DUE PROCESS

Arsenio Lumiqued vs Apolonio Exevea

282 SCRA 125 (89 SCAD 151) Political Law
Constitutional Law Due Process; Administrative Bodies
Assistance by Counsel
Law on Public Officers Right to Due Process Public
Office is Not a Property
Arsenio Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR.
He was charged by Jeannette Zamudio, the Regional
Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses
under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying
gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an
unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio
also complained that she was unjustly removed by
Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints.
The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on
the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992,
but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second
hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17,
1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel.
The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued
nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had
chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for
resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the
dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the
recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing
Lumiqued.
Lumiqued appealed averring that his right to due process
was violated as well as his right to security of tenure.
ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right
to be assisted by counsel during an administrative
inquiry?
HELD: No. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of
counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused
during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute
right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a
criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an
administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, Lumiqued
invoked the right of an accused in criminal proceedings
to have competent and independent counsel of his own
choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime.
The investigation conducted by the committee was for the
purpose of determining if he could be held
administratively liable under the law for the complaints
filed against him.
The right to counsel is not
indispensable to due process unless required by the
Constitution or the law.
. . . There is nothing in the Constitution that says
that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to
be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such
proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable,
is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without
the participation of its members, the safeguard is
deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not
that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except
only with a lawyer at his side.

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due

process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side.
Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted
by the committee was cured by Lumiqueds appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the
constitutional provision on due process safeguards life,
liberty and property. Public office is a public trust.
It is not a property guaranteed of due process. But when
the dispute concerns ones constitutional right to
security of tenure, however, public office is deemed
analogous to property in a limited sense; hence, the
right to due process could rightfully be invoked.
Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not
absolute especially when it was proven, as in this case,
that the public officer (Lumiqued) did not live up to
the Constitutional precept i.e., that all public
officers and employees must serve with responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

Secretary of Justice vs Lantion and Mark Jimenez

(private respondent)
G.R. No. 139465. October 17, 2000
Facts: On January 18, 2000, petitioner was ordered to
furnish private respondent copies of the extradition
request and its supporting papers and to grant the
latter reasonable period within which to file his
comment with supporting evidence.
Private respondent states that he must be afforded the
right to notice and hearing as required by our
Constitution. He likens an extradition proceeding to a
criminal proceeding and the evaluation stage to a
preliminary investigation.
Petitioner filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration
assailing the mentioned decision.
Issue: Whether or not the private respondent is entitled
to the due process right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process
Held: No. Private respondent is bereft of the right to
notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.
An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a
criminal proceeding which will call into operation all
the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights. The process of extradition does not involve the
determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.
His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the court of
the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule,
constitutional rights that are only relevant to
determine the guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be
invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose
extradition papers are still undergoing evaluation. As
held by the US Supreme Court in United States v.
Galanis:
An extradition proceeding is not a criminal
prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that
accompany a criminal trial in this country do not shield
an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty.

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in

character and the evaluation stage in an extradition
proceeding is not akin to a preliminary investigation,
the due process safeguards in the latter do not
necessarily apply to the former.
The procedural due process required by a given set of
circumstances must begin with a determination of the
precise nature of the government function involved as
well as the private interest that has been affected by
governmental action. The concept of due process is
flexible for not all situations calling for procedural
safeguards call for the same kind of procedure.
In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the
State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the
private respondent has no right to due process at all
throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial
proceedings. Procedural due process requires a
determination of what process is due, when it is due,
and the degree of what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior
determination should be made as to whether procedural
protections are at all due and when they are due, which
in turn depends on the extent to which an individual
will be condemned to suffer grievous loss.
As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US
Extradition Treaty affords an extraditee sufficient
opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the
petition is filed in court. The time for the extraditee
to know the basis of the request for his extradition is
merely moved to the filing in court of the formal
petition for extradition. The extraditees right to know
is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of
the extradition process to accommodate the more
compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of
potential extraditees which can be precipitated by
premature information of the basis of the request for
his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of the
extradition proceedings is the need to be more
deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the
government, the Executive, which has been endowed by our
Constitution with greater power over matters involving
our foreign relations. Needless to state, this balance
of interests is not a static but a moving balance which
can be adjusted as the extradition process moves from
the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to
the execution stage depending on factors that will come
into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on
private respondents privilege of notice and hearing is
a soft restraint on his right to due process which will
not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he decide
to resist the request for his extradition to the United
States. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.
Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan

Petition is a sequel to the case Sec. of Justice v.

