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b) The six-year term of the incumbent President and Vice President elected in the February 7, 1986 election is,
for purposes of synchronization of elections, extended to noon of June 30, 1992 [Sec. 5, Art. XVIII], See Osmena v.
Comelec, 199 SCRA 750.
4. Oath of Office [Sec. 5, Art. VII], 5. Privileges [Sec. 6, Art. VII],
a) Official residence.
b) Salary. Determined by law; shall not be decreased during tenure. No increase shall take effect until after
the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which such increase was approved.
c) Immunity from suit. In Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393, it was held that while the President is
immune from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting suit. See also In Re: Bermudez, 145 SCRA 160. In
Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, 16 Phil 534, the Supreme Court said that the President is immune from civil liability. ,
i) After his tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit for civil damages arising
out of acts done by him while he was President which were not performed in the exercise of official duties
[Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 02, 2001].
ii) Even if the DECS Secretary is an alter ego of the President, he cannot invoke the Presidents
immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts are not the acts of the President but
merely those of a department Secretary [Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000]. d) Executive Privilege. It has been defined as the right of the President and high-level executive branch
officials to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and ultimately, the public. Thus, presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings, like the internal deliberations of
the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either House of Congress, are recognized as
confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government [Senate v. Ermita,
G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006], The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of
the inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as in the area of military
and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-in-chief, appointing,
pardoning and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information relating to
these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others [Neri v. Senate Committees, G.R. No. 180843, March 25,
2008], i)
i) However, the privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information (in this case to Congress), the necessity for withholding the information must be of such a high
degree as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case. In light of this highly
exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the President (and to the Executive
Secretary, by order of the President) the power to invoke the privilege [Senate v. Ermita, supra.].
ii) In Neri, a majority of the members of the Supreme Court upheld the refusal of the petitioner to
answer the three questions asked during the Senate inquiry because the information sought by the three
questions are properly covered by the presidential communications privilege, and executive privilege w,as
validly claimed by the President, through the Executive Secretary. First, the communications relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power (the power to enter into an executive agreement with other
countries) of the President; second, the communications were received by a close advisor of the President,
Secretary Neri being a member of the Cabinet and by virtue of the proximity test, he is covered by
executive privilege; and third, there was no adequate showing by the respondents of the compelling need for
the information as to justify the limitation of the privilege, nor was there a showing of the unavailability of the
information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.
6. Prohibitions/lnhibitions [Secs. 6 & 13, Art. V///. Paragraphs (a) to (d) apply to the Vice President; paragraphs (b)
to (d) also apply to Members of the Cabinet, their deputies or assistants. During tenure:
a) Shall not receive any other emoluments from the government or any other source.
i) In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003, the Court noted that the total
accumulated salaries of the Marcos couple amounted to P2,319,583.33 which, when converted to dollars at the
exchange rate then prevailing would have an equivalent value of $304,372.43. This sum should be held as the
only known lawful income of the respondents Marcos since they did not file any Statement of Assets and
Liabilities, as required by law, from which their net worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935
Constitution, Ferdinand Marcos, as President, could not receive any other emolument from the Government
or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities, and under the 1973 Constitution, could not receive during
his tenure any other emolument from the Government or any other source. In fact, his management of
businesses, like the administration of foundations to accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the
1973 Constitution.
b) Unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, shall not hold any other office or employment.
i) Note, however that the Vice President may be appointed to the Cabinet, without need of
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; and the Secretary of Justice is an ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
ii) In Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA 317, the Supreme Court declared as
unconstitutional Executive Order No. 284 which allowed Cabinet members to hold two other offices in
government, in direct contravention of Sec. 13, Art. VII. The prohibition on the President and his official
family is all-embracing and covers both public and private office employment, not being qualified by the
phrase in the Government x x x This is proof of the intent of the Constitution to treat them as a class by
itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
iii) This prohibition must not, however, be construed as applying to posts occupied by the Executive
officials without additional compensation in an ex-officio capacity, as provided by law and as required by the
primary functions of the said officials office. The reason is that these posts do not comprise any other office
within the contemplation of the constitutional prohibition, but properly an imposition of additional duties and
functions on said officials. To illustrate, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is the ex-officio
Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority and the Light Rail Transit Authority. The ex-officio
position being actually and in legal contemplation part of the principal office, it follows that the official
concerned has no right to receive additional compensation for his services in said position.
