercio y la industria principalmente en manosno-filipinas, los Delegados a la
Constituyente se haciancargo tambien de la vitalisima necesidad de, por lo menos,vincular el
apatrimonio nacional, entre otras cosas la tierra, en manos de los filipinos.
Que de extrao habia, pues, que en semejante atmosfera y tales circumstancias se aprobase un
articulo rigidamentenacionalismta como es el Article XIII? La motivacion y finalidad, como ya se ha
dicho, era triple: (a)consetvar el patrimonio nacional para las presentes yfuturas generaciones
filipinas; (b) vincular, por lo menos,la propiedad de la tierra y de los recursos naturales en manos
filipinas como la mejor manera de mantener elequilibrio de un sistema economico dominado

principalmente por extranjeros en virtud de su tecnica (know-how) superior y de su abudancia de

capitales: (c) prefictos y complicaciones internacionales.
No se concibe que los Delegados tuvieran la intercionde excluir del precepto los terrenos
residenciales comercialese industrial, pues sabian muy bien que los finesque se trataban de
conseguir y los peligros quie se trataban de evitar con la politica de nacionalizacion y
conservacionrezaban tanto para una clase de terrenos como para otra. Por que se iba a temer,
verbigracia, el dominio extranjero sobre un terreno estrictamente, agricola, sujeto a cultivo, y no
sobre el terreno en que estuviera instalada unaformidable industria o fabrica?
Otro detalle significativo. Era tan vigoroso el sentimiento nacionalista en la Asamblea Constituyente
que, noobstante el natural sentimiento de gratitud que nos obligabaa favor de los americanos., a
estos no se les concedioningun privilegio en relacion con la tierra y demas recusosnaturales, sino
que se les coloco en el mismo plano que alos otros extranjeros. Como que ha habido necesidad
deuna reforma constitucional la llmada reforma sobre laparidad para equipararlos a los
filipinos.
The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to
the intention of the legislature apparent by the statute; and if the words are sufficiently
flexible to admit of some other construction it is to be adopted to effectuate that
intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the latter will, if possible, be so read as to
conform to the spirit of the act. While the intention of the legislature must be ascertained from
the words used to express it, the manifest reason and the obvious purpose of the law should
not be sacrificed to a literal interpretation of such words. (II Sutherland, Stat. Construction,
pp. 721, 722.)
IV. Se insinua que no debieramos declarar que laConstitucion excluye a loc extranjeros de la
propiedadsobre terrenos residenciales e industriales,porque ello imposibilitaria toda accion
legislativa en sentidocontrario para el caso de que el Congreso Ilegagealguna vez a pensar que
semejante interdiccio debialevantarse. Se dice que es majes y mas conveniente dejaresta cuestion
en manos del Congreso para que haya maselasticidad en las soluciones de los diferentes
problemassobre la tierra.
Cometeriamos un grave error si esto hicieramos. Estaes una cuestion constitucional por excelencia.
Solamenteel pueblo puede disponer del patrimonio nacional. Ni el Congreso, ni mucho menos los
tribunales, pueden disponerde ese patrimonio. Lo mas que puede hecer el Congreso es proponer
una reforma constitucional mediante los votosde tres cuartas (3/4) de sus miembros; y el pueblo
tienela ultima palabra que se expresara en una eleccion oplebiscito convocado al efecto.
El argumento de que esto costaria dinero es insostenible. Seria una economia mal entendida. Si no
se escatiman gastos para celebrar elctiones ordinarias periodicamente como ha del pueblo en un
asunto tan vital como es la disposicion del patrimonio nacional, base de su mismaexistencia? para
reformar la Constitucion, apoyado portres cuartas (3/4) del Congreso, por lo menos.
En el entretanto el articulo XIII de la Constitucion debequedar tal como es, e interpretarse en la
forma como lo interpretamos en nuestra decision.
Se confirma la sentencia.

PARAS, J., dissenting:

Section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no
private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines." The important
question that arises is whether private residential land is included in the terms "private agricultural
land."
There is no doubt that under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, quoted in the majority
opinion, lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, timber,or mineral. There can be no
doubt, also, that public lands suitable or actually used for residential purposes, must of necessity
come under any of the three classes.
But may it be reasonably supposed that lands already of private ownership at the time of the
approval of the Constitution, have the same classification? An affirmative answer will lead to the
conclusion which is at once absurd and anomalous that private timber and mineral lands may
be transferred or assigned to aliens by a mode other than hereditary succession. It is, however,
contended that timber and mineral lands can never be private, and reliance is placed on section 1,
Article XIII, of the Constitution providing that "all agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public
domain . . . belong to the State," and limiting the alienation of natural resources only to public
agricultural land. The contention is obviously untenable. This constitutional provision, far from stating
that all timber and mineral lands existing at the time of its approval belong to the State, merely
proclaims ownership by the Government of all such lands as are then of the public domain; and
although, after the approval of the Constitution, no public timber or mineral land may be alienated, it
does not follow that timber or mineral lands theretofore already of private ownership also became
part of the public domain. We have held, quite recently, that lands in the possession of occupants
and their predecessors in interest since time immemorial do not belong to the Government, for such
possession justifies the presumption that said lands had been private properties even before the
Spanish conquest. (Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866.) This gives effect to the
pronouncement in Cario vs. Insular Government (212 U.S., 446; 53 Law. ed., 594), that it could not
be supposed that "every native who had not a paper title is a trespasser." It is easy to imagine that
some of such lands may be timber or mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or
mineral. However, if there are absolutely no private timber or mineral lands, why did the framers of
the Constitution bother about speaking of "private agricultural land" in sections 3 and 5 of Article XIII,
and merely of "lands" in section 4?
SEC. 3. The Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which
individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subject to rights existing
prior to the enactmentof such law.
SEC. 4. The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation
of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
Under section 3, the Congress may determine by law the size of private agricultural land which
individuals, corporations, or associations may acquire and hold, subbject to rights existing prior to
the enactment of such law, and under section 4 it may authorize, upon payment of just
compensation, the expropriation of lands to be subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to
individuals. The latter section clearly negatives the idea that private lands can only be agricultural. If

the exclusive classification of public lands contained in section 1 is held applicable to private lands,
and , as we have shown, there may be private timber and mineral lands, there would be neither
sense nor justification in authorizing the Congress to determine the size of private agricultural land
only, and in not extending the prohibition of section 5 to timber and mineral lands.
In may opinion, private lands are not contemplated or controlled by the classification of public lands,
and the term "agricultural" appearing in section 5 was used as it is commonly understood, namely,
as denoting lands devoted to agricultural. In other words, residential or urban lots are not embraced
within the inhibition established in said provision. It is noteworthy that the original draft referred
merely to "private land." This certainty would have been comprehensive enough to included any kind
of land. The insertion of the adjective "agricultural " is therefore significant. If the Constitution
prohibits the alienation to foreigners of private lands of and kind, no legislation can ever be enacted
with a view to permitting limited areas of land for residential, commercial, or industrial use, and said
prohibition may readily affect any effort towards the attainment of rapid progress in Philippine
economy. On the other hand, should any danger arise from the absence of such constitutional
prohibition, a law may be passed to remedy the situation, thereby enabling the Government to adopt
such elastic policy as may from time to time be necessary, unhampered by any inconveniences or
difficulties in amending the Constitution. The power of expropriation is, furthermore, a handy
safeguard against undersirable effects of unrestricted alienation to, or ownership by, aliens of urban
properties. The majority argue that the original draft in which the more general terms "private land"
was used, was amended in the same that the adjective "agricultural" was inserted in order merely "to
clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties" and because, as under section 1, timber and mineral lands
can never be private, "the prohibition to transfer the same, would be superfluous." In answer, it may
be stated that section 4 of Article XIII, referring to the right of expropriation, uses "lands" without any
qualification, and it is logical to believe that the use was made knowingly in contradistinctions with
the limited term "private agricultural land" in section 3 and 5. Following the line of reasoning of the
majority, "lands" in section 4 necessarily implies that what may be expropriated is not only private
agricultural land but also private timber and mineral lands, as well, of course, as private residential
lands. This of course tears apart the majority's contention that there cannot be any private timber or
mineral land.
Any doubt in the matter will be removed when it is, borne in mind that no less than Honorable
Filemon Sotto, Chairman of the Sponsorship Committee of the Constitutional Convention, in
supporting section 3 of the Article XIII, explained that the same refers to agricultural land, and not to
urban properties, and such explanation is somewhat confirmed by the statement of another member
of the Convention (delegate Sevilla) to the effect that said section "is discriminatory and unjust with
regard to the agriculturists."
Sr. SOTTO (F) Seor Presidente: "Que hay caballeros de laConvencion en el fondo de esta
cuestion al parecer inocente yordinaria para que tanto revuelo haya metido tanto en la
sesion de ayer como en la de hoy? Que hay de misterios en el fondo de este problem, para
que politicos del volumen del caballero por Iloilo y del caballero por Batangas, tomen con
gran interes una macion para reconsiderar lo acordado ayer? Voy a ser frio, seores. Parece
que es meyor tratar estas cuestiones con calma y no apasionamiento. He prestado atencion,
como siempre suelo hacer a todos los argumentos aqui en contra del precepto contenido en
el draft y a favor ahora de la reconsideracion y siento decir lo siguiente; todos son
argumentos muy buenos a posteriori. Cuando la Asamble Nacional se haya reunido, sera la
ocasion de ver si procede o no expropiar terrenos o latifundios existentes ahorao existentes
despues. En el presente, yo me limito a invitar la atencion de la Convencion al hecho de que
el procepto no tome las medidas necesarias en tiempo oportuno, cuando el problema del
latifundismo se haya presentado con caracterres tales que el beinestar, interes y orden
publico lo requieran. Permitame la Convencion que lo discuta en globo las dos pates del
articulo 9. Hay tal engranaje en los dos mandatos que tiene dicho precepto, hay tral eslabon

en una u otra parte que es imposible, que es dificil que quitaramos deslindes si nos
limitasemos a considerar una sola parte. La primera parte autoriza a la legislatura para fijar
el limite maximo de propiedad agricola que los ciudadanos particulares puede tener. Parece
que es un punto que ha pasado desapercibido. No se trata aqui ahora de propiedades
urbanas, sino de propiedades agricolas, y es por la razon de que con mucha especialidad en
las regiones agricolas, en las zones rusticas es donde el latifundismo se extiende con
facilidad, y desde alli los pequeos propietariou precisamente para ahogarles y para
intilizarles. Esta pues, a salvo completamente la cuestion de las propiedades urbans. Cietos
grandes soleres de nuestras ciudaes que con pretexto de tener cietos eficios, que en
realidad no necesitan de tales extensos solares para su existencia ni para su
mantenimineto, puedan dormir transquilos. No Vamos contra esas propiedades. Por una
causa o por otra el pasado nos legardo ese lastre doloroso. Pero la region agricola, la region
menos explotada por nuetro pueblo, la region que necesitamos si queremos vivir cuenta
propia la region que es el mayor incentivo no para solo para los grandes capitalistas de
fuera merece todos los ciudados del gobierno.
Voy a pasar ahora a la relacion que tiene la seggunda parte de la enmiendad con la primera.
Una vez demostrado ante la Lehgislatura, una vez convencida la Asamblea Nacional de que
existe un latifundismo y que este laitifundismo puede producir males e esta produciendo
daos a la comunidad, es cuando entonces la Legislatura puede acordar la expropiacion de
los latifundios. Donde esta el mal que los opositores a este es un postulado que todos
conocen. Bien, voy a admitir para los propositos del argumento que hoy no existen
laifundios, y si los opostores al precepto quieren mas vamos a convenir en que no existrian
en el futuro. Pues, entonces, donde este el temor de que el hijo de tal no pueda recibir la
herencia de cual? Por lo demas el ejemplo repetidas veces presentado ayer yhoy en cuanto
al herdero y al causahabiente no es completamente exacto. Vamos a suponer que
efectivamente un padre de familia posee un numero tal de hectareas de terreno, superior o
exedente a lo que fija la ley. Creen los Caballeros, creen los opositorees al precepto que la
Legislatura, la Asamblea Nacional va a ser tan imprudente, tan loca que inmediatemente
disponga por ley que aquella porcion excedente del terreno que ha de recibir un hijo de su
padre no podra poseerlo, no podra tenerlo o recibirlo el heredero.
Esa es una materia para la Asamblea Nacional. La asamblea Nacional sabe que no puede
dictar leyes o medidas imposibles de cumplir. Fijara el plazo, fijara la proporcion de acuedo
con las circunstancias del tiempo entonces en que vivamos. Es posible que ahora un
numero determinado de hectereas sea excesivo; es posible que por desenvolvimientos
economics del paius ese numero de hectareas puede ser elevado o reducido. Es por esto
porque el Comite precisamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas
presamente no ha querido fijar desde ahora el numero de hectareas, prefireindo dejar a la
sabiduria, a la prudencia, al patriotismo y a la justicia de la Asambela Nacional el fijar ese
numero.
Lomismo digo de la expropiacion. Se habla de que el gobierno no tendra dinero; se hablqa
de que no podra revender las propieedades. Pero, Caballeros de la Convencion, caballeros
opositores del precepto; si la Legislatura, si la AsambleaNacional estuviera convencida de
que el gobierno no puede hecer una exporpiacion, va a hecerlo? La Asamblea Nacional
dictara una ley autorizando la expropiacion de tal a cual latifundio cuando este convencida,
primero, de que la existencia de ese latifundio es amenazante para el publico; y segundo,
cuando la asamblea Nacional este convencida de que el gobierno esta disposicion para
disponer la expropiacion.
Visto, pues, desde este punto el asunto, no es malo autorizar,fijar los limites, ni macho
menos es malo autorizar a la Legislatura para dictar leyes de expropiacion.

Pero voy a molestaros por un minuto mas. Se ha mentado aquicon algun exito esta maana
y digo con exito porque he oidoalgunos aplausos se ha mentado la posibilidad de que
los comunistas hagan unissue de esta disposicion que existe en el draft; podran los
comunistas pedir los votos del electorado para ser elloslos que dicten las leyes fijando el
limite del terreno y ordenen la expropriacion? Que argumento mas bonito si tuviera base! Lo
mas natural, creo yo, es que el pueblo, el electorado, al ver queno es una Asamblea
Constituyente comunista la que ha puestoesta disposicion, otorgue sus votors a esta misma
Asamblea Nacional, o a esos condidatos no comunistas. Quien esta en disposicion de
terminar mejor una obra aquel que trazado y puesto los primeros pilares, o aquel que viene
de gorra al final de la obra para decir: "Aqui estoy poner el tejado?"
Es sensible, sin embargo, que una cuetion de importancia tannacional como este,
pretendamos ligarla a los votos de los comulites de terreno; no ha de venir porque nosotros
fijemos loslimites de terreno; no ha de venir porque prohibamos los latifundiosmediante
expropiacion forzosa, no; ha de venir precisamentepor causa de los grandes propietarios de
terreno, y ha de venir,queramoslo o no, porque el mundo esta evolucionando y se va
aconvencer de que la vida no es solamente para unos cuantos sinopara todos , porque Dios
no la dio, con la libertad, el aire, la luz,la tierra para vivir (Grandes Aplausosz), y por algo se
ha dichoque en los comienzos de la vida himana debio haber sido fusilado,matado, a aquel
primero que puso un cerco a un pedazo de tierrareclamando ser suya a propiedad.
Por estas razones, seor Presidente, y sintiendo que mi tiempoesta para terminar, voy a dar
fin a mi discurso agradeciendo a la Convencion. (Speech of Delegate Sotto.)
I would further add, Mr. President, that this precept by limiting private individuals to holding
and acquiring lands, private agricultural lands . . . is discriminatory and unjust with regard to
the agriculturists. Why not, Mr. President, extend this provision also to those who are
engaged in commerce and industries? Both elements amass wealth. If the purpose of the
Committee, Mr. President, is to distribute the wealth in such a manner that it will no breed
discontent, I see no reason for the discrimination against the agricultural. In view of these
reasons, Mr. President, I do not want to speak further and I submit this amendment because
many reasons have been given already yesterday and this morning. (Speech of Delegate
Sevilla.)
Delegate Sotto was not interpellated, much less contradicted, on the observation that section 3 of
Article XIII does not embrace private urban lands. There is of course every reason to believe that the
sense in which the terms "private agricultural lands" were employed in section 3 must be the same
as that in section 5, if consistency is to be attributed to the framers of the Constitution.
We should not be concluded by te remarks, cited in the majority opinion, made by Delegate
Ledesma to the effect that "the exclusion of aleins from the private of acquiring public agricultural
lands and of owning real estate is a necessary part of the Public Land Laws," and of the statement of
Delegate Montilla regarding "the complete nationalization of our lands and natural resources,"
because (1) the remarks of Delegate Ledesma expressly mentions "public agricultural lands" and the
terms "real estate" must undoubtedly carry the same meaning as the preceding words "public
agricultural lands", under the principle of "ejusdem generis"; (2) Delegate Ledesma must have in
mind purely "agricultural" lands, sicne he was the Chairman of the Committee on Agricultural
Development and his speech was made in connection with the national policy on agricultural lands;
(3) the general nature of the explanations of both Delegate Ledesma and Delegate Montilla, cannot
control the more specific clarification of Delegate Sotto that agricultural lands in section 3 do not
include urban propeties. Neither are we bound to give reater force to the view (apparently based on

mere mental recollections) of the Justices who were members of the Constitutional Convention than
tot he specific recorded manifestation of Delegate Sotto.
The decision in the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), invoked by the majority, is
surely not controlling, because, first, it dealt with "agricultural public lands" and, secondly, in that
case it was expressly held that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 "means
those public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands," the definition held
to be found in section 13 of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902.
We hold that there is to found in the act of Congress a definition of the phrase "agricultural
public lands," and after a carefully consideration of the question we are satisfied that the only
definition which exists in said act is the definition adopted by the court below. Section 13
says that the Government shall "make rules and regulations for the lease, sale or other
disposition of the public lands other than timber or mineral lands." To our minds that is the
only definition that can be said to be given to agricultural lands. In other words, that the
phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands accquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. (Mapa vs. Insular Government, 10 Phil., 182.)
The majority, in support of their construction, invoke Commonwealth Act No. 141, enected after the
approval of the Constitution, which prohibits the alienation to foreigners of "land originally acquired in
any manner under the provisions of this Act," (section 122) or "land originally acquired in any manner
under the provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision
of law formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios realengos, or
lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain." (Section
123.) They hold that the constitutional intent "is made more patent and is strongly implemented by
said Act." The majority have evidently overlooked the fact that the prohibition contained in said
sections refer to lands originally acquired under said sections referto land originally acqured under
said Act or otherlegal provisions lands, which of course do not include lands not originally of the
public domain. The lands that may be acquired under Act No. 141 necessarily have to be public
agricultural lands, since they are the only kinds that are subject to alienation or disposition under the
Constitution. Hence, even if they become private, said lands retained their original agricultural
character and may not therefore be alienated to foreigners. It is only in this sense, I think, that act
No. 141 seeks to carry out and implement the constitutional objective. In the case before us,
however, there is no pretense that the land bought by the appellant was originally acquired under
said Act or other legal provisions contemplated therein.
The majority is also mistaken in arguing that "prior to the Constitution, under section 24 of the Public
Land Act No. 2874 aliens could acquire public agricultural lands used for industrial or residential
purposes, but after the Constitution and under section 23 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, the right of
aliens to acquire such kind of lands is completely stricken out, undoubtedly in pursuanceof the
Constitutional limitation," and that "prior to the Constitution, under section 57 of the Public Land Act
No.2874, land of the public domain suitable for residence or industrial purposes could
be sold or leased to aliens, but after the Constitution and under section 60 of Commonwealth Act
No. 141, such land may only be leased, but not sold, to aliens, and the lease granted shall only be
valid while the land is used for the purpose referred to." Section 1 of article XIII of the Constitution
speaks of "public agricultural lands" and quite logically, Commonwealth Act No. 141, enacted after
the approval of the Constitution, has to limit the alienation of its subject matter (public agricultural
land, which includes public residential or industrial land) to Filipino citizens. But it is not correct to
consider said Act as a legislation on, or a limitation against, the right of aliens to acquire residential
land that was already of private ownership prior to the approval of the Constitution.

The sweeping assertion of the majority that "the three great departments of the Government
Judicial, Legislative and Executive have always maintained that lands of the public domain are
classified into agricultural, mineral and timber, and that agricultural lands include residential lots," is
rather misleading and not inconsistent, with our position. While the construction mistakenly invoked
by the majority refers exclusively to lands of the public domain, our view is that private residential
lands are not embraced within the terms "private agricultural land" in section 5 of Article XIII. Let us
particularize in somewhat chronological order. We have already pointed out that the leading case
of Mapa vs. Insular Government, supra, only held that agricultural public lands are those public
lands acquired from Spain which are neither timber nor mineral lands. The opinion of the Secretary
of Justice dated July 15, 1939, quoted in the majority opinion, limited itself in affirming that
"residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public domain . . . must be classified as
agricultural." Indeed, the limited scope of said opinion is clearly pointed out in the following
subsequent opinion of the Secretary of Justice dated September 25, 1941, expressly hoding that "in
cases involving the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or
assignment of private agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not
agricultural lands is applicable."
This is with reference to your first indorsement dated July 30, 1941, forwarding the request of
the Register of Deeds of Oriental Misamis for an opinion as to whether Opinion No. 130,
dated July 15, 1939, of this Department quoted in its Circular No. 28, dated May 13, 1941,
holding among others, that the phrase "public agricultural land" in section 1, Article XIII
(formerly article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines, includes residential, commercial or
industrial lots for purposes of their disposition, amends or supersedeas a decision or order of
the fourth branch of the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila rendered pursuant to
section 200 of the Administrative Code which holds that a residential lot is not an agricultural
land, and therefore, the prohibition in section 5, Article XIII (formerly Article XII) of the
Constitution of the Philippines does not apply.
There is no conflict between the two opinions.
Section 1, Artcile XIII (formerly article XII of the Constitution of the Philippines, speaks
of public agricultural lands while section 5 of the same article treats of private agricultural
lands. A holding, therefore, that a residential lot is not private agricultural land within the
meaning of that phrase as found in section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) does not
conflict with an opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming part of the public
domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in section 1, Article XIII
(formerly Article XII) of the Constitution of the Philippines. In cases involving the prohibition in
section 5 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII) regarding transfer or assignment of private
agricultural lands to foreigners, the opinion that residential lots are not agricultural lands is
applicable. In cases involving the prohibition in section 1 of Article XIII (formerly Article XII)
regarding disposition in favor of, and exploitation, development or utilization by foreigners
of public agricultural lands, the opinion that residential, commercial or industrial lots forming
part of the public domain are included within the phrase "public agricultural land" found in
said section 1 of the Article XIII (formerly Article XII) governs.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, passed after the approval of the Constitution limited its restriction
against transfers in favor of alien to public agricultural lands or to lands originally acquired under said
Act or other legal provisions formerly in force in the Philippines with regard to public lands. On
November 29, 1943, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First
rendered a decision affirming that of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac in a case in which it was
held that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5 of Article XIII. (CA-G.
R. No. 29.) During theJapanese occupation, the Constitution of the then Republic of the Philippines
contained an almost verbatim reproduction of said section 5 of Article XIII; and the then National

Assembly passed an Act providing that "no natural or juridical person who is not a Filipino citizen
shall acquire directly or indirectly any title to private lands (which are not agricultural lands) including
buildings and other improvements thereon or leasehold rights on said lands, except by legal
succession of proper cases, unless authorized by the President of the Republic of the Philippines."
(Off. Gaz., Vol. I, p. 497, February,1944.) It is true that the Secretary of Justice in 1945 appears to
have rendered an opinion on the matter, but it cannot have any persuasive force because it merely
suspended the effect of the previous opinion of his Department pending judicial determination of the
question. Very recently, the Secretary of Justice issued a circular adopting in effect the opinion of his
Department rendered in1941. Last but not least, since the approval of the Constitution, numerous
transactions involving transfers of private residential lots to aliens had been allowed to be registered
without any opposition on the part of the Government. It will thus be seen that, contrary to what the
majority believe, our Government has constantly adopted the view that private residential lands do
not fall under the limitation contained in section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution.
I do not question or doubt the nationalistic spirit permeating the Constitution, but I will not permit
myself to be blinded by any sentimental feeling or conjectural considerations to such a degree as to
attribute to any of its provisions a construction not justified by or beyond what the plain written words
purport to convey. We need not express any unnecessary concern over the possibility that entire
towns and cities may come to the hands of aliens, as long as we have faith in our independence and
in our power to supply any deficiency in the Constitution either by its amendment or by
Congressional action.
There should really have been no occasion for writing this dissent, because the appellant, with the
conformity of the appellee, had filed a motion for the withdrawal of the appeal and the same should
have been granted outright. In Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan (p. 122, ante),decided only a few days ago,
we reiterated the well-settled rule that "a court should not pass upon a constitutional question and
decide a law to be unconstitutional or invalid unless such question is raised by the the parties, and
that when it is raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the court may rest
its judgment, that course will be adopted and the constitutional question will be left for consideration
until a case arises in which a decision upon such question will be unavoidable." In other words, a
court will always avoid a constitutional question, if possible. In the present case, that course of action
was not only possible but absolutely imperative. If appellant's motion for withdrawal had been
opposed by the appellee, there might be some reasons for its denial, in view of section 4 of Rule 52
which provides that after the filing of appellee's brief, "the withdrawal may be allowed by the court in
its discretion." At any rate, this discretion should always be exercised in favor of a withdrawal where
a constitutional question will thereby be avoided.
In this connection, let us describe the proceedings (called "arbitrary and illegal" by Mr. Justice
Tuason) that led to teh denial of the motion for withdrawal. During the deliberation in which all the
eleven members were present, seven voted to allow and four to deny. Subsequently, without any
previous notice and when Mr. Justice Hontiveros was absent, the matter was again submitted to a
vote, and one Justice (who previously was in favor of the withdrawal) reversed his stand, with the
result that the votes were five to five. This result was officially released and the motion denied under
the technicality provided in Rule of Court No. 56, section 2. It is very interesting to observe that Mr.
Justice Hontiveros, who was still a member of the Court and could have attended the later
deliberation, if notified and requested, previously voted for the granting of the motion. The real
explanation for excluding Mr. Justice Hontiveros, against my objection, and for the reversal of the
vote of one Justice who originally was in favor of the withdrawal is found in the confession made in
the majority opinion to the effect that the circular of the Department of Justice instructing all registers
of deeds to accept for registration transfers of residential lots to aliens, was an "interference with the
regular and complete exercise by this Court of its constitutional functions," and that "if we grant the
withdrawal, the result is that petitioner-appellant Alexander A. Krivenko wins his case, not by a
decision of this Court, but by the decision or circular of the Department of Justice issued while this

case was pending before this Court." The zealousness thus shown in denying the motion for
wuthdrawal is open to question. The denial of course is another way of assuming that the petitionerappellant and the Solicitor General had connived with the Department of Justice in a scheme not
only to interfere with the functions of this Court but to dispose of the national patrimony in favor of
aliens.
In the absence of any injunction from this Court, we should recognize tha right of the Department of
Justice to issue any circular it may deem legal and proper on any subject, and the corollary right of
the appellant to take advantage thereof. What is most regrettable is the implication that the
Department of Justice, as a part of the Executive Department, cannot be as patriotic and able as this
Court in defending the Constitution. If the circular in question is objectionable, the same can be said
of the opinion of the Secretary of Justice in 1945 in effect prohibiting the registration of transfers of
private residential lots in favor of aliens, notwithstanding the pendency in this Court of the case of Oh
Cho vs. Director of Lands (43 Off. Gaz., 866), wherin according to the appellant, the only question
raised was whether, or not "an alien can acquire a residential lot and register it in his name," and
notwithstanding the fact that in said case the appealed decision was in favor of the alien applicant
and that, as hereinbefore stated, the Court of Appeals in another case (CA-G.R. No. 29) had renderd
in 1943 a decision holding that private residential lots are not included in the prohibition in section 5
of Article XIII of the Constitution. And yet this Court, failing to consider said opinion as an
"interference," chose to evade the only issue raised by the appellant and squarely met by the
appellee in the Oh Cho case which already required a decision on the constitutional question
resolved in the case at bar against, so to say, the will of the parties litigant. In other words, the
majority did not allow the withdrawal of the present appeal not so much as to dispose of it on the
merits, but to annul the circular of the Department of Justice which is, needless to say, not involved
in this case. I cannot accept the shallow excuse of the majority that the denial of the motion for
withdrawal was promted by the fear that "our indifference of today might signify a permanent offense
to the Constitution," because it carries the rather immodest implication that this Court has a
monopoly of the virtue of upholding and enforcing, or supplying any deficiency in, the Constitution.
Indeed, the fallacy of the impliation is made glaring when Senator Franscisco lost no time in
introducing a bill that would clarify the constitutional provision in question in the sense desired by the
majority. Upon the other hand, the majority should not worry about the remoteness of the opportunity
that will enable this Court to pass upon this constitutional question, because we can take advance
notice of the fact that in Rellosa vs. Gaw Chee Hun (49 Off. Gaz., 4345), in which the parties have
already presented. But even disregarding said case, I am sure that, in view of the recent newspaper
discussion which naturally reached the length and breadth of the country, there will be those who will
dispute their sales of residential lots in favor of aliens and invoke the constitutional prohibition.
BENGZON, J., dissenting:
It is unnecessary to deliver at this time any opinion about the extent of the constitutional prohibition.
Both parties having agreed to writer finis to the litigation, there is no obligation to hold forth on the
issue. It is not our mission to give advice to other person who might be interested to give advice to
other persons who might be interested to know the validity or invalidity of their sales or purchases.
That is the work of lawyers and juriscounsults.
There is much to what Mr. Justice Padilla explains regarding any eagerness to solve the
constitutional problem. It must be remembered that the other departments of the Government are
not prevented from passing on constitutional question arising in the exercise of their official powers.
(Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., p. 101.) This Tribunal was not established, nor is it
expected to play the role of an overseer to supervise the other Government departments, with the
obligation to seize any opportunity to correct what we may believe to be erroneous application of the
constitutional mandate. I cannot agree to the suggestion that the way the incumbent Secretary of
Justice has interpreted the fundamental law, no case will ever arise before the court, because the

registers of deeds under his command, will transfer on thier books all sales to aliens. It is easy to
perceive several probabilities: (1) a new secretary may entertain opposite views; (2) parties legally
affected like heirs or or creditors of the seller may wish to avoid the conveyance to aliens,
invoking the constitutional inhibition. Then, in a truly contested case, with opposing litigants actively
arguing their sides we shall be in a position to do full justice. It is not enough that briefs as in this
case have been filed; it is desirable, perhaps essential, to make sure that in a motion for
reconsideration, or in a re-hearing in case of tie, our attention shall be invited to points inadequately
touched or improperly considered.
It is stated that sales to aliens of residential lots are currently being effected. No matter. Those sales
will be subject to the final decision we shall reach in a properly submitted litigation. To spell
necessity out of the existence of such conveyances, might amount to begging the issue with the
assumption that such transfers are obviously barred by the Organic Law. And yet sales to foreigners
of residential lots have taken place since our Constitution was approved in 1935, and no one
questioned their validity in Court until nine years later in 1945, after the Japanese authorities had
shown distaste for such transfers.
The Court should have, I submit, ample time to discuss this all-important point, and reflect upon the
conflicting politico-economic philosophies of those who advocate national isolation against
international cooperation, and vice-versa. We could also delve into several aspects necessarily
involved, to wit:
(a) Whether the prohibition in the Constitution operated to curtail the freedom to dispose
of landowners at the time of its adoption; or whether it merely affected the rights of those who should
become landowners after the approval of the Constitution;7
(b) What consequences would a ruling adverse to aliens have upon our position and commitments in
the United Nations Organization, and upon our treaty-making negotiations with other nations of the
worlds; and
(c) When in 1941 Krivenko acquired this land he was a Russian citizen. Under the treaties between
the United States and Russia, were Russian nationals allowed to acquire residential lots in places
under the jurisdiction of the United States? If so, did our Constitution have the effect of modifying
such treaty during the existence of the Commonwealth Government?
The foregoing view and doubts induced me to vote for dismissal of the appeal as requested by the
parties, and for withholding of any ruling on the constitutional prohibition. However, I am now ready
to cast my vote. I am convinced that the organic law bans the sales of agricultural lands as they are
popularly understood not including residential, commercial, industrial or urban lots. This belief is
founded on the reasons ably expounded by Mr. Justice Paras, Mr. Justice Padilla and Mr. Justice
Tuason. I am particularly moved by the consideration that a restricted interpretation of the
prohibition, if erroneous or contrary to the poeple's desire, may be remedied by legislation amplifying
it; whereas a liberal and wide application, if erroneous, would need the cumbersome and highly
expensive process of a constitutional amendment.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The question submitted for decision is whether a parcel of land of private ownership suitable or
intended for residence may be alienated or sold to an alien.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution provides:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or

assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
The majority holds that a parcel of land of privateownership suitable or intended or used for
residence is included in the term "private agricultural land" and comes within the prohibition of the
Constitution. In support of the opinion that lands of private ownership suitable for residence are
included in the term "private agricultural land" and cannot be alienated or sold to aliens, the majority
invokes the decision of this Court in Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil., 175), which holds that
urban lands of the public domain are included in the term "public agricultural land." But the opinion of
the majority overlooks the fact that the inclusion by this Court of public lands suitable for residence in
the term "public agricultural land" was due to the classification made by the Congress of the United
States in the Act of 1 July 1902, commonly known as the Philippine Bill. In said Act, lands of the
public domain were classified into agricultural, timber and mineral. The only alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain were those belonging to the first class. Hence a parcel of land of the
public domain suitable for residence, which was neither timber nor mineral, could not be disposed of
or alienated unless classified as public agricultural land. The susceptibility of a residential lot of the
public domain of being cultivated is not the real reason for the inclusion of such lot in the
classification of public agricultural land, for there are lands, such as foreshore lands, which would
hardly be susceptible of cultivation (Ibaez de Aldecoa vs. Insular Government, 13 Phil., 159, 167168), and yet the same come under the classification of public agricultural land. The fact, therefore,
that parcels of land of the public domain suitable for residence are included in the classification of
public agricultural land, is not a safe guide or index of what the framers of the Constitution intended
to mean by the term "private agricultural land." It is contrary to the rules of statutory construction to
attach technical meaning to terms or phrases that have a common or ordinary meaning as
understood by he average citizen.
At the time of the adoption of the Constitution (8 February 1935), the Public Land Act in force was
Act No. 2874. Under this Act, only citizens of the Philippine Islands or of the United States and
corporations or associations described in section 23 thereof, and citizens of countries the laws of
which grant to citizens of the Philippine Islands the same right to acquire the public land as to their
own citizens, could acquire by purchase agricultural land of the public domain (section 23, Act No.
2874). This was the general rule. There was an exception. Section 24of the Act provides:
No person, corporation, association or partnership other than those mentioned in the last
preceding section may acquire or own agricultural public land or land of any other
denomination or classification, not used for industrial or residence purposes, that is at the
time or was originally, really or presumptively, of the public domain, or any permanent
improvement thereon, or any real right on such land and improvement:Provided, however,
That persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships which at the date upon which this
Act shall take effect, hold agricultural public lands or land of any other denomination not used
for industrial or residence purposes, that belonged originally, really or presumptively, to the
public domain, or permanent improvements on such lands, or a real right upon such lands
and improvements, having acquired the same under the laws and regulations in force at the
date of such acquisition, shall be authorized to continue holding the same as if such persons,
corporations, associations, or partnerships were qualified under the last preceding section;
but they shall not encumber, convey, or alienate the same to persons, corporations,
associations or partnerships not included in section twenty-three of this Act, except by
reason of hereditary succession, duly legalized and acknowledged by competent Courts.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Section 57 of the Act, dealing with lands of the public domain suitable for residential, commercial,
industrial, or other productive purposes other than agricultural, provides:

Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may be, to
any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands for
agricultural purposes. . . .Provided further, That any person, corporation, association, or
partnership disqualified from purchasing public land for agricultural purposes under the
provisions of this Act, may purchase or lease land included under this title suitable for
industrial or residence purposes, but the title or lease granted shall only be valid while such
land issued for the purposes referred to. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 121 of the Act provides:
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of the former Public Land Act
or of any other Act, ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law
formerly in force in the Philippine Islands with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y
realengos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually or presumptively of the
public domain, or by royal grant or in any other form, nor any permanent improvement on
such land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations, or
associations who may acquire land of the public domain under this Act; . . .Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the conveyance or acquisition by
reason of hereditary succession duly acknowledged and legalized by competent Courts, nor
to lands and improvements acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes, while used
for such purposes: . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Under and pursuant to the above quoted provisions of Act No. 2874, lands of the public domain, that
were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial or residence purposes, could be acquired by
aliens disqualified from acquiring by purchase or lease public agricultural lands (sections 24, 57,
121, Act No. 2874). The delegates to the Constituent Assembly were familiar with the provisions of
the Public Land Act referred to. The prohibition to alienate public agricultural lands to disqualified
persons, corporations or associations did not apply to "lands and improvements acquired or held for
industrial or residence purposes, while used for such purposes." Even under the provisions of Act
No. 926, the first Public Land Act, lots for townsites could be acquired by any person irrespective of
citizenship, pursuant to section 47 of the said Act. In spite of the nationalistic spirit that pervades all
the provisions of Act No. 2874, the Philippine Legislature did not deem it necessary to exclude aliens
from acquiring and owning lands of the public domain suitable for industrial or residence purposes. It
adopted the policy of excluding aliens from acquiring agricultural lands of the public domain not
"suitable for residential, commercial, industrial, or other productive purposes," which, together with
timber, mineral and private agricultural lands, constitute the mainstay of the nation. Act No. 2874
was in force for nearly sixteen years from 1919 to 1935. There is nothing recorded in the journals
of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which would have justified a
departure from the policy theretofore adopted.
If under the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, aliens could acquire by
purchase or lease lands of the public domain, that were neither timber nor mineral, held for industrial
or residence purposes, how can it be presumed that the framers of the Constitution intended to
exclude such aliens from acquiring by purchase private lands suitable for industrial or residence
purposes? If pursuant to the law in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, lands of the
public domain and improvements thereon acquired or held for industrial or residence purposes were
not included in the prohibition found in section 121 of ActNo. 2874, there is every reason for
believing that the framers of the Constitution, who were familiar with the law then in force, did not
have the intention of applying the prohibition contained in section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution to
lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, there being nothing recorded
in the journals of proceedings of the Constituent Assembly regarding the matter which, as above
stated, would have justified a departure from the policy then existing. If the term "private agricultural
land" comprehends lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence, as held by

the majority, there was no need of implementing a self-executory prohibition found in the
Constitution. The prohibition to alienate such lands found in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 is a clear indication and proof that section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution does not apply to
lands of private ownership suitable or intended or used for residence. The term "private agricultural
land" means privately owned lands devoted to cultivation, to the raising of agricultural products, and
does not include urban lands of private ownership suitable for industrial or residence purposes. The
use of the adjective "agricultural" has the effect of excluding all other private lands that are not
agricultural. Timber and mineral ands are not, however, included among the excluded, because
these lands could not and can never become private lands. From the land grants known
as caballerias and peonias under the Laws of Indies down to those under the Royal Decrees of 25
June 1880 and 13 February 1894, the Philippine Bill, Act No. 926, the Jones Law, Act No. 2874, the
Constitution, and Commonwealth Act No. 141, timber and mineral lands have always been excluded
from alienation. The repeal by sections 23, 60, 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the exception
provided for in sections 24, 57, 121 of Act No. 2874, did not change the meaning of the term "private
agricultural land," as intended by the framers of the Constitution and understood by the people that
adopted it.
The next question is whether the court below was justified under the in confirming the refusal of the
Register of Deeds of Manila to record the sale of the private land for residence purposes to the
appellant who is an alien.
There is no evidence to show the kind of land, the deed of sale of which is sought to be recorded by
the appellant whether it is one of those described in section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141;
or a private land that had never been a part of the public domain (Carino vs. Insular Government,
212 U.S., 449; Oh Cho vs. Director of Lands, 43 Off. Gaz., 866). If it is the latter, the prohibition of
section 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 does not apply. If it is the former, section 123 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, which providesthat
No land originally acquired in any manner under the provisions of any previous Act,
ordinance, royal order, royal decree, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands,terrenos baldios y realengos, or lands of any other
denomination that were actually or presumptively of the public domain, or by royal grant or in
any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land, shall be encumbered,
alienated, or conveyed, except to persons, corporations or associations who may acquire
land of the public domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the Philippines
whose charters authorize them to do so: . . .
is similar in nature to section 121 of Act No. 2874. This Court held the last mentioned section
unconstitutional, for it violates section 3 of the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916, commonly known
as the Jones Law (Central Capizvs. Ramirez, 40 Phil., 883). Section 123 of Commonwealth Act No.
141, following the rule laid down in the aforecited case, must also be declared unconstitutional, for it
violates section 21 (1), Article VI, of the Constitution, which is exactly the same as the one infringed
upon by section 121 of Act No. 2874. This does not mean that a law may not be passed by
Congress to prohibit alienation to foreigners of urban lands of private ownership; but in so doing, it
must avoid offending against the constitutional provision referred to above.
Before closing, I cannot help but comment on the action taken by the Court in considering the merits
of the case, despite the withdrawal of the appeal by the appellants, consented to by the appellee. If
discretion was to be exercised, this Court did not exercise it wisely. Courts of last resort generally
avoid passing upon constitutional questions if the case where such questions are raised may be
decided on other grounds. Courts of last resort do not express their opinion on a consitutional
question except when it is the very lis mota (Yangco vs. Board of Public Utility Commissioners, 36

Phil., 116, 120; Co Chiong vs. Dinglasan, p. 122, ante). Moreover, the interpretation of the provisions
of the Constitution is no exclusive of the courts. The other coordinate branches of the government
may interpret such provisions acting on matters coming within their jurisdiction. And although such
interpretation is only persuasive and not binding upon the courts, nevertheless they cannot be
deprived of such power. Of course, the final say on what is the correct interpretation of a
constitutional provision must come from and be made by this Court in an appropriate action
submitted to it for decision. The correct interpretation of a constitutional provision is that which gives
effect to the intent of its framers and primarily to the understanding of such provision by the poeple
that adopted it. This Court is only an interpreter of the instrument which embodies what its framers
had in mind and especially what the people understood it to be when they adopted it. The eagerness
of this Court to express its opinion on the constitutional provision involved in this case,
notwithstanding of the withdrawal of the appeal, is unusualf or a Court of last resort. It seems as if it
were afraid to be deprived by the other coordinate branches of the government of its prerogative to
pass upon the constitutional question herein involved. If all the members of the Court were
unanimous in the interpretation of the constitutional provision under scrutiny, that eagerness might
be justified, but when some members of the Court do not agree to the interpretation placed upon
such provision, that eagerness becomes recklessness. The interpretation thus placed by the majority
of the Court upon the constitutional provision referred to will be binding upon the other coordinate
branches of the government. If, in the course of time, such opinion should turn out to be erroneous
and against the welfare of the country,an amendment to the Constitution a costly process
would have to be proposed and adopted. But, if the Court had granted the motion for the withdrawal
of the appeal, it would not have to express its opinion upon the constitutional provision in question. It
would let the other coordinate branches of the Government act according to their wisdom, foresight
and patriotism. They, too, possess those qualities and virtues. These are not of the exclusive
possession of the members of this Court. The end sought to be accomplished by the decision of this
Court may be carried out by the enactment of a law. And if the law should turn out to be against the
well-being of the people, its amendment or repeal would not be as costly a process as a
constitutional amendment.
In view of the denial by this Court of the motion to dismiss the appeal, as prayed for by the appellant
and consented to by the appellee, I am constrained to record my opinion, that, for the reasons
hereinbefore set forth, the judgment under review should be reversed.

TUASON, J., dissenting:

The decision concludes with the assertion that there is no choice. "We are construing" it says, "the
Constitution as we see it and not as we may wish it to be. If this is the solemn mandate of the
Constitution, we cannot compromise it even in the name of equity." We wish deep in our heart that
we were given the light to see as the majority do and could share their opinion. As it is, we perceive
things the other way around. As we see it, the decision by-passed what according to our humble
understanding is the plain intent of the Constitution and groped out of its way in search of the ideal
result. The denial by this Court of the motion to withdraw the appeal to which the Solicitor General
gave his conformity collides with the professed sorrow that the decision cannot be helped.
Section 5, Article XIII, of the Constitution reads:
5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold
lands of the public domain in the Philippines.

The sole and simple question at issue is, what is the meaning of the term "agricultural land" as used
in this section? Before answering the question, it is convenient to refresh our memory of the
pertinent rule in the interpretation of constitutions as expounded in decisions of courts of last resort
and by law authors.
It is a cardinal rule in the interpretation of constitutions that the instrument must be a
construed so to give effect to the intention of the people who adopted it. This intention is to
be sought in the constitution itself, and the apparent meaning of the words employed is to be
taken as expressing it, except in cases where the assumption would lead to absurdity,
ambiguity, or contradiction. Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2nd ed., p. 20.)
Every word employed in the constitution is to be expounded in its plain, obvious, and
common sense, unless the context furnishes some ground to control, qualify, or enlarge it.
Constitutions are not designed for metaphysical or logical subtleties, for niceties of
expression, for critical propriety, for elaborate shades of meaning, or for the exercise of
philosophical acuteness or judicial research. They are instruments of a practical nature
founded on the common business of human life adapted to common wants, designed for
common use, and fitted for common understandings. The people make them, the people
adopt them, the people must be supposed to read them with the help of common sense, and
cannot be presumed to admit in them any recondite meaningor any extraordinary gloss. (1
Story, Const. sec. 451.)
Marshall , Ch. J., says:
The framers of the Constitution, and the people who adopted it, "must be understood to have
employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said."
(Gibbons vs. Ogdon, 9 Wheat, 1, 188; 6 Law. ed., 23).
Questions as to the wisdom, expediency, or justice of constitutional provisions afford no
basis for construction where the intent to adopt such provisions is expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms. Nor can construction read into the provisions of a constitution some
unexpressed general policy or spirit, supposed to underline and pervade the instrument and
to render it consonant to the genius of the institutions of the state. The courts are not at
liberty to declare an act void because they deem it opposed to the spirit of the Constitution.
(12 C.J., 702-703.)
There is no obscurity or ambiguity in the section of the Constitution above quoted, nor does a literal
interpretation of the words "agricultural land" lead to any un-the majority opinion, the phrase has no
technical meaning, and the same could not have been used in any sense other than that in which it
is understood by the men in the street.
That there are lands of private ownership will not be denied, inspite of the fiction tha all lands
proceed from the sovereign. And, that lands of private ownership are known as agricultural,
residential, commercial and industrial, is another truth which no one can successfully dispute. In
prohibiting the alienation of private agricultural land to aliens, the Constitution, by necessary
implication, authorizes the alienation of other kinds of private property. The express mention of one
thing excludes all others of the same kind.
Let us then ascertain the meaning of the word "agricultural" so that by process of elimination we can
see what lands do not fall within the purview of the constitutional inhibition. Webster's New
international Dictionary defines this word as "of or pertaining to agriculture connected with, or
engaged in, tillage; as, the agricultural class; agricultural implements, wages, etc." According to this

definition and according to the popular conception of the word, lands in cities and towns intended or
used for buildings or other kinds of structure are never understood to mean agricultural lands. They
are either residential, commercial, or industrial lands. In all city plannings, communities are divided
into residential, commercial and industrial sections. It would be extremely out of the ordinary, not to
say ridiculous, to imagine that the Constitutional Convention considered a lot on the Escolta with its
improvement as agricultural land.
If extrinsic evidence is needed, a reference to the history of the constitutional provision under
consideration will dispel all doubts that urban lands were in the minds of the framers of the
Constitution as properties that may be assigned to foreigners.
Dean Aruego, himself a member of the Constitutional Convention, is authority for the statement that
the committee on nationalization and preservation of lands and other natural resources in its report
recommended the incorporation into the Constitution of the following provision:
SEC. 4. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be
transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands;
and the Government shall regulate the transfer or assignment of land now owned by
persons, or corporations,or associations not qualified under the provisions of this
Constitution to acquire or hold lands in the Philippine Islands.
In Article XIII, entitled "General Provisions," of the first draft of the Constitution, the sub-committee of
seven embodied the following provision which had been recommended in the reports of the
committee on agricultural development, national defense, industry, and nationalization and
preservation of lands and other natural resources:
SEC. 16. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no land of private ownership shall be
transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
But on January 22, 1935, the sub-committee of seven submitted to the Convention a revised draft of
the articleo n General Provisions of the first draft, which revised draft had been prepared by the
committee in consultation with President Quezon. The revised draft as it touches private lands
provides as follows:
Save in cases of hereditary succession, no agricultural land of private ownership shall be
transferred or assigned by the owner thereof except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands, of the public domain in the Philippine Islands.
(2 The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Aruego, 595-599.)
The last-quoted proposal became section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution in its final form with
sligh alteration in the phraseology.
It will thus be seen that two committees in their reports and the sub-committee of seven in its first
draft of the Constitution all proposed to prescribe the transfer to non-Filipino citizens of any land of
private ownership without regard to its nature or use, but that the last mentioned sub-committee later
amended that proposal by putting the word "agricultural" before the word "land." What are we to
conclude from this modification? Its self-evident purpose was to confine the prohibition to agricultural
lands, allowing the ownership by foreigners of private lands that do not partake of agricultural
character. The insertion of the word "agricultural" was studied and deliberated, thereby eliminating
any possibility that its implication was not comprehended.

In the following paragraphs we shall, in our inadequate way, attempt to show that the conclusions in
this Court's decision are erroneous either because the premises are wrong or because the
conclusions do not follow the premises.
According to the decision, the insertion of the word "agricultural" was not intended to change the
scope of the provision. It says that "the wording of the first draft was amended for no other purpose
than to clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties."
If this was the intention of the Constitutional Assembly, that could not have devised a better way of
messing up and obscuring the meaning of the provision than what it did. If the purpose was "to
clarify concepts and avoid uncertainties," the insertion of the word "agricultural" before the word
"land" produced the exact opposite of the result which the change was expected to accomplish as
witness the present sharp and bitter controversy which would not have arisen had they let well
enough alone.
But the assumption is untenable. To brush aside the introduction of the word "agricultural" into the
final draft as "merely one of words" is utterly unsupported by evidence, by the text of the
Constitution, or by sound principles of construction. There is absolutely no warrant or the statement
that the Constitutional Convention, which was guided by wise men, men of ability and experience in
different fields of endeavor, used the termafter mature deliberation and reflection and after
consultation with the President, without intending to give it its natural signification and connotation.
"We are not at liberty to presume that the framers of the Constitution, or the people who adopted it,
did not understand the force of language." (People vs. Rathbone, 32 N.Y.S., 108.) The Constitution
will be scanned in vain for any reasonable indication that its authors made the change with intention
that it should not operate according to the rules of grammar and the ordinary process of drawing
logical inferences. The theory is against the presumption, based on human experience, that the
framers of a constitution "have expressed themselves in careful and measured terms, corresponding
with the immense importance of the powers delegated, leaving as little as possible to implication." (1
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 128, 129.) "As men, whose intention require no
concealment, generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they
intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted
it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense and to have intended what
they have said." (Gibbons vs. Ogden, ante.)
When instead of prohibiting the acquisition of private land of any kind by foreigners, as originally
proposed, the prohibition was changed to private agricultural lands, the average man's faculty of
reasoning tells him that other lands may be acquired. The elementary rules of speech with which
men of average intelligence, and, above all, the members of the Constitutional Assembly were
familiar, inform us that the object of a descriptive adjective is to specify a thing as distinct from
another. It is from this process of reasoning that the maxim expressio unius est exclusio
alterius stems; a familiar rule of interpretation often quoted, and admitted as agreeable to natural
reason.
If then a foreigner may acquire private lands that are not agricultural, what lands are they? Timber
land or mineral land, or both? As the decision itself says these lands are not susceptible of private
ownership, the answer can only be residential, commercial, industrial or other lands that are not
agricultural. Whether a property is more suitable and profitable to the owners as residential,
commercial or industrial than if he devotes it to the cultivation of crops is a matter that has to be
decided according to the value of the property, its size, and other attending circumstances.
The main burden of this Court's argument is that, as lands of the public domain which are suitable
for home building are considered agricultural land, the Constitution intended that private residential,

commercial or industrial lands should be considered also agricultural lands. The Court says that
"what the members of the Constitutional Convention had in mind when they drafted the Constitution
was this well-known classification (timber, mineral and agricultural) and its technical meaning then
prevailing."
As far as private lands are concerned, there is no factual or legal basis for this assumption. The
classification of public lands was used for one purpose not contemplated in the classification of
private lands. At the outset, it should be distinctively made clear that it was this Court's previous
decisions and not an Act of Congress which declared that public lands which were not forest or
mineral were agricultural lands. Little reflection on the background of this Court's decisions and the
nature of the question presented in relation to the peculia rprovisions of the enactments which came
up for construction, will bring into relief the error of applying to private lands the classification of
public lands.
In the first place, we cannot classify private lands in the same manner as public lands for the very
simple and manifest reason that only lands pertaining to one of the three groups of public lands
agricultural can find their way into the hands of private persons. Forest lands and mineral lands
are preserved by the State for itself and for posterity. Granting what is possible, that there are here
and there forest lands and mineral lands to which private persons have obtained patents or titles, it
would be pointless to suppose that such properties are the ones which section 5 of Article XIII of the
Constitution wants to distinguish from private agricultural lands as lienable. The majority themselves
will not admit that the Constitution which forbids the alienation or private agricultural lands allows the
conveyance of private forests and mines.
In the second place, public lands are classified under special conditions and with a different object in
view. Classification of public lands was and is made for purposes of administration; for the purpose
principally of segregating lands that may be sold from lands that should be conserved. The Act of
July 1, 1902, of the United States Congress designated what lands of the public domain might be
alienated and what should be kept by the State. Public lands are divided into three classes to the
end that natural resources may be used without waste. Subject to some exceptions and limitation,
agricultural lands may be disposed of by the Government. Preservation of forest and mineral lands
was and is a dominant preoccupation. These are important parts of the country's natural resources.
Private non-agricultural land does not come within the category of natural resources. Natural
resources are defined in Webster's Standard Dictionary as materials supplied or produced by nature.
The United States Congress evinced very little if any concern with private lands.
It should also be distinctively kept in mind that the Act of Congress of the United States above
mentioned was an organic law and dealt with vast tracts of untouched public lands. It was enacted
by a Congress whose members were not closely familiar with local conditions affecting lands. Under
the circumstances, it was natural that the Congress employed "words in a comprehensive sense as
expressive of general ideas rather than of finer shades of thought or of narrow distinctions. "The
United States Congress was content with laying down a broad outline governing the administration,
exploitation, and disposition of the public wealth, leaving the details to be worked out by the local
authorities and courts entrusted with the enforcement and interpretation of the law.
It was a result of this broad classification that questions crept for a definition of the status of
scattered small parcels of public lands that were neither forest, mineral, nor agricultural, and with
which the Congress had not bothered itself to mention separately or specifically. This Court, forced
by nature of its duty to decide legal controversies, ruled that public lands that were fit for residential
purposes, public swamps and other public lands that were neither forest nor mineral, were to be
regarded as agricultural lands. In other words, there was an apparent void, often inevitable in a law
or constitution, and this Court merely filled that void. It should be noted that this Court did not say

that agricultural lands and residential lands are the same or alike in their character and use. It merely
said that for the purpose of judging their alienability, residential, commercial or industrial lands
should be brought under the class of agricultural lands.
On the other hand, section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution treats of private lands with a different
aim. This Court is not now confronted with any problem for which there is no specific provision, such
as faced it when the question of determining the character of public residential land came up for
decision. This Court is not called to rule whether a private residential land is forest, mineral or
agricultural. This Court is not, in regard to private lands, in the position where it found itself with
reference to public lands, compelled by the limited field of its choice for a name to call public
residential lands, agricultural lands. When it comes to determining the character of private nonagricultural lands, the Court's task is not to compare it with forests, mines and agricultural lands, to
see which of these bears the closest resembrance to the land in question. Since there are no private
timber nor mineral lands, and if there were, they could not be transferred to foreigners, and since the
object of section 5 of Article XIII of the Constitution is radically at variance withthat of the laws
covering public lands, we have to have different standards of comparison and have to look of the
intent of this constitutional provision from a different angle and perspective. When a private nonagricultural land demands to know where it stands, we do not acquire, is it mineral, forest or
agricultural? We only ask, is it agricultural? To ascertain whether it is within the inhibition of section 5
of Article XIII.
The last question in turn resolves itself into what is understood by agricultural land. Stripped of the
special considerations which dictated the classification of public lands into three general groups,
there is no alternative but to take the term "agricultural land" in its natural and popular signification;
and thus regarded, it imports a distinct connotation which involves no absurdity and no contradiction
between different parts of the organic law. Its meaning is that agricultural land is specified in section
5 of Article XIII to differentiate it from lands that are used or are more suitable for purposes other
than agriculture.
It would profit us to take notice of the admonition of two of the most revered writers on constitutional
law, Justice Story and Professor Cooley:
"As a general thing, it is to be supposed that the same word is used in the same sense wherever it
occurs in a constitution. Here again, however, great caution must be observed in applying an
arbitrary rule; for, as Mr. Justice Story has well observed; `It does not follow, either logically or
grammatically, that because a word is found in one connection in the Constitution with a definite
sense, therefore the same is to be adopted in every other connection in which it occurs. This would
be to suppose that the framers weighed only the force of single words, as philologists or critics, and
not whole clauses and objects, as statesmen and practical reasoners. And yet nothing has been
more common than to subject the Constitution to this narrow and mischievous criticism. Men of
ingenious and subtle minds, who seek for symmetry and harmony in language, having found in the
Constitution a word used in some sense which falls in with their favorite theory of interpreting it, have
made that the standard by which to measure its use in every other part of the instrument. They have
thus stretched it, as it were, on the bed of Procrustes, lopping off its meaning when it seemed too
large for their purposes, and extending it, when it seemed too short. They have thus distorted it to
the most unnatural shapes, and crippled where they have sought only to adjust its proportions
according to their own opinions? And he gives many instances where, in the National Constitution, it
is very manifest the same word is employed in different meanings. So that, while the rule may be
sound as one of presumption merely, its force is but slight, and it must readily give way to a different
intent appearing in the instrument." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 135.)

As to the proposition that the words "agricultural lands" have been given a technical meaning and
that the Constitution has employed them in that sense, it can only be accepted in reference to public
lands. If a technical import has been affixed to the term, it can not be extended to private lands if we
are not to be led to an absurdity and if we are avoid the charge that we are resorting to subtle and
ingenious refinement to force from the Constitution a meaning which its framers never held. While in
the construction of a constitution words must be given the technical meaning which they have
acquired, the rule is limited to the "well-understood meaning" "which the people must be supposed to
have had in view in adopting them." To give an example. "When the constitution speaks of an ex
post facto law, it means a law technically known by that designation; the meaning of the phrase
having become definite in the history of constitutional law, and being so familiar to the people that it
is not necessary to employ language of a more popular character to designate it." In reality, this is
not a departure from the general rule that the language used is to be taken in the sense it conveys to
the popular mind, "for the technical sense in these cases is the sense popularly understood,
because that is the sense fixed upon the words in legal and constitutional history where they have
been employed for the protection of popular rights." (1 Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed.,
132-133.) Viewed from this angle, "agricultural land" does not possess the quality of a technical
term. Even as applied to public lands, and even among lawyers and judges, how many are familiar
with the decisions of this Court which hold that public swamps and public lands more appropriate for
buildings and other structures than for agriculture are agricultural lands? The same can be truthfully
said of members of the Constitutional Assembly.
The speeches of delegates Montilla and Ledesma cannot serve as a means of interpretation. The
sentiments expressed in those speeches, like the first drafts of section 5 of Article XIII, may have
reflected the sentiments of the Convention in the first stages of the deliberation or down to its close.
If they were, those sentiments were relaxed and not given full sway for reasons on which we need
not speculate. Speeches in support of a project can be a valuable criterion for judging the intention
of a law or constitution only if no changes were afterward affected. If anything, the change in section
5 of Article XIII wrought in the face of a strong advocacy for complete and absolute nationalization of
all lands, without exception, offers itself as the best proof that to the framers of the Constitution the
change was not "merely one of words" but represented something real and substantial. Firm and
resolute convictions are expressed in a document in strong, unequivocal and unqualified language.
This is specially true when the instrument is a constitution, "the most solemn and deliberate of
human writings, always carefully drawn, and calculated for permanent endurance."
The decision quotes from the Framing of the Constitution by Dean Aruego a sentence which says
that one of the principles underlying the provision of Article XIII of the Constitution is "that lands,
minerals, forests and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage of the Filipino Nation."
In underlying the word lands the Court wants to insinuate that all lands without exceptions are
included. This is nothing to be enthusiastic over. It is hyperbole, "a figure of speech in which the
statement expresses more than the truth" but "is accepted as a legal form of expression." It is an
expression that "lies but does not deceive." When we say men must fight we do not mean all men,
and every one knows we don't.
The decision says:
It is true that in section 9 of said Commonwealth Act No. 141,"alienable or disposable public
lands" which are the same as "public agricultural lands" under the Constitution, are classified
into agricultural, residential, commercial, industrial and for other purposes. This simply
means that the term "public agricultural lands" has both a broad and a particular meaning.
Under its broad or general meaning, as used in the Constitution, it embraces all lands that
are neither timber nor mineral. This broad meaning is particularized in section 9 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 which classifies "public agricultural lands" for purposes of
alienation or disposition, into lands that are strictly agricultural or actually devoted to

cultivation for agricultural purposes; lands that are residential; commercial; industrial; or
lands for other purposes. The fact that these lands are made alienable or disposable under
Commonwealth Act No. 141, in favor of Filipino Citizen, is a conclusive indication of their
character as public agricultural lands under said statute and under the Constitution."
If I am not mistaken in my understanding of the line of reasoning in the foregoing passage, my
humble opinion is that there is no logical connection between the premise and the conclusion. What
to me seems clearly to emerge from it is that Commonwealth Act No. 141, so far from sustaining that
Court's theory, actually pulls down its case which it has built upon the foundation of parallel
classification of public and private lands into forest, mineral and agricultural lands, and the
inexistence of such things as residential, industrial or commercial lands. It is to be noted that Act No.
141, section 9, classifies disposable lands into agricultural, industrial, residential, commercial, etc.
And these are lands of the public domain.
The fact that the provisions regarding alienation of private lands happens to be included in Article
XIII, which is entitled "Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources," is no ground for treating
public lands and private lands on the same footing. The inference should rather be the exact
reverse. Agricultural lands, whether public or private, are natural resources. But residential,
commercial, and industrial lands, as we have seen, are not natural resources either in the sense
these words convey to the popular mind or as defined in the dictionary. This fact may have been one
factor which prompted the elimination of private non-agricultural lands from the range of the
prohibition, along with reasons, of foreign policy, economics and politics.
From the opinion of Secretary of Justice Jose A. Santos in 1939, the majority can not derive any
comfort unless we cling to the serious argument that as public lands go so go private lands. In that
opinion the question propounded was whether a piece of public land which was more profitable as a
homesite might not be sold and considered as agricultural. The illustrious Secretary answered yes,
which was correct. But the classification of private lands was not directly or indirectly involved. It is
the opinion of the present Secretary of Justice that is to the point. If the construction placed by the
law-officer of the government on a constitutional provision may properly be invoked, as the majority
say but which I doubt, as representing the true intent of the instrument, this Court, if it is to be
consistent, should adopt Secretary Ozaeta's view. If the Solicitor General's attitude as interested
counsel for the government in a judicial action is as the decision also suggests but which, I think,
is still more incorrect both in theory and in practice then this Court should have given heed to the
motion for withdrawal of the present appeal, which had been concurred in by the Solicitor General in
line presumably with the opinion of the head of his department.
The Court fears that "this constitutional purpose of conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may alienate their
agricultural lands in favor of aliens." It reasons that "it would certainly be futile to prohibit the
alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their
becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of Filipino citizens." Sections122 and 123 of Act No.
141 should banish this fear. These sections, quoted and relied upon in the majority opinion, prevent
private lands that have been acquired under any of the public land laws from falling into alien
possession in fee simple. Without this law, the fear would be well-founded if we adopt the majority's
theory, which we precisely reject, that agricultural and residential lands are synonymous, be they
public or private. The fear would not materialize under our theory, that only lands which are not
agricultural may be owned by persons other than FIlipino citizens.
Act No. 141, by the way, supplies the best argument against the majority's interpretation of section 5
of Article XIII. Prohibiting the acquisition by foreigners of any lands originally acquired in any manner
under its provisions or under the provisions of any previous law, ordinace, royal order, royal decree,

or any other law formerly enforced in the Philippines with regard to public lands, etc., it is a mute
eloquent testimony that in the minds of the legislature, whose interpretation the majority correctly say
should be looked to as authoritative, the Constitution did not carry such prohibition. For if the
Constitution already barred the alienation of lands of any kind in favor of aliens, the provisions of
sections 122 and 123 of Commonwealth Act No. 141 would have been superfluous.
The decision says that "if under Article XIV section 8, of the Constitution, an alien may not even
operate a small jeepney for hire, it is certainly not hard to understand that neither is he allowed to
own a piece of land." There is no similitude between owning a lot for a home or a factory or a store
and operating a jeepney for hire. It is not the ownership of a jeepney that is forbidden; it is the use of
it for public service that is not allowed. A foreigner is not barred from owning the costliest motor cars,
steamships or airplanes in any number, for his private use or that of his friends and relatives. He can
not use a jeepney for hire because the operation of public utilities is reserved to Filipino nationals,
and the operation of a jeepney happens to be within this policy. The use of a jeepney for hire maybe
insignificant in itself but it falls within a class of industry that performs a vital function in the country's
economic life, closely associated with its advancing civilization, supplying needs so fundamental for
communal living and for the development of the country's economy, that the government finds need
of subjecting them to some measure of control and the Constitution deems it necessary to limit their
operation by Filipino citizens. The importance of using a jeepney for hire cannot be sneered at or
minimized just as a vote for public office by a single foreign citizen can not be looked at with a shrug
of the shoulder on the theory that it would not cause a ripple in the political complexion or scene of
the nation.
This Court quotes with approval from the Solicitor General's brief this passage: "If the term `private
agricultural lands' is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands of similar nature, the
result will be that aliens may freely acquire and possess not only residential lots and houses for
themselves but entire subdivisions and whole towns and cities, and that they may validly buy and
hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories, industrial plants, fisheries,
hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses, playgrounds, airfields and
a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellant's words, strictly agricultural." Arguments
like this have no place where there is no ambiguity in the constitution or law. The courts are not at
liberty to disregard a provision that is clear and certain simply because its enforcement would work
inconvenience or hardship or lead to what they believe pernicious results. Courts have nothing to do
with inconvenience or consequences. This role is founded on sound principles of constitutional
government and is so well known as to make citations of authorities presumptuous.
Granting the possibility or probability of the consequences which this Court and the Solicitor General
dread, we should not overlook the fact that there is the Congress standing guard to curtail or stop
such excesses or abuses if and when the menace should show its head. The fact that the
Constitution has not prohibited, as we contend, the transfer of private non-agricultural lands to aliens
does not prevent the Congress from passing legislation to regulate or prohibit such transfer, to
define the size of private lands a foreigner may possess in fee simple, or to specify the uses for
which lands may be dedicated, in order to prevent aliens from conducting fisheries, hatcheries,
vacation resorts, markets, golf-courses, cemeteries. The Congress could, if it wants, go so far as to
exclude foreigners from entering the country or settling here. If I may be permitted to guess, the
alteration in the original draft of section 5 of Article XIII may have been prompted precisely by the
thought that it is the better policy to leave to the political departments of the Government the
regulation or absolute prohibition of all land ownership by foreigners, as the changed, changing and
ever-changing conditions demand. The Commonwealth Legislature did that with respect to lands
that were originally public lands, through Commonwealth Act No. 141, and the Legislative Assembly
during the Japanese occupation extended the prohibition to all private lands, as Mr. Justice Paras
has pointed out. In the present Congress, at least two bills have been introduced proposing
Congressional legislation in the same direction. All of which is an infallible sign that the Constitution

does not carry such prohibition, in the opinion of three legislatures, an opinion which, we entirely
agree with the majority, should be given serious consideration by the courts (if needed there were
any doubt), both as a matter of policy, and also because it may be presumed to represent the true
intent of the instrument. (12 C.J., 714.) In truth, the decision lays special emphasis on the fact that
"many members of the National Assembly who approved the new Act (No. 141) had been members
of the Constitutional Convention." May I add that Senator Francisco, who is the author of one of the
bills I have referred to, in the Senate, was a leading, active and influential member of the
Constitutional Convention?
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-27170 November 22, 1977
IN RE APPLICATION FOR THE REGISTRATION OF LAND. EUGENE MOSS, through his
Administrator, DR. TEODORICO H. JACELDO, applicant-appellant,
vs.
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellee.
Estanislao L. Granados for appellant.
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Eulogio Raquel-Santos and
Solicitor Salvador C. Jacob for appellee.

AQUINO, J.:
Eugene Moss appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Carigara Branch VI,
denying his application for the registration of a ten-hectare island on the ground that, being an
American citizen or an alien, he is disqualified to acquire lands under section 5, Article XIII of the
1935 Constitution, as held in Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil. 461 (Land Registration Case
No. N-68, LRC Record No. N-27971).
The Solicitor General, disagreeing with the trial court, recommends in his brief for the Director of
Lands that the decision be reversed and that the application of Moss be granted.
On Carigara Bay there is an islet known as Calumpihan Island within the jurisdiction of Barrio
Calumpihan, Capoocan, Leyte. It is planted to coconuts more than sixty to eighty years old in 1966.
Fruit trees, corn and tobacco are also grown on the land.
That land was already declared for tax p in 1930. It was then owned by Vicente Pragas who had
possessed and cultivated it since 1894. On November 14, 1932 Pragas sold the island to Eduardo
Cecilio. On March 23, 1937 Cecilio sold it to Catalina Pabilion. Then, on December 23, 1944 the
spouses Catalina Pabilion and Guillermo Dadizon sold the land to Rufino M. Pascual who, in turn
sold it on January 20, 1945 for P 1,200 to Eugene Moss and Albert Boyd Cassidy, American
nationals.

