UNIT 1: RATIONALISM

HANDOUT 13: LEIBNIZS MONADOLOGY

1: MONADS AS SIMPLE SUBSTANCES
Leibniz begins the Monadology by investigating the fundamental building blocks of the universe
which he terms monads. As we will see, these monads serve essentially the same function as atoms,
although they do so in a much different way.
1.1 SIMPLES AND COMPOSITES
Leibniz tells us that the monad is a simple substance that enters into composites simple, that is,
without parts (68). The reason we know that these simple substances exist is that there have to be
simples in order for there to be composites. This is because a composite is nothing more than a
collection, or aggregate, of simples (68). Furthermore, these monads are not extended things
because they lack parts.
But where there are no parts, neither extension, nor shape, nor divisibility is possible.
These monads are the true atoms of nature and, in brief, the elements of things (68).
Here we see that, for Leibniz, the fundamental building blocks of the universe are immaterial.
1.2 MONADS AND CREATION
Furthermore, because monads are simple they must be created.
5. For the same reason, there is no conceivable way a simple substance can begin
naturally, since it cannot be formed by composition.
6. Thus, one can say that monads can only begin or end all at once, that is, they can
only begin by creation and end by annihilation, whereas composites begin or end
through their parts (68).
Composite entities like tables and chairs cease to exist when their parts are separated or destroyed.
However, monads have no parts. Therefore they can only come into existence, or cease to exist by
an act of creation.
1.3 MONADS AND INTERACTION
This means that monads cannot be changed through their interaction with other monads.
There is also no way of explaining how a monad can be altered or changed internally
by some other creature, since one cannot transpose anything in it, nor can one
conceive of any internal motion that can be excited, directed, augmented, or
diminished within it, as can be done in composites, where there can be change
among the parts (68).

Just like individual substances and bodies and minds do not actually interact with one another, so
also monads do not interact with one another.
The monads have no windows through which something can enter or leave.
Accidents cannot be detached, nor can they go about outside of substances, as the
sensible species of the Scholastics once did. Thus, neither substance nor accident can
enter a monad from without (68).
Monads are windowless because none of their qualities are passed to anything else and they never
receive qualities from anything else. None of the accidental qualities of one monad can be passed to
another via causal interaction. Unlike the atomist picture where the universe consists of atoms
bumping into each other and imparting motion to one another, Leibniz is clear that there is no
causal interaction between monads.
1.4 IDENTITY AND DIFFERENCE
To this point Leibniz has only told us what monads are not, but has not said anything positive about
them. However, he notes that monads must have some qualities for them to qualify as something in
the first place.
However, monads must have some qualities, otherwise they would not even be
beings. And if simple substances did not differ at all in their qualities, there would be
no way of perceiving any change in things, since what there is in an composite can
only come from its simple ingredients; and if monads had no qualities, they would be
indiscernible from one another, since they also do not differ in quantity. As a result,
assuming a plenum, in motion, each place would always receive only the equivalent
of what it already had, and one state of things would be indistinguishable from
another (69).
If monads did not have any qualities which differentiated them from each other, then change would
never occur. Every state of the universe would be exactly the same as every other. Additionally,
based on Leibnizs belief in the indiscernibility of identicals, if monads had no differences then they
would be the same thing.
It is also necessary that each monad be different from each other. For there are
never two beings in nature that are perfectly alike, two beings in which it is not
possible to discover an internal difference, that is, one founded on an intrinsic
denomination (69).