' The reason is that these services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to the
principal office [National Amnesty Commission v. CO A, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004].
iv) The Secretary of Labor, who sits in an ex officio capacity as member of the Board of Directors of
the Philippine Export Processing Zone (PEZA), is prohibited from receiving any compensation for this
additional office, because his services are already paid for and covered by the compensation attached to his
principal office. It follows that the petitioner, who sits in the PEZA Board merely as representative of the
Secretary of Labor, is likewise prohibited from receiving any compensation therefor. Otherwise, the
representative would have a better right than his principal, and the fact that the petitioners position as
Director IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) is not covered by the ruling in the Civil
Liberties Union case is of no moment. After all, the petitioner attended the PEZA Board meetings by authority
given to him by the Secretary of Labor; without such designation or authority, petitioner would not have been
in the Board at all [Bitonio v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004].
c) Shall not directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the government or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or -controlled corporations or their subsidiaries.
d) Strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
e) May not appoint spouse or relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree as Members
of Constitutional Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under Secretaries, chairmen or
heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or -controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.
7. Rules on Succession.
a) Vacancy at the beginning of the term.
i) Death or permanent disability of the President-elect: Vice President-elect shall become President.
ii) President-elect fails to qualify: Vice President-elect shall act as President until the Presidentelect'shall have qualified.
iii) President shall not have been chosen: Vice President-elect shall act as President until a President
shall have been chosen and qualified.
iv) No President and Vice President chosen nor shall have qualified, or both shall have died or
become permanently disabled: The President of the Senate or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall act as President until a President or a Vice President shall have been chosen
and qualified. In the event of inability of the officials mentioned, Congress shall, by law, provide for the
manner in which one who is to act as President shall be selected until a President or a Vice President shall
have qualified.
b) Vacancy during the term:
i) Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of the President: Vice President
shall become the President. In Joseph Ejercito Estrada v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G. R. No. 146738, March
2, 2001, the Supreme Court declared that the resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as
confirmed by his leaving Malacanang. In the press release containing his final statement,
he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President;
he emphasized he was leaving the palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the healing
process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was going to
reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);
he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President (without doubt
referring to the past opportunity);
he assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same service of the
country;
he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of
reconciliation and solidarity. The Court declared that the elements of a valid resignation are: [1] intent
to resign; and [2] act of relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace.
ii) Death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of President and Vice
President: Senate President or, in case of his inability, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall act
as President until a President or Vice President shall be elected and qualified. Congress, by law, shall provide
for the manner in which one is to act as President in the event of inability of the officials mentioned above.
c) Temporary Disability.
i) When President transmits to the Senate President and the Speaker of the House his written
declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a
written declaration to the contrary: such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
ii) When a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the Senate President and the
Speaker their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President, x x x
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the Senate President and Speaker his written declaration that no
inability exists, he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of the
Members of the Cabinet transmit within 5 days to the Senate President and Speaker their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, Congress shall decide the issue.
For this purpose, Congress shall convene, if not in session, within 48 hours. And if, within 10 days from
receipt of the last written declaration or, if not in session, within 12 days after it is required to assemble,
Congress determines by a 2/3 vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge
the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall act as President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and duties of his office.
d)Constitutional duty of Congress in case of vacancy in the offices ofPresident and Vice President: At 10
oclock in the morning of the 3rd day after the vacancy occurs, Congress shall convene without need of a call, and
within 7 days enact a law calling for a special election to elect a President and a Vice President to be held not earlier
than 45 nor later than 60 days from the time of such call. The bill shall be deemed certified and shall become law upon
its approval on third reading by Congress, x x x The convening of Congress cannot be suspended nor the special
election postponed, x x x No special election shall be called if the vacancy occurs within 18 months before the date of
the next presidential election.
8.Removal of the President. By impeachment [Secs. 2 & 3, Art. XI].
B. The Vice President.
1.Qualifications, election, term of office and removal. The same as thePresident [Sec. 3, Art. VII], but no Vice
President shall serve for more than 2 successive terms. The Vice President may be appointed as Member of the
Cabinet. Such appointment requires no confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
2.Vacancy in the office of the Vice President [Sec. 9, Art. VII]: The Presidentshall nominate a Vice president from
among the members of the Senate and the House of Representatives who shall assume office upon confirmation by a
majority vote of all the Members of both Houses of Congress voting separately.
C. Powers of the President
1.The Executive Power [Secs. 1, Art. VII: The executive power shall bevested in the President of the Philippines.
