FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUEA and RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO vs.

HONORATA MENDOZA BOLANTE

G.R. No. 137944 April 6, 2000
FACTS:
Prior to 1954 a parcel of land located in the Province of Rizal was originally declared for taxation purposes of the father (Sinfroso
Mendoza) of herein respondent who also is the present occupant of the land.
Subsequently the said tax declaration was cancelled and declared under the name of Sinfroso's brother (Margarito Mendoza) who are
alsot the Petitioners' father.
On October 15, 1975. respondent and another brother of the petitioners ( Miguel) had a dispute over the ownership of the land
during the cadastral survey of the same.
Trial Court rendred that the righful owner and possessor of the land is the petitioners.
Court of Appeals reversed the decision on the ground that the affidavits presented during trial had not been sufficiently
established. Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners' tax receipts and declarations paled in
comparison with respondent's proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical, exclusive and continuous possession by
respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under Article 538 of the Civil Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is the lawful owner and possessor of the parcel of land.
HELD:
YES.
When respondent came of age in 1948, she paid realty taxes for the years 1932-1948. Margarito declared the lot for taxation in his
name in 1953 and paid its realty taxes beginning 1952. When he died, Miguel continued cultivating the land. As found by the CA, the
respondent and her mother were living on the land, which was being tilled by Miguel until 1985 when he was physically ousted by
the respondent.
Based on Article 538 of the Civil Code, the respondent is the preferred possessor because, benefiting from her father's tax
declaration of the subject lot since 1926, she has been in possession thereof for a longer period. On the other hand, petitioners'
father acquired joint possession only in 1952.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven acquisitive prescription.
Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years. Being the sole heir of her
father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932.
When her father died in 1930, she continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged
in kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.
Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But by then, her possession,
which was in the concept of owner public, peaceful, and uninterrupted had already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she
herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership
for taxation, when coupled with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.
In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire ownership. It is settled that
ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation
and use, however long, will not confer title by prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their
possession was public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership through
extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-1985), This supposed ownership cannot
extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the portion that they actually farmed.
We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was established before the trial court
through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. Aside from manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's
adverse claim against the state and other interested parties.
However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they constitute mere prima facie proof of
ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been paid. In the absence of actual public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership. In sum, the petitioners' claim of ownership of the whole parcel
has no legal basis.

HEIRS OF QUIRICO SERASPI AND PURIFICACION R. SERASPI, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND SIMEON
RECASA, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This case is here for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated May 15, 1998, reversing the decision of Branch 1 of the
Regional Trial Court, Kalibo, Aklan and dismissing, on the ground of prescription, the complaint filed by petitioners for the recovery
of possession and ownership of two parcels of land in Banga, Aklan.
The facts are as follows:
Marcelino Recasa was the owner of two parcels of land described as follows:
PARCEL I: A parcel of cocal land located at Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan, with an area of 770 square meters, more or less; bounded
North by Lazaro Navarra, now Flocerfina Ibit; South by Celsa Retis; East by Banga-Libacao Provincial Road; and West by Aklan River,
which parcel of land declared in the name of Marcelino Recasa under Tax Declaration No. 3721, Series of 1984, with an assessed
value of P2,440.00;
PARCEL II: A parcel of cocal land with an area of 3,648 square meters, more or less, located in Barangay Lapnag, Banga, Aklan;
bounded North by Concepcion Navarra; South by Diosdado Navarra; East by Gabriel Reloj; and West by National Road; covered by Tax
Declaration No. 11079 in the name of Purificacion Seraspi, Series of 1984, and having an assessed value of P1,650.00.
During his lifetime, Marcelino contracted three (3) marriages. At the time of his death in 1943, he had fifteen (15) children from his
three marriages. In 1948, his intestate estate was partitioned into three parts by his heirs, each part corresponding to the share of
the heirs in each marriage.
In the same year, Patronicio Recasa, representing the heirs of the first marriage, sold the share of the heirs in the estate to
Dominador Recasa, an heir of the second marriage. On June 15, 1950, Dominador, representing the heirs of the second marriage, in
turn sold the share of the heirs to Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi whose heirs are the present petitioners. Included in this sale was
the property sold by Patronicio to Dominador. Sdaad
In 1958, the Seraspis obtained a loan from the Kalibo Rural Bank, Inc. (KRBI) on the security of the lands in question to finance
improvements on the lands. However, they failed to pay the loan for which reason the mortgage was foreclosed and the lands were
sold to KRBI as the highest bidder. Subsequently, the lands were sold by KRBI to Manuel Rata, brother-in-law of Quirico Seraspi. It
appears that Rata, as owner of the property, allowed Quirico Seraspi to administer the property.
In 1974, private respondent Simeon Recasa, Marcelinos child by his third wife, taking advantage of the illness of Quirico Seraspi, who
had been paralyzed due to a stroke, forcibly entered the lands in question and took possession thereof.
In 1983, the Seraspis purchased the lands from Manuel Rata and afterwards filed a complaint against Simeon Recasa for recovery of
possession of the lands.
The trial court ruled in favor of the Seraspis, stating that they had acquired the property through a sale and acquisitive prescription.
However, on appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed on the ground that the action of the Seraspis was barred by the statute of
limitations. Hence, this petition filed by Quirico Seraspi who, in the meantime, had passed away and was thus substituted by his
heirs.
Two issues are presented: (1) whether petitioners action is barred by extinctive prescription; and (2) whether private respondent
Simeon Recasa acquired ownership of the properties in question through acquisitive prescription.
We rule for petitioners.
The Court of Appeals, while ruling that petitioners were able to establish the identity of the property as well as the credibility of
their title the elements required to prove ones claim for recovery of property [2] nonetheless held that the action was barred by
prescription. Citing Arradaza v. Court of Appeals,[3] it held that an action for recovery of title or possession of real property or an
interest therein can only be brought within ten (10) years after the cause of action has accrued. Since the action for recovery of
possession and ownership was filed by petitioners only on April 12, 1987, i.e., thirteen (13) years after their predecessor-in-interest
had been allegedly deprived of the possession of the property by private respondent, it was held that the action had
prescribed. Scsdaad
Arradaza involves acquisitive, not extinctive, prescription. What is more, the facts in that case arose before the effectivity of the
Civil Code. Accordingly, what was applied was 41 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that title by prescription is acquired
after ten (10) years, in whatever manner possession may have been commenced or continued, and regardless of good faith or with
just title. On the other hand, what is involved here is extinctive prescription, and the applicable law is Art. 1141 of the Civil Code
which provides:
Real actions over immovables prescribe after thirty years.
This provision is without prejudice to what is established for the acquisition of ownership and other real rights by prescription.

