THIRD DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 116121, July 18, 2011 ]

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE RUBEN REINOSO, SR.,
REPRESENTED BY RUBEN REINOSO JR., PETITIONERS,
VS. COURT OF APPEALS, PONCIANO TAPALES, JOSE
GUBALLA, AND FILWRITERS GUARANTY ASSURANCE
CORPORATION,** RESPONDENT.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the May 20, 1994 Decision
[1]
and June 30, 1994 Resolution [2] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R.
CV No. 19395, which set aside the March 22, 1988 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 8, Manila (RTC) for non-payment of docket fees. The
dispositive portion of the CA decision reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE
and REVERSED and the complaint in this case is ordered DISMISSED.
No costs pronouncement.
SO ORDERED.
The complaint for damages arose from the collision of a passenger jeepney
and a truck at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of June 14, 1979 along E.
Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. As a result, a passenger of the jeepney,
Ruben Reinoso, Sr. (Reinoso), was killed. The passenger jeepney was owned
by Ponciano Tapales (Tapales) and driven by Alejandro Santos (Santos),
while the truck was owned by Jose Guballa (Guballa) and driven by Mariano
Geronimo (Geronimo).
On November 7, 1979, the heirs of Reinoso (petitioners) filed a complaint for
damages against Tapales and Guballa. In turn, Guballa filed a third party
complaint against Filwriters Guaranty Assurance Corporation (FGAC) under
Policy Number OV-09527.
On March 22, 1988, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners
and against Guballa. The decision in part, reads:
In favor of herein plaintiffs and against defendant Jose Guballa:
1. For the death of Ruben Reinoso, Sr.
P30,000.00
2. Loss of earnings (monthly income at the time of death
120,000.00
(P2,000.00 Court used P1,000.00 only per month (or P12,000.00
only per year) & victim then being 55 at death had ten (10) years

life expectancy...............
3. Mortuary, Medical & funeral expenses and all incidental
expenses in the wake in serving those who
condoled........................................................
4. Moral damages ............................................
5. Exemplary damages .......................................
6. Litigation expenses ........................................
7. Attorney's fees .............................................

15,000.00

50,000.00
25,000.00
15,000.00
25,000.00

Or a total of ?250,000.00
For damages to property:
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales and against defendant Jose Guballa:
1. Actual damages for repair is already awarded to defendantcross-claimant Ponciano Tapales by Br. 9, RTC-Malolos, Bulacan
(Vide: Exh. 1-G-Tapales); hence, cannot recover twice.
2. Compensatory damages (earnings at P150.00 per day) and for
two (2) months jeepney stayed at the repair
shop..............................................
3. Moral damages ..............................
4. Exemplary damages ......................
5. Attorney's fees..............................

P9,000.00

10,000.00
10,000.00
15,000.00

or a total of P44,000.00
Under the 3rd party complaint against 3rd party defendant Filwriters Guaranty
Assurance Corporation, the Court hereby renders judgment in favor of said
3rd party plaintiff by way of 3rd party liability under policy No. OV-09527 in
the amount of ?50,000.00 undertaking plus ?10,000.00 as and for attorney's
fees.
For all the foregoing, it is the well considered view of the Court that plaintiffs,
defendant Ponciano Tapales and 3rd Party plaintiff Jose Guballa established
their claims as specified above, respectively. Totality of evidence
preponderance in their favor.
JUDGMENT
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
In favor of plaintiffs for the death of Ruben Reinoso, Sr.
..........................................................................................................P
250,000.00;
In favor of defendant Ponciano Tapales due to damage of his passenger
jeepney
............................................................................................................
P44,000.00;

In favor of defendant Jose Guballa under Policy No. OV-09527

............................................................................................................
.P60,000.00;
All the specified accounts with 6% legal rate of interest per annum from date
of complaint until fully paid (Reformina vs. Tomol, 139 SCRA 260; and finally;
Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

[3]