Sec. 17, Art. VII: x x x He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. ] .
a)The executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.In National Electrification
Administration v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143481, February 15, 2002, the Supreme Court said that as the
administrative head of the government, the President is vested with the power to execute, administer and carry out
laws into practical operation. Executive power, then, is the power of carrying out the laws into practical operation and
enforcing their due observance.
b) Authority to reorganize the Office of the President. TheAdministrative Code of 1987 (EO 292)
expressly grants the President continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President. The law grants the
President this power in recognition of the recurring need of every President to reorganize his office to achieve
simplicity, economy and efficiency. The Office of the President is the nerve center of the Executive Branch. To
remain effective and efficient, the Office of the President must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the
President in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. But the power to reorganize the Office of
the President under Sec. 31 (2) and (3) of the Administrative Code should be distinguished from his power to
reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Sec. 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of
the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to
another. In contrast, under Sec. 31 (2) and (3), the Presidents power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the
President Proper is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to
Departments or Agencies, and vice versa [Domingo v. Zamora, G.R. No. 142283, February 6, 2003].
c) In Villena v. Secretary of the Interior, 67 Phil 451, and in Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil 62, the Supreme Court
declared that the President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines and no other, and
that all executive authority is thus vested in him. [This is in keeping with the rule announced in Myers v. United
States, 272 U.S. 52, that the specific grant of executive powers is not inclusive but is merely a limitation upon the
general grant of executive power.] However, in Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil 456, and in Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil 143,
the Supreme Court opted for a stricter interpretation of executive power, e.g., the Presidents power of general
supervision over local governments could be exercised by him only as may be provided by law. See Marcos v.
Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668, on certain residual powers of the President of the Philippines.
d) In Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc.(MEWAP) v. Romulo, G.R. No.
160093, July 31, 2007, it was held that the President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the
Department of Health under the Constitution and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of the Presidents power of
control under Art. VII, Secs. 1 and 17, and it is also an exercise of his residual powers. However, the President must
exercise good faith in carrying out the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive department.
e) It is not for the President to determine the validity of a law since this is a question addressed to the
judiciary. Thus, until and unless a law is declared unconstitutional, the President has a duty to execute it regardless
of his doubts on its validity. A contrary opinion would allow him to negate the will of the legislature and to encroach
upon the prerogatives of the Judiciary.
2. The Power of Appointment [Sec. 16, Art. VII: The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers
and consuls, or officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in him in this Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in
the heads of departments, agencies, commissions or boards.].
a) Appointment is the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to exercise the
functions of a given office. It is distinguished from designation in that the latter simply means the imposition of
additional duties, usually by law, on a person already in the public service. It is also different from the commission in
that the latter is the written evidence of the appointment.
b) Appointments, classified.
i) Permanent or temporary. Permanent appointments are those extended to persons possessing the
qualifications and the requisite eligibility and are thus protected by the constitutional guarantee of security of
tenure. Temporary appointments are given to persons without such eligibility, revocable at will and without
the necessity of just cause or a valid investigation; made on the understanding that the appointing power has
not yet decided on a permanent appointee and that the temporary appointee may be replaced at any time a
permanent choice is made.
ia) A temporary appointment and a designation are not subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. Such confirmation, if given erroneously, will not make the incumbent
a permanent appointee [Valencia v. Peralta, 8 SCRA 692].
ib) In Binamira v. Garrucho, 188 SCRA 154, it was held that where a person is merely
designated and not appointed, the implication is that he shall hold the office only in a temporary
capacity and may be replaced at will by the appointing authority. In this sense, a designation is
considered only an acting or temporary appointment which does not confer security of tenure on the
person named.
ii) Regular or ad interm. A regular appointment is one made by the President while Congress is in
session, takes effect only after confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, and once approved,
continues until the end of the term of the appointee. An ad interim appointment is one made by the President
while Congress is not in session, takes effect immediately, but ceases to be valid if disapproved by the
Commission on Appointments or upon the next adjournment of Congress. In the latter case, the ad interim
appointment is deemed by-passed through inaction. The ad interim appointment is intended to prevent
interruptions in vital government services that would otherwise result from prolonged vacancies in
government offices.
iia) An ad interim appointment is a permanent appointment [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng
Maynila v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 140 SCRA 22]. It is a permanent appointment because it
takes effect immediately and can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments
does not alter its permanent character [Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002].
iib) An ad interim appointment can be terminated for two causes specified in the
Constitution: disapproval of the appointment by the Commission on Appointments, or adjournment by
Congress without the Commission on Appointments acting on the appointment. There is no dispute
that when the Commission on Appointments disapproves an ad interim appointment, the appointee
can no longer be extended a new appointment, inasmuch as the disapproval is a final decision of the
Commission in the exercise of its checking power on the appointing authority of the President. Such
disapproval is final and binding on both the appointee and the appointing power. But when an ad
interim appointment is by-passed because of lack of time or failure of the Commission on
Appointments to organize, there is no final decision by the Commission to give or withhold its
consent to the appointment. Absent such decision, the President is free to renew the ad interim
appointment [Matibag v. Benipayo, supra.].
c) Officials who are to be appointed by the President.
i) The first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII, says that the President shall nominate, and with the consent
of the Commission on Appointments, appoint the following:
a) Heads of executive departments;
b) Ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
c) Officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain;
d) Those other officers whose appointments are vested in him in the Constitution.
