MECANO vs.

COA
G.R. No. 103982
December 11, 1992

FACTS: Mecano is a Director II of the NBI. He was hospitalized and

on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization
expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
In a memorandum to the NBI Director, Director Lim requested
reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled
to the benefits under Section 699 of the RAC, the pertinent
provisions of which read:
Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred
in performance of duty. When a person in the service of the
national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal
district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to
receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of
Department may direct that absence during any period of disability
thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six
months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize
the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation,
subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the
case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if
any there be.
xxx xxx xxx
In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the
performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head
may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary
hospital fees.
Director Lim then forwarded petitioners claim, to the Secretary of
Justice. Finding petitioners illness to be service-connected, the
Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice
favorably recommended the payment of petitioners claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Bello III returned
petitioners claim to Director Lim, having considered
the statements of the Chairman of the COA to the effect

that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the

Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy
of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Drilon
stating that the issuance of the Administrative Code did not
operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the
latter.
Director Lim transmitted anew Mecanos claim to then
Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration; Secretary Drilon
forwarded petitioners claim to the COA Chairman, recommending
payment of the same. COA Chairman however, denied petitioners
claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed
by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that
the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the
Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the
claim may be filed with the Employees Compensation
Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano
occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioners claim was returned by Undersecretary of
Justice Montenegro to Director Lim with the advice that petitioner
elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires.
Hence this petition for certiorari.
ISSUE: 1. WON the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or
abrogated Section 699 of the RAC

HELD: The Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is

hereby ordered to give due course to petitioners claim for benefits
NO
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not
by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The
lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a
repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the
particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be
repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause,
that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title,
is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the
ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature
to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the

scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is

found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:
Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. All laws, decrees, orders, rules and
regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this
repealing clause?
It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing
provision. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal
under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior acts. This latter situation falls under the category
of an implied repeal.
There are two categories of repeal by implication.
1.

Where provisions in the two acts on the same subject

matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the
extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the
earlier one.
2.
2.
If the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one
and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal
the earlier law.
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does
not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old
Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are
not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries
public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699,
and still others.
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice,
what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of
government that pertain to administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because of the many changes that
transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the
RAC decades of years ago.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the
two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an

irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict

because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being
claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative
Code of 1987.
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals
of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is
against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have
enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.
NOTES:
1. the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699
was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that
the same section had been repealed. The COA anchored this
argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:
WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced
by a new Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified
document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles and rules of governance; and
xxx xxx xxx
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code
the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject
matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to
cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may
merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What
is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to
repeal.
2. Regarding COA contention that recovery under this subject
section (699) shall bar the recovery of benefits under the
Employees Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld.
The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on
Employees Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of
the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that
the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised
Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the
system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government.

G.R. No. L-30642 (April 30, 1985)

Floresca vs. Philex Mining Corporation
FACTS:
Several miners, who, while working at the copper mines
underground operations at Tuba, Benguet on June 28, 1967, died as
a result of the cave-in that buried them in the tunnels of the mine.
The heirs of the deceased claimed their benefits pursuant to the
Workmens Compensation Act before the Workmens Compensation
Commission. They also petitioned before the regular courts and
sue Philex for additional damages, pointing out in the complaint
'gross and brazen negligence on the part of Philex in failing to take
necessary security for the protection of the lives of its employees
working underground'. Philex invoked that they can no longer be
sued because the petitioners have already claimed benefits under
the Workmens Compensation Act, which, Philex insists, holds
jurisdiction over provisions for remedies.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the heirs of the deceased have a right of selection
between availing themselves of the workers right under the
Workmens Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts
under the Civil Code for higher damages (actual, moral and
exemplary) from the employers by virtue of that negligence or fault
of the employers or whether they may avail themselves
cumulatively of both actions.
RULING:
The court held that although the other petitioners had received the
benefits under the Workmens Compensation Act, such may not
preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been
remiss in its contractual obligations with the deceased miners only
after receiving compensation under the Act. Had petitioners been

aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by

Philex, and of its negligence, they would not have sought redress
under the Workmens Compensation Commission which awarded a
lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the
first remedy was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which
nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent choice. The case
should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings. However, should the petitioners be successful in their
bid before the lower court, the payments made under the
Workmens Compensation Act should be deducted from the
damages that may be decreed in their favor.
Pesca v. Pesca, G.R. No. 136921, April 17, 2001
FACTS: The petitioner and respondent were married and had four
children. Lorna filed a petition for declaration of nullity of their
marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of
her husband. She alleged that he is emotionally immature and
irresponsible. He was cruel and violent. He was a habitual drinker.
Whenever she tells him to stop or at least minimize his drinking,
her husband would hurt her. There was even a time when she was
chased by a loaded shotgun and threatened to kill her in the
presence of their children. The children also suffered physical
violence. Petitioner and their children left the home. Two months
later, they returned upon the promise of respondent to change. But
he didnt. She was battered again. Her husband was imprisoned for
11 days for slight physical injuries. RTC declared their marriage null
and void. CA reversed RTCs ruling. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N the guidelines for psychological incapacity in the case
of Republic vs CA & Molina should be taken in consideration in
deciding in this case.
HELD: Yes. In the Molina case, guidelines were laid down by the SC
before a case would fall under the category of psychological
incapacity to declare a marriage null and void. This decision has
force and effect of a law. These guidelines are mandatory in nature.
Petition denied.

