G.R. No.

210055
June 22, 2015
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE JUAN B. GUTIERREZ, represented by ANTONIA S. GUTIERREZ, (for herself and in her capacity as
duly appointed Special Administratrix of the Estate of Juan B. Gutierrez), Petitioners, vs. HEIRS OF SPOUSE JOSE and GRACITA
CABANGON, represented by BLANCA CABANGON, JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, AL HAJ, Branch 14, 12th Judicial Region Cotabato
City, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, Special Former 21st Division, Mindanao Station, Cagayan De Oro City, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
REMEDIAL LAW
Facts:
Spouses Cabangon bought 3 lots from Juan Gutierrez. The latter allegedly promised to transfer the title in the name of the Spouses
upon full payment of the purchase price. However, Gutierrez suddenly stopped collecting from the Spouses, saying that he will only
receive the balance if the Spouses agree to take only 1 of the 3 lots. Aside from failing to transfer the title in the name of the
Spouses Cabangon, Juan also leased the lots to various occupants. Thus, Spouses Cabangon filed a suit for Specific Performance
and Damages (Civil Case No. 2618) before the RTC Cotabato Branch 13. During the pendency of the case, Gutierrez died.
On 11 July 2005, Judge Cader P. Indar was assigned to the Cotabato RTC, Branch 14, while Judge Bansawan Imbrahim was
appointed as regular judge of RTC, Branch 13. On 12 July 2005, RTC Branch 13, through Judge Indar, ordered the case submitted
for resolution, and considered the Estate as to have waived its right to present further evidence and to have rested its case. On
August 26, 2005, it rendered a Decision ordering the transfer of ownership, possession, and control of the best subject lots to the
Spouses Cabangon.
On 28 September 2005, the Estate of Gutierrez filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial, which was, however, denied.
Hence, the Estate filed a Notice of Appeal. The RTC denied its appeal since its Motion for Reconsideration was merely pro forma
and did not toll the reglementary period. On 23 January 2006, the RTC granted the Motion for Execution of Judgment of the
Spouses Cabangon and directed the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Undaunted, the Estate filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition
and Mandamus before the CA. On 21 January 2013, the appellate court denied said petition and sustained the ruling of the RTC.
The Estate then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the same was denied. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue:

1. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the case -YES
2. Whether or not Judge Indar has authority to issue the assailed decision -YES
3. Whether or not the appeal was properly filed -NO

Ruling:
1. Jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which
comprise a concise statement of the ultimate facts constituting the plaintiff's cause of action. The nature of an action, as well as
which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff,
regardless of whether or not he is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein. The averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted. Here, the action which the Spouses Cabangon filed
was one for specific performance, well within the jurisdiction of the Cotabato RTC.
2. As for the authority of Judge Indar to issue the assailed decision, it is settled that cases that have been submitted for decision or
those past the trial stage, such as when all the parties have finished presenting their evidence, prior to the transfer or promotion,
shall be resolved or disposed by the judge to which these are raffled or assigned. Also, a judge transferred, detailed or assigned to
another branch shall be considered as Assisting Judge of the branch to which he was previously assigned. Once trial judges act as
presiding judges or otherwise designated as acting or assisting judges in branches other than their own, cases substantially heard
by them and submitted to them for decision, unless they are promoted to higher positions, may be decided by them wherever they
may be, if so requested by any of the parties and endorsed by the incumbent Presiding Judges through the Office of the Court
Administrator.
The following procedure may be followed:
(1) The judge who takes over the branch must immediately make an inventory of the cases submitted for decision left by the
previous judge, unless the latter has, in the meantime, been promoted to a higher court;
(2) The succeeding judge must then inform the parties that the previous judge who heard the case and before whom it was
submitted for decision, may be required to decide the case. In such an event and upon request of any of the parties, the succeeding
judge may request the Court Administrator to formally endorse the case for decision to the judge before whom it was previously
submitted for decision; and
(3) After the judge who previously heard the case is finished with his decision, he should send back the records and his decision to
the branch to which the case properly belongs, by registered mail or by personal delivery, for recording and promulgation, with
notice of such fact to the Court Administrator. Also, it must be pointed out that the authority to resolve cases of the newly-appointed
judge starts, not upon appointment, but upon assumption of duty. Likewise, assumption of duty does not automatically mean
resolution of cases because the newly assumed judge must first conduct the necessary inventory of all pending cases in the branch.

Here, the Estate failed to prove that Judge Imbrahim assumed office at the RTC, Branch 13 on August 18, 2005. Even granting that
Judge Ibrahim in fact assumed his duties on said date, the Estate still failed to present any evidence that would show that, prior to
the release of the August 26, 2005 Decision, he conducted an inventory of cases where Civil Case No. 2618 was included, as
required by the court guidelines.
3. The CA also correctly held that the Estate's appeal was filed out of time.
Since the Estate's Motion for Reconsideration and/or New Trial did not contain the mandated notice of hearing, it becomes proforma
or a mere scrap of paper. As such, said motion did not toll the reglementary period for the filing of an appeal. The Estate even
admits this but simply pleads for the relaxation of the applicable procedural rules. Time and again, the Court has held that a notice
of time and place of hearing is mandatory for motions for new trial or motion for reconsideration, as in this case. The
requirement of notice under Sections 4 and 5, Rule 15 is mandatory and the lack thereof is fatal to a motion for reconsideration.

