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PIP ELEGL02
Arc Flash Implementation Guideline
PRINTING HISTORY
September 2011 Issued
Not printed with State funds
September 2011
PIP ELEGL02
Arc Flash Implementation Guideline
Table of Contents
1. Introduction....................................2
1.1 Purpose...............................................2
1.2 Scope..................................................2
2. References......................................2
2.1 Industry Codes and Standards............2
3. Definitions.......................................2
4. General............................................3
4.5 Backup Protection Considerations......3
5. Markings..........................................4
5.8 Maintenance Switches........................5
5.9 Multiple PPE Labels............................5
General................................................6
Arc Resistant Equipment.....................7
Remote Operation...............................8
Low Voltage Motor Control Center Design
System Selectivity.............................10
System Design..................................12
Procedures........................................14
Integration of Multiple Mitigation Methods
15
APPENDIXES
APPENDIX A ARC RESISTANT SWITCHGEAR CONSIDERATIONS
A-1 Arc Resistant Switchgear - General. A-1
A-2 Medium Voltage Arc Resistant Switchgear
A-1
A-3 Low Voltage Arc Resistant SwitchgearA-3
Page 1 of 15
1.
Introduction
1.1
Purpose
This Practice provides guidance for implementing arc flash hazard analysis results for
electrical installations.
1.2
Scope
This Practice describes guidelines for signage, equipment, and design applications for
electrical installations that are used to mitigate hazards identified by arc flash hazard
analysis. This Practice does not cover calculations of arc flash energy.
2.
References
Applicable parts of the following industry codes and standards shall be considered an integral
part of this Practice. The edition in effect on the date of contract award shall be used, except as
otherwise noted. Short titles are used herein where appropriate.
2.1
3.
Definitions
arc flash hazard analysis: Analysis of the electrical system performed to determine the flash
protection boundary and the personal protective equipment that people within the flash protection
boundary should use
arc flash calculations: Calculations used to determine the incident energy at a given distance
(e.g., in cal/cm2). Three standard methods for performing arc flash calculations are recognized:
NFPA 70E, IEEE 1584 and IEEE C2.
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arc flash protection boundary: An approach limit at a distance from exposed live parts within
which a person can receive a second degree burn if an electrical arc flash occurred (i.e., point at
which the incident energy equals 1.2 cal/ cm2)
arc resistant switchgear: Switchgear designed to withstand the effects of an internal arcing fault
incident energy: Amount of energy impressed on a surface, a certain distance from the source,
generated during an electrical arc event
maintenance switch: A device used to change a protective scheme (e.g., relay setpoints) to reduce
the fault clearing time (frequently at the expense of selectivity) to reduce arc flash energy during
maintenance activities
4.
General
4.1
This Practice is intended for use by persons knowledgeable of the applicable codes and
standards, electrical system design, operations and maintenance of electrical facilities and
arc flash calculations.
4.2
This Practice may be used to aid in the design of new installations or the review and
refurbishment of existing installations and should be used to prepare company or facility
specifications.
4.3
This Practice does not cover calculations of arc flash energy, but is only intended for the
application of the results of the calculations. However, there are differences in the
applicability and results between the calculations in NFPA 70E and IEEE 1584.
4.4
The first method to mitigate arc flash hazards shall be to work the equipment de-energized.
OSHA 29 CFR Subpart S1910.333 limits conditions where energized work is permitted. See
also IEEE 1584, Section 4.1 and NFPA 70E, Section 130.1 and Annex F.
4.5
4.5.2
4.5.3
4.6
The clearing times used can have major implications on the methodologies used
to mitigate arc flash.
This Practice describes several methods that may be used for implementation of arc flash
requirements and mitigation of personnel risks. Typically, one or more methods are
combined.
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4.7
Implementation of an arc flash mitigation plan can have an impact on the operation and
maintenance of electrical equipment. Therefore, these disciplines should be consulted
during the process of developing a mitigation plan.
4.8
Both the parameters used for arc flash calculations and the reasoning used to apply
marking and mitigation should be consistent throughout a facility. A reduction in the
variety of operating procedures and systems helps reduce the possibility of error.
4.9
An arc flash hazard analysis should be updated after major modifications and also
periodically, not to exceed 5 years, in accordance with NFPA 70E, Section 130.3.
Markings
5.1
NFPA 70-2011, Section 110.16 requires electrical equipment in other than dwelling units
to be field marked to warn qualified persons of potential electric arc flash hazards.