The question, therefore, is whether private respondent has acquired the ownership of the two lands by prescription. On this point,
the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1117. Acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary.
Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession of things in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.
Art. 1134. Ownership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten
years.
Art. 1137. Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for
thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Thus, acquisitive prescription of dominion and other real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary, depending on whether the
property is possessed in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law.[4] Private respondent contends that he acquired the
ownership of the questioned property by ordinary prescription through adverse possession for ten (10) years.
The contention has no merit, because he has neither just title nor good faith. As Art. 1129 provides: Supremax
For the purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of
the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not
transmit any right.
In the case at bar, private respondent did not acquire possession of the property through any of the modes recognized by the Civil
Code, to wit: (1) occupation, (2) intellectual creation, (3) law, (4) donation, (5) succession, (6) tradition in consequence of certain
contracts, and (7) prescription.[5]
Private respondent could not have acquired ownership over the property through occupation since, under Art. 714 of the Civil Code,
the ownership of a piece of land cannot be acquired by occupation. Nor can he base his ownership on succession for the property
was not part of those distributed to the heirs of the third marriage, to which private respondent belongs. It must be remembered
that in the partition of the intestate estate of Marcelino Recasa, the properties were divided into three parts, each part being
reserved for each group of heirs belonging to one of the three marriages Marcelino entered into. Since the contested parcels of land
were adjudicated to the heirs of the first and second marriages, it follows that private respondent, as heir of the third marriage, has
no right over the parcels of land. While, as heir to the intestate estate of his father, private respondent was co-owner of all of his
fathers properties, such co-ownership rights were effectively dissolved by the partition agreed upon by the heirs of Marcelino
Recasa.
Neither can private respondent claim good faith in his favor. Good faith consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom
the possessor received the thing was its owner but could not transmit the ownership thereof. [6] Private respondent entered the
property without the consent of the previous owner. For all intents and purposes, he is a mere usurper. Jurissc
Like private respondent, petitioners have not acquired the property through any of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition
of ownership. The basis of petitioners claim of ownership is the contract of sale they had with Rata, but this by itself is insufficient
to make them owners of the property. For while a contract of sale is perfected by the meeting of minds upon the thing which is the
object of the contract and upon the price,[7] the ownership of the thing sold is not transferred to the vendee until actual or
constructive delivery of the property.[8] Hence, the maxim non nudis pactis, sed traditione dominia dominica rerum
transferuntur (not mere agreements but tradition transfers the ownership of things).
Consequently, petitioners are not the owners of the property since it has not been delivered to them. At the time they bought the
property from Rata in 1983, the property was in the possession of private respondent.
However, this does not give private respondent a right to remain in possession of the property. Petitioners title to the property
prevails over private respondents possession in fact but without basis in law. As held in Waite v. Peterson,[9] when the property
belonging to a person is unlawfully taken by another, the former has the right of action against the latter for the recovery of the
property. Such right may be transferred by the sale or assignment of the property, and the transferee can maintain such action
against the wrongdoer.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED, and private respondent Simeon Recasa is ordered
to return the possession of the contested parcels of land to petitioners as heirs of Quirico and Purificacion Seraspi.
FRANCISCO MEDINA, MARIA MEDINA, RAYMUNDO MEDINA, ENRIQUE MEDINA, EDGARDO MEDINA, EVELYN MEDINA, ERNIE MEDINA,
ELPIDIO MEDINA, EDWIN MEDINA, ELEONOR MEDINA, TEOFILO MEDINA, JR., EUGENE MEDINA, ELVIRA MEDINA, ANATALIO MEDINA,
MARIO MEDINA, CORNELIO MEDINA, ERNESTO MEDINA, IGNACIO CONSTANTINO, SANTOS CONSTANTINO, HERMOGENES
CONSTANTINO, FLORENCIO CONSTANTINO, VIRGINIA CONSTANTINO, MARCELO GEREMILLO, ROSILA GEREMILLO, ERNESTO
GEREMILLO, MERCEDES GEREMILLO, MELENCIO GEREMILLO, BALBINO MEDINA, CRISANTA MEDINA, YOLANDA MEDINA, LYDIA
MEDINA, RENATO MEDINA, EUFEMIA MEDINA, VIRGILIO MEDINA, SONIA MEDINA, LUZVIMINDA MEDINA, CRISPIN MEDINA, REMIGIO
M. RODOLFO, MILAGROS M. RODOLFO, NIDA M. RODOLFO, BELEN M. RODOLFO, MANUEL M. RODOLFO, ALFREDO M. RODOLFO,
SALLY AREVALO, ELMER AREVALO, CELSO AREVALO, JR., VINCENT AREVALO, NENE AREVALO, THE HEIRS OF NAZARIA CRUZ and
SANTOS AREVALO, petitioners, vs. GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondent.
DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
The propriety of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (Branch 276) in Civil Case
No. 98-233 is the sole issue in this petition for review on certiorari, assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals nullifying said writ.
Petitioners are the grandchildren of Pedro Medina from two marriages. In his first marriage to Isadora San Jose, Pedro sired three
children: Rafael, Rita and Remegia; in his second marriage, this time to Natalia Mullet, Pedro had five: Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino,
Crisanta and Rosila. Except for Balbino and Crisanta, all of Pedros children likewise bore children, the petitioners in this case. [1]
On June 5, 1962, Pedro, his brother Alberto Medina and his niece Nazaria Cruz (Albertos daughter) executed a notarized Contract to
Sell in favor of respondent Greenfield Development Corporation over a parcel of land located in Muntinlupa City, then in the
Province of Rizal, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 100177 (Lot 90-A) and measuring 17,121 square meters. [2] A
notarized Deed of Sale covering said property was subsequently entered into on June 27, 1962, in favor of respondent, and this time
signed by Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria, Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz, as
vendors.[3]
Thereafter, a notarized Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage was executed on September 4, 1964 in favor of respondent over Lot 90B covered by TCT No. 100178, measuring 16,291 square meters. Signing as vendors were Pedro, Cornelio, Brigida, Balbino, Gregoria,
Crisanta, Rosila, and Alberto, all surnamed Medina, and Nazaria Cruz.[4]
By virtue of these sales, respondent was able to register in its name the title to the two parcels of land with TCT No. 100578
covering Lot 90-A and TCT No. 133444 covering Lot 90-B. These properties were consolidated with other lots and were eventually
registered on July 19, 1995, in the name of respondent under TCT Nos. 202295, 202296 and 202297. [5]
On November 6, 1998, petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 98-233, an action for annulment of titles and deeds, reconveyance,
damages with preliminary injunction and restraining order, against respondent and the Register of Deeds of Makati. [6] Included in the
complaint are the heirs of Nazaria Cruz, as unwilling co-plaintiffs. [7] Petitioners allege in their complaint that they are co-owners of
these two parcels of land. While the titles were registered in the names of Pedro, Alberto, Cornelio, Brigida and Gregoria, all
surnamed Medina, they alleged that they were recognized as co-owners thereof. In support of their case, petitioners maintain that
the deeds of sale on these properties were simulated and fictitious, and the signatures of the vendors therein were fake. Despite the
transfer of the title to respondents name, they remained in possession thereof and in fact, their caretaker, a certain Santos Arevalo
and his family still reside on a portion of the property. On July 13, 1998, petitioners caused an adverse claim to be annotated on the
titles. After discovering the annotation, respondent constructed a fence on the property and posted security personnel, barring their
ingress and egress. Thus, petitioners sought, among others, the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining respondent and its agents and representatives from preventing petitioners to exercise their rights over the
properties.[8]
Respondent denied the allegations, stating that petitioners have no valid claim on the properties as it is already titled in its name by
virtue of the public documents executed by their predecessors. As counterclaim, respondent alleged that Santos Arevalo is not
petitioners caretaker and it was them who employed him as caretaker.[9]
On January 18, 1999, the trial court issued its resolution granting petitioners prayer for injunctive relief. The dispositive portion of
the resolution reads:
Let therefore an injunction issue, enjoining and directing defendant GREENFIELD DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, its security guards,
agents, representatives, and all those claiming rights under it, from preventing plaintiffs and their caretaker Santos Arevalo, from
entering and going out of the subject premises, and from preventing them to exercise their property rights, upon payment of a bond
in the amount of P100,000.00.
It is SO ORDERED.[10]
Respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 52015.
On July 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals[11]rendered its decision nullifying the trial courts resolution, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
IN THE (sic) LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Public Respondent
Judge, dated January 18, 1999, in Civil Case No. 98-233 is hereby NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.[12]
Petitioners now seek recourse with this Court, alleging the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RELYING HEAVILY ON THE ANTECEDENT FACTS NARRATED IN THE PETITION OF THE RESPONDENT IN
CA-G.R. SP NO. 52015 AND ADOPTED THE SAME AS ITS OWN WITHOUT EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF THE DEEDS OF SALE IN FAVOR OF THE
RESPONDENT AND IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENTS TRANSFER CERTIFICATES OF TITLE ARE VALID DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SAID
ISSUES ARE YET TO BE TRIED
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PRESUMING THAT NOTARIZED DOCUMENTS ARE VALID AND THAT RESPONDENTS TORRENS TITLES ARE
INDEFEASIBLE ON THE WRONG NOTION THAT THE RESPONDENT WAS PRESUMED INNOCENT PERSON

IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A MISTAKE IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT WAS IN CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION OF THE SUBJECT
PREMISES NOTWITHSTANDING THAT PETITIONERS ARE IN ACTUAL POSSESSION THEREOF
V
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS RIGHT TO IMPUGN RESPONDENTS TITLES HAVE (SIC) PRESCRIBED SINCE
AN ACTION OR DEFENSE BASED ON THE INEXISTENCE OF A CONTRACT DOES NOT PRESCRIBE[13]
As stated at the outset, the sole issue in this case is whether or not the trial court erred in granting petitioners prayer for injunctive
relief. This Courts resolution will revolve only on the propriety of the injunction. Any reference to the validity or invalidity of the
transfers and the titles is merely preliminary, as the matter should be resolved after trial on the merits.
It was the trial courts opinion that petitioners are entitled to the injunction for the following reasons:
The Court however holds suspect the acquisition by Greenfield Development Corporation of the two parcels. Lot 90-A covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100177, was promised to be sold to defendant under a contract to sell but the other co-owners did
not sign this Contract to Sell, who all denied knowledge of the same. No contract of Sale followed this Contract to Sell which cannot
be the bases of the issuance of a new title. A Contract to Sell is only a promise to sell, and is not a deed of sale, specially as this
Contact to Sell is not signed by all of the registered owners.
This Court cannot also understand how the document, denominated as DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE WITH MORTGAGE can be the bases
(sic) of a new title. The absoluteness of the sale, is contradicted by the mortgage it also provides. There is absoluteness of sale only
when the buyer upon execution of the contract, pay (sic) in full the consideration and ownership passes to the Vendee. The
registered owners of Lot 90-B covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 100178 even deny having executed this document of Deed
of Absolute Sale with Mortgage.
Until these matters are threshed out at the trial on the merits, and after this is fully explained and determined, whether the
properties were actually sold to Defendant Greenfield Development Corporation, irreparable injury will visit the landowner if the
claim of ownership by Greenfield Development Corporation is allowed and not enjoined. [14]
The Court of Appeals, however, disagreed with the trial court. It noted that the trial court relied mainly on petitioners allegations in
the complaint, which were not supported by substantial evidence, and ignored the presumption of validity ascribed to the duly
notarized deeds of conveyances and the titles issued to respondent. The Court of Appeals also found that respondent is in
constructive possession of the properties in dispute considering that it is already the registered owner thereof since 1962. Lastly, the
Court of Appeals held that petitioners right to impugn respondents title to the property has already prescribed. [15]
Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides for the grounds justifying the issuance of a preliminary injunction, to wit:
SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunction. - A preliminary injunction may be granted when it is established:
(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief consists in restraining the commission
or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or
perpetually;
(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of during the litigation would probably work
injustice to the applicant; or
(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening or is attempting to do, or is procuring or suffering to be done, some
act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to
render the judgment ineffectual.
The purpose of a preliminary injunction is to prevent threatened or continuous irremediable injury to some of the parties before
their claims can be thoroughly studied and adjudicated. Its sole aim is to preserve the status quo until the merits of the case can be
heard fully.[16] Thus, to be entitled to an injunctive writ, the petitioner has the burden to establish the following requisites: [17]
1) a right in esse or a clear and unmistakable right to be protected;
(2) a violation of that right;
(3) that there is an urgent and permanent act and urgent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Hence, petitioners entitlement to the injunctive writ hinges on their prima facie legal right to the properties subject of the present
dispute. The Court notes that the present dispute is based solely on the parties allegations in their respective pleadings and the
documents attached thereto. We have on one hand, petitioners bare assertion or claim that they are co-owners of the properties
sold by their predecessors to respondent, and on the other, respondents claim of ownership supported by deeds of conveyances and
torrens titles in their favor. From these alone, it is clear that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of clearly showing a clear
and unmistakable right to be protected. Where the complainants right or title is doubtful or disputed, injunction is not proper. The
possibility of irreparable damage without proof of actual existing right is not a ground for an injunction. [18]
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals should not have relied on respondents allegations regarding the circumstances
surrounding the sales and the transfer of the titles. Petitioners point out that trial on the merits of the case is still ongoing and
respondent is yet to adduce evidence in support of its contention. The same, however, applies to petitioners cause of action. They
only have their own allegations and are yet to prove their claim. And as stated earlier, the only bases from which the propriety of

the injunction can be determined are their respective pleadings and documents. What tilt the balance in respondents favor are the
notarized documents and the titles to the properties. The well-settled rule is that a document acknowledged before a notary public
enjoys the presumption of regularity. It is a prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. To overcome this presumption, there
must be presented evidence that is clear and convincing. Absent such evidence, the presumption must be upheld. [19] In addition, the
titles in the name of respondent, having been registered under the Torrens system, are generally a conclusive evidence of the
ownership of the land referred to therein,[20] and a strong presumption exists that the titles are regularly issued and valid.
[21]
Therefore, until and unless petitioners show that the documents are indeed spurious and the titles invalid, then the presumptions
must prevail at this juncture.
Petitioners, however, argue that the presumption of validity of the notarized documents and titles cannot be applied in respondents
case as it is not an innocent purchaser.[22]According to petitioners, respondent is fully aware that at the time that the Contract to
Sell was entered into in 1962, Leon Medina who is a co-owner of the property then covered by TCT No. 21314, was already dead.
Suffice it to say that these arguments already involve the merits of the main case pending before the trial court, which should not
even be preliminarily dealt with, as it would be premature.
Equally pertinent is the rule that courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction, which in effect, would dispose of the
main case without trial.[23] The ground relied upon by the trial court in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction in this case is its
doubt over the acquisition of the properties by respondent. [24] Such basis would be virtually recognizing petitioners claim that the
deeds of conveyances and the titles are a nullity without further proof, to the detriment of the doctrine of presumption of validity
in favor of these documents. There would, in effect, be a prejudgment of the main case and a reversal of the rule on the burden of
proof since it would assume the proposition which the petitioners are inceptively duty bound to prove. [25]
Petitioners also claim that they are in actual possession of the property. As alleged in their complaint, they instituted Santos
Arevalo, a co-petitioner, as caretaker.[26] They also alleged in their petition filed before this Court that Balbino and Yolanda Medina
and their respective families are still residing on a portion of the property.[27] Respondent belies their claim, declaring that it
employed Arevalo as caretaker. Respondent presented a notarized Receipt and Quitclaim dated April 26, 1994, signed by Arevalo,
who attested that he was employed by respondent as caretaker and that his stay on the property was a mere privilege granted by
respondent.
Possession and ownership are two different legal concepts. Just as possession is not a definite proof of ownership, neither is nonpossession inconsistent with ownership. Even assuming that petitioners allegations are true, it bears no legal consequence in the
case at hand because the execution of the deeds of conveyances is already deemed equivalent to delivery of the property to
respondent, and prior physical delivery or possession is not legally required. [28] Under Article 1498 of the Civil Code, when the sale is
made through a public instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the object of the contract, if from
the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot be inferred. Possession is also transferred, along with ownership thereof, to
respondent by virtue of the notarized deeds of conveyances. [29]
In sum, the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, and the Court of Appeals
was correct in nullifying the same.
The Court, however, finds that it was precipitate for the Court of Appeals to rule that petitioners action is barred by prescription. As
previously stressed, the parties are yet to prove their respective allegations and the trial court is yet to receive the evidence. There
is nothing on record that can conclusively support the conclusion that the action is barred by prescription. Hence, the Court of
Appeals should not have made such ruling.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated July 16, 1999 rendered by the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 52015 is AFFIRMED, except as to its view on prescription, as discussed in the body of the text.
Let the original records of this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City (Branch 276) with dispatch for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, BULACAN GARDEN CORPORATION and MANILA SEEDLING
BANK FOUNDATION, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review[1] seeking to set aside the Decision[2] dated 30 March 2001 of the Court of Appeals (appellate court) in CAG.R. CV No. 48382, as well as its Resolution dated 25 June 2001 denying the motion for reconsideration. The appellate court
reversed the Decision[3] of Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (trial court) dated 8 March 1994 in Civil Case No. Q53464. The trial court dismissed the complaint for injunction filed by Bulacan Garden Corporation (BGC) against the National Housing
Authority (NHA). BGC wanted to enjoin the NHA from demolishing BGCs facilities on a lot leased from Manila Seedling Bank
Foundation, Inc. (MSBF). MSBF allegedly has usufructuary rights over the lot leased to BGC.
Antecedent Facts

