Republic of the Philippines

Regional Trial Court

National Capital Judicial Region
Branch _____
Quezon City
JABBA D. HUTT,
Plaintiff
- versus -

Civil Case No.16-100

For Collection of Sum of Money

SPOUSES HAN AND LEIA SOLO,

and THE TRADE FEDERATION, INC.
Defendants.
x-------------------------------------------------x

REPLY

(TO DEFENDANT SPOUSES SOLO'S ANSWER)

Plaintiff JABBA D. HUTT, through the undersigned counsel, and unto
this Honorable Court, most respectfully states:
1. Plaintiff Jabba D. Hutt, through undersigned counsel received on 05
February 2016 the defendant Spouses Han and Leia Solo's Answer
dated 01 February 2016. Pursuant to the Order of this Honorable
Court, the instant Reply is hereby submitted to the Honorable Court.
2. Defendant spouses Solo's charges are weak and flimsy to abolish the
claim of the plaintiff. Thus, plaintiff stands with conviction that
defendant Han Solo has an outstanding debt to the plaintiff.
3. Plaintiff strongly opposes Defendant Solo's allegations. Consequently,
the allegations contained in Paragraph 2 of the Defendants Spouses
Solo's Answer are hereby partially denied.
4. In the process of securing the Contract of Loan by a chattel mortgage,
defendant Solo informed plaintiff that he is the chief operating officer
of TFI. In doing so, defendant Solo gave plaintiff a copy of the Board
Resolution No. 14. In fact, plaintiff has the same document, which
was attached as integral part of the complaint. Furthermore, the
allegations of defendant Solo denying that he presented any Board
Resolution to the plaintiff is without basis and is not supported with
any evidence at all. Hence, this defendants contention has no leg to
stand.
1

5. When defendant Han Solo admitted in paragraph 3 of the answer that

he did not respond to the Demand Letters sent to him, he just showed
how negligent he was in performing his obligation.
6. Assuming arguendo that Hutt misconstrued the investment as a loan,
defendant Han Solo should have explained this matter as soon as he
received the first demand letter. This is the normal thing to do when
caring for an investor of a company. However, such demand letter fell
only on the deaf ears of the defendant.
7. Thus, the allegation in the Answer that to the defendant Solos mind,
an investment was being made and not loan, was a creature of an
impure mind.

8. In addition, the Second Demand Letter should be understood as a

demand "to take immediate action upon the principal obligation"
which is the payment of the obligation in case and not the
encashment of the first Post-Dated Check. The PDCs served only as a
means of securing the primary obligation which is the payment in
cash. The purpose of the demand letter was to remind the defendant
to fulfill his obligation to do the principal obligation which is to pay in
cash the designated installment. Thus, the letter was sent before the
supposed maturity of the check.
9. Plaintiff denies paragraph 4 and sub-paragraphs (a), (b), (c), (d), and
(e) of defendants Answer.
10.
Defendant Solo obtained a loan from plaintiff, as evidenced by
the notarized Contract of Loan. The Contract of Loan is not a product
of forgery. The Contract was executed in the presence of Master
Oogway and Master Shifu as the witnesses, and Atty. Margery
Carreon, the notarial lawyer. These are reflected in the Contract itself.
11. It is a settled rule that when an instrument becomes a public
document its validity cannot be questioned before a trial court
because the commissioned notary is presumed to have performed its
duty in consonance with the laws, hence entitled to great weight
before any proceedings contesting the same. 1
12. A contract or conduct apparently honest and lawful must be treated
as such until it is shown to be otherwise by either positive or
1 Antillon v. Barcelon, G.R. No. L-12483, November 16, 1917; Pan Pacific Industrial Sales Co., Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125283, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 164, 174.
2