G.R. No. 191787

June 22, 2015
MACARIO CATIPON, JR., Petitioner, vs. JEROME JAPSON, Respondent.
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Principle:
POLITICAL LAW: Doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention
of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her.
Facts:
Petitioner is a holder of a Bachelor's Degree in Commerce from Baguio Colleges Foundation but with a deficiency of 1.5 units in
Military Science. In 1985, he was employed in SSS Bangued, Abra. The personnel head of SSS informed him that the Civil Service
Commission will be conducting a Career Service Professional Examination. He applied, believing that the CSC still allowed CSPE
applicants to substitute the length of their government service for any academic deficiency which they may have.
Petitioner obtained a rating of 80.52% in the said exam. He was promoted to Senior Analyst and OIC Branch Head of SSS in
Bangued. In October 1995, he eliminated his deficiency of 1.5 units in Military Science.
On March 10, 2003, respondent filed a complaint with the CSC alleging that petitioner made deliberate false entries in his CSPE
application, saying that he obtained his college degree in 1993 when actually he graduated in 1995 after removing his deficiency.
Petitioner was charged with Dishonesty, Falsification of Official documents, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service by the CSC-CAR. In a Decision rendered by CSC-CAR Director Atty. Danipog, petitioners eligibility is
revoked for being the fruit of a poisonous tree. He was, nevertheless, exonerated of the charges Dishonesty, Falsification of Official
Documents and Grave Misconduct but is found guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.
MR: Decision of CSC-CAR is sustained.
CA: Petition denied for lack of merit. It ruled that petitioner should have interposed an appeal with the CSC pursuant to Sections
5(A)(1), 43 and 49 of the CSC Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases; and that by filing a petition directly with it, petitioner violated
the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies.
Petitioners Contention: The Doctrine of Administrative remedies should not have been applied strictly in his case given the special
circumstance that his suspension would mean loss of his only source of income and that immediate judicial intervention was
necessary to prevent serious injury and damage to him. Also, that he should be completely exonerated from the charges against
him since conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service must be accompanied by deliberate intent or a willful desire to defy or
disregard established rules or norms in the service which is absent in his case; and that his career service professional eligibility
should not be revoked in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and preserves civil service eligibility.
Issues:

1. Whether or not petitioner violated the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies YES
2. Whether or not petitioner is guilty of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service -YES

Ruling:
Petition is denied.
1. Pursuant to Section 5(A)(1) of MC 19, the Civil Service Commission Proper, or Commission Proper, shall have jurisdiction over
decisions of Civil Service Regional Offices brought before it on petition for review. And under Section 43, "decisions of heads of
departments, agencies, provinces, cities, municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty days

suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, may be appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen
days from receipt thereof." "Commission Proper" refers to the Civil Service Commission-Central Office.
It is only the decision of the Commission Proper that may be brought to the CA on petition for review, under Section 50 of MC 19. xx
Thus, [the Supreme Court] agree with the CAs conclusion that in filing his petition for review directly with it from the CSC-CAR
Regional Director, petitioner failed to observe the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. As correctly stated by the
appellate court, non-exhaustion of administrative remedies renders petitioners CA petition premature and thus dismissible.
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that "before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of the court,
he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to
a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to
decide on a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the court's judicial
power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to ones cause of action.
The CA is further justified in refusing to take cognizance of the petition for review, as "[t]he doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not
warrant a court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence." When petitioners recourse lies in an appeal to the Commission Proper in accordance
with the procedure prescribed in MC 19, the CA may not be faulted for refusing to acknowledge petitioner before it.
2. Petitioners claim of good faith and absence of deliberate intent or willful desire to defy or disregard the rules relative to the CSPE
is not a defense as to exonerate him from the charge of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service; under our legal
system, ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith. Moreover, petitioner as mere applicant for acceptance
into the professional service through the CSPE cannot expect to be served on a silver platter; the obligation to know what is
required for the examination falls on him, and not the CSC or his colleagues in office.
Here, petitioner failed to verify the requirements before filing his application to take the CSPE exam. He simply relied on his prior
knowledge of the rules, particularly, that he could substitute his deficiency in Military Science with the length of his government
service. He cannot lay blame on the personnel head of the SSS-Bangued, Abra, who allegedly did not inform him of the pertinent
rules contained in Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 42, Series of 1991. For, [if] he were truly a reasonably prudent and
careful person, petitioner himself should have verified from the CSC the requirements imposed on prospective examinees. In so
doing, he would certainly have been informed of the new CSC policy disallowing substitution of ones length of government service
for academic deficiencies. Neither should petitioner have relied on an unnamed Civil Service employees advice since it was not
shown that the latter was authorized to give information regarding the examination nor that said employee was competent and
capable of giving correct information. His failure to verify the actual CSPE requirements which a reasonably prudent and careful
person would have done constitutes negligence.
Finally, the Court cannot consider petitioner's plea that "in the interest of justice and in the spirit of the policy which promotes and
preserves civil service eligibility," his career service professional eligibility should not be revoked. The act of using a fake or spurious
civil service eligibility for one's benefit not only amounts to violation of the civil service examinations or CSPE; it also results in
prejudice to the government and the public in general. It is a transgression of the law which has no place in the public service.
"Assumption of public office is impressed with the paramount public interest that requires the highest standards of ethical conduct. A
person aspiring for public office must observe honesty, candor, and faithful compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected."
G.R. No. 179874
June 22, 2015
ADELFA DIO TOLENTINO, VIRGINIA DIO, RENATO DIO, and HEIRS OF ROBERTO DIO, represented by ROGER DIO,
Petitioners, vs. SPOUSES MARIA JERERA AND EBON LATAGAN, substituted by his heirs, namely: MA. JANELITA LATAGANBULAWAN, YVONNE LATAGAN, LESLIE LATAGAN, RODOLFO H. LATAGAN, EMMANUEL NOEL H. LATAGAN, GEMMA
LATAGAN-DE LEON, MARIE GLEN LATAGAN-CERUJALES, and CELESTE LATAGAN-BO; and SALVE VDA. DE JERERA,
Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
REMEDIAL LAW
Facts:
Cipriano, Dionisia, Teopisto, Servillano, Maria and Rosa Jerera are co-owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT No. 12494.
On June 27, 1933, Servillano, Dionisia, Teofilo, and Cipriano ceded and conveyed by way of sale with right to repurchase to Amado
Dio, his heir and assigns, a 10,000 square-meter coconut land, as evidenced by "Escritura de Venta Con Pacto de Retro." The said
document stated that the property was part of Tax Dec. No. 15078 in the name of Guillermo Jerera; that the period within which to
repurchase the property was 2 years from the date of its execution; that the Jereras were the ones to pay the realty taxes; and that
once they have paid the amount of P122.00, the deed would be canceled and deemed without force and effect.
On December 4, 1935, Amado sold to Flora Girao, wife of Servillano and mother of respondent Maria Jerera Latagan, a 1,890
square-meter coconut land in Sorsogon. The deed of sale of the land stated that Amado was its absolute owner and possessor, and
that it was part and parcel registered under Tax Dec. No. 15078 in the name of Guillermo Jerera.