On 24 October 1968, Proclamation No. 481 issued by then President Ferdinand Marcos set aside a 120-hectare portion of land in
Quezon City owned by the NHA[4] as reserved property for the site of the National Government Center (NGC). On 19 September 1977,
President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1670, which removed a seven-hectare portion from the coverage of the NGC. Proclamation
No. 1670 gave MSBF usufructuary rights over this segregated portion, as follows:
Pursuant to the powers vested in me by the Constitution and the laws of the Philippines, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, do hereby exclude from the operation of Proclamation No. 481, dated October 24, 1968, which
established the National Government Center Site, certain parcels of land embraced therein and reserving the same for the Manila
Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc., for use in its operation and projects, subject to private rights if any there be, and to future survey,
under the administration of the Foundation.
This parcel of land, which shall embrace 7 hectares, shall be determined by the future survey based on the technical descriptions
found in Proclamation No. 481, and most particularly on the original survey of the area, dated July 1910 to June 1911, and on the
subdivision survey dated April 19-25, 1968. (Emphasis added)
MSBF occupied the area granted by Proclamation No. 1670. Over the years, MSBFs occupancy exceeded the seven-hectare area
subject to its usufructuary rights. By 1987, MSBF occupied approximately 16 hectares. By then the land occupied by MSBF was
bounded by Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) to the west, Agham Road to the east, Quezon Avenue to the south and a creek to
the north.
On 18 August 1987, MSBF leased a portion of the area it occupied to BGC and other stallholders. BGC leased the portion facing EDSA,
which occupies 4,590 square meters of the 16-hectare area.
On 11 November 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued Memorandum Order No. 127 (MO 127) which revoked the reserved status of
the 50 hectares, more or less, remaining out of the 120 hectares of the NHA property reserved as site of the National Government
Center. MO 127 also authorized the NHA to commercialize the area and to sell it to the public.
On 15 August 1988, acting on the power granted under MO 127, the NHA gave BGC ten days to vacate its occupied area. Any
structure left behind after the expiration of the ten-day period will be demolished by NHA.
BGC then filed a complaint for injunction on 21 April 1988 before the trial court. On 26 May 1988, BGC amended its complaint to
include MSBF as its co-plaintiff.
The Trial Courts Ruling
The trial court agreed with BGC and MSBF that Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF the right to conduct the survey, which would
establish the seven-hectare area covered by MSBFs usufructuary rights. However, the trial court held that MSBF failed to act
seasonably on this right to conduct the survey. The trial court ruled that the previous surveys conducted by MSBF covered 16
hectares, and were thus inappropriate to determine the seven-hectare area. The trial court concluded that to allow MSBF to
determine the seven-hectare area now would be grossly unfair to the grantor of the usufruct.
On 8 March 1994, the trial court dismissed BGCs complaint for injunction. Thus:
Premises considered, the complaint praying to enjoin the National Housing Authority from carrying out the demolition of the
plaintiffs structure, improvements and facilities in the premises in question is hereby DISMISSED, but the suggestion for the Court to
rule that Memorandum Order 127 has repealed Proclamation No. 1670 is DENIED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The NHA demolished BGCs facilities soon thereafter.
The Appellate Courts Ruling
Not content with the trial courts ruling, BGC appealed the trial courts Decision to the appellate court. Initially, the appellate court
agreed with the trial court that Proclamation No. 1670 granted MSBF the right to determine the location of the seven-hectare area
covered by its usufructuary rights. However, the appellate court ruled that MSBF did in fact assert this right by conducting two
surveys and erecting its main structures in the area of its choice.
On 30 March 2001, the appellate court reversed the trial courts ruling. Thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 8, 1994 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The National Housing Authority is enjoined from demolishing the structures, facilities and improvements of
the plaintiff-appellant Bulacan Garden Corporation at its leased premises located in Quezon City which premises were covered by
Proclamation No. 1670, during the existence of the contract of lease it (Bulacan Garden) had entered with the plaintiff-appellant
Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.[6]
The NHA filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the appellate court on 25 June 2001.
Hence, this petition.

The Issues
The following issues are considered by this Court for resolution:
WHETHER THE PETITION IS NOW MOOT BECAUSE OF THE DEMOLITION OF THE STRUCTURES OF BGC; and
WHETHER THE PREMISES LEASED BY BGC FROM MSBF IS WITHIN THE SEVEN-HECTARE AREA THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 1670 GRANTED
TO MSBF BY WAY OF USUFRUCT.
The Ruling of the Court
We remand this petition to the trial court for a joint survey to determine finally the metes and bounds of the seven-hectare area
subject to MSBFs usufructuary rights.
Whether the Petition is Moot because of the
Demolition of BGCs Facilities
BGC claims that the issue is now moot due to NHAs demolition of BGCs facilities after the trial court dismissed BGCs complaint for
injunction. BGC argues that there is nothing more to enjoin and that there are no longer any rights left for adjudication.
We disagree.
BGC may have lost interest in this case due to the demolition of its premises, but its co-plaintiff, MSBF, has not. The issue for
resolution has a direct effect on MSBFs usufructuary rights. There is yet the central question of the exact location of the sevenhectare area granted by Proclamation No. 1670 to MSBF. This issue is squarely raised in this petition. There is a need to settle this
issue to forestall future disputes and to put this 20-year litigation to rest.
On the Location of the Seven-Hectare Area Granted by
Proclamation No. 1670 to MSBF as Usufructuary
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure limits the jurisdiction of this Court to the review of errors of law.[7] Absent any of the
established grounds for exception,[8] this Court will not disturb findings of fact of lower courts. Though the matter raised in this
petition is factual, it deserves resolution because the findings of the trial court and the appellate court conflict on several points.
The entire area bounded by Agham Road to the east, EDSA to the west, Quezon Avenue to the south and by a creek to the north
measures approximately 16 hectares. Proclamation No. 1670 gave MSBF a usufruct over only a seven-hectare area. The BGCs leased
portion is located along EDSA.
A usufruct may be constituted for a specified term and under such conditions as the parties may deem convenient subject to the
legal provisions on usufruct.[9] A usufructuary may lease the object held in usufruct.[10] Thus, the NHA may not evict BGC if the 4,590
square meter portion MSBF leased to BGC is within the seven-hectare area held in usufruct by MSBF. The owner of the property must
respect the lease entered into by the usufructuary so long as the usufruct exists. [11] However, the NHA has the right to evict BGC if
BGC occupied a portion outside of the seven-hectare area covered by MSBFs usufructuary rights.
MSBFs survey shows that BGCs stall is within the seven-hectare area. On the other hand, NHAs survey shows otherwise. The entire
controversy revolves on the question of whose land survey should prevail.
MSBFs survey plots the location of the seven-hectare portion by starting its measurement from Quezon Avenue going northward along
EDSA up until the creek, which serves as the northern boundary of the land in question. Mr. Ben Malto (Malto), surveyor for MSBF,
based his survey method on the fact that MSBFs main facilities are located within this area.
On the other hand, NHAs survey determines the seven-hectare portion by starting its measurement from Quezon Avenue going
towards Agham Road. Mr. Rogelio Inobaya (Inobaya), surveyor for NHA, based his survey method on the fact that he saw MSBFs gate
fronting Agham Road.
BGC presented the testimony of Mr. Lucito M. Bertol (Bertol), General Manager of MSBF. Bertol presented a map, [12] which detailed
the area presently occupied by MSBF. The map had a yellow-shaded portion, which was supposed to indicate the seven-hectare area.
It was clear from both the map and Bertols testimony that MSBF knew that it had occupied an area in excess of the seven-hectare
area granted by Proclamation No. 1670.[13] Upon cross-examination, Bertol admitted that he personally did not know the exact
boundaries of the seven-hectare area.[14] Bertol also admitted that MSBF prepared the map without consulting NHA, the owner of the
property.[15]
BGC also presented the testimony of Malto, a registered forester and the Assistant Vice-President of Planning, Research and
Marketing of MSBF. Malto testified that he conducted the land survey, which was used to construct the map presented by Bertol.
[16]
Bertol clarified that he authorized two surveys, one in 1984 when he first joined MSBF, and the other in 1986. [17] In both instances,
Mr. Malto testified that he was asked to survey a total of 16 hectares, not just seven hectares. Malto testified that he conducted the
second survey in 1986 on the instruction of MSBFs general manager. According to Malto, it was only in the second survey that he was
told to determine the seven-hectare portion. Malto further clarified that he based the technical descriptions of both surveys on a
previously existing survey of the property.[18]