NFPA 70 also states that the field marks (i.e., labels, signs) must be clearly visible before
a qualified person enters a hazard condition. NFPA 70, however, gives only examples of
equipment that may require the markings.
5.2
NFPA 70E-2009, Section 130.3 establishes the requirement of an arc flash hazard analysis
to determine the arc flash protection boundary and corresponding personnel protective
equipment (PPE). However, NFPA 70E-2009, Section 130.3, Exception No. 1 permits
exclusion from this requirement for electrical equipment that is in accordance with all of
the following conditions, and therefore markings are not required:
a. The circuit is rated 240 volts or less
b. The circuit is supplied by one transformer
c. The transformer supplying the circuit is rated less than 125 kVA
Comment: Owners safe work practices should define the minimum voltage and
kVA levels.
5.3
In addition to the requirements of NFPA 70E, the following marking requirements should
be included and comply with ANSI Z535.4:
a. Equipment tag number
b. Arc flash energy at specified working distance in inches
c. PPE level required and description of minimum PPE
Comment: It may be necessary to specify different PPE depending on activity to
be performed.
d. Arc flash protection boundary in feet or inches
e. Warning header: Arc Flash Hazard Appropriate PPE Required Failure to
Comply Can Result in Injury or Death.
5.4
The values in Section 5.3 may vary in content. Calculated values or generalized values
(e.g., 4, 8, 25 and 40 cal/cm2) may be used. Generalized values are the next higher values
obtained from either calculations or tables in NFPA 70E. Use of generalized values should
reduce the need to change labels with changes in the electrical system and updates to arc
flash formulas that can occur as the field develops further.
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5.5
5.6
A label warning of the evaluated arc flash hazard condition (based on operating
procedures) shall be installed.
Comment: Where the evaluated condition does not apply, the Owners job safety
analysis evaluation determines the PPE required.
5.7
Labels can be obtained from a variety of suppliers and can be printed from some analysis
software. Examples include blank labels for use with printers or hand markup, bilingual
labels, combination arc flash and shock hazard labels, warning and danger sign labels.
Information on labels and examples can be found in label supplier websites.
5.8
Maintenance Switches
5.9
5.10
5.8.1
5.8.2
A label for the maintenance switch condition shall indicate the values shown are
only applicable when the maintenance switch is turned on.
5.8.3
Turning on a maintenance switch shall provide clear indication on the equipment that
the maintenance mode is turned on (e.g., alarm or indicating light).
5.8.4
Procedures shall be established, and personnel shall be trained for using the
maintenance mode and understanding the repercussions of its use or lack thereof.
5.9.2
5.9.3
Clear indication shall be provided of the operation condition, such that the
appropriate arc hazard can be identified (via the labels). For example, logic may
be added to operate an alarm for this indication.
5.9.4
Rooms, buildings, or yards, where a person can readily enter an area considered hazardous
because of arc flash, shall have clearly visible signs or labels posted at the entrances to the
areas (e.g., at the doors of substations or electrical rooms of buildings). For these situations,
the labels at the entrances need not show the specific information listed in Section 5.3 but
should include the information shown in Section 5.5.
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If arc resistant equipment is used, a label should be located on each door or cover stating
that if opened or removed, the equipment is rendered non arc resistant. The label should
include the following information:
Warning header: Opening This Compartment Can Result in Exposure to Arc
Flash Hazards Appropriate PPE Required When Opened Failure to
Comply Can Result in Injury or Death.
6.
General
6.1.1
6.1.2
6.1.3
Arcing Current
Incident
Energy
Clearing Time
Physical Separation
6.2
6.1.4
In the above discussion, separation from the arc includes presence and distance at
the time of the incident. Where a person is behind a proper wall, for example,
when the incident occurs, the wall provides the separation. This is the
methodology corresponding to arc resistant equipment.
6.1.4
Reducing the arcing current for a given equipment type, voltage rating and a
given system grounding is done by reducing the available short circuit current.
Standard methods for reduction of short circuit current levels apply.
6.1.5
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6.2.3
Arc resistance is only intended for normal operating conditions. See IEEE
C37.20.7, Paragraph 5.1.1.e. Typically, arc resistance is achieved when the
compartment doors of the interrupting device are closed. Before equipment
application, the design of the equipment should be verified to clearly understand
under what conditions the arc resistance is achieved and lost.
6.2.4
The equipment loses arc resistance if the door to the interrupting device is
opened. Procedures should include removal of the rack-out element, (when PPE
is required).