In an action to quiet title filed by Moss against Cassidy, an absentee, Moss was ajudged the sole
owner of the and in a decision dated March 27, 1962 rendered by the Court of First Instance of Leyte
in Civil Case No. 645.
Moss declared the land for tax purposes on June 27, 1950. He paid the realty taxes on the said land
for the years 1945 to 1966. He had it surveyed on November 20, 1962.
On April 3, 1965 Moss, through Dr. Teodorico H. Jaceldo, his administrator and attorney-in-fact, filed
an application for the registration of the said land. Moss is a retired army colonel, an American
citizen, married to Eileen Moss and a former resident of 504 Glen Park Drive, Nashville, Tennessee
and now Los Fresnos Texas.
As already stated, the trial court denied the application for registration because Moss is an alien.
That holding is erroneous. It is erroneous because while aliens are disqualified to Acquire lands
under the 1935 Constitution (Levy Hermanos vs. Ledesma, 69 Phil. 49; Krivenko vs. Register of
Deeds, supra), citizens of the United States can acquire lands like Filipino citizens.
The trial court overlooked the Ordinance which was appended to the 1935 Constitution by
Resolution No. 39 of the National Assembly dated September 15, 1939. That resolution was
approved by the President of the United States on November 10, 1939. It provides as follows:
ORDINANCE APPENDED TO THE CONSTITUTION
SECTION 1. Notwithstanding the provisions of the foregoing Constitution, pending
the final and complete withdrawal of the sovereignty of the United States over the
Philippines
xxx xxx xxx
(17) Citizens and corporations of the United States shall enjoy in the Commonwealth
of the Philippines all the civil rights of the citizens and corporations, respectively,
thereof. (1 Philippine Annotated Laws, pp. 31-34).
That Ordinance was made a part of the 1935 Constitution as directed in section 2 of the TydingsMcDuffie Law or the Independence law. Subsection (17) quoted above is a reproduction of
subsection (16) of section 2(a) of the Independence Law.
Moss validly acquired the island in question under the provisions of subsection (17), section I of the
aforementioned Ordinance (See sec. 127 of Public Land Law; Republic vs. Quasha, L-30299,
August 17, 1972, 46 SCRA 160, 172-173. Note that the instant case is not covered by section 11,
Article XVII of the 1973 Constitution and by Presidential Decree No. 713 dated May 27, 1975, 71
O.G. 4115 re residential lands of American citizens).
The proclamation of Philippine independence on July 4, 1946, did not impair Moss' proprietary fights
over the said land because the 1935 Constitution provides that upon the proclamation of Philippine
independence 'all existing property rights of citizens or corporations of the United States shall be
acknowledged, respected, and safeguarded to the same extent as property right of citizens of the
Philippines" (Sec. 1[1], Article XVII).
That constitutional provision is implemented in Article VI of the Treaty of General Relations entered
into between the Republic of the Philippines and the United States on July 4, 1946 which provides

that all existing property rights of citizens and corporations of the United States in the Republic of the
Philippines shall be acknowledged, respected and safeguarded to the same extent as property rights
of citizens and corporation of the Republic of the Philippines (42 O.G. 1651. See Republic Act No.
76).
When Moss purchased the land, Leyte was already liberated as shown in the proclamation of
General Douglas MacArthur dated October 23, 1944. (Moss and Cassidy were allegedly members of
the American liberation forces that landed in Leyte). See 41 O.G. 147.
Since Moss and his predecessors in interest have been in possession en concepts de dueo of
Calumpihan Island for more than thirty years immediately preceding the firing of his application for
confirmation of his title, he is entitled to the registration of his title to the island (Sec. 48[b], Public
Land Law, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's decision is reversed and set aside and the application of Eugene
Moss, of age, citizen of the United States, married to Eileen Moss, P. O. Box 184, Los Fresnos
Texas, U. S. A., for the confirmation and registration of his title to the land shown in the plan Psu198022, is hereby granted.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, Concepcion, Jr. and Santos, JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-1411. September 29, 1953.]
DIONISIO RELLOSA, Petitioner, vs. GAW CHEE
HUN, Respondent.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals
holding that the sale in question is valid and, even if it were invalid,
plaintiff cannot maintain the action under the principle of pari delicto.
On February 2, 1944, Dionisio Rellosa sold to Gaw Chee Hun a parcel
of land, together with the house erected thereon, situated in the City
of Manila, Philippines, for the sum of P25,000. The vendor remained
in possession of the property under a contract of lease entered into
on the same date between the same parties. Alleging that the sale
was executed subject to the condition that the vendee, being a

Chinese citizen, would obtain the approval of the Japanese Military

Administration in accordance with (seirei) No. 6 issued on April 2,
1943, by the Japanese authorities, and said approval has not been
obtained, and that, even if said requirement were met, the sale would
at all events be void under article XIII, section 5, of our Constitution,
the vendor instituted the present action in the Court of First Instance
of Manila seeking the annulment of the sale as well as the lease
covering the land and the house above mentioned, and praying that,
once the sale and the lease are declared null and void, the vendee be
ordered to return to vendor the duplicate of the title covering the
property, and be restrained from in any way dispossessing the latter
of said property.
Defendant answered the complaint setting up as special defense that
the sale referred to in the complaint was absolute and unconditional
and was in every respect valid and binding between the parties, it
being not contrary to law, morals and public order, and that plaintiff
is guilty of estoppel in that, by having executed a deed of lease over
the property, he thereby recognized the title of defendant to that
property.
Issues having been joined, and the requisite evidence presented by
both parties, the court declared both the sale and the lease valid and
binding and dismissed the complaint. The court likewise ordered
plaintiff to turn over the property to defendant and to pay a rental of
P50 a month from August 1, 1945 until the property has been actually
delivered. As this decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of
Appeals, plaintiff sued out the present petition for review.
One of the issues raised by petitioner refers to the validity of Seirei
No. 6 issued on April 2, 1943 by the Japanese authorities which
prohibits an alien from acquiring any private land not agricultural in
nature during the occupation unless the necessary approval is
obtained from the Director General of the Japanese Military
Administration. Petitioner contends that the sale in question cannot
have any validity under the above military directive in view of the
failure of respondent to obtain the requisite approval and it was error
for the Court of Appeals to declare said directive without any binding
effect because the occupation government could not have issued it
under article 43 of the Hague Regulations which command that laws

that are municipal in character of an occupied territory should be

respected and cannot be ignored unless prevented by military
necessity.
We do not believe it necessary to consider now the question relative
to the validity of Seirei No. 6 of the Japanese Military Administration
for the simple reason that in our opinion the law that should govern
the particular transaction is not the above directive but the
Constitution adopted by the then Republic of the Philippines on
September 4, 1943, it appearing that the aforesaid transaction was
executed on February 2, 1944. Said Constitution, in its article VIII,
section 5, provides that "no private agricultural land shall be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations, or
associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines", which provisions are similar to those contained in
our present Constitution. As to whether the phrase "private
agricultural land" employed in said Constitution includes residential
lands, as the one involved herein, there can be no doubt because said
phrase has already been interpreted in the affirmative sense by this
court in the recent case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds, 79 Phil.
461, wherein this court held that "under the Constitution aliens may
not acquire private or public agricultural lands, including residential
lands." This matter has been once more submitted to the court for
deliberation, but the ruling was reaffirmed. This ruling fully disposes
of the question touching on the validity of the sale of the property
herein involved.
The sale in question having been entered into in violation of the
Constitution, the next question to be determined is, can petitioner
have the sale declared null and void and recover the property
considering the effect of the law governing rescission of contracts?
Our answer must of necessity be in the negative following the
doctrine laid down in the case of Trinidad Gonzaga de Cabauatan, et
al. vs. Uy Hoo, et al., 88 Phil. 103, wherein we made the following
pronouncement: "We can, therefore, say that even if the plaintiffs
can still invoke the Constitution, or the doctrine in the Krivenko Case,
to set aside the sale in question, they are now prevented from doing
so if their purpose is to recover the lands that they have voluntarily
parted with, because of their guilty knowledge that what they were
doing was in violation of the Constitution. They cannot escape this

conclusion because they are presumed to know the law. As this court
well said: 'A party to an illegal contract cannot come into a court of
law and ask to have his illegal objects carried out. The law will not
aid either party to an illegal agreement; it leaves the parties where it
finds them.' The rule is expressed in the maxims: 'Ex dolo malo non
oritur actio,' and 'In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis.'
(Bough and Bough vs. Cantiveros and Hanopol, 40 Phil., 210, 216.)"
The doctrine above adverted to is the one known as In Pari Delicto.
This is well known not only in this jurisdiction but also in the United
States where common law prevails. In the latter jurisdiction, the
doctrine is stated thus: "The proposition is universal that no action
arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be
maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property
agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or
damages for its violation. The rule has sometimes been laid down as
though it were equally universal, that where the parties are in pari
delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against
the other." (Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence, Vol. 3, 5th ed., p. 728.)
It is true that this doctrine is subject to one important limitation,
namely, "whenever public policy is considered as advanced by
allowing either party to sue for relief against the transaction" (idem,
p. 733). But not all contracts which are illegal because opposed to
public policy come under this limitation. The cases in which this
limitation may apply only "include the class of contracts which are
intrinsically contrary to public policy, contracts in which the illegality
itself consists in their opposition to public policy, and any other
species of illegal contracts in which, from their particular
circumstances, incidental and collateral motives of public policy
require relief." Examples of this class of contracts are usurious
contracts, marriage-brokerage contracts and gambling contracts.
(Idem. pp. 735-737.)
In our opinion, the contract in question does not come under this
exception because it is not intrinsically contrary to public policy, nor
one where the illegality itself consists in its opposition to public policy.
It is illegal not because it is against public policy but because it is
against the Constitution. Nor may it be contended that to apply the
doctrine of pari delicto would be tantamount to contravening the

fundamental policy embodied in the constitutional prohibition in that

it would allow an alien to remain in the illegal possession of the land,
because in this case the remedy is lodged elsewhere. To adopt the
contrary view would be merely to benefit petitioner and not to
enhance public interest.
The danger foreseen by counsel in the application of the doctrine
above adverted to is more apparent than real. If we go deeper in the
analysis of our situation we would not fail to see that the best policy
would be for Congress to approve a law laying down the policy and
the procedure to be followed in connection with transactions affected
by our doctrine in the Krivenko case. We hope that this should be
done without much delay. And even if this legislation be not
forthcoming in the near future, we do not believe that public interest
would suffer thereby if only our executive department would follow a
more militant policy in the conservation of our natural resources as
or dained by our Constitution. And we say so because there are at
present two ways by which this situation may be remedied, to wit,
(1) action for reversion, and (2) escheat to the state. An action for
reversion is slightly different from escheat proceeding, but in its
effects they are the same. They only differ in procedure. Escheat
proceedings may be instituted as a consequence of a violation of
article XIII, section 5 of our Constitution, which prohibits transfers of
private agricultural lands to aliens, whereas an action for reversion is
expressly authorized by the Public Land Act (sections 122, 123, and
124 of Commonwealth Act No. 141).
In the United States, as almost everywhere else, the doctrine which
imputes to the sovereign or to the government the ownership of all
lands and makes such sovereign or government the original source
of private titles, is well recognized (42 Am. Jur., 785). This doctrine,
which was expressly affirmed in Lawrence vs. Garduo, G. R. No.
16542, and which underlies all titles in the Philippines, (See Ventura,
Land Registration and Mortgages, 2nd ed., pp. 2-3) has been
enshrined in our Constitution (article XIII). The doctrine regarding
the course of all titles being the same here as in the United States, it
would seem that if escheat lies against aliens holding lands in those
states of the Union where common law prevails or where similar
constitutional or statutory prohibitions exist, no cogent reason is

perceived why similar proceedings may not be instituted in this

jurisdiction.
"Escheat is an incident or attribute of sovereignty, and rests on
the principle of the ultimate ownership by the state of all
property within its jurisdiction.' (30 C.J.S., 1164.)
". . . America escheats belong universally to the state or some
corporation thereof as the ultimate proprietor of land within its
Jurisdiction." (19 Am. Jur., 382.)
"An escheat is nothing more or less than the reversion of
property to the state, which takes place when the title fails."
(Delany vs. State, 42 N. D., 630, 174 N.W., 290, quoted in
footnote 6, 19 Am. Jur., 381.)
"As applied to the right of the state to lands purchased by an
alien, it would more properly be termed a 'forfeiture' at common
law." (19 Am. Jur., 381.)
"In modern law escheat denotes a falling of the estate into the
general property of the state because the tenant is an alien or
because he has died intestate without lawful heirs to take his
estate by succession, or because of some other disability to take
or hold property imposed by law." (19 Am. Jur.,
With regard to an action for reversion, the following sections of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 are pertinent:
"SEC. 122. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of this Act, nor any permanent improvement on such
land, shall be encumbered, alienated, or transferred, except to
persons, corporations, associations, or partnerships who may
acquire lands of the public domain under this Act or to
corporations organized in the Philippines authorized therefor by
their charters."
"SEC. 123. No land originally acquired in any manner under the
provisions of any previous Act, ordinance, royal decree, royal
order, or any other provision of law formerly in force in the
Philippines with regard to public lands, terrenos baldios y

realenqos, or lands of any other denomination that were actually

or presumptively of the public domain or by royal grant or in
any other form, nor any permanent improvement on such land,
shall be encumbered, alienated, or conveyed, except to persons,
corporations or associations who may acquire land of the public
domain under this Act or to corporate bodies organized in the
Philippines whose charters authorize them to do so: Provided,
however, That this prohibition shall not be applicable to the
conveyance or acquisition by reason of hereditary succession
duly acknowledged and legalized by competent courts;
Provided, further, That in the event of the ownership of the lands
and improvements mentioned in this section and in the last
preceding section being transferred by judicial decree to
persons, corporations or associations not legally capacitated to
acquire the same under the provisions of this Act, such persons,
corporation, or associations shall be obliged to alienate said
lands or improvements to others so capacitated within the
precise period of five years; otherwise, such property shall
revert to the Government."
"SEC. 124. Any acquisition, conveyance, alienation, transfer, or
other contract made or executed in violation of any of the
provisions of sections one hundred and eighteen, one hundred
and twenty, one hundred and twenty-one, one hundred and
twenty-two, and one hundred and twenty-three of this Act shall
be unlawful and null and void from its execution and shall
produce the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title,
patent, or permit originally issued, recognized or confirmed,
actually or presumptively, and cause the reversion of the
property and its improvements to the State."
Note that the last quoted provision declared any prohibited
conveyance not only unlawful but null and void ab initio. More
important yet, it expressly provides that such conveyances will
produce "the effect of annulling and cancelling the grant, title, patent,
or permit, originally issued, recognized of confirmed, actually or
presumptively", and of causing "the reversion of the property and its
improvements to the State." The reversion would seem to be but a
consequence of the annulment and cancellation of the original grant
or title, and this is so for in the event of such annulment or

cancellation no one else could legitimately claim the property except

its original owner or grantor the state.
We repeat. There are two ways now open to our government whereby
it could implement the doctrine of this Court in the Krivenko case
thereby putting in force and carrying to its logical conclusion the
mandate of our Constitution. By following either of these remedies,
or by approving an implementary law as above suggested, we can
enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution regarding our
natural resources without doing violence to the principle of pari
delicto. With these remedies open to us, we see no justifiable reason
for pursuing the extreme unusual remedy now vehemently urged by
the amici curiae.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that the sale in question is null and
void, but plaintiff is barred from taking the present action under the
principle of pari delicto.
The decision appealed from
pronouncement as to costs.

is

hereby

affirmed

without

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17587

September 12, 1967

PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION, representing the estate of JUSTINA SANTOS Y

CANON FAUSTINO, deceased, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
LUI SHE in her own behalf and as administratrix of the intestate estate of Wong Heng,
deceased,defendant-appellant.
Nicanor S. Sison for plaintiff-appellant.
Ozaeta, Gibbs & Ozaeta for defendant-appellant.

CASTRO, J.:
Justina Santos y Canon Faustino and her sister Lorenzo were the owners in common of a piece of
land in Manila. This parcel, with an area of 2,582.30 square meters, is located on Rizal Avenue and
opens into Florentino Torres street at the back and Katubusan street on one side. In it are two
residential houses with entrance on Florentino Torres street and the Hen Wah Restaurant with

entrance on Rizal Avenue. The sisters lived in one of the houses, while Wong Heng, a Chinese,
lived with his family in the restaurant. Wong had been a long-time lessee of a portion of the property,
paying a monthly rental of P2,620.
On September 22, 1957 Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property as her sister died
with no other heir. Then already well advanced in years, being at the time 90 years old, blind,
crippled and an invalid, she was left with no other relative to live with. Her only companions in the
house were her 17 dogs and 8 maids. Her otherwise dreary existence was brightened now and then
by the visits of Wong's four children who had become the joy of her life. Wong himself was the
trusted man to whom she delivered various amounts for safekeeping, including rentals from her
property at the corner of Ongpin and Salazar streets and the rentals which Wong himself paid as
lessee of a part of the Rizal Avenue property. Wong also took care of the payment; in her behalf, of
taxes, lawyers' fees, funeral expenses, masses, salaries of maids and security guard, and her
household expenses.
"In grateful acknowledgment of the personal services of the lessee to her," Justina Santos executed
on November 15, 1957 a contract of lease (Plff Exh. 3) in favor of Wong, covering the portion then
already leased to him and another portion fronting Florentino Torres street. The lease was for 50
years, although the lessee was given the right to withdraw at any time from the agreement; the
monthly rental was P3,120. The contract covered an area of 1,124 square meters. Ten days later
(November 25), the contract was amended (Plff Exh. 4) so as to make it cover the entire property,
including the portion on which the house of Justina Santos stood, at an additional monthly rental of
P360. For his part Wong undertook to pay, out of the rental due from him, an amount not exceeding
P1,000 a month for the food of her dogs and the salaries of her maids.
On December 21 she executed another contract (Plff Exh. 7) giving Wong the option to buy the
leased premises for P120,000, payable within ten years at a monthly installment of P1,000. The
option, written in Tagalog, imposed on him the obligation to pay for the food of the dogs and the
salaries of the maids in her household, the charge not to exceed P1,800 a month. The option was
conditioned on his obtaining Philippine citizenship, a petition for which was then pending in the Court
of First Instance of Rizal. It appears, however, that this application for naturalization was withdrawn
when it was discovered that he was not a resident of Rizal. On October 28, 1958 she filed a petition
to adopt him and his children on the erroneous belief that adoption would confer on them Philippine
citizenship. The error was discovered and the proceedings were abandoned.
On November 18, 1958 she executed two other contracts, one (Plff Exh. 5) extending the term of the
lease to 99 years, and another (Plff Exh. 6) fixing the term of the option of 50 years. Both contracts
are written in Tagalog.
In two wills executed on August 24 and 29, 1959 (Def Exhs. 285 & 279), she bade her legatees to
respect the contracts she had entered into with Wong, but in a codicil (Plff Exh. 17) of a later date
(November 4, 1959) she appears to have a change of heart. Claiming that the various contracts
were made by her because of machinations and inducements practiced by him, she now directed
her executor to secure the annulment of the contracts.
On November 18 the present action was filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. The complaint
alleged that the contracts were obtained by Wong "through fraud, misrepresentation, inequitable
conduct, undue influence and abuse of confidence and trust of and (by) taking advantage of the
helplessness of the plaintiff and were made to circumvent the constitutional provision prohibiting
aliens from acquiring lands in the Philippines and also of the Philippine Naturalization Laws." The
court was asked to direct the Register of Deeds of Manila to cancel the registration of the contracts

and to order Wong to pay Justina Santos the additional rent of P3,120 a month from November 15,
1957 on the allegation that the reasonable rental of the leased premises was P6,240 a month.
In his answer, Wong admitted that he enjoyed her trust and confidence as proof of which he
volunteered the information that, in addition to the sum of P3,000 which he said she had delivered to
him for safekeeping, another sum of P22,000 had been deposited in a joint account which he had
with one of her maids. But he denied having taken advantage of her trust in order to secure the
execution of the contracts in question. As counterclaim he sought the recovery of P9,210.49 which
he said she owed him for advances.
Wong's admission of the receipt of P22,000 and P3,000 was the cue for the filing of an amended
complaint. Thus on June 9, 1960, aside from the nullity of the contracts, the collection of various
amounts allegedly delivered on different occasions was sought. These amounts and the dates of
their delivery are P33,724.27 (Nov. 4, 1957); P7,344.42 (Dec. 1, 1957); P10,000 (Dec. 6, 1957);
P22,000 and P3,000 (as admitted in his answer). An accounting of the rentals from the Ongpin and
Rizal Avenue properties was also demanded.
In the meantime as a result of a petition for guardianship filed in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court, the Security Bank & Trust Co. was appointed guardian of the properties of Justina
Santos, while Ephraim G. Gochangco was appointed guardian of her person.
In his answer, Wong insisted that the various contracts were freely and voluntarily entered into by
the parties. He likewise disclaimed knowledge of the sum of P33,724.27, admitted receipt of
P7,344.42 and P10,000, but contended that these amounts had been spent in accordance with the
instructions of Justina Santos; he expressed readiness to comply with any order that the court might
make with respect to the sums of P22,000 in the bank and P3,000 in his possession.
The case was heard, after which the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
[A]ll the documents mentioned in the first cause of action, with the exception of the first which
is the lease contract of 15 November 1957, are declared null and void; Wong Heng is
condemned to pay unto plaintiff thru guardian of her property the sum of P55,554.25 with
legal interest from the date of the filing of the amended complaint; he is also ordered to pay
the sum of P3,120.00 for every month of his occupation as lessee under the document of
lease herein sustained, from 15 November 1959, and the moneys he has consigned since
then shall be imputed to that; costs against Wong Heng.
From this judgment both parties appealed directly to this Court. After the case was submitted for
decision, both parties died, Wong Heng on October 21, 1962 and Justina Santos on December 28,
1964. Wong was substituted by his wife, Lui She, the other defendant in this case, while Justina
Santos was substituted by the Philippine Banking Corporation.
Justina Santos maintained now reiterated by the Philippine Banking Corporation that the lease
contract (Plff Exh. 3) should have been annulled along with the four other contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7)
because it lacks mutuality; because it included a portion which, at the time, was in custodia legis;
because the contract was obtained in violation of the fiduciary relations of the parties; because her
consent was obtained through undue influence, fraud and misrepresentation; and because the lease
contract, like the rest of the contracts, is absolutely simulated.
Paragraph 5 of the lease contract states that "The lessee may at any time withdraw from this
agreement." It is claimed that this stipulation offends article 1308 of the Civil Code which provides

that "the contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the
will of one of them."
We have had occasion to delineate the scope and application of article 1308 in the early case
of Taylor v. Uy Tieng Piao.1 We said in that case:
Article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code in our opinion creates no impediment to the
insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the
cancellation of the contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen,
does not make either the validity or the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of
the party to whom is conceded the privilege of cancellation; for where the contracting parties
have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the option is as much in the
fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement.
Indeed, the cancellation of a contract in accordance with conditions agreed upon beforehand
is fulfillment.2
And so it was held in Melencio v. Dy Tiao Lay 3 that a "provision in a lease contract that the lessee,
at any time before he erected any building on the land, might rescind the lease, can hardly be
regarded as a violation of article 1256 [now art. 1308] of the Civil Code."
The case of Singson Encarnacion v. Baldomar 4 cannot be cited in support of the claim of want of
mutuality, because of a difference in factual setting. In that case, the lessees argued that they could
occupy the premises as long as they paid the rent. This is of course untenable, for as this Court said,
"If this defense were to be allowed, so long as defendants elected to continue the lease by
continuing the payment of the rentals, the owner would never be able to discontinue it; conversely,
although the owner should desire the lease to continue the lessees could effectively thwart his
purpose if they should prefer to terminate the contract by the simple expedient of stopping payment
of the rentals." Here, in contrast, the right of the lessee to continue the lease or to terminate it is so
circumscribed by the term of the contract that it cannot be said that the continuance of the lease
depends upon his will. At any rate, even if no term had been fixed in the agreement, this case would
at most justify the fixing of a period5 but not the annulment of the contract.
Nor is there merit in the claim that as the portion of the property formerly owned by the sister of
Justina Santos was still in the process of settlement in the probate court at the time it was leased,
the lease is invalid as to such portion. Justina Santos became the owner of the entire property upon
the death of her sister Lorenzo on September 22, 1957 by force of article 777 of the Civil Code.
Hence, when she leased the property on November 15, she did so already as owner thereof. As this
Court explained in upholding the sale made by an heir of a property under judicial administration:
That the land could not ordinarily be levied upon while in custodia legis does not mean that
one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest or participation which he has or might have in
the lands under administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is
prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court. But the sale made
by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the pending administration, in
no wise stands in the way of such administration.6
It is next contended that the lease contract was obtained by Wong in violation of his fiduciary
relationship with Justina Santos, contrary to article 1646, in relation to article 1941 of the Civil Code,
which disqualifies "agents (from leasing) the property whose administration or sale may have been
entrusted to them." But Wong was never an agent of Justina Santos. The relationship of the parties,
although admittedly close and confidential, did not amount to an agency so as to bring the case
within the prohibition of the law.

Just the same, it is argued that Wong so completely dominated her life and affairs that the contracts
express not her will but only his. Counsel for Justina Santos cites the testimony of Atty. Tomas S.
Yumol who said that he prepared the lease contract on the basis of data given to him by Wong and
that she told him that "whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed."7
The testimony of Atty. Yumol cannot be read out of context in order to warrant a finding that Wong
practically dictated the terms of the contract. What this witness said was:
Q Did you explain carefully to your client, Doa Justina, the contents of this document before
she signed it?
A I explained to her each and every one of these conditions and I also told her these
conditions were quite onerous for her, I don't really know if I have expressed my opinion, but
I told her that we would rather not execute any contract anymore, but to hold it as it was
before, on a verbal month to month contract of lease.
Q But, she did not follow your advice, and she went with the contract just the same?
A She agreed first . . .
Q Agreed what?
A Agreed with my objectives that it is really onerous and that I was really right, but after that,
I was called again by her and she told me to follow the wishes of Mr. Wong Heng.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Q So, as far as consent is concerned, you were satisfied that this document was perfectly
proper?
xxx

xxx

xxx

A Your Honor, if I have to express my personal opinion, I would say she is not, because, as I
said before, she told me "Whatever Mr. Wong wants must be followed."8
Wong might indeed have supplied the data which Atty. Yumol embodied in the lease contract, but to
say this is not to detract from the binding force of the contract. For the contract was fully explained to
Justina Santos by her own lawyer. One incident, related by the same witness, makes clear that she
voluntarily consented to the lease contract. This witness said that the original term fixed for the lease
was 99 years but that as he doubted the validity of a lease to an alien for that length of time, he tried
to persuade her to enter instead into a lease on a month-to-month basis. She was, however, firm
and unyielding. Instead of heeding the advice of the lawyer, she ordered him, "Just follow Mr. Wong
Heng."9 Recounting the incident, Atty. Yumol declared on cross examination:
Considering her age, ninety (90) years old at the time and her condition, she is a wealthy
woman, it is just natural when she said "This is what I want and this will be done." In
particular reference to this contract of lease, when I said "This is not proper," she said
"You just go ahead, you prepare that, I am the owner, and if there is any illegality, I am the
only one that can question the illegality."10

Atty. Yumol further testified that she signed the lease contract in the presence of her close friend,
Hermenegilda Lao, and her maid, Natividad Luna, who was constantly by her side.11 Any of them
could have testified on the undue influence that Wong supposedly wielded over Justina Santos, but
neither of them was presented as a witness. The truth is that even after giving his client time to think
the matter over, the lawyer could not make her change her mind. This persuaded the lower court to
uphold the validity of the lease contract against the claim that it was procured through undue
influence.
Indeed, the charge of undue influence in this case rests on a mere inference12 drawn from the fact
that Justina Santos could not read (as she was blind) and did not understand the English language
in which the contract is written, but that inference has been overcome by her own evidence.
Nor is there merit in the claim that her consent to the lease contract, as well as to the rest of the
contracts in question, was given out of a mistaken sense of gratitude to Wong who, she was made to
believe, had saved her and her sister from a fire that destroyed their house during the liberation of
Manila. For while a witness claimed that the sisters were saved by other persons (the brothers
Edilberto and Mariano Sta. Ana)13 it was Justina Santos herself who, according to her own witness,
Benjamin C. Alonzo, said "very emphatically" that she and her sister would have perished in the fire
had it not been for Wong.14 Hence the recital in the deed of conditional option (Plff Exh. 7) that
"[I]tong si Wong Heng ang siyang nagligtas sa aming dalawang magkapatid sa halos ay tiyak na
kamatayan", and the equally emphatic avowal of gratitude in the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3).
As it was with the lease contract (Plff Exh. 3), so it was with the rest of the contracts (Plff Exhs. 4-7)
the consent of Justina Santos was given freely and voluntarily. As Atty. Alonzo, testifying for her,
said:
[I]n nearly all documents, it was either Mr. Wong Heng or Judge Torres and/or both. When
we had conferences, they used to tell me what the documents should contain. But, as I said,
I would always ask the old woman about them and invariably the old woman used to tell me:
"That's okay. It's all right."15
But the lower court set aside all the contracts, with the exception of the lease contract of November
15, 1957, on the ground that they are contrary to the expressed wish of Justina Santos and that their
considerations are fictitious. Wong stated in his deposition that he did not pay P360 a month for the
additional premises leased to him, because she did not want him to, but the trial court did not believe
him. Neither did it believe his statement that he paid P1,000 as consideration for each of the
contracts (namely, the option to buy the leased premises, the extension of the lease to 99 years, and
the fixing of the term of the option at 50 years), but that the amount was returned to him by her for
safekeeping. Instead, the court relied on the testimony of Atty. Alonzo in reaching the conclusion that
the contracts are void for want of consideration.
Atty. Alonzo declared that he saw no money paid at the time of the execution of the documents, but
his negative testimony does not rule out the possibility that the considerations were paid at some
other time as the contracts in fact recite. What is more, the consideration need not pass from one
party to the other at the time a contract is executed because the promise of one is the consideration
for the other.16
With respect to the lower court's finding that in all probability Justina Santos could not have intended
to part with her property while she was alive nor even to lease it in its entirety as her house was built
on it, suffice it to quote the testimony of her own witness and lawyer who prepared the contracts (Plff
Exhs. 4-7) in question, Atty. Alonzo:

The ambition of the old woman, before her death, according to her revelation to me, was to
see to it that these properties be enjoyed, even to own them, by Wong Heng because Doa
Justina told me that she did not have any relatives, near or far, and she considered Wong
Heng as a son and his children her grandchildren; especially her consolation in life was when
she would hear the children reciting prayers in Tagalog.17
She was very emphatic in the care of the seventeen (17) dogs and of the maids who helped
her much, and she told me to see to it that no one could disturb Wong Heng from those
properties. That is why we thought of the ninety-nine (99) years lease; we thought of
adoption, believing that thru adoption Wong Heng might acquire Filipino citizenship; being
the adopted child of a Filipino citizen.18
This is not to say, however, that the contracts (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are valid. For the testimony just
quoted, while dispelling doubt as to the intention of Justina Santos, at the same time gives the clue
to what we view as a scheme to circumvent the Constitutional prohibition against the transfer of
lands to aliens. "The illicit purpose then becomes the illegal causa"19 rendering the contracts void.
Taken singly, the contracts show nothing that is necessarily illegal, but considered collectively, they
reveal an insidious pattern to subvert by indirection what the Constitution directly prohibits. To be
sure, a lease to an alien for a reasonable period is valid. So is an option giving an alien the right to
buy real property on condition that he is granted Philippine citizenship. As this Court said in Krivenko
v. Register of Deeds:20
[A]liens are not completely excluded by the Constitution from the use of lands for residential
purposes. Since their residence in the Philippines is temporary, they may be
granted temporary rights such as a lease contract which is not forbidden by the Constitution.
Should they desire to remain here forever and share our fortunes and misfortunes, Filipino
citizenship is not impossible to acquire.
But if an alien is given not only a lease of, but also an option to buy, a piece of land, by virtue of
which the Filipino owner cannot sell or otherwise dispose of his property,21 this to last for 50 years,
then it becomes clear that the arrangement is a virtual transfer of ownership whereby the owner
divests himself in stages not only of the right to enjoy the land ( jus possidendi, jus utendi, jus
fruendi and jus abutendi) but also of the right to dispose of it ( jus disponendi) rights the sum total
of which make up ownership. It is just as if today the possession is transferred, tomorrow, the use,
the next day, the disposition, and so on, until ultimately all the rights of which ownership is made up
are consolidated in an alien. And yet this is just exactly what the parties in this case did within the
space of one year, with the result that Justina Santos' ownership of her property was reduced to a
hollow concept. If this can be done, then the Constitutional ban against alien landholding in the
Philippines, as announced in Krivenko v. Register of Deeds,22 is indeed in grave peril.
It does not follow from what has been said, however, that because the parties are in pari delicto they
will be left where they are, without relief. For one thing, the original parties who were guilty of a
violation of the fundamental charter have died and have since been substituted by their
administrators to whom it would be unjust to impute their guilt.23 For another thing, and this is not
only cogent but also important, article 1416 of the Civil Code provides, as an exception to the rule
on pari delicto, that "When the agreement is not illegal per se but is merely prohibited, and the
prohibition by law is designed for the protection of the plaintiff, he may, if public policy is thereby
enhanced, recover what he has paid or delivered." The Constitutional provision that "Save in cases
of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in

the Philippines"24 is an expression of public policy to conserve lands for the Filipinos. As this Court
said in Krivenko:
It is well to note at this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are
construing the Constitution as it is and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of
our construction is to preclude aliens admitted freely into the Philippines from owning sites
where they may build their homes. But if this is the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we
will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of amity or equity . . . .
For all the foregoing, we hold that under the Constitution aliens may not acquire private or
public agricultural lands, including residential lands, and, accordingly, judgment is affirmed,
without costs.25
That policy would be defeated and its continued violation sanctioned if, instead of setting the
contracts aside and ordering the restoration of the land to the estate of the deceased Justina Santos,
this Court should apply the general rule of pari delicto. To the extent that our ruling in this case
conflicts with that laid down in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun 26 and subsequent similar cases, the latter
must be considered as pro tanto qualified.
The claim for increased rentals and attorney's fees, made in behalf of Justina Santos, must be
denied for lack of merit.
And what of the various amounts which Wong received in trust from her? It appears that he kept two
classes of accounts, one pertaining to amount which she entrusted to him from time to time, and
another pertaining to rentals from the Ongpin property and from the Rizal Avenue property, which he
himself was leasing.
With respect to the first account, the evidence shows that he received P33,724.27 on November 8,
1957 (Plff Exh. 16); P7,354.42 on December 1, 1957 (Plff Exh. 13); P10,000 on December 6, 1957
(Plff Exh. 14) ; and P18,928.50 on August 26, 1959 (Def. Exh. 246), or a total of P70,007.19. He
claims, however, that he settled his accounts and that the last amount of P18,928.50 was in fact
payment to him of what in the liquidation was found to be due to him.
He made disbursements from this account to discharge Justina Santos' obligations for taxes,
attorneys' fees, funeral services and security guard services, but the checks (Def Exhs. 247-278)
drawn by him for this purpose amount to only P38,442.84.27 Besides, if he had really settled his
accounts with her on August 26, 1959, we cannot understand why he still had P22,000 in the bank
and P3,000 in his possession, or a total of P25,000. In his answer, he offered to pay this amount if
the court so directed him. On these two grounds, therefore, his claim of liquidation and settlement of
accounts must be rejected.
After subtracting P38,442.84 (expenditures) from P70,007.19 (receipts), there is a difference of
P31,564 which, added to the amount of P25,000, leaves a balance of P56,564.3528 in favor of
Justina Santos.
As to the second account, the evidence shows that the monthly income from the Ongpin property
until its sale in Rizal Avenue July, 1959 was P1,000, and that from the Rizal Avenue property, of
which Wong was the lessee, was P3,120. Against this account the household expenses and
disbursements for the care of the 17 dogs and the salaries of the 8 maids of Justina Santos were
charged. This account is contained in a notebook (Def. Exh. 6) which shows a balance of P9,210.49
in favor of Wong. But it is claimed that the rental from both the Ongpin and Rizal Avenue properties
was more than enough to pay for her monthly expenses and that, as a matter of fact, there should

be a balance in her favor. The lower court did not allow either party to recover against the other.
Said the court:
[T]he documents bear the earmarks of genuineness; the trouble is that they were made only
by Francisco Wong and Antonia Matias, nick-named Toning, which was the way she
signed the loose sheets, and there is no clear proof that Doa Justina had authorized these
two to act for her in such liquidation; on the contrary if the result of that was a deficit as
alleged and sought to be there shown, of P9,210.49, that was not what Doa Justina
apparently understood for as the Court understands her statement to the Honorable Judge of
the Juvenile Court . . . the reason why she preferred to stay in her home was because there
she did not incur in any debts . . . this being the case, . . . the Court will not adjudicate in
favor of Wong Heng on his counterclaim; on the other hand, while it is claimed that the
expenses were much less than the rentals and there in fact should be a superavit, . . . this
Court must concede that daily expenses are not easy to compute, for this reason, the Court
faced with the choice of the two alternatives will choose the middle course which after all is
permitted by the rules of proof, Sec. 69, Rule 123 for in the ordinary course of things, a
person will live within his income so that the conclusion of the Court will be that there is
neither deficit nor superavit and will let the matter rest here.
Both parties on appeal reiterate their respective claims but we agree with the lower court that both
claims should be denied. Aside from the reasons given by the court, we think that the claim of
Justina Santos totalling P37,235, as rentals due to her after deducting various expenses, should be
rejected as the evidence is none too clear about the amounts spent by Wong for
food29 masses30 and salaries of her maids.31 His claim for P9,210.49 must likewise be rejected as his
averment of liquidation is belied by his own admission that even as late as 1960 he still had P22,000
in the bank and P3,000 in his possession.
ACCORDINGLY, the contracts in question (Plff Exhs. 3-7) are annulled and set aside; the land
subject-matter of the contracts is ordered returned to the estate of Justina Santos as represented by
the Philippine Banking Corporation; Wong Heng (as substituted by the defendant-appellant Lui She)
is ordered to pay the Philippine Banking Corporation the sum of P56,564.35, with legal interest from
the date of the filing of the amended complaint; and the amounts consigned in court by Wong Heng
shall be applied to the payment of rental from November 15, 1959 until the premises shall have been
vacated by his heirs. Costs against the defendant-appellant.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Angeles,
JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

With the able and well-written opinion of Justice Castro, I am in full agreement. The exposition of the
facts leaves nothing to be desired and the statement of the law is notable for its comprehensiveness
and clarity. This concurring opinion has been written solely to express what I consider to be the

unfortunate and deplorable consequences of applying the pari delicto concept, as was, to my mind,
indiscriminately done, to alien landholding declared illegal under the Krivenko doctrine in some past
decisions.
It is to be remembered that in Krivenko v. The Register of Deeds of Manila,1 this Court over strong
dissents held that residential and commercial lots may be considered agricultural within the meaning
of the constitutional provision prohibiting the transfer of any private agricultural land to individuals,
corporations or associations not qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the
Philippines save in cases of hereditary succession.
That provision of the Constitution took effect on November 15, 1935 when the Commonwealth
Government was established. The interpretation as set forth in the Krivenko decision was only
handed down on November 15, 1947. Prior to that date there were many who were of the opinion
that the phrase agricultural land should be construed strictly and not be made to
cover residential and commercial lots. Acting on that belief, several transactions were entered into
transferring such lots to alien vendees by Filipino-vendors.
After the Krivenko decision, some Filipino vendors sought recovery of the lots in question on the
ground that the sales were null and void. No definite ruling was made by this Court until September
of 1953, when on the 29th of said month, Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun,2 Bautista v. Uy
Isabelo,3 Talento v. Makiki,4 Caoile v. Chiao Peng5 were decided.
Of the four decisions in September, 1953, the most extensive discussion of the question is found
in Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, the opinion being penned by retired Justice Bautista Angelo with the
concurrence only of one Justice, Justice Labrador, also retired. Former Chief Justice Paras as well
as the former Justices Tuason and Montemayor concurred in the result. The necessary sixth vote for
a decision was given by the then Justice Bengzon, who had a two-paragraph concurring opinion
disagreeing with the main opinion as to the force to be accorded to the two cases,6 therein cited.
There were two dissenting opinions by former Justices Pablo and Alex Reyes. The doctrine as
announced in the Rellosa case is that while the sale by a Filipino-vendor to an alien-vendee of a
residential or a commercial lot is null and void as held in the Krivenko case, still the Filipino-vendor
has no right to recover under a civil law doctrine, the parties being in pari delicto. The only remedy to
prevent this continuing violation of the Constitution which the decision impliedly sanctions by
allowing the alien vendees to retain the lots in question is either escheat or reversion. Thus: "By
following either of these remedies, or by approving an implementary law as above suggested, we
can enforce the fundamental policy of our Constitution regarding our natural resources without doing
violence to the principle of pari delicto."7
Were the parties really in pari delicto? Had the sale by and between Filipino-vendor and alienvendee occurred after the decision in the Krivenko case, then the above view would be correct that
both Filipino-vendor and alien-vendee could not be considered as innocent parties within the
contemplation of the law. Both of them should be held equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution.
Since, however, the sales in question took place prior to the Krivenko decision, at a time when the
assumption could be honestly entertained that there was no constitutional prohibition against the
sale of commercial or residential lots by Filipino-vendor to alien-vendee, in the absence of a definite
decision by the Supreme Court, it would not be doing violence to reason to free them from the
imputation of evading the Constitution. For evidently evasion implies at the very least knowledge of
what is being evaded. The new Civil Code expressly provides: "Mistakes upon a doubtful or difficult
question of law may be the basis of good faith."8

According to the Rellosa opinion, both parties are equally guilty of evasion of the Constitution, based
on the broader principle that "both parties are presumed to know the law." This statement that the
sales entered into prior to the Krivenko decision were at that time already vitiated by a guilty
knowledge of the parties may be too extreme a view. It appears to ignore a postulate of a
constitutional system, wherein the words of the Constitution acquire meaning through Supreme
Court adjudication.
1aw phl.nt

Reference may be made by way of analogy to a decision adjudging a statute void. Under the
orthodox theory of constitutional law, the act having been found unconstitutional was not a law,
conferred no rights, imposed no duty, afforded no protection.9 As pointed out by former Chief Justice
Hughes though in Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank:10 "It is quite clear, however,
that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken
with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative
fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration. The effect of subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be
considered in various aspects, with respect to particular relations, individual and corporate, and
particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status,
of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the
light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination."
After the Krivenko decision, there is no doubt that continued possession by alien-vendee of property
acquired before its promulgation is violative of the Constitution. It is as if an act granting aliens the
right to acquire residential and commercial lots were annulled by the Supreme Court as contrary to
the provision of the Constitution prohibiting aliens from acquiring private agricultural land.
The question then as now, therefore, was and is how to divest the alien of such property rights on
terms equitable to both parties. That question should be justly resolved in accordance with the
mandates of the Constitution not by a wholesale condemnation of both parties for entering into a
contract at a time when there was no ban as yet arising from the Krivenko decision, which could not
have been anticipated. Unfortunately, under the Rellosa case, it was assumed that the parties,
being in pari delicto, would be left in the situation in which they were, neither being in a position to
seek judicial redress.
Would it not have been more in consonance with the Constitution, if instead the decision compelled
the restitution of the property by the alien-vendee to the Filipino-vendor? Krivenko decision held in
clear, explicit and unambigous language that: "We are deciding the instant case under section 5 of
Article XIII of the Constitution which is more comprehensive and more absolute in the sense that it
prohibits the transfer to aliens of any private agricultural land including residential land whatever its
origin might have been . . . . This prohibition [Rep. Act No. 133] makes no distinction between private
lands that are strictly agricultural and private lands that are residential or commercial. The prohibition
embraces the sale of private lands of any kind in favor of aliens, which is again a clear
implementation and a legislative interpretation of the constitutional prohibition. . . . It is well to note at
this juncture that in the present case we have no choice. We are construing the Constitution as it is
and not as we may desire it to be. Perhaps the effect of our construction is to preclude aliens,
admitted freely into the Philippines, from owning sites where they may build their homes. But if this is
the solemn mandate of the Constitution, we will not attempt to compromise it even in the name of
amity or equity."11
Alien-vendee is therefore incapacitated or disqualified to acquire and hold real estate. That
incapacity and that disqualification should date from the adoption of the Constitution on November
15, 1935. That incapacity and that disqualification, however, was made known to Filipino-vendor and
to alien-vendee only upon the promulgation of the Krivenko decision on November 15, 1947. Alien-

vendee, therefore, cannot be allowed to continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over said
property, when it is clearly included within the Constitutional prohibition. Alien-vendee should thus be
made to restore the property with its fruits and rents to Filipino-vendor, its previous owner, if it could
be shown that in the utmost good faith, he transferred his title over the same to alien-vendee, upon
restitution of the purchase price of course.
The Constitution bars alien-vendees from owning the property in question. By dismissing those suits,
the lots remained in alien hands. Notwithstanding the solution of escheat or reversion offered, they
are still at the moment of writing, for the most part in alien hands. There have been after almost
twenty years no proceedings for escheat or reversion.
Yet it is clear that an alien-vendee cannot consistently with the constitutional provision, as
interpreted in theKrivenko decision, continue owning and exercising acts of ownership over the real
estate in question. It ought to follow then, if such a continuing violation of the fundamental law is to
be put an end to, that the Filipino-vendor, who in good faith entered into, a contract with an
incapacitated person, transferring ownership of a piece of land after the Constitution went into full
force and effect, should, in the light of the ruling in the Krivenko case, be restored to the possession
and ownership thereof, where he has filed the appropriate case or proceeding. Any other
construction would defeat the ends and purposes not only of this particular provision in question but
the rest of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution frowns upon the title remaining in the alien-vendees. Restoration of the property
upon payment of price received by Filipino vendor or its reasonable equivalent as fixed by the court
is the answer. To give the constitutional provision full force and effect, in consonance with the
dictates of equity and justice, the restoration to Filipino-vendor upon the payment of a price fixed by
the court is the better remedy. He thought he could transfer the property to an alien and did so. After
the Krivenko case had made clear that he had no right to sell nor an alien-vendee to purchase the
property in question, the obvious solution would be for him to reacquire the same. That way the
Constitution would be given, as it ought to be given, respect and deference.
It may be said that it is too late at this stage to hope for such a solution, the Rellosa opinion,
although originally concurred in by only one justice, being too firmly imbedded. The writer however
sees a welcome sign in the adoption by the Court in this case of the concurring opinion of the then
Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon. Had it been followed then, the problem would not be still with
us now. Fortunately, it is never too late not even in constitutional adjudication.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 113539 March 12, 1998

CELSO R. HALILI and ARTHUR R. HALILI, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HELEN MEYERS GUZMAN, DAVID REY GUZMAN and EMILIANO
CATANIAG,respondents.