circumstantial evidence. A duly executed contract carries with it the

presumption of validity. The party who impugns its regularity has the
burden of proving its simulation. A notarized document is executed to
lend truth to the statements contained therein and to the authenticity
of the signatures. Notarized documents enjoy the presumption
of regularity which can be overturned only by clear and
convincing evidence. (Emphasis ours) 2
13.The contract of loan, as intended is binding. It is the law between the
parties. Obligations arising from contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and should be complied with in good
faith.3 Thus, defendant Solos bare and unsupported allegations are
not enough to overthrow the presumption of the validity of said
Contract of Loan or to raise the presumption of fraud on the part of
the plaintiff.
14. Paragraph 4 (c) of the answer is of no moment. In the complaint, the
plaintiff already stated under oath that defendant TFI owns the plane
to be mortgaged. When plaintiff knew of this fact, he asked for the
authority of defendant Solo. The authority of the latter to mortgage
was set forth in the Board Resolution No. 14.
15.Assuming for the sake of argument, that defendant Han Solo is not a
co-owner, he likewise has the authority to act in behalf of TFI, still by
virtue of Board Resolution No. 14.
16. Defendant Han Solo claimed that the Five Million Pesos (Php 5,
000,000.00) given by plaintiff to defendant Han Solo is an investment
of the former to the defendant corporation. This is an absolute falsity.
First, it would be contrary to human experience for one to invest in a
corporation without conducting due diligence. There is no reason for
plaintiff to invest or subscribe on the stocks of the defendant
Corporation which he only knew from the time defendant Han Solo
presented to him a Board Resolution executed by the said corporation.
17.The loaned amount referred to in the Complaint was a loan in itself and
not an investment. The existence of a Subscription Agreement does not
warrant the non-existence of a Contract of Loan. Assuming arguendo
that the Five Million involved in the Complaint is termed as
investment, it shall still fall under the purview of the loan.

2 Delfin, et al. vs. Billones, et al., G.R. No. 146550, March 17, 2006
3 Morla v. Belmonte, GR No. 171146, December 7, 2011
3

18.
The civil code provides that in contractual obligations, the
nomenclature of an agreement does not prevail over the intention of
the parties. Circumstances, as set forth in the complaint and in this
Reply, warrant that the intention of the parties was indeed a contract
of loan and never an investment agreement.
19. Defendant Solos averment in paragraph 4 (h) of the Answer is
contradictory to the actual facts, as well as to the Answer itself.
20. The averments in paragraphs 5, 6, and 7 of the complaint are all
reflected in the contract of loan and the promissory note. To even
corroborate these evidence, there is a chattel mortgage executed, and
checks issued.
21.Spouses Solo admit in paragraph 3 of their Answer that they have
received the demand letters attached in the Complaint. In the demand
letters, the loan was well described. Thus, it cannot be said that Solo
has no knowledge of the existence of the loan.
22. Plaintiff denies paragraph 4, subparagraphs (b), (i), and (k) in the
defendants Answer. The Supreme Court held in Ros and Aguete v.
PNB, to wit:
Every instrument duly acknowledged and certified
as provided by law may be presented in evidence without
further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment
being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved. The execution of a
document that has been ratified before a notary public
cannot be disproved by the mere denial of the alleged
signer. PNB was correct when it stated that
petitioners(sic) omission to present other positive
evidence to substantiate their claim of forgery was fatal
to petitioners cause.4
23.
In the case at bar, the defendants simply denied the documents
by setting up forgery as a defense. The denial of the defendants was
not even substantiated by another positive evidence.
24. Plaintiff denies the allegations in paragraphs 4 (j) and 5 (g). The postdated checks were given by defendant Solo as a security to the Contract
of Loan. The allegation that defendant Leia Solo gave the checks to
defendant Han Solo for the latter to pay their house is not a matter that
was disclosed to the plaintiff. All the more, it is not material to support
the claim that the check cannot be given as a security. Even if
defendant Han Solo spent the checks in a different manner than that
agreed between him and his spouse, Spouses Solo are still liable for the
power to administer conjugal properties lie upon the husband.5
4 Ros and Aguette v. Philippine National Bank, Laoag Branch, G.R. No. 170166, 6 April 2011
5 Family Code, Article 112
4