On appeal, the CA, in its Decision dated May 20, 1994, set aside and
reversed the RTC decision and dismissed the complaint on the ground of nonpayment of docket fees pursuant to the doctrine laid down in Manchester v.
CA. [4] In addition, the CA ruled that since prescription had set in, petitioners
could no longer pay the required docket fees. [5]
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA decision but it was
denied in a resolution dated June 30, 1994. [6] Hence, this appeal, anchored
on the following
GROUNDS:
A. The Court of Appeals MISAPPLIED THE RULING of the Supreme
Court in the case of Manchester Corporation vs. Court of Appeals to
this case.
B. The issue on the specification of the damages appearing in the
prayer of the Complaint was NEVER PLACED IN ISSUE BY ANY OF THE
PARTIES IN THE COURT OF ORIGIN (REGIONAL TRIAL COURT) NOR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS.
C. The issues of the case revolve around the more substantial issue
as to the negligence of the private respondents and their culpability
to petitioners." [7]
The petitioners argue that the ruling in Manchester should not have been
applied retroactively in this case, since it was filed prior to the promulgation
of the Manchester decision in 1987. They plead that though this Court stated
that failure to state the correct amount of damages would lead to the
dismissal of the complaint, said doctrine should be applied prospectively.
Moreover, the petitioners assert that at the time of the filing of the complaint
in 1979, they were not certain of the amount of damages they were entitled
to, because the amount of the lost income would still be finally determined in
the course of the trial of the case. They claim that the jurisdiction of the trial
court remains even if there was failure to pay the correct filing fee as long as
the correct amount would be paid subsequently.
Finally, the petitioners stress that the alleged defect was never put in issue
either in the RTC or in the CA.

The Court finds merit in the petition.

The rule is that payment in full of the docket fees within the prescribed
period is mandatory.[8] In Manchester v. Court of Appeals, [9] it was held that
a court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the
prescribed docket fee. The strict application of this rule was, however,
relaxed two (2) years after in the case of Sun Insurance Office, Ltd. v.
Asuncion,[10] wherein the Court decreed that where the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by the payment of the docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond
the applicable prescriptive or reglementary period. This ruling was made on
the premise that the plaintiff had demonstrated his willingness to abide by
the rules by paying the additional docket fees required. [11] Thus, in the more
recent case of United Overseas Bank v. Ros,[12] the Court explained that
where the party does not deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment
of docket fees, and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying
additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal doctrine
enunciated in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., and not the strict regulations set in
Manchester, will apply. It has been on record that the Court, in several
instances, allowed the relaxation of the rule on non-payment of docket fees
in order to afford the parties the opportunity to fully ventilate their cases on
the merits. In the case of La Salette College v. Pilotin,[13] the Court stated:
Notwithstanding the mandatory nature of the requirement of payment of
appellate docket fees, we also recognize that its strict application is qualified
by the following: first, failure to pay those fees within the reglementary
period allows only discretionary, not automatic, dismissal; second, such
power should be used by the court in conjunction with its exercise of sound
discretion in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, as well as
with a great deal of circumspection in consideration of all attendant
circumstances. [14]
While there is a crying need to unclog court dockets on the one hand, there
is, on the other, a greater demand for resolving genuine disputes fairly and
equitably,[15] for it is far better to dispose of a case on the merit which is a
primordial end, rather than on a technicality that may result in injustice.
In this case, it cannot be denied that the case was litigated before the RTC
and said trial court had already rendered a decision. While it was at that
level, the matter of non-payment of docket fees was never an issue. It was
only the CA which motu propio dismissed the case for said reason.
Considering the foregoing, there is a need to suspend the strict application of
the rules so that the petitioners would be able to fully and finally prosecute
their claim on the merits at the appellate level rather than fail to secure
justice on a technicality, for, indeed, the general objective of procedure is to
facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties,
bearing always in mind that procedure is not to hinder but to promote the
administration of justice.[16]