In 1967, Amado executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership stating that Servillano, Dionesia, Teofilo and Cepriano have
neither exercised their right to repurchase the subject property within the 2-year period nor paid the amount of P122.00. Thus,
Amado consolidated his absolute ownership over the property, gave his children and legal heirs the right to inherit it, and himself the
right to administer and to dispose of it. He also stated that the property was free from all liens, charges and encumbrances.
Amado then declared the subject property in his name for taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No. 9273 which cancelled Tax Dec. No.
2840 in Ceferino Jerera's name. In 1970, the Spouses Amado Dio and Modesta Domer allegedly executed a Deed of Absolute Sale
of the subject property in favor of Servillano for P585.00. On even date, the property was declared for taxation purposes in
Servillano's name under Tax Dec. No. 10326.
On May 25, 1971, Servillano executed with marital consent a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property for P585.00 in favor of
his daughter, Maria Jerera, married to Ebon Latagan.
On September 6, 1973, Maria declared the property in her name for taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No. 4826, which cancelled
Tax Dec. No. 10326 in Servillano's name.
On 1977, Servillano executed again a Deed of Absolute Sale of the subject property for P585.00 in favor of his daughter, Maria. On
the same day, Servillano also executed a Self-Adjudication of Real Property over the same property, claiming that he was the only
surviving co-owner. He caused OCT No. 1249 to be cancelled and TCT No. T-15364 was issued and registered in his name. Then,
TCT-15364 was cancelled and TCT No. T-15365 was issued and registered in the name of Maria, married to Ebon. The property
was then subdivided into 7 lots, all in the name of Maria.
On May 1998, petitioners filed a Complaint for quieting of title, recovery of property and damages before the RTC Sorsogon City,
alleging that they are the successors-in-interest of Amado over the subject property. They claimed that Amado acquired the property
from Servillano, Dionesia, Teofilo (Teopisto), Cipriano (Ceferino) and Heirs of Rosa and later caused it to be declared in his name for
taxation purposes under Tax Dec. No. 9273. Petitioners assert that the Deed of Sale executed by the Spouses Amado and Modesta,
conveying the property to Servillano, is simulated and/or fictitious for being a forgery, hence, all transactions emanating from it are
null and void.
The trial court ruled in favor of petitioners [plaintiffs] finding that the Deed of Sale executed by Spouses Amado and Modesta in favor
of Servillano is simulated for being a forgery, hence, void; that petitioners are the lawful owners of the property.
CA: reversed and set aside the Decision of the trial court for failure to prove that the Deed of Sale is forged. Moreover, the inaction
and indifference of petitioners constitute laches.
MR: denied.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the instant petition should be dismissed for non-compliance with the requirements of verification and
certification against forum shopping NO
2. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that petitioners failed to discharge their burden of proof considering that the NBI
handwriting expert based its conclusion on mere photocopies of the questioned document -YES
3. Whether or not the CA erred in holding that respondents did not act in bad faith -NO

Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
1. In Oldarico S. Traveno v. Bobongon Banana Growers Multi-Purpose Cooperative, the Court restated the jurisprudential
pronouncements respecting non-compliance with the requirements on, or submission of defective, verification and certification
against forum shopping:
1) A distinction must be made between non-compliance with the requirement on or submission of defective verification, and
noncompliance with the requirement on or submission of defective certification against forum shopping.
2) As to verification, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein does not necessarily render the pleading fatally defective. The
Court may order its submission or correction or act on the pleading if the attending circumstances are such that strict compliance
with the Rule may be dispensed with in order that the ends of justice may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed substantially complied with when one who has ample knowledge to swear to the truth of the allegations in
the complaint or petition signs the verification, and when matters alleged in the petition have been made in good faith or are true and
correct.
4) As to certification against forum shopping, non-compliance therewith or a defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax the Rule on the ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of "special circumstances or compelling reasons."
5) The certification against forum shopping must be signed by all the plaintiffs or petitioners in a case; otherwise, those who did not
sign will be dropped as parties to the case. Under reasonable or justifiable circumstances, however, as when all the plaintiffs or
petitioners share a common interest and invoke a common cause of action or defense, the signature of only one of them in the
certification against forum shopping substantially complies with the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification against forum shopping must be executed by the party-pleader, not by his counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, the party-pleader is unable to sign, he must execute a Special Power of Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on his behalf.
The [Supreme] Court finds substantial compliance with the Rules when Adelfa signed the said verification and certification in behalf
of her co-petitioners. As heirs and successors-in-interest of Amado over the subject property, Adelfa and her co-petitioners share a
common interest and cause of action in their complaint for the quieting of title and recovery of possession thereof, as well as in the
instant petition for review on certiorari.
2. Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court clearly states that the petition filed shall raise only questions of law. In the exercise of its
power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts and, subject to certain exceptions, it does not normally undertake the re-examination
of the evidence presented by the parties during trial. One of these exceptions is when the findings of the appellate court are contrary
to those of the trial court. After all, findings of fact of the trial court and the CA may be set aside when such findings are not
supported by the evidence or where the lower courts' conclusions are based on a misapprehension of facts.
The contrary findings of the trial court and the CA leave the Court with no other alternative but to re-examine the factual issues
raised in the present petition.
The Court rules that the CA erred in ruling that petitioners failed to prove that the signatures of Amado and Modesta in the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated January 14, 1970 were forged. Contrary to respondents' claim that no original documents were submitted to the
NBI, records show that the trial court ordered the original copies the questioned Deed of Absolute Sale and the documents
containing the standard specimen signature of Amado and Modesta, to be submitted to it for examination purposes by the NBI
Questioned Documents Division in Manila.
Consequently, the CA erred in ruling that the NBI expert witness merely relied on photocopies of the questioned documents and
sample signatures in concluding that Amado's signature was forged.
Settled is the rule that forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party
alleging the same. Through Questioned Documents Report No. 196-300 and the credible expert witness testimony thereon,
petitioners have proven that only the signature of Amado in the Deed of Absolute Sale was forged, but not that of Modesta due to
insufficiency of specimen submitted to be used as basis for comparative analysis. xx Upon a careful examination of such pieces of
documentary evidence, the Court finds that petitioners have successfully proved that both signatures of Amado and Modesta in the
Deed of Absolute Sale were indeed forged.
3. The Court agrees with the CA that Maria is an innocent purchaser for value of the subject property.
In Sigaya v. Mayuga, the Court held that the burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good faith lies upon one who asserts that
status and this onus probandi cannot be discharged my mere invocation of the legal presumption of good faith. A purchaser in good
faith is one who buys property without notice that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays its fair price
before she has notice of the adverse claims and interest of another person in the same property. The honesty of intention which
constitutes good faith implies a freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put a person on inquiry.
It is a well-settled rule that every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title
issued therefor and the law will in no way oblige him to go beyond the certificate to determine the condition of the property. Where
there is nothing in the certificate of title to indicate any cloud or vice in the ownership of the property, or any encumbrance thereon,
the purchaser is not required to explore further than what the Torrens Title upon its face indicates in quest for any hidden defects or
inchoate right that may subsequently defeat his right thereto. However, this rule shall not apply when the party has actual knowledge
of facts and circumstances that would impel a reasonably cautious person to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has
knowledge of a defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent person to inquire into the
status of the title of the property in litigation.
In this case, the Court finds that respondents have successfully discharged such burden of proving the status of a purchaser in good
faith and for value.
Petition is denied.
G.R. No. 188839
June 22, 2015
CESAR NAGUIT, Petitioner, vs. SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Principle:
LABOR LAW: The settled rule is that fighting within company premises is a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee.
Moreover, the act of assaulting another employee is serious misconduct which justifies the termination of employment.
REMEDIAL LAW: As a rule, a petition for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order
denying a motion for reconsideration. Exceptions: (see ruling)