25. Plaintiff rejects the contention of Spouses Solo in their Answer,

paragraph 5 (a), (b), and (c). The defense of improper venue should be
denied because the stated jurisprudence was improperly appreciated.
26. The Contract of Loan specifically provides for the stipulation as to
venue. Paragraph 13 of said Contract reads:
In case that there is any action arising from this
Contract, the parties agree to have Quezon City
included among the list of proper venues for said
action.
27.
The stipulation is not restrictive but permissive. Thus, it cannot
be said that there is improper venue. The cited case of Nicolas v.
Reparations Committee is highly improper for the defense to use.
Rather, it exactly supports the argument of the plaintiff.
28.
In Ang v. Ang6, the Highest Court ruled that when a party is a
non-resident citizen, he does not have a choice as to the venue. The
residence of the defendant who is actually residing in the Philippines
shall be the proper venue of personal actions. This is the very reason
for providing in the Contract of Loan a particular stipulation as to
venueto make a leeway to both parties. In effect, the venue is not
restrictive to the residence of the defendants, nor to the stipulated
place.
29.
The ruling states that the case should not be confined within an
exclusive venue that would clearly give inconvenience to the parties.
However, this ruling is not conclusive in the case at bar. The fact that
the parties already agreed upon a specific venue for complaints in
case disagreements arise signifies that both parties knew the
possibility of inconvenience and waives such it by signing the
contract.
30.
According to Sec. 4 (B) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court 7, a waiver
is valid "where the parties have validly agreed in writing before the
filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof."
31.The complaint refers to a Contract of Loan and not to any contract
such as investment that Spouses Solo avers in their Answer. For this,
paragraph 5 (e) and (f) of the Answer are immaterial to this case.
32.
The allegations set forth in paragraph 5 (h) and (i) of the
defendants Answer lack substantial proof. When the checks were
lost, defendant Solo did not execute any Affidavit of Loss. The
Affidavit of Loss that was only executed, apparently, was that
pertaining to the allegedly lost Drivers License.
6 G.R. No. 186993 (22 August 2012)
7 Rule 4 Sec. 4. When Rule not applicable.This Rule shall not apply (a) In those
cases where a specific rule or law provides otherwise; or (b) Where the parties have validly
agreed in writing before the filing of the action on the exclusive venue thereof.

33.
When the defendants alleged that they have ordered the Stop
Payment of the checks, they have in effect evaded their contractual
obligations. Thus, paragraph 5 (k) and (l) of the Answer cannot be
made to support the defendants claim.
34. The alleged loss of defendant Han Solos Drivers License does not
necessarily lead to any irregularity. What were only stated in paragraph
5 (m) and (n) of the Answer are:
m. That, the Drivers License of defendant Han Solo
used by the plaintiff as an identification card in the
Contract of Loan and in the Chattel Mortgage was in
an envelope together with the lost checks mentioned
above;
n. That, the above-mentioned identification card was
lost and an Affidavit of Loss was made therefor;
35.
There is not even a single averment that the allegedly lost
License was used to fabricate the Contract of Loan and the Chattel
Mortgage. Thus, the allegations in paragraph 5 (m) and (n) of the
Answer are irrelevant to the case at bar.
36.

Rule 8, Section 5 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 5. Fraud, mistake, condition of the mind. In all
averments of fraud or mistake, the circumstances
constituting fraud or mistake must be stated with
particularity. Malice, intent, knowledge or other
condition of the mind of a person may be averred
generally.

37.
In the present case, the defendants failed to state with
particularity the connection of fraud in the form of forgery with the
lost drivers license.
38.
The rationale of filing of this suit is no more or less than what is
indicated in the title: For Collection of Sum of Money, coupled with
a prayer for preliminary attachment.
39.
At this point, it should be pointed out that the Subscription
Agreement is suspicious, and should not be given probative value. In
the Acknowledgment of the Subscription Agreement presented, what
was allegedly presented by plaintiff as identification is a Community
Tax Certificate (CTC).
a. Firstly, in notarial practice, presentation of CTC as proof of
identity is no longer allowed. What is allowed is the presentation of
government issued IDs bearing the photograph and signature of
the person to be identified.8
8 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC)
6