The Court also takes into account the fact that the case was filed before the
Manchester ruling came out. Even if said ruling could be applied retroactively,
liberality should be accorded to the petitioners in view of the recency then of
the ruling. Leniency because of recency was applied to the cases of Far
Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals [17] and Spouses Jimmy and
Patri Chan v. RTC of Zamboanga. [18] In the case of Mactan Cebu
International Airport Authority v. Mangubat (Mactan), [19] it was stated that
the "intent of the Court is clear to afford litigants full opportunity to comply
with the new rules and to temper enforcement of sanctions in view of the
recency of the changes introduced by the new rules."In Mactan, the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) also failed to pay the correct docket fees on time.
We held in another case:
x x x It bears stressing that the rules of procedure are merely tools designed
to facilitate the attainment of justice. They were conceived and promulgated
to effectively aid the court in the dispensation of justice. Courts are not
slaves to or robots of technical rules, shorn of judicial discretion. In rendering
justice, courts have always been, as they ought to be, conscientiously guided
by the norm that, on the balance, technicalities take a backseat against
substantive rights, and not the other way around. Thus, if the application of
the Rules would tend to frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always
within the power of the Court to suspend the Rules, or except a particular
case from its operation. [20]
The petitioners, however, are liable for the difference between the actual fees
paid and the correct payable docket fees to be assessed by the clerk of court
which shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2 of Rule
141 which provides:
SEC. 2. Fees in lien. - Where the court in its final judgment awards a claim
not alleged, or a relief different from, or more than that claimed in the
pleading, the party concerned shall pay the additional fees which shall
constitute a lien on the judgment in satisfaction of said lien. The clerk of
court shall assess and collect the corresponding fees.
As the Court has taken the position that it would be grossly unjust if
petitioners' claim would be dismissed on a strict application of the
Manchester doctrine, the appropriate action, under ordinary circumstances,
would be for the Court to remand the case to the CA. Considering, however,
that the case at bench has been pending for more than 30 years and the
records thereof are already before this Court, a remand of the case to the CA
would only unnecessarily prolong its resolution. In the higher interest of
substantial justice and to spare the parties from further delay, the Court will
resolve the case on the merits.
The facts are beyond dispute. Reinoso, the jeepney passenger, died as a
result of the collision of a jeepney and a truck on June 14, 1979 at around
7:00 o'clock in the evening along E. Rodriguez Avenue, Quezon City. It was
established that the primary cause of the injury or damage was the
negligence of the truck driver who was driving it at a very fast pace. Based
on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities and the narration of

the jeepney driver and his passengers, the collision was brought about
because the truck driver suddenly swerved to, and encroached on, the left
side portion of the road in an attempt to avoid a wooden barricade, hitting
the passenger jeepney as a consequence. The analysis of the RTC appears in
its decision as follows:
Perusal and careful analysis of evidence adduced as well as proper
consideration of all the circumstances and factors bearing on the issue as to
who is responsible for the instant vehicular mishap convince and persuade
this Court that preponderance of proof is in favor of plaintiffs and defendant
Ponciano Tapales. The greater mass of evidence spread on the records and
its influence support plaintiffs' plaint including that of defendant Tapales.
The Land Transportation and Traffic Rule (R.A. No. 4136), reads as follows:
"Sec. 37. Driving on right side of highway. - Unless a different course of
action is required in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person
or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance
therewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal drawn vehicle
on highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming
toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the
same direction, and when turning to the left in going from one highway to
another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the
intersection of the highway."
Having in mind the foregoing provision of law, this Court is convinced of the
veracity of the version of the passenger jeepney driver Alejandro Santos,
(plaintiffs' and Tapales' witness) that while running on lane No. 4 westward
bound towards Ortigas Avenue at between 30-40 kms. per hour (63-64 tsn,
Jan. 6, 1984) the "sand & gravel" truck from the opposite direction driven by
Mariano Geronimo, the headlights of which the former had seen while still at
a distance of about 30-40 meters from the wooden barricade astride lanes 1
and 2, upon reaching said wooden block suddenly swerved to the left into
lanes 3 and 4 at high speed "napakabilis po ng dating ng truck." (29 tsn,
Sept. 26, 1985) in the process hitting them (Jeepney passenger) at the left
side up to where the reserve tire was in an oblique manner "pahilis" (57 tsn,
Sept. 26, 1985). The jeepney after it was bumped by the truck due to the
strong impact was thrown "resting on its right side while the left side was on
top of the Bangketa (side walk)". The passengers of the jeepney and its
driver were injured including two passengers who died. The left side of the
jeepney suffered considerable damage as seen in the picture (Exhs. 4 & 5Tapales, pages 331-332, records) taken while at the repair shop.
The Court is convinced of the narration of Santos to the effect that the
"gravel & sand" truck was running in high speed on the good portion of E.
Rodriguez Avenue (lane 1 & 2) before the wooden barricade and (having in
mind that it had just delivered its load at the Corinthian Gardens) so that
when suddenly confronted with the wooden obstacle before it had to avoid
the same in a manner of a reflex reaction or knee-jerk response by forthwith
swerving to his left into the right lanes (lanes 3 & 4). At the time of the
bumping, the jeepney was running on its right lane No. 4 and even during
the moments before said bumping, moving at moderate speed thereon since