PANGANIBAN, J.:
The factual findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, may no longer be
reviewed and reversed by this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
transfer of an interest in a piece of land to an alien may no longer be assailed on constitutional
grounds after the entire parcel has been sold to a qualified citizen.
The Case
These familiar and long-settled doctrines are applied by this Court in denying this petition under Rule
45 to set aside the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals 2 in CA-GR CV No. 37829 promulgated on
September 14, 1993, the dispositive portion of which states:3
WHEREFORE, and upon all the foregoing, the Decision of the court below dated
March 10, 1992 dismissing the complaint for lack of merit is AFFIRMED without
pronouncement as to costs.
The Facts
The factual antecedents, as narrated by Respondent Court, are not disputed by the parties. We
reproduce them in part, as follows:
Simeon de Guzman, an American citizen, died sometime in 1968, leaving real
properties in the Philippines. His forced heirs were his widow, defendant appellee
[herein private respondent] Helen Meyers Guzman, and his son, defendant appellee
[also herein private respondent] David Rey Guzman, both of whom are also
American citizens. On August 9, 1989, Helen executed a deed of quitclaim (Annex AComplaint), assigning [,] transferring and conveying to David Rey all her rights, titles
and interests in and over six parcels of land which the two of them inherited from
Simeon.
Among the said parcels of land is that now in litigation, . . . situated in Bagbaguin,
Sta. Maria, Bulacan, containing an area of 6,695 square meters, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-170514 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan. The quitclaim
having been registered, TCT No. T-170514 was cancelled and TCT No. T-120259
was issued in the name of appellee David Rey Guzman.
On February 5, 1991, David Rey Guzman sold said parcel of land to defendantappellee [also herein private respondent] Emiliano Cataniag, upon which TCT No. T120259 was cancelled and TCT No. T-130721(M) was issued in the latter's name.4
Petitioners, who are owners of the adjoining lot, filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court of
Malolos, Bulacan, questioning the constitutionality and validity of the two conveyances between
Helen Guzman and David Rey Guzman, and between the latter and Emiliano Cataniag and
claiming ownership thereto based on their right of legal redemption under Art. 1621 5 of the Civil
Code.
In its decision6 dated March 10, 1992,7 the trial court dismissed the complaint. It ruled that Helen
Guzman's waiver of her inheritance in favor of her son was not contrary to the constitutional
prohibition against the sale of land to an alien, since the purpose of the waiver was simply authorize
David Rey Guzman to dispose of their properties in accordance with the Constitution and the laws of

the Philippines, and not to subvert them. On the second issue, it held that the subject land was
urban; hence, petitioners had no reason to invoke their right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the
Civil Code.
The Halilis sought a reversal from the Court of Appeals which, however, denied their appeal.
Respondent Court affirmed the factual finding of the trial court that the subject land was urban.
Citing Tejido vs. Zamacoma,8 andYap vs. Grageda,9 it further held that, although the transfer of the
land to David Rey may have been invalid for being contrary to the Constitution, there was no more
point in allowing herein petitioners to recover the property, since it has passed on to and was thus
already owned by a qualified person.
Hence, this petition. 10
Issues
The petition submits the following assignment of errors:
. . . the Honorable Court of Appeals
1. Erred in affirming the conclusion of the trial court that the land in question is urban,
not rural
2. Erred in denying petitioners' right of redemption under Art. 1621 of the Civil Code
3. Having considered the conveyance from Helen Meyers Guzman to her son David
Rey Guzman illegal, erred in not declaring the same null and void[.] 11
The Court's Ruling
The petition has no merit.
First Issue: The Land Is Urban;
Thus, No Right of Redemption
The first two errors assigned by petitioners being interrelated the determination of the first being a
prerequisite to the resolution of the second shall be discussed together
Subject Land Is Urban
Whether the land in dispute is rural or urban is a factual question which, as a rule, is not reviewable
by this Court.12 Basic and long-settled is the doctrine that findings of fact of a trial judge, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding upon the Supreme Court. This admits of only a few
exceptions, such as when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; when an inference made by the appellate court from its factual findings is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts;
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the
admissions of the parties to the case or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, will justify a different conclusion; when there is a misappreciation of facts; when the
findings of fact are conclusions without mention of the specific evidence on which they are based,
are premised on the absence of evidence or are contradicted by evidence on record. 13

The instant case does not fall within any of the aforecited exceptions. In fact, the conclusion of the
trial court that the subject property is urban land is based on clear and convincing evidence, as
shown in its decision which disposed thus:
. . . As observed by the court, almost all the roadsides along the national ghighway
[sic] of Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, are lined up with residential, commercial or
industrial establishments. Lined up along the Bagbaguin Road are factories of feeds,
woodcrafts [sic] and garments, commercial stores for tires, upholstery materials,
feeds supply and spare parts. Located therein likewise were the Pepsi-Cola
Warehouse, the Cruz Hospital, three gasoline stations, apartment buildings for
commercial purposes and construction firms. There is no doubt, therefore, that the
community is a commercial area thriving in business activities. Only a short portion of
said road [is] vacant. It is to be noted that in the Tax Declaration in the name of
Helen Meyers Guzman[,] the subject land is termed agricultural[,] while in the letter
addressed to defendant Emiliano Cataniag, dated October 3, 1991, the Land
Regulatory Board attested that the subject property is commercial and the trend of
development along the road is commercial. The Board's classification is based on the
present condition of the property and the community thereat. Said classification is far
more later [sic] than the tax declaration.14
No Ground to Invoke
Right of Redemption
In view of the finding that the subject land is urban in character, petitioners have indeed no right to
invoke Art. 1621 of the Civil Code, which presupposes that the land sought to be redeemed is rural.
The provision is clearly worded and admits of no ambiguity in construction:
Art. 1621. The owners of adjoining lands shall also have the right of redemption
when a piece of rural land, the area of which does not exceed one hectare, is
alienated, unless the grantee does not own any rural land.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Under this article, both lands that sought to be redeemed and the adjacent lot belonging to the
person exercising the right of redemption must be rural. If one or both are urban, the right cannot
be invoked.15 The purpose of this provision, which is limited in scope to rural lands not exceeding one
hectare, is to favor agricultural development.16 The subject land not being rural and, therefore, not
agricultural, this purpose would not be served if petitioners are granted the right of redemption under
Art. 1621. Plainly, under the circumstances, they cannot invoke it.
Second Issue: Sale to Cataniag Valid
Neither do we find any reversible error in the appellate court's holding that the sale of the subject
land to Private Respondent Cataniag renders moot any question on the constitutionally of the prior
transfer made by Helen Guzman to her son David Rey.
True, Helen Guzman's deed of quitclaim in which she assigned, transferred and conveyed to
David Rey all her rights, titles and interests over the property she had inherited from her husband
collided with the Constitution, Article XII, Section 7 of which provides:

Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred

or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain.
The landmark case of Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds 17 settled the issue as to who are qualified (and
disqualified) to own public as well as private lands in the Philippines. Following a long discourse
maintaining that the "public agricultural lands" mentioned in Section 1, Article XIII of the 1935
Constitution, include residential, commercial and industrial lands, the Court then stated:
Under section 1 of Article XIII [now Sec. 2, Art. XII] of the Constitution, "natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and
with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation is limited to Filipino citizens.
But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the hands of
Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may
alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that
section 5 is included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be
transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to
acquire or hold lands of the public domain in the Philippines.
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which
agricultural resources may leak into aliens' hands. It would certainly be futile to
prohibit the alienation of public agricultural lands to aliens if, after all, they may be
freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural lands in the hands of
Filipino citizens. Undoubtedly, as above indicated, section 5 [now Sec. 7] is intended
to insure the policy of nationalization contained in section 1 [now Sec. 2]. Both
sections must, therefore, be read together for they have the same purpose and the
same subject matter. It must be noticed that the persons against whom the
prohibition is directed in section 5 [now Sec. 7] are the very same persons who under
section 1 [now Sec. 2] are disqualified "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain
in the Philippines." And the subject matter of both sections is the same, namely, the
non transferability of "agricultural land" to aliens . . . .18
The Krivenko rule was recently reiterated in Ong Ching Po vs. Court of Appeals, 19 which involves a
sale of land to a Chinese citizen. The Court sad:
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire
or hold lands of the public domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only
to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of the public domain" (II Bernas,
The Constitution of the Philippines 439-440 [1988 ed.]).
The 1935 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the "disposition,
exploitation, development and utilization" of all "lands of the public domain and other
natural resources of the Philippines" for Filipino citizens or corporations at least sixty
percent of the capital of which was owned by Filipinos. Aliens, whether individuals or
corporations, have been disqualified from acquiring public lands; hence, they have
also been disqualified from acquiring private lands. 20
In fine, non-Filipinos cannot acquire or hold title to private lands or to lands of the public domain,
except only by way of legal succession. 21

But what is the effect of a subsequent sale by the disqualified alien vendee to a qualified Filipino
citizen? This is not a novel question. Jurisprudence is consistent that "if land is invalidly transferred
to an alien who subsequently becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original
transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is rendered valid." 22
Thus, in United Church Board of Word Ministries vs. Sebastian, 23 in which an alien resident who
owned properties in the Philippines devised to an American non-stock corporation part of his shares
of stock in a Filipino corporation that owned a tract of land in Davao del Norte, the Court sustained
the invalidity of such legacy. However, upon proof that ownership of the American corporation has
passed on to a 100 percent Filipino corporation, the Court ruled that the defect in the will was
"rectified by the subsequent transfer of the property."
The present case is similar to De Castro vs. Tan. 24 In that case, a residential lot was sold to a
Chinese. Upon his death, his widow and children executed an extrajudicial settlement, whereby said
lot was allotted to one of his sons who became a naturalized Filipino. The Court did not allow the
original vendor to have the sale annulled and to recover the property, for the reason that the land
has since become the property of a naturalized Filipino citizen who is constitutionally qualified to own
land.
Likewise, in the cases of Sarsosa vs. Cuenco, 25 Godinez vs. Pak Luen, 26 Vasquez vs. Li Seng
Giap 27 andHerrera vs. Luy Kim Guan, 28 which similarly involved the sale of land to an alien who
thereafter sold the same to a Filipino citizen, the Court again applied the rule that the subsequent
sale can no longer be impugned on the basis of the invalidity of the initial transfer.
The rationale of this principle was explained in Vasquez vs. Li Seng Giap thus:
. . . [I]f the ban on aliens from acquiring not only agricultural but also urban lands, as
construed by this Court in the Krivenko case, is to preserve the nation's lands for
future generations of Filipinos, that aim or purpose would not be thwarted but
achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by aliens who became
Filipino citizens by naturalization.29
Accordingly, since the disputed land is now owned by Private Respondent Cataniag, a Filipino
citizen, the prior invalid transfer can no longer be assailed. The objective of the constitutional
provision to keep our land in Filipino hands has been served.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The challenged Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 74833

January 21, 1991

THOMAS C. CHEESMAN, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ESTELITA PADILLA, respondents.
Estanislao L. Cesa, Jr. for petitioner.
Benjamin I. Fernandez for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:
This appeal concerns the attempt by an American citizen (petitioner Thomas Cheesman) to annul
for lack of consent on his part the sale by his Filipino wife (Criselda) of a residential lot and
building to Estelita Padilla, also a Filipino.
Thomas Cheesman and Criselda P. Cheesman were married on December 4, 1970 but have been
separated since February 15,1981. 1
On June 4, 1974, a "Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights" was executed by Armando
Altares conveying a parcel of unregistered land and the house thereon (at No. 7 Neptune Street,
Gordon Heights, Olongapo City) in favor of "Criselda P. Cheesman, of legal age, Filipino citizen,
married to Thomas Cheesman, and residing at Lot No. 1, Blk. 8, Filtration Road, Sta. Rita, Olongapo
City . . ." 2 Thomas Cheesman, although aware of the deed, did not object to the transfer being made
only to his wife.3
Thereafterand again with the knowledge of Thomas Cheesman and also without any protest by
himtax declarations for the property purchased were issued in the name only of Criselda
Cheesman and Criselda assumed exclusive management and administration of said property,
leasing it to tenants. 4
On July 1, 1981, Criselda Cheesman sold the property to Estelita M. Padilla, without the knowledge
or consent of Thomas Cheesman. 5 The deed described Criselda as being" . . . of legal age, married
to an American citizen,. . ."6
Thirty days later, or on July 31, 1981, Thomas Cheesman brought suit in the Court of First Instance
at Olongapo City against his wife, Criselda, and Estelita Padilla, praying for the annulment of the
sale on the ground that the transaction had been executed without his knowledge and consent. 7 An
answer was filed in the names of both defendants, alleging that (1) the property sold was
paraphernal, having been purchased by Criselda with funds exclusively belonging to her ("her own
separate money"); (2) Thomas Cheesman, being an American, was disqualified to have any interest
or right of ownership in the land; and (3) Estelita Padilla was a buyer in good faith. 8
During the pre-trial conference, the parties agreed upon certain facts which were subsequently set
out in a pre-trial Order dated October 22, 1981, 9 as follows:
1. Both parties recognize the existence of the Deed of Sale over the residential house
located at No. 7 Granada St., Gordon Heights, Olongapo City, which was acquired from
Armando Altares on June 4, 1974 and sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman to Estelita
Padilla on July 12, 1981; and

2. That the transaction regarding the transfer of their property took place during the existence
of their marriage as the couple were married on December 4, 1970 and the questioned
property was acquired sometime on June 4,1974.
The action resulted in a judgment dated June 24, 1982, 10 declaring void ab initio the sale executed
by Criselda Cheesman in favor of Estelita M. Padilla, and ordering the delivery of the property to
Thomas Cheesman as administrator of the conjugal partnership property, and the payment to him of
P5,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.11
The judgment was however set aside as regards Estelita Padilla on a petition for relief filed by the
latter, grounded on "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence" which had seriously impaired her
right to present her case adequately. 12 "After the petition for relief from judgment was given due
course," according to petitioner, "a new judge presided over the case." 13
Estelita Padilla filed a supplemental pleading on December 20, 1982 as her own answer to the
complaint, and a motion for summary judgment on May 17, 1983. Although there was initial
opposition by Thomas Cheesman to the motion, the parties ultimately agreed on the rendition by the
court of a summary judgment after entering into a stipulation of facts, at the hearing of the motion on
June 21, 1983, the stipulation being of the following tenor: 14
(1) that the property in question was bought during the existence of the marriage between
the plaintiff and the defendant Criselda P. Cheesman;
(2) that the property bought during the marriage was registered in the name of Criselda
Cheesman and that the Deed of Sale and Transfer of Possessory Rights executed by the
former owner-vendor Armando Altares in favor of Criselda Cheesman made no mention of
the plaintiff;
(3) that the property, subject of the proceedings, was sold by defendant Criselda Cheesman
in favor of the other defendant Estelita M. Padilla, without the written consent of the plaintiff.
Obviously upon the theory that no genuine issue existed any longer and there was hence no need of
a trial, the parties having in fact submitted, as also stipulated, their respective memoranda each
praying for a favorable verdict, the Trial Court 15 rendered a "Summary Judgment" dated August 3,
1982 declaring "the sale executed by . . . Criselda Cheesman in favor of . . . Estelita Padilla to be
valid," dismissing Thomas Cheesman's complaint and ordering him "to immediately turn over the
possession of the house and lot subject of . . . (the) case to . . . Estelita Padilla . . ." 16
The Trial Court found that
1) the evidence on record satisfactorily overcame the disputable presumption in Article 160
of the Civil Codethat all property of the marriage belongs to the conjugal partnership
"unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife"and that the
immovable in question was in truth Criselda's paraphernal property;
2) that moreover, said legal presumption in Article 160 could not apply "inasmuch as the
husband-plaintiff is an American citizen and therefore disqualified under the Constitution to
acquire and own real properties; and
3) that the exercise by Criselda of exclusive acts of dominion with the knowledge of her
husband "had led . . . Estelita Padilla to believe that the properties were the exclusive

properties of Criselda Cheesman and on the faith of such a belief she bought the properties
from her and for value," and therefore, Thomas Cheesman was, under Article 1473 of the
Civil Code, estopped to impugn the transfer to Estelita Padilla.
Thomas Cheesman appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court. There he assailed the Trial Court
acts (1) of granting Estelita Padilla's petition for relief, and its resolution of matters not subject of said
petition; (2) of declaring valid the sale to Estelita Padilla despite the lack of consent thereto by him,
and the presumption of the conjugal character of the property in question pursuant to Article 160 of
the Civil Code; (3) of disregarding the judgment of June 24, 1982 which, not having been set aside
as against Criselda Cheesman, continued to be binding on her; and (4) of making findings of fact not
supported by evidence. All of these contentions were found to be without merit by the Appellate
Tribunal which, on January 7, 1986, promulgated a decision (erroneously denominated,
"Report")17 affirming the "Summary Judgment complained of," "having found no reversible error"
therein.
Once more, Thomas Cheesman availed of the remedy of appeal, this time to this Court. Here, he
argues that it was reversible error for the Intermediate Appellate Court
1) to find that the presumption that the property in question is conjugal in accordance with Article 160
had been satisfactorily overcome by Estelita Padilla; 18
2) to rule that Estelita Padilla was a purchaser of said property in good faith, it appearing:
a) that the deed by which the property was conveyed to Criselda Cheesman
described her as "married to Thomas C. Cheesman," as well as the deed by which
the property was later conveyed to Estelita Padilla by Criselda Cheesman also
described her as "married to an American citizen," and both said descriptions had
thus "placed Estelita on knowledge of the conjugal nature of the property;" and
b) that furthermore, Estelita had admitted to stating in the deed by which she
acquired the property a price much lower than that actually paid "in order to avoid
payment of more obligation to the government;"19
3) to decline to declare that the evidence did not warrant the grant of Estelita Padilla's petition for
relief on the ground of "fraud, mistake and/or excusable negligence;" 20
4) to hold that Thomas Cheesman had waived his objection to Estelita's petition for relief by failing to
appeal from the order granting the same;
5) to accord to Estelita Padilla a relief other than that she had specifically prayed for in her petition
for relief, ie., "the restoration of the purchase price which Estelita allegedly paid to Criselda;" 21 and
6) to fail to declare that Thomas Cheesman's citizenship is not a bar to his action to recover the lot
and house for the conjugal partnership.22
Such conclusions as that (1) fraud, mistake or excusable negligence existed in the premises
justifying relief to Estelita Padilla under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court, or (2) that Criselda Cheesman
had used money she had brought into her marriage to Thomas Cheesman to purchase the lot and
house in question, or (3) that Estelita Padilla believed in good faith that Criselda Cheesman was the
exclusive owner of the property that she (Estelita) intended to and did in fact buyderived from the
evidence adduced by the parties, the facts set out in the pleadings or otherwise appearing on

recordare conclusions or findings of fact. As distinguished from a question of lawwhich exists

"when the doubt or difference arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts" "there is a
question of fact when the doubt or difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of alleged
facts;"23or when the "query necessarily invites calibration of the whole evidence considering mainly
the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their
relation; to each other and to the whole and the probabilities of the situation." 24
Now, it is axiomatic that only questions of law, distinctly set forth, may be raised in a petition for the
review oncertiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals presented to this Court. 25 As everyone
knows or ought to know, the appellate jurisdiction of this Court is limited to reviewing errors of law,
accepting as conclusive the factual findings of the lower court upon its own assessment of the
evidence. 26 The creation of the Court of Appeals was precisely intended to take away from the
Supreme Court the work of examining the evidence, and confine its task to the determination of
questions which do not call for the reading and study of transcripts containing the testimony of
witnesses.27 The rule of conclusiveness of the factual findings or conclusions of the Court of Appeals
is, to be sure, subject to certain exceptions, 28 none of which however obtains in the case at bar.
It is noteworthy that both the Trial Court and the Intermediate Appellate Court reached the same
conclusions on the three (3) factual matters above set forth, after assessment of the evidence and
determination of the probative value thereof. Both Courts found that the facts on record adequately
proved fraud, mistake or excusable negligence by which Estelita Padilla's rights had been
substantially impaired; that the funds used by Criselda Cheesman was money she had earned and
saved prior to her marriage to Thomas Cheesman, and that Estelita Padilla did believe in good faith
that Criselda Cheesman was the sole owner of the property in question. Consequently, these
determinations of fact will not be here disturbed, this Court having been cited to no reason for doing
so.
These considerations dispose of the first three (3) points that petitioner Cheesman seeks to make in
his appeal. They also make unnecessary an extended discussion of the other issues raised by him.
As to them, it should suffice to restate certain fundamental propositions.
1wphi1

An order of a Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) granting a petition for relief under
Rule 38 is interlocutory and is not appealable. Hence, the failure of the party who opposed the
petition to appeal from said order, or his participation in the proceedings subsequently had, cannot
be construed as a waiver of his objection to the petition for relief so as to preclude his raising the
same question on appeal from the judgment on the merits of the main case. Such a party need not
repeat his objections to the petition for relief, or perform any act thereafter (e.g., take formal
exception) in order to preserve his right to question the same eventually, on appeal, it being
sufficient for this purpose that he has made of record "the action which he desires the court to take
or his objection to the action of the court and his grounds therefor." 29
Again, the prayer in a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 is not necessarily the same
prayer in the petitioner's complaint, answer or other basic pleading. This should be obvious. Equally
obvious is that once a petition for relief is granted and the judgment subject thereof set aside, and
further proceedings are thereafter had, the Court in its judgment on the merits may properly grant
the relief sought in the petitioner's basic pleadings, although different from that stated in his petition
for relief.
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain." 30 Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with

knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be
purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he
knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. 31 In any event, he had and
has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on
the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were
a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out
militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so acquired
or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share of the
money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of conjugal
funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise. An
equally decisive consideration is that Estelita Padilla is a purchaser in good faith, both the Trial Court
and the Appellate Court having found that Cheesman's own conduct had led her to believe the
property to be exclusive property of the latter's wife, freely disposable by her without his consent or
intervention. An innocent buyer for value, she is entitled to the protection of the law in her purchase,
particularly as against Cheesman, who would assert rights to the property denied him by both letter
and spirit of the Constitution itself.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Gancayco, Grio-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 149615 August 29, 2006
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY ELENA BUENAVENTURA
MULLER, Petitioner,
vs.
HELMUT MULLER, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the February 26, 2001 Decision 2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 affirming with modification the August 12, 1996 Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862, which terminated the

regime of absolute community of property between petitioner and respondent, as well as the
Resolution 4 dated August 13, 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in Hamburg,
Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house owned by
respondents parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines in 1992. By this
time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from his parents which he sold and used the
proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the
construction of a house amounting to P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the
name of petitioner under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 5 of the Register of Deeds of
Marikina, Metro Manila.
Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and maltreatment, the
spouses eventually separated. On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition 6 for separation of
properties before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City.
On August 12, 1996, the trial court rendered a decision which terminated the regime of absolute
community of property between the petitioner and respondent. It also decreed the separation of
properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal properties located within the
country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo
property, the court held that it was acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it
ruled that respondent cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of
Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution. Thus
However, pursuant to Article 92 of the Family Code, properties acquired by gratuitous title by either
spouse during the marriage shall be excluded from the community property. The real property,
therefore, inherited by petitioner in Germany is excluded from the absolute community of property of
the herein spouses. Necessarily, the proceeds of the sale of said real property as well as the
personal properties purchased thereby, belong exclusively to the petitioner. However, the part of that
inheritance used by the petitioner for acquiring the house and lot in this country cannot be recovered
by the petitioner, its acquisition being a violation of Section 7, Article XII of the Constitution which
provides that "save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or
conveyed except to individuals, corporations or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain." The law will leave the parties in the situation where they are in without prejudice to a
voluntary partition by the parties of the said real property. x x x
xxxx
As regards the property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 219438 of the Registry of Deeds
of Marikina, Metro Manila, situated in Antipolo, Rizal and the improvements thereon, the Court shall
not make any pronouncement on constitutional grounds. 7
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which rendered the assailed decision modifying the
trial courts Decision. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of
the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It also considered
petitioners ownership over the property in trust for the respondent. As regards the house, the Court
of Appeals ruled that there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits respondent from acquiring
the same. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision of the lower court dated August 12, 1996 is
hereby MODIFIED. Respondent Elena Buenaventura Muller is hereby ordered to REIMBURSE the
petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the acquisition of the land and the amount of
P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the house situated in Atnipolo, Rizal, deducting therefrom the
amount respondent spent for the preservation, maintenance and development of the aforesaid real
property including the depreciation cost of the house or in the alternative to SELL the house and lot
in the event respondent does not have the means to reimburse the petitioner out of her own money
and from the proceeds thereof, reimburse the petitioner of the cost of the land and the house
deducting the expenses for its maintenance and preservation spent by the respondent. Should there
be profit, the same shall be divided in proportion to the equity each has over the property. The case
is REMANDED to the lower court for reception of evidence as to the amount claimed by the
respondents for the preservation and maintenance of the property.
SO ORDERED. 8
Hence, the instant petition for review raising the following issues:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT HEREIN IS ENTITLED TO REIMBURSEMENT OF THE AMOUNT USED TO
PURCHASE THE LAND AS WELL AS THE COSTS FOR THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HOUSE,
FOR IN SO RULING, IT INDIRECTLY ALLOWED AN ACT DONE WHICH OTHERWISE COULD
NOT BE DIRECTLY x x x DONE, WITHOUT DOING VIOLENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PROSCRIPTION THAT AN ALIEN IS PROHIBITED FROM ACQUIRING OWNERSHIP OF REAL
PROPERTIES LOCATED IN THE PHILIPPINES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF
ACTION WHICH IS ACTUALLY A DESPERATE ATTEMPT TO OBTAIN OWNERSHIP OVER THE
LOT IN QUESTION, CLOTHED UNDER THE GUISE OF CLAIMING REIMBURSEMENT.
Petitioner contends that respondent, being an alien, is disqualified to own private lands in the
Philippines; that respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition but circumvented the same;
and that respondents purpose for filing an action for separation of property is to obtain exclusive
possession, control and disposition of the Antipolo property.
Respondent claims that he is not praying for transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property but
merely reimbursement; that the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his
marriage to petitioner; that the funds were given to petitioner in trust; and that equity demands that
respondent should be reimbursed of his personal funds.
The issue for resolution is whether respondent is entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the
acquisition of the Antipolo property.
The petition has merit.
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution states:

Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, are disqualified from acquiring lands of the public
domain. Hence, they are also disqualified from acquiring private lands. 9 The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony. In the case of Krivenko v.
Register of Deeds, 10 the Court held:
Under section 1 of Article XIII of the Constitution, "natural resources, with the exception of public
agricultural land, shall not be alienated," and with respect to public agricultural lands, their alienation
is limited to Filipino citizens. But this constitutional purpose conserving agricultural resources in the
hands of Filipino citizens may easily be defeated by the Filipino citizens themselves who may
alienate their agricultural lands in favor of aliens. It is partly to prevent this result that section 5 is
included in Article XIII, and it reads as follows:
"Sec. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural land will be transferred or
assigned except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain in the Philippines."
This constitutional provision closes the only remaining avenue through which agricultural resources
may leak into aliens hands. It would certainly be futile to prohibit the alienation of public agricultural
lands to aliens if, after all, they may be freely so alienated upon their becoming private agricultural
lands in the hands of Filipino citizens. x x x
xxxx
If the term "private agricultural lands" is to be construed as not including residential lots or lands not
strictly agricultural, the result would be that "aliens may freely acquire and possess not only
residential lots and houses for themselves but entire subdivisions, and whole towns and cities," and
that "they may validly buy and hold in their names lands of any area for building homes, factories,
industrial plants, fisheries, hatcheries, schools, health and vacation resorts, markets, golf courses,
playgrounds, airfields, and a host of other uses and purposes that are not, in appellants words,
strictly agricultural." (Solicitor Generals Brief, p. 6.) That this is obnoxious to the conservative spirit
of the Constitution is beyond question.
Respondent was aware of the constitutional prohibition and expressly admitted his knowledge
thereof to this Court. 11 He declared that he had the Antipolo property titled in the name of petitioner
because of the said prohibition. 12 His attempt at subsequently asserting or claiming a right on the
said property cannot be sustained.
The Court of Appeals erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of
law in view of petitioners marriage to respondent. Save for the exception provided in cases of
hereditary succession, respondents disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is absolute.
Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in violation of an
existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who is
guilty of the fraud. 13 To hold otherwise would allow circumvention of the constitutional prohibition.
Invoking the principle that a court is not only a court of law but also a court of equity, is likewise
misplaced. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done
indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. 14 He who seeks equity must do
equity, and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands. The latter is a frequently stated
maxim which is also expressed in the principle that he who has done inequity shall not have equity.

It signifies that a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has
been inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful as to the controversy in issue. 15
Thus, in the instant case, respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition.
Further, the distinction made between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is a
futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit respondent to
enjoy the fruits of a property which he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is likewise proscribed by law.
As expressly held in Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court: 16
Finally, the fundamental law prohibits the sale to aliens of residential land. Section 14, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution ordains that, "Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private land shall be
transferred or conveyed except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or
hold lands of the public domain." Petitioner Thomas Cheesman was, of course, charged with
knowledge of this prohibition. Thus, assuming that it was his intention that the lot in question be
purchased by him and his wife, he acquired no right whatever over the property by virtue of that
purchase; and in attempting to acquire a right or interest in land, vicariously and clandestinely, he
knowingly violated the Constitution; the sale as to him was null and void. In any event, he had and
has no capacity or personality to question the subsequent sale of the same property by his wife on
the theory that in so doing he is merely exercising the prerogative of a husband in respect of
conjugal property. To sustain such a theory would permit indirect controversion of the constitutional
prohibition. If the property were to be declared conjugal, this would accord to the alien husband a not
insubstantial interest and right over land, as he would then have a decisive vote as to its transfer or
disposition. This is a right that the Constitution does not permit him to have.
As already observed, the finding that his wife had used her own money to purchase the property
cannot, and will not, at this stage of the proceedings be reviewed and overturned. But even if it were
a fact that said wife had used conjugal funds to make the acquisition, the considerations just set out
to militate, on high constitutional grounds, against his recovering and holding the property so
acquired, or any part thereof. And whether in such an event, he may recover from his wife any share
of the money used for the purchase or charge her with unauthorized disposition or expenditure of
conjugal funds is not now inquired into; that would be, in the premises, a purely academic exercise.
(Emphasis added)
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated
February 26, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59321 ordering petitioner Elena
Buenaventura Muller to reimburse respondent Helmut Muller the amount of P528,000 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000 for the construction of the house in Antipolo
City, and the Resolution dated August 13, 2001 denying reconsideration thereof, are REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The August 12, 1996 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
86 in Civil Case No. Q-94-21862 terminating the regime of absolute community between the
petitioner and respondent, decreeing a separation of property between them and ordering the
partition of the personal properties located in the Philippines equally, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 159310

February 24, 2009

CAMILO F. BORROMEO, Petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIETTA O. DESCALLAR, Respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
What are the rights of an alien (and his successor-in-interest) who acquired real properties in the
country as against his former Filipina girlfriend in whose sole name the properties were registered
under the Torrens system?
The facts are as follows:
Wilhelm Jambrich, an Austrian, arrived in the Philippines in 1983 after he was assigned by his
employer, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G., an Austrian company, to work at a project in Mindoro. In
1984, he transferred to Cebu and worked at the Naga II Project of the National Power Corporation.
There, he met respondent Antonietta Opalla-Descallar, a separated mother of two boys who was
working as a waitress at St. Moritz Hotel. Jambrich befriended respondent and asked her to tutor
him in English. In dire need of additional income to support her children, respondent agreed. The
tutorials were held in Antoniettas residence at a squatters area in Gorordo Avenue.
Jambrich and respondent fell in love and decided to live together in a rented house in Hernan
Cortes, Mandaue City. Later, they transferred to their own house and lots at Agro-Macro
Subdivision, Cabancalan, Mandaue City. In the Contracts to Sell dated November 18, 19851 and
March 10, 19862 covering the properties, Jambrich and respondent were referred to as the buyers. A
Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 19873 was likewise issued in their favor. However, when
the Deed of Absolute Sale was presented for registration before the Register of Deeds, registration
was refused on the ground that Jambrich was an alien and could not acquire alienable lands of the
public domain. Consequently, Jambrichs name was erased from the document. But it could be
noted that his signature remained on the left hand margin of page 1, beside respondents signature
as buyer on page 3, and at the bottom of page 4 which is the last page. Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 over the properties were issued in respondents name alone.
Jambrich also formally adopted respondents two sons in Sp. Proc. No. 39-MAN,4 and per Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City dated May 5, 1988.5
However, the idyll lasted only until April 1991. By then, respondent found a new boyfriend while
Jambrich began to live with another woman in Danao City. Jambrich supported respondents sons
for only two months after the break up.
Jambrich met petitioner Camilo F. Borromeo sometime in 1986. Petitioner was engaged in the real
estate business. He also built and repaired speedboats as a hobby. In 1989, Jambrich purchased an
engine and some accessories for his boat from petitioner, for which he became indebted to the latter
for about P150,000.00. To pay for his debt, he sold his rights and interests in the Agro-Macro
properties to petitioner for P250,000, as evidenced by a "Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment."6 On
July 26, 1991, when petitioner sought to register the deed of assignment, he discovered that titles to
the three lots have been transferred in the name of respondent, and that the subject property has
already been mortgaged.