The "doctrine of stare decisis," ordained in Article 8 of the Civil

Code, expresses that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the
law shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. The rule
follows the settled legal maxim legis interpretado legis vim
obtinet that the interpretation placed upon the written law by a
competent court has the force of law.
G.R. No. L-19650

September 29, 1966

CALTEX (PHILIPPINES), INC vs. ENRICO PALOMAR, in his capacity as

THE POSTMASTER GENERAL
FACTS:
In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest",
which called for participants to estimate the actual number of liters
a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a
specified period.Participants were not required consideration nor
pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products were also required to be
made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each
Caltex station where a sealed can would be provided for the
deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the
media for publicizing the contest but also for the transmission of
communications relative thereto, representations were made by
Caltex with the postal authorities for the contest to be cleared in
advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of
the Revised Administrative Code. Postmaster General Enrico
Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated
the provisions of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial
intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor. Respondent
Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest
violated the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
Issue:

Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the

purview of the prohibitive provisions of the Postal Law.
HELD:
The Postal Law does not allow any lottery, gift enterprise, or
scheme for the distribution of money, or of any real or personal
property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind"
The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX
is not a lottery nor a gift enterprise but rather a gratuitous
distribution of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit.
The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of
prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift exhibitions, prize
concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The
three essential elements of a lottery are: First, consideration;
second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking
the element of consideration, cannot be deemed al lottery. The
rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable consideration
of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to
draw a prize. The term gift enterprise also could not embrace the
scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to
which the chance offered is attached as an inducement to the
purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants
irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.
By virtue of noscitur a sociis which Opinion 217 aforesaid also
relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is
concerned it is only logical that the term under a construction
should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent
with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery
is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the
term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in
the law the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that
element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein included
PEOPLE VS LICERA
SYLLABUS

1. COURT DECISIONS; PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS. Article 8 of

the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution form part of
this jurisdictions legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves are not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws
mean. The application or interpretation merely establishes the
contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports
to carry into effect.
2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE EXEMPTING
SECRET AGENTS FROM THE FIREARM LICENSE REQUIREMENT,
ABANDONED. The rule enunciated in Macarandang (106 Phil.
713) to the effect that the appointment of a civilian as a "secret
agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns
and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within the category of
a peace officer equivalent to a member of the municipal police"
whom Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts
from the requirements relating to firearms licenses, had been
revoked by the rule in Mapa (L-22301, August 30, 1967) which held
that said section provides no exemption for persons appointed as
secret agents by provincial governors from the firearm license
requirement.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EX POST FACTO LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE AGAINST EX POST FACTO LAW APPLIED TO JUDICIAL
DOCTRINES. Where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule, the
new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not
adversely affect those favored by the old rule, especially those who
relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds more
especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the
field of penal law, for, in this area, more than in any other it is
imperative that the punishability of an act be reasonably foreseen
for the guidance of society.
4. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE
OBTAINING AT THE TIME OF POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY SECRET
AGENT APPLIES. Where the rule obtaining not only at the time of
his appointment as secret agent, but as well as at the time of his
apprehension, Accused as such secret agent was exempt from the
firearm license requirements under Section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code and therefore incurred no criminal liability for
possession of the firearm, a subsequent rule holding that said law

does not exempt a secret agent from the firearm license

requirement shall not adversely affect said accused who was
favored by the abandoned doctrine.

DECISION

CASTRO, J.:

This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the

judgment dated August 14, 1968 of the Court of First Instance of
Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five
(5) years. We reverse the judgment of conviction, for the reasons
hereunder stated.
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog,
Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint, subscribed and sworn to by
him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging
Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55,
Caliber .30. On August 13, 1966 the municipal court rendered
judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged, sentencing
him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one
day to six years and eight months of imprisonment. Licera
appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of
the case for illegal possession of firearm and another case, likewise
filed against Licera with the municipal court but already forwarded
to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a
person in authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same
occasion: apprehension of Licera by the Chief of Police and a
patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of
the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.
On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting
Licera of the charge of assault upon an agent of a person in
authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm,
sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering
the forfeiture of the Winchester rifle in favor of the Government.

