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NIKOLETTE Y. CLAVEL*
ABSTRACT
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, New England Law | Boston (2012). B.A., Philosophy and
Politics, University of California, Santa Cruz (2004). I would like to thank the New England Law
Review staff for their invaluable assistance, my friends and family for their everlasting praise,
and especially my parents for their phenomenal wisdom.
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INTRODUCTION
1 See Paul H. Robinson & Markus D. Dubber, The American Model Penal Code: A Brief
Overview, 10 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 319, 326 (2007).
2 Id.
3 See MODEL PENAL CODE 210.3 cmt. 5 at 60-61 (1980) (rejecting the common law
categories of what constitutes adequate provocation).
4
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Dressler, supra note 6, at 975-84 (discussing the various feminist challenges to the
provocation defense).
13 See, e.g., Victoria Nourse, Passions Progress: Modern Law Reform and the Provocation
Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1337 (1997) (arguing for a retention of the provocation defense as
a partial excuse but only in the limited set of cases in which the defendant and the victim
stand on an equal emotional and normative plane).
14
See, e.g., id.; see also infra Part III.B (noting that feminist revisionists argue that the
provocation defense should be limited to situations where the provoking act was actually a
crime or its equivalent).
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16
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itself to the MPCs formulation of the provocation defense and help solve
the issues raised by feminist scholars.17 In memoriam of the common laws
categorical inclusions, categorical rules of exclusionwhich prohibit the
use of the defense in instances where an intimate partner is killed as a
product of domestic violenceallow the benefits of the defense to flourish
while satisfying the issues raised by feminists.18 Like the common laws
categorical rules of inclusion, categorical rules of exclusion should be
written into the MPC and utilized by state legislatures and courts to limit
the application of manslaughter in domestic violence cases. 19
Part I of this Note will discuss the relevant law regarding murder and
manslaughter, along with the common law and MPC conceptions of the
provocation defense. Part II will discuss feminist concerns with the MPC in
regard to domestic violence. Part III.A will explain the value of the
provocation defense and why feminist arguments for its abolition are
untrustworthy. Part III.B will discuss the leading revisionist theory,
proposed by Professor Victoria Nourse, and argue why it is unworkable.
Finally Part III.C will elucidate how categorical exclusionary rules will
assuage feminists claims.
I.
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21
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24
MODEL PENAL CODE 210.3 cmt. 1 at 44; see infra Part I.B.
MODEL PENAL CODE 210.3 cmt. 1 at 45.
26 JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 295 (5th ed. 2009).
27 See, e.g., 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-3 (Supp. 2011). This Note only deals with voluntary
manslaughter; therefore, whenever the term manslaughter is used, it is in reference to
voluntary manslaughter.
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34
See id.
Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96
COLUM. L. REV. 269, 305 (1996).
35
36 For an enlightening discussion regarding how this category evolved, see Miller, supra
note 8, at 672 (Having violated cultural norms and been subjugated by property law, a wife
who committed adultery was deemed to have provoked her husbands violence.). The
classic provocation paradigm involved catching ones spouse in the commission of
adultery and more particularly, adultery committed by women as opposed to men. Eric Y.
Drogin & Ryan Marin, Commentary, Extreme Emotional Disturbance (EED), Heat of Passion, and
Provocation: A Jurisprudent Science Perspective, 36 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 133, 135 (2008).