On August 2, 1991, petitioner filed a complaint against respondent for recovery of real property
before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City. Petitioner alleged that the Contracts to Sell dated
November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 16, 1987
over the properties which identified both Jambrich and respondent as buyers do not reflect the true
agreement of the parties since respondent did not pay a single centavo of the purchase price and
was not in fact a buyer; that it was Jambrich alone who paid for the properties using his exclusive
funds; that Jambrich was the real and absolute owner of the properties; and, that petitioner acquired
absolute ownership by virtue of the Deed of Absolute Sale/Assignment dated July 11, 1991 which
Jambrich executed in his favor.
In her Answer, respondent belied the allegation that she did not pay a single centavo of the
purchase price. On the contrary, she claimed that she "solely and exclusively used her own personal
funds to defray and pay for the purchase price of the subject lots in question," and that Jambrich,
being an alien, was prohibited to acquire or own real property in the Philippines.
At the trial, respondent presented evidence showing her alleged financial capacity to buy the
disputed property with money from a supposed copra business. Petitioner, in turn, presented
Jambrich as his witness and documentary evidence showing the substantial salaries which Jambrich
received while still employed by the Austrian company, Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.
In its decision, the court a quo found
Evidence on hand clearly show that at the time of the purchase and acquisition of [the] properties
under litigation that Wilhelm Jambrich was still working and earning much. This fact of Jambrich
earning much is not only supported by documentary evidence but also by the admission made by
the defendant Antoniet[t]a Opalla. So that, Jambrichs financial capacity to acquire and purchase the
properties . . . is not disputed.7
xxx
On the other hand, evidence . . . clearly show that before defendant met Jambrich sometime in the
latter part of 1984, she was only working as a waitress at the St. Moritz Hotel with an income
of P1,000.00 a month and was . . . renting and living only in . . . [a] room at . . . [a] squatter area at
Gorordo Ave., Cebu City; that Jambrich took pity of her and the situation of her children that he
offered her a better life which she readily accepted. In fact, this miserable financial situation of hers
and her two children . . . are all stated and reflected in the Child Study Report dated April 20, 1983
(Exhs. "G" and "G-1") which facts she supplied to the Social Worker who prepared the same when
she was personally interviewed by her in connection with the adoption of her two children by Wilhelm
Jambrich. So that, if such facts were not true because these are now denied by her . . . and if it was
also true that during this time she was already earning as much as P8,000.00 to P9,000.00 as profit
per month from her copra business, it would be highly unbelievable and impossible for her to be
living only in such a miserable condition since it is the observation of this Court that she is not only
an extravagant but also an expensive person and not thrifty as she wanted to impress this Court in
order to have a big saving as clearly shown by her actuation when she was already cohabiting and
living with Jambrich that according to her . . . the allowance given . . . by him in the amount of
$500.00 a month is not enough to maintain the education and maintenance of her children.8
This being the case, it is highly improbable and impossible that she could acquire the properties
under litigation or could contribute any amount for their acquisition which according to her is worth
more than P700,000.00 when while she was working as [a] waitress at St. Moritz Hotel
earning P1,000.00 a month as salary and tips of more or less P2,000.00 she could not even provide
[for] the daily needs of her family so much so that it is safe to conclude that she was really in

financial distress when she met and accepted the offer of Jambrich to come and live with him
because that was a big financial opportunity for her and her children who were already abandoned
by her husband.9
xxx
The only probable and possible reason why her name appeared and was included in [the contracts
to sell dated November 18, 1985 and March 10, 1986 and finally, the deed of absolute sale dated
November 16, 1987] as buyer is because as observed by the Court, she being a scheming and
exploitive woman, she has taken advantage of the goodness of Jambrich who at that time was still
bewitched by her beauty, sweetness, and good attitude shown by her to him since he could still very
well provide for everything she needs, he being earning (sic) much yet at that time. In fact, as
observed by this Court, the acquisition of these properties under litigation was at the time when their
relationship was still going smoothly and harmoniously.10 [Emphasis supplied.]
The dispositive portion of the Decision states:
WHEREFORE, . . . Decision is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant
Antoniet[t]a Opalla by:
1) Declaring plaintiff as the owner in fee simple over the residential house of strong materials
and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5 which are covered by TCT Nos.
24790, 24791 and 24792 issued by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
2) Declaring as null and void TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and 24792 issued in the name of
defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar by the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City;
3) Ordering the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to cancel TCT Nos. 24790, 24791 and
24792 in the name of defendant Antoniet[t]a Descallar and to issue new ones in the name of
plaintiff Camilo F. Borromeo;
4) Declaring the contracts now marked as Exhibits "I," "K" and "L" as avoided insofar as they
appear to convey rights and interests over the properties in question to the defendant
Antoniet[t]a Descallar;
5) Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the amount of P25,000.00 and
litigation expenses in the amount of P10,000.00; and,
6) To pay the costs.11
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated April 10, 2002,12 the appellate
court reversed the decision of the trial court. In ruling for the respondent, the Court of Appeals held:
We disagree with the lower courts conclusion. The circumstances involved in the case cited by the
lower court and similar cases decided on by the Supreme Court which upheld the validity of the title
of the subsequent Filipino purchasers are absent in the case at bar. It should be noted that in said
cases, the title to the subject property has been issued in the name of the alien transferee (Godinez
et al., vs. Fong Pak Luen et al., 120 SCRA 223 citing Krivenko vs. Register of Deeds of Manila, 79
Phils. 461; United Church Board for World Ministries vs. Sebastian, 159 SCRA 446, citing the case
of Sarsosa Vda. De Barsobia vs. Cuenco, 113 SCRA 547; Tejido vs. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78). In

the case at bar, the title of the subject property is not in the name of Jambrich but in the name of
defendant-appellant. Thus, Jambrich could not have transferred a property he has no title thereto.13
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioner assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DISREGARDING
RESPONDENTS JUDICIAL ADMISSION AND OTHER OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE
ESTABLISHING JAMBRICHS PARTICIPATION, INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP OF THE
PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AS FOUND BY THE HONORABLE TRIAL COURT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT JAMBRICH
HAS NO TITLE TO THE PROPERTIES IN QUESTION AND MAY NOT THEREFORE TRANSFER
AND ASSIGN ANY RIGHTS AND INTERESTS IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN REVERSING THE WELLREASONED DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT AND IN IMPOSING DOUBLE COSTS AGAINST
HEREIN PETITIONER (THEN, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE).14
First, who purchased the subject properties?
The evidence clearly shows, as pointed out by the trial court, who between respondent and Jambrich
possesses the financial capacity to acquire the properties in dispute. At the time of the acquisition of
the properties in 1985 to 1986, Jambrich was gainfully employed at Simmering-Graz Panker A.G.,
an Austrian company. He was earning an estimated monthly salary of P50,000.00. Then, Jambrich
was assigned to Syria for almost one year where his monthly salary was approximately P90,000.00.
On the other hand, respondent was employed as a waitress from 1984 to 1985 with a monthly salary
of not more than P1,000.00. In 1986, when the parcels of land were acquired, she was unemployed,
as admitted by her during the pre-trial conference. Her allegations of income from a copra business
were unsubstantiated. The supposed copra business was actually the business of her mother and
their family, with ten siblings. She has no license to sell copra, and had not filed any income tax
return. All the motorized bancas of her mother were lost to fire, and the last one left standing was
already scrap. Further, the Child Study Report15 submitted by the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) in the adoption proceedings of respondents two sons by Jambrich disclosed
that:
Antonietta tried all types of job to support the children until she was accepted as a waitress at St.
Moritz Restaurant in 1984. At first she had no problem with money because most of the customers
of St. Moritz are (sic) foreigners and they gave good tips but towards the end of 1984 there were no
more foreigners coming because of the situation in the Philippines at that time. Her financial problem
started then. She was even renting a small room in a squatters area in Gorordo Ave., Cebu City. It
was during her time of great financial distress that she met Wilhelm Jambrich who later offered her a
decent place for herself and her children.16
The DSWD Home Study Report17 further disclosed that:

[Jambrich] was then at the Restaurant of St. Moritz when he saw Antonietta Descallar, one of the
waitresses of the said Restaurants. He made friends with the girl and asked her to tutor him in [the]
English language. Antonietta accepted the offer because she was in need of additional income to
support [her] 2 young children who were abandoned by their father. Their session was agreed to be
scheduled every afternoon at the residence of Antonietta in the squatters area in Gorordo Avenue,
Cebu City. The Austrian was observing the situation of the family particularly the children who were
malnourished. After a few months sessions, Mr. Jambrich offered to transfer the family into a decent
place. He told Antonietta that the place is not good for the children. Antonietta who was miserable
and financially distressed at that time accepted the offer for the sake of the children.18
Further, the following additional pieces of evidence point to Jambrich as the source of fund used to
purchase the three parcels of land, and to construct the house thereon:
(1) Respondent Descallar herself affirmed under oath, during her re-direct examination and
during the proceedings for the adoption of her minor children, that Jambrich was the owner
of the properties in question, but that his name was deleted in the Deed of Absolute Sale
because of legal constraints. Nonetheless, his signature remained in the deed of sale, where
he signed as buyer.
(2) The money used to pay the subject parcels of land in installments was in postdated
checks issued by Jambrich. Respondent has never opened any account with any bank.
Receipts of the installment payments were also in the name of Jambrich and respondent.
(3) In 1986-1987, respondent lived in Syria with Jambrich and her two children for ten
months, where she was completely under the support of Jambrich.
(4) Jambrich executed a Last Will and Testament, where he, as owner, bequeathed the
subject properties to respondent.
Thus, Jambrich has all authority to transfer all his rights, interests and participation over the subject
properties to petitioner by virtue of the Deed of Assignment he executed on July 11, 1991.
Well-settled is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of fact of the trial court are
accorded great weight and respect, if not finality by this Court, subject to a number of exceptions. In
the instant case, we find no reason to disturb the factual findings of the trial court. Even the appellate
court did not controvert the factual findings of the trial court. They differed only in their conclusions of
law.
Further, the fact that the disputed properties were acquired during the couples cohabitation also
does not help respondent. The rule that co-ownership applies to a man and a woman living
exclusively with each other as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage, but are otherwise
capacitated to marry each other, does not apply.19 In the instant case, respondent was still legally
married to another when she and Jambrich lived together. In such an adulterous relationship, no coownership exists between the parties. It is necessary for each of the partners to prove his or her
actual contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be able to lay claim to any portion of it.
Presumptions of co-ownership and equal contribution do not apply.20
Second, we dispose of the issue of registration of the properties in the name of respondent alone.
Having found that the true buyer of the disputed house and lots was the Austrian Wilhelm Jambrich,
what now is the effect of registration of the properties in the name of respondent?

It is settled that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership.21 It is only a means of confirming
the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.22 Certificates of title are not a source of right.
The mere possession of a title does not make one the true owner of the property. Thus, the mere
fact that respondent has the titles of the disputed properties in her name does not necessarily,
conclusively and absolutely make her the owner. The rule on indefeasibility of title likewise does not
apply to respondent. A certificate of title implies that the title is quiet,23and that it is perfect, absolute
and indefeasible.24 However, there are well-defined exceptions to this rule, as when the transferee is
not a holder in good faith and did not acquire the subject properties for a valuable
consideration.25 This is the situation in the instant case. Respondent did not contribute a single
centavo in the acquisition of the properties. She had no income of her own at that time, nor did she
have any savings. She and her two sons were then fully supported by Jambrich.
Respondent argued that aliens are prohibited from acquiring private land. This is embodied in
Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,26 which is basically a reproduction of Section 5, Article
XIII of the 1935 Constitution,27 and Section 14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution.28 The capacity to
acquire private land is dependent on the capacity "to acquire or hold lands of the public domain."
Private land may be transferred only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain." Only Filipino citizens or corporations at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by
Filipinos are qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. Thus, as the rule now stands,
the fundamental law explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands,
except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former natural-born
citizen.29
Therefore, in the instant case, the transfer of land from Agro-Macro Development Corporation to
Jambrich, who is an Austrian, would have been declared invalid if challenged, had not Jambrich
conveyed the properties to petitioner who is a Filipino citizen. In United Church Board for World
Ministries v. Sebastian,30 the Court reiterated the consistent ruling in a number of cases31 that if land
is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently becomes a Filipino citizen or transfers it to a
Filipino, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of the transferee is
rendered valid. Applying United Church Board for World Ministries, the trial court ruled in favor of
petitioner, viz.:
[W]hile the acquisition and the purchase of (sic) Wilhelm Jambrich of the properties under litigation
[were] void ab initio since [they were] contrary to the Constitution of the Philippines, he being a
foreigner, yet, the acquisition of these properties by plaintiff who is a Filipino citizen from him, has
cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of the transferee is valid.
The trial court upheld the sale by Jambrich in favor of petitioner and ordered the cancellation of the
TCTs in the name of respondent. It declared petitioner as owner in fee simple of the residential
house of strong materials and three parcels of land designated as Lot Nos. 1, 3 and 5, and ordered
the Register of Deeds of Mandaue City to issue new certificates of title in his name. The trial court
likewise ordered respondent to pay petitioner P25,000 as attorneys fees and P10,000 as litigation
expenses, as well as the costs of suit.
We affirm the Regional Trial Court.
The rationale behind the Courts ruling in United Church Board for World Ministries, as reiterated in
subsequent cases,32 is this since the ban on aliens is intended to preserve the nations land for
future generations of Filipinos, that aim is achieved by making lawful the acquisition of real estate by
aliens who became Filipino citizens by naturalization or those transfers made by aliens to Filipino
citizens. As the property in dispute is already in the hands of a qualified person, a Filipino citizen,

there would be no more public policy to be protected. The objective of the constitutional provision to
keep our lands in Filipino hands has been achieved.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R.
CV No. 42929 dated April 10, 2002 and its Resolution dated July 8, 2003 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Mandaue City in Civil Case No. MAN-1148 is
REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 132963 September 10, 1998

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, (represented by Opol National Secondary Technical
School), petitioner,
vs.
NICANOR DOLDOL, respondent.

ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court and dismissing herein petitioner's complaint, as well as its resolution of March 5, 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The facts are as follows:

Sometime in 1959, respondent Nicanor Doldol occupied a portion of land in Barrio Pontacan,
Municipality of Opol, Misamis Oriental. On October 23, 1963, he filed an application for saltwork
purposes for the said area with the Bureau of Forest Development. The Director of Forestry,
however, rejected the same on April 1, 1968. Meanwhile, the Provincial Board of Misamis Oriental
passed a resolution in 1965 reserving Lot 4932, Cad-237, Opol Cadastre as a school site. This
reserved lot unfortunately included the area occupied by Doldol.
In accordance with said resolution, the Opol High School transferred to the site in 1970. Seventeen
years later, on November 2, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 180
reserving the area, including the portion in dispute, for the Opol High School, now renamed the Opol
National Secondary Technical School (hereafter Opol National School). Needing the area occupied
by Doldol for its intended projects, the school made several demands for him to vacate said portion,
but he refused to move.
In view of Doldol's refusal to vacate, Opol National School filed in 1991 a complaint for accion
possessoria with the Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. The trial court ruled in the school's
favor and ordered Doldol to vacate the land. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision

of the court a quo, ruling that Doldol was entitled to the portion he occupied, he having possessed
the same for thirty-two years, from 1959 up to the time of the filing of the complaint in 1991.
Opol National School's motion for reconsideration of said decision having been denied by the Court
of Appeals in its resolution of March 5, 1998, Opol National School elevated its case to this Court,
claiming that the Court of Appeals erred on a question of law when it held, contrary to the evidence
on record, that respondent had been in open, continuous, notorious and exclusive possession of the
land in dispute for thirty-two years.
The petition is meritorious.
In ruling in Doldol's favor, the Court of Appeals grounded its decision on Section 48 of
Commonwealth Act No. 141 (otherwise known as the Public Land Act). Said provision, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1942, provides as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected
or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of
the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the
issuance of a certification of title therefor under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. (Emphasis
ours)
In accordance with the above provision, the appellate court averred that a citizen of the Philippines
may acquire alienable land of the public domain if he has possessed the same for thirty years.
Finding Doldol to have occupied the disputed lot for thirty-two years, it ruled that the former had
acquired ownership of the same, thereby negating Opol National School's claim over the questioned
area.
To further bolster its argument, the appellate court cited Republic vs.
CA 1 where this Court, citing Director of Lands vs. Iglesia ni Cristo, 200 SCRA 606 (1991) declared that:
The weight of authority is that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of
alienable public land for the period prescribed by law creates the legal fiction
whereby the land upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and without the
need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private
property.
xxx xxx xxx

. . . with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for more than 30 years since
1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land has vested
on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land.
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing
provision are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation
of law, a right to a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of
title being issued. The land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond
the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.The application for confirmation is
mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as
would he evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent.
The appellate court has resolved the question as to who between the parties had a better right to
possess the lot through the erroneous application of an outdated version of Section 48 of the Public
Land Act. Likewise, Solicitor Renan E. Ramos of the Office of the Solicitor General erred in
assuming that the thirty-year proviso in the aforementioned section was still good law. The original
Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of the public domain
since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by R.A. No. 1942, 2 whichprovided for a simple thirty year
prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The same,
however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977.
As amended, Section 48(b) now reads:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter. (Emphasis ours)
Thus, in the aforecited Republic vs. CA case, we stated that the Public Land Act requires that the
applicant must prove (a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
The evidence presented shows that the land in dispute is alienable and disposable, in accordance
with the District Forester's Certification dated September 20, 1978, that the subject area is within
Project 8, an alienable and disposable tract of public land, as appearing in Bureau of Forest Land
Classification Map No. 585. Doldol, thus, meets the first requirement.
The parties, however, stipulated during the pre-trial hearing that Doldol had been occupying the
portion reserved for the school site only since 1959. The law, as presently phrased, requires that
possession of lands of the pubic domain must be from June 12, 1945 or earlier, for the same to be
acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Consequently, Doldol could not have acquired an imperfect title to the disputed lot since his
occupation of the same started only in 1959, much later than June 12, 1945. Not having complied
with the conditions set by law, Doldol cannot be said to have acquired a right to the land in question
as to segregate the same from the public domain. Doldol cannot, therefore, assert a right superior to
the school, given that then President Corazon Aquino had reserved the lot for Opol National School.
As correctly pointed out by the Solicitor General:
(T)he privilege of occupying public lands with a view of preemption confers no
contractual or vested right in the lands occupied and the authority of the President to
withdraw such lands for sale or acquisition by the public, or to reserve them for public
use, prior to the divesting by the government of title thereof stands, even though this
may defeat the imperfect right of a settler. Lands covered by reservation are not
subject to entry, and no lawful settlement on them can be acquired. 3
In sum, Opol National School has the better right of possession over the land in dispute.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 27, 1997,
and Resolution dated March 27, 1998, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court dated August 25, 1992, is hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-36637 July 14, 1978
GENEROSO MENDOZA, substituted by his wife and administratrix DIEGA DE LEON VDA. DE
MENDOZA,petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, DANIEL GOLE CRUZ and DOLORES
MENDOZA, respondents.
Demetrio B. Encarnacion & Carlos J. Antiporda for petitioner.
Norberto S. Gonzalez for private respondents.

SANTOS, J.:
This petition for review by certiorari seeks the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals * dated
February 27, 1973 in CA-G.R. No. 46581-R entitled "Generoso Mendoza, applicants", applicant-appellee vs. Daniel Gole Cruz, et
al., movant, which upheld the registration in the names of herein private respondents, purchasers of the landholdings subject matter of an
application for registration, notwithstanding that they were not parties in the original registration proceedings.

Relevant antecedent facts follow. On May 15, 1964, Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, 1 filed with
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application for the registration of two parcels of land, with a
residential house thereon, situated in the Poblacion of Sta. Maria Bulacan. A notice was issued on
December 3, 1964 setting the date of initial hearing on June 18, 1965. Said notice was duly published,
posted and served but nobody appeared nor filed an answer or opposition within the period allowed for
that purpose. Consequently, the registration court entered on July 6, 1965, an order of general default
and allowed the applicant to present his evidence ex-parte. 2

From the evidence presented by applicant Generoso Mendoza, herein petitioner, it was proven that
he and his wife, Diega de Leon, were the owners of the parcels of land subject of the application but
the same were sold by them, during the pendency of the case, to the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and
Dolores Mendoza, herein private respondents, subject to the vendors' usufructuary rights. The
instrument embodying such sale was presented as Exhibit 1. On the basis of such evidence, the
registration court rendered a decision on July 21, 1965, ordering the registration of the two parcels of
land in the names of the vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, subject to the
usufructuary rights of the vendors, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de Leon. On the same day, a
copy of said decision was received by Generoso Mendoza. 3
On November 5, 1965. after the decision had become final, the applicant-vendor, Generoso
Mendoza, filed a motion for the issuance of the decree. On May 16, 1967, Decree No. 114454 was
issued confirming the title to the land of vendees Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, and
ordering the registration of the same in their names, subject to the usufructuary rights of the vendors.
Consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 was issued to spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and
Dolores Mendoza. 4
On April 16, 1968, Generoso Mendoza filed an urgent petition for reconsideration praying that the
decision dated July 21, 1965 and the decree issued pursuant thereto dated May 16, 1967 be set
aside and that Original Certificate of Title No. 03787 be cancelled, on the ground that the vendees,
the registered owners, had failed to pay the purchase price of the lands. 5
The registration court considered said urgent petition for reconsideration as a petition for review of
the decree and issued an order dated September 3, 1968 setting aside its decision, its order for the
issuance of the decree, and the decree of registration, on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction
to order the registration of the lands in the names of the vendees, who were not parties to the
application for registration. Moreover, said court ordered the cancellation of O.C.T. No. 03787 and
directed the registration of the lands in the names of spouses, Generoso Mendoza and Diega de
Leon, subject to the rights of vendees, Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza, stated in the deed of
sale. 6
On September 17, 1968, spouses Cruz and Mendoza moved to reconsider the order, but their
motion was denied on October 17, 1968. On December 19, 1968, said spouses appealed from the
order dated September 3, 1968. On March 11, 1969, Mendoza filed a motion to dismiss the appeal
and on April 10, 1969, the registration court dismissed the appeal. 7
The spouses Cruz and Mendoza then filed with the Court of Appeals a special civil action
for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition, which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 43250-R. The Court
of Appeals on January 5, 1970, ordered the registration court to give due course to the appeal. The
registration court approved the Record on Appeal and forwarded the same to the Court of Appeals
together with all the evidence adduced during the trial.8
Acting on said appeal which was docketed as CA-G.R. No. 46581- R, the Court of Appeals rendered
on February 27, 1973, the decision, subject matter of the present petition for review. It set aside the

order of the land registration court of September 3, 1968 which set aside its decision of July 21,
1965 and the decree issued pursuant thereto. It also denied applicant Mendoza's petition for
reconsideration dated April 15 (filed April 16), 1968, which was considered as a petition for review of
the decree.
Hence, this Petition for Review which alleges that the respondent Court of Appeals erred
1. ... IN HOLDING THAT THE APPELLEE HIMSELF CAUSED THE
REGISTRATION OF THE TITLE TO THE LAND IN QUESTION IN THE NAME OF
THE APPELLANTS.
2. ... IN HOLDING THAT ALTHOUGH THERE WAS NO FORMAL AMENDMENT OF
THE APPLICATION FOR REGISTRATION SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR
THE APPLICANT, THE REGISTRATION COURT COULD LEGALLY ORDER THE
TITLE ISSUED IN THE NAME OF VENDEES BECAUSE THE APPLICANT
HIMSELF PROVIDED THE BASIS FOR ADJUDICATION; AND THAT THE
APPLICATION COULD HAVE BEEN AMENDED TO CONFORM TO THE
EVIDENCE ALREADY ADVANCED BY SUBSTITUTING THE VENDEES FOR THE
SAID APPLICANT.
3. ... IN HOLDING THAT THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WAS NOT
BASED ON FRAUD PERPETRATED ON THE APPELLEE BY THE PRIVATE
RESPONDENT. 9
The foregoing assigned errors question the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals ordering the
registration of the landholdings subject matter of the application for registration in the names of
herein private respondents who are the purchasers of the landholdings, notwithstanding that they
were not parties in the original registration proceedings before the lower court.
In the first assignment of error, the petitioner assails the Court of Appeals' holding that he himself
caused the registration of the land in question in the name of the vendees, the herein private
respondents. But whether or not the petitioner did in fact cause the registration of the land in favor of
private respondents is a question of fact which cannot properly be raised in the present petition for
review inasmuch as Section 2, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court expressly provides that in an appeal
from the Court of Appeals to this Court, only questions of law my be raised. 10 Thus, the finding of the
Court of Appeals that petitioner caused the registration of the land in favor of the private respondents
cannot now be raised in this Appeal much less disturbed by this Court.

However, by petitioner's insistence that he could not be deemed to have caused the registration of
the land in the names of private respondents as he never testified in court having sold the same to
said Private respondents 11he, in effect, invokes the exception to the above-stated rule of
conclusiveness of the Court of Appeals' findings of fact, namely: that the Court of Appeals' finding is
grounded entirely on surmises or conjectures and has no basis in the evidence on
record. 12 Consequently, We are tasked with the e petition of the records of the case to determine the
veracity of petitioner's claim that he never testified in court as having sold the property to the herein
private respondents. And it must here be emphasized that should the records confirm such claim of the
petitioner, the Court of Appeals' holding that he caused the registration of the land in the names of private
respondents would have no basis in the evidence and should, thus, be reversed.

A careful study and consideration of the records of the case, however, belie petitioner's claim that he
did not testify relative to the aforementioned deed of sale. The transcript of the stenographic notes of
the hearing on the application for registration held on July 6, 1965 all too clearly show that petitioner

and his wife testified before the deputed commissioner, Mr. Ricardo Cruz, that they sold the property
sought to be registered to the private respondents. Thus, the records show that petitioner testified as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Valentin:
Q. You said that you are the owners of these two parcels of land
subject matter of this litigation, after you have caused the filing of this
application, was there any transaction that took place with respect to
the same?
A. Yes sir, we have sold these two parcels of land to Daniel Gole
Cruz and his wife Dolores Mendoza.
Q. Showing to you this document which is an original carbon copy of
a deed of sale written in Tagalog and executed and ratified on
October 15, 1964, would you kindly tell this Honorable Court which is
Exhibit I, will you tell this Honorable Court if you know this Exhibit
I? (sic)
A. Yes, sir, that is the carbon copy of the deed of sale I have just
mentioned. 13 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Similarly, applicant-petitioner's wife, Diega de Leon, testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALENTIN:
Q. Do you know the two parcels of land subject matter of this
registration proceedings?
A. Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you know who are now in possession of these properties.
A. We, I, my husband and Daniel Gole Cruz and and his wife,
Dolores Mendoza are in actual possession of the same.
Q. Why are Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza co-possessing
with you these two parcels of land?

A. Because on October 15, 1964, we sold this property to them with

one of the conditions that until my husband and myself or anyone of
us die, we will live with them.14 (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Furthermore, applicant-petitioner even presented the private respondent Daniel Gole Cruz to confirm
the aforesaid sale of the subject property. Thus, Cruz testified as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
ATTY. VALENTIN:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Do you know the property covered by this registration
proceedings?
A. Yes sir.
Q. Why do you know the same?
A. Because we have been living in said place since I got married and
besides, on October 15, 1964, the said two parcels of land were sold
to us by the herein applicant and his wife.
Q. Showing to you this Exhibit 1, would you Identify and tell this
Honorable Court if you know the same?
A. Yes sir, Exhibit I is the carbon original of the deed of sale executed
in our favor. 15(Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Finally, even the registration court itself did not believe applicant-petitioner's claim that he did not
previously cause the registration of the subject property in the names of private respondents. For,
while it granted applicant-petitioner's petition for review of the decree and ordered the re-registration
of the land in his name, the Court, nevertheless, expressly declared in the very same order that:
Generoso Mendoza was the original applicant in this case. At the hearing, he himself
produced evidence that on October 15,1964 he and his wife sold the Land in favor of
the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza for the amount of P6,000.00
payable in installments (Exh. 1). ... 16(Emphasis supplied).
In view of the foregoing, it is crystal clear that the respondent Court of Appeals did not incur any
error when it held that applicant. Petitioner himself caused the registration of the land in the names
of private respondents.
Petitioner, however, insists in his second assignment of error, that the registration court could not
legally order the registration of the land in the names of the vendees-respondents, who were neither
the applicants nor the oppositors in the registration case below. Petitioner overlooks Section 29 of

the Land Registration Act which expressly authorizes the registration of the land subject matter of a
registration proceeding in the name of the buyer or of the person to whom the land has been
conveyed by an instrument executed during the interval of time between the filing of the application
for registration and the issuance of the decree of title, thus
SEC. 29. After the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree of
title by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, the land therein described
may be dealt with and instruments relating thereto shall be recorded in the office of
the register of said at any time before issuance of the decree of title, in the same
manner as if no application had been made. The interested Party may, however,
present such instruments to the Court of First Instance instead of presenting them to
the office of the register of deeds, together with a motion that the same be
considered in relation with the application, and the court after notice to the parties,
shall order such land registered subject to the ecumbrance created by a said
instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of
the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. ...
(Emphasis supplied).
It is clear from the above-quoted provision that the law expressly allows the land subject matter of an
application for registration to be "dealt with", i.e., to be disposed of or encumbered during the interval
of time between the filing of the application and the issuance of the decree of title, and to have the
instruments embodying such disposition or encumbrance presented to the registration court by the
,interested party" for the court to either "order such land registered subject to the encumbrance
created by said instruments, or order the decree of registration issued in the name of the buyer or of
the person to whom the property has been conveyed by said instruments. 17 The law does not require
that the application for registration be amended by substituting the "buyer" or the person to whom the
property has been conveyed" for the applicant. Neither does it require that the "buyer" or the "person to
whom the property has been conveyed" be a party to the case. He may thus be a total stranger to the
land registration proceedings. The only requirements of the law are: (1) that the instrument be presented
to the court by the interested party together with a motion that the same be considered in relation with the
application; and (2) that prior notice be given to the parties to the case. And the peculiar facts and
circumstances obtaining in this case show that these requirements have been complied with.

As heretofore stated, the instrument embodying the sale of the subject property by the petitioner to
the private respondents was duly presented to the registration court for consideration. That the
purpose was to have the land registered in the names of private respondents subject to the
usufructuary rights of petitioner and his wife is explicit in the following facts and circumstances.
Firstly, it was the petitioner himself, the applicant in the registration proceedings, who presented the
deed of sale (Exh. I) to the court and testified before the same that he did sell the land to the private
respondents. This was done by him despite the fact that he could easily have the land registered in
his name as an order of general default had been issued and the hearing on the application for
registration had been conducted EX-PARTE. Secondly, as if to fully convince the court of the fact of
sale, petitioner presented his wife, Diega de Leon, and private respondent, Daniel GolE Cruz, to
confirm the said sale of the land and the stipulated usufructuary rights. Finally, the petitioner even
filed the motion for the issuance of the decree of confirmation of title after having received the
decision of the court ordering the registration of the title to the land in the names of vendeesrespondents, subject to the stipulated usufructuary rights thereby signifying his full assent to the
same.
It is true that no written motion was filed seeking the consideration of the deed of sale in relation with
the application for registration. But the law does not require that the motion accompanying the
presentation of the instrument be in writing. And the above- enumerated acts of the applicantpetitioner and the circumstances surrounding the same accept of no interpretation than that the

applicant-petitioner did in fact move the court to order the registration of the title to the land in the
names of vendees- respondents, subject only to the stipulated usufructuary rights of the petitioner
and his wife. There was, therefore, sufficient compliance with the first requirement of the law.
Anent the second requirement of prior notice to the parties, the relevant fact to be considered is that
an order of general default had been issued prior to the presentation of the deed of sale by the
applicant-petitioner, since nobody filed an opposition to the application for registration. Thus, the
only person who should have been entitled to a notice from the court was the applicant-petitioner
himself, as the only party with a legal standing in the proceedings. In view thereof, no legal objection
to the court's jurisdiction to order the registration of the lands in the names of vendees-respondents
may be interposed on the ground of non-compliance with the requirement of prior notice to the
parties.
Since there was sufficient compliance with the aforestated requirements of the law, respondent
Court of Appeals did not, therefore, err in holding that the lower court had jurisdiction to order the
registration of the lands in the names of vendees-respondents.
The petitioner, finally, contends in a desperate effort to justify the validity of the appealed order of
September 3, 1968 that respondent Court of Appeals erred in holding that he was not the victim
of fraud perpetrated by the vendees, private respondents, herein, who allegedly failed to pay the
purchase price of the landholdings. This is also without merit. Section 38 of the Land Registration
Act provides as follows
SEC. 38. If the court after hearing finds that the applicant or adverse claimant has
title as stated in his application or adverse claim and proper for registration, a decree
of confirmation and registration shall be entered. ... Such decree shall not be opened
by reason of the absence, infancy, or other disability of any person affected thereby,
nor by any proceeding in any court for reversing judgments or decree: subject,
however, to the right of any person deprived of land or of any estate or interest
therein by decree of registration obtained by fraud to file in the competent Court of
First Instance a petition for review within one year after entry of the decree provided
no innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest. ... (Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing provision that the only ground upon which a decree of registration may
be set aside is fraud in obtaining the same. In the instant case, applicant-petitioner cannot complain
of fraud in obtaining the decree of registration for as heretofore stated, it was solely upon his
testimony and proof that the lots were ordered registered in the names of the vendees-respondents
and it was also upon his motion that the decree of registration was issued by the lower court. What
the applicant-petitioner actually invokes in this case is not fraud in obtaining the decree of
registration but the alleged failure of the vendees-respondents to pay the purchase price of the
landholdings. But as correctly held by respondent Court of Appeals:
(B)reach of contract is not a ground for a petition for a review. And the registration
court has no jurisdiction to decide the contentious issue of whether or not the deed of
sale, Exh. "1", should be rescinded for the alleged failure of the vendees to pay the
purchase price. The issue on the breach of contract has to be letigated in the
ordinary court. 18
In view of all the foregoing, We hold that the Honorable Court of Appeals did not commit any error in
setting aside the order of the lower court dated September 13, 1968, and thus allowing the
registration of the lots of the names of the vedees, herein private respondents.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 17, 1973 is hereby affirmed with
costs against petitioner.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio and Guererro, * JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concuring:

I concur in the judgment and the main opinion in this case. After all, as I view the whole controversy
here, whether the title of the land in qustion be in the name of the Mendoza or Cruz spouses is of
secondary importance, since the title issued to the latter would anyway carry the appropriate
annotations protective of the rights of the former under the deed of sale and vice-versa. Inasmuch as
the factuality of the sale to the Cruz spouses is beyond dispute and it is evidenced by a public
instrument, it is unquestionable that the title to the property, which is real property, passed to them
upon the execution of the deed of sale and delivery thereof to them. In fact, in recognition of such
transfer of title it is expressly stipulated in the deed that the vendors would retain possession and
usufruct of the properties sold, as long as the total price has not been paid. Thus, the only right that
has remained with the Mendozas is to exact complieance with such conditions of the sale.
The alleged failure of the vendees to pay a single centavo of the price does not, to my mind,
constitute fraud in securing the registration of the property in their names. Worse, the Cruz spouses
were not even parties to the registration proceeding they were not represented therein by
anybody; it was the court that caused such registration at the instance, according to the evidence, of
the petitioner himself. And on this score, I am not ready to assume that Generoso Mendoza did not
actually testify, even as I feel that anyway his recorded testimony denied by him to have been
actually given is hardly indispensable, considering it merely confirmed what is alleged in the
application, qualified by the deed of sale in favor of the Cruz spouses, the authenticity and due
execution of which are, as I have already stated, beyond dispute. The reopening of the decree of
registration by Judge de Borja had no legal basis.
As aptly held in the main opinion, the mere presentation to the court of that deed of sale, in one way
or another, justified the issuance of the title to the respondent, subject to the annotated rights of the
petitioner, in connection with which, if it be true that the stipulated price has not been paid even
partially, I might suggest that all that petitioner or his successor or heirs should do is to file a sworn
manifestation with the register of deeds to such effect, so that together with the provisions of the
deed of sale, the fact of such alleged non-payment may be known to the whole world, so to speak,
for his protection. That protection is as good as if the title were in his name.
In short, I believe there is not much real substance in the controversy before Us. It should be
disposed of in the simplest manner possible. For may part, I am more inclined to leave things as
they are, rather than unnecessarily reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, since for all
practical purposes, it would not make any difference in whose name the title in question is issued.
The respective rights of the parties would remain the same either way.