The NHA presented the testimony of Inobaya, a geodetic engineer employed by the NHA. Inobaya testified that as part of the NHAs
Survey Division, his duties included conducting surveys of properties administered by the NHA. [19] Inobaya conducted his survey in
May 1988 to determine whether BGC was occupying an area outside the seven-hectare area MSBF held in usufruct. [20] Inobaya
surveyed the area occupied by MSBF following the same technical descriptions used by Malto. Inobaya also came to the same
conclusion that the area occupied by MSBF, as indicated by the boundaries in the technical descriptions, covered a total of 16
hectares. He further testified that the seven-hectare portion in the map presented by BGC, [21] which was constructed by Malto, does
not tally with the boundaries BGC and MSBF indicated in their complaint.
Article 565 of the Civil Code states:
ART. 565. The rights and obligations of the usufructuary shall be those provided in the title constituting the usufruct; in default of
such title, or in case it is deficient, the provisions contained in the two following Chapters shall be observed.
In the present case, Proclamation No. 1670 is the title constituting the usufruct. Proclamation No. 1670 categorically states that the
seven-hectare area shall be determined by future survey under the administration of the Foundation subject to private rights if
there be any. The appellate court and the trial court agree that MSBF has the latitude to determine the location of its seven-hectare
usufruct portion within the 16-hectare area. The appellate court and the trial court disagree, however, whether MSBF seasonably
exercised this right.
It is clear that MSBF conducted at least two surveys. Although both surveys covered a total of 16 hectares, the second survey
specifically indicated a seven-hectare area shaded in yellow. MSBF made the first survey in 1984 and the second in 1986, way before
the present controversy started. MSBF conducted the two surveys before the lease to BGC. The trial court ruled that MSBF did not
act seasonably in exercising its right to conduct the survey. Confronted with evidence that MSBF did in fact conduct two surveys, the
trial court dismissed the two surveys as self-serving. This is clearly an error on the part of the trial court. Proclamation No. 1670
authorized MSBF to determine the location of the seven-hectare area. This authority, coupled with the fact that Proclamation No.
1670 did not state the location of the seven-hectare area, leaves no room for doubt that Proclamation No. 1670 left it to MSBF to
choose the location of the seven-hectare area under its usufruct.
More evidence supports MSBFs stand on the location of the seven-hectare area. The main structures of MSBF are found in the area
indicated by MSBFs survey. These structures are the main office, the three green houses, the warehouse and the composting area.
On the other hand, the NHAs delineation of the seven-hectare area would cover only the four hardening bays and the display area. It
is easy to distinguish between these two groups of structures. The first group covers buildings and facilities that MSBF needs for its
operations. MSBF built these structures before the present controversy started. The second group covers facilities less essential to
MSBFs existence. This distinction is decisive as to which survey should prevail. It is clear that the MSBF intended to use the yellowshaded area primarily because it erected its main structures there.
Inobaya testified that his main consideration in using Agham Road as the starting point for his survey was the presence of a gate
there. The location of the gate is not a sufficient basis to determine the starting point. MSBFs right as a usufructuary as granted by
Proclamation No. 1670 should rest on something more substantial than where MSBF chose to place a gate.
To prefer the NHAs survey to MSBFs survey will strip MSBF of most of its main facilities. Only the main building of MSBF will remain
with MSBF since the main building is near the corner of EDSA and Quezon Avenue. The rest of MSBFs main facilities will be outside
the seven-hectare area.
On the other hand, this Court cannot countenance MSBFs act of exceeding the seven-hectare portion granted to it by Proclamation
No. 1670. A usufruct is not simply about rights and privileges. A usufructuary has the duty to protect the owners interests. One such
duty is found in Article 601 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 601. The usufructuary shall be obliged to notify the owner of any act of a third person, of which he may have knowledge, that
may be prejudicial to the rights of ownership, and he shall be liable should he not do so, for damages, as if they had been caused
through his own fault.
A usufruct gives a right to enjoy the property of another with the obligation of preserving its form and substance, unless the title
constituting it or the law otherwise provides. [22] This controversy would not have arisen had MSBF respected the limit of the
beneficial use given to it. MSBFs encroachment of its benefactors property gave birth to the confusion that attended this case. To
put this matter entirely to rest, it is not enough to remind the NHA to respect MSBFs choice of the location of its seven-hectare area.
MSBF, for its part, must vacate the area that is not part of its usufruct. MSBFs rights begin and end within the seven-hectare portion
of its usufruct. This Court agrees with the trial court that MSBF has abused the privilege given it under Proclamation No. 1670. The
direct corollary of enforcing MSBFs rights within the seven-hectare area is the negation of any of MSBFs acts beyond it.
The seven-hectare portion of MSBF is no longer easily determinable considering the varied structures erected within and surrounding
the area. Both parties advance different reasons why their own surveys should be preferred. At this point, the determination of the
seven-hectare portion cannot be made to rely on a choice between the NHAs and MSBFs survey. There is a need for a new survey,
one conducted jointly by the NHA and MSBF, to remove all doubts on the exact location of the seven-hectare area and thus avoid
future controversies. This new survey should consider existing structures of MSBF. It should as much as possible include all of the
facilities of MSBF within the seven-hectare portion without sacrificing contiguity.
A final point. Article 605 of the Civil Code states:

ART. 605. Usufruct cannot be constituted in favor of a town, corporation, or association for more than fifty years. If it has been
constituted, and before the expiration of such period the town is abandoned, or the corporation or association is dissolved, the
usufruct shall be extinguished by reason thereof. (Emphasis added)
The law clearly limits any usufruct constituted in favor of a corporation or association to 50 years. A usufruct is meant only as a
lifetime grant. Unlike a natural person, a corporation or associations lifetime may be extended indefinitely. The usufruct would then
be perpetual. This is especially invidious in cases where the usufruct given to a corporation or association covers public land.
Proclamation No. 1670 was issued 19 September 1977, or 28 years ago. Hence, under Article 605, the usufruct in favor of MSBF has
22 years left.
MO 127 released approximately 50 hectares of the NHA property as reserved site for the National Government Center. However, MO
127 does not affect MSBFs seven-hectare area since under Proclamation No. 1670, MSBFs seven-hectare area was already exclude[d]
from the operation of Proclamation No. 481, dated October 24, 1968, which established the National Government Center Site.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 30 March 2001 and its Resolution dated 25 June 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No.
48382 are SET ASIDE. This case is REMANDED to Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which shall order a joint survey
by the National Housing Authority and Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. to determine the metes and bounds of the sevenhectare portion of Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. under Proclamation No. 1670. The seven-hectare portion shall be
contiguous and shall include as much as possible all existing major improvements of Manila Seedling Bank Foundation, Inc. The
parties shall submit the joint survey to the Regional Trial Court for its approval within sixty days from the date ordering the joint
survey.
ANASTACIA QUIMEN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and YOLANDA Q. OLIVEROS, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO,J.:
IN EASEMENT OF RIGHT OF WAY that easement where the way is shortest and will cause least prejudice shall be chosen. However, if
the two circumstances do not concur in a single tenement, the way where damage will be least shall be used even if not the shortest
route.[1] This is so because least prejudice prevails over shortest distance. This means that the court is not bound to establish what
is the shortest distance; a longer way may be adopted to avoid injury to the servient estate, such as when there are constructions or
walls which can be avoided by a round about way, or to secure the interest of the dominant owner, such as when the shortest
distance would place the way on a dangerous decline.
Thus we conclude from the succeeding facts: Petitioner Anastacia Quimen together with her brothers Sotero, Sulpicio, Antonio and
sister Rufina inherited a piece of property situated in Pandi, Bulacan. They agreed to subdivide the property equally among
themselves, as they did, with the shares of Anastacia, Sotero, Sulpicio and Rufina abutting the municipal road. The share of
Anastacia, located at the extreme left, was designated as Lot No. 1448-B- 1. It is bounded on the right by the property of Sotero
designated as Lot. No. 1448-B-2. Adjoining Soteros property on the right are Lots Nos. 1448-B-3 and 1448-B-4 originally owned by
Rufina and Sulpicio, respectively, but which were later acquired by a certain Catalina Santos. Located directly behind the lots of
Anastacia and Sotero is the share of their brother Antonio designated as Lot No. 1448-B-C which the latter divided into two (2) equal
parts, now Lots Nos. 1448-B-6-A and 1448-B-6-B, each with an area of 92 square meters. Lot No. 1448-B-6-A is located behind
Anastacias Lot No. 1448-B-1, while Lot No. 1448-B-6-B is behind the property of Sotero, father of respondent Yolanda.
In February 1982 Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-A from her uncle Antonio through her aunt Anastacia who was then acting as
his administratrix. According to Yolanda, when petitioner offered her the property for sale she was hesitant to buy as it had no
access to a public road. But Anastacia prevailed upon her to buy the lot with the assurance that she would give her a right of way on
her adjoining property for P200.00 per square meter.
Thereafter, Yolanda constructed a house on the lot she bought using as her passageway to the public highway a portion of Anastacia s
property. But when Yolanda finally offered to pay for the use of the pathway Anastacia refused to accept the payment. In fact she
was thereafter barred by Anastacia from passing through her property.[2]
In February 1986 Yolanda purchased the other lot of Antonio Quimen, Lot No. 1448-B-6-B, located directly behind the property of her
parents who provided her a pathway gratis et amore between their house, extending about nineteen (19) meters from the lot of
Yolanda behind the sari-sari store of Sotero, and Anastacias perimeter fence. The store is made of strong materials and occupies the
entire frontage of the lot measuring four (4) meters wide and nine meters (9) long. Although the pathway leads to the municipal
road it is not adequate for ingress and egress. The municipal road cannot be reached with facility because the store itself obstructs
the path so that one has to pass through the back entrance and the facade of the store to reach the road.
On 29 December 1987 Yolanda filed an action with the proper court praying for a right of way through Anastacia s property. An ocular
inspection upon instruction of the presiding judge was conducted by the branch clerk of court. The report was that the proposed
right of way was at the extreme right of Anastacias property facing the public highway, starting from the back of Soteros sari-sari
store and extending inward by one (1) meter to her property and turning left for about five (5) meters to avoid the store of Sotero in
order to reach the municipal road[3] and the way was unobstructed except for an avocado tree standing in the middle.[4]
But on 5 September 1991 the trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, explaining that the right of way through
Soteros property was a straight path and to allow a detour by cutting through Anastacias property would no longer make the path
straight. Hence the trial court concluded that it was more practical to extend the existing pathway to the public road by removing