37
43
Irene Merker Rosenberg & Yale L. Rosenberg, Cain Rose Up Against His Brother Abel and
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connection between the provocation, the passion, and the fatal act.44 In
addition, mere words or insults were not enough to prove adequate
provocation;45 provocation often required some sort of physical conflict
such as violent assault or mutual combat. 46 Witnessing adultery was the
only major category that did not require any sort of physical provocation,47
making it an anomaly in the provocation doctrine.48
At the defenses inception, property law justified the doctrines use in
instances when a husband killed his wife after catching her in an
adulterous act.49 Indeed, it is this very example that many scholars refer to
as the doctrines archetype, sufficient enough to mitigate charges from
murder to manslaughter.50 Today, nearly all jurisdictions recognize
adultery as a legitimate situation in which a man may claim the defense.51
As the heat-of-passion defense evolved in American law, the rigid
categories were somewhat abandoned, and the belief emerged that the jury
should determine the adequacy of the provocation.52 The standard used by
juries to determine what constitutes adequate provocation was the
objective, reasonable-man standard.53 In order for the provocation to be
considered adequate, it must be calculated to inflame the passion of a
reasonable man and tend to cause him to act for the moment from passion
rather than reason.54 The modern view saw provocation as undefined
and probably incapable of exact definition and thus must vary with the
Killed Him: Murder or Manslaughter?, 30 GA. J. INTL & COMP. L. 37, 42-43 (2001). But cf. MODEL
PENAL CODE 210.3 cmt. 5 at 60-61 (1980) (Under the Code, mitigation may be appropriate
where the actor believes that the deceased is responsible for some injustice to another or even
where he strikes out in a blinding rage and kills an innocent bystander.).
44 Girouard v. State, 583 A.2d 718, 721 (Md. 1991).
45 See, e.g., id. at 722-23 (holding that mere words alone are not adequate provocation).
46 Miller, supra note 8, at 673.
47 Donna K. Coker, Heat of Passion and Wife Killing: Men Who Batter/Men Who Kill, 2 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMENS STUD. 71, 73 (1992).
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The MPC formulation of manslaughter expanded the common law heat-ofpassion defense in a number of ways. 61
For instance, the MPC introduced the concept of extreme emotional
or mental disturbance,62 which essentially replaced the common law
requirement of adequate provocation.63 The EEMD standard has been
defined as containing two key components: (1) that the defendant acted
under the influence of the EEMD; and (2) there must have been a
reasonable explanation or excuse for the EEMD.64 The first requirement
is entirely subjective and ensures that the EEMD was, in fact, the driving
55
Brown, 584 A.2d at 542 (quoting Commonwealth v. Pease, 69 A. 891, 892 (Pa. 1908)).
DRESSLER, supra note 26, at 270.
57 Paul H. Robinson, Abnormal Mental State Mitigations of Murder: The U.S. Perspective, in
LOSS OF CONTROL AND DIMINISHED RESPONSIBILITY: DOMESTIC, COMPARATIVE AND
INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 291, 302 (Alan Reed & Michael Bohlander eds., 2011).
58 See Id. For an analysis as to why some MPC jurisdictions have not adopted the MPC
EEMD formulation, see id. at 304 (It seems that the resistance is primarily a legislative
animal. . . [since] homicide, especially intentional homicide, as the most serious offense in
American criminal law, has special status in the politics of crime.).
59 Id. at 302.
60 MODEL PENAL CODE 210.3 (1980).
61 Id. 210.3 cmt. 5 at 60-62 (discussing the numerous ways in which the MPC expanded
the provocation doctrine).
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65 People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1316-17 (N.Y. 1980) (discussing the Model Penal
Code formulation of manslaughter); Robinson, supra note 57, at 294.
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77
Id.
Id. at 63 (emphasis added).
79 See id. at 60 (Section 210.3 of the Model Code continues a modified and substantially
enlarged version of the rule of provocation.).
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83
MODEL PENAL CODE 210.3 cmt. 5 at 61 & n.55 (This development *of rejecting the
common law categories] reflects the trend of many modern decisions to abandon
preconceived notions of what constitutes adequate provocation and to submit that question to
the jurys deliberation.).
84 See People v. Casassa, 404 N.E.2d 1310, 1314 (N.Y. 1980) (discussing New York Penal
Law of manslaughter that adopted the language of the Model Penal Codes manslaughter
provision).