AQUINO, J., dissenting:

It is not lawful and just that the two lots in litigation should be registered in the names of the spouses
Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza. The registration in their names is not proper because they
did not intervene in the land registration proceeding; they did not defray the expenses thereof, and
they have not paid to Generoso Mendoza, or his widow, Diega de Leon, the sum of P6.000 as the
price of the two lots. The antecedents of Generoso Mendoza's appeal are as follows:
On May 15, 1964 Generoso Mendoza filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application
for the registration of two residential lots, with a total area of 258 square meters, located in the
poblacion of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. He prayed that his title thereto be confirmed and registered.
On October 15, 1964, or during the pendency of the proceeding, Generoso Mendoza and his wife
Diega de Leon, both seventy-five years old, conditionally sold to the Cruz spouses, 25 and 26 years
old, the said residential lots for P6,000 as follows: P1,000 upon the signing of the deed and P1,000
annually until the balance of P5,000 is paid. Among the conditions of the sale is that as long as the
total price had not been paid, the vendors, or the survivor in case one of them died, would retain the
possession and usufruct of the two lots and the house thereon. Upon full payment of the price, the
vendees or either one of them, would take care of the vendors, or the survivor, as if the latter were
the parents of the vendees.
At the hearing, the deed of sale was presented in evidence. Judge Juan de Borja in a decision dated
July 21, 1965, ordered the registration of the two lots in the names of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz
and Dolores Mendoza "subject to the usufructuary rights of the spouses Generoso Mendoza and
Diega de Leon". Lorenzo C. Valentin, who notarized the deed of sale, represented the Mendoza
spouses in the land registration proceeding.
On May 16, 1967, a decree of registration was issued. Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 was
issued to the Cruz spouses. On April 16, 1968, or within one year from the issuance of the decree,
Generoso Mendoza, through another lawyer, filed a motion to set aside the decree and title on the
ground that the Cruz spouses had not paid a single centavo of the price and, "hence, they have dirty
hands". A copy of that motion was personally served upon the Cruz spouses.
Without denying that they had not paid the price, they opposed the motion on the ground that the
decision, which had long become final, could no longer be set aside. Generoso Mendoza, in his
reply, argued that the review of the decree was sought on the ground of fraud and that the deed of
sale had become void for non-payment of the price.
At the hearing of the said motion on May 15, 1968, the old man, Generoso Mendoza, was placed on
the witness stand. He declared that during the hearing of his application for registration he was in the
courtroom but that he did not testify; that only his lawyer, Atty. Valentin and the stenographer were
present at the hearing, and that he did not give his consent to the issuance of the title in the name of
Daniel Gole Cruz.
Judge De Borja, in his order of September 3, 1968, treated the motion as a petition for review under
section 38 of Act No. 496. Realizing that he might have perpetrated an injustice in his decision, when
he ordered the registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses, Judge De Borja set
aside that decision and the decree of registration and ordered that the two lots be registered in the
name of Generoso Mendoza, "subject to the rights of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza" under the aforementioned deed of sale.

The Cruz spouses filed a motion for reconsideration wherein they alleged that they had already paid
P3,000 out of the price of P6,000 (p, 42, Record on Appeal). Judge De Borja denied the motion. The
Cruz spouses appealed. Judge De Borja did not give due course to their appeal. He issued a writ of
execution requiring the register of deeds to cancel the title issued to the Cruz spouses.
However, the Court of Appeals in the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the
Cruz spouses, ordered the lower court to give due course to their appeal (Cruz vs. De Borja, CA-G.
R. No. 43250-R, January 5, 1970).
Later, the Court of Appeals in adjudicating the appeal upheld the registration of the lots in the names
of the Cruz spouses and reversed Judge De Borja's order for the registration of the lots in the name
of Generoso Mendoza (De Leon vs. Gole Cruz, CA-G. R. No. 46581-R, February 27, 1973, per
Fernandez, J., Concepcion Jr. and Gancayco, JJ., concurring). Diega de Leon, in substitution for her
deceased husband, Generoso Mendoza, appealed to this Court.
The Court of Appeals assumed that at the hearing of Generoso Miss. Mendoza's application on July
6, 1965, the Mendoza spouses testified that they sold the two lots to Daniel Gole Cruz. According to
the Cruz spouses, Daniel Gole Cruz supposedly testified also at the hearing on July 17, 1965 (pp.
83-84, Record on Appeal).
However, as already noted, Generoso Mendoza at the hearing on May 15, 1968 of his motion to set
aside the decree and the title testified that he was never interrogated, meaning that he did not take
the witness stand at the hearing of his application for registration, and that only his counsel, Atty.
Valentin, and the court stenographer were present at the hearing.
We have, therefore, the conflicting versions of the parties as to what transpired at the hearing before
the commissioner of Generoso Mendoza's application for registration and as to whether there has
been any payment of the price for the sale. Generoso Mendoza himself, by testifying that he never
took the witness stand at the hearing of his application, destroyed the basis for the confirmation of
his alleged title to the land or for its registration in the names of the Cruz spouses.
In my opinion the ends of justice would be served by setting aside all the proceedings in the lower
court and holding a rehearing. The Cruz spouses should file a counter-petition in the trial court for
the registration of the two lots in their names on the basis of the deed of sale. The trial court should
ascertain whether the price of the sale had been paid by the this time. (See Vda. de Catindig vs.
Roque, L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83).
At this juncture, it may be stressed that in the deed of sale (which was executed after the land
registration proceeding had been commenced), it was stipulated that, since the two lots were
unregistered, the parties agreed that the deed would be registered in the registry for unregistered
land as provided for in Act No. 3344.
Had the parties intended that the vendees, the Cruz spouses, would be substituted as applicants in
the land registration proceeding, it could easily have been so stipulated in the deed of sale. But no
such stipulation was made. And no move was made by the vendees to have themselves substituted
as applicants maybe because the sale was conditional and they had allegedly not paid any part of
the price. Neither did the vendor, Generoso Mendoza, the applicant in the land registration
proceeding, amend his application after the deed had been signed, by praying that the two lots be
registered in the names of the Cruz spouses. He did not do so because, as already noted, the
stipulation in the deed of sale was that the deed would be registered in the registry for unregistered
land.

Evidently, the registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses was the Idea of the
notary Valentin who acted as counsel of Generoso Mendoza in the land registration proceeding. He
did not bother to get the written consent of the septuagenarian Generoso Mendoza, to the
registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses.
The Cruz spouses never contradicted nor refuted the declaration in court of Generoso Mendoza at
the hearing of his motion to set aside the decree and the title that he never testified during the
hearing of his application and that it was only Atty. Valentin who appeared before the stenographer
during that hearing.
Any practising lawyer who has appeared in hearings before a commissioner deputed by the land
registration court to hear uncontested applications for registration knows that in some instances the
hearings are not conducted in a formal manner; that only the applicant's lawyer and the
stenographer are usually present; that the deputy clerk of court, as commissioner, or the hearing
officer does not even bother to hear the applicant's testimony, and that the stenographer and the
applicant's lawyer may fabricate the testimonies that appear in the transcript, which usually indicates
that the applicant and his witnesses testified when in truth they did not testify at all. Such
reprehensible practice should be condemned. Trial courts should exercise close supervision over the
hearings of uncontested land registration cases so as not to make a farce or mockery of the hearing.
I vote for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the nullification of all the
proceedings in the lower court and for the holding of a new hearing on the application for registration
of Generoso Mendoza and the counter-petition of the, Cruz spouses as above-indicated.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concuring:
I concur in the judgment and the main opinion in this case. After all, as I view the whole controversy
here, whether the title of the land in qustion be in the name of the Mendoza or Cruz spouses is of
secondary importance, since the title issued to the latter would anyway carry the appropriate
annotations protective of the rights of the former under the deed of sale and vice-versa. Inasmuch as
the factuality of the sale to the Cruz spouses is beyond dispute and it is evidenced by a public
instrument, it is unquestionable that the title to the property, which is real property, passed to them
upon the execution of the deed of sale and delivery thereof to them. In fact, in recognition of such
transfer of title it is expressly stipulated in the deed that the vendors would retain possession and
usufruct of the properties sold, as long as the total price has not been paid. Thus, the only right that
has remained with the Mendozas is to exact complieance with such conditions of the sale.
The alleged failure of the vendees to pay a single centavo of the price does not, to my mind,
constitute fraud in securing the registration of the property in their names. Worse, the Cruz spouses
were not even parties to the registration proceeding they were not represented therein by
anybody; it was the court that caused such registration at the instance, according to the evidence, of
the petitioner himself. And on this score, I am not ready to assume that Generoso Mendoza did not
actually testify, even as I feel that anyway his recorded testimony denied by him to have been
actually given is hardly indispensable, considering it merely confirmed what is alleged in the
application, qualified by the deed of sale in favor of the Cruz spouses, the authenticity and due

execution of which are, as I have already stated, beyond dispute. The reopening of the decree of
registration by Judge de Borja had no legal basis.
As aptly held in the main opinion, the mere presentation to the court of that deed of sale, in one way
or another, justified the issuance of the title to the respondent, subject to the annotated rights of the
petitioner, in connection with which, if it be true that the stipulated price has not been paid even
partially, I might suggest that all that petitioner or his successor or heirs should do is to file a sworn
manifestation with the register of deeds to such effect, so that together with the provisions of the
deed of sale, the fact of such alleged non-payment may be known to the whole world, so to speak,
for his protection. That protection is as good as if the title were in his name.
In short, I believe there is not much real substance in the controversy before Us. It should be
disposed of in the simplest manner possible. For may part, I am more inclined to leave things as
they are, rather than unnecessarily reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals, since for all
practical purposes, it would not make any difference in whose name the title in question is issued.
The respective rights of the parties would remain the same either way.
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
It is not lawful and just that the two lots in litigation should be registered in the names of the spouses
Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores Mendoza. The registration in their names is not proper because they
did not intervene in the land registration proceeding; they did not defray the expenses thereof, and
they have not paid to Generoso Mendoza, or his widow, Diega de Leon, the sum of P6.000 as the
price of the two lots. The antecedents of Generoso Mendoza's appeal are as follows:
On May 15, 1964 Generoso Mendoza filed with the Court of First Instance of Bulacan an application
for the registration of two residential lots, with a total area of 258 square meters, located in the
poblacion of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. He prayed that his title thereto be confirmed and registered.
On October 15, 1964, or during the pendency of the proceeding, Generoso Mendoza and his wife
Diega de Leon, both seventy-five years old, conditionally sold to the Cruz spouses, 25 and 26 years
old, the said residential lots for P6,000 as follows: P1,000 upon the signing of the deed and P1,000
annually until the balance of P5,000 is paid. Among the conditions of the sale is that as long as the
total price had not been paid, the vendors, or the survivor in case one of them died, would retain the
possession and usufruct of the two lots and the house thereon. Upon full payment of the price, the
vendees or either one of them, would take care of the vendors, or the survivor, as if the latter were
the parents of the vendees.
At the hearing, the deed of sale was presented in evidence. Judge Juan de Borja in a decision dated
July 21, 1965, ordered the registration of the two lots in the names of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz
and Dolores Mendoza "subject to the usufructuary rights of the spouses Generoso Mendoza and
Diega de Leon". Lorenzo C. Valentin, who notarized the deed of sale, represented the Mendoza
spouses in the land registration proceeding.
On May 16, 1967, a decree of registration was issued. Original Certificate of Title No. 0-3787 was
issued to the Cruz spouses. On April 16, 1968, or within one year from the issuance of the decree,
Generoso Mendoza, through another lawyer, filed a motion to set aside the decree and title on the
ground that the Cruz spouses had not paid a single centavo of the price and, "hence, they have dirty
hands". A copy of that motion was personally served upon the Cruz spouses.
Without denying that they had not paid the price, they opposed the motion on the ground that the
decision, which had long become final, could no longer be set aside. Generoso Mendoza, in his

reply, argued that the review of the decree was sought on the ground of fraud and that the deed of
sale had become void for non-payment of the price.
At the hearing of the said motion on May 15, 1968, the old man, Generoso Mendoza, was placed on
the witness stand. He declared that during the hearing of his application for registration he was in the
courtroom but that he did not testify; that only his lawyer, Atty. Valentin and the stenographer were
present at the hearing, and that he did not give his consent to the issuance of the title in the name of
Daniel Gole Cruz.
Judge De Borja, in his order of September 3, 1968, treated the motion as a petition for review under
section 38 of Act No. 496. Realizing that he might have perpetrated an injustice in his decision, when
he ordered the registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses, Judge De Borja set
aside that decision and the decree of registration and ordered that the two lots be registered in the
name of Generoso Mendoza, "subject to the rights of the spouses Daniel Gole Cruz and Dolores
Mendoza" under the aforementioned deed of sale.
The Cruz spouses filed a motion for reconsideration wherein they alleged that they had already paid
P3,000 out of the price of P6,000 (p, 42, Record on Appeal). Judge De Borja denied the motion. The
Cruz spouses appealed. Judge De Borja did not give due course to their appeal. He issued a writ of
execution requiring the register of deeds to cancel the title issued to the Cruz spouses.
However, the Court of Appeals in the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus filed by the
Cruz spouses, ordered the lower court to give due course to their appeal (Cruz vs. De Borja, CA-G.
R. No. 43250-R, January 5, 1970).
Later, the Court of Appeals in adjudicating the appeal upheld the registration of the lots in the names
of the Cruz spouses and reversed Judge De Borja's order for the registration of the lots in the name
of Generoso Mendoza (De Leon vs. Gole Cruz, CA-G. R. No. 46581-R, February 27, 1973, per
Fernandez, J., Concepcion Jr. and Gancayco, JJ., concurring). Diega de Leon, in substitution for her
deceased husband, Generoso Mendoza, appealed to this Court.
The Court of Appeals assumed that at the hearing of Generoso Miss. Mendoza's application on July
6, 1965, the Mendoza spouses testified that they sold the two lots to Daniel Gole Cruz. According to
the Cruz spouses, Daniel Gole Cruz supposedly testified also at the hearing on July 17, 1965 (pp.
83-84, Record on Appeal).
However, as already noted, Generoso Mendoza at the hearing on May 15, 1968 of his motion to set
aside the decree and the title testified that he was never interrogated, meaning that he did not take
the witness stand at the hearing of his application for registration, and that only his counsel, Atty.
Valentin, and the court stenographer were present at the hearing.
We have, therefore, the conflicting versions of the parties as to what transpired at the hearing before
the commissioner of Generoso Mendoza's application for registration and as to whether there has
been any payment of the price for the sale. Generoso Mendoza himself, by testifying that he never
took the witness stand at the hearing of his application, destroyed the basis for the confirmation of
his alleged title to the land or for its registration in the names of the Cruz spouses.
In my opinion the ends of justice would be served by setting aside all the proceedings in the lower
court and holding a rehearing. The Cruz spouses should file a counter-petition in the trial court for
the registration of the two lots in their names on the basis of the deed of sale. The trial court should
ascertain whether the price of the sale had been paid by the this time. (See Vda. de Catindig vs.
Roque, L-25777, November 26, 1976, 74 SCRA 83).

At this juncture, it may be stressed that in the deed of sale (which was executed after the land
registration proceeding had been commenced), it was stipulated that, since the two lots were
unregistered, the parties agreed that the deed would be registered in the registry for unregistered
land as provided for in Act No. 3344.
Had the parties intended that the vendees, the Cruz spouses, would be substituted as applicants in
the land registration proceeding, it could easily have been so stipulated in the deed of sale. But no
such stipulation was made. And no move was made by the vendees to have themselves substituted
as applicants maybe because the sale was conditional and they had allegedly not paid any part of
the price. Neither did the vendor, Generoso Mendoza, the applicant in the land registration
proceeding, amend his application after the deed had been signed, by praying that the two lots be
registered in the names of the Cruz spouses. He did not do so because, as already noted, the
stipulation in the deed of sale was that the deed would be registered in the registry for unregistered
land.
Evidently, the registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses was the Idea of the
notary Valentin who acted as counsel of Generoso Mendoza in the land registration proceeding. He
did not bother to get the written consent of the septuagenarian Generoso Mendoza, to the
registration of the two lots in the names of the Cruz spouses.
The Cruz spouses never contradicted nor refuted the declaration in court of Generoso Mendoza at
the hearing of his motion to set aside the decree and the title that he never testified during the
hearing of his application and that it was only Atty. Valentin who appeared before the stenographer
during that hearing.
Any practising lawyer who has appeared in hearings before a commissioner deputed by the land
registration court to hear uncontested applications for registration knows that in some instances the
hearings are not conducted in a formal manner; that only the applicant's lawyer and the
stenographer are usually present; that the deputy clerk of court, as commissioner, or the hearing
officer does not even bother to hear the applicant's testimony, and that the stenographer and the
applicant's lawyer may fabricate the testimonies that appear in the transcript, which usually indicates
that the applicant and his witnesses testified when in truth they did not testify at all. Such
reprehensible practice should be condemned. Trial courts should exercise close supervision over the
hearings of uncontested land registration cases so as not to make a farce or mockery of the hearing.
I vote for the reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and the nullification of all the
proceedings in the lower court and for the holding of a new hearing on the application for registration
of Generoso Mendoza and the counter-petition of the, Cruz spouses as above-indicated.
Footnotes
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179987

September 3, 2013

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN, (Represented by Sally A. Malabanan), Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

RESOLUTION
BERSAMIN, J.:
For our consideration and resolution are the motions for reconsideration of the parties who both
assail the decision promulgated on April 29, 2009, whereby we upheld the ruling of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the application of the petitioners for the registration of a parcel of land situated
in Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite on the ground that they had not established by sufficient evidence
their right to the registration in accordance with either Section 14(1) or Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).
Antecedents
The property subject of the application for registration is a parcel of land situated in Barangay Tibig,
Silang Cavite, more particularly identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, with an area of 71,324-square
meters. On February 20, 1998, applicant Mario Malabanan, who had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco, filed an application for land registration covering the property in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in Tagaytay City, Cavite, claiming that the property formed part of the alienable and
disposable land of the public domain, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, uninterrupted, public and adverse possession and occupation of the land for more than
30 years, thereby entitling him to the judicial confirmation of his title.1
To prove that the property was an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, Malabanan
presented during trial a certification dated June 11, 2001 issued by the Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR), which reads:
This is to certify that the parcel of land designated as Lot No. 9864 Cad 452-D, Silang Cadastre as
surveyed for Mr. Virgilio Velasco located at Barangay Tibig, Silang, Cavite containing an area of
249,734 sq. meters as shown and described on the Plan Ap-04-00952 is verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No.
20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.2
After trial, on December 3, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment granting Malabanans application for
land registration, disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One
Thousand Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical
description now forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the
name of MARIO MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting
Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.3
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the judgment to the CA, arguing that Malabanan
had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public

domain, and that the RTC erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the
manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On February 23, 2007, the CA promulgated its decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application for registration of Malabanan. Citing the ruling in Republic v. Herbieto (Herbieto),4 the CA
declared that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, any period of possession
prior to the classification of the land as alienable and disposable was inconsequential and should be
excluded from the computation of the period of possession. Noting that the CENRO-DENR
certification stated that the property had been declared alienable and disposable only on March 15,
1982, Velazcos possession prior to March 15, 1982 could not be tacked for purposes of computing
Malabanans period of possession.
Due to Malabanans intervening demise during the appeal in the CA, his heirs elevated the CAs
decision of February 23, 2007 to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari.
The petitioners assert that the ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Corazon Naguit5 (Naguit)
remains the controlling doctrine especially if the property involved is agricultural land. In this regard,
Naguit ruled that any possession of agricultural land prior to its declaration as alienable and
disposable could be counted in the reckoning of the period of possession to perfect title under the
Public Land Act (Commonwealth Act No. 141) and the Property Registration Decree. They point out
that the ruling in Herbieto, to the effect that the declaration of the land subject of the application for
registration as alienable and disposable should also date back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, was a
mere obiter dictum considering that the land registration proceedings therein were in fact found and
declared void ab initio for lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing.
The petitioners also rely on the ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.6 to support their argument
that the property had been ipso jure converted into private property by reason of the open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession by their predecessors-in-interest of an alienable
land of the public domain for more than 30 years. According to them, what was essential was that
the property had been "converted" into private property through prescription at the time of the
application without regard to whether the property sought to be registered was previously classified
as agricultural land of the public domain.
As earlier stated, we denied the petition for review on certiorari because Malabanan failed to
establish by sufficient evidence possession and occupation of the property on his part and on the
part of his predecessors-in interest since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
In their motion for reconsideration, the petitioners submit that the mere classification of the land as
alienable or disposable should be deemed sufficient to convert it into patrimonial property of the
State. Relying on the rulings in Spouses De Ocampo v. Arlos,7 Menguito v. Republic8 and Republic
v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,9 they argue that the reclassification of the land as alienable or disposable
opened it to acquisitive prescription under the Civil Code; that Malabanan had purchased the
property from Eduardo Velazco believing in good faith that Velazco and his predecessors-in-interest
had been the real owners of the land with the right to validly transmit title and ownership thereof; that
consequently, the ten-year period prescribed by Article 1134 of the Civil Code, in relation to Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, applied in their favor; and that when Malabanan filed the
application for registration on February 20, 1998, he had already been in possession of the land for
almost 16 years reckoned from 1982, the time when the land was declared alienable and disposable
by the State.

The Republics Motion for Partial Reconsideration

The Republic seeks the partial reconsideration in order to obtain a clarification with reference to the
application of the rulings in Naguit and Herbieto.
Chiefly citing the dissents, the Republic contends that the decision has enlarged, by implication, the
interpretation of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree through judicial legislation. It
reiterates its view that an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Ruling
We deny the motions for reconsideration.
In reviewing the assailed decision, we consider to be imperative to discuss the different
classifications of land in relation to the existing applicable land registration laws of the Philippines.
Classifications of land according to ownership
Land, which is an immovable property,10 may be classified as either of public dominion or of private
ownership.11Land is considered of public dominion if it either: (a) is intended for public use; or (b)
belongs to the State, without being for public use, and is intended for some public service or for the
development of the national wealth.12 Land belonging to the State that is not of such character, or
although of such character but no longer intended for public use or for public service forms part of
the patrimonial property of the State.13 Land that is other than part of the patrimonial property of the
State, provinces, cities and municipalities is of private ownership if it belongs to a private individual.
Pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine (Jura Regalia), a legal concept first introduced into the country
from the West by Spain through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,14 all lands of the
public domain belong to the State.15 This means that the State is the source of any asserted right to
ownership of land, and is charged with the conservation of such patrimony.16
All lands not appearing to be clearly under private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
Also, public lands remain part of the inalienable land of the public domain unless the State is shown
to have reclassified or alienated them to private persons.17

Classifications of public lands

according to alienability
Whether or not land of the public domain is alienable and disposable primarily rests on the
classification of public lands made under the Constitution. Under the 1935 Constitution,18 lands of the
public domain were classified into three, namely, agricultural, timber and mineral.19 Section 10,
Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into seven, specifically,
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest, and grazing
land, with the reservation that the law might provide other classifications. The 1987 Constitution
adopted the classification under the 1935 Constitution into agricultural, forest or timber, and mineral,
but added national parks.20 Agricultural lands may be further classified by law according to the uses
to which they may be devoted.21 The identification of lands according to their legal classification is
done exclusively by and through a positive act of the Executive Department.22

Based on the foregoing, the Constitution places a limit on the type of public land that may be
alienated. Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, only agricultural lands of the public
domain may be alienated; all other natural resources may not be.
Alienable and disposable lands of the State fall into two categories, to wit: (a) patrimonial lands of
the State, or those classified as lands of private ownership under Article 425 of the Civil
Code,23 without limitation; and (b) lands of the public domain, or the public lands as provided by the
Constitution, but with the limitation that the lands must only be agricultural. Consequently, lands
classified as forest or timber, mineral, or national parks are not susceptible of alienation or
disposition unless they are reclassified as agricultural.24 A positive act of the Government is
necessary to enable such reclassification,25 and the exclusive prerogative to classify public lands
under existing laws is vested in the Executive Department, not in the courts.26 If, however, public
land will be classified as neither agricultural, forest or timber, mineral or national park, or when public
land is no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth, thereby
effectively removing the land from the ambit of public dominion, a declaration of such conversion
must be made in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or by a Presidential proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law to that effect.27 Thus, until the Executive
Department exercises its prerogative to classify or reclassify lands, or until Congress or the
President declares that the State no longer intends the land to be used for public service or for the
development of national wealth, the Regalian Doctrine is applicable.
Disposition of alienable public lands
Section 11 of the Public Land Act (CA No. 141) provides the manner by which alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, i.e., agricultural lands, can be disposed of, to wit:
Section 11. Public lands suitable for agricultural purposes can be disposed of only as follows, and
not otherwise:
(1) For homestead settlement;
(2) By sale;
(3) By lease; and
(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;
(a) By judicial legalization; or
(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).
The core of the controversy herein lies in the proper interpretation of Section 11(4), in relation to
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which expressly requires possession by a Filipino citizen of the
land since June 12, 1945, or earlier, viz:
Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title thereafter, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or
earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for confirmation of title, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. (Bold emphasis supplied)
Note that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act used the words "lands of the public domain" or
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain" to clearly signify that lands otherwise
classified, i.e., mineral, forest or timber, or national parks, and lands of patrimonial or private
ownership, are outside the coverage of the Public Land Act. What the law does not include, it
excludes. The use of the descriptive phrase "alienable and disposable" further limits the coverage of
Section 48(b) to only the agricultural lands of the public domain as set forth in Article XII, Section 2
of the 1987 Constitution. Bearing in mind such limitations under the Public Land Act, the applicant
must satisfy the following requirements in order for his application to come under Section 14(1) of
the Property Registration Decree,28 to wit:
1. The applicant, by himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, has been in possession
and occupation of the property subject of the application;
2. The possession and occupation must be open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious;
3. The possession and occupation must be under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership;
4. The possession and occupation must have taken place since June 12, 1945, or earlier;
and
5. The property subject of the application must be an agricultural land of the public domain.
Taking into consideration that the Executive Department is vested with the authority to classify lands
of the public domain, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, in relation to Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree, presupposes that the land subject of the application for registration must have
been already classified as agricultural land of the public domain in order for the provision to apply.
Thus, absent proof that the land is already classified as agricultural land of the public domain, the
Regalian Doctrine applies, and overcomes the presumption that the land is alienable and disposable
as laid down in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. However, emphasis is placed on the
requirement that the classification required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is classification or
reclassification of a public land as agricultural.
The dissent stresses that the classification or reclassification of the land as alienable and disposable
agricultural land should likewise have been made on June 12, 1945 or earlier, because any
possession of the land prior to such classification or reclassification produced no legal effects. It
observes that the fixed date of June 12, 1945 could not be minimized or glossed over by mere
judicial interpretation or by judicial social policy concerns, and insisted that the full legislative intent
be respected.
We find, however, that the choice of June 12, 1945 as the reckoning point of the requisite
possession and occupation was the sole prerogative of Congress, the determination of which should

best be left to the wisdom of the lawmakers. Except that said date qualified the period of possession
and occupation, no other legislative intent appears to be associated with the fixing of the date of
June 12, 1945. Accordingly, the Court should interpret only the plain and literal meaning of the law
as written by the legislators.
Moreover, an examination of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act indicates that Congress
prescribed no requirement that the land subject of the registration should have been classified as
agricultural since June 12, 1945, or earlier. As such, the applicants imperfect or incomplete title is
derived only from possession and occupation since June 12, 1945, or earlier. This means that the
character of the property subject of the application as alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain determines its eligibility for land registration, not the ownership or title over it.
Alienable public land held by a possessor, either personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously and exclusively during the prescribed statutory period is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of the period.29 In fact, by virtue of this doctrine,
corporations may now acquire lands of the public domain for as long as the lands were already
converted to private ownership, by operation of law, as a result of satisfying the requisite period of
possession prescribed by the Public Land Act.30 It is for this reason that the property subject of the
application of Malabanan need not be classified as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain for the entire duration of the requisite period of possession.
To be clear, then, the requirement that the land should have been classified as alienable and
disposable agricultural land at the time of the application for registration is necessary only to dispute
the presumption that the land is inalienable.
The declaration that land is alienable and disposable also serves to determine the point at which
prescription may run against the State. The imperfect or incomplete title being confirmed under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is title that is acquired by reason of the applicants possession
and occupation of the alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain. Where all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government are complied with through actual physical,
open, continuous, exclusive and public possession of an alienable and disposable land of the public
domain, the possessor is deemed to have acquired by operation of law not only a right to a grant,
but a grant by the Government, because it is not necessary that a certificate of title be issued in
order that such a grant be sanctioned by the courts.31
If one follows the dissent, the clear objective of the Public Land Act to adjudicate and quiet titles to
unregistered lands in favor of qualified Filipino citizens by reason of their occupation and cultivation
thereof for the number of years prescribed by law32 will be defeated. Indeed, we should always bear
in mind that such objective still prevails, as a fairly recent legislative development bears out, when
Congress enacted legislation (Republic Act No. 10023)33 in order to liberalize stringent requirements
and procedures in the adjudication of alienable public land to qualified applicants, particularly
residential lands, subject to area limitations.34
On the other hand, if a public land is classified as no longer intended for public use or for the
development of national wealth by declaration of Congress or the President, thereby converting such
land into patrimonial or private land of the State, the applicable provision concerning disposition and
registration is no longer Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act but the Civil Code, in conjunction with
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.35 As such, prescription can now run against the
State.
To sum up, we now observe the following rules relative to the disposition of public land or lands of
the public domain, namely:

(1) As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the public domain
belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under private ownership
are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be alienated or disposed;
(2) The following are excepted from the general rule, to wit:
(a) Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicants possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises,36 and the applicant becomes the
owner of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the
land has already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private
property.37
(b) Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer
intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from
the sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or
lands of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the
modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is
prescription, whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already
converted to private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is
a condition sine qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that
property of the State not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of
prescription.
To reiterate, then, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that they and their
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June 12, 1945. Without satisfying
the requisite character and period of possession - possession and occupation that is open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or earlier - the land cannot be considered
ipso jure converted to private property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and
disposable. Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Likewise, the land
continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues a proclamation declaring the land as
no longer intended for public service or for the development of the national wealth.
1wphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration and the respondent's
Partial Motion for Reconsideration for their lack of merit.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-32266 February 27, 1989

THE DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioner

vs.
RUPERTO A. VILLAREAL, respondent.
The Solicitor General for petitioner.
Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Valmonte, Pena & Marcos for respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic question before the Court is the legal classification of mangrove swamps, or manglares,
as they are commonly known. If they are part of our public forest lands, they are not alienable under
the Constitution. If they are considered public agricultural lands, they may be acquired under private
ownership. The private respondent's claim to the land in question must be judged by these criteria.
The said land consists of 178,113 square meters of mangrove swamps located in the municipality of
Sapian, Capiz. Ruperto Villareal applied for its registration on January 25, 1949, alleging that he and
his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land for more than forty years. He was
opposed by several persons, including the petitioner on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.
After trial, the application was approved by the Court of First Instance. of Capiz. 1 The decision was
affirmed by the Court of Appeals. 2 The Director of Forestry then came to this Court in a petition for review
on certiorari claiming that the land in dispute was forestal in nature and not subject to private
appropriation. He asks that the registration be reversed.

It should be stressed at the outset that both the petitioner and the private respondent agree that the
land is mangrove land. There is no dispute as to this. The bone of contention between the parties is
the legal nature of mangrove swamps or manglares. The petitioner claims, it is forestal and therefore
not disposable and the private respondent insists it is alienable as agricultural land. The issue before
us is legal, not factual.
For a proper background of this case, we have to go back to the Philippine Bill of 1902, one of the
earlier American organic acts in the country. By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three grand divisions, to wit, agricultural, mineral and timber or forest
lands. This classification was maintained in the Constitution of the Commonwealth, promulgated in
1935, until it was superseded by the Constitution of 1973. That new charter expanded the
classification of public lands to include industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, and
grazing lands and even permitted the legislature to provide for other categories. 3 This provision has
been reproduced, but with substantial modifications, in the present Constitution.

Under the Commonwealth Constitution, which was the charter in force when this case arose, only
agricultural lands were allowed to be alienated. 5 Their disposition was provided for under C.A. No. 141.
Mineral and timber or forest lands were not subject to private ownership unless they were first reclassified
as agricultural lands and so released for alienation.

In the leading case of Montano v. Insular Government, 6 promulgated in 1909, mangrove swamps
or manglares were defined by the Court as:

... mud flats, alternately washed and exposed by the tide, in which grows various
kindred plants which will not live except when watered by the sea, extending their
roots deep into the mud and casting their seeds, which also germinate there. These

constitute the mangrove flats of the tropics, which exist naturally, but which are also,
to some extent cultivated by man for the sake of the combustible wood of the
mangrove and like trees as well as for the useful nipa palm propagated thereon.
Although these flats are literally tidal lands, yet we are of the opinion that they cannot
be so regarded in the sense in which that term is used in the cases cited or in
general American jurisprudence. The waters flowing over them are not available for
purpose of navigation, and they may be disposed of without impairment of the public
interest in what remains.
xxx
Under this uncertain and somewhat unsatisfactory condition of the law, the custom
had grown of converting manglares and nipa lands into fisheries which became a
common feature of settlement along the coast and at the same time of the change of
sovereignty constituted one of the most productive industries of the Islands, the
abrogation of which would destroy vested interests and prove a public disaster.
Mangrove swamps were thus considered agricultural lands and so susceptible of private ownership.
Subsequently, the Philippine Legislature categorically declared, despite the above-cited case, that
mangrove swamps form part of the public forests of this country. This it did in the Administrative
Code of 1917, which became effective on October 1 of that year, thus:
Section 1820. Words and phrase defined. - For the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved public land,
including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves of whatever character.
It is noteworthy, though, that notwithstanding this definition, the Court maintained the doctrine in the
Montano case when two years later it held in the case of Jocson v. Director of Forestry: 7
...the words timber land are always translated in the Spanish translation of that Act
(Act of Congress) as terrenos forestales. We think there is an error in this translation
and that a better translation would be 'terrenos madereros.' Lumber land in English
means land with trees growing on it. The mangler plant would never be called a tree
in English but a bush, and land which has only bushes, shrubs or aquatic plants
growing on it cannot be called 'timber land.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that there are a few trees growing in a manglare or nipa swamps does not
change the general character of the land from manglare to timber land.
More to the point, addressing itself directly to above-quoted Section 1820, the Court declared:
'In the case of Mapa vs. Insular Government (10 Phil. Rep., 175), this Court said that
the phrase agricultural lands as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands
acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands.
Whatever may have been the meaning of the term 'forestry' under the Spanish law,
the Act of Congress of July 1st 1902, classifies the public lands in the Philippine
Islands as timber, mineral or agricultural lands, and all public lands that are not

timber or mineral lands are necessarily agricultural public lands, whether they are
used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm lands.
The definition of forestry as including manglares found in the Administrative Code of
1917 cannot affect rights which vested prior to its enactment.
These lands being neither timber nor mineral lands, the trial court should have
considered them agricultural lands. If they are agricultural lands, then the rights of
appellants are fully established by Act No. 926.
The doctrine was reiterated still later in Garchitorena Vda. de Centenera v. Obias, 8 promulgated on
March 4, 1933, more than fifteen years after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1917. Justice
Ostrand declared for a unanimous Court:

The opposition rests mainly upon the proposition that the land covered by the
application there are mangrove lands as shown in his opponent's Exh. 1, but we think
this opposition of the Director of Forestry is untenable, inasmuch as it has been
definitely decided that mangrove lands are not forest lands in the sense in which this
phrase is used in the Act of Congress.
No elaboration was made on this conclusion which was merely based on the cases of Montano and
Jocson. And in 1977, the above ruling was reaffirmed in Tongson v. Director of Forestry, 9 with
Justice Fernando declaring that the mangrove lands in litis were agricultural in nature. The decision even
quoted with approval the statement of the trial court that:

... Mangrove swamps where only trees of mangrove species grow, where the trees
are small and sparse, fit only for firewood purposes and the trees growing are not of
commercial value as lumber do not convert the land into public land. Such lands are
not forest in character. They do not form part of the public domain.
Only last year, in Republic v. De Porkan, 10 the Court, citing Krivenko v. Register of Deeds, 11 reiterated
the ruling in the Mapa case that "all public lands that are not timber or mineral lands are necessarily
agricultural public lands, whether they are used as nipa swamps, manglares, fisheries or ordinary farm
lands.

But the problem is not all that simple. As it happens, there is also a line of decisions holding the
contrary view.
In Yngson v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 12 promulgated in 1983, the Court ruled
"that the Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to dispose of swamp lands or mangrove lands forming
part of the public domain while such lands are still classified as forest lands.

Four months later, in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry, 13 the Court was more positive when
it held, again through Justice Gutierrez:

The Heirs of Jose Amunategui maintain that Lot No. 885 cannot be classified as
forest land because it is not thickly forested but is a 'mangrove swamps.' Although
conceding that 'mangrove swamp' is included in the classification of forest land in
accordance with Section 1820 of the Revised Administrative Code, the petitioners
argue that no big trees classified in Section 1821 of the said Code as first, second
and third groups are found on the land in question. Furthermore, they contend that
Lot 885, even if it is a mangrove swamp, is still subject to land registration

proceedings because the property had been in actual possession of private persons
for many years, and therefore, said land was already 'private land' better adapted
and more valuable for agricultural than for forest purposes and not required by the
public interests to be kept under forest classification.
The petition is without merit.
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such
classification simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest
cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or
planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other farmers. 'Forested lands' do not have
to be on mountains or in out-of-the-way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove
trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be
classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status
and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classsified as 'forest' is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the
rules on confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply.'
The view was maintained in Vallarta v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 14 where this Court agreed with
the Solicitor General's submission that the land in dispute, which he described as "swamp mangrove or
forestal land," were not private properties and so not registerable. This case was decided only twelve
days after the De Porkan case.