lane No. 3 was then somewhat rough because being repaired also according
to Mondalia who has no reason to prevaricate being herself one of those
seriously injured. The narration of Santos and Mondalia are convincing and
consistent in depicting the true facts of the case untainted by vacillation and
therefore, worthy to be relied upon. Their story is forfeited and confirmed by
the sketch drawn by the investigating officer Pfc. F. Amaba, Traffic Division,
NPD, Quezon City who rushed to the scene of the mishap (Vide: Resolution of
Asst fiscal Elizabeth B. Reyes marked as Exhs. 7, 7-A, 7-B-Tapales, pp. 166168, records; the Certified Copy found on pages 598-600, ibid, with the
attached police sketch of Pfc. Amaba, marked as Exh. 8-Tapales on page 169,
ibid; certified copy of which is on page 594, ibid) indicating the fact that the
bumping indeed occurred at lane No. 4 and showing how the `gavel & sand'
truck is positioned in relation to the jeepney. The said police sketch having
been made right after the accident is a piece of evidence worthy to be relied
upon showing the true facts of the bumping-occurrence. The rule that official
duty had been performed (Sec.5(m), R-131, and also Sec. 38, R-a30, Rev.
Rules of Court) - there being no evidence adduced and made of record to the
contrary - is that said circumstance involving the two vehicles had been the
result of an official investigation and must be taken as true by this Court. [21]
While ending up on the opposite lane is not conclusive proof of fault in
automobile collisions, [22] the position of the two vehicles, as depicted in the
sketch of the police officers, clearly shows that it was the truck that hit the
jeepney. The evidentiary records disclosed that the truck was speeding along
E. Rodriguez, heading towards Santolan Street, while the passenger jeepney
was coming from the opposite direction. When the truck reached a certain
point near the Meralco Post No. J9-450, the front portion of the truck hit the
left middle side portion of the passenger jeepney, causing damage to both
vehicles and injuries to the driver and passengers of the jeepney. The truck
driver should have been more careful, because, at that time, a portion of E.
Rodriguez Avenue was under repair and a wooden barricade was placed in
the middle thereof.
The Court likewise sustains the finding of the RTC that the truck owner,
Guballa, failed to rebut the presumption of negligence in the hiring and
supervision of his employee. Article 2176, in relation to Article 2180 of the
Civil Code, provides:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this
Chapter.
xxxx
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Art. 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damage caused by their employees and
household helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks even
though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage.
Whenever an employee's negligence causes damage or injury to another,
there instantly arises a presumption juris tantum that the employer failed to
exercise diligentissimi patris families in the selection or supervision of his
employee.[23] Thus, in the selection of prospective employees, employers are
required to examine them as to their qualification, experience and service
record. With respect to the supervision of employees, employers must
formulate standard operating procedures, monitor their implementation, and
impose disciplinary measures for breaches thereof. These facts must be
shown by concrete proof, including documentary evidence. [24] Thus, the RTC
committed no error in finding that the evidence presented by respondent
Guballa was wanting. It ruled:
x x x. As expected, defendant Jose Guballa, attempted to overthrow this
presumption of negligence by showing that he had exercised the due
diligence required of him by seeing to it that the driver must check the vital
parts of the vehicle he is assigned to before he leaves the compound like the
oil, water, brakes, gasoline, horn (9 tsn, July 17, 1986); and that Geronimo
had been driving for him sometime in 1976 until the collision in litigation
came about (5-6 tsn, ibid); that whenever his trucks gets out of the
compound to make deliveries, it is always accompanied with two (2) helpers
(16-17 tsn, ibid). This was all which he considered as selection and
supervision in compliance with the law to free himself from any responsibility.
This Court then cannot consider the foregoing as equivalent to an exercise of
all the care of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of his
driver Mariano Geronimo." [25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The May 20, 1994 Decision and
June 30, 1994 Resolution of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the March 22, 1988 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
8, Manila, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Carpio,* Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, and Abad, JJ., concur.

Designated as additional member of the Third Division per Special Order

No. 1042 dated July 6, 2011.
*

**

Now Centennial Guarantee Assurance Corporation. Rollo, p. 244.

Id. at 24-28. Penned by then Associate Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr.

and concurred in by Associate Justice Jorge S. Imperial and Associate Justice
Pacita Caizares-Nye.
[1]

[2]

Id. at 30.

[3]

Rollo, pp. 54-56.

[4]

233 Phil. 579 (1987).

[5]

Rollo, pp. 24-28.

[6]

Id at 30.

[7]

Id. at 15-19.

[8]

Pedrosa v. Hill, 327 Phil. 153, 158 (1996).

[9]

Supra note 4.

[10]

252 Phil. 280 (1989).

[11]

Id. at 291.

[12]

G.R. No. 171532, August 7, 2007, 529 SCRA 334, 353.

[13]

463 Phil. 785 (2003).

[14]

Id. at 794.

[15]

Santos v. Court of Appeals, 323 Phil. 762, 770 (1996).

