ASPEC

1NC Shell

1NC Shell
ASPEC they have to clarify the agent of action and
implementation in the plan text voting issue for clash
and education since enforcement is what makes or breaks
policy proves they undermine ground defining the term
US is a prereq to debate
FGF 9
(Family Guardian Fellowship, AN INVESTIGATION INTO THE MEANING OF THE
TERM "UNITED STATES"
http://famguardian.org/subjects/Taxes/ChallJurisdiction/Definitions/freemaninv
estigation.htm)
I doubt if many Americans have ever given a second thought to the meaning
of the term United States, or would believe that it could be a perplexing
question. It would have my vote, however, as being by far the most
important and controversial word (or term) of art, vocabula artis also referred to as a
statute term, leading word (or term), or what the French call parol de ley, technical word of law in all American
legal writings as well as the most dangerous. For it is ambivalent, equivocal, and
ambiguous. Indeed, as you will see, its use in the law exemplifies patent ambiguity, which is defined as: An ambiguity
apparent on face of instrument [sic] and arising by reason of any inconsistency or inherent uncertainty of language used
so that effect is either to convey no definite meaning or confused meaning. (Black's Law Dictionary, 6th edition. Emphasis
added.) Reading Hamlet in the park this afternoon, I chanced on to an intriguing way to put it. In the words of King
Claudius: The harlot's cheek, beautified with plast ring art, Is not more ugly to the thing that helps it Than is my deed to
my most painted word. O heavy burden! (III, I, 51-54. Emphasis added.) The editor, Harold Jenkins, in his notes on painted
says: " fair but false in appearance, like the beauty of the painted cheek." What serendipity to find this, just as I am on my
final proofing of this paper.

It is so appropriate, to describe how 'United States'

usually is used by the government. And it has indeed imposed on us all a heavy
burden ! With dogged determination and perseverance, however, one can succeed in seeing through this meticulous and
painstakingly contrived duplicity. For, fortunately, Congress must define all terms that it uses in a particular and special
way. For example, in the Internal Revenue Code (IRC), chapter 79 Definitions, Section 7701 Definitions, it states: "(a) When
used in this title, where not otherwise distinctly expressed or manifestly incompatible with the intent thereof " It goes on,
then, to define many terms of art. These definitions apply throughout the code, "where not otherwise distinctly expressed"
which will sometimes be done for a single chapter, section, subsection, or even sentence which, you will later see, can be
very instructive. I fear that such analysis can be tedious, and for this I apologize. I will try to be as pithy and compendious
as possible, but I am not writing merely to express opinions; I am writing to prove the points I discuss. And I will worry a
question like a bull dog, until I am satisfied that I have presented enough hard data to conclusively establish my particular
contention, especially in the eyes of those of a different persuasion. For there are intelligent and respected researchers,
for whom I have the greatest regard, who do not agree, for example, with my interpretation of the meaning of 'United
States' in Title 26, as well as in all the other titles.

The history of the usage of United States, from

the time of the American colonies to the present, is remarkably complex. This is thoroughly investigated in
an easy-reading yet scholarly book that I highly recommend, by Sebastian de Gracia, A Country With No Name, Pantheon,
1997. Herein, however, I will have occasion to avail myself of virtually nothing from this wonderful tome. When I think of

my focus is primarily on the relevance of this term

as it relates to the law, especially tax law, to which he simply doesn t allude at least in the way I
do. Before getting started, let me give you just a hint as to why it is so extremely important
this, it astonishes even me. But

to have an absolutely correct interpretation of the term

United States, but also, in the two quotes below, nonresident alien, and gross income. This preview is an
important section from the IRC, which is Title 26, also written in cites as 26 United States Code or 26 USC, Section (the
symbol or, often, as in this paper, these are omitted) 872 Gross income: (a) General rule. In the case of a nonresident
alien individual gross income includes only (1) gross income which is derived from sources within the United States and
which is not effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States, and (2) gross income
which is effectively connected with the conduct of a trade or business within the United States Add to this 26 USC

7701(b)(1)(B): An individual is a nonresident alien if such individual is neither a citizen of the United States nor a resident
of the United States and I think you will agree that the cardinal conundrum here indeed the very crux is the determination
as to what is meant by the term "United States" and, above, nonresident alien. For, under certain circumstances we see
that the nonresident alien is not subject to any federal income tax if his relationship to the United States is of a certain
nature.