No one has a vested right to file an appeal or a petition for certiorari. These are statutory privileges which may be exercised only in
the manner prescribed by law.
Facts:
Petitioner was an employee of San Miguel Corporation. He got involved in an altercation with Renato Regala, a co-employee.
Regala filed a complaint with respondents Human Resources Department. San Miguel (respondent) then conducted an
administrative investigation giving both parties the opportunity to defend themselves. However, petitioner opted to remain silent and
did not address the charges against him. The company-designated investigator found petitioner guilty of willful injury to another
employee within company premises. Thus, respondent terminated petitioners employment. This prompted petitioner to file a
complaint for illegal dismissal against respondent.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed petitioners complaint for lack of merit. He then appealed to the NLRC, which affirmed the Labor
Arbiters Decision. So, petitioner filed a Special Civil Action for Certiorari before the CA to assail the NLRC Decision. On 9 February
2009, petitioner filed with the CA a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari on the ground that he just hired a new
counsel for the case and that the latter still had to study the records of the case. The CA denied petitioners Motion for Extension of
Time to File a Petition for Certiorari citing that the 60-day period to file such petition is non-extendible as stated in Section 4, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court. In another Resolution, the CA considered petitioners certiorari petition as filed out of time and declared the
questioned NLRC Decision as final and executory. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but was denied.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the CA abused its discretion when it failed to decide the case on the merits in accordance with Supreme
Court Jurisprudence afforded to Labor Cases -NO
2. Whether or not petitioner had been unlawfully dismissed NO
Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
1. xx The general rule, as laid down in Laguna Metts Corporation v. Court of Appeals, is that a petition for certiorari must be filed
strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or from the order denying a motion for reconsideration. This is in accordance with the
amendment introduced by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC where no provision for the filing of a motion for extension to file a petition for
certiorari exists. xx
xx Under exceptional cases, however, and as held in Domdom v. Third and Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan, the 60-day period
may be extended subject to the courts sound discretion. xx
Then in Labao v. Flores, we laid down some of the exceptions to the strict application of the 60-day period rule, thus: [T]here are
recognized exceptions to their strict observance, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an
injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by
immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances;
(5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the
rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly
prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellants fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable
circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved;
and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Thus, there should be an effort on the
part of the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure to comply with the rules.
In the instant case, [the Supreme Court] is not convinced [of petitioners argument.] Suffice it to say that workload and resignation of
the lawyer handling the case are insufficient reasons to justify the relaxation of the procedural rules. xx In addition, it is also the duty
of petitioner to monitor the status of his case and not simply rely on his former lawyer, whom he already knew to be unable to attend
to his duties as counsel. It is settled that litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back and
relax, and await the outcome of their case. They should give the necessary assistance to their counsel, for at stake is their interest
in the case.
Moreover, it is true that rules of procedure are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. Also, the general rule is that every
litigant must be given amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities. However, the [Supreme] Court agrees with the CA that petitioner's failure to file his petition on time does not involve
mere technicality but is jurisdictional. Petitioner's failure to timely file his petition renders the questioned NLRC Decision final and
executory, thus, depriving the CA of its jurisdiction over the said petition.
Furthermore, no one has a vested right to file an appeal or a petition for certiorari. These are statutory privileges which may be
exercised only in the manner prescribed by law.
2. The settled rule is that fighting within company premises is a valid ground for the dismissal of an employee. Moreover, the act of
assaulting another employee is serious misconduct which justifies the termination of employment.

G.R. No. 182926

June 22, 2015
ANA LOU B. NAVAJA, Petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL A. DE CASTRO, or the Acting Presiding Judge of MCTC Jagna-GarciaHernandez, DKT PHILS., INC., represented by ATTY. EDGAR BORJE, Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Principle:
REMEDIAL LAW: Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Venue and jurisdiction over criminal cases is not
only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In other words, the
venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was committed or
some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Facts:
Private Respondent DKT Philippines Inc. filed a Complaint-Affidavit against petitioner Navaja alleging that while Navaja was still its
Regional Sales Manager, she falsified a receipt by making it appear that she incurred meal expenses in the amount of P1,810.00
instead of P810.00 at Garden Caf, Jagna Bohol and claimed reimbursement for it.
Navaja was charged with the crime of falsification of private document before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of JagnaGarcia-Hernandez, Bohol, docketed as Criminal Case No. 2904.
On August 2005, Navaja filed a Motion to Quash and Defer Arraignment on the ground that none of the essential elements of the
crime of falsification of private document occurred in Jagna, Bohol, hence, the MCTC had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the
case due to improper venue. The MCTC denied the motion to quash. MR: denied.
Navaja filed a Petition for Certiorari before the RTC. RTC denied the petition for lack of basis. CA: dismissed.
Petitioners Argument: Not one of the 3 essential elements of the crime was shown to have been committed and that there is no
showing in the Information or even in the complaint-affidavit and the annexes thereto that the crime of falsification of a private
document was committed in Bohol.
Issues:

1. Whether or not the MCTC of Bohol does not have jurisdiction over the instant case -NO
2. Whether or not a Petition for Certiorari may be filed to question the denial of motion to quash -NO

Ruling:
The petition lacks merit.
1. Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. xx In determining the venue where the criminal action is to be
instituted and the court which has jurisdiction over it, Section 15(a), Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides:
(a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court or municipality or territory where
the offense was committed or where any of its essential ingredients occurred.
Section 10, Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure pertinently states:
Place of commission of the offense. The complaint or information is sufficient if it can be understood from its allegations that the
offense was committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at some place within the jurisdiction of the court, unless the
particular place where it was committed constitutes an essential element of the offense charged or is necessary for its identification.
In Union Bank of the Philippines v. People, the Court said that both provisions categorically place the venue and jurisdiction over
criminal cases not only in the court where the offense was committed, but also where any of its essential ingredients took place. In
other words, the venue of action and of jurisdiction are deemed sufficiently alleged where the Information states that the offense was
committed or some of its essential ingredients occurred at a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
In cases of falsification of private documents, the venue is the place where the document is actually falsified, to the prejudice of or
with the intent to prejudice a third person, regardless whether or not the falsified document is put to the improper or illegal use for
which it was intended.
Contrary to Navaja's argument that the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol, has no jurisdiction over the case because not one of the essential
elements of falsification of private document was committed within its jurisdiction, the allegations in the Information and the
complaint-affidavit make out a prima facie case that such crime was committed in Jagna, Bohol.
Guided by the settled rule that the jurisdiction of the court is determined by the allegations of the complaint or information and not by
the result of proof, the [Supreme] Court holds that Navaja's case for falsification of private document falls within the territorial
jurisdiction of the MCTC of Jagna, Bohol.