ia) In Sarmiento v. Mison, 156 SCRA 549, the Supreme Court declared that the foregoing are
the only categories of appointments which require confirmation by the Commission on Elections. In
this case, it was held that the appointment of Salvador Mison as Commissioner of Customs needs no
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments, because the Commissioner of the Customs is not
among the officers mentioned in the first sentence, Sec. 16, Art. VII. On the other hand, in QuintosDeles v. Committee on Constitutional Commissions, Commission on Appointments, 177 SCRA 259,
the appointment of a sectoral representative by the President of the Philippines is specifically
provided for in Sec. 7, Art. XVIII of the Constitution. Thus, the appointment of a sectoral
representative falls under category [d] above.
ib) In Soriano v. Lista, G.R. No. 153881, March 24, 2003, the Supreme Court said that
because the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) is no longer part of the Philippine Navy or the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, but is now under the Department of Transporation and Communications
(DOTC), a civilian agency, the promotion and appointment of respondent officers of the PCG will not
require confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Obviously, the clause officers of the
armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain refers to military officers alone.
ii) The second sentence of Sec. 16, VII, states that he shall also appoint [a] All other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided by law; and [b] Those whom he may be
authorized by law to appoint.
iia) In Mary Concepcion Bautista v. Salonga, 172 SCRA 16, the Supreme Court held that the
appointment of the Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights is not otherwise provided for in
the Constitution or in the law. Thus, there is no necessity for such appointment to be passed upon by
the Commission on Appointments. In Calderon v. Carale, 208 SCRA 254, Article 215 of the Labor
Code, as amended by R.A. 6715, insofar as it requires confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the appointment of the NLRC Chairman and commissioners, is unconstitutional,
because it violates Sec. 16,Art. VII. Infact, inManalov. Sistoza, G.R. No. 107369,August 11,1999, the
Supreme Court said that Congress cannot, by law, require the confirmation of appointments of
government officials other than those enumerated in the first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII.
iib) In Tarrosa v. Singson, supra., the Court denied the petition for prohibition filed by the
petitioner as a taxpayer questioning the appointment of Gabriel Singson as Governor of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas for not having been confirmed by the Commission on Appointments as provided
in RA 7653, calling attention to its ruling in Calderon v. Carale. The petition was dismissed, however,
primarily on the ground that it was in the nature of a quo warranto proceeding, which can be
commenced only by the Solicitor General or by a person claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position unlawfully held or exercised by another.
iic) In Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 113956, July 21, 2006, the Supreme Court declared that a
statute cannot circumvent the constitutional provisions on the power of appointment by filling
vacancies in a public office through election by the co-workers in that office. This manner of filling
vacancies in public office has no constitutional basis. Thus, because the challenged section of the law
is unconstitutional, it is the President who shall appoint the trustees, by virtue of Sec. 16, Art. VII of
the Constitution which provides that the President has the power to appoint officers whose
appointments are not otherwise provided by law.
d) Steps in the appointing process:
[Note: The presidential power of appointment may also be limited by Congress through its power to prescribe
qualifications for public office; and the judiciary may annul an appointment made by the President if the appointee is
not qualified or has not been validly confirmed.
g) The Power of Removal. As a general rule, the power of removal may be implied from the power of
appointment. However, the President cannot remove officials appointed by him where the Constitution prescribes
certain methods for separation of such officers from public service, e.g., Chairmen and Commissioners of
Constitutional Commissions who can be removed only by impeachment, or judges who are subject to the disciplinary
authority of the Supreme Court. In the cases where the power of removal is lodged in the Presfdent, the same may be
exercised only for cause as may be provided by law, and in accordance with the prescribed administrative procedure.
i) Members of the career service of the Civil Service who are appointed by the President may be directly
disciplined by him [Villaluz v. Zaldivar, 15 SCRA 710], provided that the same is for cause and in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by law.
ii) Members of the Cabinet and such officers whose continuity in office depends upon the pleasure of
the President may be replaced at any time, but legally speaking, their separation is effected not by removal but
by expiration of their term. See Alajar v. Alba, 100 Phil 683; Aparri v. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231
3. The Power of Control [Sec. 17, Art. VII: "The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices, x x x].
a) Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter [Mondano v.
Silvosa, supra.]. It is distinguished from supervision in that the latter means overseeing, or the power or authority of
an officer to see that subordinate officers perform their duties, and if the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them, then the
former may take such action or steps as prescribed by law to make them perform these duties.
i)The President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutes. This authority is an adjunct of his power of control under Art. VII, Sections 1 and
17, of the Constitution. While the power to abolish an office is generally lodged in the legislature, the
authority of the President to reorganize the executive branch, which may incidentally include such abolition, is
permissible under present laws [Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines (MEWAP) v.