6.2.5
The following is a list of major points affecting the selection and implementation of
arc resistant switchgear. See Appendix A for more information.
a. For air insulated equipment, the arc resistant version may be larger than
standard equipment and requirements vary by manufacturer.
b. The by-products of the arcing process have to be discharged from the
switchgear and away from personnel that may be present.
c. Cable entries to the switchgear require special attention, such as limited
space in the switchgear.
d. IEEE C37.20.7 does not require, but does suggest the use of a nameplate to
specifically identify the arc-resistant ratings of the switchgear.
6.2.6
6.2.7
IEEE C37.20.7, paragraph 4.3 defines arcing duration, but does not specify a minimum
required arcing time duration. However, it provides a preferred duration of 0.5 seconds
and recommends that the duration be at least 0.1 seconds. Because manufacturers are
not required to follow a specific time test, the arcing duration should be verified at the
initial stages of system design. Arcing duration is not necessarily the same duration as
the rated short time current.
6.2.8
High voltage substations are not covered by IEEE C37.20.7 which covers only
medium voltage substations. For air-insulated substations this is expected due to
their open bus nature. However, high voltage GIS is inherently designed to account
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for the effects of internal arcs, although the term arc resistant is not specified. IEEE
C37.122 paragraphs 5.2.1.5, 5.2.1.6, and 5.2.1.8 specify the withstand required by
the high voltage GIS and the operation of pressure relief devices. IEEE C37.122
sets the minimum arcing current to be the rated short circuit magnitude for a
minimum of 0.33 seconds.
6.2.9
Low voltage arc resistant switchgear is not currently as common as the medium
voltage equipment but its use is increasing as more manufacturers develop the
equipment. IEEE C37.20.7 includes a separate section for consideration when
testing. See Appendix A for additional considerations.
a. Low voltage arc resistant switchgear is generally type 2.
b. The footprint penalty for low voltage switchgear is less than that of medium
voltage switchgear or none at all.
c. Insulated and bare bus designs are available, but some manufacturers only
offer insulated bus. The use of insulated bus is recommended.
d. Shutters in breaker compartments are standard for some designs and
available as options in others. Shutters are recommended.
Remote Operation
6.3.1
6.3.2
Remote operation may be required for existing non-arc resistant equipment for
personnel protection during normal operation.
6.3.3
6.3.4
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6.4
6.3.6
6.3.7
Because a remote control may not operate, a backup plan should be developed.
Local operation should be provided in accordance with all safety precautions
typically required. Personnel should be properly trained on the local operation of
equipment.
Low voltage motor control centers (MCC), although frequently accessed for
maintenance and adjustment in industrial facilities, are the latest to be developed
for the purposes of arc flash hazard protection. Unlike switchgear, there are no
current, specific standards for arc resistance. The development of specific
standards for arc resistant low voltage MCCs is currently taking place, and
several design features are becoming available that can reduce the arc flash
hazard exposure in addition to shock hazard. Some designs have been tested to
reduce the risk category with doors closed based on a proposed standard
IEEE 1584P, Guide for Performing Arc-Flash Hazard Calculations.
6.4.2
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Line terminal guards unless using items from Sections 6.4.2.a and 6.4.2.h of
this Practice
j.
External, low voltage control power (e.g., 24 Vdc). This results in total
disconnection from the bus supply for testing because a CPT is not provided.
System Selectivity
6.5.1
Arc flash calculations affect system selectivity for relay coordination. Faster
clearing times, desired to reduce the arc flash energy predicted, can conflict with
the capability of the relaying system. This characteristic adds further
requirements on the speed at which faults are cleared. Faster clearing times can
increase the risk of miscoordination between coordination levels.
6.5.2
Because of the possible conflict with faster clearing times, relay coordination
should be considered early in a project. This conflict can impact the selection of
protection device technology, protection and communications schemes, system
design, training requirements, maintenance, and operations.
6.5.3
6.5.4
6.5.5
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for relay coordination to permit compromise between faster clearing times and
operating security of the coordination scheme. For arc flash purposes, this
optimization should occur not only for the maximum fault currents but for the
minimum fault currents.
6.5.6
6.5.7
Schemes using fuses in selected parts of a distribution system may also provide a
method to reduce clearing times, especially if available short circuit is at the high
end of the fuse curves. In this region, current limiting fuses can permit upstream
devices to be set at faster times and at critical levels of current. In the current
limiting zone, fuses can also reduce the available short circuit significantly. Use
of fuses versus other devices for coordination is a system issue that should take
into account other requirements of the electrical system and operation and
maintenance.