Hon. Lantion. The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr.
Jimenez copies of the extradition request and its
supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting
evidence. But, on motion for reconsideration by the
Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but held that
the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and
hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA,
represented by the Philippine Department of Justice,
filed with the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying
for the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest
pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1069 in order to prevent the
flight of Jimenez. Before the RTC could act on the
petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion praying for his
application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
After the hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez
submitted his Memorandum. Therein seeking an
alternative prayer that in case a warrant should issue,
he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.
The court ordered the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M
in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted
provisional liberty.
Government of the USA filed a petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set
aside the order for the issuance of a warrant for his
arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M
in cash which the court deems best to take cognizance as
there is still no local jurisprudence to guide lower
court.
ISSUES:
i.
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting
a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee
before issuing an arrest warrant under Section 6 of PD
No. 1069
ii.
Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting
the prayer for bail
iii.
Whether or NOT there is a violation of due
process
HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is
CANCELLED. Regional Trial Court of
Manila is directed to conduct the extradition
proceedings before it.

GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002

i.
Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right
of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition
Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition
Treaty
FACTS:

YES.

By using the phrase if it appears, the law further

conveys that accuracy is not as important as speed at
such early stage. From the knowledge and the material
then available to it, the court is expected merely to
get a good first impression or a prima facie finding
sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as
regards the arrest and detention of the accused. The
prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the

petition and, a priori, for issuing an arrest warrant

was already evident from the Petition itself and its
supporting documents. Hence, after having already
determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did
exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez. The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to
the more reasonable interpretation that there is no
intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step
in the entire proceedings. It also bears emphasizing at
this point that extradition proceedings are summary in
nature. Sending to persons sought to be extradited a
notice of the request for their arrest and setting it
for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which
neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at

issue. The provision in the Constitution stating that
the right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended
finds application only to persons judicially charged
for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.

Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution,

which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice
or a hearing before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest
warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination under oath or affirmation of complainants
and the witnesses they may produce.

Exceptions to the No Bail Rule

The Proper Procedure to Best Serve The Ends Of Justice

In Extradition Cases

1)
that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be
a flight risk or a danger to the community; and

Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its

supporting documents, the judge must study them and
make, as soon as possible, a prima facie finding whether

2)
that there exist special, humanitarian and
compelling circumstances including, as a matter of
reciprocity, those cited by the highest court in the
requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in
extradition cases therein

a)

they are sufficient in form and substance

b)
they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty
and Law
c)

the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission

of further documentation or may personally examine the
affiants and witnesses of the petitioner. If, in spite
of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is
possible, the petition may be dismissed at the
discretion of the judge. On the other hand, if the
presence of a prima facie case is determined, then the
magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the
arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time
summoned to answer the petition and to appear at
scheduled summary hearings. Prior to the issuance of
the warrant, the judge must not inform or notify the
potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition,
lest the latter be given the opportunity to escape and
frustrate the proceedings.
ii.

Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III,

Section 13 of the Constitution, as well as Section 4 of
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a
person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws. It does not apply to
extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do
not render judgments of conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, the constitutional right to bail flows from
the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused
who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as
thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his
guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt. In

That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be

extradited are bailable in the United States is not an
argument to grant him one in the present case.
Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from
the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He
should apply for bail before the courts trying the
criminal cases against him, not before the extradition
court.

Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.