Romulo, G.R. No. 160093, July 31, 2007].
ii)The Presidents power to reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his residual powers
under Section 20, Title I, Book II, Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of the Philippines), which
grants the President broad organization powers to implement reorganization measures. Further, Presidential
Decree No. 1772, which amended P.D. 1416, grants the President the continuing authority to reorganize the
national government which includes the power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices,
to transfer functions, to create and classify functions, services and activities, and to standardize salaries and
materials [MEWAP v. Romulo, supra.].
iii) Be that as it may, the President must exercise good faith incarrying out the reorganization of any
branch or agency of the executive department if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient. R.A, 6656 enumerates the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the
removal of civil service employees as a result of reorganization:
(a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern
of the department or agency concerned;
(b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is
created;
(c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment,
performance and merit;
(d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the
reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices; and
(e) where the removal violates the order of separation [MEWAP v. Romulo, supra.].
b)The alter ego principle. Also known as the doctrine of qualifiedpolitical agency. Under this doctrine
which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, all executives and administrative organizations are adjuncts
of the Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief
Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and administrative functions of
the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries of such
departments performed and promulgated in the regular course of business are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive [DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees. G.R. No.
149724, August 19, 2003].
i) The President may exercise powers conferred by law upon Cabinet members or other subordinate
executive officers [City of lligan v. Director of Lands, 158 SCRA 158; Araneta v. Gatmaitan, 101 Phil 328],
Even where the law provides that the decision of the Director of Lands on questions of fact shall be
conclusive when affirmed by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, the same may, on appeal to
the President, be reviewed and reversed by the Executive Secretary [Lacson-Magallanes v. Pano, 21 SCRA
895]. Thus, in Gascon v. Arroyo, 178 SCRA 582, it was held that the Executive Secretary had the authority to
enter into the Agreement to Arbitrate with ABS-CBN, since he was acting on behalf of the President who
had the power to negotiate such agreement.
ii) Applying this doctrine, the power of the President to reorganize the National Government may
validly be delegated to his Cabinet Members exercising control over a particular executive department.
Accordingly, in this case, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the transfer of
the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this
authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego of the President, is presumed to be the act of the President
because the latter had not expressly repudiated the same [DENR v. DENR Region XII Employees, supra.].
iii) But even if he is an alter-ego of the President, the DECS Secretary cannot invoke the Presidents
immunity from suit in a case filed against him, inasmuch as the questioned acts are not those of the President
[Gloria v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000].
c) Appeal to the President from decisions of subordinate executive officers, including Cabinet members,
completes exhaustion of administrative remedies [Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302], except in the instances
when the doctrine of qualified political agency applies, in which case the decision of the Cabinet Secretary carries the
presumptive approval of the President, and there is no need to appeal the decision to the President in order to complete
exhaustion of administrative remedies [Kilusang Bayan, etc., v. Dominguez, 205 SCRA 92],
d) But the power of control may be exercised by the President only over the acts, not over the actor
[Angangco v. Castillo, 9 SCRA 619].
e) The Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) is under the control of the Office of the President. All
projects undertaken by SBMA involving P2- million or above require the approval of the President of the Philippines
under LOI 620 [Hutchinson Ports Phils, Ltd. V. SBMA, G.R. No. 131367, August 31,
2000] .
f) Power of control of Justice Secretary over prosecutors. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, supra., it was
reiterated that decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the Secretary of Justice who exercises the
power of direct control and supervision over prosecutors. Review, as an act of supervision and control by the Justice
Secretary, finds basis in the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. This power may still be availed of
despite the filing of a criminal information in Court, and in his discretion, the Secretary may affirm, modify or reverse
the resolutions of his subordinates. The Crespo ruling did not foreclose the Justice Secretarys power of review. Thus,
where the Secretary of Justice exercises his power of review only after an information is filed, trial courts should defer
or suspend arraignment and other proceedings until the appeal is resolved. Such deferment, however, does not mean
that the trial court is ipso facto bound by the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, because jurisdiction, once acquired
by the trial court, is not lost despite the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the information or to dismiss
the case. See also Solar Team Entertainment v. Judge How, G.R. No. 140863, August 22, 2000; Noblejas v. Salas, 67
SCRA 47; Villegas v. Enrile, 50 SCRA 11; David v. Villegas, 81 SCRA 842.
g) The President exercises only the power of general supervision over local governments [Sec. 4, Art. X],
i) On the Presidents power of general supervision, however, the President can only interfere in the
affairs and activities of a local government unit if he or she finds that the latter had acted contrary to law. The
President or any of his alter egos, cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the concerned local government
unit acts within the parameters of the law and the Constitution. Any directive, therefore, by the President or
any of his alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-conforming judgment on local affairs of a local
government unit is a patent nullity, because it violates the principle of local autonomy, as well as the doctrine
of separation of powers of the executive and the legislative departments in governing municipal corporations
[Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350. December 3, 2002].
ii)Sec. 187, R.A. 7160, which authorizes the Secretary of Justiceto review the constitutionality or
legality of a tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on either or both grounds is valid, and does not
confer the power of control over local government units in the Secretary of Justice, as even if the latter can set
aside a tax ordinance, he cannot substitute his own judgment for that of the local government unit [Drilon v.