2: PAN-PSYCHISM
2.1 CHANGE
Leibniz assumes from the outset that change, in fact continual change, occurs in the universe.
I also take for granted that every created being, and consequently the created monad
as well, is subject to change, and even that this change is continual in each thing (69).
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If that is the case, then whatever change occurs in a monad cannot be the product of something
external.
It follows from what we have just said that the monads natural changes come from
an internal principle, since no external cause can influence it internally (DME 69).
2.2 PERCEPTION
The internal principle that Leibniz identifies is perception or the ability for representation. This
is what ensures that the monad has some qualities, and is thus different from other monads,
even though it cannot interact with anything else.
The passing state which involves and represents a multitude in the unity or in the
simple substance is nothing other than what one calls perception, which should be
distinguished from apperception, or consciousness, as will be evident in what follows
(69).
The faculty of representation is the ability to represent a multitude as a unity (i.e. to see a collection
of droplets of water as a wave). Each monad is different because it perceives the universe from a
different perspective. Thus, for Leibniz the basic building blocks of the universe resemble minds to
a certain extent. Here we see Leibniz adopt a form of pan-psychism. This is the mistake committed
by Cartesians who thought there was a material world composed of dead entities.
This is where the Cartesians have failed badly, since they took no account of the
perceptions that we do no apperceive. This is also what made them believe that
minds alone are monads and that there are no animal souls or other entelechies. With
the common people, they have confused a long stupor with death (69).
Voltaire also famously made fun of this claim.
Can you really believe that a drop of urine is an infinity of monads, and that each of
these has ideas, however obscure, of the universe as a whole?1
Leibniz is clear that it would be impossible for perception to be explained without invoking the idea
that the building blocks of the universe have psychic qualities. He provides the following example.
If we imagine that there is a machine whose structure makes it think, sense, and have
perceptions, we could conceive it enlarged, keeping the same proportions, so that we
could enter into it, as one enters a mill. Assuming that, when inspecting its interior,
we will only find parts that push one another, and we will never find anything to
explain a perception. And so, we should seek perception in the simple substance and
not in the composite or the machine (70).
The machine (the composite) must already be made of entities capable of mental activity if
perception is ever to arise. It cannot simply come from the concatenation and interaction of the
individual parts.
1

Voltaire, Oeuvres compltes, Vol. 22, 434.

2.3 FUNCTIONALISM AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

The preceding example shows that Leibniz would oppose what is currently known as functionalism in
the philosophy of mind. According to functionalism, mind is simply whatever performs the
functions associated with mind (i.e. taking in external stimuli and producing certain outputs). It
differs from mind-brain identity theory (which holds that the mind is just the brain), because having
an organic or biological brain is not necessary for having a mind. Anything that performs the
appropriate functions of mind, and passes along information in the appropriate way, is considered a
mind. This implies that we could construct a mind, that AI would be possible. According to the view
Leibniz is putting forth here, AI would not be possible if what the robot or computer in question is
made out of is simply dead matter.

3: SOULS
If monads have psychic properties then we must also consider how they are related to souls or
minds.
3.1 PERCEPTION VERSUS SENSATION
Although bare monads have perception, he does not think it is fully appropriate to call them souls.
But, since sensation is something more than simple perception, I think that the
general name of monad and entelechy is sufficient for simple substances which only
have perceptions, and that we should only call those substances souls where
perception is more distinct and accompanied by memory (71).
It is not proper to call monads souls because they have perceptions but not sensations. Sensation
implies a heightened sense of awareness and memory which bare monads do not have. Instead the
mental activity of monads is more similar to when we are in a deep, dreamless sleep or a coma.
For we experience within ourselves a state in which we remember nothing and have
no distinct perception; this is similar to when we faint or when we are overwhelmed
by a deep, dreamless sleep. In this state the soul does not differ sensibly from a
simple monad; but since this state does not last, and since the soul emerges from it,
our soul is something more (71).
However, we know that monads still have perceptions despite their lack of any real consciousness
based on the following reasoning.
Therefore, since on being awakened from a stupor, we apperceive our perceptions, it
must be the case that we had some perceptions immediately before, even though we
did not apperceive them; for a perception can only come naturally from another
perception, as a motion can only come naturally from a motion (71).
When we awake from sleep we have conscious perceptions again. However, if we have perceptions
when we are awake we must have also had perceptions when asleep. This is because a perception

