PEOPLE VS.

JUDGE VERGARA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SPS. AMADO and TERESA RUBITE, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FILOMENO A. VERGARA, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 51, PALAWAN, and
LEONARDO SALDE, SR., LEONARDO SALDE, JR., FLORESITA SALDE, GLORIA SALDEPANAGUITON, and JOJETA PANAGUITON, respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent Judge, upon motion of the Provincial Fiscal, ordered without notice and hearing the
dismissal of Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 both for frustrated murder filed against private
respondents before the Regional Trial Court of Palawan, which thereafter were reinstated upon
initiative of the Secretary of Justice and docketed anew as Criminal Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573.
After pleading not guilty to the new informations, the accused moved to quash on the ground
of double jeopardy, which was opposed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor.
Petitioners contend that the filing of the two (2) new Informations did not place accused-private
respondents in double jeopardy since the dismissal of the previous cases was made with the
latter's express consent, which can be equated with their motion for reinvestigation of the cases,
dismissal of the cases being their ultimate intention in moving for reinvestigation. It is the
position of petitioners that when the dismissal is with the express consent of the accused, such
dismissal cannot be the basis of a claim of double jeopardy.
Petitioners further submit that the dismissal of the previous cases is null and void as the motion
to dismiss filed by the Provincial Prosecutor which led to the dismissal of the cases did not
contain a notice of hearing; hence, it was then a "mere scrap of paper" which the lower court
should not even have entertained.
Finally, petitioners maintain that where the prosecution has been deprived of a fair opportunity
to prosecute and prove its case, its right to due process is violated.
While the Solicitor General concedes that "[w]hat should have been done by the new Provincial
Prosecutor was to refile the Informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 and not to file new
Informations which were docketed as Crim. Cases Nos. 8572 and 8573," he nevertheless avers
that the filing of the new Informations amounted merely to a continuation of the first jeopardy
and did not expose the private respondents to a second jeopardy.
The Solicitor General then claims that there can be no valid defense of double jeopardy since
one of the requisites for its valid defense, i.e., that there be a valid termination of the first
jeopardy. He further argues that the motion to dismiss filed by the public prosecutor should not
have been entertained, much less granted, since there was no notice of hearing, nor was it
actually set for hearing.

Private respondents on the other hand, invoking the now repealed Sec. 9, Rule 117, of the
Rules of Court, asseverate that the "rules provide and speak of EXPRESS CONSENT" which
cannot be equated with intention. Hence, while they may have intended to have their cases
dismissed upon moving for reinvestigation, they never gave their express consent to the
dismissal of the cases. In fact, they never sought the dismissal of the charges against them.
Furthermore, private respondents, in response to the allegation that the orders of respondent
judge dismissing the first two cases were null and void, argue that if indeed the dismissal orders
were null and void, petitioners should not have waited for the filing of the new Informations and
their subsequent quashal. They should have immediately challenged the dismissal order. After
sleeping on their rights, they cannot belatedly say that they were denied due process.
ISSUES:
a) Whether or not private respondents gave their express consent to the dismissal of the
original Informations.
b) Whether or not notice and hearing are required in motion to dismiss filed by the Public
Prosecutor who himself instituted the criminal cases.
c) Whether or not the first jeopardy was validly terminated.
HELD:
a) No. Express consent has been defined as that which is directly given either viva voce or in
writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to
supply its meaning. This is hardly what private respondents gave. What they did was merely to
move for reinvestigation of the case before the prosecutor. To equate this with express consent
of the accused to the dismissal of the case in the lower court is to strain the meaning of
"express consent" too far. Simply, there was no express consent of the accused when the
prosecutor moved for the dismissal of the original Informations.
b) No. Since it was the prosecuting officer who instituted the cases, and who thereafter moved
for their dismissal, a hearing on his motion to dismiss was not necessary at all. While it may be
true that, as a general rule, all motions should contain a notice of hearing under Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, these cases present an unusual situation where the motion to dismiss filed
negates the necessity of a hearing. Here, it was the public prosecutor himself who after
instituting Crim. Cases Nos. 7396 and 7397 filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that after a
reinvestigation it was found that . . . the evidence in these cases clearly tilts in favor of both
accused. Moreover, Section 5 of Rule 110 of the New Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly
provides that "[a]ll criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be
under the direction and control of the fiscal." The private complainants are also precluded from
questioning the discretion of the fiscal in moving for the dismissal of the criminal action. Hence,
a hearing on the motion to dismiss would be useless and futile.

c) Yes. It has been repeatedly held that once an Information is filed with the court, it acquires
jurisdiction over the case, and the consequent discretion to dismiss it. While the prosecutor
retains full control over the prosecution, he loses jurisdiction over the entire proceedings.
Hence, what petitioners should have done was to appeal the dismissal of the cases on the
ground that the said motion failed to include a notice of hearing, and should not have waited for
the dismissal of the subsequent cases on the ground of double jeopardy, and thereafter
question the first dismissal, which by then had already become final, erroneous though it may
be.
The order of the court granting the motion to dismiss despite absence of a notice of hearing, or
proof of service thereof, is merely an irregularity in the proceedings. It cannot deprive a
competent court of jurisdiction over the case. The court still retains its authority to pass on the
merits of the motion. The remedy of the aggrieved party in such cases is either to have the
order set aside or the irregularity otherwise cured by the court which dismissed the complaint, or
to appeal from the dismissal order, and not certiorari.
It must be stressed that after a court has obtained jurisdiction over the case, the failure to give
notice of a subsequent step in the proceedings does not deprive the court of jurisdiction. If
substantial injury results from failure of notice and complaint is duly made thereof, the act of the
court may be held to be erroneous and will be corrected in the proper proceeding, but it is not
an act without or in excess of jurisdiction and is not void. There is a great difference in the
results which follow the failure to give the notice, which is necessary to confer on the court
jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the action, and that which follows a failure
to give notice of a step taken after the court has obtained such jurisdiction and is proceeding
with the action.
Hence, the conditions for a valid defense of double jeopardy, i.e., (a) a first jeopardy must have
attached prior to the second; (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and, (c)
the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that of the first, all being present in these
cases, the defense of double jeopardy must prevail.