2. In Zamoranos v. People, this Court emphasized that "a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the
remedy is not to resort forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable verdict is handed
down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law."
On a number of occasions, however, Court had sanctioned a writ of certiorari as an appropriate remedy to assail an interlocutory
order in the following circumstances:
(1) when the court issued the order without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion;
(2) when the interlocutory order is patently erroneous and the remedy of appeal would not afford adequate and expeditious relief;
(3) in the interest of a more enlightened and substantial justice;
(4) to promote public welfare and public policy; and
(5) when the cases have attracted nationwide attention, making it essential to proceed with dispatch in the consideration thereof.
Navaja failed to prove that any of the said special circumstances obtains in this case, let alone the grave abuse of discretion she
imputed against the MCTC. Hence, the CA did not err in affirming the RTC ruling that the MCTC correctly denied her motion to
quash.
G.R. No. 185407
June 22, 2015
SIO TIAT KING, Petitioner, vs. VICENTE G. LIM, MICHAEL GEORGE 0. LIM, MATHEW VINCENT 0. LIM, MEL PATRICK 0. LIM,
MOISES FRANCIS W. LIM, MARVIN JOHN W. LIM, and SAARSTAHL PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents.
REYES, J.:
CIVIL LAW: "The third party's possession of the property is legally presumed to be based on a just title, a presumption which may
be overcome by the purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property. Through such a judicial proceeding, the nature of
the adverse possession by the third party may be determined, after such third party is accorded due process and the opportunity to
be heard. The third party may be ejected from the property only after he has been given an opportunity to be heard, conformably
with the time-honored principle of due process."
Facts:
In Civil Case No. 94-71083, the Spouses Calidguid executed a Compromise Agreement binding themselves to pay the amount of
P2,520,000.00 to the Spouses Lee, which was approved by the RTC Manila. However, the Spouses Calidguid failed to comply with
the terms of the said decision, leading the Spouses Lee to avail of the remedy of execution. A Writ of Execution was issued to satisfy
the compromise judgment and a property belonging to the Spouses Calidguid covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
85561 was levied on execution. During its sale at a public auction, the judgment creditor, Jaime emerged as the highest bidder and
a corresponding Certificate of Sale was issued in his favor.
As an assignee of the Spouses Calidguid, Sio Tiat King redeemed the subject property on October 30, 1996, before the expiration of
the one-year period of right of redemption. More than 11 years after the redemption, King filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession which was granted by the RTC. Pursuant to this, Sheriff Cesar Javier served a Notice to Vacate addressed to the
Spouses Calidguid, their agents and all other persons claiming rights under the subject property.
On February 2008, respondents Lim filed a Joint Affidavit of Third Party Claim, alleging that they are the registered owners of the
subject property under TCT No. 122207. They filed an Entry of Appearance with Motion to Quash Writ of Execution. The RTC issued
an Order setting the case for preliminary conference. However, on March 2008, the actual and physical possession of a part of the
subject property was turned over to King prompting the Lims to file an Extremely Urgent Motion to Issue Status Quo Ante Order.
Such Motion was granted but to last only on April 11, 2008.
The Lims filed a Petition for Certiorari before the CA alleging that the RTC judge committed grave abuse of discretion when they
were ousted from their property by virtue of the writ of possession, without a separate and independent action to resolve the issue of
ownership. Meanwhile, the RTC issued an Order date 28 April 2008, denying the Motion to Quash filed by the Lims.
On July 22, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision annulling the Order of the RTC dated 28 April 2008. Accordingly, the Writ of
Possession issued to King is quashed, without prejudice to any separate action which King may file against all parties concerned for
the enforcement of whatever right he may have over the property.
MR: denied. Hence, this petition.
Petitioners Contention: He alleged that he is considered as a redemptioner, who is entitled to a writ of possession. He averred that
the word "redemptioner" found in Section 33 Rule 39 of the Rules of Court should be loosely applied to include the judgment
debtor's successor-in-interest.
Issue: Whether or not the Lims may be evicted from the property by virtue of a writ of possession issued in favor or King -NO
Ruling:
1. King's line of reasoning is flawed. His understanding of the word "redemptioner" is that the writ of possession can only be
rightfully enforced against the Spouses Calidguid and their successors-in-interest - which ironically includes King himself. Even