b. Secondly, the date of birth reflected on the CTC is 5 May 1992. As

already set forth in the Complaint, Hutt is already Twenty-Five
(25) years of age. Thus, in the year 2014 when the CTC of plaintiff
was allegedly issued, Hutts age was Twenty-Two (22). In such a
case, his year of birth should be 1990 and not 1992. Besides, Hutts
date of Birth is 12 June 1992.
c. Thirdly, plaintiffs residence in 2014 was in Quezon City, not in
Makati. He could not been issued of a CTC in Makati since he is
not a resident thereof.
d. It can be clearly shown that what was presented to be a
Subscription Agreement is an actual fraud in the form of Forgery.
This was done by fabricating a CTC of plaintiff and forging the
latters signature. This is easily done as it is not very hard to
fabricate a CTC. Plaintiffs signature may be found in the Contract
of Loan and Chattel Mortgage.
40. Another argument is that the defendants may no longer raise their
wishes for immediate dismissal of the case. Not only did they answer to
the complaint, but they are actually seeking for a relief before the Court.
By filing their ANSWER WITH COUNTERCLAIM, they are in effect,
VALIDLY WAIVING to attack the matter on venue. This is
considered an act of surrendering themselves to the jurisdiction of the
Court.
41.Because of this, there is no sufficient security for the claim sought to be
recovered from defendant Solo in the instant action, and the amount
due to plaintiff's is as much as the sum for which the order of the
attachment may be granted above all counterclaims.
42. Finally, plaintiff vehemently disagrees with the unconscionable and
baseless defenses of the defendant spouses. Thus, plaintiff strongly
believes that no court should shield a party from compliance with valid
obligations based on wholly unsubstantiated claims of mistake or fraud.9
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it most respectfully prayed to
the Honorable Court that this Reply be CONSIDERED in granting the
reliefs being sought in the Complaint, and be DULY NOTED on the records.
All other reliefs just and equitable are likewise prayed for.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
Quezon City. 22 February 2016

CONCEPCION AND PARTNERS

Counsel for the Plaintiff

9 Sps Pasco v. Heirs of Filomena De Guzman, G.R. No. 165554, July 26, 2010
7

109 Shining Star Blrdg. Nagniningning Condominiums,

Central Avenue, 1107 Quezon City, Philippines
E-mail Address: relc12345@yahoo.com.ph
Cellphone Number: 09055073129
By:

Rey Edward L. Concepcion

ROLL OF ATTORNEYS NO. 37123
IBP LIFETIME MEMBER NO. 1238-RSM
PTR NO. 2184563-05 January 2016-QC
MCLE COMPLIANCE NO. V-0009929-04/10/15

Kevin Harris Co
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS NO. 32173
IBP LIFETIME MEMBER NO. 1239-RSM
PTR NO. 2184563-06 January 2016-QC
MCLE COMPLIANCE NO. V-0009928-04/10/15

Jesse Mae N. Oliva

ROLL OF ATTORNEYS NO. 37124
IBP LIFETIME MEMBER NO. 1232-RSM
PTR NO. 2184565-05 January 2016-QC
MCLE COMPLIANCE NO. V-0009979-04/10/15

Genie C. Morales
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS NO. 37125
IBP LIFETIME MEMBER NO. 1248-RSM
PTR NO. 2184543-05 January 2016-QC
MCLE COMPLIANCE NO. V-0007929-04/10/15
Copy Furnished:
HON. CLERK OF COURT
Branch 96, Regional Trial Court
Quezon City

SPOUSES HAN AND LEILA SOLO

No. 111 Magallanes Village,
1232 Makati City

THE TRADE FEDERATION, INC.

#75 Commonwealth Avenue,
1121 Quezon City

EXPLANATION
Pursuant to Section 11 of Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Court, the
foregoing Reply was filed and served through registered mail due to the
distances involved and the lack of personnel to effect personal service.

Atty. Edward L. Concepcion