[16]

Bautista v. Unangst, G.R. No. 173002, July 4, 2008, 557 SCRA 256, 271.

[17]

G.R. No. 130150, October 1, 1998, 297 SCRA 30.

[18]

G.R. No. 149253, April 15, 2004, 427 SCRA 796.

[19]

371 Phil. 393 (1999).

Cua, Jr. v. Tan, G.R. Nos. 181455-56, December 4, 2009, 607 SCRA 645,
687.
[20]

[21]

Records, Vol. I, pp. 698-699.

[22]

Macalinao v. Ong, 514 Phil. 127, 137 (2005).

[23]

Id.

[24]

Pleyto v. Lomboy, 476 Phil. 373, 386 (2004).

[25]

Records, Vol. I, pp. 701-702.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 179878, December 24, 2008 ]
NEGROS ORIENTAL PLANTERS ASSOCIATION, INC. (NOPA), PETITIONER, VS.
HON. PRESIDING JUDGE OF RTC-NEGROS OCCIDENTAL, BRANCH 52,
BACOLOD CITY, AND ANICETO MANOJO CAMPOS, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari seeking the reversal of the
Resolutions[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007 and 16 August
2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651 outrightly dismissing the Petition
for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental Planters Association, Inc.
(NOPA) against private respondent Aniceto Manojo Campos (Campos).
On 17 March 1999, Campos filed a Complaint for Breach of Contract with
Damages, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-10773, against NOPA before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Occidental, Bacolod City. According to
the Complaint, Campos and NOPA entered into two separate contracts
denominated as Molasses Sales Agreement. Campos allegedly paid the
consideration of the Molasses Sales Agreement in full, but was only able to
receive a partial delivery of the molasses because of a disagreement as to
the quality of the products being delivered.
On 17 August 2005, more than six years after NOPA filed its Answer, NOPA
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of an alleged failure of Campos to file
the correct filing fee. According to NOPA, Campos deliberately concealed in
his Complaint the exact amount of actual damages by opting to estimate the
value of the unwithdrawn molasses in order to escape the payment of the
proper docket fees.
On 30 June 2006, the RTC issued an Order denying the Motion to Dismiss.
NOPA received this Order on 17 July 2006.
On 1 August 2006, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the 30 June
2006 Order. On 5 January 2007, the RTC issued an Order denying NOPA's
Motion for Reconsideration.
On 2 April 2007, NOPA filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of
Appeals assailing the Orders of the RTC dated 30 June 2006 and 5 January
2007.

On 23 May 2007, the Court of Appeals issued the first assailed Resolution
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari on the following grounds:
1. Failure of the Petitioner to state in its Verification that the allegations
in the petition are "based on authentic records", in violation of Section
4, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended by A.M.
No. 00-2-10-SC (May 1, 2000), which provides:
" - x x x - A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has
read the pleading and that the allegations therein are true and correct
of his personal knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based
on "information and belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be
treated as an unsigned pleading."
2. Failure of the petitioner to append to the petition relevant pleadings
and documents, which would aid in the resolution of the instant
petition, in violation of Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, such
as:

a. Ex-parte Motion to Set the Case for Pre-Trial dated July 27,
1999;
b. Notice of Pre-Trial;
c. Motion for Leave to File Third Party Complaint;
d. Orders dated July 31, 2000, March 20 2001, November 17,
2004, and May 17, 2005, respectively;
e. Motion to Suspend the Proceedings dated August 10, 2003;
f. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Prosecute; and
g. Motion for Reconsideration to the Order dated May 12, 2005.

Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, provides:

"When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the
facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered annulling
or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the

judgment, order or resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings

and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of
section 3, Rule 46."
3. Failure of petitioner's counsel to indicate in the petition his current IBP
Official Receipt Number, in violation of Bar Matter No. 1132 and/or
A.M. No. 287, which reads as follows:
"The Court resolved, upon recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant, to GRANT the request of the Board of Governors of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Sanguniang Panlalawigan of
Ilocos Norte to require all lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys
Number in all papers or pleadings submitted to the various judicial or
quasi-judicial bodies in addition to the requirement of indicating the
current Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and the IBP Official Receipt or
Lifetime Member Number."[2]
On 22 June 2007, NOPA filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above
Resolution, attaching thereto an Amended Petition for Certiorari in
compliance with the requirements of the Court of Appeals deemed to have
been violated by NOPA. The Court of Appeals denied the said Motion in the
second assailed Resolution dated 16 August 2007.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari, where NOPA raises the following
issue and arguments:
ISSUE
WHETHER OR NOT THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA COMMITTED REVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
WITH THE PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS WHEN PETITIONER FAILED TO
ALLEGE IN ITS VERIFICATION THAT THE ALLEGATIONS THEREIN ARE TRUE
AND CORRECT OF HIS PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE OR BASED ON AUTHENTIC
RECORDS AND FAILURE TO ATTACH THE NECESSARY DOCUMENTS ON ITS
PLEADINGS AS REQUIRED BY SECTION 1, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE.[3]
ARGUMENTS
1. The requirement that a pleading be verified is merely formal and not
jurisdictional. The court may give due course to an unverified pleading
where the material facts alleged are a matter of record and the
questions raised are mainly of law such as in a petition for certiorari. [4]
2. Petitioner had attached to its Petition for Certiorari clearly legible and
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the judgment or final order
or resolution of the court a quo and the requisite number of plain
copies thereof and such material portions of the record as would
support the petition.[5]