6.5.8
6.5.9
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6.5.10 If considering a reduction in clearing time, there can be an increase in the total
current the breaker must interrupt. Interrupting capability of devices in high X/R
systems (e.g., located close to generators or large motors) can be exceeded by
instantaneous operation (e.g., if using a maintenance switch).
6.6
System Design
6.6.1
General
6.6.1.1 System design encompasses all items previously discussed in this
Practice and the configuration of the electrical system.
6.6.1.2 Guidelines provided in this Practice can be used for design of new
systems and possibly for modifications to existing systems. Existing
system modifications can have multiple constraints not covered in this
Practice.
6.6.1.3 Because there are many system configurations, it is not possible to provide
descriptions for all of them in this Practice, especially considering cases
where there is combination of basic designs. However, very brief
descriptions for several frequently used configurations for medium and low
voltage designs are provided. In all cases, other design parameters are
affected and should be considered.
6.6.1.4 For the design description provided in Section 6.6.2 of this Practice,
overcurrent relaying is used for purposes of comparison. There are
methods of mitigation that may be used, but typically at the expense of
simplicity and possibly cost.
6.6.2
Flat Design
6.6.2.1 For flat designs, a main or bulk distribution substation supplies
transformers for the different utilization voltages required. For example,
a 13.8 kV distribution station supplies 4160V and 480V transformers
directly.
6.6.2.2 Flat design is advantageous because fewer coordination levels are
required. However, lower voltage (e.g., 480V) buses tend to have higher
available system short circuit.
6.6.2.3 For arc flash, the possibility of a faster overcurrent trip time may be
advantageous over the expected increase in short circuit (from the
source) at the lower voltages as compared to cascading designs.
6.6.3
Cascading Design
6.6.3.1 For cascading designs, the higher voltage distribution substation supplies a
medium voltage system which then supplies the lower voltage system. For
example, differently than in the flat design, a 480V bus transformer is
supplied by a 4160V bus, not by the 13.8 kV bus.
6.6.3.2 If all other variables are the same, a cascading design results in a
minimum of one additional level of coordination, but a lower short
circuit at 480V than for a flat design.
6.6.3.3 Large drivers at the supply voltage tend to increase the short circuit at
480V and may require a slower response from upstream protection
devices in order to coordinate; therefore, in comparison with a flat
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Loop Design
6.6.4.1 For loop designs, the interconnections between substations are made at
the higher incoming voltage.
6.6.4.2 Because the systems interconnect many nodes at the same coordination
level, an increase in delay at a node can result in upstream changes that
affect the clearing time at other nodes.
6.6.4.3 Because of the typically widespread geographical area covered, a single
change at a medium voltage node can have repercussions at distant
points of the system.
6.6.4.4 Sources at a node can locally clear at a significantly different time.
6.6.5
Radial Switchgear
Radial switchgear design is the most straightforward design, having only one
power source and load short circuit backfeed.
6.6.6
Secondary Selective
6.6.6.1 Secondary selective design can be thought of as a combination of multiple
radial systems with their secondary buses connected by tied breakers.
6.6.6.2 For simplicity, the following description is for a case with only two power
sources. For this case, either source can supply both buses when the bus tie
is closed (by definition one main breaker is opened). Typically, the source
available short circuit is very similar between both sources; however, the
minimum and maximum should still be used.
6.6.6.3 Because the tie breaker may be closed, both sides of the bus are
considered for maximum short circuit as typical. However, in some
instances there can be a requirement to coordinate the tie breaker and the
main breakers. This can cause an additional delay for main overcurrent
relays.
6.6.6.4 Typically, the need to coordinate the tie and main breakers is not
required; however, if necessary it is possible to use zone selective
interlocking, for example, to improve response time.
6.6.7
Spot Network
6.6.7.1 Spot network design is also composed of multiple radial forms, except
the tie breakers are normally closed. Therefore, this type of substation
can see the available short circuit from all sources.
6.6.7.2 By definition, the tie and main breakers require coordination. A partial
differential scheme is typically used for this purpose.
6.6.7.3 For a spot network design, the main and tie breakers operate in unison
(i.e., as a zone); therefore, there is not a further delay on the main breaker
operation.
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Ring Bus
6.6.8.1 Ring bus designs are rare at medium and low voltage. Similar to the spot
network, the power sources are paralleled. However, opening a tie
breaker or tie and main breakers does not clear a fault.
6.6.8.2 Ring bus design is similar to the center bus of a three sources spot
network.
