Review: The Problem with Nature

Author(s): Nicholas Agar

Reviewed work(s):
Our Posthuman Future: Consequences of the Biotechnology Revolution by Francis
Fukuyama
Source: The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 32, No. 6 (Nov. - Dec., 2002), pp. 39-40
Published by: The Hastings Center
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3528132
Accessed: 31/01/2010 17:44
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review
new book,Our PosthumanFuture:Consequences
FrancisFukuyamascontroversial
of the BiotechnologyRevolution,has elicitedvariedreactions,but like it or not, it
seemslikelyto be influential.Hereare threeopinions.-Ed.

The

Problem

with

Nature

by NicholasAgar

ur Posthuman Future is the

handiwork of two Francis
Fukuyamas. There is Francis
Fukuyama, architect of grand theory
who declaredhistoryfinishedand liberal democracyeternallytriumphant.But
thereis also FrancisFukuyama,member
of President Bush's Council on
Bioethics, a body tasked with making
measuredpronouncementson the use
of human stem cells, reproductive
cloning, and genetic modification.The
books conclusion shows Fukuyamain
cautiousmode. He defends the by now
familiar claim that we should use
biotechnologyto treatdiseasebut not to
enhance human capacities.Fukuyama,
man of big ideas, dictatesthat this conclusion be arrivedat by a theoretically
mountainousroute.
A moral distinctionbetweentreating
and enhancing is most often defended
by pointing to the potentialfor the misuse of biotechnologyto infringeprocreative freedoms,violate children'sautonomy, or to cause social strife.Although
Fukuyama mentions such problems,
they are not his immediate concern.
The posthuman future of the title is
what biotechnology threatens.It must
be avoidedbecause,contraryto the apparentmessageof the title, biotechs futurewould not be ours.We can ensurea
futurewith human beings in it only by
protectinghuman naturefrom the tampering of genetic engineers and neuropharmacologists.
November-December 2002

But Fukuyama'saccount of human

nature cannot deliver his sensible conclusion.
Fukuyamafuses two scientific ideas.
He says that human nature comprises
shared
"thespeciestypicalcharacteristics
by all human beingsqua human beings"
(p. 101). "Speciestypical"is to be understood in the way that biologists do
when they say "pairbonding is typical
of robinsand catbirdsbut not of gorillas
and orangutans"(p. 130). Fukuyama
also invokes genes, saying "human natureis the sum of the behaviorand characteristicsthat are typicalof the human
species,arisingfrom genetic ratherthan
environmentalfactors"(p. 130).
"Species typical characteristic"and
are perfectlyre"geneticcharacteristic"
scientific
concepts. But
spectable
Fukuyama'shandling of them transmutes good science into a combination
of pseudo science and shallow moral
thinking.
No term is more misunderstoodin
contemporary moral thinking than
"gene."Fukuyamais alertto one booby
trap-that of genetic determinism.He
allowsthat genes do not fix traitslike intelligence or height. Instead they set
"limits to the degree of variancepossible" (p. 132). Problemsbegin when he
elaborateson this idea. Fukuyamasays
"thefinding that IQ is 40 to 50 percent
heritablealreadycontains within it an
estimateof the impact of cultureon IQ
and implies that even taking culture

into account, thereis a significantcomponent of IQ that is geneticallydetermined"(p. 138). His idea is that the geneticallydeterminedregionconstituting
human natureshould be immune from
biotechnological interference. In this
way we make room for biotech treatments of Alzheimer'sand diabeteswhile
rulingout enhancement.
But we must be carefulwhen confrontedwith statementssuch as "intelligence is 40 to 50 percent genetic," or
"malehomosexualityis 31 to 76 percent
heritable" (p. 37). It is tempting to
think of these statistics as measuring
how hard genes have worked to make a
particularperson intelligent or gay. If
male homosexualityis 76 percentgenetic, we suppose, then a gay man'sgenes
have done most of the work, leaving
diet and education to add the finishing
touches to his sexuality.But this is mistaken. Statementsabout the degree of
heritability,or the extent to which a trait
is genetic, addressvariationin populations. It is almost certain that the observed variation in intelligence in
human populationsis explainedby both
differencesin genes and differencesin
environmentalinputs within and without the womb. But variationin one of
these factors may contribute more to
the observed variation in intelligence
than does variationin the otherfactor.If
human intelligenceis 40 to 50 percent
genetic, then differences in genes account for just under half to aroundhalf
of the observedvariationin intelligence.
The remainderis explained by differences in environmentalinputs such as
educationand nutrition.
The population-relativedefinition of
"genetic"ill suits it to guide us in respect
of what we should and should not do to
individuals.Suppose we want to begin
enhancing human intelligence, but are
mindful of Fukuyama'sdirectivenot to
mess with characteristicsthat are sub-