Liceras appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16,

1974 to this Court as involving only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the
Winschester rifle his appointment as secret agent on December 11,
1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that as
secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to
People v. Macarandang, 1 was exempt from the requirements
relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges
that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People v.
Mapa 2 which held that section 879 of the Revised Administrative
Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret
agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to
firearm licenses.
The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the
rule that should be applied to the case at bar that enunciated in
Macarandang or that in Mapa.
The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears
the date "December 11, 1961" includes a grant of authority to
Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L12088 dated December 23, 1959, you will have the right to bear a
firearm . . . for use in connection with the performance of your
duties." Under the rule then prevailing enunciated in Macarandang,
3 the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of
crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a peace
officer equivalent even to a member of the municipal police"
whom section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts
from the requirement relating to firearm licenses.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution form
part of this jurisdictions legal system. These decisions, although in
themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean.
The application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is
part of the law as of the date of the enactment of the said law
since the Courts application or interpretation merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law
purports to carry into effect. 4
At the time of Liceras designation as secret agent in 1961 and at

the time of his apprehension for possession of the Winchester rifle

without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the
Revised Administrative Code formed part of our jurisprudence
and, hence, of this jurisdictions legal system. Mapa revoked the
Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new
doctrine abrogates an old rule, the new doctrine should operate
prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored
by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on
the faith thereof. This holds more especially true in the application
or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for, in this
area, more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability
of an act be reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. 5
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of
Liceras appointment as secret agent, which appointment included
a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle, but as well at
the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability
for possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance
with the legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is
hereby acquitted. Costs de oficio.

G.R. No. L-48137

October 4, 1943

In re testate estate of NARCISO A. PADILLA.

CONCEPCION PATERNO VDA. DE PADILLA, widow-appellee,
vs.
ISABEL BIBBY VDA. DE PADILLA, executrix-appellant.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case is an incident of the settlement of the testate estate of
the late Narciso A. Padilla. In order that his property may be
divided according to his last will and testament, it is necessary first
to liquidate the conjugal partnership. It was in connection with
such liquidation that the widow, Concepcion Paterno Vda. de
Padilla, commenced the instant proceedings by filing a petition
wherein she prayed, inter alia, that her paraphernal property be
segregated from the inventoried estate and delivered to her

together with the corresponding reimbursements and indemnities;

that she be given one-half of the conjugal partnership property;
and that her usufructuary right over one-half of the portion
pertaining to the heir instituted in the will be recognized. The Court
of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment declaring certain
pieces of real estate and jewelry as well as certain sums of money
to be paraphernal, and ordering the same to be delivered to the
widow (appellee herein). The trial court's judgment, as amended,
reads:
En vista de los hechos y consideraciones que preceden, el
Juzgado dicta sentencia y declara:
(a) Que todos los bienes que constan en el inventario, y
sobre los cuales no se ha suscitado controversia por las
partes, son bienes gananciales;
(b) Que se nombran tres (3) Comisionados, uno a
recomendacion de la heredera instituida en el testamento,
otro a recomendacion de Da. Concepcion Paterno Vda. de
Padilla, y el tercero por el Juzgado, para que se hagan
cargo de avaluar las fincas o partes de fincas que se deben
justipreciar de conformidad con las conclusiones sentadas
en esta decision hagan las computaciones
correspondientes a fin de determinar el remanente liquido
de la sociedad de gananciales, tomando por base los
precios calculados y avaluados sobre dichos bienes, y
dividan por mitad el remanente liquido entre Da.
Concepcion Paterno Vda. de Padilla, y la heredera
testamentaria Da. Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla,
especificando los bienes que a cada una debe
corresponder;
(c) Que pagadas todas las deudas de la sociedad de
gananciales, dichos comisionados procederan a dividir en
tres partes los bienes que deben corresponder al difunto, a
fin de que las dos terceras partes sean adjudicadas a la
heredera testamentaria en pleno dominio, y la otra tercera
parte en nuda propiedad a la misma heredera
testamentaria y en usufructo a la viuda Concepcion
Paterno mientras ella viva.lawphil.net

(d) Que los gastos en que incurra esta Testamentaria por

los servicios de los Comisionados se paguen por ambas
partes, por mitad.
From the foregoing judgment the testator's mother and instituted
heir, Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, appeals.
I
The value in controversy being over P50,000, we have reviewed
the evidence. After a careful examination of the oral and
documentary proof, we find no error in the findings of fact made by
the trial court. From the evidence it appears that Narciso A. Padilla
and Concepcion Paterno were married on December 12, 1912. The
husband, who was a medical student, contributed a small capital to
the conjugal partnership at the time of the marriage. The wife, on
the other hand, brought to the marriage considerable property in
real estate, jewelry and cash. Practically all of the conjugal
partnership property came from the fruits of the paraphernal
property. The conjugal partnership lasted twenty-one years, the
husband having died on February 12, 1934. (The wife also died
recently, during the pendency of this appeal, but in this decision
she is referred to as if still living.) The common fortune, consisting
of real and personal property, is fairly large. The husband, who left
no children, executed a will giving his whole estate to his mother,
Isabel Bibby Vda. de Padilla, appellant herein. The property
included in the inventory is appraised at P261,000. Seven pieces of
real estate are in controversy in this case. The remaining ten real
properties left by the deceased husband admittedly pertain to the
conjugal partnership.
A thorough study of the evidence convinces us that the trial court
was right in finding that the following properties in Manila are
paraphernal: (1) the lot at 305 Arquiza Street and the demolished
improvements; (2) the lot at 1393-1409 Juan Luna Street and the
improvements that had been torn down; (3) the lot and
improvements (except the building constructed during the
marriage for P4,000) at 401-407 Camba Street; (4) the lot at 613631 and 634-636 Martin Ocampo Street, with the original
"accesorias" and a camarin which was destroyed in order that new
"accesorias" might be constructed, these new "accesorias" being of
the conjugal partnership; (5) the property at 620-A-H Callejon De la