that portion of the store blocking the path as that was the shortest route to the public road and the least prejudicial to the parties
concerned than passing through Anastacias property.[5]
On appeal by respondent Yolanda, the Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and held that she was entitled to a right of way on
petitioners property and that the way proposed by Yolanda would cause the least damage and detriment to the servient estate.
[6]
The appellate court however did not award damages to private respondent as petitioner did not act in bad faith in resisting the
claim.
Petitioner now comes to us imputing ERROR to respondent Court of Appeals: (a) in disregarding the agreement of the parties; (b) in
considering petitioners property as a servient estate despite the fact that it does not abut or adjoin the property of private
respondent; and, (c) in holding that the one-meter by five-meter passage way proposed by private respondent is the least
prejudicial and the shortest distance to the public road.
Incidentally, petitioner denies having promised private respondent a right of way. She claims that her agreement with private
respondent was to provide the latter with a right of way on the other lot of Antonio Quimen under her administration when it was
not yet sold to private respondent. Petitioner insists that passing through the property of Yolandas parents is more accessible to the
public road than to make a detour to her property and cut down the avocado tree standing thereon.
Petitioner further argues that when Yolanda purchased Lot No. 1448-B-6-B in 1986 the easement of right of way she provided her
(petitioner) was ipso jure extinguished as a result of the merger of ownership of the dominant and the servient estates in one person
so that there was no longer any compelling reason to provide private respondent with a right of way as there are other surrounding
lots suitable for the purpose. Petitioner strongly maintains that the proposed right of way is not the shortest access to the public
road because of the detour and that, moreover, she is likely to suffer the most damage as she derives a net income of P600.00 per
year from the sale of the fruits of her avocado tree, and considering that an avocado has an average life span of seventy (70) years,
she expects a substantial earning from it.[7]
But we find no cogent reason to disturb the ruling of respondent appellate court granting a right of way to private respondent
through petitioners property. In fact, as between petitioner Anastacia and respondent Yolanda their agreement has already been
rendered moot insofar as it concerns the determination of the principal issue herein presented. The voluntary easement in favor of
private respondent, which petitioner now denies but which the court is inclined to believe, has in fact become a legal easement or
an easement by necessity constituted by law.[8]
As defined, an easement is a real right on anothers property, corporeal and immovable, whereby the owner of the latter must
refrain from doing or allowing somebody else to do or something to be done on his property, for the benefit of another person or
tenement.[9] It is jus in re aliena, inseparable, indivisible and perpetual, unless extinguished by causes provided by law. A right of
way in particular is a privilege constituted by covenant or granted by law [10] to a person or class of persons to pass over anothers
property when his tenement is surrounded by realties belonging to others without an adequate outlet to the public highway. The
owner of the dominant estate can demand a right of way through the servient estate provided he indemnifies the owner thereof for
the beneficial use of his property.[11]
The conditions sine qua non for a valid grant of an easement of right of way are: (a) the dominant estate is surrounded by other
immovables without an adequate outlet to a public highway; (b) the dominant estate is willing to pay the proper indemnity; (c) the
isolation was not due to the acts of the dominant estate; and, (d) the right of way being claimed is at a point least prejudicial to the
servient estate.[12]
A cursory examination of the complaint of respondent Yolanda for a right of way [13] readily shows that
[E]ven before the purchase of the said parcels of land the plaintiff was reluctant to purchase the same for they are enclosed with
permanent improvements like a concrete fence and store and have (sic) no egress leading to the road but because of the assurance
of the defendant that plaintiff will be provided one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long right of way in the sum of P200.00 per
square meter to be taken from Anastacias lot at the side of a concrete store until plaintiff reach(es) her fathers land, plaintiff was
induced to buy the aforesaid parcels of land x x x. That the aforesaid right of way is the shortest, most convenient and the least
onerous leading to the road and being used by the plaintiffs predecessors-in-interest from the very inception x x x.
The evidence clearly shows that the property of private respondent is hemmed in by the estates of other persons including that of
petitioner; that she offered to pay P200.00 per square meter for her right of way as agreed between her and petitioner; that she did
not cause the isolation of her property; that the right of way is the least prejudicial to the servient estate. [14] These facts are
confirmed in the ocular inspection report of the clerk of court, more so that the trial court itself declared that [t]he said properties
of Antonio Quimen which were purchased by plaintiff Yolanda Quimen Oliveros were totally isolated from the public highway and
there appears an imperative need for an easement of right of way to the public highway.[15]
Petitioner finally insists that respondent court erroneously concluded that the right of way proposed by private respondent is the
least onerous to the parties. We cannot agree.Article 650 of the New Civil Code explicitly states that the easement of right of way
shall be established at the point least prejudicial to the servient estate and, insofar as consistent with this rule, where the distance
from the dominant estate to a public highway may be the shortest. The criterion of least prejudice to the servient estate must
prevail over the criterion of shortest distance although this is a matter ofjudicial appreciation. While shortest distance may
ordinarily imply least prejudice, it is not always so as when there are permanent structures obstructing the shortest distance; while
on the other hand, the longest distance may be free of obstructions and the easiest or most convenient to pass through. In other
words, where the easement may be established on any of several tenements surrounding the dominant estate, the one where the
way is shortest and will cause the least damage should be chosen. However, as elsewhere stated, if these two (2) circumstances do