6.6.8.3 Relaying should be designed to clear by zones, although clearing a
source first can be advantageous.
6.7
Procedures
6.7.1
6.7.2
The primary method to mitigate the effects of arc flash is to de-energize the
equipment and use a lockout/tagout procedure.
6.7.3
Procedures that call for work in or about electrical equipment should require
personnel to locate and understand the associated arc flash labels.
6.7.4
6.7.5
6.7.6
6.7.7
Procedures for access outside substation should account for the possibility of an
arc energy release in the following areas:
a. Underside of the substation building. See IEEE C37.20.7 regarding elevated tests.
b. If using exhaust ducts, the area around the exhaust
6.7.8
6.8
General
6.8.1.1 The optimum way to mitigate the effects of arc flash is typically a
combination of methods.
6.8.1.2 The following sections provide examples of mitigation considerations for
existing and new facilities; however, each facilitys requirements vary,
requiring a customized solution.
6.8.2
Existing Facilities
6.8.2.1 Existing facilities can face problems such as the following:
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New Facilities
6.8.3.1 New facilities may find use of multiple methods cost effective. As an
example, if a project already requires a monitoring and control system,
integration of relays and communications with the system can be cost
effective.
6.8.3.2 The above can be combined with reduced short circuit designs to
maintain acceptable incident energy levels.
6.8.3.3 If large machines are required, an option may be to incorporate arc
resistant designs while permitting a higher short circuit.
APPENDIX A
ARC RESISTANT SWITCHGEAR CONSIDERATIONS
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IEEE C37.20.7 permits use of fuses or fast-acting breakers to achieve the arcing
short-circuit rating of the equipment. Manufacturers are required to show this item on
the nameplate. The use of any specific devices should be determined early in the
design to verify compatibility with other equipment in the electrical system (e.g.,
protection relays).
g. IEEE C37.20.7 does not require, but does suggest the use of a nameplate to
specifically identify the arc-resistant ratings of the switchgear. The nameplate
should be a requirement of the purchase order. The nameplate should include the
following information:
(1) Accessibility type
(2) Internal arcing short-circuit current
(3) Arcing duration
(4) Type of protective device (if applicable) and rated maximum clearing time for the
device
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the freely accessible front, back and sides only. Equipment may be tested to three
optional sub-types as follows:
(1) In addition to type 1 or 2 requirements, sub-type B requires that arcing cannot
cause holes in the walls isolating the low-voltage control or instrument
compartment(s).
(2) In addition to type 1 or 2 requirements, sub-type C requires that arcing cannot
cause holes in the walls separating the compartments.
(3) Sub-type D is used for type 1 equipment where some external surfaces of the
equipment are inaccessible and a type 2 design is not required. In addition to the
type 1 requirements, sub-type D requires that arcing cannot cause holes in any
surface under evaluation.
(4) A type 2BC should be used when arc resistant switchgear is specified.
b. In addition to the larger size per section of air insulated equipment, additional sections
may be required, not necessarily the same size as a standard section. The additional
sections are part of the pressure control and exhaust mechanism. The resulting assembly
has a required area greater than standard air insulated equipment.
c. Two-high switchgear can reduce the footprint of the assembly; however, the control
compartment space is severely reduced as compared to standard air-insulated
switchgear (AIS). Unlike standard switchgear, the arc resistant switchgear control
compartment is separate from the breaker compartment. This separation can cause
physical problems even with the use of multi-function relays.
d. In a similar fashion, the wiring space for two-high switchgear is severely reduced as
compared to standard switchgear.
e. Although IEEE C37.20.7 covers air insulated equipment, gas-insulated switchgear
(GIS) designs for medium voltage switchgear also provide arc resistant features and
are compliant with IEEE C37.20.7. However, medium voltage GIS construction is
much different than the AIS equipment. It is not the intent of this Practice to evaluate
the pros and cons of GIS vs. AIS, however, several items relevant to arc resistant
design are as follows:
(1) GIS designs do not have draw-out interrupting elements as these elements are
bolted on inside a gas enclosure; however, the operating mechanism of the
element is outside the gas compartment and can be removed. The GIS design
does not have doors that when opened cancel the arc resistant features.
(2) As an additional safety feature, the GIS interrupting element is isolated by a
disconnect switch that also serves to ground the circuit.
(3) GIS is more compact than AIS, although it is not offered as a two-high design.
The reduced footprint as compared to AIS may help the layout of the room as
greater separation can be obtained between equipment using the same floor area.
This has to be considered on a case-by-case basis.