It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of
the peculiar facts of each case. Bail may be applied
for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and
convincing showing

Since this exception has no express or specific

statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially
from general principles of justice and fairness, the
applicant bears the burden of proving the above twotiered requirement with clarity, precision and emphatic
forcefulness.
It must be noted that even before private respondent
ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was
already of public knowledge that the United States was
requesting his extradition. Therefore, his constituents
were or should have been prepared for the consequences
of the extradition case. Thus, the court ruled against
his claim that his election to public office is by
itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.
Giving premium to delay by considering it as a
special circumstance for the grant of bail would be
tantamount to giving him the power to grant bail to
himself. It would also encourage him to stretch out and
unreasonably delay the extradition proceedings even
more.
Extradition proceedings should be conducted with
all deliberate speed to determine compliance with the
Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding
basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic
contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate
that purpose.
That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot
be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still
be within reach of our government if and when it
matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition
for Extradition.
iii.

NO.

Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to

due process and to fundamental fairness. The doctrine
of right to due process and fundamental fairness does
not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.
A
subsequent opportunity to be heard is enough. He will
be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when
the extradition court hears the Petition for
Extradition. Indeed, available during the hearings on
the petition and the answer is the full chance to be
heard and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is
compatible with the summary nature of extradition.
It is also worth noting that before the US
government requested the extradition of respondent,
proceedings had already been conducted in that country.
He already had that opportunity in the requesting state;
yet, instead of taking it, he ran away.

Extradition is merely a measure of international

judicial assistance through which a person charged with
or convicted of a crime is restored to a jurisdiction
with the best claim to try that person. The ultimate
purpose of extradition proceedings in court is only to
determine whether the extradition request complies with
the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person sought is
extraditable.
4)

Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good

faith with our obligations under the Treaty.
Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a
position to deliver the accused, should it be found
proper.
5)

There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Other Doctrines:
Five Postulates of Extradition
1)
Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the
Suppression of Crime
In this era of globalization, easier and faster
international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to
be an isolationist state. We need to cooperate with
other states in order to improve our chances of
suppressing crime in our own country.
2)
the

The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to

Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines

is deemed to have reposed its trust in the reliability
or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its
treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the
willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the
accused in the pending criminal case therein.
3)

The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if

only the accused were willing to submit to trial in the
requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a)
leaving the requesting state right before the
conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b)
remaining in the requested state despite learning
that the requesting state is seeking his return and that
the crimes he is charged with are bailable
Extradition is Essentially Executive
Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial,
responsibility arising out of the presidential power to
conduct foreign relations and to implement treaties.
Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad
discretion in its duty and power of implementation.
G.R. No.190529 : April 29, 2010
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. (PGBI),
represented by its Secretary-General GEORGE FGBF GEORGE
DULDULAO, Petitioner, v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondent.

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

FACTS:
a)
It is not a criminal proceeding which will call
into operation all the rights of an accused as
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. It does not involve
the determination of the guilt or innocence of an
accused. His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
court of the state where he will be extradited.
b)
An extradition proceeding is summary in nature
while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c)
In terms of the quantum of evidence to be
satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond
reasonable doubt for conviction while a fugitive may be
ordered extradited upon showing of the existence of a
prima facie case
d)
Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes
executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition
proceeding, our courts may adjudge an individual
extraditable but the President has the final discretion
to extradite him.

For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELECen banc

issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679 deleting
several party-list groups or organizations from the list
of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions.Among the party-list
organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because
it failed to get 2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did
not participate in the 2007 elections.PGBI filed its
Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought,
through its pleading, the admission ad cautelam of its
petition for accreditation as a party-list organization
under the Party-List System Act. The COMELEC denied
PGBIs motion/opposition for lack of merit.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is legal basis for delisting
PGBI.
HELD: COMELEC's decision is annulled.
POLITICAL LAW: delisting of any national, regional or
sectoral party