can only come naturally from another perception (71). In a similar fashion, monads also have
perceptions despite the fact that they do not have genuine consciousness.
3.2 ANIMALS
One consequence of this is that non-human animals have a soul.
We also see that nature has given heightened perceptions to animals, from the care
she has taken to furnish them organs that collect several rays of light or several
waves of air, in order to make them more effectual by bringing them together (71).
Animals have greater mental activity than that of unconscious bare monads, but as Leibniz goes on
to make clear, their mental functioning is not equivalent to that of humans. This is because the
mental functioning of animals relies heavily upon memory and habit instead of reason.
Memory provides a kind of sequence in souls, which imitates reason, but which must
be distinguished from it. We observe that when animals have the perception of
something which strikes them, and when they previously had a similar perception of
that thing, then, through a representation in their memory, they expect that which
was attached to the thing in the preceding perception, and are led to have sensations
similar to those they had before. For example, if we show dogs a stick, they
remember the pain that it caused them and they flee (71-72).
Based upon what we have observed, and remember from the past, we expect that the same thing
will happen in the future. Leibniz notes that for a great part of our lives that humans act the same
way.
Men act like beasts insofar as the sequence of their perceptions results from the
principle of memory alone; they resemble the empirical physicians who practice
without theory. We are all mere Empirics in three fourths of our actions. For
example, when we expect that the day will dawn tomorrow, we act like an Empiric,
because until now it has always been thus. Only the astronomer judges this by reason
(72).
The astronomer does not merely have the animalistic expectation that the day will dawn, but
understands why the day will dawn. Thus, the astronomer makes this judgment on the basis of
reason.
3.3 NECESSARY TRUTHS
The reason that humans have the ability to reason, and animals lack it, has to do with our ability to
understand eternal and necessary truths.
But the knowledge of eternal and necessary truths is what distinguishes us from
simple animals and furnishes us with reason and the sciences, by raising us to a
knowledge of ourselves and of God. And this is what we call rational soul, or mind,
in ourselves (72).
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Leibniz also points out that we have the capacity for self-reflection which animals lack.
It is also through the knowledge of necessary truths and through their abstractions
that we rise to reflective acts, which enable us to think of that which is called I and
enable us to consider that this or that is in us (72).