Lim, 235 SCRA 135],
iii)In Pimentel v. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000, theSupreme Court held that Sec. 4,
Administrative Order No. 327, which withholds 5% of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) of local
government units, is unconstitutional, because the Presidents power over local governments is only one of
general supervision, and not one of control. A basic feature of local fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of
LGU shares in the national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
4.The Military Powers [Sec. 18, Art. VII: The President shall be theCommander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the
Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. In cases of invasion or rebellion, when the public safety requires it, he may, for a
period not exceeding sixty days, suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or place the Philippines or any part
thereof under martial law. x x x]
a)The Commander-in-Chief clause.
i)The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armedforces of the Philippines... In
Gudaniv. Senga, G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006, the Senate Committee on National Defense invited
several senior AFP officers to testify on matters related to the conduct of the 2004 elections. AFP Chief of
Staff General Senga wrote Senator Biazon, chairman of the Senate Committee, that no approval has been
granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear at the Senate hearing. This notwithstanding, General
Gudani and Col. Balutan attended and both testified atthe hearing. On recommendation of the Office of the
Provost Marshal General, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were charged with violation of Articles of War 65, on
will fully disobeying a superior officer, in relation to Articles of War 97, on conduct prejudicial to good order
and military discipline. Gudani and Balutan filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition, asking that the order
of PGMA preventing petitioners from testifying be declared unconstitutional, the charges for violation of the
Articles of War be quashed, and the respondents be permanently enjoined from proceeding against the
petitioners. The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
ia) The ability of the President to require a military official to secure prior consent before
appearing in Congress pertains to a wholly different and independent specie of presidential authority
the Commander-in-Chief powers of the President. By tradition and jurisprudence, these
commander- in-chief powers are not encumbered by the same degree of restriction as that which may
attach to executive privilege or executive control.
ib) The vitality, of the tenet that the President is the commander-in-chief of the AFP is most
crucial to the democratic way of life, to civil supremacy over the military, and to the general stability
of our representative system of government. The Court quoted Kapunan v. De Villa: The Court is of
the view that such is justified by the requirements of military discipline. It cannot be gainsaid that
certain liberties of persons in the military service, including the freedom of speech, may be
circumscribed by rules of military discipline. Thus, to a certain degree, individual rights may be
curtailed, because the effectiveness of the military in fulfilling its duties under the law depends to a
large extent on the maintenance of discipline within its ranks. Hence, lawful orders must be followed
without question and rules must be faithfully complied with, irrespective of a soldiers personal view
on the matter.
ii) To call out (such) armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion.
iia) In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra., the Supreme Court said that the petitioners failed
to prove that President Arroyos exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing Presidential
Proclamation No. 1017, is totally bereft of factual basis. The Court noted the Solicitor Generals
Consolidated Comment and Memorandum showing a detailed narration of the events leading to the
issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the record. Thus, absent any contrary
allegations, the Court is convinced that the President was justified in issuing PP 1017, calling for
military aid. Indeed, judging from the seriousness of the incidents, President Arroyo was not expected
to simply fold her arms and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion.
iia1) Under the calling-out power, the President may summon the armed forces to aid
her in suppressing lawless violence, invasion or rebellion; this involves ordinary police
action. But every act that goes beyond the Presidents calling-out power is considered illegal
or ultra vires. For this reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of her powers. She
cannot invoke a greater power when she wishes to act under a lesser power.
iia2) General Order No. 5, issued to implement PP 1017, is valid. It is an order issued
by the President, acting as commander- in-chief, addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry
out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it provides a valid standard that the military
and the police should take only the necessary and appropriate actions and measures to
suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence. But the words acts of terrorism found in the
GO, had not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress, and thus, should be
deemed deleted from the GO.
iia3) However, PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants the President the
authority to promulgate decrees, because legislative power is peculiarly within the province
of Congress. Likewise, the inclusion in PP 1017 of Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution is an
encroachment on the legislatures emergency powers. Sec. 17, Art. XII, must be understood as
an aspect of the emergency powers clause, and thus, requires a delegation from Congress.
iib) In Guanzort v. de Villa, 181 SCRA 623, the Supreme Court recognized, as part of the military
powers of the President, the conduct of saturation drives or areal target zoning by members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines.
iic) In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000, the Supreme
Court said that when the President calls out the armed forces to suppress lawless violence, rebellion or
invasion, he necessarily exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom. The Court cannot
overrule the Presidents discretion or substitute its own. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call out the armed forces. In the exercise of the power, on-the-spot decisions
may be necessary in emergency situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass destruction of property.