assuming for the sake of argument that King is treated as a redemptioner, he seemed to have forgone that the same provision he
invoked provides for an exception, which is hereunder quoted:
Sec. 33. Deed and possession to be given at expiration of redemption period; by whom executed or given.
x x x The possession of the property shall be given to the purchaser or last redemptioner by the same officer unless a
third party is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor.
King acquired his right over the property with TCT No. 85561 from the Spouses Calidguid when their right to redeem the property
was assigned to him and subsequently, when redemption was made; whereas the Lims' claim of ownership is based on TCT No.
122207 registered in their names. This goes to show that the Lims hold the property adversely to the judgment obligor, Spouses
Calidguid.
The Lims are considered as a third party, whose possession over the subject property may not be defeated summarily. "The third
party's possession of the property is legally presumed to be based on a just title, a presumption which may be overcome by the
purchaser in a judicial proceeding for recovery of the property. Through such a judicial proceeding, the nature of the adverse
possession by the third party may be determined, after such third party is accorded due process and the opportunity to be heard.
The third party may be ejected from the property only after he has been given an opportunity to be heard, conformably with the timehonored principle of due process."
King took a procedural shortcut when he applied for the issuance of a writ of possession instead of filing a suit to recover
possession of the property against the Lims. Besides, as the CA had espoused, the issuance of the writ of possession produced a
peculiar situation in which the writ sought by King was directed against himself as the assignee of the judgment debtors.
Petition is denied.
G.R. No. 171095
June 22, 2015
MAYOR MARCIAL VARGAS and ENGR. RAYMUNDO DEL ROSARIO, Petitioners, vs. FORTUNATO CAJUCOM, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Principle:
REMEDIAL LAW: [Petitioners] may not raise in their opposition to the writ of execution issues that they should have raised in the
case during the trial proper or against the judgment via an appeal. Exceptions (see ruling)
Facts:
Fortunato Cajucom filed with the RTC of Cabanatuan City a Complaint for mandamus and abatement of nuisance against the
Municipal Mayor Vargas. He alleged that he had intended to start a gasoline station business on his lot in Aliaga, Nueva Ecija, but
several illegal structures built on the road shoulder by Puno, et al. were obstructing access to his site, thus, also frustrating his plan.
He claimed that demand was made for Puno, et al. to remove their structures, but to no avail. Cajucom then alleged that he tried to
enlist the help of Mayor Vargas and Engr. Del Rosario, but the latter similarly did not act. Cajucom ultimately prayed for the court to
command the said municipal mayor and engineer to cause the removal of all buildings and structures built on the concerned road
shoulder by Puno, et al.
The court rendered a Decision in favor of Cajucom. No appeal was interposed from the Decision. As the Decision became final and
executory, Cajucom filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, to which the RTC granted.
Then, the court sheriff reported that he served a copy of the writ of execution on Mayor Vargas and Engr. del Rosario. However, the
sheriff also reported in his Return of Service that, as of June 13, 2001 the judgment has not been executed.
Subsequently, Puno, et al. filed a petition for Annulment of Judgment with the CA to annul Decision of the RTC. The grounds alleged
in the petition include the trial court's lack of jurisdiction and its speculation as to certain facts of the case.
CA: denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Whether or not the writ of execution may be quashed. -NO
Ruling:
It is a consistent practice that once a judgment has become final and executory, a writ of execution is issued as a matter of course,
in the absence of any order restraining its issuance. In addition, even a writ of demolition, if the case calls for it, is ancillary to the
process of execution and is logically also issued as a consequence of the writ of execution earlier issued.
[Under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court], once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is entitled as a matter of right to a writ of
execution. Its issuance is, in fact, the trial courts ministerial duty, the only limitation being that the writ must conform substantially to
every essential particular of the judgment promulgated, more particularly, the orders or decrees in the dispositive portion of the
decision. Even the holding in abeyance of the issuance of a writ of execution of a final and executory judgment can be considered
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court.

In the case at bar, there is no dispute that the trial court's decision had become final and executory, as petitioners themselves did
not appeal the same. In the current petition, neither is there an allegation that the judgment is a void one. But even if there is such
an allegation, the issue is a settled one, as this Court itself, in the petition for annulment of judgment filed by petitioner's co-obligors,
i.e., Puno et al., had upheld the judgment rather than declare the same void. That petition also alleged lack of jurisdiction and raised
other issues which are similarly raised in the instant petition.
Therefore, at this late stage, nothing more may be done to disturb the said final judgment.
As for the regularity of the issuance of the writ of execution itself, it is uncontested that all the requirements for the issuance of such
a writ, as laid down in the rules, were followed in the case a bar. No issue was raised before the trial court which qualifies as an
exception to the general rule that parties may not object to its issuance. Instead, for the most part, the petition appears to pray for a
quashal of the writ of execution on grounds that, when closely examined, go into the merits of the case and the judgment being
executed and are not based on any defect in the writ of execution itself or in its issuance.
[Petitioners] may not raise in their opposition to the writ of execution issues that they should have raised in the case during the trial
proper or against the judgment via an appeal. They may not object to the execution by raising new issues of fact or law, except
under the following circumstances:
(1) the writ of execution varies the judgment;
(2) there has been a change in the situation of the parties making execution inequitable or unjust;
(3) execution is sought to be enforced against property exempt from execution;
(4) it appears that the controversy has been submitted to the judgment of the court;
(5) the terms of the judgment are not clear enough and there remains room for interpretation thereof; or
(6) it appears that the writ of execution has been improvidently issued, or that it is defective in substance, or issued against the
wrong party, or that the judgment debt has been paid or otherwise satisfied, or the writ was issued without authority.
For the most part, the petition does not clearly state whether the subject writ of execution falls under any of the above exceptions. It
raised two grounds, i.e., that the writ is incapable of being enforced and that it varies the judgment, which can be interpreted as
falling under the exceptions above, but these grounds as applied to the case at bar simply lack merit.
Petition is dismissed.
G.R. No. 175795
June 22, 2015
NORMILITO R. CAGATIN, Petitioner, vs. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION and C.S.C.S. INTERNATIONAL NV,
Respondents.
PERALTA, J.:
Principle:
LABOR LAW: In labor cases, as in all cases which require the presentation and weighing of evidence, the basic rule is that the
burden of evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue.
REMEDIAL LAW (EVIDENCE): Substantial evidence is not one that establishes certainty beyond reasonable doubt, but only "such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," even if other minds, equally
reasonable, might conceivably opine otherwise. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.
Facts:
Magsaysay Maritime Corp. employed petitioner Cagatin as Cabin Steward for Costa Atlantica. The POEA-approved contract was for
a period of 7 months. Petitioner commenced work at the ship Costa Atlantica, however, he was eventually assigned to work at
another ship, Costa Tropicale, which was then on drydock. There, he performed tasks such as cleaning the ship and lifting objects
like furniture, steel vaults and others for almost two months or until mid-July 2001. Thereafter, after the ship had sailed and petitioner
started performing his official duty as Cabin Steward, he felt what he described as a "crackle" or a slip in his back or spinal bone,
which was followed by an intense pain in the lower back and an inability to bend. The next morning, he was unable to stand up due
to the intense pain in his lower back. He was brought to the clinic and was given shots of a painkiller for about three days, after
which, he resumed work.
Upon disembarkation in Italy, he underwent a medical examination and an X-ray procedure. Then, he was told by the doctor that he
could no longer continue working in the vessel. Thus, petitioner was signed off the ship and he returned to the Philippines. In the
Philippines, he immediately reported to respondent Magsaysay Maritime, which referred him to the hospital Medical Center Manila
and the company-designated physician Dr. Nicomedes Cruz. Petitioner underwent a Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of the
lumbosacral spine. Dr. Cruz diagnosed petitioner as suffering from "small central disc protrusion with annular fissure formation
L5S1; disc annular bulge L4L5." Thereafter, petitioner was referred to specialists, while Dr. Cruz continued to see and treat petitioner
until January 15, 2002.
On January 15, 2002, Dr. Cruz declared petitioner as fit to work and executed an affidavit to such effect. Almost seven months later,
petitioner went to another physician, Dr. Enrique Collantes, Jr., for another opinion. Dr. Collantes examined petitioner and,
thereafter, made the finding that petitioner was "no longer fit to work at sea" in a vessel, which contradicts the earlier finding of Dr.
Cruz. Dr. Collantes gave petitioner a disability grading of 8 (33.59%) for his injury.