4: REASON AND GOD

Leibniz gives further explanation of our ability to reason starting in section 31.
4.1 PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION AND THE PRINCIPLE OF SUFFICIENT REASON
Leibniz states that there are two principles according to which we reason.
Principle of Contradiction Whatever involves a contradiction must be false, and
whatever contradicts that which is false must be true.
Principle of Sufficient Reason [W]e can find no true or existent fact, no true
assertion, without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not otherwise
(DME 72).
4.2 TWO KINDS OF TRUTHS
Additionally, there are two different kinds of truths.
Truths of Reasoning A truth which is necessary and its opposite is impossible.
Truths of Fact A truth which is contingent and its opposite is possible.
A truth such as 2+2=4 is a truth of reasoning. A truth such as Alexander crossed the Rubicon is a
truth of fact.
4.3 GOD AND OUR KNOWLEDGE OF TRUTHS OF FACT
Our knowledge of truths of reasoning is based primarily upon the principle of contradiction. 2+2=4
must be true because it would be contradictory for 2+2 to equal anything else. However, the
principle of contradiction does not show us that Alexander crossed the Rubicon (a truth of fact).
This is because the opposite (that he did not cross the Rubicon) is still conceivable. Thus, it is the
principle of sufficient reason that allows us to have knowledge of truths of fact.
But there must also be a sufficient reason in contingent truths, or truths of fact, that
is, in the series of things distributed throughout the universe of creatures [] There
is an infinity of past and present shapes and motions that enter into the efficient
cause of my present writing, and there is an infinity of small inclinations and
dispositions of my soul, present and past, that enter into its final cause (73).
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There is an infinity of causes which have determined why, for instance, Leibniz is currently writing
the Monadology. In other words, although it is often very difficult for us to know the cause, there is
some cause which determined Leibniz to write the Monadology as opposed to writing something else
or not writing at all. Furthermore, Leibniz believes this shows us the existence of God.
And since all this detail involves nothing but other prior or more detailed
contingents, each of which needs a similar analysis in order to give its reason, we do
not make progress in this way. It must be the case that the sufficient or ultimate
reason is outside the sequence or series of this multiplicity of contingencies, however
infinite it may be (73).
If the principle of sufficient reason is true, then there must be some reason why this series of events
came about and not some other series of events. However, this means there must be something
external to the entire series which explains why that is the case. To see why this is the case consider
the following example.
A and B are standing at the edge of the train tracks, looking at a train that is not
moving and which stretches off into the distance as far as the eye can see. Suddenly
they hear a bang and a creak and the cars of the train start to move off to the right.
Now imagine that Bo points to the car just in front of them and asks Why did that
car move? The event of the car accelerating is, of course, a dependent thing in the
sense that something has to cause it to accelerate in this way. A replies:
A: Well of course, it moved because the care right in front of it moved, and the two
are hooked together.
B: Alright, but what caused that other car to move.
A: The one in front of it, of course!
B: Yes, but what cause that one to move?
A: The one in front of it!
B: (seeing where this is going, and becoming annoyed) Why do I talk to you? Look,
what I want to know is, what is the ultimate cause of the train moving?!2
The answer B is looking for is something along the lines of the conductor started the train. This is
something external to the chain of things we are trying to explain which explains why the train as a whole
begins to move. According to Leibniz, the external cause we are looking for in this case is God.
And that is why the ultimate reason of things must be in a necessary substance in
which the diversity of changes is only eminent as in its source. This is what we call
God (73).
This is known as the cosmological argument for the existence of God.

Murray and Rea, An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, 139.

4.4 LEIBNIZS MODAL ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Leibniz also provides an Ontological Argument for the existence of God. Leibniz begins with the
idea that God is a necessary being. What this means is that Gods actual existence is a simple
consequence of its possible existence (73). To make theis idea more precise, it is helpful to
introduce the terminology of possible, impossible, and actual world. Philosophers use these terms to talk
about alternative ways that the world could have been.
Possible World Any description of a world that could exist.
Impossible World Any description of a world that could not have existed.
Actual World The description of the possible world that does exist.
The following are examples of possible and impossible worlds.
Possible World A world that is exactly the same as the actual world except that
Ryan is 55. A world that is exactly the same as the actual world except that England
won the Revolutionary War.
Impossible World A world that is exactly the same as the actual world except
that 2+2=5. A world that is exactly the same as the actual world except that triangles
have 4 sides.
What distinguishes possible and impossible worlds is that we can coherently imagine possible
worlds, but we cannot coherently imagine impossible worlds. Using this terminology we can redefine
the terms contingent and necessary beings in the following.
Contingent Beings A being is contingent if its existence in one possible world
does not imply that it must exist in all possible worlds.
Necessary Beings A being is necessary if its existence in one possible world does
imply that it must exist in all possible worlds.
Although the following example involves truth and not existence, it can be helpful for applying these
concepts to God. Consider the statement 2+2=4. If this statement is true in one possible world,
would it be possible for it to be false in another possible world? No, it has to be true in every
possible world. Similarly, if God (as a necessary being) exists in one possible world, then God must
exist in every possible world. For Leibniz, this must be the case if God is going to be perfect.
From this it follows that God is absolutely perfect perfection being nothing but the
magnitude of positive reality considered as such, setting aside the limits or bounds in
the things which have it. And here, where there are not limits, that is, in God,
perfection is absolutely infinite (73).
If God were not necessary, then God would not be independent. Gods existence would depend on
other things. However, a perfect being should be absolutely independent.
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Thus God alone (or the necessary being) has this privilege, that he must exist if he is
possible (74).
We can outline this argument as the following.
The Modal Ontological Argument
P1 Its conceivable that God (a necessary being) exists.
P2 If its conceivable that God (a necessary being) exists, then God (a necessary
being) exists in at least one possible world.
C1 God (a necessary being) exists in one possible world.
P3 If God (a necessary being) exists in one possible world, then he exists in all
possible worlds.
P4 The actual world is a possible world.
C2 God (a necessary being) exists in the actual world.
One controversial premise of this argument is P1 and Leibniz recognizes this.
And since nothing can prevent the possibility of what is without limits, without
negation, and consequently without contradiction, this by itself is sufficient for us to
know the existence of a God a priori (74).
The important question is an omnibenevolent, omniscient, and omnipotent being actually possible?
Or does it imply some sort of contradiction? There are some challenges in the way of thinking that
the concept of an omniomniomni God is internally consistent. For instance, can God create a rock
so large that even God cannot lift it? Either way the question is answered it seems like God is not
omniscient. Leibniz defends the possibility of God in other works.