not concur in a single tenement, the way which will cause the least damage should be used, even if it will not be the shortest.
[16]
This is the test.
In the trial court, petitioner openly admitted
Q. You testified during your direct examination about this plan, kindly go over this and please point to us in what portion of this plan
is the house or store of the father of the (plaintiff)?
A. This one, sir (witness pointed a certain portion located near the proposed right of way).xxx xxx xxx
Q. Now, you will agree with me x x x that this portion is the front portion of the lot owned by the father of the plaintiff and which
was (sic) occupied by a store made up of strong materials?
A. It is not true, sir.
Q. What materials does (sic) this store of the father of the plaintiff made of?
A. Hollow blocks and the side is made of wood, sir.xxx xxx xxx
Q. Just before your brother disposed that 1/2 portion of the lot in question, what right of way does (sic) he use in reaching the
public road, kindly point to this sketch that he is (sic) using in reaching the public road?
A. In my property, sir.
Q. Now you will agree with me x x x the main reason why your brother is (sic) using this property is because there was a store
located near this portion?
A. Yes, and according to the father of Yolanda there is no other way than this, sir.[17]
The trial court found that Yolandas property was situated at the back of her fathers property and held that there existed an
available space of about nineteen (19) meters long which could conveniently serve as a right of way between the boundary line and
the house of Yolanda s father; that the vacant space ended at the left back of Soteros store which was made of strong materials;
that this explained why Yolanda requested a detour to the lot of Anastacia and cut an opening of one (1) meter wide and
five (5) meters long to serve as her right of way to the public highway. But notwithstanding its factual observations, the trial court
concluded, although erroneously, that Yolanda was not entitled to a right of way on petitioners property since a detour through it
would not make the line straight and would not be the route shortest to the public highway.
In applying Art. 650 of the New Civil Code, respondent Court of Appeals declared that the proposed right of way of Yolanda, which is
one (1) meter wide and five (5) meters long at the extreme right of petitioners property, will cause the least prejudice and/or
damage as compared to the suggested passage through the property of Yolanda s father which would mean destroying the sari-sari
store made of strong materials. Absent any showing that these findings and conclusion are devoid of factual support in the records,
or are so glaringly erroneous, this Court accepts and adopts them. As between a right of way that would demolish a store of strong
materials to provide egress to a public highway, and another right of way which although longer will only require an avocado tree to
be cut down, the second alternative should be preferred. After all, it is not the main function of this Court to analyze or weigh the
evidence presented all over again where the petition would necessarily invite calibration of the whole evidence considering
primarily the credibility of witnesses, existence and relevancy of specific surrounding circumstances, their relation to each other,
and the probabilities of the situation.[18] In sum, this Court finds that the decision of respondent appellate court is thoroughly backed
up by law and the evidence.
WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by respondent Court of Appeals, the petition is DENIED and the decision
subject of review is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SPOUSES VICTOR VALDEZ and JOCELYN VALDEZ v. SPOUSES FRANCISCO TABISULA and CARIDAD TABISULA
560 SCRA 332 (2008), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.)
The requisites provided in conferment of a legal easement of right of way under the Civil Law must be complied and such
existence be proven.
FACTS: Spouses Victor and Jocelyn Valdez bought from Spouses Francisco and Caridad Tabisula a parcel of land located in San
Fernando, La Union. The absolute sale indicated a right of way.
Spouses Tabisula subsequently built a concrete wall on the western side of the subject property. Believing that that side is the
intended road right of way mentioned in the deed, Spouses Valdez opposed such act. Conciliation was then initiated. Spouses
Tabisula failed to attend the conferences scheduled. This prompted Spouses Valdez to file, after more than six years of execution of
the deed, a complaint for Specific Performance with Damages.
Spouses Valdez contended that they purchased the subject property on the assurance of providing them a road right of way. On the
other hand, spouses Tabisula averred that the 2-meter easement should be taken from the western portion of the subject property
and not theirs.
The trial court dismissed the petition. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
ISSUES: Whether or not Spouses Valdez are entitled to the right of way as indicated in the absolute sale
HELD: Article 1358 of the Civil Code provides that any transaction involving the sale or disposition of real property must be in
writing. The stipulation harped upon by Spouses Valdez that they shall be provided a 2 meters wide road right-of-way on the western
side of their lot but which is not included in this sale is not a disposition of real property. The proviso that the intended grant of
right of way is not included in this sale could only mean that the parties would have to enter into a separate and distinct agreement
for the purpose. The use of the word shall, which is imperative or mandatory in its ordinary signification, should be construed as
merely permissive where, as in the case at bar, no public benefit or private right requires it to be given an imperative meaning.

As found, however, by the trial court, which is supported by the Sketch of the location of the lots of the parties and those adjoining
them, a common evidence of the parties, Spouses Valdez and their family are also the owners of two properties adjoining the
subject property which have access to two public roads or highways.
To be conferred a legal easement of right of way under Article 649, the following requisites must be complied with: (1) the property
is surrounded by other immovables and has no adequate outlet to a public highway; (2) proper indemnity must be paid; (3) the
isolation is not the result of the owner of the dominant estates own acts; (4) the right of way claimed is at the point least
prejudicial to the servant estate; and (5) to the extent consistent with the foregoing rule, the distance from the dominant estate to
a public highway may be the shortest. The onus of proving the existence of these prerequisites lies on the owner of the dominant
estate, herein the spouses Valdez.
Since Spouses Valdez then have more than adequate passage to two public roads, they have no right to demand the grant by spouses
Tabisula of an easement on the western side of Spouses Tabisulas lot.
Dichoso v Marcos Digest
G.R. No. 180282, April 11, 2011
Nachura, J.:
Facts:
1.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to reverse and set aside the CA decision
and resolution which reversed and set aside the RTC decision on the civil case. The resolution denied the MR filed by the
petitioners .
2. In 2002, petitioners filed a Complaint for Easement of Right of Way against the respondent Patrocinio L. Marcos and alleged
therein that they are the owners of Lot No. 21553; while respondent is the owner another lot.
3.
Since the petitioners had no access to a public road to and from their property, they claimed to have used a portion of Lot No.
1 in accessing the road since 1970. Respondent, however, blocked the passageway with piles of sand. Though petitioners have been
granted another passageway by Spouses Arce, the owners of another adjacent lot.
4.
Hence the complaint before the RTC. Instead of filing an Answer, respondent filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of
cause of action and noncompliance with the requisite certificate of non-forum shopping.
5.
The RTC denied respondents motion to dismiss.
6.
Respondent denied that he allowed anybody to use Lot No. 1 as passageway and that petitioners claim of right of way is only
due to expediency and not necessity. He also maintained that there is an existing easement of right of way available to petitioners
granted by the Spouses Arce. The RTC declared that respondents answer failed to tender an issue, and opted to render judgment on
the pleadings and thus deemed the case submitted for decision.
7.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners, granting a right of way over Lot 01 after finding that petitioners
adequately established the requisites to justify an easement of right of way in accordance with Articles 649 and 650 of the Civil
Code.
8.
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision and dismissed petitioners complaint. It concluded that there is no
need to establish an easement over respondents property since the Arce spouses had already provided an access road which is
adequate. It emphasized that the convenience of the dominant estate is never the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that respondent's lot is the shortest route in going to and fro their property to a public
street and where they used to pass.
ISSUE: W/N petitioners are entitled to a legal easement
NO. The petition is without merit. Petitioners failed to show sufficient factual evidence to satisfy the enumerated requirements
under Art. 650 (NCC).
1.
By its very nature, an easement involves an abnormal restriction on the property rights of the servient owner and is regarded
as a charge or encumbrance on the servient estate. It is incumbent upon the owner of the dominant estate to establish by clear and
convincing evidence the presence of all the preconditions before his claim for easement of right of way may be granted.
2.
Mere convenience for the dominant estate is not what is required by law as the basis of setting up a compulsory
easement. The convenience of the dominant estate has never been the gauge for the grant of compulsory right of way. The true
standard for the grant of the legal right is "adequacy." In order to justify the imposition of an easement of right of way, there must
be real, not fictitious or artificial, necessity for it. As such, when there is already an existing adequate outlet from the dominant
estate to a public highway, as in this case, even when the said outlet, for one reason or another, be inconvenient, the need to open
up another servitude is entirely unjustified.
3.
Petitioners had already been granted a right of way through the other adjacent lot. There is an existing outlet to and from the
public road. Other lot owners use the said outlet in going to and coming from the public highway.
G.R. No. 152319, October 28, 2009 Heirs of Joaquin Limense vs Rita Vda. De Ramos
Ponente: Peralta
Facts:
Lozada was the registered owner of a land in Manila, he subdivided his property into five and gave the divided lots to his daughters
through a deed of donation on March 9, 1932.
In 1981, Joaquin Limense wanted to build a hollow block fence on his property but could not because a substantial portion of the
respondent's building encroached upon portion of Limense property.

