11/11/2016

LegalNotesfromtheUnderdog:Davidv.MacapagalArroyo
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Davidv.MacapagalArroyo
Davidv.MacapagalArroyo
G.R.No.171396May3,2006
SandovalGutierrez,J.
Facts:
OnFebruary24,2006,asthenationcelebratedthe20thAnniversaryoftheEdsa
PeoplePowerI,PresidentArroyoissuedPP1017declaringastateofnationalemergency,
thus:
NOW,THEREFORE,I,GloriaMacapagalArroyo,PresidentoftheRepublicof
the Philippines and CommanderinChief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines,byvirtueofthepowersvesteduponmebySection18,Article7
ofthePhilippineConstitutionwhichstatesthat:ThePresident...wheneverit
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or
suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their CommanderinChief,
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain
law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all
formsoflawlessviolenceaswellasanyactofinsurrectionorrebellion
andtoenforceobediencetoallthelawsandtoalldecrees,ordersand
regulationspromulgatedbymepersonallyoruponmydirectionandas
providedinSection17,Article12oftheConstitutiondoherebydeclare
aStateofNationalEmergency.
Onthesameday,thePresidentissuedG.O.No.5implementingPP1017.
Respondents stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was
the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army
(NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate
President Arroyo.They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take
overthereignsofgovernmentasaclearandpresentdanger.
Issue:
whethertheissuanceofPP1021rendersthepetitionsmootandacademic
Held:
Thepowerofjudicialreviewmaybeexercisedonlywhenthefollowingrequisites
are present: first, there must be an actual case or controversy second, petitioners
havetoraiseaquestionofconstitutionalitythird,theconstitutionalquestionmust
be raised at the earliest opportunity and fourth, the decision of the constitutional
questionmustbenecessarytothedeterminationofthecaseitself.
Anactualcaseorcontroversyinvolvesaconflictoflegalright,anoppositelegal
claims susceptible of judicial resolution. It is definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal interest a real and substantial controversy
admittingofspecificrelief.TheSolicitorGeneralrefutestheexistenceofsuchactualcaseor
controversy, contending that the present petitions were rendered moot and academic by
PresidentArroyosissuanceofPP1021.

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11/11/2016

LegalNotesfromtheUnderdog:Davidv.MacapagalArroyo

Amootandacademiccaseisonethatceasestopresentajusticiablecontroversyby
virtueofsuperveningevents,sothatadeclarationthereonwouldbeofnopracticaluseor
value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of
mootness.
The Court holds that President Arroyos issuance of PP 1021 did not render the
presentpetitionsmootandacademic.Duringtheeight(8)daysthatPP1017wasoperative,
thepoliceofficers,accordingtopetitioners,committedillegalactsinimplementingit.ArePP
1017andG.O.No.5constitutionalorvalid?Dotheyjustifytheseallegedillegalacts?
Thesearethevitalissuesthatmustberesolvedinthepresentpetitions.Itmustbestressed
thatanunconstitutionalactisnotalaw,itconfersnorights,itimposesnoduties,it
affordsnoprotectionitisinlegalcontemplation,inoperative.
The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula that can automatically
dissuade the courts in resolving a case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and
academic, if: first, there is a grave violation of the Constitution second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is involved third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
thebar,andthepublicandfourth,thecaseiscapableofrepetitionyetevadingreview.

Casibangv.AquinoG.R.No.L38025
August20,1979Makasiar,J.Facts:
RespondentRemigioP.Yu
wasproclaime...

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Lindov.COMELEC

All the foregoing exceptions are present here and justify the Supreme Courts
assumptionofjurisdictionovertheinstantpetitions.Petitionersallegedthattheissuanceof
PP1017andG.O.No.5violatestheConstitution.Thereisnoquestionthattheissuesbeing
raisedaffectthepublicsinterest,involvingastheydothepeoplesbasicrightstofreedomof
expression, of assembly and of the press. Moreover, the Court has the duty to formulate
guiding and controlling constitutional precepts, doctrines or rules. It has the symbolic
functionofeducatingthebenchandthebar,andinthepresentpetitions,themilitaryand
the police, on the extent of the protection given by constitutional guarantees. And lastly,
respondentscontestedactionsarecapableofrepetition.Certainly,thepetitionsaresubject
tojudicialreview.