Indeed, the decision to call out the armed forces must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have any
effect at all.
iid) In Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. 147780. May 10, 2001, the Supreme Court said that the President
has discretionary authority to declare a state of rebellion. The Court may only look into the sufficiency of
the factual basis for the exercise of the power.
iie) In Sanlakas v. Reyes, supra., it was held that the Presidents authority to declare a state of
rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief executive and, at the same time, draws strength from
her Commander-in-Chief powers. However, a mere declaration of a state of rebellion cannot diminish or
violate constitutionally protected rights. There is also no basis for the apprehensions that, because of the
declaration, military and police authorities may resort to warrantless arrests. As held in Lacson v. Perez,
supra., the authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected of rebellion as provided
under Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Be that as it may, the Court said that, in calling out the armed
forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation
that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. The Court finds that
such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not
written.
iie1) It is pertinent to state that there is a distinction between the Presidents authority to
declare a state of rebellion (in Sanlakas) and the authority to proclaim a state of national emergency.
While the authority to declare a state of rebellion emanates from her powers as Chief Executive (the
statutory authority being Sec. 4, Chapter 2, Book II, Administrative Code of 1997), and the
declaration was deemed harmless and without legal significance, in declaring a state of national
emergency in PP1017, President Arroyo did not only rely on Sec. 18, Art. VII of the Constitution, but
also on Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution, calling for the exercise of awesome powers which cannot
be deemed as harmless or without legal significance [David v. Macapagal-Arroyo, supra.].
iii)The power to organize courts martial for the discipline of the members of the armed forces, create
military commissions for the punishment of war criminals. See Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil 875; Kuroda v.
Jalandoni 42 0.G.4282.
iiia) But see Olaguer v. Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, where it was held that
military tribunals cannot try civilians when civil courts are open and functioning. In Quilona v.
General Court Martial, 206 SCRA 821, the Supreme Court held that pursuant to R.A. 6975, members
of the Philippine National Police are not within the jurisdiction of a military court.
iiib) This is made clear in Navales v. General Abaya, G.R. No. 162318. October 25, 2004,
where the Supreme Court said that in enacting R.A. 7055, the lawmakers merely intended to return to
the civilian courts jurisdiction over those offenses that have been traditionally within their
jurisdiction, but did not divest the military courts jurisdiction over cases mandated by the Articles of
War. Thus, the RTC cannot divest the General Court Martial of jurisdiction over those charged with
violations of Art. 63 (Disrespect Toward the President,etc.), 64 (Disrespect Toward Superior Officer),
67 (Mutiny or Sedition). 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and 97 (General
Articles) of the Articles of War, as these are specifically included as service-connected offenses or
crimes under Sec. 1, R.A. 7055.
iiic) In Gudani v. Senga, supra., on the issue of whether the court martial could still assume
jurisdiction over General Gudani who had been compulsorily retired from the service, the Court
quoted from Abadilla v. Ramos, where it was held that an officer whose name was dropped from the
roll of officers cannot be considered to be outside the jurisdiction of military authorities when military
justice proceedings were initiated against him before the termination of his service. Once jurisdiction
has been acquired over the officer, it continues until his case is terminated.
b)Suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
i)Grounds: Invasion or rebellion, when public safety requires it.
ii)Duration: Not to exceed sixty days, following which it shall belifted, unless extended by Congress.
iii) Can be granted only after conviction by final judgment. In People v. Salle, 250 SCRA 581,
reiterated in People v. Bacang, 260 SCRA 44, the Court declared that the 1987 Constitution prohibits the grant
of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal from the judgment of
conviction by the trial court. Any application for a pardon should not be acted upon, or the process toward its
grant should not begin, unless the appeal is withdrawn. The ruling in Monsanto v. Factoran, 170 SCRA 190,
which was laid down under the 1973 Constitution, is now changed by virtue of the explicit requirement under
the 1987 Constitution. In People v. Catido, G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997, it was held that while the pardon
was void for having been extended during the pendency of the appeal, or before conviction by final judgment,
and therefore a violation of Sec. 19, Art. VII, the grant of amnesty, applied for by the accused-appellants under
Proclamation No. 347, was valid.