Fe; (6) one-half of the property at 631 Regidor Street; and (7) nine
twenty-ninths (9/29) of the property at 302-306 R. Hidalgo Street.
We also agree with the finding of the lower court that certain
jewels, namely: two pairs of ear-rings, a bracelet, and a gold watch,
belong to the widow.
In like manner, we see no error in the following findings of the trial
court: (1) that the husband borrowed P7,000 from the wife to meet
his personal obligations; and (2) that the amount of P21,046.52
(the remainder of P66,046.52) received by the wife during the
marriage was commingled with the conjugal partnership funds.
II
Several questions of law are raised in the present appeal. We shall
discuss them one by one.
1. The first legal controversy is on a sort of no-man's land where
many a legal battle has been fought. The issue is, How far is a
Torrens title conclusive and incontestable? Various manifestations
of this legal question have been decided by the courts, and while
certain of its aspects may still be doubtful, we are persuaded,
however, that there can be no doubt, as will presently be shown,
that what appears in the Torrens certificate in this case is neither
final nor incontrovertible.
Appellant contends that because certain of these real estates (on
Camba, Martin Ocampo and Regidor Streets) have been registered
in the names of both spouses, Narciso Padilla and Concepcion
Paterno de Padilla, and considering the presumption in Art. 1407 of
the Civil Code, these properties must be held to be of the conjugal
partnership. The trial court, however, found that the whole
purchase price of the Camba and Martin Ocampo properties, and
one-half of the purchase price of the Regidor property, were from
the wife's exclusive funds, and therefore the whole of the original
Camba and Ocampo estates and one-half of the Regidor realty
must be adjudged paraphernal, in spite of the fact that the
certificates of title are in the names of both spouses.
There is nothing sacrosanct and definitive in the certificate of title
when the conjugal partnership is liquidated. The true and real

owner may be shown whether it be the husband, or the wife, or

both. Thus, in Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, this Court held that
property acquired during the marriage but registered in the
husband's name still belonged to the conjugal partnership. A
similar ruling was announced when the real estate was registered
in the wife's name. Romero vs. Sheriff, 53 Phil., 51. But the
appellant maintains that the converse is not true; and that even if
evidence is admissible to alter the conjugal character of the
property, such evidence must be clear, strong and convincing
(citing Art 1407, Civil Code, and Ahern vs. Julian, 39 Phil., 607).
We are of the opinion that an exception should in no wise be made
when the property is registered in the names of both spouses. In
such instances, the property may be shown to be really of either
spouse, though recorded in the names of both. The underlying
reason is the same in all cases, which is the confidential relation
between husband and wife. Because of the feelings of trust
existing between the spouses, certificates of title are often secured
in the name of both, or of either, regardless of the true ownership
of the property, and regardless of the source of the purchase
money. It is thus but fair that on liquidation of the partnership, the
trust should be recognized and enforced, so that the real
ownership of the property may be established. The principle that a
trustee who takes a Torrens title in his name cannot repudiate the
trust by relying on the registration, is one of the well-known
limitations upon the finality of a decree of title.
(See Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil., 343). It is because a certificate
of title under the Torrens system should not be turned into an
instrument for deprivation of ownership. The Torrens plan, created
to protect dominion, is not a Frankenstein that destroys this very
dominion. A trust, deriving its strength from confidence, which runs
though with the woof and warp of the social fabric, does not lose
that character on the plea that a Torrens certificate of title is
conclusive. It is meet and seemly that this should be so, for any
rule that permits the violation of a fiduciary duty would be a
reproach to any legal system. These observations apply with
peculiar force to the relations between husband and wife. In a
normal marriage, the spouses trust each other so implicitly that
they attach little or no importance to what appears in legal
documents, fully and unreservedly believing that no technicality
would be availed of to claim what in very truth pertains to one or
the other. Things would indeed come to a sorry pass if the
jurisprudence of this country should harbor any theory which would

impair this intimate reliance, this unquestioning loyalty, this

befitting faith between husband and wife.

partnership, and any depreciation should be suffered by the

partnership.