Brillantesv.Yorac
Cayetanov.Monsod
Quimsonv.Ozaeta
SSSEAv.CA
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whetherpetitionershavelegalstanding

DelosSantosv.Mallare

Held:
Locusstandiisdefinedasarightofappearanceinacourtofjusticeonagiven
question. In private suits, standing is governed by the realpartiesin interest rule as
containedinSection2,Rule3ofthe1997RulesofCivilProcedure,asamended.Itprovides
thatevery action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in
interest.Accordingly,therealpartyininterestisthepartywhostandstobebenefited
orinjuredbythejudgmentinthesuitorthepartyentitledtotheavailsofthesuit.
Succinctlyput,theplaintiffsstandingisbasedonhisownrighttothereliefsought.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both citizen and taxpayer standing in
publicactions.However,topreventjustaboutanypersonfromseekingjudicialinterference
in any official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service the Supreme Court laid down the more
stringent direct injury test. For a private individual to invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he must show that he has
sustainedadirectinjuryasaresultofthataction,anditisnotsufficientthathehas
a general interest common to all members of the public. However, being a mere
procedural technicality, the requirement of locusstandi may be waived by the Court in the
exercise of its discretion in cases of transcendental importance and farreaching
implications.

TUPASv.NHA
Mateov.CA
FilipinasEngineeringand
MachineShop
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Acenav.CSC
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KomatsuIndustries
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Borromeov.CA
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Peoplev.Gacott

Bywayofsummary,thefollowingrulesmaybeculledfromthecasesdecidedby
theSupremeCourt.Taxpayers,voters,concernedcitizens,andlegislatorsmaybeaccorded
standingtosue,providedthatthefollowingrequirementsaremet:

DeLaLlanav.Alba

(1)thecasesinvolveconstitutionalissues
(2) fortaxpayers,theremustbeaclaimofillegaldisbursementofpublicfundsorthat
thetaxmeasureisunconstitutional
(3) forvoters,theremustbeashowingofobviousinterestinthevalidityoftheelection
lawinquestion

Javellanav.v.DILG

http://legalhullabaloo.blogspot.com/2013/04/davidvmacapagalarroyo.html

Nitafanv.CIR
Macedav.Vasquez

Aruelov.CA
FirstLepantoCeramics,
Inc.v.CA
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11/11/2016

LegalNotesfromtheUnderdog:Davidv.MacapagalArroyo

(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendentalimportancewhichmustbesettledearlyand
(5) forlegislators,theremustbeaclaimthattheofficialactioncomplainedofinfringes
upontheirprerogativesaslegislators.
Issue:

Bustosv.Lucero
Kilosbayanv.Morato
Tatadv.Garcia
Kilosbayanv.Guingona
Dumlaov.COMELEC

whetherornottheSupremeCourtmayreviewthefactualbasesofthePresidents
exerciseofhisCommanderinChiefpower

Legaspiv.CSC

Held:

Joyav.PCGG

Yes.InIBPv.Zamora,whiletheCourtconsideredthePresidentscallingout
powerasadiscretionarypowersolelyvestedinhiswisdom,itstressedthatthis does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within permissible
constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting grave
abuse of discretion. This ruling is mainly a result of the Courts reliance on Section 1,
ArticleVIIIof1987Constitutionwhichfortifiestheauthorityofthecourtstodetermineinan
appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. Under the new
definitionofjudicialpower,thecourtsareauthorizednotonlytosettleactualcontroversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
government.The latter part of the authority represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was before a forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretionofthepoliticaldepartmentsofthegovernment.Itspeaksofjudicialprerogativenot
onlyintermsofpowerbutalsoofduty.
AstohowtheCourtmayinquireintothePresidentsexerciseofpower,Lansangv.
Garciaadopted the test that judicial inquiry can go no further than to satisfy the Court not
thatthePresidentsdecisioniscorrect,butthatthePresidentdidnotactarbitrarily.Thus,the
standardlaiddownisnotcorrectness,butarbitrariness.InIntegratedBarofthePhilippines,
the Court further ruled that it is incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the
Presidentsdecisionistotallybereftoffactualbasisandthatifhefails,bywayofproof,
to support his assertion, then the Supreme Court cannot undertake an independent
investigationbeyondthepleadings.