The law is clear the COMELEC may motu proprio or upon

verified complaint of any interested party, remove or
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration
of any national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition if it: (a)fails to participate
in the last two (2) preceding elections; or(b)fails to
obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast
under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding
elections for the constituency in which it has
registered. The word or is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence of one thing from the
other things enumerated; it should, as a rule, be
construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies,
as a disjunctive word. Thus, the plain, clear and
unmistakable language of the law provides for two (2)
separate reasons for delisting.
To reiterate, (a) Section 6(8) of RA 7941 provides for
two separate grounds for delisting; these grounds cannot
be mixed or combined to support delisting; and (b) the
disqualification for failure to garner 2% party-list
votes in two preceding elections should now be
understood to mean failure to qualify for a party-list
seat in two preceding elections for the constituency in
which it has registered. This is how Section 6(8) of RA
7941 should be understood and applied.
PGBIs situation a party list group or organization that
failed to garner 2% in a prior election and immediately
thereafter did not participate in the preceding election
is something that is not covered by Section 6(8) of RA
7941.From this perspective, it may be an unintended gap
in the law and as such is a matter for Congress to
address. The Court cannot and do not address matters
over which full discretionary authority is given by the
Constitution to the legislature; to do so will offend
the principle of separation of powers. If a gap indeed
exists, then the present case should bring this concern
to the legislatures notice.
On the due process issue, PGBI's right to due process
was not violated for PGBI was given an opportunity to
seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution
No. 8679.The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative
proceedings, due process is the opportunity to explain
ones side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration
of the action or ruling complained of. A formal or
trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all
instances essential. The requirement is satisfied where
the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity
to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What
is frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing.
PGBI was not denied due process. In any case, given the
result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause
for complaint on due process grounds.
The petition for review is GRANTED.
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
Telecommunications And Broadcast Attorneys Of The Phils.
Vs. COMELEC
289 SCRA 337

G.R. No. 132922

April 21, 1998

Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast

Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. (TELEBAP) is an
organization of lawyers of radio and television

broadcasting companies. It was declared to be without

legal standing to sue in this case as, among other
reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer
from actual or threatened injury as a result of the
subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand,
had the requisite standing to bring the constitutional
challenge. Petitioner operates radio and television
broadcast stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P.
No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and
television time to be known as the Comelec Time which
shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and
television stations. For this purpose, the franchise of
all radio broadcasting and television stations are
hereby amended so as to provide radio or television
time, free of charge, during the period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same
law requires COMELEC to procure print space in
newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92
provides that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free
of charge. Thus it contends that Section 92 singles out
radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to
several million pesos in providing COMELEC Time in
connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even
more should it be required to do so again this year.
Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of
the radio and television stations is the sale of air
time to advertisers and to require these stations to
provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of
private property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it
lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time for one
hour each day and, in this years elections, it stands
to lost P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELECs requirement
that it provide at least 30 minutes of prime time daily
for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio
and television broadcast companies the equal protection
of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes
taking of property without due process of law and
without just compensation.
Held: Petitioners argument is without merit. All
broadcasting, whether radio or by television stations,
is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have
to be allocated as there are more individuals who want
to broadcast that there are frequencies to assign. Radio
and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies
through which they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the temporary privilege
to use them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may
reasonably be burdened with the performance by the
grantee of some form of public service. In granting the
privilege to operate broadcast stations and supervising
radio and television stations, the state spends

considerable public funds in licensing and supervising

them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and
television stations to provide free air time as against
newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is
likewise without merit. Regulation of the broadcast
industry requires spending of public funds which it does
not do in the case of print media. To require the
broadcast industry to provide free air time for COMELEC
is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own
the airwaves, no private property is taken by the
requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
PEOPLE V JALOSJOS Feb. 3, 2000
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a fullfledged member of Congress who is confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal. The
accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be
allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and
committee meetings despite his having been convicted in
the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the
basis of popular sovereignty and the need for his
constituents to be represented
Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be
allowed to discharge mandate as member of House of
Representatives
Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power
of the people. However, inspite of its importance, the
privileges and rights arising from having been elected
may be enlarged or restricted by law.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and
members of the House of Representatives arises from a
provision of the Constitution. The privilege has always
been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision
granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It
may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he
should be exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art.
VI of the Constitution. The members of Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions if the reason
for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of
a Congressman charged with a crime punishable by
imprisonment of more than six years is not merely
authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations. To
allow accused-appellant to attend congressional sessions
and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation
not only elevates accused-appellants status to that of
a special class, it also would be a mockery of the
purposes of the correction system.
BIRAOGO VS PTC
MARCH 28, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
192935 December 7, 2010

G.R. No.

FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing

Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and
to submit its finding and recommendations to the
President, Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the
powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasijudicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate,
resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and
assess evidence of graft and corruption and make
recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has
no power to cite people in contempt, much less order
their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause
exists as to warrant the filing of an information in our
courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing
its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it
arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President
to structurally reorganize the Office of the President
to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public
office which was hitherto inexistent like the Truth
Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with
quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the
1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as
it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration
as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it
excludes those of the other administrations, past and
present, who may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing
of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress
because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to
conduct investigations to ensure that laws are
faithfully executed and that, in any event, the
Constitution, Revised Administrative Code of 1987, PD
No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form
such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but

a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by

Congress.

benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the

party entitled to the avails of the suit.

3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede

the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it
is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and
its functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the
latters jurisdiction.

Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public

suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right
in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does
so as a representative of the general public. He has to
show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He
has to make out a sufficient interest in the vindication
of the public order and the securing of relief as a
citizen or taxpayer.

4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal

protection clause because it was validly created for
laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the
petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation
of powers by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies
and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations,
to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy
calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the
person challenging the act must have the standing to
question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of
its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the
power of the Congress as a body to which they belong as
members. To the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since
his office confers a right to participate in the
exercise of the powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus,
they are allowed to question the validity of any
official action which, to their mind, infringes on their
prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he
sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any personal
and direct injury attributable to the implementation of
E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of
justice on a given question. In private suits, standing
is governed by the real-parties-in interest rule. It
provides that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party in interest.
Real-party-in interest is the party who stands to be

The person who impugns the validity of a statute must

have a personal and substantial interest in the case
such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct
injury as a result. The Court, however, finds reason in
Biraogos assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of
jurisdiction by the Court. There are constitutional
issues in the petition which deserve the attention of
this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our
laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the
President are not limited to those specific powers under
the Constitution. One of the recognized powers of the
President granted pursuant to this constitutionallymandated duty is the power to create ad hoc committees.
This flows from the obvious need to ascertain facts and
determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The
purpose of allowing ad hoc investigating bodies to exist
is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President
is entitled to know so that he can be properly advised
and guided in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment
or allocations of existing funds already appropriated.
There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of
the power of Congress to appropriate funds. There is no
need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the
operation of the commission because, whatever funds the
Congress has provided for the Office of the President
will be the very source of the funds for the commission.
The amount that would be allocated to the PTC shall be
subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so
there is no impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or
erode their respective powers. If at all, the
investigative function of the commission will complement
those of the two offices. The function of determining
probable cause for the filing of the appropriate
complaints before the courts remains to be with the DOJ
and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is limited
to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the
President in the performance of his duties relative to
the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of
its apparent transgression of the equal protection
clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill of
Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It

requires public bodies and institutions to treat

similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The
purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure
every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether
occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the states duly constituted
authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification,
however, to be valid must pass the test of
reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The
classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It
is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not
limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all
the members of the class are not similarly treated, both
as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative
of the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of
truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration only. The
intent to single out the previous administration is
plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class,
that is, a class of past administrations. It is not a
class of its own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not
make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations.
The PTC must, at least, have the authority to
investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and
all public authority administered. Laws that do not
conform to the Constitution should be stricken down for
being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order
No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it
is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Comelec vs Conrado Cruz et. al November 20, 2009
Facts: The present petition seeks a review of the RTCs
decision granting the petition of the respondents on
declaring Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164
(entitled An Act Providing for Synchronized Barangay and
Sangguniang Kabataan Elections, amending RA No. 7160, as
amended, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991) unconstitutional: Sec. 2. Term of Office. The term
of office of all barangay and sangguniang kabataan
officials after the effectivity of this Act shall be
three (3) years. No barangay elective official shall

serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the

same position: Provided, however, That the term of
office shall be reckoned from the 1994 barangay
elections. Voluntary renunciation of office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official was elected.
Antecedent: Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized
Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
Elections, some of the then incumbent officials of
several barangays of Caloocan City filed with the
RTC a petition for declaratory relief to challenge the
constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso,
based on the following arguments:
1. The term limit of Barangay officials should be
applied prospectively and not retroactively.
2. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No.
9164 would be a violation of the equal protection of the
law.
3. Barangay officials have always been a political.
Issue: 1. WON the term limit should apply prospectively
and not retroactively.
2. WON it violates the equal protection of the law.
Ruling: SC affirmed the constitutionality of Section 2,
paragraph 2 of Republic Act No. 9164:
1. No retroactive application was made because the
three-term limit has been there all along as early as
the second barangay law (RA No. 6679-changed the twoterm limit by providing for a three-consecutive term
limit). after the 1987 Constitution took effect; it was
continued under the LGC and can still be found in the
current law.
2. No. The equal protection guarantee under the
Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III,
which provides: Nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality
guaranteed under this clause is equality under the same
conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is
equality among equals, not similarity of treatment of
persons who are different from one another on the basis
of substantial distinctions related to the objective of
the law; when things or persons are different in facts
or circumstances, they may be treated differently in
law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality
provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion
that no basis exists in the present case for an equal
protection challenge. The law can treat barangay
officials differently from other local elective
officials because the Constitution itself provides a
significant distinction between these elective officials
with respect to length of term and term limitation. The
clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself,
is that while the Constitution provides for a three-year
term and three-term limit for local elective officials,
it left the length of term and the application of the
three-term limit or any form of term limitation for

determination by Congress through legislation. Not only

does this disparate treatment recognize substantial
distinctions, it recognizes as well that the
Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No
equal protection violation can exist under these
conditions. From another perspective, we see no reason
to apply the equal protection clause as a standard
because the challenged proviso did not result in any
differential treatment between barangay officials and
all other elective officials.
G.R. No. 199082 : September 18, 2012
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO, Petitioner, v. DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
FACTS:
The Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the
creation of a joint committee with the Department of
Justice (DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary
investigation on the alleged election offenses and
anomalies committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
The Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and FactFinding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections
electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of
officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. In its initial
report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that
manipulation of the results in the May 14, 2007
senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South
Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The
Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein petitioners
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage.
After the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc
adopted a resolution ordering that information/s for the
crime of electoral sabotage be filed against GMA, et al.
while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among
others, should be dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence.
Consequently, GMA, et al. assail the validity of the
creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order
No. 001-2011 before the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
I. Whether or not the creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint
Panel is valid?
II. Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the
equal protection clause?
HELD: Petitions are DISMISSED.
FIRST ISSUE: The creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel is
valid.
POLITICAL LAW: powers of COMELEC
Section 2, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution
enumerates the powers and functions of the Comelec. The

grant to the Comelec of the power to investigate and

prosecute election offenses as an adjunct to the
enforcement and administration of all election laws is
intended to enable the Comelec to effectively insure to
the people the free, orderly, and honest conduct of
elections. The constitutional grant of prosecutorial
power in the Comelec was reflected in Section 265 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus
Election Code.
Under the above provision of law, the power to conduct
preliminary investigation is vested exclusively with the
Comelec. The latter, however, was given by the same
provision of law the authority to avail itself of the
assistance of other prosecuting arms of the government.
Thus, under the Omnibus Election Code, while the
exclusive jurisdiction to conduct preliminary
investigation had been lodged with the Comelec, the
prosecutors had been conducting preliminary
investigations pursuant to the continuing delegated
authority given by the Comelec.
Thus, Comelec Resolution No. 9266, approving the
creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team,
should be viewed not as an abdication of the
constitutional bodys independence but as a means to
fulfill its duty of ensuring the prompt investigation
and prosecution of election offenses as an adjunct of
its mandate of ensuring a free, orderly, honest,
peaceful and credible elections.
SECOND ISSUE: Joint Order No. 001-2011 does not violate
the equal protection clause.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: equal protection
Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution because its
sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of
certain persons and incidents. They insist that the
Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo
Administration as well as public officials linked to the
Arroyo Administration.
While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected to
preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein
were linked to GMA as there were public officers who
were investigated upon in connection with their acts in
the performance of their official duties. Private
individuals were also subjected to the investigation by
the Joint Committee.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue
favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality.
Recognizing the existence of real differences among men,
it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires
that all persons under like circumstances and conditions
shall be treated alike both as to privileges conferred
and liabilities enforced.
DISMISSED.