iv) Cannot be granted in cases of legislative contempt (as it would violate separation of powers), or
civil contempt (as the State is without interest in the same) ,
v) Cannot absolve the convict of civil liability. See People v. Nacional, G.R. No. 11294, September 7,
1995, where the Court said that the grant of conditional pardon and the subsequent dismissal of the appeal did
not relieve the accused of civil liability.
vi) Cannot restore public offices forfeited [Monsanto v. Factoran, supra.]. But see Sabello v. DECS,
180 SCRA 623, where a pardoned elementary school principal, on considerations of justice and equity, was
deemed eligible for reinstatement to the same position of principal and not to the lower position of classroom
teacher. On executive clemency re: administrative decisions, see Garcia v. Chairman, Commission on Audit,
226 SCRA 356.
d) Pardon Classified.
i) Plenary or partial.
ii) Absolute or conditional.
iia) On conditional pardon, see Torres v. Gonzales, 152 SCRA 273. The rule is reiterated in In
Re: Petition for Habeas Corpus of Wilfredo S. Sumulong, supra., that a conditional pardon is in the
nature of a contract between the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal; by the pardonees
consent to the terms stipulated in the contract, the pardonee has placed himself under the supervision
of the Chief Executive or his delegate who is duty bound to see to it that the pardonee complies with
the conditions of the pardon. Sec. 64 (i), Revised Administrative Code, authorizes the President to
order the arrest and re-incarceration of such person who, in his judgment, shall fail to comply with the
conditions of the pardon. And the exercise of this Presidential judgment is beyond judicial scrutiny.
e) Amnesty.
i) In People v. Patriarca, G,R. No. 135457, September 29, 2000, it was held that the person released
under an amnesty proclamation stands before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense. Par. 3,
Art. 89, Revised Penal Code, provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by amnesty; the penalty
and all its effects are thus extinguished.
ii) In Vera v. People of the Philippines, 7 SCRA 152, it was held that to avail of the benefits of an
amnesty proclamation, one must admit his guilt of the offense covered by the proclamation.
iii) Distinguished from pardon: A - addressed to political offenses, P - infractions of peace of the
state; A - classes of persons, P - individuals; A - no need for distinct acts of acceptance, P - acceptance
necessary; A - requires concurrence of Congress, P - does not; A - a public act which the courts may take
judicial notice of, P - private act which must be pleaded and proved; A - looks backward and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, P - looks forward and relieves the pardonee of the consequences of the offense. See People
v. Casido, supra.. 6
6. The Borrowing Power. Sec. 20, Art. VII: The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the
Republic with the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. The Monetary Board shall, within 30 days from the end of every quarter, submit to the Congress a complete
report of its decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the Government or governmentowned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other
matters as may be provided by law.
7. The Diplomatic Power. Sec. 21, Art. VII: No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate.
a) In Commissioner of Customs v. Eastern Sea Trading, 3 SCRA 351, the Supreme Court distinguished
treaties from executive agreements, thus:
(i) international agreements which involve political issues or changes of national policy and those
involving international arrangements of a permanent character take the form of a treaty; while international
agreements involving adjustment of details carrying out well established national policies and traditions and
involving arrangements of a more or less temporary nature take the form of executive agreements; and
(ii) in treaties, formal documents require ratification, while executive agreements become binding
through executive action.
b) But see Bayan v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, where the Supreme Court said
that the Philippine government had complied with the Constitution in that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) was
concurred in by the Philippine Senate, thus complying with Sec.-21, Art. VII. The Republic of the Philippines cannot
require the United States to submit the agreement to the US Senate for concurrence, for that would be giving a strict
construction to the phrase, recognized as a treaty. Moreover, it is inconsequential whether the US treats the VFA as
merely an executive agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is just as binding as a treaty.
8. Budgetary Power. Sec. 22, Art. VII: The President shall submit to Congress within 30 days from the opening of
every regular session, as the basis of the general appropriations act, a budget of expenditures and sources of financing,
including receipts from existing and proposed revenue measures. ,
9. The Informing Power. Sec. 23, Art. VII: The President shall address the Congress at the opening of its regular
session. He may also appear before it at any other time.
10. Other powers:
a) Call Congress to a special session [Sec. 15, Art. VI: x x x The President may call a special session at any
time ],
b) Power to approve or veto bills [Sec. 27, Art. VI].
c) To consent to deputation of government personnel by the Commission on Elections [Sec. 2(4), Art. IX-C].
d) To discipline such deputies [Sec. 2(8), Art. IX-C].
e) By delegation from Congress, emergency powers [Sec. 23(2), Art. VI], and tariff powers [Sec. 28(2), Art.
VI].
f) General supervision over local governments and autonomous regional governments [Art. X].
i) See Judge Dadole v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 125350, December 2, 2002.