TELEBAPv.COMELEC

PASSCUv.Secretaryof
Education
MantrusteSystems,Inc.
v.CA
Commissionerof
Customsv.Eastern
SeaTrading
Torresv.Gonzales
Llamasv.Orbos
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Garciav.COA
Peoplev.Salle
Monsantov.Factoran
Davidv.Macapagal
Arroyo
Quilonav.GeneralCourt
Martial
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CommissionNo.34
Ruffyv.ChiefofStaff
Guazonv.DeVilla

PetitionersfailedtoshowthatPresidentArroyosexerciseofthecallingoutpower,by
issuing PP 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. A reading of the Solicitor Generals
ConsolidatedCommentandMemorandumshowsadetailednarrationoftheeventsleading
totheissuanceofPP1017,withsupportingreportsformingpartoftherecords.Mentioned
are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo DDay, the
defectionsinthemilitary,particularlyinthePhilippineMarines,andthereprovingstatements
from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and
Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA and
themilitary.Petitionerspresentednothingtorefutesuchevents.Thus,absentanycontrary
allegations,theCourtisconvincedthatthePresidentwasjustifiedinissuingPP1017calling
formilitaryaid.

NAMARCOv.Arca

Issue:

Villenav.Secretaryof
Interior

whetherPP1017andG.O.No.5areunconstitutional

Blaquerav.Alcala

Held:

Angangcov.Catillo
KilusangBayansa
Paglilingkodngmga
Magtitindan...
Gasconv.Arroyo
CityofIliganv.Directorof
Lands
LacsonMagallanesCo.,
Inc.v.Pano

Drilonv.Lim
Pobrev.Mendieta

Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes

which,bytheirterms,seektoregulateonlyspokenwordsandagain,thatoverbreadth
claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary
criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free
speech,whichismanifestlysubjecttostateregulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as manifestly strong medicine,
to be used sparingly and only as a last resort, and is generally disfavored The
reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional
adjudicationistheprinciplethatapersontowhomalawmaybeappliedwillnotbeheardto

http://legalhullabaloo.blogspot.com/2013/04/davidvmacapagalarroyo.html

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11/11/2016

LegalNotesfromtheUnderdog:Davidv.MacapagalArroyo

challengealawonthegroundthatitmayconceivablybeappliedunconstitutionallytoothers,
i.e.,inothersituationsnotbeforetheCourt.

Binamirav.Garrucho

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an

exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particularlitigantclaimsthatastatuteisunconstitutionalasappliedtohimorherif
thelitigantprevails,thecourtscarveawaytheunconstitutionalaspectsofthelawby
invalidatingitsimproperapplicationsonacasetocasebasis.Moreover,challengers
toalawarenotpermittedtoraisetherightsofthirdpartiesandcanonlyasserttheir
own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way challenges are
permittedtoraisetherightsofthirdpartiesandthecourtinvalidatestheentirestatute
onitsface,notmerelyasappliedforsothattheoverbroadlawbecomesunenforceable
untilaproperlyauthorizedcourtconstruesitmorenarrowly.Thefactorthatmotivatescourts
todepartfromthenormaladjudicatoryrulesistheconcernwiththechillingdeterrenteffect
of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court
assumesthatanoverbroadlawsveryexistencemaycauseothersnotbeforethecourtto
refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression. An overbreadth ruling is
designedtoremovethatdeterrenteffectonthespeechofthosethirdparties.

CivilLibertiesUnionv.
ExecutiveSecretary

In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the
CourttoexaminePP1017andpinpointitsflawsanddefects,notonthebasisofitsactual
operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may
cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or
expression.

Pascualv.Secretaryof
PublicWorksand
Communica...