3. Substantial compliance of the rules, which was further supplied by the

petitioner's subsequent full compliance demonstrates its good faith to
abide by the procedural requirements.[6]
4. The resolution of the important jurisdictional issue raised by the
petitioner before the PUBLIC RESPONDENT CA would justify a
relaxation of the rules.[7]
The original Verification in the original Petition for Certiorari filed by NOPA
states as follows:
1. That I am the President and Chairman of the Board of Directors of
Negros Oriental Planters' Association, Inc. (NOPA), the petitioner in
this case, a domestic corporation duly organized under Philippine Laws,
with principal place of business at Central Bais, Bais City, Philippines;
that I am duly authorized by the Board of NOPA (Secretary's
Certificate attached as Annex "A") to cause the preparation of the
foregoing petition; and that I hereby affirm and confirm that all the
allegations contained herein are true and correct to my own knowledge
and belief;[8]
NOPA claims that this Court has in several cases allowed pleadings with a
Verification that contains the allegation "to the best of my knowledge" and
the allegation "are true and correct," without the words "of his own
knowledge," citing Decano v. Edu,[9] and Quimpo v. De la Victoria.[10] NOPA
claims that the allegations in these cases constitute substantial compliance
with the Rules of Court, and should likewise apply to the case at bar.
NOPA is mistaken. NOPA cited cases promulgated before 1 May 2000, when
Section 4 of Rule 7 was amended by A.M. No. 00-2-10. Before the
amendment, said Section 4 stated:
SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his
knowledge and belief.
As amended, said Section 4 now states:
SEC. 4. Verification.Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
Clearly, the amendment was introduced in order to make the verification
requirement stricter, such that the party cannot now merely state under oath
that he believes the statements made in the pleading. He cannot even
merely state under oath that he has knowledge that such statements are
true and correct. His knowledge must be specifically alleged under oath to be
either personal knowledge or at least based on authentic records.
Unlike, however, the requirement for a Certification against Forum Shopping

in Section 5, wherein failure to comply with the requirements is not curable

by amendment of the complaint or other initiatory pleading, [11] Section 4 of
Rule 7, as amended, states that the effect of the failure to properly verify a
pleading is that the pleading shall be treated as unsigned:
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based
on "information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and
belief," or lacks a proper verification, shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.
Unsigned pleadings are discussed in the immediately preceding section of
Rule 7:
SEC. 3. Signature and address. - x x x.
xxxx
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in
its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that
the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel
who deliberately files an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of
this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails to
promptly report to the court a change of his address, shall be subject to
appropriate disciplinary action. (5a)
A pleading, therefore, wherein the Verification is merely based on the party's
knowledge and belief produces no legal effect, subject to the discretion
of the court to allow the deficiency to be remedied. In the case at bar,
the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of this discretion, refused to allow the
deficiency in the Verification to be remedied, by denying NOPA's Motion for
Reconsideration with attached Amended Petition for Certiorari.
May an appellate court reverse the exercise of discretion by a lower court?
The old case of Lino Luna v. Arcenas[12] states that it can, but only in
exceptional cases when there is grave abuse of this discretion or adverse
effect on the substantial rights of a litigant:
Discretionary power is generally exercised by trial judges in furtherance of
the convenience of the courts and the litigants, the expedition of business,
and in the decision of interlocutory matters on conflicting facts where one
tribunal could not easily prescribe to another the appropriate rule of
procedure.
The general rule, therefore, and indeed one of the fundamental principles
of appellate procedure is that decisions of a trial court which "lie in
discretion" will not be reviewed on appeal, whether the case be civil
or criminal at law or in equity.
We have seen that where such rulings have to do with minor matters, not
affecting the substantial rights of the parties, the prohibition of review in
appellate proceedings is made absolute by the express terms of the statute;
but it would be a monstrous travesty on justice to declare that where
the exercise of discretionary power by an inferior court affects
adversely the substantial legal rights of a litigant, it is not subject to
review on appeal in any case wherein a clear and affirmative
showing is made of an abuse of discretion, or of a total lack of its