There is another reason why evidence of the nature of any property

as paraphernal should be allowed, despite the Torrens certificate. It
is this: the manager of the conjugal partnership is the husband. He
may, without let or hindrance, deal with and dispose of any
property appearing in the names of both spouses, even if the
property should really be paraphernal. In the course of years, any
such property may have been sold, transformed or substituted.
Upon liquidation of the conjugal partnership, to forbid an
investigation of the true source of the purchase price of the original
property, after many years of marriage, would make liquidation a
mockery, for it would be well nigh impossible to trace and identity
the paraphernal property. The law positively ordains that the wife's
property (dowry and paraphernal) should be returned, even before
the payment of the debts of the conjugal partnership (Art. 1421
and 1422, Civil Code). But how can this mandate of the law be
complied with when the means to that end are withheld and
forbidden?

Article 1404, Civil Code, provides:

As for the appellants proposition that the evidence to rebut the

Torrens certificates and the legal presumption in favor of the
conjugal partnership (Art. 1407) should be clear, strong and
convincing, we find that the proof, both oral and documentary, in
the record is more than sufficient to offset and counteract the
certificates of title and the presumption of law.
2. The second legal inquiry is the interpretation of Article 1404,
par. 2, Civil Code: whether the value of the paraphernal land to be
reimbursed to the wife is that obtaining at the time of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. With conjugal funds the
husband constructed buildings on the wife's lots on Arquiza, Juan
Luna, Camba and Martin Ocampo streets. The court a quo ordered
that the value of the lots occupied by these constructions, to be
paid to the widow, should be that prevailing at the time of the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
Appellant claims such pronouncement of the trial court to be
erroneous because from the time of the construction of the
buildings, the conjugal partnership became the owner of the whole
property (lot and building) in each instance, and therefore the
subsequent increase in value should accrue to the conjugal

Las expensas utiles hechas en los beines peculiares de

cualquiera de los conyuges mediante anticipaciones de la
sociedad o por la industria del marido o de la mujer, son
ganaciales.
Los seran tambien los edificios construidos durante el
matrimonio en suelo propio de uno de los conyuges
abonandose el valor del suelo al conyuge a quien
pertenezca.
Appellant's theory is untenable. The ownership of the land is
retained by the wife until she is paid the value of the lot, as a result
of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. The mere
construction of a building from common funds does not
automatically convey the ownership of the wife's land to the
conjugal partnership. Such a mode of using the land, namely, by
erecting a building thereon, is simply an exercise of the right of
usufruct pertaining to the conjugal partnership over the wife's land.
As Manresa says, "la sociedad de gananciales es realmente la
usufructuaria de los bienes privativos de cada conyuge."
(Comment on Art. 1408.) In consequence of this usufructuary right,
the conjugal partnership is not bound to pay any rent during the
occupation of the wife's land because if the lot were leased to a
third person, instead of being occupied by the new construction
from partnership funds, the rent from the third person would
belong to the conjugal partnership. Therefore, before payment of
the value of the land is made from the common funds, inasmuch as
the owner of the land is the wife, all the increase or decrease in its
value must be for her benefit or loss. And when may she demand
payment? Not until the liquidation of the conjugal partnership
because up to that time, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to
transfer to the partnership the dominion over the land, which is
lawfully held in usufruct by the conjugal partnership during the
marriage.
The foregoing finds support, by analogy, in Article 361, Civil Code,
which reads:

Art. 361. El dueo del terreno en que se edificare,

sembrare o plantare de buena fe, tendra derecho a hacer
suya la obra, siembra o plantacion, previa
la indemnizacion establecida en los arts. 453 y 454, o a
obligar al que fabrico o planto a pagarle el precio del
terreno, y al que sembro, la renta correspondiente.
(Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, no reimbursement for the value of the lots was
made from the common funds during the marriage.
Moreover, Sanchez Roman declares:
Los derechos de la muyer en la sociedad legal de
gananciales se remiten todos a la epoca de su disolucion y
liquidacion, cuando se trata de la existencia normal de la
sociedad legal de gananciales. (Emphasis supplied.)
And Manresa states:
El valor fijado a los bienes debe ser el que realmente
tengan el dia de la disolucion de la sociedad, con las
necesarias aclaraciones, para conocer lo que pueda tener
caracter propio o ganancial. (Emphasis supplied).
Furthermore, the wife should not be allowed to demand payment of
the lot during the marriage and before liquidation because this
would unduly disturb the husband's management of the conjugal
partnership. The scheme of the Civil Code is that in the interest of
successful administration of the common property, the wife should
not interfere with the husband's way of directing the affairs of the
partnership. Besides, such premature requirement of the value
making improvements, whereas article 1404, par. 2, has for its
purpose the encouragement of construction by the husband.
(Manresa's comment on Art. 1404.) On the other hand, if the
payment for the lot is deferred till the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership, the initial outlay for the erection of the building would
be less, and consequently the construction would be facilitated.
3. The next question of law is whether the value of the paraphernal
buildings which were demolished to make possible the construction
of new ones, at the expense of the conjugal partnership, should be