The task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring
correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is rarely if ever an
appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the
controversy,theimpactonthelegislativeprocessofthereliefsought, and above all
the speculative and amorphous nature of the required linebyline analysis of
detailed statutes,...ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for
decidingconstitutionalquestions,whicheverwaytheymightbedecided.
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult
challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that there can be no
instancewhentheassailedlawmaybevalid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to
showwhetherthissituationexists.
Relatedtotheoverbreadthdoctrineisthevoid for vagueness doctrine which
holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily
guessatitsmeaninganddifferastoitsapplication.Itissubjecttothesameprinciples
governing overbreadth doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing on their
facesstatutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a litigant may
challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications. Again,
petitionersdidnotevenattempttoshowthatPP1017isvagueinallitsapplication.
They also failed to establish that men of common intelligence cannot understand the
meaningandapplicationofPP1017.

Inre:Valenzuela

Estradav.Disierto
AquinoIIIv.COMELEC
Macalintalv.Presidential
ElectoralTribunal
Marcosv.Manglapus
Marcosv.Manglapus
SBMAv.COMELEC
Diazv.CA
Osmeav.Orbos
Guingonav.Carague

AbraValleyCollegev.
Aquino
ProvinceofAbrav.
Hernando
Kapatiranngmga
Naglilingkodsa
PamahalaanngPil...
Bengzonv.Drilon
Gonzalesv.Macaraig
Tobiasv.Abalos
Tanv.DelRosario
Tiov.VRB
PHILCONSAv.Gimenez
PHILCONSAv.Enriquez
Demetriav.Alba
Alvarezv.Guingona
Tolentinov.Secretaryof
Finance
Neriv.SenateCommittee
onAccountabilityof
Publ...

ConstitutionalBasisofPP1017

Senatev.Ermita

Firstprovision:

Arnaultv.Nazareno

byvirtueofthepowervesteduponmebySection18,ArticleVIIdoherebycommandthe
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
preventorsuppressallformsoflawlessviolenceaswellanyactofinsurrectionorrebellion

Bengzonv.SenateBlue
RibbonCommittee
Guingonav.Gonzales
Cosetengv.Mitra

Secondprovision:

Dazav.Singson

and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgatedbymepersonallyoruponmydirection
Thirdprovision:

Total
Pageviews

as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby declare a State of
NationalEmergency.
FirstProvision:CallingoutPower

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The first provision pertains to the Presidents callingout power. In Sanlakas v. Executive
Secretary,theSupremeCourtheldthatSection18,ArticleVIIoftheConstitutionreproduced
asfollows:
Sec.18.ThePresidentshallbetheCommanderinChiefofallarmedforces
of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out
sucharmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasionor
rebellion.Incaseofinvasionorrebellion,whenthepublicsafetyrequiresit,
he may, for a period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part thereof under
martial law. Within fortyeight hours from the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, the President
shallsubmitareportinpersonorinwritingtotheCongress.TheCongress,
votingjointly,byavoteofatleastamajorityofallitsMembersinregularor
special session, may revoke such proclamation or suspension, which
revocation shall not be set aside by the President. Upon the initiative of the
President,theCongressmay,inthesamemanner,extendsuchproclamation
orsuspensionforaperiodtobedeterminedbytheCongress,iftheinvasion
orrebellionshallpersistandpublicsafetyrequiresit.

