SPECIAL PROCEEDING CASES:

I.

SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE
1. SAN LUIS V. SAN LUIS (GR 133743/134029)
Who Died: Felicisimo T. San Luis, former governor of the
Province of Laguna
Who Claimed: Felicidad San Luis third wife of Felicisimo with
whom he lived with in Alabang
Who Opposed: Rodolfo and Edgar San Luis, joined by Mila San
Luis children of Felicisimo from first marriage
Contention: Improper venue Petitioners claim that the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Laguna as
Felicisimo was the duly elected governor of Laguna, to which it is
declared that he is the resident of Laguna. Respondent, having
filed assailed petition in Makati, countered with documentary
evidence showing that Felicisimos actual residence is in Alabang
including billing statements, proof of membership in Ayala
Alabang Country Club, letter envelopes sent by decedents
children to Alabang house, and calling cards stating that his
home address is in Alabang.
Issue: Was the petition filed in the right venue?
Held: YES, petitioners claim that residence under the Rules of
Court is synonymous to domicile as held in election cases is
unmeritorious. Under the rules, residence pertains to actual
residence (ex vi termini), or the personal or physical habitation of
a person, which respondent was able to successfully prove with
documentary evidence. Further, Supreme Court Administrative
Order No. 3, 1983, provided that since Muntinlupa was still a
municipality, the Regional Trial Courts who had jurisdiction over
Muntinlupa were seated in Makati.
2. GARCIA QUIAZON V. BELEN (GR 189121)
Who Died: Eliseo Quiazon
Who Claimed: Elise Quiazon represented by her mother Ma.
Lourdes Belen daughter of Eliseo Quiazon with Belen (common
law wife)

Who Opposed: Amelia Quiazon, joined by her daughters

Jenneth and Jennifer, - wife and children of Eliseo
Contention: Improver venue Petitioners claim that the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in Tarlac as
the death certificate of Eliseo shows that he is a resident of
Tarlac. Respondents contend that they properly filed said petition
in Las Pinas as it was the actual residence of Eliseo.
Issue: Was the petition filed in the right venue?
Held: YES, while recitals in the death certificate can be
considered proof of decedents residence at the time of his
death, the contents thereof is not binding on the courts. Further,
that Eliseo went to the extent of taking his marital feud (petition
for declaration of nullity against Amelia) before the courts of law
renders untenable the petitioners position that Eliseo spent the
final days of his life in Tarlac with Amelia and her children.
3. AGTARAP V. AGTARAP (GR 177099/ 177192)
Who Died: Joaquin Agtarap
Who Claimed: Eduardo Agtarap child of second marriage with
Caridad (after first wife, Lucia, died)
Who Opposed: Joseph, Gloria and Teresa grandchildren of
Joaquin from first marriage; Abelardo Dagoro husband of
Mercedes (deceased child of Joaquin with second marriage)
Contention: On Jurisdiction of probate courts Appellants assail
that the probate courts has no jurisdiction to decide on the
ownership of the two properties which were disputed to be
whether it was a conjugal property under the first or second
marriage
Issue: Do probate/intestate courts have jurisdiction over settling
dispute of ownership?
Held: YES, probate/intestate courts may decide upon disputes of
ownership. The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial
court, either as a probate or an intestate court, relates only to
matters having to do with the probate of the will and/or
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise
during the proceedings. The patent rationale for is rule is that

such court merely exercises special and limited jurisdiction.

However, this general rule is subject to exceptions as justified by
expediency and convenience. First, the probate court may
provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding
the question of inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory of a
piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties
are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of collation or
advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of
jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties
are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve
issues on ownership.
4. SUNTAY III V. CONJUANCO-SUNTAY (GR 183053)
Who Died: Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay daughter of Emilio
Aguinaldo
Who
Claimed:
Isabel
granddaughter of decedent