exercise, or of conduct amounting to an abuse of discretion, such as

its improper exercise under a misapprehension of the law applicable to the
facts upon which the ruling is based.
In its very nature, the discretionary control conferred upon the trial judge
over the proceedings had before him implies the absence of any hard-andfast rule by which it is to be exercised, and in accordance with which it may
be reviewed. But the discretion conferred upon the courts is not a
willful, arbitrary, capricious and uncontrolled discretion. It is a
sound, judicial discretion which should always be exercised with due
regard to the rights of the parties and the demands of equity and
justice. As was said in the case of The Styria vs. Morgan (186 U. S., 1, 9):
"The establishment of a clearly defined rule of action would be the end of
discretion, and yet discretion should not be a word for arbitrary will or
inconsiderate action." So in the case of Goodwin vs. Prime (92 Me., 355), it
was said that "discretion implies that in the absence of positive law or fixed
rule the judge is to decide by his view of expediency or by the demands of
equity and justice."
There being no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide the judge in the court
below in such cases, there is no "positive law or fixed rule" to guide a court
of appeal in reviewing his action in the premises, and such courts will not
therefore attempt to control the exercise of discretion by the court below
unless it plainly appears that there was "inconsiderate action" or the exercise
of mere "arbitrary will," or in other words that his action in the premises
amounted to "an abuse of discretion." But the right of an appellate court to
review judicial acts which lie in the discretion of inferior courts may properly
be invoked upon a showing of a strong and clear case of abuse of power to
the prejudice of the appellant, or that the ruling objected to rested on an
erroneous principle of law not vested in discretion.[13]
The case at bar demonstrates a situation in which there is no effect on the
substantial rights of a litigant. NOPA's Petition for Certiorari is seeking the
reversal of the Orders of the RTC denying NOPA's Motion to Dismiss on the
ground of failure to pay the proper docket fees. The alleged deficiency in the
payment of docket fees by Campos, if there is any, would not inure to the
benefit of NOPA.
There is therefore no substantive right that will be prejudiced by the Court of
Appeals' exercise of discretion in the case at bar. While the payment of
docket fees is jurisdictional, it is nevertheless unmistakably also a
technicality. Ironically, in seeking the leniency of this Court on the basis of
substantial justice, NOPA is ultimately praying for a Writ of Certiorari
enjoining the action for breach of contract from being decided on the merits.
What's sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. A party cannot expect its
opponent to comply with the technical rules of procedure while, at the same
time, hoping for the relaxation of the technicalities in its favor.
There was therefore no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Court of
Appeals warranting this Court's reversal of the exercise of discretion by the
former. However, even if we decide to brush aside the lapses in technicalities
on the part of NOPA in its Petition for Certiorari, we nevertheless find that

such Petition would still fail.

NOPA seeks in its Petition for Certiorari for the application of this Court's
ruling in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[14]
wherein we ruled that the court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon
payment of the prescribed docket fee. An amendment of the complaint or
similar pleading will not thereby vest jurisdiction in the court, much less the
payment of the docket fee based on the amount sought in the amended
pleading.
In denying[15] NOPA's Motion to Dismiss, the RTC cited Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. (SIOL) v. Asuncion,[16] wherein we modified our ruling in Manchester and
decreed that where the initiatory pleading is not accompanied by the
payment of the docket fee, the court may allow payment of the fee within a
reasonable period of time, but in no case beyond the applicable prescriptive
or reglementary period. The aforesaid ruling was made on the justification
that, unlike in Manchester, the private respondent in Sun Insurance Office,
Ltd. (SIOL) demonstrated his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees required. NOPA claims that Sun is not applicable to the
case at bar, since Campos deliberately concealed his claim for damages in the
prayer.
In United Overseas Bank (formerly Westmont Bank) v. Ros,[17] we discussed
how Manchester was not applicable to said case in view of the lack of
deliberate intent to defraud manifested in the latter:
This Court wonders how the petitioner could possibly arrive at the conclusion
that the private respondent was moved by fraudulent intent in omitting the
amount of damages claimed in its Second Amended Complaint, thus placing
itself on the same footing as the complainant in Manchester, when it is clear
that the factual milieu of the instant case is far from that of Manchester.
First, the complainant in Manchester paid the docket fee only in the
amount of P410.00, notwithstanding its claim for damages in the
amount of P78,750,000.00, while in the present case, the private
respondent paid P42,000.00 as docket fees upon filing of the original
complaint.
Second, complainant's counsel in Manchester claimed, in the body of the
complaint, damages in the amount of P78,750.00 but omitted the same in its
prayer in order to evade the payment of docket fees. Such fraud-defining
circumstance is absent in the instant petition.
Finally, when the court took cognizance of the issue of non-payment
of docket fees in Manchester, the complainant therein filed an
amended complaint, this time omitting all mention of the amount of
damages being claimed in the body of the complaint; and when
directed by the court to specify the amount of damages in such
amended complaint, it reduced the same from P78,750,000.00 to
P10,000,000.00, obviously to avoid payment of the required docket
fee. Again, this patent fraudulent scheme is wanting in the case at bar.