5: THE PERFECTION OF GODS CREATION

Leibniz again reemphasizes here that Gods creation is perfect or the best possible.
53. Now, since there is an infinity of possible universes in Gods ideas, and since
only one of them can exist, there must be a sufficient reason for Gods choice, a
reason which determines him toward one thing rather than another.
54. And this reason can only be found in fitness, or in the degree of perfection that
these worlds contain (75-76).
The way in which God has arranged the various monads is reflective of the perfection of the
universe.
56. This interconnection or accommodation of all created things to each other, and
each to all the others, brings it about that each simple substance has relations that
express all the others, and consequently, that each simple substance is a perpetual,
living mirror of the universe.
57. Just as the same city viewed from different directions appears entirely different
and, as it were, multiplied perspectively, in just the same way it happens that, because
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of the multitude of simple substances, there are, as it were, just as many different
universes which are, nevertheless, only perspectives on a single one, corresponding
to different points of view of each monad (76).
Each monad reflects the entire universe from a different point of view, thus adding to the variety
(and thus the perfection) of the universe.
And this is the way of obtaining as much variety as possible, but with the greatest
order possible, that is, it is the way of obtaining as much perfection as possible (76).
Leibniz describes this as a universal harmony (76). Of course, not every monad perceives the
universe in precisely the same way.
However, it is true that this representation is only confused as to the detail of the
whole universe, and can only be distinct for a small portion of things, that is, either
for those that are closest, or for those that are greatest with respect to each monad,
otherwise each monad would be a divinity (76-77).
If monads had a clear and distinct perception of the entire universe then monads would be Gods.
Thus the perception of a monad is limited by its perspective. However, each monad still reflects the
entire universe to some extent.

6: COMPOSITES
Beginning in section 61 Leibniz explains the nature of composite beings.
6.1 ORGANIZATION OF LIVING BEINGS
Leibniz explains the difference between living beings and animals.
The body belonging to a monad (which is the entelechy or soul of that body)
together with an entelechy constitutes what may be called a living being, and together
with a soul constitutes what is called an animal (77).
As we would expect, all of these composites are alive.
Thus there is nothing fallow, sterile, or dead in the universe, no chaos and no
confusion except in appearance (78).
In each composite the monads all coalesce (but do not interact) around one dominant monad.
Where that dominant monad is a soul, the composite is an animal.
Thus we see that each living body has a dominant entelechy, which in the animal is
the soul; but the limbs of this living body are full of other living beings, plants,
animals, each of which also has its entelechy, or its dominant soul (78).