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TheCongress,ifnotinsession,shallwithintwentyfourhoursfollowingsuch
proclamation or suspension, convene in accordance with its rules without
needofacall.
The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filed by any
citizen,thesufficiencyofthefactualbasesoftheproclamationofmartiallaw
or the suspension of the privilege of the writ or the extension thereof, and
mustpromulgateitsdecisionthereonwithinthirtydaysfromitsfiling.
AstateofmartiallawdoesnotsuspendtheoperationoftheConstitution,nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor
authorizetheconfermentofjurisdictiononmilitarycourtsandagenciesover
civilianswherecivilcourtsareabletofunction,norautomaticallysuspendthe
privilegeofthewrit.
The suspension of the privilege of the writ shall apply only to persons
judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected
withinvasion.
Duringthesuspensionoftheprivilegeofthewrit,anypersonthusarrestedor
detained shall be judicially charged within three days, otherwise he shall be
released.
grantsthePresident,asCommanderinChief,asequenceofgraduatedpowers.Fromthe
most to the least benign, these are: the callingout power, the power to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. Citing
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, the Court ruled that the only criterion for the
exerciseofthecallingoutpoweristhatwheneveritbecomesnecessary, the President
may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.Aretheseconditionspresentintheinstantcases?Asstatedearlier,considering
the circumstances then prevailing, President Arroyo found it necessary to issue PP 1017.
OwingtoherOfficesvastintelligencenetwork,sheisinthebestpositiontodeterminethe
actualconditionofthecountry.
Underthecallingoutpower,thePresidentmaysummonthearmedforcestoaidhim
in suppressing lawless violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary police
action.ButeveryactthatgoesbeyondthePresidentscallingoutpowerisconsideredillegal
orultravires.Forthisreason,aPresidentmustbecarefulintheexerciseofhispowers.He
cannotinvokeagreaterpowerwhenhewishestoactunderalesserpower.Thereliesthe
wisdomofourConstitution,thegreaterthepower,thegreaterarethelimitations.
It is pertinent to state, however, that there is a distinction between the Presidents
authoritytodeclareastateofrebellion(inSanlakas)andtheauthoritytoproclaimastate
of national emergency. While President Arroyos authority to declare a state of rebellion
emanatesfromherpowersasChiefExecutive,thestatutoryauthoritycitedinSanlakaswas
Section4,Chapter2,BookIIoftheRevisedAdministrativeCodeof1987,whichprovides:

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SEC.4.Proclamations.ActsofthePresidentfixingadateordeclaringa
statusorconditionofpublicmomentorinterest,upontheexistenceofwhich
the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order.
PresidentArroyosdeclarationofastateofrebellionwasmerelyanactdeclaringa
statusorconditionofpublicmomentorinterest,adeclarationallowedunderSection4cited
above. Such declaration, in the words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance,
anddeemednotwritten.Inthesecases,PP1017ismorethanthat.Indeclaringastateof
national emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution,aprovisioncallingontheAFPtopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence,invasion
or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the States
extraordinary power to take over privatelyowned public utility and business affected with
public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome power. Obviously,
suchProclamationcannotbedeemedharmless,withoutlegalsignificance,ornotwritten,as
inthecaseofSanlakas.
SomeofthepetitionersvehementlymaintainthatPP1017isactuallyadeclarationof
MartialLaw.Itisnoso.
ThedeclarationofMartialLawisawarn[ing]tocitizensthatthemilitarypowerhas
beencalleduponbytheexecutivetoassistinthemaintenanceoflawandorder,andthat,
whiletheemergencylasts,theymust,uponpainofarrestandpunishment,notcommitany
actswhichwillinanywayrendermoredifficulttherestorationoforderandtheenforcement
oflaw.
A state of martial law does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor
supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the
confermentofjurisdictiononmilitarycourtsandagenciesovercivilianswherecivilcourtsare
abletofunction,norautomaticallysuspendtheprivilegeofthewrit.
PP1017isnotadeclarationofMartialLaw.ItisnomorethanacallbythePresident
tothearmedforcestopreventorsuppresslawlessviolence.Assuch,itcannotbeusedto
justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done. Its use for any
other purpose is a perversion of its nature and scope, and any act done contrary to its
commandisultravires.
(a) Arrests and seizures without judicial warrants (b) ban on public
assemblies(c)takeoverofnewsmediaandagenciesandpresscensorshipand(d)
issuanceofPresidentialDecrees,arepowerswhichcanbeexercisedbythePresidentas
CommanderinChiefonlywherethereisavaliddeclarationofMartialLaworsuspensionof
thewritofhabeascorpus.
Basedontheabovedisquisition,itisclearthatPP1017isnotadeclarationofMartial
Law. It is merely an exercise of President Arroyos callingout power for the armed
forcestoassistherinpreventingorsuppressinglawlessviolence.
SecondProvision:TakeCarePower
The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws be
faithfullyexecuted.ThisisbasedonSection17,ArticleVIIwhichreads:
SEC.17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed.
AstheExecutiveinwhomtheexecutivepowerisvested,theprimaryfunctionofthe
President is to enforce the laws as well as to formulate policies to be embodied in existing
laws. He sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his
department. Before assuming office, he is required to take an oath or affirmation to the
effect that as President of the Philippines, he will, among others, execute its laws. In the
exerciseofsuchfunction,thePresident,ifneeded,mayemploythepowersattachedtohis
office as the CommanderinChief of all the armed forces of the country, including the
PhilippineNationalPoliceundertheDepartmentofInteriorandLocalGovernment.