This Court is not inclined to adopt the petitioner's piecemeal construction of

our rulings in Manchester and Sun Insurance. Its attempt to strip the said
landmark cases of one or two lines and use them to bolster its arguments
and clothe its position with jurisprudential blessing must be struck down by
this Court.
All told, the rule is clear and simple. In case where the party does not
deliberately intend to defraud the court in payment of docket fees,
and manifests its willingness to abide by the rules by paying
additional docket fees when required by the court, the liberal
doctrine enunciated in Sun Insurance and not the strict regulations
set in Manchester will apply.
In the case at bar, Campos filed an amount of P54,898.50 as docket fee,
based on the amounts of P10,000,000.00 representing the value of
unwithdrawn molasses, P100,00.00 as storage fee, P200,00.00 as moral
damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and P500,000.00 as
attorney's fees. The total amount considered in computing the docket fee
was P10,900,000.00. NOPA alleges that Campos deliberately omitted a claim
for unrealized profit of P100,000.00 and an excess amount of storage fee in
the amount of P502,875.98 in its prayer and, hence, the amount that should
have been considered in the payment of docket fees is P11,502,875.98. The
amount allegedly deliberately omitted was therefore only P602,875.98 out of
P11,502,875.98, or merely 5.2% of said alleged total. Campos's pleadings
furthermore evince his willingness to abide by the rules by paying the
additional docket fees when required by the Court.
Since the circumstances of this case clearly show that there was no
deliberate intent to defraud the Court in the payment of docket fees, the case
of Sun should be applied, and the Motion to Dismiss by NOPA should be
denied.
WHEREFORE, the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 23 May 2007
and 16 August 2007, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 02651, outrightly
dismissing the Petition for Certiorari filed by petitioner Negros Oriental
Planters Association, Inc. against private respondent Aniceto Manojo
Campos, are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, (Chairperson), Austria-Martinez, Nachura, and Reyes, JJ.,
concur.

Penned by Associate Justice Antonio L. Villamor with Associate Justices

Isaias P. Dicdican and Stephen C. Cruz, concurring. Rollo, pp. 45-47 and 160163.
[1]

[2]

Rollo, pp. 46-47.

[3]

Id. at 198.

[4]

Id. at 200.

[5]

Id. at 201.

[6]

Id.

[7]

Id. at 202.

[8]

Id. at 42.

[9]

G.R. No. L-30070, 29 August 1980, 99 SCRA 410, 420.

[10]

150-B Phil. 124, 131-132 (1972).

SEC. 5. Certification against forum shopping.The plaintiff or principal

party shall certify under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading
asserting a claim for relief, or in a sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not theretofore commenced
any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court, tribunal
or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other
action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or
claim, a complete statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he
should thereafter learn that the same or similar action or claim has been filed
or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed.
[11]

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be

curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice,
unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of
a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein
shall constitute indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the
corresponding administrative and criminal actions. If the acts of the party or
his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall constitute
direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.
[12]

34 Phil. 80 (1916).

[13]

Id. at 95-97.

[14]

G.R. No. L-75919, 7 May 1987, 149 SCRA 562.

[15]

Rollo, pp. 133-137.

[16]

G.R. Nos. 79937-38, 13 February 1989, 170 SCRA 274.

[17]

G.R. No. 171532, 7 August 2007, 529 SCRA 334, 352-353.

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: April 14, 2014

This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System

Supreme Court E-Library

Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: August 17, 2011

This page was dynamically generated by the E-Library Content Management System

Supreme Court E-Library