Petitioner then filed his Complaint before the NLRC claiming for Disability Benefits and damages from respondents. The Labor
Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioner. On appeal, the NLRC overturned the LAs decision. CA: affirmed the decision of the NLRC.
Hence, this petition for review.
Petitioners Argument: There was malice, bad faith and abuse when the company-designated physician declared him fit to work.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to disability benefits -NO
Ruling:
In labor cases, as in all cases which require the presentation and weighing of evidence, the basic rule is that the burden of evidence
lies with the party who asserts the affirmative of an issue. In particular, in a case of claims for disability benefits, the onus probandi
falls on the seafarer as claimant to establish his claim with the right quantum of evidence; it cannot rest on speculations,
presumptions or conjectures. Such party has the burden of proving the said assertion with the quantum of evidence required by law
which, in a case such as this of a claim for disability benefits arising from one's employment as a seafarer, is substantial evidence.
Substantial evidence is not one that establishes certainty beyond reasonable doubt, but only "such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion," even if other minds, equally reasonable, might conceivably
opine otherwise. It is more than a mere scintilla of evidence.
The allegation of petitioner that the allegedly contradicting reports of Dr. Cruz were the result of respondents' malice, bad faith and
abuse is not supported by him with substantial evidence. It is consistently held that good faith is always presumed and he who
alleges the contrary on his opponent has the burden of proving that the latter acted in bad faith, with malice, or with ill motive. Mere
allegation is not equivalent to proof. Although strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability
benefits, the seafarer must still prove his claim with substantial evidence, otherwise, injustice will be done to his employer.
Dr. Cruz's earlier finding was supported by tests and opinions of experts. Dr. Cruz has stated in his report and affidavit that
petitioner's treatment was conducted not just by him alone, but by his other "colleagues who specialize in orthopedic surgery and
rehabilitation medicine."
Under POEA Memorandum Circular No. 9 dated 14 June 2000, it is the findings and evaluations of the company-designated
physician which should form the basis of the seafarer's disability claim. It is this physician who is entrusted with the task of
assessing a seafarers disability and there is a procedure to be followed to contest his findings. But the assessment of the companydesignated physician is not final, binding or conclusive on anyone, including the seafarer, the labor tribunals, or the courts, since the
seafarer may seek a second opinion and consult a doctor of his choice regarding his ailment or injury. If the physician chosen by the
seafarer disagrees with the assessment of the company-designated physician, the company and the seafarer may agree jointly to
refer the latter to a third doctor whose decision shall be final and binding on them. Petitioner's failure to comply with the requirement
under the POEA-SEC to have the conflicting assessments of his disability determined by a third doctor also militates against his
claim. It is held that without such a binding third opinion, the original certification of the company-designated physician that the
claimant was "fit to work" should stand.
And in jurisprudence interpreting the aforequoted provision of the POEA-SEC, a temporary total disability only becomes permanent
when so declared by the company-designated physician within the periods he is allowed to do so, or upon the expiration of the
maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a declaration of either fitness to work or the existence of a permanent disability.
xx Where before it was held that permanent disability is the inability of a seafarer to perform his work for more than 120 days,
regardless of whether or not he loses the use of any part of his body, now the rule is that if the injury or sickness still requires
medical attendance beyond 120 days, the company-designated physician has, including the initial 120 days, up to a maximum of
240 days to declare either fitness to work or permanent disability, beyond which and with or without any declaration, the disability is
considered total and permanent.
In the case at bar, the declaration by Dr. Cruz that petitioner was "fit to work" went beyond the 120-day period; however, as the
reason therefor was that petitioner still required additional medical treatment, his declaration as "fit to work" was made within the
maximum 240 days which therefore forestalls the automatic classification of petitioner's injury as total and permanent and, thus,
entitled to the pertinent disability benefits.