reimbursed to the wife. Such tearing down of buildings was done

with regard to the Arquiza, Juan Luna and Martin Ocampo
properties. Appellant maintains that it is doubtful if these buildings
had any value at the time they were destroyed, and that there is
no evidence that the conjugal partnership realized any benefit
therefrom. However, we are certain these old buildings had some
value, though small, and it will be the duty of the commissioners
mentioned in the judgment appealed from, to assess that value.
We entertain no manner of doubt that the conjugal partnership
derived a positive advantage from the demolition, which made it
possible to erect new constructions for the partnership. It is but
just, therefore, that the value of the old buildings at the time they
were torn down should be paid to the wife. We dismiss, as without
any merit whatever, the appellant's contention that because article
1404, par. 2, of the Civil Code does not provide for the
reimbursement of the value of demolished improvements, the wife
should not be indemnified. Suffice it to mention the ancient maxim
of the Roman law, "Jure nature aequum est, meminem cum alterius
detrimento et injuria fieri locupletiorem" which was restated by the
Partidas in these terms: "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse
tortizeramente con dano de otro." When the statutes are silent or
ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental principles which the
courts invoke in order to arrive at a solution that would respond to
the vehement urge of conscience.
4. Then, there is the total amount of P7,000 borrowed by the
husband from the wife, thus itemized: (1) P3,000 lost in horseraces and in poker; (2) P3,000 spent for pastime ("diversion"); and
(3) P1,000 to pay a personal debt of the husband. The trial court
applied article 1386 of the Civil Code, and ordered that said
amount of P7,000 be deducted from the husband's share. But
appellant's theory is that articles 1408 (par. 1) and 441 should
govern, so that the amount is chargeable against the conjugal
partnership. These provisions read thus:
Art. 1408. Seran de cargo de la sociedad de gananciales:
1.o. Todas las deudas y obligaciones contraidas durantes el
matrimonio por el marido, y tabien las que contrajere la
mujer en los casos en que pueda legalmente obligar a la
sociedad. . . .

Art. 1411. Lo perdido y pagado durante el matrimonio por

alguno de los conyuges en cualquier clase de juego, no
disminuira su parte respectiva de los ganaciales. . . .
It is true that article 1385 ordains that the fruits of the paraphernal
property form part of the conjugal partnership and are subject to
the payment of the charges against the marriage. But as Manresa
says, article 1386 contains a limitation on the first part (just cited)
of article 1385.
It is likewise true that under article 1408, par. 1, all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband during the marriage are
chargeable against the conjugal partnership, but article 1386 is an
exception to the rule, and exempts the fruits of the paraphernal
property from the payment of the personal obligations of the
husband, unless there is proof that they redounded to the benefit
of the family. It is self-evident that the amounts in question did not
benefit the family. Hence, they cannot be charged against the fruits
of the paraphernal property. They should be paid from the
husband's funds. We quote from Manresa's comment on article
1386:
No hay, desde luego, contradiccion entre los preceptos de
los articulos 1408 y 1386; hay solo una regla general
contenida en aquel, y una excepcion contenida en este. El
articulo 1386, como especial, modifica la regla, y ha de
aplicarse siempre que las obligaciones personales
contraidas por el marido quieren hacerse efectivas en
frutos o rentas de los bienes parafernales de la mujer.
La frase 'obligaciones personales', se reduce a deudas u
obligaciones contraidas privativamente por el marido,
deudas y obligaciones que son desde luego propiamente
personales o no reales, pues si se reclamase contra bienes
o derecho especial y legalmente efectos al cumplimiento
de la obligacion, no podria haber inconveniente para que
esta se hiciese efectiva. Por lo demas, el espiritu del
precepto es que el marido no puede aprovecharse en
interes proprio o para atenciones privativas o personales
suyas, de los frutos de los bienes parafernales; que estos
se destinen a las verdaderas necesidades y cargas de la
sociedad conyugal, y, por tanto, se emplean, como deben,
en beneficio de la familia.

Valverde in his "Tratado de Derecho Civil Espaol," Vol. 4, pp. 347348, says:
Consecuencia natural de esta especie de separacion de
responsabilidades y de patrimonios, es que el Codigo
ordene que 'las obligaciones personales del marido no
podran hacerse efectivas sobre los frutos de los bienes
parafernales, a menos que se pruebe que redundaron en
provecho de la familia'. En efecto, el marido, como
administrador de la sociedad legal, obliga a esta con sus
actos, y por eso los gananciales responden de las deudad y
obligaciones contraidas por el marido durante el
matrimonio, presumiendose hechos en interes de la
sociedad, a no ser que se pruebe lo contrario, pero como
caso de excepcion, si los gananciales son frutos de bienes
parafernales, entonces, para que respondan tales frutos de
las obligaciones del marido, es preciso que prueba este
que las dichas obligaciones redundaron en provecho de la
familia, pues por el precepto del codigo, si los frutos de los
parafernales son gananciales, cuando de las deudad del
marido se trata, solo son responsables esos frutos en el
caso que se demuestre que redundaron en provecho de
aquella. (Emphasis supplied.)
Oyuelos, in his work, "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia
Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol" (Vol. 6, pp. 79-80), has this to
say:
(c) Fundamento de la exencion de los frutos. El articulo
1386 es un complemento de los articulos 1385, 1408,
1413, 1417, 1433 y 1434, y se inspira en los mismos
principios economicos de la familia, porque si los frutos de
los parafernales forman parte de la sociedad conyugal, que
subsiste mientras no se disuelva el matrimonio o se
decrete la separacion de bienes, y si a cargo de la misma
corre el sostenimiento de la familia, la educacion de los
hijos y las deudas que el marido contraiga como jefe de
ella, es logico concluir, sobre todo teniendo presente el
articulo 1385, que aun prescindiendo del texto claro y
terminante del articulo 1386, las responsabilidades del
marido en tanto puedan hacerse efectivas con los
productos de dichos bienes en cuanto se hubiesen
contraido en provecho de la familia; no existiendo