85 Id.
86 Robinson, supra note 57, at 294.
87 See MODEL PENAL CODE 210.3 cmt. 5 at 61 (By eliminating any reference to
provocation in the ordinary sense of improper conduct by the deceased, the Model Code
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avoids arbitrary exclusion of some circumstances that may justify reducing murder to
manslaughter.).
88 See Miller, supra note 42, at 253-57 (explaining that even though women are no longer
viewed as the property of men, the historicaland continuedlack of protection for women
under voluntary manslaughter is attributable to male domination in the creation and
development of the doctrine).
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98
See id.
See infra notes 105-07 and accompanying text.
See infra note 102 and accompanying text.
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99
105
Id. at 270-71.
106
Coker, supra note 47, at 72 & n.5; see Miller, supra note 42, at 271.
107
Coker, supra note 47, at 72 & n.5; see Miller, supra note 42, at 271.
Miller, supra note 42, at 271.
109 See id. (Accordingly, a woman who kills in the heat of passion has strayed much
further from social norms than men who kill under similar circumstances.).
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110
Id. at 271-72.
Miller, supra note 8, at 669.
112 Miller, supra note 42, at 265-66 (Even though society has progressed in its views of the
marital relationship, thousands of years of viewing women as the marital property of their
husbands is not easily erased.).
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accepted categories.121
Feminists are worried that the expansion of the provocation defense
under the MPC has allowed more batterers to claim manslaughter when
they kill their spouses.122 In addition, feminists are concerned with the
gender stereotypes inherent in juries that reinforce and condone male
aggression towards women.123
ANALYSIS
III. Righting the WrongFinding a Solution to Abolitionists Concerns
A. The Value in the Provocation Defense and the EEMD Standard
Despite the criticism of the provocation defense in general, and EEMD
in particular, the manslaughter doctrine remains important and valuable in
American criminal law because it considers natural human weakness. 124 In
addition, EEMD is a more appropriate standard to apply because it
expands the common laws heat-of-passion defense.125 However, this
expansion has shown to be a double-edged sword.126 On the one hand, the
EEMD standard expands the doctrine so that a wider variety of cases can
utilize its mitigating factors.127 On the other hand, the expansion has
resulted in the doctrines abuse in cases of domestic violence.128
However, the essential value of the manslaughter doctrine lies in
recognizing the frailty of human will.129 The ALI explained that the
provocation doctrine is the laws recognition that
[an] inquiry into the reasons for the actors formulation of an
intent to kill will sometimes reveal factors that should have
significance in grading. . . . It is a concession to human
weakness . . . a recognition of the fact that one who kills in
response to certain provoking events should be regarded as
demonstrating a significantly different character deficiency than
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130
Id.
See id. at 54.
132 See generally ANN RULE, THE STRANGER BESIDE ME 218 (1980) (describing how Ted
Bundy would dress in multiple layers of clothes so that he could change out of the bloodsoiled clothes quickly).
131
133
See Mother in Courtroom Slaying Calls Jail Term Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1994, at 20.
People v. Gounagias, 153 P. 9, 10 (Wash. 1915).
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Robinson, supra note 57, at 306.
138 Id.
139 Dressler, supra note 6, at 964-65.
140 See id.
141 Danger has little to do with the law of homicide because danger does not necessarily
implicate lethality. See WEBSTERS THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 573 (1986)
(defining dangerous as able or likely to inflict injury but makes no mention of death).
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153
See Neimark, supra note 151 (Our fight or flight response is designed to protect us from
the proverbial saber tooth tigers that once lurked in the woods and fields around us,
threatening our physical survival.).
154
Id.
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155
Id.
Id.
157 Id.
158 Id. However, we must remain vigilant of our fight-or-flight response in order to deal
with stress in a healthier way than fighting or fleeing. Id.