Faced with these apparent contradictions, the Court feels there is a need for a categorical
pronouncement that should resolve once and for all the question of whether mangrove swamps are
agricultural lands or forest lands.
The determination of this question is a function initially belonging to the legislature, which has the
authority to implement the constitutional provision classifying the lands of the public domain (and is
now even permitted to provide for more categories of public lands). The legislature having made
such implementation, the executive officials may then, in the discharge of their own role, administer
our public lands pursuant to their constitutional duty " to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed'
and in accordance with the policy prescribed. For their part, the courts will step into the picture if the
rules laid down by the legislature are challenged or, assuming they are valid, it is claimed that they
are not being correctly observed by the executive. Thus do the three departments, coordinating with
each other, pursue and achieve the objectives of the Constitution in the conservation and utilization
of our natural resources.
In C.A. No. 141, the National Assembly delegated to the President of the Philippines the function of
making periodic classifications of public lands, thus:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain
into:
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Lumber, and
(c) Mineral lands,

and may at any time and in a like manner transfer such lands from one class to
another, for the purposes of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or
disposable lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are
open to disposition or concession under this Act.
With particular regard to alienable public lands, Section 9 of the same law provides:
For the purpose of their administration and disposition, the lands of the public domain
alienable or open to disposition shall be classified, according to the use or purposes
to which such lands are destined, as follows:
(a) Agricultural;
(b) Residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes;
(c) Educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; and
(d) Reservations for townsites and for public and quasi-public uses.
The President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources, shall from time to time make the classifications provided for in this
section, and may, at any time and in a similar manner, transfer lands from one class
to another.
As for timber or forest lands, the Revised Administrative Code states as follows:
Sec. 1826. Regulation setting apart forest reserves- Revocation of same. - Upon
there commendation of the Director of Forestry, with the approval of the Department
Head, the President of the Philippines may set apart forest reserves from the public
lands and he shall by proclamation declare the establishment of such reserves and
the boundaries thereof, and thereafter such forest reserves shall not be entered,
sold, or otherwise disposed of, but shall remain as such for forest uses, and shall be
administered in the same manner as public forest.
The President of the Philippines may in like manner by proclamation alter or modify
the boundaries of any forest reserve from time to time, or revoke any such
proclamation, and upon such revocation such forest reserve shall be and become
part of the public lands as though such proclamation had never been made.
Sec. 1827. Assignment of forest land for agricultural purposes. - Lands in public
forest, not including forest reserves, upon the certification of the Director of Forestry
that said lands are better adapted and more valuable for agricultural than for forest
purposes and not required by the public interests to be kept under forest, shall be
declared by the Department Head to be agricultural lands.
With these principles in mind, we reach the following conclusion:

Mangrove swamps or manglares should be understood as comprised within the public forests of the
Philippines as defined in the aforecited Section 1820 of the Administrative Code of 1917. The
legislature having so determined, we have no authority to ignore or modify its decision, and in effect
veto it, in the exercise of our own discretion. The statutory definition remains unchanged to date and,
no less noteworthy, is accepted and invoked by the executive department. More importantly, the said
provision has not been challenged as arbitrary or unrealistic or unconstitutional assuming the
requisite conditions, to justify our judicial intervention and scrutiny. The law is thus presumed valid
and so must be respected. We repeat our statement in the Amunategui case that the classification of
mangrove swamps as forest lands is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
descriptive of what the land actually looks like. That determination having been made and no cogent
argument having been raised to annul it, we have no duty as judges but to apply it. And so we shall.
Our previous description of the term in question as pertaining to our agricultural lands should be
understood as covering only those lands over which ownership had already vested before the
Administrative Code of 1917 became effective. Such lands could not be retroactively legislated as
forest lands because this would be violative of a duly acquired property right protected by the due
process clause. So we ruled again only two months ago in Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of
Appeals, 15 where the possession of the land in dispute commenced as early as 1909, before it was much
later classified as timberland.

It follows from all this that the land under contention being admittedly a part of the mangrove
swamps of Sapian, and for which a minor forest license had in fact been issued by the Bureau of
Forestry from 1920 to 1950, it must be considered forest land. It could therefore not be the subject of
the adverse possession and consequent ownership claimed by the private respondent in support of
his application for registration. To be so, it had first to be released as forest land and reclassified as
agricultural land pursuant to the certification the Director of Forestry may issue under Section 1827
of the Revised Administrative Code.
The private respondent invokes the survey plan of the mangrove swamps approved by the Director
of Lands, 16to prove that the land is registerable. It should be plain, however, that the mere existence of
such a plan would not have the effect of converting the mangrove swamps, as forest land, into agricultural
land. Such approval is ineffectual because it is clearly in officious. The Director of Lands was not
authorized to act in the premises. Under the aforecited law, it is the Director of Forestry who has the
authority to determine whether forest land is more valuable for agricultural rather than forestry uses, as a
basis for its declaration as agricultural land and release for private ownership.

Thus we held in the Yngson case:

It is elementary in the law governing the disposition of lands of the public domain that
until timber or forest lands are released as disposable and alienable neither the
Bureau of Lands nor the Bureau of Fisheries has authority to lease, grant, sell or
otherwise dispose of these lands for homesteads, sales patents, leases for grazing
or other purposes, fishpond leases and other modes of utilization.
The Bureau of Fisheries has no jurisdiction to administer and dispose of swamp
lands or mangrove lands forming part of the public domain while such lands are still
classified as forest land or timber land and not released for fishery or other purposes.
The same rule was echoed in the Vallarta case, thus:
It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be
owned by private persons. It is not registerable. The adverse possession which can

be the basis of a grant of title in confirmation of imperfect title cases cannot

commence until after the forest land has been declared alienable and disposable.
Possession of forest land, no matter bow long cannot convert it into private property.'
We find in fact that even if the land in dispute were agricultural in nature, the proof the private
respondent offers of prescriptive possession thereof is remarkably meager and of dubious
persuasiveness. The record contains no convincing evidence of the existence of
the informacion posesoria allegedly obtained by the original transferor of the property, let alone the
fact that the conditions for acquiring title thereunder have been satisfied. Nowhere has it been shown
that the informacion posesoria has been inscribed or registered in the registry of property and that
the land has been under the actual and adverse possession of the private respondent for twenty
years as required by the Spanish Mortgage Law. 17 These matters are not presumed but must be
established with definite proof, which is lacking in this case.

Significantly, the tax declarations made by the private respondent were practically the only basis
used by the appellate court in sustaining his claim of possession over the land in question. Tax
declarations are, of course, not sufficient to prove possession and much less vest ownership in favor
of the declarant, as we have held in countless cases. 18
We hold, in sum, that the private respondent has not established his right to the registration of the
subject land in his name. Accordingly, the petition must be granted.
It is reiterated for emphasis that, conformably to the legislative definition embodied in Section 1820
of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, which remains unamended up to now, mangrove
swamps or manglares form part of the public forests of the Philippines. As such, they are not
alienable under the Constitution and may not be the subject of private ownership until and unless
they are first released as forest land and classified as alienable agricultural land.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and the application for
registration of title of private respondent is DISMISSED, with cost against him. This decision is
immediately executory.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 65663 October 16, 1992

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and LINO ANIT, respondents.

NOCON, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision 1 dated September 28, 1983

of the then Intermediate Appellate Court in AC-G.R. No. 66095 which affirmed in toto the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, Branch I, granting the application of Lino Anit for the

registration of land title, but ordering that the title be issued in the name of Lino Anit's heirs,
assigns or successors-in-interest.
The facts of this case are as follows: On October 20, 1975, respondent Lino Anit, a Filipino who became an
American citizen by virtue of his service with the U.S. Navy, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cavite an
application for registration of a parcel of land with an area of 42,567 square meters situated at Ternate,
Cavite, which case was docketed as Land Registration Case No. TM-101, LRC Record No. N-47776.
After the required notices were published, the court heard the application on March 29, 1976, during which
time only one Florante Malimban, through his counsel Vicente Forteza, informally registered his opposition
to the application. However, Malimban did not file any formal pleading with the court.
Respondent claims that the subject parcel of land was originally owned by Felix Garay, who sold the same to
Jose Andra in 1943. In 1961, Andra sold the land to his parents, the spouses Servando Anit and Natalia
Benitez. Respondent allegedly entered into possession of the land sometime in 1966, planting thereon
bamboo, mango, and banana trees, and camote. His parents died in 1967. Thereafter, the heirs, which include
respondent's brothers and sisters Teodoro, Librada, Domingo, Pascuala, and Victoria, allegedly executed a
deed of partition wherein, among others, the subject property was given to respondent. The deed of partition
was never presented in evidence before the trial court.
To identify the subject land, respondent presented a blue-print copy of Plan Psu-04-003805. 2 Respondent

failed to show the exact date when he became an American citizen.

On March 3, 1979, the trial court rendered a decision 3 granting respondent's application, the

dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, considering the complete records under our present lights, judgment is
hereby rendered and the application is hereby granted in favor of the applicant LINO ANIT
married to Pelagia Lupisan of Ternate, Cavite, with postal address at 486 Higante Drive, Daly
City, State of California, United States of America, his heirs, assigns and successors-ininterest, who are hereby declared possessors and owners in fee simple of one parcel of land
containing forty-two thousand five hundred sixty seven (42,567) square meters found at
Sitio Batalay, Barrio Sapang, Municipality of Ternate, Province of Cavite, and bearing the
technical descriptions (Exhibit CC-4) under Psu-04-003805 as set forth by Geodetic Engineer
Leonardo C. Santos and approved by the Regional Director Narciso V. Villapando on
September 12, 1972 for the Director of Lands;
Once this decision shall have become final, let the corresponding decree be therefore
produced completely and absolutely subject to Presidential Proclamation No. 1520 (dated
November 28, 1975) for the tourism areas of concern of the Republic of the Philippines and
its future expropriation causes of actions for such filed of governmental endeavor and
program areas.
Provided further that the parcel of land described herein shall however, be fully registered in
the name (not of the applicant LINO ANIT) but in the names of his wife Pelagia Lupisan of
Ternate, Cavite and his other heirs, assignees and successors-in-interest who are Filipino
citizens, should there be any and if they are not American but Filipino Citizens.
SO ORDERED. 4
Petitioner then appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the trial court. After his
motion for reconsideration was denied, petitioner filed the instant petition.
Petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals erred in upholding the decision of the trial court on the grounds
that (1) it acted contrary to law when it confirmed respondent's title on the basis of a mere blue print copy of
the survey plan; (2) it misapprehended the facts when it ruled that respondent and his predecessors-ininterest had been for at least thirty years in continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject

land; (3) it erred in confirming respondent's title to the exclusion of his co-heirs; and (4) it erred in not
holding that respondent's title is not valid as against the state.
We find the petition meritorious.
It is undisputed that the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for was not submitted in evidence by
respondent, which omission is fatal to his application. The submission of the original tracing cloth plan is a
statutory requirement of mandatory character. 5
Respondent's counsel on the other hand contends that he submitted the original tracing cloth plan, together
with other documents, to the Clerk of Court when he filed the application. The application and supporting
documents were then elevated to the Land Registration Commission (now the National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration) for approval of the survey plan by the Director of Lands. Respondent
argues the fact that the Commissioner of Land Registration issued a Notice of Initial Hearing would indicate
that respondent had submitted all the pertinent documents relative to his application.
This argument had already been disposed of in Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 6 wherein this Court held
Of course, the applicant attempts to justify the non-submission of the original tracing cloth
plan by claiming that the same must be with the Land Registration Commission which
checked or verified the survey plan and the technical description thereof. It is not the
function of the LRC to check the original survey plan as it had no authority to approve
original survey plans. If, for any reason, the original tracing cloth plan was forwarded there,
the applicant may easily retrieve the same therefrom and submit the same in evidence. This
was not done. 7
Respondent further contends that petitioner failed to object to the blue print copy of the survey plan when
the same was offered in evidence, thereby waiving the objection to said evidence.
We do not agree. Rule 143 of the Rules of Court provide:
These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and elections cases, naturalization
and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or
in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and convenient.
This Court had applied the aforementioned rule in a naturalization proceeding, and held that
By reason of this provision, literal adherence to the Rules of Court, which include rules of
evidence, is not obligatory in a proceeding like that under consideration. 8
We see no reason for not applying Rule 143 to the case at bar. Besides, given the mandatory character of the
requirement for the submission of the original tracing cloth plan of the land applied for, said requirement
cannot be waived either expressly or impliedly.
We likewise find merit in petitioner's argument that respondent had not shown that he and his predecessorin-interest have been in continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land. Respondent
made no mention of how his parents came to possess the subject property, or the manner their predecessorin-interest possessed the same, in his deposition 9 taken before Vice Consul Romulo Villamil at the

Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, California, U.S.A.

Similarly, the testimony of respondent's sister Victoria Anit Manalo, merely narrated who were her brother's
predecessor-in-interest and the manner he acquired the subject property.
Clearly, respondent's evidence does not establish the nature of his predecessors-in-interest's possession.
No evidence was offered to show that his predecessors-in-interest had paid taxes on the subject land 10 or

that they had introduced any improvements thereon. In fact, respondent could only show that
property taxes were fully paid beginning 1966. 11 As this Court had said in Republic vs. Lee: 12

Private respondent should have presented specific facts that would have shown the nature
of such possession. The phrase "adverse, continuous, open, public, peaceful and in
concept of owner" by which she described her own possession in relation to that of her
predecessors-in-interest are mere conclusions of law which require factual support and
substantiation. 13
Inasmuch as respondent had failed to prove having been in open, continuous, and exclusive possession,
either by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, for at least thirty years, then his application must
necessarily fail.
Equally damaging to respondent's application is the facts that the subject land was owned by his parents,
Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez. When they died in 1967, the land passed by intestate succession to their
heirs, respondent and his brothers and sisters.
Section 14 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 provides that where the land sought to be registered is owned in
common, all the co-owners should file the application jointly. Therefore, the application should have been
filed in the names of all the heirs of Servando Anit and Natalia Benitez, and not just in the name of
respondent. Though Victoria Anit Manalo testified that the subject property was given to respondent as his
share of their parents' estate by virtue of the extrajudicial partition executed by the heirs of Servando Anit
and Natalia Benitez, the deed evidencing said extrajudicial partition was never presented in evidence before
the trial court. This Court has held that where the applicants own merely an undivided share less than fee
simple in the land described in the application, the application should be dismissed without prejudice to the
right of the various owners of the undivided interest in the land jointly to present a new application for
registration. 14
We however do not find merit in petitioner's last contention that respondent's title to the subject land is not
valid against the state because he is an American citizen. The appellate court did not err in applying Section
14, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution to respondent's case. Said provision provides:
Save in case of hereditary succession, no private land shall be transferred or conveyed
except to individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the
public domain.
Petitioner argues that said provision has no application to the case at bar since the subject land still part of
the public domain. We do not agree. It is well-settled that open, continuous and exclusive possession of at
least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts the same to private property. 15 It therefore follows

that an heir of a person who had occupied a piece of alienable public land in open, continuous
and exclusive possession for more than 30 years, may validly file an application for said parcel of
land since the same had already been converted to private land.
In the case at bar, had respondent proved open, exclusive and continuous possession for more than 30
years by his predecessors-in-interest, there would have been no bar to his application. However, since he
had not shown the duration and nature of his predecessors-in-interest's possession of the subject land, his
application would necessarily fail.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the instant application
of Lino Anit is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 83609 October 26, 1989
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, IBARRA BISNAR and AMELIA BISNAR, respondents.
Ibarra L. Bisnar for himself and for and in behalf of co-private respondent Amelia Bisnar.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
Petitioner Director of Lands, through the Solicitor General, seeks a review of the decision dated May
27, 1988, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66426, entitled "Ibarra Bisnar, et al. vs. Director
of Lands," affirming in toto the decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, granting the private
respondents' application for confirmation and registration of their title to two (2) parcels of land in
LRC Cad. Rec. 1256.
In their joint application for registration of title to two (2) parcels of land filed on July 20,1976, the
applicants Ibarra and Amelia Bisnar claimed to be the owners in fee simple of Lots 866 and 870 of
the Pilar Cadastre Plan AP-06-000869, respectively containing an area of 28 hectares (284,424 sq.
m.) and 34 hectares (345,385 sq. m.) situated in barrio Gen. Hizon, Municipality of President Roxas,
Province of Capiz (p. 14, Rollo). The applicants alleged that they inherited those parcels of land (p.
41, Rollo) and they had been paying the taxes thereon (p. 40, Rollo).
On December 16,1976, the Director of Lands and the Director of the Bureau of Forest Development,
opposed the application on the grounds that:
1. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest possess sufficient title to
acquire ownership in fee simple of the land or lots applied for, the same not having
been acquired by any of the various types of title issued by the Spanish Government,
such as, (1) 'titulo real' or royal grant, (2) the 'concession especial' or special grant,
(3) the 'composicion con el estado titulo' or adjustment title, (4) the 'titulo de
compra 'or title by purchase, and (5) the 'informacion possessoria' or possessory
information under the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894, or any other recognized
mode of acquisition of title over realty under pertinent applicable laws.
2. Neither the applicants nor their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in
question for at least thirty (30) years immediately preceding the filing of the
application.
3. The properties in question are a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines, not subject to private appropriation, (pp. 17-19, Record
on Appeal). (pp. 14-15, Rollo.)
On February 24,1977, the applicants filed an amended application, which was approved on March
14, 1977, and included the following allegation:

Should the Land Registration Act invoked be not applicable to the case, they hereby
apply for the benefits of Chapter 8, Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, as they
and their predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land as owners for
more than fifty (50) years. (p. 16, Rollo.)
After hearing, the trial court ordered the registration of the title of the lots in the names of the
applicants, herein private respondents. It found that applicants and their predecessors- in-interest
have been in open, public, continuous, peaceful and adverse possession of the subject parcels of
land under bona fide claims of ownership for more than eighty (80) years (not only 30) prior to the
filing of the application for registration, introduced improvements on the lands by planting coconuts,
bamboos and other plants, and converted a part of the land into productive fishponds (p. 68, Rollo).
On appeal, the Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It held that the classification of the
lots as timberland by the Director of Forestry cannot prevail in the absence of proof that the said lots
are indeed more valuable as forest land than as agricultural land, citing as authority the case
of Ankron vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (40 Phil. 10). In this petition, the government
alleges that:
1. the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable
agricultural land, mineral land or forest land is a prerogative of the Executive
Department of the government and not of the courts;
2. that possession of forest lands, no matter how long, cannot ripen into private
ownership; and
3. that an applicant for registration of title has the burden of proving that he meets the
requirements of Section 48 of Com. Act No. 141, as amended. (p. 19, Rollo.)
The principal issue in this appeal is whether the lots in question may be registered under Section 48
(b) of CA 141, as amended.
The petition is impressed with merit.
In the case of Bureau of Forestry vs. Court of Appeals, 153 SCRA 351, we ruled:
As provided for under Section 6 of Commonwealth Act 141, which was lifted from Act
2874, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable,
mineral or forest lands is now a prerogative of the Executive Department of the
government and not the courts. With these rules, there should be no more room for
doubt that it is not the court which determines the classification of lands of the public
domain into agricultural, forest or mineral but the Executive Branch of the
government, through the Office of the President. Hence, it was grave error and/or
abuse of discretion for respondent court to ignore the uncontroverted facts that (1)
the disputed area is within a timberland block, and (2) as certified to by the then
Director of Forestry, the area is needed for forest purposes. (pp. 21-22, Rollo.)
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is
classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes (Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA 499). Unless and until the land classified as forest is
released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply
(Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA 69; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 129

SCRA 689; Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 701; Republic vs. Court of Appeals,
148 SCRA 480; Vallarta vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 151 SCRA 679).
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership (Vano vs.
Government, 41 Phil. 161 [1920]; Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 [1960]). A parcel of
forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and
jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System (Republic vs. Court of
Appeals, 89 SCRA 648; Republic vs. Vera, 120 SCRA 210 [1983]; Director of Lands vs. Court of
Appeals, 129 SCRA 689 [1984]).
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public agricultural
land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded (p. 26, Rollo). We reiterate our ruling
in Amunategui that:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving
that he meets the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended by Republic Act 1942. He must overcome the presumption that the land he
is applying for is part of the public domain but that he has an interest therein
sufficient to warrant registration in his name because of an imperfect title such as
those derived from old Spanish grants or that he has had continuous, open and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership for at least thirty (30) years preceding
the filing of his application. (Heirs of Amunategui vs. Director of Forestry, 126 SCRA
69.)
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is reversed and set aside. The application for registration in
LRC Cad. Rec. 1256 of the former Court of First Instance, is hereby dismissed without costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 144057

January 17, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking to review the Decision1 of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 in
CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional Trial Court
(RTC),2 Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC)3 of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for
registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.

The facts are as follows:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit, filed
with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land situated in
Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas
Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application
seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.
On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor,
appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles,
opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal opposition
to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default against the
whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.
The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No. 3888 until
1991.4 On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato
Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and confirmed the
sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.5Subsequently, the heirs of Maming
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the
same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and gemelina
trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old, and paid the
corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of land surrounding the
subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees. Naguit and her
predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of owner without any
objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her application for
registration.
After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the government
did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as representative of the heirs
of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On September 27, 1997, the
MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought under the operation of the
Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto
registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.6
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable and
disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director Raoul T.
Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.7 However, the court
denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.8
1awphi 1.nt

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.9
Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the petition
filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.
Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on
September 4, 2000.10

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely
erred in holding that there is no need for the governments prior release of the subject lot from the
public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No.
1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the
required period.11
Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.
The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court12 in arguing that
the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable. Since the
subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property
Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.
Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings, bears
close examination. It expressly provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or
earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the
provisions of existing laws.
....
There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under Section
14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain; that the
applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona
fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Section 14(1). "Since June 12, 1945," as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase "under a bonafide claim of ownership." Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or
modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly
or remotely located.13 Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position. Absent a
legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the public
domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable

and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is
still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State
irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has
already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals .14 Therein, the
Court noted that "to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an
applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute."15In that case, the subject land had been
certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the
alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had
occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the said
property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released and
certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.16
This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,17 wherein the Court noted that while
the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in question were
classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not succeed.
In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was
declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after
the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling does not apply.
1awphi 1.nt

A different rule obtains for forest lands,18 such as those which form part of a reservation for provincial
park purposes19 the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.20 It is elementary in the law
governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo
v. Court of Appeals,21 forest land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy,
cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable
and alienable.22 In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as
disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court
of Appeals.23
It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through ordinary
registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a bona
fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.
A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for

confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced
from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that
the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section
48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the
reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree
and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does refer to
"agricultural lands of the public domain," while the Property Registration Decree uses the term
"alienable and disposable lands of the public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution
declares that "alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands."24 Clearly,
the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude
the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which
commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of "those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.25 There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.26 With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of "private lands" under
Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through
prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the
possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees now
over fifty years old.27 The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980 as
alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.
l^vvphi 1.net

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in the
concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged on the

assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Naguit
had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual,
and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession
since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his right
mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. The
voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere
and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against the State
and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the
Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.28
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced back
to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50) years, it
is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be properly
brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of the land in
the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private
person and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of
protection under the law.
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186166

October 20, 2010

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
JOSE T. CHING represented by his Attorney-in-fact, ANTONIO V. CHING, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
In this Petition for Review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Republic of the Philippines, represented
by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), assails the November 28, 2008 Decision1 of the Court

of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 00318-MIN, reversing the December 3, 2002 Resolution2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Butuan City, Branch 2 (RTC), disallowing the Application for Registration of
Title of respondent Jose Ching, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Antonio Ching, in Land
Registration Case No. N-290.
THE FACTS
On August 9, 1999, respondent Jose Ching, represented by his Attorney-in-Fact, Antonio Ching,
filed a verified Application for Registration of Title covering a parcel of land with improvements
identified as Lot 1, SGS-13-000037-D, being a portion of Lot 2738, GSS-10-000043, before the
RTC. The subject lot is a consolidation of three (3) contiguous lots situated in Banza, Butuan City,
Agusan del Norte, with an area of 58,229 square meters. The first parcel of land is covered by Tax
Declaration No. 96GR-11-003-0556-A; the second parcel by Tax Declaration No. 96GR-11-0030444-I; and the third parcel by Tax Declaration No. 96GR-11-003-0537-A. In support of his
application, respondent attached the (a) Sketch plan;3 (b) Technical description;4 (c) Tracing Cloth of
Plan of Portion of Lot 2738, Gss-10-000043, which is a Segregation Plan of Portion of Lot 2738,
Gss-10-0000431, as surveyed for Jose T. Ching and duly approved by the Bureau of Land DENR
Region XIII on July 08, 1998 covering the subject land;5 and (d) Special Power of Attorney executed
by Jose T. Ching authorizing Antonio V. Ching, Jr. to file an application for title over the land.6
Respondent alleged that on April 10, 1979, he purchased the subject land from the late former
governor and Congressman Democrito O. Plaza as evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Unregistered
Lands.7
Initially, the RTC, acting as a land registration court, ordered respondent to show cause why his
application for registration of title should not be dismissed for his failure to state the current assessed
value of the subject land and his non-compliance with the last paragraph of Section 17 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529.8
Accordingly, on September 3, 1999, respondent filed a Verified Amended Application9 which the
RTC found to be sufficient in form and substance. The case was set for initial hearing on December
22, 1999.10
On December 16, 1999, the OSG duly deputized the Provincial Prosecutor of Agusan del Norte to
appear on behalf of the State.11 Thereafter, on January 20, 2000, the OSG filed an Opposition to the
application for registration of title. Specifically, the OSG alleged:
(1) That neither the applicant nor his predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question since
June 12, 1945 or prior thereto [Sec. 48 (b) C.A. 141, as amended by P.D. 1073];
(2) That the muniments of title and/or any tax declarations and tax payments receipts of
applicant attached to or alleged in the application, do not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of a bona fideacquisition of the land applied for or of his open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the land in the concept of owner since
June 12, 1945 or prior and the tax declaration and tax payment receipts appear not to be
genuine and are of recent vintage;
(3) That the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of by the applicant who have failed to file an appropriate application for
registration within six (6) months from 16 February 1976 under P.D. No. 892 as the instant
application appears to have been filed on December 17, 1998; and

(4) That the parcels of land applied for are portions of the public domain belonging to the
Republic of the Philippines not subject to private appropriation.12
On June 28, 2001, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources likewise filed its
opposition to the application.
On December 3, 2002, the RTC resolved to dismiss the respondents application for
registration.13 The dispositive portion reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court resolves to dismiss as it hereby dismisses the instant
application for registration of title for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC was not convinced that respondents Deed of Sale sufficiently established that he was the
owner in fee simple of the land sought to be registered. The RTC wrote "[e]vidence only shows that
the applicant and his vendor as predecessor-in-interest have been in open, peaceful, notorious and
exclusive possession starting from 1965. Among the tax declarations marked Exhibits R to R-7
includes the oldest one marked Exhibit R-7 shown in the back lower portion that it was effective
beginning the year 1980, and among the tax declarations marked Exhibit S to S-8 inclusive, the
oldest one marked Exhibit S-8 is effective in the year 1980 and among the Tax Declaration marked
Exhibit T to T-7 inclusive, the oldest one marked Exhibit T-7 shows that it began to be effective in
the year 1980 also. In the Certification (Exhibit U) issued by the Office of the City Treasurer of
Butuan shows that the payment of the realty taxes paid for the 3 parcels started only in the year
1980."14
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and a subsequent supplemental motion for
reconsideration with attached additional tax declarations. The RTC denied both motions in its
December 11, 2003 Resolution15 stating that it could not consider the additional tax declarations
attached in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration as these were not formally offered in
evidence. The RTC also noted that the additional documents were mere photocopies and would not
have any probative value because they were not in accord with the requirements under Act
49616 and P.D. 152917 that only original muniments of title or copies thereof must be presented.
Respondent appealed the RTC ruling before the CA. Respondent claimed that the RTC erred in
dismissing the application for registration of title for insufficiency of evidence and in failing to
consider the additional tax declarations attached in his Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.18
On November 28, 2008, the CA reversed the RTCs earlier resolution and granted respondents
application for registration of title.19 The decretal portion of said decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City acting as
land registration court, dismissing the application for registration of title for insufficiency of evidence
is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Appellants application for land registration is
GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.20
The CA ruled that the RTC erred in failing to consider the additional documents attached in
respondents Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. The CA ratiocinated:

Clearly from the foregoing tax declarations which all went unchallenged and formed part of the
record of the instant case, it could clearly be seen that the same parcels of land had been in
possession of the petitioner-appellants (respondent) predecessors-in-interest since 1948 until these
parcels were purchased by him on 10 April 1979. Since the applicant and his predecessors-ininterest had been in possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years continuously, peacefully,
adversely, publicly and to the exclusion of everybody, the same was "in the concept of owners." This
also means that petitioner-appellant is no longer required to prove that the property in
question is classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain.21 The long and
continuous possession thereof by petitioner-appellant and his predecessors-in-interest since 1948 or
a total period of fifty-one (51) years before the application was filed on 09 August 1999 converted the
property to a private one. This is but a mere reiteration of the established rule that alienable public
land held by a possessor, personally, or through his predecessor-in-interest, openly, continuously
and exclusively for the prescribed statutory period of thirty (30) years under the Public Land Act, as
amended, is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure.22
Hence, this petition.23
In its Memorandum,24 the OSG submits the following
ISSUES
I
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the Resolution dated December 23,
2002 of the Land Registration Court denying the BELATED submission of tax declarations
which the herein respondent merely attached in its supplemental motion for reconsideration
and which were NOT FORMALLY OFFERED in evidence during the trial of the case, as
required under Section 34 of Rule 132 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure;
II
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the Resolution dated December 23,
2002 of the Land Registration Court denying the admission of MERE PHOTOCOPIES of tax
declarations which have not been verified or authenticated, in flagrant violation of the
requirements of both Act 496 (Land Registration Act) and PD 1529 (Property Registration
Act)providing that only ORIGINAL muniments of titles or original copies thereof shall be filed;
III
The Court of Appeals erred in reversing and setting aside the subject Resolution of the Land
Registration Court which denied the application for registration on the ground that the
respondent herein failed to prove that the subject land is alienable and disposable land of the
public domain and have been in possession for the length of time and manner and concept
prescribed in Section 48(b) of the CA 141 as amended.25
The petition is meritorious.
Sec. 14(1) of P.D. 152926 in relation to Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act 141, as amended by
Section 4 of P.D. 1073,27 provides:

SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
[now Regional Trial Court] an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Xxx
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain
or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
Xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.
Based on these legal parameters, applicants for registration of title under Section 14(1) must
sufficiently establish: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the
public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, before an applicant can adduce evidence of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the property in question, he must first prove that the land belongs to
the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It is doctrinal that, under the Regalian
doctrine, all lands of the public domain pertain to the State and the latter is the foundation of any
asserted right to ownership in land. Accordingly, the State presumably owns all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership. To overcome such presumption, irrefutable
evidence must be shown by the applicant that the land subject of registration has been declassified
and now belongs to the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.28
Notably, the Court finds no evidence in this case that would show that the land in question has been
classified as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. The sketch plan, technical
description and the tracing clothing plan that respondent presented do not show the actual legal
status of the land. Hence, the conclusion reached by the CA that it was no longer necessary for the
respondent to prove the alienability of the land in question on the assumption that he had already
completed the thirty-year possessory requirement was misplaced. The requirements of alienability
and possession and occupation since June 12, 1945 or earlier under Section 14(1) are
indispensable prerequisites to a favorable registration of his title to the property. Absent one, the
application for registration is materially infirmed.

Since respondent provided no competent and persuasive evidence to show that the land has been
classified as alienable and disposable, then the application for registration should be denied.
At any rate, after reviewing the documents submitted by the respondent, it is clear that there was no
substantive evidence to show that he complied with the requirement of possession and occupation
since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
The earliest tax declaration that respondent tried to incorporate in his Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration does not measure up to the time requirement. In particular, the tax declaration on
the first lot, as shown by Tax Declaration No. 6932 in the name of Adulfo Calo, only began in
1948.29 On the second lot, Tax Declaration No. 3852 in the name of Marcos Azote merely appeared
in 1952.30 While on the third lot, Tax Declaration No. 6891 registered in the name of the Heirs of
Felipe Calo came up in 1948.31 Unmistakably, the respondent cannot avail of registration under
Section 14(1) of P.D. 1529.
In his Memorandum,32 respondent proffered that should not the land be registrable under Section
14(1) of P.D. 1529, it could still be registered under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529.33
He cannot.
The case of Heirs of Mario Malabanan vs. Republic34 summarized the distinctions between the legal
requisites in applications for registration of title under Section 14(1) and Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529,
to wit:
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through their
predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not
require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire
period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his
title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the
timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.35
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further
confirmed by Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under
the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial
property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only
with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article
422 of the Civil Code.36 And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires
ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to
secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

lawp++il

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property through
possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under
extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession
of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just
title, ripens into ownership.
The import of this ruling is clear. Under Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529, before acquisitive prescription
could commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and
disposable; it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Thus, absent an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of
public dominion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The November 28, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals
is herebyREVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Application for Registration of Title of respondent Jose
T. Ching in Land Registration Case No. N-290 is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 175177

October 24, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA JARALVE substituted by ALAN JESS JARALVE DOCUMENTO, JR., EDGARDO
JARALVE, SERAFIN UY, JR., SHELLA UY, NIMFA LAGNADA, PANTALEON SAY A-ANG,
STARG LAD INTERNATIONAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, ANNIE TAN, TEOTIMO
CABARRUBIAS, JESSICA DACLAN, MA. EMMA RAMAS, DANILO DEEN, and ERIC ANTHONY
DEEN. Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the June 28, 2006 Decision2 and October 27,
2006 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78633, which affirmed the November
15, 2002 Decision4of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 20, Cebu City, in Land Registration
Case No. 1421-N/LRA Rec. No. N-67272.
On October 22, 1996, Gloria Jaralve,5 Edgardo Jaralve, Serafin Uy, Jr., Shella Uy, Nimfa Lagnada,
Pantaleon Saya-Ang, Starglad International and Development Corporation, Annie Tan, Teotimo

Cabarrubias, Jessica Daclan, and Ma. Emma Ramas filed an Application6 with Branch 20 of the RTC
of Cebu City, for the registration in their names of Lot Sgs-07-000307 (subject property), under
Presidential Decree No. 1529. On November 29, 1996 and November 7, 1997, they filed their
Amended7 and Second Amended8 Applications, respectively, to conform to the procedural
requirements of the law, as per Order9 of the RTC, and to join Danilo Deen and Eric Anthony Deen
as applicants10 (for brevity, we will refer to all the foregoing applicants as respondents). This was
docketed as LRC Case No. 1421-N/LRA Rec. No. N-67272.
In their original and amended applications, respondents declared that they were the co-owners in fee
simple of the subject property, a parcel of land with an area of 731,380 square meters, belonging to
Cadastral Lot 18590, and situated in Barangay Quiot, City of Cebu, and all the improvements
thereon. They alleged that they occupied the subject property and to the best of their knowledge,
there was no mortgage or encumbrance affecting it, and no one was in possession
thereof.11 Respondents further averred that the subject property was not covered by any certificate of
title or any pending case before the RTC of Cebu City.12 Respondents also identified the names and
complete postal addresses of the owners of the adjoining lots.13
The respondents claimed that they had acquired ownership over the subject property by way of
purchase from predecessors-in-interest who had been in continuous, open, adverse, public,
uninterrupted, exclusive, and notorious possession thereof for more than thirty (30) years, or from
June 12, 1945.14
In support of their application, respondents submitted the following:
1. Sepia Plan;15
2. Blue Print Copy of Survey Plan;16
3. Technical Description of SGS-07-000307;17
4. Geodetic Engineers Certificate (of the survey of the subject property);18
5. Certificate of Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) dated
March 20, 1996, signed by CENR and Provincial Environmental and Natural Resources
(PENR) Officers (CENRO Certificate) that the subject property is within the alienable and
disposable portion of Lot 18590;19
6. Deeds of Sale;20
7. Tax Clearances;21 and
8. Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region 7 Certification that
subject property is not covered by any subsisting land application.22
The respondents application was opposed by the following parties:
1. Gertrudes N. Tabanas-Singson, Lourdes N. Tabanas, Francisco N. Tabanas, Vicente N.
Tabanas, Heirs of Enrique N. Tabanas, Heirs of Mercedes N. Tabanas-Raganas, and Heirs
of Primitiva N. Tabanas-Nadera, who claimed that they owned portions of the subject
property, containing an area of 406,810 square meters, as described and bounded under
Tax Declaration No. 97GR-11-075-00581, issued in the name of their father Agaton

Tabanas; and that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in peaceful, open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of their alleged property
since time immemorial. They prayed that the respondents application be dismissed with
respect to the portion they were claiming, and that their title be confirmed (Opposition was
filed on March 3, 1997).23
2. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, who argued
that: a) neither the respondents nor their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property
since June 12, 1945 or prior thereto; b) that the muniments of title and/or the tax declarations
and tax payment receipts submitted in evidence appeared to be of recent vintage and did not
constitute competent and sufficient proof of a bona fide acquisition of the subject property; c)
that the period for an application based on a Spanish title or grant had already lapsed; and d)
that the subject property was part of the public domain, which belonged to the State and not
subject to private appropriation (Opposition was filed on March 4, 1997).24
3. The Aznar Brothers Realty Co. and Aznar Enterprises, Inc., that opposed the application
insofar as it might affect the fifteen-hectare portion they claimed and owned (Opposition was
filed on March 7, 1997).25
4. Ponciano Tabanas Ybiernas, for himself and for the other heirs of Esteban Tabanas and
Ciriaca Gabuya, who alleged that he, his co-owners, and their predecessors-in-interest, had
been occupying portions of the subject property in the concept of owners, exclusively,
openly, continuously, and peacefully for many years. He prayed that the respondents
application for registration be denied with respect to the portions he and his co-owners
claimed (Opposition was filed on March 10, 1997).26
5. Rufina and Julia Ragasajo, who contended that the respondents application was without
legal basis as the respondents were not the true owners of the subject property, which also
encroached on their own land (Opposition was filed on March 10, 1997).27
6. The National Power Corporation (NPC), that opposed the respondents application with
respect to a six-hectare portion of the subject property. NPC alleged that it was in the
process of finalizing with DENR its permit/grant to occupy as a substation office, six hectares
of the subject property, which was a public forest land in Antuanga Hills, Quiot, Pardo, Cebu
City. NPC added that the grant of respondents application would cause the government
great prejudice (Opposition was filed on March 11, 1997).28
7. Amelia and Delia Dionaldo, who opposed the respondents application on the ground that
they had interests in the subject property (Opposition was filed on March 11, 1997).29
8. Jeremias L. Dolino, in his official capacity as Regional Executive Director of the DENR,
Region VII, Banilad, Mandaue City, who averred that the subject property fell within
Timberland Block 3-C and was within the Cebu City Reforestation project, formerly known as
the Osmea Reforestation Project.30 Dolino said that there was an implied admission on the
part of the respondents of this assertion as their predecessors-in-interest had previously filed
a Petition for Reclassification of Land31 of the subject property before the DENR. Dolino
added that the CENRO Certificate relied on by the respondents was discovered to have
been inadvertently and erroneously issued as it was based on a mistaken projection
(Opposition was filed on April 10, 1997).32 The CENRO Certificate was subsequently
recalled, cancelled, and revoked by the Regional Executive Director of DENR via a
Memorandum dated March 12, 1998.33