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Shutters in breaker compartments are recommended. Shutters are standard for some
designs and available as options in others.
A-4
i.
Zone selective interlocking can be used to reduce clearing times by the main (i.e.,
upstream) breaker in a lineup.
j.
b.
c.
Automatic shutters
d.
e.
Trip, monitor and control adjustments made from the door or from a remote
location such as an HMI
f.
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h.
i.
j.
k.
l.
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Page A-4
APPENDIX B
REMOTE CONTROL CONSIDERATIONS
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Controlled Equipment
Following is a list of applications that should be considered when determining what
equipment or parts thereof can, or should, be operated remotely. The list summarizes
some of the options available that should be considered for remote control operation.
a. Switching of interrupting devices (e.g., breakers and starters). This strategy has been
applied for a long time for efficiency and automation of functions (e.g.,
reacceleration, load shedding, etc). This strategy also helps to mitigate arc flash
hazards, especially when returning equipment to service after a maintenance
procedure.
b. Remote racking devices are available for switchgear. These are not necessarily
manufacturer specific and have been available for several years. In addition to arc
flash, racking of devices can subject the operator to blast pressure waves and
shrapnel. Use of remote racking can resolve these issues. Care should be taken when
racking in a breaker to ensure proper alignment of moving and stationary switchgear
parts and opening of shutters. Racking systems should be capable of detecting a
breaker that is not racking in straight (i.e., pitch and yaw detection) and shutters that
are not opened properly (e.g., can be detected by overload of the racking motor).
c. Remote racking devices can also be installed as part of the breaker in some designs.
This is manufacturer specific.
d. Air break (i.e., load break) switches in switchgear can be motor operated remotely.
This is a readily available option.
e. Air break, high voltage switches can be motor operated remotely. A ground switch
may be in use and may also be operated remotely. However, proper interlocks need to
be provided between the switch and the ground switch operators, similar to the
interlocks and procedures used during manual switching.
f.
B-2
Low voltage motor control center designs that have a stab disconnect feature (not unit
rack out) that can be remotely operated.
Method of Control
Following is a summary of available options that should be considered for remotely
controlling equipment. Several methods may be required or provide a better solution
than a single method. The chosen method should be designed to function efficiently and
safely in conjunction with facility procedures.
a. Remote control can be exercised from a different location than the substation (e.g.,
from a facility control room or a central control outside the facility). Control systems
(e.g., SCADA, DCS) range in complexity and features, but the final result is the
same. These systems have been typically used to open and close breakers. Motor
operated switches are another application. However, though possible, racking
operations are not typical and should not be done from outside the substation.
b. If remote control is operated from a different location, the operator at the remote
control end should be capable of coordinating with the facility operators to prevent
any operation that can result in an arc hazard while personnel are in the vicinity of
the equipment. Some coordination and monitoring methods are as follows:
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(1) Procedures should be established for any personnel entering a substation area to
inform the operator in charge. Even where radios are available, a phone system
should be considered. If phones are used, phones should be located outside the
arc flash protection boundary area of any equipment that may be switched
remotely. This may require locating a phone outside a building or fence.
(2) Alarms should be located on doors and gates that lead to an area that requires
informing the operator. These are a backup to the operations information
procedure above.
(3) Operation of the devices can be interlocked, such that local personnel have to
release a permissive lockout before remote operation can take place. This
requires real-time communication between operators. This type of lockout may
be located in a control panel away from the arc flash protection boundary.
(4) If local personnel can access a panel that disables remote control, an alarm
should be provided to inform the remote operator of the condition.
(5) Cameras may be provided in the substation for use by the remote operator to
verify the conditions around the equipment area.
c. Remote control can be done at the substation by use of mimic panels or control
panels. These panels can be hardwired or electronic (e.g., HMI). A mimic panel has
the advantage of showing a single-line diagram of the system, and is a preferred
method. Because of proximity, the control operator has the advantage of visual
inspection of the area. Ideally, the mimic or control panel should be located to permit
the operator visual contact at the time of operation. A camera system may be used,
especially in substations with a centralized control area or room.
d. If remote control is done from the substation, the controls should be located outside
of area where arc hazards are possible. In some instances this may require a separate
room.
e. A typical method of remote control is the use of umbilical (extension) cord controls.
Umbilical cords can be used for opening and closing breakers and controlling the
racking mechanisms. Typical cords are available in lengths of 25 feet (7.6 m) 40 feet
(12.2 m). Although this distance may seem conservative, it works for most
installations and can reduce multiple distance requirements within the same facility.
f.
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