Suntay-Aguinaldo

legitimate

Who Opposed: Federico Suntay surviving spouse of decedent,

nominating adopted son (and illegitimate grandson), Emilio III
Contention: Petitioner claims that she is more qualified to
administer the estate of decedent as she possesses none of the
disqualifications for heirship in the estate of decedent, and that
Emilio III cannot inherit from decedent by virtue of Art. 992 of the
New Civil Code (iron curtain bar rule). Respondent claims that by
order of preference in selection of administrator of estate, the
surviving spouse or his nominee shall be preferred.
Issue: Does the iron curtain bar rule exclude Emilio III from being
the administrator of the decedents estate?
Held: NO, the iron curtain bar rule does not apply. Firstly, Emilio
IIIs interest in the estate of Cristina, as the adopted son of
Federico is apparent. Secondly, the underlying philosophy of our
law on intestate succession is to give preference to the wishes
and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective
will. Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately
reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e. love first descends,
for the decedent did not distinguish between her legitimate and
illegitimate grandchildren.

5. LEE V. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY (GR

146006)
Who Died: Dr. Juvencio P. Ortanez 90% owner of Philippine
International Life Insurance Companys subscribed capital stocks
Who Claimed: Rafael Ortanez legitimate son of Dr. Ortanez
Who Opposed: Divina Enderes illegitimate daughter of Dr.
Ortanez
Contention: Petitioners contend that the sale of shares of stock
by Juliana and Jose Ortanez to Filipino Loan Assistance Group is
valid as evidenced by Memorandum of Agreement of
extrajudicial settlement of estate signed by Juliana and her two
sons, and that the intestate court exceeded its jurisdiction by
declaring the sale void. Private respondent avers that the sale is
invalid because the court has not yet passed upon the
distribution of the estate.
Issue: Whether or not the court has jurisdiction nullifying the
sale of shares of stocks of Phlinterlife?
Held: YES, the intestate court has the power to execute its order
with regard to the nullity of an unauthorized sale of estate
property. Under Section 4 and 7, Rule 89 of the ROC, it is the
probate court that has the power to authorize and/or approve the
sale. An heir may only sell his undivided share in the estate, not
any specific property therein.
6. THE ESTATE OF HILARIO RUIZ V. CA (GR 118671)
Who Died: Hilario Cruz
Who Claimed: Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes adopted daughter of
decedent
Who Opposed: Edmond Cruz only son of decedent, executor
of the will
Contention: Respondents filed a motion for the release of titles
of the real properties in Valle Verde, which was granted by the
court, and upheld by the CA. Edmond Cruz alleges that the titles
of land cannot be released prior to the payment of debts and
finding of intrinsic validity of the will.

Issue: Whether or not the court can order the release of titles to
respondents?
Held: No, the titles cannot be released to respondents. No
distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations
above-mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the
distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by
the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs. It was also too early in the day for
the probate court to order the release of the titles six months
after admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is
conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity and
settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound
mind, freely executed it in accordance with the formalities
prescribed by law. Questions as to the intrinsic validity and
efficacy of the provisions of the will, the legality of any devise or
legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.
7. Unionbank v. Santibanez (GR No. 149926)
Who Died: Efraim Santibanez
Who Claimed: Edmund Santibanez son of Efraim, special
executor
Who Opposed: Unionbank assignee of receivables due to
FCCC
Contention: Respondent Florence Ariola (sister of Edmund)
avers that since the agreement between her and Edmund was
not allowed by the probate court and Unionbank did not claim
against the estate in the probate court, she cannot be held
personally liable for the debts being claimed by petitioner.
Issue: Whether or not Florence Ariola may be held personally
liable for the debts incurred by the decedent.
Held: No, she cannot be held personally liable. Perusing the joint
agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and
use the above-described chattel and each of them to assume the
indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after
stated which is in favor of First Countryside Credit Corp." The
assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an
event, that is, that each heir shall take possession and use of
their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to

assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel that they

were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier
discussed, the heirs in effect did not receive any such tractor. It
follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any
force and effect.
8. Heirs of Maglasang v. MBC (GR No. 171206)
Who Died: Flaviano Maglasang
Who Claimed: Salud Maglasang (wife) and their children, Edgar
Maglasang appointed as Administrator
Who Opposed: Manila Bankers Corporation (on a separate civil
action)
Contention: Manila Bankers Corporation foreclosed properties
mortgaged by the decedent and his spouse. After auctioning the
property, they claimed deficiency for the deficiency between the
debt and the winning bid. Petitioners allege that since repondent
introduced a claim in the probate court, it has waived its option
to foreclose the property.
Issue: Whether or not respondent can foreclose the property
and claim deficiency
Held: No, respondent cannot foreclose the property and still
claim deficiency of debt. Case law now holds that this rule grants
to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually
exclusive remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the
mortgage creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the
mortgagor dies, among them:
(1) To waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from
the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) To foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any
deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) To rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the
same at anytime before it is barred by prescription without
right to file a claim for any deficiency
In this case, respondent sought to extra-judicially foreclose the
mortgage of the properties previously belonging to Sps.
Maglasang (and now, their estates) and, therefore, availed of the
third option. Lest it be misunderstood, it did not exercise the first
option of directly filing a claim against the estate, as petitioners
assert, since it merely notified the probate court of the

outstanding amount of its claim against the estate of Flaviano

and that it was currently restructuring the account. Thus, having
unequivocally opted to exercise the third option of extra-judicial
foreclosure under Section 7, Rule 86, respondent is now
precluded from filing a suit to recover any deficiency amount as
earlier discussed.
9. Pilapil v. Heir of M. Briones (GR No. 150175)
Who Died: Maximino Briones
Who Claimed: Donata Ortiz-Briones (wife), succeeded by her
Heirs
Who Opposed: Silverio Briones, et al collateral relatives of
Maximino
Contention: Silverio, along with other collateral relatives, claims
that Donata, through fraud and misrepresentation, succeeded in
registering properties of Maximino under her own name having
obtained a court decision finding her as the sole heir of
Maximino, which passed down to her heirs.
Issue: Whether or not there was fraud on the part of Donata? If
there was, can the oppositors claim?
Held: No, there was no fraud. While it is true that since the CFI
was not informed that Maximino still had surviving siblings and
so the court was not able to order that these siblings be given
personal notices of the intestate proceedings, it should be borne
in mind that the settlement of estate, whether testate or
intestate, is a proceeding in rem, and that the publication in the
newspapers of the filing of the application and of the date set for
the hearing of the same, in the manner prescribed by law, is a
notice to the whole world of the existence of the proceedings and
of the hearing on the date and time indicated in the publication.
The publication requirement of the notice in newspapers is
precisely for the purpose of informing all interested parties in the
estate of the deceased of the existence of the settlement
proceedings, most especially those who were not named as heirs
or creditors in the petition, regardless of whether such omission
was voluntarily or involuntarily made.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that Donatas
misrepresentation constitutes fraud that would impose upon her
the implied trust provided in Article 1456 of the Civil Code, this

Court still cannot sustain respondents contention that their right

to recover their shares in Maximinos estate is imprescriptible. It
is already settled in jurisprudence that an implied trust, as
opposed to an express trust, is subject to prescription and
laches.
10.

Sabidong v. Solas (AM No. P-01-1448)

Who Died: Charles Hodges original owner of land

Who Claimed: Nicolasito Solas former Clerk of Court, then
Sheriff of Iloilo
Who Opposed: Rodolfo Sabidong occupants of land of Hodges
Estate
Contention: Complainant alleges that respondent cannot
purchase property as he, being an officer of the court, cannot
purchase property under litigation within its jurisdiction.
Respondent alleges that it is beyond the period of litigation as he
purchased the land after there was a decision by the court to
eject complainants.
Issue: Whether or not Solas can purchase the disputed land?
Held: No, Solas cannot purchase the disputed land. Article 1491,
paragraph 5 of the Civil Code prohibits court officers such as
clerks of court from acquiring property involved in litigation
within the jurisdiction or territory of their courts. Said provision
reads:
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire by
purchase, even at a public or judicial auction, either in
person or through the mediation of another:
xxxx
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of justice,
the property and rights in litigation or levied upon an
execution before the court within whose jurisdiction or
territory they exercise their respective functions; this
prohibition includes the act of acquiring by assignment and
shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and
rights which may be the object of any litigation in which
they may take part by virtue of their profession.
xxxx