156
159 There has been much debate surrounding the rationale behind the manslaughter
doctrine, specifically whether it is a justification or excuse. This Note does not attempt to
argue whether provocation is a justification or excuse, but rather only to hopes to show that
regardless of this debate, it is an important doctrine in light of modern-day psychology and is
worthy of retention in American law. For further information on this debate, see Vera
Bergelson, Justification or Excuse? Exploring the Meaning of Provocation, 42 TEX. TECH L. REV. 307
(2009) and Joshua Dressler, Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defense in Search of a Rationale, 73 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 421 (1982).
160 See Neimark, supra note 151.
161 Id. (explaining that when the fight-or-flight response is triggered, our rational mind is
no longer able to regulate our actions).
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recognizes the fact that anger (and other emotions) can affect self-control, and that it does
not exist to justify or condone male violence or female victimization).
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175
Id.
See Timeline of Milestones, MILLENNIUM: ENDING DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, http://
www.dvmillennium.org/TimelineFP.htm (last visited Jan. 30, 2012) (documenting the
growing movement to end domestic violence).
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204 States can amend their statutes in order to redefine manslaughter and incorporate the
suggestions from this Note whether their state has adopted the MPC or common law
formulation, although this Note specifically argues that the MPC formulation is better than
the common law construction. See supra Part III.A.
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the point at which society is willing to condone, namely, the use of the
doctrine in situations involving domestic violence.205 As the MPC drafters
explicitly rejected the sexist common law antecedents of manslaughter, 206
society and legislatures also need to acknowledge this inappropriate use of
the doctrine and resolve to make things right.
The question of whether a homicide is a product of domestic violence
should be decided by the judge, prior to instructing the jury on the lesserincluded offense of manslaughter. 207 In addition, domestic violence should
be defined as a situation in which there has been at least one instance of
physical or emotional abuse committed by the defendant against the
victim.208 Therefore, if the judge finds sufficient evidence to show that the
killing was not the first and only instance of domestic violence throughout
the relationship, the defendant would be unable to raise the defense. 209
Looking at the issue of control and the actions by the abuser may also
help the judge to determine whether the homicide was a product of domestic
violence.210 The judge should consider, inter alia, whether the defendant has
been a perpetrator of domestic violence in previous romantic relationships,
since batterers often repeat this behavior in subsequent romantic
relationships.211 Also, the judge should consider whether the violence was
instrumental rather than expressive since much of the current literature on
battering observes that domestic violence tends to be instrumental, rather
than expressive.212 In other words, the violence is not only an expression
of rage, but serves a purpose. In general, that purpose is to control his wife
or lover, to gain compliance with his demands.213
Although the ALI was concerned that not all instances of provocation
could be successfully resolved by a categorization of conduct,214 the
205 The ALI has acknowledged the expansion in its commentary to the MPC, but has yet to
acknowledge that this expansion has led to an abuse of the doctrine. MODEL PENAL CODE
210.3 cmt. 5 at 61 (1980) (explaining that the MPC sweeps away the rigid rules that limited
provocation to certain defined circumstances).
206 See id.
207 See, e.g., Mison, supra note 29, at 177-78 (arguing that the homosexual-advance defense
should be found inapplicable as a matter of law). Procedurally, and in practice, the
determination would be made by the judge prior to instructing the jury.
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CONCLUSION
Despite the concerns raised by abolitionist and revisionist scholars
regarding the MPCs EEMD formulation and domestic violence, the
provocation defense is valuable and important within American criminal
law. The MPCs formulation rejected the essential elements of its common
law ancestor, specifically the categorical inclusions of adequate
provocationthe very elements of the defense that helped limit the
defenses application. However, to adopt these inclusions within the EEMD
framework would destroy the very heart of the MPCs EEMD standard.
In order to solve all sides of the provocation defense debate, all cases in
which the homicide was a product of domestic violence should be excluded
from claiming the defense. This categorical exclusion should be applied
procedurally by the judge and would restrict the use of the provocation
defense, thereby barring domestic abusers from raising it when they kill
their spouses. Allowing domestic-violence abusers to claim manslaughter
when they kill their spouses is a wrong suffered at the expense of women
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