The United States is an abstraction given substantiality

when delegated duties began to be performed, and when 1:8:17 of the Constitution
was implemented, which provided for land for the seat of government, as well as forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards,
and other needful buildings.

Third, absent specifying, these debates will always lead to a

permutation obviating the research ground for comparative
institutional analysis
Komesar 94 (Neil Komesar, professor of Law at the University of Wisconsin,
Imperfect Alternatives: Choosing Institutions in Law, Economics, and Public
Policy, p 41-2)
Even the constitutions of totalitarian states have contained high sounding
announcements of right. The welfare of the populace depends on the
presence of institutions capable of translating high sounding principles into
substance. Issues of institutional representation and participation seem
especially important for the least advantaged, who almost by definition have
had difficulties with representation and participation are important for
resolving the simpler version of the difference principle, they would seem
even more important in fronting the more complicated standard that
Michelman derives from Rawls. They would seem more important yet when
society faces the immense task of fulfilling a measure of justice that seeks to
integrate this difference principle with the concepts of equal opportunity and
liberty. Determining the character of the legislature or agency given the task
of this integration seems central here. The real content of Rawlsian justice
depends on such determination. Any theory of justice capable of even
minimally capturing our basic sensibilities has many loosely defined
components. Because such loosely defined elements and complicated
standards are inherent in goal choice and articulation, the character of the
institutions that will define and apply these goals becomes an essentialperhaps the essential-component in the realization of the just society. The
more complex and vaguely defined the conception of the good, the more
central becomes the issue of who decides-the issue of institutional choice.
The discussion of boomer showed that these questions of institutional choice
dominate issues of resource allocation efficiency-a definition of the social
good more confined and better defined than broader conceptions of the good
such as Rawls theory of justice. The lessons about the important and
complexity of institutional choice derived from Boomer are even more
appropriate with more-complex definitions of the good.

Comparative institutional analysis is the most fundamental

question for academics working for social change. Failure to
guarantee this ground guarantees organizational failures and
prevents critical questioning of ethical responsibility

Heminway, 05 (Joan, professor of law at the University of Tennessee, 10

Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 225, lexis)
This article offers a model for comparative institutional choice specifically for use in the context of federal

the larger academic

movement advocating comparative institutional analysis. Comparative institutional
analysis is critically important to the work of scholars and other proponents of law
corporate governance reforms. It also, however, constitutes part of

reform. These rule proponents should not suggest changes in legal rules without also suggesting the
vehicle for the suggested reforms. The determination of the appropriate rulemaking body should be
accomplished by employing some rigorous form of comparative institutional analysis. In this regard, the
framework included in this article is intended to endorse in full the views of Professor Neil Komesar when

Unless we do better with the difficult issues of institutional choice, any

reforms, changes and proposals will remain illusory or cosmetic. We will
continue to cycle through the same proposals with the same arguments.
Today's policy will always have feet of clay and be replaced by yesterday's
rejected panacea, which somehow reappears (without blemishes) as
tomorrow's solution. Attempts to fashion proposals and programs cannot stop
until we fully understand institutional choice . That understanding will be long in
coming and is more likely to occur if judges, lawyers and law reformers seriously
struggle with the subject as they make their decisions and proposals. It is that
struggle that I hope for. I want those who make or seek to change law to seriously
confront and address institutional choice and comparison . I recognize that, to do so,
they will often have to rely on intuition and guesses. It is the responsibility of legal
academics to provide deeper understanding of these central issues and,
therefore, to improve the ability of those who struggle with these decisions.
he says: [*384]

581