Limense demanded the removal of the encroached area, respondent ignored both oral and written demands.
In the RTC, the respondents averred that they are daughters of on of the Lozada daughters. . After subdividing the said lot,
Dalmacio Lozada donated Lot No. 12-C in favor of his daughters Catalina, married to Sotero Natividad; Isabel, married to Isaac
Limense; and Salud, married to Francisco Ramos. Being the surviving heirs of Francisco Ramos, respondents later became co-owners
of Lot No. 12-C. Lot No. 12-C has served as right of way or common alley of all the heirs of Dalmacio Lozada since 1932 up to the
present. As a common alley, it could not be closed or fenced by Joaquin Limense without causing damage and prejudice to
respondents.
RTC: dismissed the complaint of Limense ruling that an apparent easement of right of way existed in favor of respondents. The Court
also finds that when plaintiff acquired the lot (12-C) which forms the alley, he knew that said lot could serve no other purpose than
as an alley.
Joaquin filed a notice of appeal but during the pendency of the appeal with the CA, Joaquin died. His heirs then elevated the case
to the SC via petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether CA committed a grave abuse amounting to lack of jurisdiction in holding that respondent's ot has an easement of
right of way.
Held: In the case at bar, the action filed before the RTC against respondents was an action for removal of obstruction and damages.
Respondents raised the defense that Joaquin Limense's title could have been obtained through fraud and misrepresentation in the
trial proceedings before the RTC. Such defense is in the nature of a collateral attack, which is not allowedby law.
] As with the present case, the CA's observation that TCT No. 96886 is of dubious origin, as TCT No. 40043 does not appear to have
been disposed of by Catalina, Isabel and Salud Lozada, is improper and constitutes an indirect attack on TCT No. 96886. As we see
it, TCT No. 96886, at present, is the best proof of Joaquin Limenses ownership over Lot No. 12-C. Thus, the CA erred in ruling that
repondents and petitioners co-owned Lot No. 12-C, as said lot is now registered exclusively in the name of Joaquin Limense.
Due to the foregoing, Joaquin Limense, as the registered owner of Lot 12-C, and his successors-in-interest, may enclose or fence his
land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to servitudes
constituted thereon.
Joaquin Limense and his successors-in-interests are fully aware that Lot No. 12-C has been continuously used and utilized as an alley
by respondents and residents in the area for a long period of time.
The portions of Lot No. 12-D, particularly the overhang, covering 1 meter in width and 17 meters in length; the stairs; and the
concrete structures are all within the 1/3 share allotted to them by their donor Dalmacio Lozada and, hence, there was absence of a
showing that respondents acted in bad faith when they built portions of their house on Lot No. 12-C.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 20, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 33589 is
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:
1. No co-ownership exists over Lot No. 12-C, covered by TCT No. 96886, between petitioners and respondents.
2. The case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Manila, for further proceedings without further delay to determine
the facts essential to the proper application of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.
Republic of the Philippines v. Leon Silim and Ildefonsa Mangubat (2001)
Silim and Mangubat donated a parcel of land in favor of the Bureau of Public Schools, Municipality of Malangas, Zamboanga Del Sur,
on the condition that said land shall be used exclusively and forever for educational purposes. However, as the said parcel of land
was too small for the construction of the planned Bagong Lipunan School Building, the Province of Zamboanga, through its division
superintendent, executed a deed of exchange in favor of a new and suitable location. Consequently, whatever was built on the
donated lot was dismantled and transferred to the new fitting location.
The issue arose when the donators found out that Vice-Mayor Wilfredo Palma took the land for himself and constructed his house
thereon. Silim and Mangubat sought to have the donation declared null and void on the ground that the condition of the donation
was violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was valid in view of the fact that the school, which it was conditioned on, was never built
thereon.
RULING: YES. The Court upheld the validity of the donation. Firstly, it ruled that there was a valid acceptance in accordance with
Arts. 745 and 749 of the Civil Code: it was made personally or through an agent, and it was made in a public document. Anent the
second contention concerning the non-fulfillment of the consideration, the Court ruled that contrary to Silim and Mangubats
argument, the parcel of land was used precisely for school purposes. The exchange of the donated lot for a bigger lot was done in
pursuance with the condition that they (Silim and Mangubat) imposed. Remember: the lot was exchanged with a bigger lot to give
way for the construction of Bagong Lipunan Elementary School and for no other reason.
The exclusivity of the purpose was not altered or affected. In fact, the exchange of the lot for a much bigger one was in furtherance
and enhancement of the purpose of the donation. The acquisition of the bigger lot paved the way for the release of funds for the
construction of Bagong Lipunan school building which could not be accommodated by the limited area of the donated lot.
Republic vs Guzman
Three essential elements of a donation:
1. Reduction in the patrimony of the donor
2. Increase in the patrimony of the donee
3. Intent to do an act of liberality or animus donandi

It is also required that the donation be made in a public document and that its acceptance be made in the same deed of donation
or in a separate public document, which has to be recorded as well.
FACTS:
David Rey Guzman, a natural-born American citizen, is the son of the spouses Simeon Guzman (naturalized American) and Helen
Meyers Guzman (American citizen). In 1968, Simeon died leaving to his heirs, Helen and David, an estate consisting of several
parcels of land in Bulacan.
In 1970, Helen and David executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating to themselves all of
the property, and registered it to the RD a year after.
In 1981, Helen executed a Deed of Quitclaim, assigning, transferring and conveying her share of the properties to David. But since
t was not registered, she executed another Deed of Quitclaim to confirm the first.
In 1994, Atty. Batongbacal wrote the OSG andfurnished it with documents showing that Davids ownership of of the estate was
defective. He argued that Art. XII of the Constitution only allows Filipinos to acquire private lands in the country. The only instances
when a foreigner may acquire private property are by hereditary succession and if he was formerly a natural-born citizen who lost
his Filipino citizenship. Moreover, it contends that the Deeds of Quitclaim executed by Helen were really donations inter vivos.
Republic filed with RTC a Petition for Escheat praying that of Davids interest be forfeited in its favor. RTC dismissed. CA affirmed.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a donation inter vivos
HELD: NO.
Not all the elements of a donation are present. The transfer of the properties by virtue of a Deed of Quitclaim resulted in the (1)
reduction of her patrimony as donor and the (2) consequent increase in the patrimony of David as donee. However, Helens (3)
intention to perform an act of liberality in favor of David was not sufficiently established. The 2 Quitclaims reveal that Helen
intended to convey to her son certain parcels of land and to re-affirm it, she executed a waiver and renunciation of her rights over
these properties. It is clear that Helen merely contemplated a waiver of her rights, title, interest over the lands in favor of David,
not a donation. She was also aware that donation was not possible.
Moreover, the essential element of acceptance in the proper form and registration to make the donation valid is lacking. The SPA
executed by David in favor of Atty. Abela was not his acceptance, but an acknowledgment that David owns the property referred to
and that he authorizes Atty. Abela to sell the same in his name. Further, there was nothing in the SPA to show that he indeed accept
the donation.
However, the inexistence of a donation does not make the repudiation of Helen in favor David valid. There is NO valid repudiation of
inheritance as Helen had already accepted her share of the inheritance when she, together with David, executed a Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate, dividing and adjudicating between them all the properties. By virtue of that settlement, the
properties were registered in their names and for 11 years, they possessed the land in the concept of owner. Thus, the 2 Quitclaims
have no legal force and effect. Helen still owns of the property.
2.DOLAR V. LUBLUB (2005)
FACTS:
Petitioner and Serafin Jaranilla were co-owners of a parcel of land with an area of 4.6 hectares, identified as Lot No. 1, Pcs-06000744 (Lot No. 1, for brevity), situated in Brgy. Lublub, Municipality of Dumangas, Iloilo. Said property forms part of Lots No. 4181
and 4183 of the Dumangas Cadastre. Then barangay captain Jose Militar accepted the donation in behalf of Brgy. Lublub. Sometime
in June 1989, petitioner executed another deed [5] donating to Brgy. Lublub, represented by its incumbent barangay captain, the
very same area he and Serafin Jaranilla had earlier donated to the same donee. The second deed of donation contained exactly the
same conditions expressly set forth in the first. On May 6, 1998, in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Iloilo City, petitioner filed
against Brgy. Lublub a complaint for Quieting of Title and Recovery of Possession With Damages involving the 4.6-hectare area he
had earlier donated. Basically, petitioner claimed that the donation in question had ceased to be effective, the donee barangay
having failed to comply with the conditions of the donation.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether or not his action is one for revocation of donation instead of for quieting of title; whether or not the action
for quieting has prescribed.
2.
Whether or not the deed of donation in question is (a) valid for defective acceptance and/or (b) no longer effective
by reason of the automatic reversion clause therein.
RULING:
The Supreme Court held that the donation being valid and effective, virtually forecloses any claim which petitioner may
have over the donated property against the donee and other occupants thereof, and his action to quiet title has no merit. Militar
was clothed with authority to accept the donation for respondent barangay. On this point, petitioner cites Section 88 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337 [16] - the law then in force - and Sections 91 and 389 the Local Government Code of 1991. In gist, these
provisions empower the punongbarangay to enter into contracts for the barangay upon authorization of the Sangguniang Barangay,
or, in the alternative, theSanggunian may authorize the barangay head to enter into contracts for the barangay.
When a deed of donation expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the rules on contract
and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article 1306 of said Code authorizes
the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations, . . . not contrary to law, . . . public order or public policy, we are of the
opinion that, at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the deed of donation, without
prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the rescission sought. Where such
propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory

act. In the case at bench, it cannot be gainsaid that respondent barangay denied or challenged the purported revocation of the
donation