Our PosthumanFuture:
C eences of the Biotechnmology
_Rvoluto, By FancsFukuyama,
New York:Farr Straus& Giroux,
2002. $25.0 (hardcover)

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

39

stantiallygenetic. A consequenceof his

proposalmight be that biotech companies conduct their experimentsinto the
enhancementof human intelligencein
the thirdworldwherethereis wide variation in the availabilityof dietaryinputs
requiredfor the developmentof normal
intelligence.In thesepopulationsintelligence is more environmental-meaning
that a greaterpartof the variationstems
from environmentaldifferences.Alternatively,first world intelligence might
be made more environmentaland less
genetic by increasinglead levels in selected foods. This would grant biotechnologistswider latitudein modifyingit.
Subtractingthe poorly comprehended gene talk from Fukuyama'smoral
view of human natureleavesthe idea of
speciestypicaltraits.But this is just the
old errorof tryingto translatestatistical
norms into moral norms. A practice's
being unusualis not sufficientto make
it morallywrong. Nor should a person's
being unusual make them in- or
posthuman in any morally interesting
sense.
Consider what Fukuyamais forced
to say of individualsthat depart from
the statistical norm. He explains that
"[t]hereare doubtless some mutant female kangaroosborn without pouches,
and some bulls born with three horns
on their heads. Facts like these do not
render meaningless the assertion that
pouches are somehow constitutive of
"kangarooness,"or that bulls are creatures that typicallyhave two horns on
their heads"(pp. 134-35).
It is not hard to think of "humans"
who are the statistical analogues of
pouchless kangaroosand three-horned
bulls. ShaquilleO'Neal is sevenfeet and
one inch in height and weighs 335
pounds.This deviationfrom the human
and indeed the basketballernorm has
helped him gather a host of trophies.
Stephen Hawking's diagnosis in his
early twenties of motor neuron disease
has not ruled out a distinguishedcareer
in astrophysics.Of course, O'Neal and
Hawking are not the handiworkof genetic engineers.But Fukuyama'sexamples are bulls and kangaroosoccurring
naturally,not just those on the Islandof
Dr. Moreau.
40

HASTINGS CENTER REPORT

One might respond that, their abnormal characteristicsnotwithstanding,

O'Neal and Hawking are similar
enough to us in most respects to be
human.This is a sensiblething to saybut it leaves Fukuyamawith no objection to enhancement. Enhancers will
seek to bring into existenceindividuals
who resemblethe rest of us in most respects; they will merely be smarteror
brawnier.It is hard to imagine parents
of the futurepayinggeneticengineersto
providethem with coelacanthsfor children.
Clearlysomethinghas gone quite seriouslywrong here. Fukuyama'schapter
headings suggest a diagnosis. Having
elaboratedhis notion of human nature
and sketchedout how it might ground
talk of naturalrightsand human digni-

- ?r-?*I?r I

The

ty he leaps immediately to policy recommendations.In doing so, Fukuyama

has missed a crucialstage in moral reasoning.
It is easy to come up with appealingsounding principles. "Neither a lender
nor a borrower be," "Never miss a
chance to keep your mouth shut," "Do
not corrupthuman nature."But before
we turn these moralhomilies into moral
foundationswe need to test them thoroughly againstactualand possiblecases.
ShaquilleO'Neal is not a typicalhuman
being. Does this make him inhuman in
any morallyinterestingsense?By existing as he does, does he suffer a harm
equivalent to the violation of a right?
Fukuyamahas forgottento test his ideas
by askingsuch questions.

II

Nature

of

--

the

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------

Problem

by GregoryE. Kaebnick
here is much not to like about
Frances Fukuyama's splashy
foray into bioethics. It feels
hastily written. Many big debates are
broached;few are developed especially
well or clearly.Much muddle remains.
Still, it is to be commended for broaching in a veryvisibleway some very difficult but important topics-our understanding of human nature, its connection to our genomes, and the implications of alteringour genomes. Fukuyama'soverarchinggoal is to establishthat
human nature is an important moral
guide and that it gives reasonto reignin
biotechnologies that might fundamentally change it. Fukuyamadoes not nail
it all down, by any means, but he gives
momentum to a worthwhile conversation.

The book'smost interestingand productive muddle is in the three chapters

in which Fukuyama tries to sort out
what human nature is. Fukuyama
launchesthe attemptwith the following
definition:"humannatureis the sum of
the behaviorand characteristicsthat are
typical of the human species, arising
from genetic ratherthan environmental
factors"(p. 130).
There is much to goggle at in this. It
is surprising,for example,that Fukuyama defines human nature merely in
terms of the statistical frequency of
traits, which he elaborateswith a long
discussionof averagehuman height and
its change over the centuries.Another
route would have been to discuss the
reasonsthat humans have those behaviors and characteristics-the speciesNovember-December 2002