During the trial, respondents presented the testimony of the following witnesses in support of their
application: Estanislao Nacorda, Leoncio Llamedo, Rodolfo Amancia, Melecio Joboneita, Regino
Gabuya, Constancio Llamedo, Teotimo Cabarrubias, Andres Alfanta, Efren Binolirao, Sergio Paran,
Gloria Jaralve, Ma. Emma Ramas, Shella Uy Coca, Danilo Deen, and Edgardo Jaralve.34
The foregoing witnesses testified on how the respondents acquired their respective portions of the
subject property and how they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in actual, open,
continuous, exclusive, peaceful, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property in
the concept of owners since before the war and for more than 30 years.35
The respondents also presented Forester III Anastacio Cabalejo, a duly licensed and registered
forester connected with the CENRO, and Geodetic Engineer Celso P. Mayol, the CENRO-DENR
Chief of Survey Unit to testify that upon the request of Carmelina Cuizon, one of the predecessorsin-interest of the respondents, they, with other members of the Land Evaluation Party of the Bureau
of Forestry, using Administrative Order No. 4-642 and the Bureau of Forestry Land Classification
Map No. 2124 as references, conducted an actual survey of Cadastral Lot 18590 on November 4,
1995, and found that the subject property was within its alienable and disposable portion.36 Engineer
Mayol further testified that in connection with the foregoing survey, he had prepared a plan,37 which
was the subject of the CENRO Certificate made at its dorsal side.
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-642 dated July 31, 1957 declared certain portions of the public
domain situated in Cebu City under Project No. 3-C as alienable and disposable lands. The Bureau
of Forestry Land Classification Map No. 212438 contains the bearings and distances of the areas in
Cebu City declared as alienable and disposable lands.39
Finding the testimonial and documentary evidence of the respondents sufficient to show that they
had acquired ownership over the subject property, the RTC ruled in their favor in its Decision dated
November 15, 2002. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, from all the foregoing undisputed facts supported by oral and documentary
evidence, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants have a registerable title to the parcel of
land herein applied for original registration of title, and thereby confirming the same and ordering its
registration under CA 141, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1529 over the land, denominated
as SGS-07-000307, in accordance with the respective technical descriptions of herein applicants.
Once this decision becomes final, let the decree and original certificate of title be issued in the
names of the applicants as follows:
Names
(addresses deleted)

Extent of Interest
in Lot Sgs-07-000307

1. GLORIA JARALVE

74,940 square meters;

2. EDGARDO JARALVE

44,700 square meters;

3. SERAFIN UY, JR.

61,210 square meters;

4. SHELLA UY

62,632 square meters;

5.NIMFA LAGNADA

26,972 square meters;

6. PANTALEON SAYA-ANG

44,700 square meters;

7. ATTY. DANILO DEEN AND ZENAIDA DEEN 106,903 square meters;

8. ERIC ANTHONY DEEN

110,660 square meters;

9. MA. EMMA RAMAS

23,060 square meters;

10. STARGLAD
INTERNATIONAL AND
DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION

82,023 square meters;

11. ANNIE TAN

10,000 square meters;

12. TEOTIMO CABARRUBIAS

5,000 square meters;

13. MA. EMMA RAMAS

68,580 square meters;

14. JESSICA DACLAN

10,000 square meters.40

The RTC held that according to jurisprudence and under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No.
141 or the Public Land Act, as amended by Republic Act No. 194241 and Republic Act No.
3872,42 "alienable public land held by a possessor personally or through his predecessors-in-interest,
openly, continuously, and exclusively for the prescribed period of 30 years x x x is converted to
private property by mere lapse or completion of said period ipso jure, and without need of judicial or
other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property."43
The RTC also granted Starglad International and Development Corporations application despite the
constitutional prohibition on acquisition of public lands of private corporations or associations,
explaining that such prohibition does not apply when the corporations predecessors-in-interesthad
satisfied the requirements in acquiring ownership over public lands before such land was transferred
to the corporation.44
The RTC stated that the private oppositors were not able to present any convincing evidence and/or
approved survey plan that clearly identified the portions of the subject property they were
claiming.45 Likewise, the RTC held that the DENR Region VII failed to controvert the fact that the
subject property was within the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain. The RTC
added that its witnesses did not even conduct an actual relocation or verification survey of the
subject property to determine its relative position to the timberland area. Thus, the RTC stated, the
DENR Region VIIs conclusion with respect to the subject propertys position was inaccurate and
unreliable.46 In giving more credit to respondents evidence, particularly the CENRO Certificate, the
RTC explained:
As against the approved plan of [the subject property] which has been thoroughly verified under the
Land Classification Map No. 2124 (Exhibit J-NAMRIA) and which merely conformed to the actual
verification/relocation surveys (Exhibits K, K-1) of the Land Evaluation Party of CENRO and PENRO,
specifically conducted by CENRO Chief of Survey Unit Engr. Celso Mayol and the Chief of the Land
Evaluation Party Anastacio Cabalejo and Forester Justicio Nahid (Exhibits L, L-1), the relocation
survey and map prepared by Engineer Icoy are simply undeserving of any weight. DENR-7 Regional
Executive Director Jeremias Dolino and Director Estanislao Galano of the Regional Management
Services of DENR-7, themselves, admitted that the task of determining whether a parcel of land is
within the alienable and disposable area of the public domain falls within the Land Evaluation Party
of the Forest Management Services of CENRO and PENRO of the DENR. In this case, the
CENRO/PENRO Land Evaluation Party headed by Forester Anastacio Cabalejo, together with the
Chief of the Survey Unit of CENRO, Engr. Celso Mayol, actually conducted a segregation survey of

Cadastral Lot 18590 on November 4, 1995 to determine the alienable and disposable portion of
Cadastral Lot 18590 and on the ground that they located three (3) Forest Reserve (FR) monuments
marked as FR 67, FR 69 and FR 70. Thus, after the said verification survey, a survey plan was
prepared by Engr. Celso Mayol and at the back portion thereof, he certified to the following, x x x.
xxxx
The [CENRO Certificate], having been issued by the proper government officers tasked with the duty
of certifying as to land classifications in the region, the same should be given weight and believed,
especially so that the results of the actual ground survey of
November 4, 1996 were re-verified and re-checked upon the order of PENRO Isabelo Montejo.47
The CENRO Certificate relied on by the respondents and given much weight by the RTC reads as
follows:
Republic of the Philippines
Department of Environment and Natural Resources
COMMUNITY ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OFFICE
Cebu City
CENRO, Cebu City/Lands Verification
CARMELINA CUIZON, et al. (Cebu City) March 20, 1996
CERTIFICATION
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that per projection and verification conducted by Forester Anastacio C. Cabalejo, a
tract of land lot No. 18590, Cebu Cadastre 12 Extension, situated at Quiot, Pardo, Cebu City. As
shown and described in the Plan at the back hereof, as surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Celso P.
Mayol for Carmelina Cuizon, et al. The same was found as here-under indicated:
Lot A containing an area of SEVEN HUNDRED THIRTY-SEVEN THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED
FIVE (737, 305) square meters, more or less, is within the Alienable and Disposable, block-1, land
classification project 3-C, per Map 2124 of Cebu City. Certified under Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-642 dated July 31, 1957.
Lot B containing an area of TWO HUNDRED SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY[-]TWO
(206,552) square meters, more or less, is within the Timberland block-C, land classification project
3-C, per Map 2124 of Cebu City. Certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-642 dated July
31, 1957.
This certification is issued upon the request of the interested party for the purpose of ascertaining
the land classification status only and does not entitle him/her preferential priority rights of
possession until determined by competent authorities.

[signed]
ILUMINADO C. LUCAS
Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer

[signed]
ISABELO R. MONTEJO
Provincial Environment and
Natural Resources Officer
SWORNSTATEMENT

I, Anastacio C. Cabalejo, forest officer, after having been duly sworn to under oath according to the
law do hereby depose and say that I personally projected and verified the area and the result is the
basis of the aforementioned certification.
[signed]
ANASTACIO C. CABALEJO
FORESTER III
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 12[th] day of
April 1996, at Cebu City, Philippines.
[signed]
ILUMINADO C. LUCAS
Community Environment and
Natural Resources Officer48
Aggrieved, the petitioner and three of the private oppositors appealed the decision of the RTC to the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78633, positing the following assignment of errors:
1. Raised by private oppositors Gertrudes N. Tabanas-Singson, Lourdes N. Tabanas,
Francisco N. Tabanas, and Vicente N. Tabanas (Heirs of Agaton Tabanas):
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT APPLICANTS HAVE A
REGISTERABLE TITLE TO THE PARCEL OF LAND HEREIN APPLIED FOR
ORIGINAL REGISTRATION OF TITLE AND CONFIRMING THE SAME AND
ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION UNDER CA 141, AS AMENDED BY P.D. 1529
OVER THE LAND DENOMINATED AS SGS-07-000307, IN ACCORDANCE WITH
THE RESPECTIVE TECHNICAL DESCRIPTIONS.
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT ONCE THE DECISION
BECOMES FINAL, THE DECREE AND ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE BE
ISSUED IN THE NAME OF THE APPLICANTS x x x.49
2. Raised by petitioner Republic of the Philippines:
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN GRANTING RESPONDENTSAPPLICATION FOR
REGISTRATION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE AREA COVERED BY THE
APPLICATION IS CLASSIFIED AS TIMBERLAND AND THEREFORE UNALIENABLE. 50

3. Raised by private oppositors Heirs of Ponciano Ybiernas:

Error No. 1 That the trial court erred in disposing all the area of Lot 18590 to the
[respondents], but none to the oppositors-applicants, contrary to the Magsaysay Credo:
THAT THOSE WHO HAVE LESS IN LIFE SHOULD HAVE MORE IN LAW;
Error No. 2 That under Art. 24 of the Civil Code, judges are enjoined by law to protect the
underdog, which provides as follows:
"Art. 24. In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a
disadvantage on account of his moral dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness,
tender age or other handicap, the courts must be vigilant for his protection."
Error No. 3 That none of the respondents have complied with the requirement as alluded to
in Error No. 1, which is the procurement of a permit from the government agency in charge of
issuance of such permit, to occupy a public land, duly endorsed by the DENR official, but
PONCIANO YBIERNAS has duly complied with all the requirements, plus possession of
more than 30 years of the land applied for by him, and yet PONCIANO YBIERNAS, the
poorest among all the oppositors-applicants, was not given a single square meter by the trial
court. Hence this shows that money talks.51
4. Raised by private oppositors Aznar Enterprises, Inc. and Aznar Brothers Realty Co.:
I.
THE HONORABLE LOWER COURT HAS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENTS HAVE REGISTRABLE TITLE OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF
LAND DESCRIBED AS LOT SGS-07-000307, PORTION OF LOT 18590 AND
ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE APPLICANTS UNDER
COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 141 AS AMENDED BY PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1529.
II.
THE LOWER COURT HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN INCLUDING THE PORTIONS OF
41.2092 HECTARES OF THE LOT WHICH BELONGS TO THE APPELLANTS
AZNAR ENTERPRISES, INC. AND AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY CO., IN ITS
DECISION AND ORDERING ITS REGISTRATION IN THE NAMES OF THE
RESPONDENTS.
III.
THE LOWER COURT HAS GRAVELY ERRED IN DENYING THE MOTION FILED
BY [THE] AZNARS DATED MARCH 31, 1998, TO ALLOW THEM TO RELOCATE
THE PORTION THEY CLAIMED OUT OF THE AREA APPLIED FOR BY THE
RESPONDENTS.52
Finding for the respondents, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC in its Decision dated June 28,
2006.

The Court of Appeals stated that the private oppositors failed to prove that the parcels of land they
were claiming were identical to the respective portions of the subject property the respondents
sought to register.53
As for the petitioners appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the RTCs findings that the petitioner
failed to controvert the fact that the subject property was within the alienable and disposable portion
of the public domain. It added that it was a great blunder that petitioners own witness, for his failure
to conduct an actual relocation or verification survey, could not even categorically identify the relative
position of the subject property to the timberland area.54
Undaunted, the Heirs of Agaton Tabanas,55 Aznar Enterprises, Inc. and Aznar Brothers Realty
Co.,56 and the petitioner57 each moved to have the Court of Appeals reconsider its Decision.
The Court of Appeals, however, denied these motions on October 27, 2006 for lack of merit.58
The same oppositors filed their separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari before this Court, to wit:
1. Private oppositors Aznar Enterprises, Inc. and Aznar Brothers Realty Co.s Petition for Review on
Certiorari was docketed as G.R. No. 175568 and was denied by this Court in its February 26, 2007
Resolution59 for the following reasons:
a. as the petition was filed beyond the extended period pursuant to Section 5[a], Rule 56;
b. for failure to accompany the petition with a clearly legible duplicate original, or a certified
true copy of the assailed resolution in violation of Sections 4[d] and 5, Rule 45 in relation to
Section 5[d], Rule 56; and
c. for insufficient or defective verification, the same being based "on knowledge and belief" in
violation of Section 4, Rule 7, as amended by Administrative Matter No. 00-2-10-SC.
In any event, the petition failed to sufficiently show that the appellate court committed any reversible
error in the challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise by this Court of its
discretionary appellate jurisdiction and the issues raised therein are factual in nature.
This Court likewise denied with finality the Motion for Reconsideration60 of Aznar Enterprises, Inc.
and Aznar Brothers Realty Co. in a Resolution61 dated July 2, 2007.
2. Private oppositors Heirs of Agaton Tabanass Petition for Review on Certiorari62 was docketed as
G.R. No. 175397 and in a Resolution63 dated March 14, 2007, was denied by this Court "for the
Heirs failure to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals committed any reversible error in the
challenged decision and resolution as to warrant the exercise of this Courts discretionary appellate
jurisdiction," and for raising issues, which were factual in nature.
This Court similarly denied with finality the Heirs of Agaton Tabanass Motion for
Reconsideration64 in a Resolution dated June 18, 2007.65
On October 1, 2007, this Court denied for lack of merit the Heirs of Agaton Tabanass motion to file a
second motion for reconsideration, and added that no further pleadings would be entertained.66
The Petition for Review on Certiorari67 now before us is the one filed by the petitioner Republic of the
Philippines, which presented the following ground:

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE

JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE SUBJECT LOTS ARE ALIENABLE LAND
DESPITE THE CLEAR EVIDENCE TO THE CONTRARY.68
The petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals ignored the long-standing rule that in land registration
proceedings, the applicants have the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to
be registered is inalienable land of the public domain when it affirmed the RTCs decision to grant
the respondents application for original registration over the subject property despite their failure to
prove that it was alienable and disposable.69
The petitioner argues that the CENRO Certificate the respondents relied on was erroneously issued;
thus, it did not afford them any vested right. The petitioner adds: "at any rate, being the government
department charged with the duty to conduct survey and classification of lands, the DENRs recall of
the certification that the subject property is alienable and disposable should have been accorded
respect."70
The respondents, in their Comment,71 contend that the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, that the subject property falls within the alienable and disposable portion of the public
domain, is duly supported by substantial evidence. Moreover, they asseverate, that the issue posed
by the petitioner is a factual issue, which had been thoroughly discussed and resolved by the lower
courts.
Issue
The crux of the controversy in the case at bar boils down to whether the grant of respondents
application for registration of title to the subject property was proper under the law and
jurisprudence.
This Courts Ruling
This Court finds the petition to be meritorious.
Procedural Issue: Nature of Issue
At the outset, this Court would like to address respondents concern that the petition involves an
issue purely factual in nature; thus, it cannot be subject of a petition for review under Rule 45.
This Court, in New Rural Bank of Guimba (N.E.), Inc. v. Abad,72 reiterated the distinction between a
question of law and a question of fact, viz:
We reiterate the distinction between a question of law and a question of fact. A question of law exists
when the doubt or controversy concerns the correct application of law or jurisprudence to a certain
set of facts; or when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, the truth or falsehood of facts being admitted. A question of fact exists when the doubt or
difference arises as to the truth or falsehood of facts or when the query invites calibration of the
whole evidence considering mainly the credibility of the witnesses, the existence and relevancy of
specific surrounding circumstances, as well as their relation to each other and to the whole, and the
probability of the situation. (Citation omitted.)
The petitioner herein is not calling for an examination of the probative value or truthfulness of the
evidence presented.73 What it wants to know is whether the lower courts correctly applied the law

and jurisprudence when they granted the respondents application for registration of title to the
subject property.
Main Issue: Nature and Character of Subject Property
Going to the merits of the case, this Court agrees with the petitioner that the respondents failed to
prove in accordance with law that the subject property is within the alienable and disposable portion
of the public domain.
The Public Land Act or Commonwealth Act No. 141, until this day, is the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain, except for timber and
mineral lands. "Under the Regalian doctrine embodied in our Constitution, land that has not been
acquired from the government, either by purchase, grant, or any other mode recognized by law,
belongs to the State as part of the public domain."74Thus, it is indispensable for a person claiming
title to a public land to show that his title was acquired through such means.75
Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Presidential Decree No.
1073,76 provides:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in the open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, since June 12, 1945,
except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree, likewise
provides:
SECTION 14. Who may apply. - The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance
an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Based on the foregoing parameters, applicants for registration under Section 14(1) of Presidential
Decree No. 1529 must sufficiently establish the following:
1. that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain;

2. that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and
3. that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.77
Land classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. It must be proved.78 To prove that the
subject property is alienable and disposable land of the public domain, respondents presented the
CENRO Certificate dated March 20, 1996 signed by CENR Officer Iluminado C. Lucas and PENR
Officer Isabelo R. Montejo, and verified by Forester Anastacio C. Cabalejo.
However, this Court, in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,79 ruled that a CENRO or PENRO
Certification is not enough to certify that a land is alienable and disposable:
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable. (Emphasis ours.)
Although the survey and certification were done in accordance with Forestry Administrative Order
No. 4-642, issued by the then Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources declaring certain
portions of the public domain situated in Cebu City as alienable and disposable, an actual copy of
such classification, certified as true by the legal custodian of the official records, was not presented
in evidence. This was a crucial mistake. What was presented was the certification80 of Nicomedes R.
Armilla, the Land Evaluation Party Coordinator, that the Cebu CENRO had on file a certified
photocopy of the administrative order. In fact, one of the private oppositors objected to its
submission in evidence for violating the best evidence rule.81
Moreover, DENR Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20 dated May 30, 1988,82 delineated the functions
and authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under Section G(1) of the above DAO, CENROs
issue certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. For those falling above 50
hectares, the issuance of such certificates is within the function of the PENROs, as per Section F(1)
of the same DAO. This delineation, with regard to the offices authorized to issue certificates of land
classification status, was retained in DAO No. 3883dated April 19, 1990.84
In the case at bar, the subject property has an area of 731,380 square meters or 73.138
hectares. Clearly, under DAO No. 38, series of 1990, the subject property is beyond the authority of
the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.85
1wphi 1

It is undisputed that while PENR Officer Montejos signature appears on the CENRO Certificate, it
was under the CENRO that the survey of the subject property was conducted. The certificate was
likewise issued under the CENRO, and not the PENRO. The respondents admit and even
emphasize that it was the CENRO that was involved in the conduct of the survey and issuance of
the certification with respect to the land classification status of the subject property.
In Republic v. Medida,86 this Court said:

This Court x x x holds that the alienability and disposability of land are not among the matters that
can be established by mere admissions, or even the agreement of parties. The law and
jurisprudence provide stringent requirements to prove such fact. Our Constitution, no less, embodies
the Regalian doctrine that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the source of
any asserted right to ownership of land. The courts are then empowered, as we are duty-bound, to
ensure that such ownership of the State is duly protected by the proper observance by parties of the
rules and requirements on land registration.
Unfortunately, respondents were not able to discharge the burden of overcoming the presumption
that the land they sought to be registered forms part of the public domain.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The June 28, 2006 Decision and October 27, 2006
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 78633, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
respondents application for registration and issuance of title to Lot SGS-07-000307, Cebu Cad. 12
Extension, Barangay Quiot, Cebu City, in Land Registration Case No. 1421-N/LRA Rec. No. N67272 filed with the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 20 is accordingly DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167707

October 8, 2008

THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,

THE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, REGIONAL TECHNICAL
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, REGION VI PROVINCIAL
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, AKLAN, REGISTER OF
DEEDS, DIRECTOR OF LAND REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY, petitioners,
vs.
MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and ANICETO YAP, in their
behalf and in behalf of all those similarly situated, respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. G.R. No. 173775

October 8, 2008

DR. ORLANDO SACAY and WILFREDO GELITO, joined by THE LANDOWNERS OF BORACAY
SIMILARLY SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST, ANNEX "A" OF THIS PETITION, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES,
THE REGIONAL TECHNICAL DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
REGION VI, PROVINCIAL ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
AKLAN, respondents.

DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants of Boracay Island to
secure titles over their occupied lands.
There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for review
on certiorari of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondentsclaimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes. The second
is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No.
10645">[3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo classifying Boracay into reserved forest
and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand beaches and warm
crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist destination. The island is also home to
12,003 inhabitants4 who live in the bone-shaped islands three barangays.5
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) approved the
National Reservation Survey of Boracay
Island,6 which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.7
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 18018 declaring
Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as tourist zones and
marine reservesunder the administration of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President
Marcos later approved the issuance of PTA Circular 3-829 dated September 3, 1982, to implement
Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from filing an
application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling purposes,
respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 382 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied lands. They declared that they
themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation in Boracay since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time
immemorial. They declared their lands for tax purposes and paid realty taxes on them.10
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing Circular did not
place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified as a tourist zone, it
was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141,
otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the right to have the lots registered in their names
through judicial confirmation of imperfect titles.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition for declaratory
relief. The OSG countered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain. It
formed part of the mass of lands classified as "public forest," which was not available for disposition
pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the Revised Forestry Code,11 as
amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 382 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was governed by CA No. 141 and PD
No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as alienable and disposable, whatever
possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following facts: (1)
respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay Island; (2) these
parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing trees; (3) the coconut
trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted more or less fifty (50) years
ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were occupying for tax purposes.12
The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal: whether Proclamation
No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of the lands in Boracay. They
decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for resolution upon submission of their
respective memoranda.13
The RTC took judicial notice14 that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more particularly Lots 1
and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 19502 (RO 2222) in the
name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil Case Nos. 5222 and 5262
filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan.15 The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.16
RTC and CA Dispositions
On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA
Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title
to their lands in Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner prescribed
therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by respondent Regional Technical Director
of Lands as the approved survey does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
SO ORDERED.17
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in their name. It
ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned that lands in Boracay
were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition.18 The Circular itself recognized private
ownership of lands.19 The trial court cited Sections 8720 and 5321 of the Public Land Act as basis for
acknowledging private ownership of lands in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public
lands were declared as part of the forest reserve.22
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied.23 The Republic then appealed to the
CA.

On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING the
appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the decision of the lower court.24
The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration that the lands they
occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.
Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied.25 Hence, the present petition
under Rule 45.
G.R. No. 173775
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
issued Proclamation No. 106426 classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400) hectares of
reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and 96/100 (628.96)
hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation likewise provided for a
fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and trails, reserved for right-of-way
and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay,27 Wilfredo Gelito,28 and other
landowners29 in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064.30 They allege that the Proclamation infringed on their "prior
vested rights" over portions of Boracay. They have been in continued possession of their respective
lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have also invested billions of pesos in developing their
lands and building internationally renowned first class resorts on their lots.31
Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation reclassifying Boracay into
agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber land, the island
is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926, known as the first
Public Land Act.32 Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for the required period entitled
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a vested right over
their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public forest land pursuant to Section
3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions of the island are inalienable and cannot
be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect title. It is only the executive department, not the
courts, which has authority to reclassify lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable
lands. There is a need for a positive government act in order to release the lots for disposition.
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as they principally
involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.33
Issues
G.R. No. 167707
The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose
any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire title to their occupied
lands in Boracay Island.34

G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:
I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN CONCEPT OF
OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT
THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY
RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL
LANDS AS DEFINED BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT
TITLES OR PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
II.
HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF PRIVATE
OWNERSHIPOVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND, DESPITE THE FACT
THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN] INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR
PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLEUNDER THE TORRENS SYSTEM?
IV.
IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF THE PRIOR
VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER THEIR LANDS IN
BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION OR IS
PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141, OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE SURVEY AND TO
APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANS FOR PURPOSES OF THE APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE
LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?35 (Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in G.R. No. 167707
and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles over their occupied
portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to judicial confirmation of
imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve their right to secure title under
other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain

Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 190236 in relation to Act No. 926, later amended and/or
superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141;37 (b) Proclamation No. 180138 issued by then
President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 106439 issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the
public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or
timber.40 Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other
classes as may be provided by law,41 giving the government great leeway for classification.42 Then
the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition: national
parks.43 Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.44 Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May
22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of
these grand divisions. Boracay was an unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State
is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such
patrimony.45 The doctrine has been consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitutions.46
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to
the State.47Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable public domain.48 Necessarily, it is up to the
State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed of for private ownership. The
government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to
determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may
be granted such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what
otherwise would be ordinary acts of ownership.49
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the
Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the
Spanish Crown.50 The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of
the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,which laid the foundation that "all lands that were not acquired
from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain."51
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The
Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as
possessory claims.52
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law53 partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and
the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession
of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were set forth in said decree.54 Under Section
393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory information title,55 when duly
inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the lapse of
twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,56 from the
date of its inscription.57 However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the
State.58

In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal
concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or
special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by
purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.59>
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was
embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.60 By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine
Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest
lands.61 The act provided for, among others, the disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute
grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).62 It also provided the definition by
exclusion of "agricultural public lands."63 Interpreting the meaning of "agricultural lands" under the
Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:64
x x x In other words, that the phrase "agricultural land" as used in Act No. 926 means those
public lands acquired from Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x65 (Emphasis
Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes
absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as the Torrens system.66
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the
first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted
corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the controlling stock to lease or
purchase lands of the public domain.67 Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904
was sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.68
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the
second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural
lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same
privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en concepto dueo since time
immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.69
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1,
1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber and mineral lands,70 and
privately owned lands which reverted to the State.71
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and
occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However,
this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942,72 which provided for a simple thirtyyear prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The provision was last amended
by PD No. 1073,73 which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied for since
June 12, 1945, or earlier.74
The issuance of PD No. 89275 on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as
evidence in land registration proceedings.76 Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants
should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity
of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of all unregistered lands77 shall be
governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.

On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property
Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.78 It
governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including
chattel mortgages.79
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the
presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a
positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,80 declassifying inalienable public
land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.81 In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits
alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been "officially delimited and
classified."82
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable.83 To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.84 There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.85 The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.86
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof.87
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of it,
agricultural lands.Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land pursuant to
the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)88 and De Aldecoa v. The Insular
Government (1909).89 These cases were decided under the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902
and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that "in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."90
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did not have the
effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into agricultural lands. It should be
stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 merely provided the manner through which
land registration courts would classify lands of the public domain. Whether the land would be
classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the Philippines had no power
to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and agricultural. At that time, the courts
were free to make corresponding classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit
power to do so, depending upon the preponderance of the evidence.91 This was the Courts ruling
in Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v.
Republic,92 in which it stated, through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:

x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be formally released by an act of
the Executive before it can be deemed open to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v.
Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v. Government is misplaced.
These cases were decided under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926
enacted by the Philippine Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to classify lands of the public
domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so that the courts then were free to make corresponding
classifications in justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence.93
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then necessary to
devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum in Ankron that "the courts have
a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown."94
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an argument that all
lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as disposable and alienable
agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption convert all lands of the public
domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926 would have
automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already classified as timber or mineral
land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these lands out of State ownership and worse,
would be utterly inconsistent with and totally repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases brought under
the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with judicial and
administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an applicant for judicial or
administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It certainly cannot apply to
landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, who failed to avail
themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land remained unclassified and, by virtue
of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land classification was, in
the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was better suited for non-agricultural
uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this
Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-General admitted in effect that
whether the particular land in question belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The
mere fact that a tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself sufficient to
declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral land. There must be some proof of the extent
and present or future value of the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for "agriculture," "forestry," and "mineral" lands, and that in each case it
is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in order to be forestry or mineral land the proof
must show that it is more valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that there exists some trees
upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land may be classified as forestry or mineral today,

and, by reason of the exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land tomorrow.
And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the discovery of valuable minerals, lands
classified as agricultural today may be differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided
upon the proof in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one or
the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a matter of public
knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine Islands are agricultural lands that the courts
have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in a particular land
registration case is forestry or mineral land must, therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior
value for one purpose or the other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each
particular case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient for the courts
to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It may perchance belong to one or the
other of said classes of land. The Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No.
1148, may, by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be considered forestry
land, unless private interests have intervened before such reservation is made. In the latter case,
whether the land is agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests
have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself
what portions of the "public domain" shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land.
(Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)95 (Emphasis ours)
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from the facts of each
case, except those that have already became private lands.96 Act No. 2874, promulgated in 1919
and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive Department, through the President,
the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral
or forest.96-a Since then, courts no longer had the authority, whether express or implied, to determine
the classification of lands of the public domain.97
Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in 1933,98 did not
present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of the propertys land
classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to resolve if the land the
Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When Act No. 926 was supplanted by
Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial confirmation having been filed by private
claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the courts were no longer authorized to determine the
propertys land classification. Hence, private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
We note that the RTC decision99 in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register of Deeds of
Manila,100which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive with the sole power to
classify lands of the public domain was already in effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v.
Insular Government,101 De Aldecoa v. The Insular Government,102 and Ankron v. Government of the
Philippine Islands.103
Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different issue. The pertinent
issue inKrivenko was whether residential lots were included in the general classification of
agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a residential lot. This Court ruled that as
an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935 Constitution104 from acquiring agricultural land, which
included residential lots. Here, the issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are
automatically deemed agricultural.
Notably, the definition of "agricultural public lands" mentioned in Krivenko relied on the old cases
decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De Aldecoa.105 As We have
already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were decided when the Executive did not
have the authority to classify lands as agricultural, timber, or mineral.

Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a presumption
that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued possession of
portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act No. 926106 ipso
facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.107 Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz v.
Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
"Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine
Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and
regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public domain of the
Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the "issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon
public lands," for the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of
imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the
Islands." In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the
Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The
term "public land" referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the
patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands."
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.108 (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are considered public
forest under PD No. 705. The DENR109 and the National Mapping and Resource Information
Authority110 certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the public domain as
public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as "a mass of lands of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of classification for the determination
of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which are not." Applying PD No. 705, all
unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island, areipso facto considered public forests. PD No.
705, however, respects titles already existing prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705 may seem to
be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has been partly stripped of
its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a premier tourist destination for
local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a commercial island resort, rather than a forest
land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach resorts on the
island;111 that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that the implementation of
Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry, do not negate its character as
public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution112 classifying lands of the
public domain into "agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks," do not

necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense growths of trees and
underbrushes.113 The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of Forestry114 is particularly
instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification simply
because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as
forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin cultivators or other
farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas
covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also
be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and
does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of
the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.115(Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in a dictionary and "forest or timber land" as a
classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is descriptive of what
appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes.116 At any
rate, the Court is tasked to determine thelegal status of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical
layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other
commercial establishments, it has not been automatically converted from public forest to alienable
agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an agricultural land. However,
private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by then President Marcos in 1978 entitles
them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The Proclamation classified Boracay, among other
islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of
private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay into an
agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which made Boracay Island an
agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to "private lands"117 and "areas declared as
alienable and disposable"118 does not by itself classify the entire island as agricultural. Notably,
Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private lands and areas but also to public forested
lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority from the PTA. All forested areas
in public lands are declared forest reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely recognizes that the
island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its powers under CA No. 141. In
fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of Forest Developments authority to
declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable by the Bureau of Forest
Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to classify Boracay
Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to classify the island as
alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified the specific limits of each, as
President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not done in Proclamation No. 1801.

The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the declaration of
Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the Philippines, as a tourist
zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure the concentrated efforts of the
public and private sectors in the development of the areas tourism potential with due regard for
ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply put, the proclamation is aimed at
administering the islands for tourism and ecological purposes. It does not address the areas
alienability.119
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-four (64) other
islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde Islands in Batangas,
Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol, Coron Island, Puerto
Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan de Oro, and Misamis
Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist zone makes it alienable and
disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other areas mentioned would likewise be
declared wide open for private disposition. That could not have been, and is clearly beyond, the
intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as alienable
and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141120 provide that it is
only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper department head, who has the authority
to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands.121
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely exercised the authority
granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably subject to existing vested rights.
Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of the Executive Department, through the
Office of the President. Courts have no authority to do so.122 Absent such classification, the land
remains unclassified until released and rendered open to disposition.123
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land and 628.96
hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter buffer zone on each
side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of way and which shall form
part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much less
unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President through
Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification, subject to existing
vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law. Private
claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public forests into agricultural
lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No. 705, President Arroyo can no
longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided
in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:

(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture.
No reclassification of forest or mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity
considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain.
That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the Executive
from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an unclassified land of the
public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,124 the Court
stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not categorically state that the islands
are public forests, the fact that they were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the
absence of the classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land until
released and rendered open to disposition.125 (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a "reclassification" of land. If the land had
never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no prohibited
reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the Department of Justice126 on
this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in Section 4(a) is the word
"reclassification." Where there has been no previous classification of public forest [referring, we
repeat, to the mass of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest purposes and which are not]
into permanent forest or forest reserves or some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code,
there can be no "reclassification of forest lands" to speak of within the meaning of Section 4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against the reclassification of forest
lands to agricultural lands without a prior law delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and
cannot, apply to those lands of the public domain, denominated as "public forest" under the Revised
Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or classified, as needed for forest
purposes in accordance with the provisions of the Revised Forestry Code.127
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA
No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under the said law. There
are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under CA No. 141, namely:
(1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject land by
himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under a bona fide claim of ownership since time
immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the classification of the land as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain.128
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did not convert
portions of Boracay Island into an agricultural land. The island remained an unclassified land of the
public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the Philippine Bill of 1902,
Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the absence of the second element of
alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a government grant under our present Public
Land Act presupposes that the land possessed and applied for is already alienable and disposable.

This is clear from the wording of the law itself.129Where the land is not alienable and disposable,
possession of the land, no matter how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights.130
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Proclamation No.
1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural lands. Private claimants failed
to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of their lands in
Boracay since June 12, 1945.
We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief that private
claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the first element of
possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of private claimants were
issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not sufficient to convince this Court
that the period of possession and occupation commenced on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in possession of the
island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing the island into a tourist
spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them a vested right which cannot
be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not automatically
give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for a title to the land
they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to decide cases based on the
evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and jurisprudence stand, private claimants
are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of title over their occupied portions in Boracay even
with their continued possession and considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development of Boracay Island,
making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The Court also notes that for a
number of years, thousands of people have called the island their home. While the Court
commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply the law strictly and judiciously.
This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended, this does not denote
their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other areas they possess now classified
as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their substantial investments on their occupied
alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of improvements. They
can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they may look into other modes
of applying for original registration of title, such as by homestead131 or sales patent,132 subject to the
conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire title to their
occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present land laws. There is one
such bill133 now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether that bill or a similar bill will
become a law is for Congress to decide.

In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to open up the
island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some sectors which view
the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as absurd. That the island is no longer
overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision to protect its remaining forest cover and to
strike a healthy balance between progress and ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as
economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion and protection are
not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that become more urgent as
destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to control. As aptly observed by Justice
Conrado Sanchez in 1968 inDirector of Forestry v. Munoz:134
The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to public policy that should be
followed with respect to forest lands. Many have written much, and many more have spoken, and
quite often, about the pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection, development
and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests constitute a vital segment of any country's
natural resources. It is of common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on
our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious proportions. Without the trees,
watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish
disappear. Denuded areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will hydroelectric
plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away; geological erosion results. With erosion
come the dreaded floods that wreak havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses,
and highways not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations should be
written down in a lumbermans decalogue.135
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:
1. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 167707 is GRANTED and the Court of Appeals Decision in
CA-G.R. CV No. 71118 REVERSED AND SET ASIDE.
2. The petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 173775 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.