The rationale advanced for the prohibition is that public policy

disallows the transactions in view of the fiduciary relationship
involved, i.e., the relation of trust and confidence and the
peculiar control exercised by these persons. In so providing, the
Code tends to prevent fraud, or more precisely, tends not to give
occasion for fraud, which is what can and must be done.
For the prohibition to apply, the sale or assignment of the
property must take place during the pendency of the litigation
involving the property. Where the property is acquired after the
termination of the case, no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491
of the Civil Code attaches.
In the case at bar, when respondent purchased Lot 11-A on
November 21, 1994, the Decision in Civil Case No. 14706, which
was promulgated on May 31, 1983 had long become final. Be
that as it may, it can not be said that the property is no longer
"in litigation" at that time considering that it was part of the
Hodges Estate then under settlement proceedings (Sp. Proc. No.
1672).
A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest
or litigation over it in court, but also from the moment that it
becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge. A property
forming part of the estate under judicial settlement continues to
be subject of litigation until the probate court issues an order
declaring the estate proceedings closed and terminated. The rule
is that as long as the order for the distribution of the estate has
not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be
deemed closed and terminated.
11.

Aranas v. Mercado (GR No. 156407)

Who Died: Emigdio Mercado

Who Claimed: Teresita Mercado second wife of decedent
Who Opposed: Thelma Aranas child of decedent from first
marriage
Contention: Teresita, as administrator of the estate of Emigdio,
submitted an inventory of the estate. This declared that there
were no real properties in the estate. Thelma opposed. Teresita
claims that the real properties were already sold to Melver Realty

in exchange for shares of stocks. Thelma claims that the real

properties should be included in the inventory.
Issue: (1) Whether or not the disputed real properties should be
included in the inventory? (2) Whether or not the RTC had
jurisdiction to include the disputed properties?
Held: (1) Yes, the disputed real properties should be included.
Upon issuing the letters of administration to the surviving
spouse, the RTC becomes dutybound to direct the preparation
and submission of the inventory of the properties of the estate,
and the surviving spouse, as the administrator, has the duty and
responsibility to submit the inventory within three months from
the issuance of letters of administration pursuant to Rule 83 of
the Rules of Court, viz:
Section 1. Inventory and appraisal to be returned within
three months. Within three (3) months after his
appointment every executor or administrator shall return
to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the
real and personal estate of the deceased which has
come into his possession or knowledge. In the
appraisement of such estate, the court may order one or
more of the inheritance tax appraisers to give his or their
assistance.
The usage of the word all in Section 1, supra, demands the
inclusion of all the real and personal properties of the decedent
in the inventory. However, the word all is qualified by the phrase
which has come into his possession or knowledge, which signifies
that the properties must be known to the administrator to belong
to the decedent or are in her possession as the administrator.
Section 1 allows no exception, for the phrase true
inventory implies that no properties appearing to belong to the
decedent can be excluded from the inventory, regardless of their
being in the possession of another person or entity.
The RTC strictly followed the directives of the Rules of Court and
the jurisprudence relevant to the procedure for preparing the
inventory by the administrator. The aforequoted explanations
indicated that the directive to include the properties in question
in the inventory rested on good and valid reasons, and thus was
far from whimsical, or arbitrary, or capricious.
(2) Yes, the RTC has jurisdiction to include the disputed
properties. There is no dispute that the jurisdiction of the trial

court as an intestate court is special and limited. The trial court

cannot adjudicate title to properties claimed to be a part of the
estate but are claimed to belong to third parties by title adverse
to that of the decedent and the estate, not by virtue of any right
of inheritance from the decedent. All that the trial court can do
regarding said properties is to determine whether or not they
should be included in the inventory of properties to be
administered by the administrator.