contradiccion entre los articulos 1386 y 1408, numero 1.0

(alegada en el concepto de que el articulo 1386 no puede
aplicarse al caso de subsistencia del matrimonio), por
cuanto la esfera de actuacion del 1386 no se contrae al
estado de derecho consiguiente a la separacion de bienes
de los respectivos esposos.
Is the amount under consideration, P7,000, being enforced against
the fruits of the paraphernal property? Yes, because practically all
of the conjugal partnership assets have been derived from the
fruits of the wife's exclusive property.
In the case of Fidelity and Surety Co. vs. Ansaldo, 37 Off. Gaz.,
1164, (promulgated November 26, 1938), this Court held:
Article 1386 of the Civil Code provides that the personal obligations
of the husband may not be paid out of the fruits of the paraphernal
property, unless it be proved that such obligations redounded to
the benefit of the family. It, as contended by the appellant, the
properties levied upon in Civil Case No. 33923 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, entitled "Fidelity & Surety Company of the
Philippines Islands vs. Romarico Agcaoili and Angel A. Ansaldo"
were acquired with the fruits of the paraphernal properties
belonging to Margarita Quintos, said properties, although conjugal
(art. 1385, par. 1 and art. 1408, Civil Code; Mirasol vs. Lim, 59 Phil.,
701, 709) are not liable for the personal obligations of the
husband, unless said obligations redounded to the benefit of the
family. Paragraph 1 of article 1408 of the Civil Code makes all debts
and obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband
chargeable against the conjugal partnership, as a general rule, that
is to say, although the fruits of the paraphernal property of the wife
are conjugal, they do not respond for the personal obligations of
the latter unless said obligations have redounded to the benefit of
the family."
In the sentence of January 15, 1917, of the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain, the following doctrine is enunciated:
Considerando a mayor abundamiento que si bien en orden
al regimen familiar y conforme a la doctina legal
establecida por el Tribunal Supremo, interpretando el art.
1385 del expresado Codigo, al marido incumbe

exclusivamente la administracion de los frutos de los

bienes parafernales como parte del haber de la sociedad
conyugal, esta potsted esta condicionada y regulada por el
1386, al prohibir al esposo el aprovechamiento de tales
rendimientos en benficio propio o sea de sus obligaciones
personales,imponiendole por modo expreso, el deber de
aplicarlos al levantamiento de las cargas matrimoniales,
pues de otra forma se desnaturalizaria la reserva y
privilegio que constituye el concepto del patrimonia
parafernal, con riesgo de infringir la disposicion legal que
precede invocada. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the instant case, it is quite plain that if the amount of P7,000.00
under review should be charged against the conjugal partnership
property which came almost exclusively from the fruits of the
paraphernal property, the reservation and privilege established by
law on behalf of the paraphernal patrimony would be encroached
upon and tempered with.
There are just and sound reasons for article 1386. The wife
contributes the fruits, interests, and rents of her paraphernal
property to help bear the expenses of the family. When the
husband contracts any debt in his own name, it is chargeable
against the conjugal partnership as a general rule (article 1408,
par. 1) because it is presumed that the debt is beneficial to the
family. But when such a debt is enforced against the fruits of the
paraphernal property, such a presumption no longer applies,
considering article 1386. On the contrary, it must be proved that
the purpose for which the wife contributes the fruits of her
paraphernal property has been accomplished through such
personal debt of the husband.
Appellant relies on article 1411 which reads:
Lo perdido y pagado por alguno de los conyuges en juego
licito, sera a cargo de la sociedad de gananciales.
Lo perdido y no pagado por alguno de los conyuges en
juego licito, sera a cargo de la sociedad de ganaciales.
But this provision should be applied only when the debt is not
being charged against the fruits of the paraphernal property. If the