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Petitioners argue that PP 1017 is unconstitutional as it arrogated upon President

Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees in violation of Section 1, Article VI of the
Constitution, which vests the power to enact laws in Congress. They assail the clause to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations
promulgatedbymepersonallyoruponmydirection.
IsitwithinthedomainofPresidentArroyotopromulgatedecrees?
ThePresidentisgrantedanOrdinancePowerunderChapter2,BookIIIofExecutiveOrder
No.292(AdministrativeCodeof1987).Shemayissueanyofthefollowing:
Sec. 2. Executive Orders. Acts of the President providing for rules of a
general or permanent character in implementation or execution of
constitutionalorstatutorypowersshallbepromulgatedinexecutiveorders.
Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. Acts of the President which relate to
particular aspect of governmental operations in pursuance of his duties as
administrativeheadshallbepromulgatedinadministrativeorders.
Sec. 4. Proclamations. Acts of the President fixing a date or declaring a
statusorconditionofpublicmomentorinterest,upontheexistenceofwhich
the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend, shall be
promulgated in proclamations which shall have the force of an executive
order.
Sec. 5. Memorandum Orders. Acts of the President on matters of
administrative detail or of subordinate or temporary interest which only
concernaparticularofficerorofficeoftheGovernmentshallbeembodiedin
memorandumorders.
Sec.6.MemorandumCirculars.ActsofthePresidentonmattersrelating
tointernaladministration,whichthePresidentdesirestobringtotheattention
of all or some of the departments, agencies, bureaus or offices of the
Government, for information or compliance, shall be embodied in
memorandumcirculars.
Sec.7.GeneralorSpecialOrders.ActsandcommandsofthePresidentin
his capacity as CommanderinChief of theArmed Forces of the Philippines
shallbeissuedasgeneralorspecialorders.
President Arroyos ordinance power is limited to the foregoing issuances. She
cannotissuedecreessimilartothoseissuedbyFormerPresidentMarcosunderPP1081.
PresidentialDecreesarelawswhichareofthesamecategoryandbindingforceasstatutes
becausetheywereissuedbythePresidentintheexerciseofhislegislativepowerduringthe
periodofMartialLawunderthe1973Constitution.
TheassailedPP1017isunconstitutionalinsofarasitgrantsPresidentArroyo
theauthoritytopromulgatedecrees.Legislativepowerispeculiarlywithintheprovince
of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically states that [t]he legislative power
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate
andaHouseofRepresentatives.Tobesure,neitherMartialLawnorastateofrebellion
nor a state of emergency can justify President Arroyos exercise of legislative power by
issuingdecrees.
ThirdProvision:PowertoTakeOver
ThepertinentprovisionofPP1017states:
xxxandtoenforceobediencetoallthelawsandtoalldecrees,orders,and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction and as
providedinSection17,ArticleXIIoftheConstitutiondoherebydeclare
astateofnationalemergency.
TheimportofthisprovisionisthatPresidentArroyo,duringthestateofnationalemergency
underPP1017,cancallthemilitarynotonlytoenforceobediencetoallthelawsandtoall
decreesxxxbutalsotoactpursuanttotheprovisionofSection17,ArticleXIIwhichreads:

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Sec.17.Intimesofnationalemergency,whenthepublicinterestsorequires,
theStatemay,duringtheemergencyandunderreasonabletermsprescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privatelyowned
publicutilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest.
What could be the reason of President Arroyo in invoking the above provision when she
issuedPP1017?
The answer is simple. During the existence of the state of national emergency, PP
1017purportstograntthePresident,withoutanyauthorityordelegationfromCongress,to
take over or direct the operation of any privatelyowned public utility or business affected
withpublicinterest.
Petitioners, particularly the members of the House of Representatives, claim that
PresidentArroyosinclusionofSection17,ArticleXIIinPP1017isanencroachmentonthe
legislaturesemergencypowers.
AdistinctionmustbedrawnbetweenthePresidentsauthoritytodeclareastateof
nationalemergencyandtoexerciseemergencypowers.Tothefirst,aselucidatedbythe
Court, Section 18, Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate
constitutionalobjectioncanberaised.Buttothesecond,manifoldconstitutionalissuesarise.
Section23,ArticleVIoftheConstitutionreads:
SEC. 23. (1) The Congress, by a vote of twothirds of both Houses in joint
sessionassembled,votingseparately,shallhavethesole power to declare
theexistenceofastateofwar.
(2)Intimesofwarorothernationalemergency,theCongressmay,bylaw,
authorizethePresident,foralimitedperiodandsubjecttosuchrestrictionsas
it may prescribe, to exercise powers necessary and proper to carry out a
declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by resolution of the
Congress,suchpowersshallceaseuponthenextadjournmentthereof.
It may be pointed out that the second paragraph of the above provision refers not
onlytowarbutalsotoothernationalemergency.PresidentArroyocouldvalidlydeclare
the existence of a state of national emergency even in the absence of a Congressional
enactment.
Buttheexerciseof emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned
public utility or business affected with public interest, is a different matter. This requires a
delegationfromCongress.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in
thetenorofSection23(2),ArticleVIauthorizingittodelegatesuchpowerstothePresident.
Certainly,abodycannotdelegateapowernotreposeduponit.However,knowingthat
duringgraveemergencies,itmaynotbepossibleorpracticableforCongresstomeetand
exercise its powers, the Framers of our Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to
grantemergencypowerstothePresident,subjecttocertainconditions,thus:
(1)Theremustbeawarorotheremergency.
(2)Thedelegationmustbeforalimitedperiodonly.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) Theemergencypowersmustbeexercisedtocarryoutanationalpolicydeclared
byCongress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency powers
clause.Thetakingoverofprivatebusinessaffectedwithpublicinterestisjustanotherfacet
oftheemergencypowersgenerallyreposeduponCongress.Thus,whenSection17states
thatthetheStatemay,duringtheemergencyandunderreasonabletermsprescribed
by it, temporarily take over or direct the operation of any privately owned public
utilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest,itreferstoCongress,notthePresident.
Now, whether or not the President may exercise such power is dependent on whether
Congressmaydelegateittohimpursuanttoalawprescribingthereasonabletermsthereof.
Emergency, as a generic term, connotes the existence of conditions suddenly
intensifyingthedegreeofexistingdangertolifeorwellbeingbeyondthatwhichisaccepted
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as normal. Implicit in this definitions are the elements of intensity, variety, and perception.
Emergencies have been occasioned by a wide range of situations, classifiable under three
(3)principalheads:a)economic,b)naturaldisaster,andc)nationalsecurity.
Emergency, as contemplated in our Constitution, is of the same breadth. It may
include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic, typhoon, flood, or other similar
catastropheofnationwideproportionsoreffect.
In Araneta v. Dinglasan, the Supreme Court emphasized that legislative power,
throughwhichextraordinarymeasuresareexercised,remainsinCongressevenintimesof
crisis.
FollowingourinterpretationofSection17,ArticleXII,invokedbyPresidentArroyoin
issuing PP 1017, the Supreme Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her
duringtheemergencytotemporarilytakeoverordirecttheoperationofanyprivatelyowned
publicutilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterestwithoutauthorityfromCongress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privatelyowned
publicutilityorbusinessaffectedwithpublicinterest.ThePresidentcannotdecidewhether
exceptionalcircumstancesexistwarrantingthetakeoverofprivatelyownedpublicutilityor
business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine when such exceptional
circumstanceshaveceased.Likewise,withoutlegislation,the President has no power to
pointoutthetypesofbusinessesaffectedwithpublicinterestthatshouldbetakenover.In
short,thePresidenthasnoabsoluteauthoritytoexerciseallthepowersoftheStateunder
Section17,ArticleVIIintheabsenceofanemergencypowersactpassedbyCongress.

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