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6.2 GENERATION AND DEATH

However, the soul is not tied forever to one single identical body.
But we must not imagine [] that each soul ahs a mass or portion of matter of its
own, always proper to or allotted by it, and that it consequently possesses other
lower living beings, forever destined to serve it. For all bodies are in a perpetual flux,
like rivers, and parts enter into them and depart from them continually (78).
The body that is attached to any given soul changes little by little, but the soul does not travel from
one body to another.
There is often metamorphosis in animals, but there is never metempsychosis nor
transmigration of souls; there are also no completely separated souls, nor spirits
without bodies. God alone is completely detached from bodies (78)
Over time the body that a soul is attached to gradually changes, but the soul and body never become
completely separated. This has an important consequence for how we conceive of death.
76. But this was only half the truth. I have, therefore, held that if the animal never
begins naturally, it does not end naturally, either; and not only will there be no
generation, but also no complete destruction, nor any death, strictly speaking []
77. Thus one can state that not only is the soul (mirror of an indestructible universe)
indestructible, but so is the animal itself, even though its mechanism often perishes
in part, and casts off or puts on its organic coverings (79).
There is no such thing as a complete death, simply the rearrangement of body around the dominant
monad.
6.3 PRE-ESTABLISHED HARMONY OF BODY AND MIND
Leibniz also gives further explanation of the relationship between mind and body here.
These principles have given me a way of naturally explaining the union, or rather the
conformity of the soul and the organic body. The soul follows its own laws and the
body also follows its own; and they agree in virtue of the harmony pre-established
between all substances, since they are all representations of a single universe (79).
There are separate laws governing the body and the mind which Leibniz has set up to agree with one
another as a pre-established harmony. Furthermore, this allows for the harmony of final and
efficient causation.
Souls act according to the laws of final causes, through appetition, ends, and means.
Bodies act according to the laws of efficient causes or of motions. And these two
kingdoms, that of efficient causes and that of final causes, are in harmony with each
other (79).

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The mind acts according to a set of laws having to do with reason and intention, while the body
simply follows laws of efficient causation. God ensures that these two sorts of laws will correspond
to one another.

7: THE CITY OF GOD AND THE MORAL ORDER

7.1 THE CITY OF GOD
We saw in the Discourse that Leibniz believes the universe can be described as a sort of city or society
between minds and God. He takes up that topic again here to finish the Monadology. He first
emphasizes that what distinguishes the human mind is its resemblance to divinity.
[T]hat minds are also images of the divinity itself, or of the author of nature, capable
of knowing the system of the universe, and imitating something of it through their
schematic representations of it, each mind being like a little divinity it its own realm
(80).
This is why humans can form a sort of society with God.
This is what makes minds capable of entering into a kind of society with God, and
allows him to be, in relation to them, not only what an inventor is to his machine (as
God is in relation to the other creatures) but also what a prince is to his subjects, and
even what a father is to his children (80).
7.2 THE MORAL ORDER AND THE GRACE OF GOD
What is more novel in the Monadology is an explanation of Gods grace as a pre-established harmony
between the physical and moral worlds.
[W]e ought to note here yet another harmony between the physical kingdom of
nature and the moral kingdom of grace, that is, between God considered as the
architect of the mechanism of the universe, and God considered as the monarch of
the divine city of minds (81).
Events in the physical world are made to be consistent with Gods moral goodness in another pre
established harmony.
This harmony leads things to grace through the very paths of nature. For example,
this globe must be destroyed and restored by natural means at such times as the
governing of minds requires it, for the punishment of some and the reward of others
[] [S]ins must carry their penalty with them by the order of nature, and even in
virtue of the mechanical structure of things (81).
Again, a wider view of the universe would reveal that all of Gods decisions are for the best.
This is what causes wise and virtuous persons to work for all that appears to be in
conformity with the presumptive or antecedent divine will, and nevertheless, to
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content themselves with what God brings about by his secret, consequent, or
decisive will, since they recognize that if we could understand the order of the
universe well enough, we would find that it surpasses that wishes of the wisest, and
that it is impossible to make it better than it is (81).

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