conjugal partnership assets are derived almost entirely, if not

entirely, from the fruits of the paraphernal property, as in this case,
it is neither lawful nor equitable to apply article 1411 because by
so doing, the fruits of the paraphernal property would in reality be
the only kind of property to bear the husband's gambling losses. In
other words, what the husband loses in gambling should be
shouldered by him and not by the conjugal partnership if the
latter's assets come solely from the fruits of the paraphernal
property. This is but just, because gambling losses of the husband
cannot by any process of reasoning be considered beneficial to the
family. By the same token, to charge the gambling losses against
the conjugal partnership in such a situation would fly in the case of
the stern prohibition of article 1386, which protects the fruits of the
paraphernal property precisely against expenses of the husband
that are of no help to the family.
We are satisfied that the foregoing is by and large a fair and
rational interpretation of articles 1408 and 1411, which must be
read in the light of article 1386. If such a qualification of articles
1408 and 1411 is not made, article 1386 becomes nugatory.
5. The next question is whether interest should be paid by the
widow on the amount of P9,229.48 withdrawn by her from the
Monte de Piedad savings account No. 3317 of the conjugal
partnership. There is no question that the principal should be
credited to the partnership as the appellee's counsel does not
dispute this point. The withdrawal of said amount was made on
April 7, 1934, about two months after the husband's death, and
while the widow was a special administratrix. There being no
evidence in the record as to the purpose for which this amount was
used, although counsel for appellee suggests the possibility that
the same might have been disbursed for funeral and similar
expenses, we believe she should pay such interest, if any, as the
Monte de Piedad would have paid on the amount aforesaid, had
not the same been withdrawn by the widow.
Wherefore, with the modification that the appellee shall pay such
interest, if any, on P9,229.48 as the Monte de Piedad would have
paid if the amount had not been withdrawn, the judgment
appealed from should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the appellant. So ordered.
Martinez v Van Buskirk Digest

Facts:
1. On the 11th day of September, 1908, Carmen Ong de Martinez,
was riding a carromata in Ermita, Manila when a delivery wagon
owned by the defendant (used for the transportation of fodder and
to which two horses are attached), came from the opposite
direction, while their carromata went close to the sidewalk in order
to let the delivery wagon pass by. However, instead of merely
passing by, the horses ran into the carromata occupied by the
plaintiff with her child and overturned it, causing a serious cut
upon the plaintiffs head.
3. The defendant contends that the cochero, who was driving his
delivery wagon at the time of the accident, was actually a good
servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero. He also
claims that the cochero was tasked to deliver some forage at Calle
Herran, and for that purpose the defendants employee tied the
driving lines of the horses to the front end of the delivery wagon
for the purpose of unloading the forage to be delivered. However, a
vehicle passed by the driver and made noises that frightened the
horses causing them to run. The employee failed to stop the horses
since he was thrown upon the ground.
4. From the stated facts, the court ruled that the defendant was
guilty of negligence. The court specifically cited a paragraph of
Article 1903 of the Civil Code. Hence, this is appeal to reverse such
decision.
Issue: Whether or not the employer, who has furnished a gentle
and tractable team (of horses) and a trusty and capable driver, is
liable for the negligence of such driver.
NO. The cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the
horses in the manner described by the evidence in this case. It is
believed that acts or performances which, in a long time, have not
been destructive and which are approved by the society are
considered as custom. Hence, they cannot be considered as
unreasonable or imprudent.
The reason why they have been permitted by the society is that
they are beneficial rather that prejudicial. One could not easily hold
someone negligent because of some act that led to an injury or

accident. It would be unfair therefore to render the cochero

negligent because of such circumstances.
The court further held that it is a universal practice of merchants
during that time to deliver products through horse-drawn vehicles;
and it is also considered universal practice to leave the horses in
the manner in which they were left during the accident. It has been
practiced for a long time and generally has not been the cause of
accidents or injuries the judgment is therefore reversed.
FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF ART. 11-12 OF THE CIVIL CODE In The
Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm
Name Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon etc. 92 SCRA 1 July 30, 1979
Melencio-Herrera,

.: Facts: The surviving parters of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta filed a

petition praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the
name of their firm, the names of their partner who passed away.
One of the petitioners arguments stated that no local custom
prohibits the continued use of a deceased partners name in a
professional firms name in so far as Greater Manila Area is
concerned. No custom exists which recognizes that the name of a
law firm necessarily identifies the individual members of the firm.
They also stated that the continued use of a deceased partners
name in the firm name of law partnerships has been consistently
allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted practice in the legal
profession of most countries in the world. Issue: Whether or not the
law firm Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes is allowed

to sustain the name of their deceased partner, Atty. Herminio

Ozaeta, in the name of their firm. Held: NO. Canon 33 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association stated the following: The continued use of the name
of a deceased or former partner when permissible by local custom,
is not unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. No local custom permits
or allows the continued use of a deceased or former partners
name in the firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under
Philippine custom, identify the more active or senior partners in a
firm. Firm names in the Philippines change and evolve when
partners die, leave or a new one is added. It is questionable to add
the new name of a partner and sustain the name of the deceased
one since they have never been, technically, partners in the first
place. When it comes to the arguments of the petitioners stating
that U.S. Courts grant the continued use of the deceased partners
name, this is so because in the U.S., it is a sanctioned custom as
stated in the case of
Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society
(33 N.Y.S 2d 733). This does not apply in the Philippines. The
petition filed herein is denied and petitioner is advised to drop the
name OZAETA from the firm name.