14.

DOJ v LIWAG
Facts: Mary Ong alleges that she was a former undercover
agent
of the Presidential Anti- Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF)
and the Philippine National Police (PNP) Narcotics Group Jan.
8, 2001 - She filed before the OMB a complaint against PNP
General Panfilo M. Lacson, PNP Colonel Michael Ray B.
Aquino, other high-ranking ocials of the PNP, and several
private individuals Her complaint-adavit gave rise to
separate cases involving dierent oenses imputed to
respondents Lacson and Aquino including:
1. Kidnapping for ransom of Zeng Jia Xuan, Hong Zhen Quiao,
Zeng Kang Pang, James Wong and Wong Kam Chong;
2. Murder of Wong Kam Chong; and
3. Kidnapping for ransom and murder of Chong Hiu Ming May
7, 2001 - a panel of prosecutors from the DOJ sent a
subpoena to Lacson et al May 18, 2001 - Lacson and Aquino
sent a letter saying the DOJ should dismiss the complaint
because the OMB has a similar complaint with the same facts
May 28, 2001 - DOJ denied dismissal Lacson and Aquino filed
in the RTC a motion for prohibition, insisting the DOJ does not
have jurisdiction Judge Liwag issued a writ of preliminary
injunction enjoining the DOJ from conducting a preliminary
investigation DOJ et al appealed to the SC
Issue: W.O.N. the DOJ can concurrently investigate a case
wherein the OMB has an existing complaint before it
No - the pendency of the case before the OMB is one of
primary jurisdiction to investigate 1987 Admin Code
governing the DOJ states: Section 1. Declaration of policy. It

is the declared policy of the State to provide the government

with a principal law agency which shall be both its legal
counsel and prosecution arm; administer the criminal justice
system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of
oenders and administration of the correctional system;
Section 3. Powers and Functions.
To accomplish its mandate, the Department shall have the
following powers and functions: Investigate the commission
of crimes, prosecute oenders and administer the probation
and correction system; PD 1275 states: Section 1. Creation of
the National Prosecution Service; Supervision and Control of
the Secretary of Justice.
There is hereby created and established a National
Prosecution Service under the supervision and control of the
Secretary of Justice, to be composed of the Prosecution Sta
in the Oce of the Secretary of Justice and such number of
Regional State Prosecution Oces, and Provincial and City
Fiscals Oces as are hereinafter provided, which shall be
primarily responsible for the investigation and prosecution of
all cases involving violations of penal laws. OMB act (RA
6640) states: Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.
The Oce of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties: Investigate and prosecute on
its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of
any public ocer or employee, oce or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inecient.
It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at anystage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of

such cases; Art. 11, Sec. 13 of the Constitution vests the OMB
with plenary investigative powers and fiscal autonomy They
are granted great leeway in investigating and prosecuting
oenses Prosecution under the OMB has preference over
other bodies RA 6770 gives them primary jurisdiction in
cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and authorizes them
to take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency,
the investigation of such cases.
The DOJ has general jurisdiction, it cannot diminish the
primary jurisdiction of the OMB This is the first case wherein
the first complaint was filed with the OMB before the DOJ The
subsequent assumption of the DOJ would not promote an
orderly administration of Justice Defendants would not know
where their recourse would be (DOJ or OMB) There is a risk of
conflicting resolutions regarding guilt Two investigations
would lead to unnecessary expenditure of government funds
Petition dismissed, OMB to have jurisdiction for the
preliminary investigation

23. MERCADO V MANZANO

FACTS:
Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Eduardo Manzano were both candidates for
Vice-Mayor of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.
Based on the results of the election, Manzano garnered the highest number
of votes. However, his proclamation was suspended due to the pending
petition for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mercado on the ground that he
was not a citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
From the facts presented, it appears that Manzano is both a Filipino and a
US citizen.

The Commission on Elections declared Manzano disqualified as candidate

for said elective position.
However, in a subsequent resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the
disqualification of the respondent was reversed. Respondent was held to
have renounced his US citizenship when he attained the age of majority and
registered himself as a voter in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.
Manzano was eventually proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City on
August 31, 1998.
Thus the present petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not a dual citizen is disqualified to hold public elective office in
the philippines.

RULING:
The court ruled that the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A. 7160 Sec. 40 (d)
and R.A. 7854 Sec. 20 must be understood as referring to dual allegiance.
Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the application of the different laws of two or more states, a person
is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. Dual allegiance
on the other hand, refers to a situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual
citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is a result of an individual's volition.
Article IV Sec. 5 of the Constitution provides "Dual allegiance of citizens is
inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law."
Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be
subject to strict process with respect to the termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice if, upon the filing of their

certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate their

status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of conflicting laws of different states.
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear
allegiance to the other country of which they are also citizens and thereby
terminate their status as dual citizens. It may be that, from the point of view
of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not effectively
renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment.
When a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that
he renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly
declares that he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the
condition imposed by law is satisfied and complied with. The determination
whether such renunciation is valid or fully complies with the provisions of our
Naturalization Law lies within the province and is an exclusive prerogative of
our courts. The latter should apply the law duly enacted by the legislative
department of the Republic. No foreign law may or should interfere with its
operation and application.
The court ruled that the filing of certificate of candidacy of respondent
sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any
disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. By declaring in his certificate
of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident
or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and
that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as
the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American
citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines,
when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood,
received his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in
past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking
made under oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for
declaring the loss of his Philippine citizenship through expatriation in
appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago, the court sustained the
denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking
his oath as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese
passport and declared in commercial documents executed abroad that he
was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can be taken against any one
who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality, but
subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine
citizenship.
The petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

31. ARIAS V SANDIGANBAYAN

Wala ako mahanap na digest

The Arias doctrine: another wrong that should

be corrected
While the Supreme Court is now seriously considering the
scrapping of the old condonation doctrine or the Aguinaldo
doctrine, I suggest it also look into and revisit the other twin of the
dodging corruption cases mantra repeatedly abused and misused
by heads of government oces and agencies, the Arias doctrine.

In Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court in 1989 declared:

"We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of oce plagued by
all too common problems dishonest or negligent subordinates,
overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence
is suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he
did not personally examine every single detail, painstakingly trace
every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every

person involved in a transaction before axing his signature as the

final approving authority. "x x x x "x x x. All heads of oces have to
rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good
faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations. x x x. There has to be some added reason why he
should examine each voucher in such detail. Any executive head of
even small government agencies or commissions can attest to the
volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of
documents, letters, memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers
that routinely pass through his hands. The number in bigger oces
or department is even more appalling."

The Arias doctrine has been abused to the hilt by heads of

government oces, both appointed and elected, going by the
number of corruption cases dismissed by the courts owing to its
invocation. These, regardless of whether or not said heads of
agencies were the ultimate and prime beneficiaries of the assailed
transactions, especially when "added reason" or "unusual fact"
could not be established by the prosecution.

However, it is a not a secret that under the padrinosystem (kamaganak, kaklase, kaibigan) prevailing in the bureaucracy, heads of
agencies appoint to juicy and key positions only those persons who
fall in the 3K category. These are subordinates who usually control
the budget and finance; they will not act or do anything, especially
those involving the use of public funds, without the bidding and/or
imprimatur of their bosses. And so the boss always knows.

At the very least, the doctrine tolerates and even encourages

incompetence and buck passing, instead of encouraging
competent, upright and responsible leaders. In this manner, the
Arias doctrine is sadly and unfortunately turned on its head.