Framework Supplement 2.

0 BFHLR
7 Week Seniors
All credit to Brendan Schuler for this update. Excellent Job!

Topic Education

1NC/2AC TSE
Detailed information exchange, research, debate, and info-processing on
economic and diplomatic foreign policy key to an informed citizenry that
constrains hurtful foreign policies
Dr. Eliasson 10
(Dr. Leif Johan Eliasson, East Stroudsburg University, Assessing Whether
Increased Knowledge of Foreign Affairs Alters Public Opinion on Foreign
Policy and Influences Actions: A First Step, pg online @
http://www.mpsanet.org/Portals/0/PaperArchive/916879-Eliasson_MWPSA
%202010.pdf //um-ef)
The basic

foundation of democracy is that power stems from the citizenry This

.

structure

acts to

constrain public officials, restricting, if not completely preventing, policies that

counteract the majority view
in foreign policy,
whether in regards to trade, aid, or military conflict Yet the evolutionary ceding of foreign
policy powers from Congress to the executive branch, along with an ever increasing
complexity in international affairs, and a diminished public interest in foreign policy, has
brought renewed relevance to the question of whether policy makers are less beholden
to public opinion in foreign policy. Case in point
Chinas influence
Though the American population is generally illinformed of politics, it remains slightly more knowledgeable about domestic than
international affairs, and tends to react and engage to a larger extent on domestic
policies
a more informed citizenry makes for better
, as officials are judged by the voters their employers on a regular basis. In theory there is no reason this should not hold true

degree,

: debates and protests over the self-defense response against Afghanistan, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq, and, to lesser

and taking jobs [from] Americans.

, with the partial exception of foreign wars. The majority of the literature argues that

government and better policy , thus turning the debate to how we increase public
understanding , from which will
emerge better public debates, more accurate
assessments of the arguments, and better/different decisions
, hopefully,

. One can legitimately ask how, or whether, this can, or should, be done? Most

importantly: does it matter whether people are better informed? Despite the vast and longstanding literature on the media and foreign policy, the role of the attentive public, and the influence of domestic opinion polls on foreign policy, there is less research on

This paper is
multi-year undertaking, on public knowledge of foreign policy

whether the level of public understanding of foreign affairs actually affects foreign policy in our current era of 24/7 news and constant internet access. 2
in a larger,

predominantly is

structured-brainstorming session, the first installment

. It partly emanates from a book that looks at Americans beliefs about

Europe Americas Perception on Europe (2010) which includes the many myths, misperceptions, and distortions the public holds in regards to close allies of the United States. Similar to the debate on domestic opinion and public engagement one may ask

knowledge of foreign affairs leads to

changed opinion
altered opinions lead to action that changes policy
whether U.S. foreign policy
would change if the population, and some policy makers, were more knowledgeable of
international affairs Would avoid unnecessary spats and harmful trade disputes
whether it matters if the views espoused are anchored in facts? The overarching two-part question guiding this new endeavor is whether

, and, most crucially, would

? Put differently, is opinion

subject to, and altered by, knowledge, and are there practical resultants? What if momentum and advocacy is all opinion, partly, or largely, devoid of facts? The larger question is

we

? This paper has an

initial discussion of three pertinent issues in need of clarification in any discussion on whether and how Americans knowledge actually influences foreign policy. After explaining the motivation for this project, a summary discussion of the different between opinion
and knowledge precedes an assessment of whether these difference matter, followed by examples of accepted distortions and myths. I end by reflecting on how we may construct surveys to better address the question of whether increased knowledge would alter
opinions and affect policy. In so doing I accept as a premise, and provide further evidence of, what the existing literature shows, namely that Americans knowledge of foreign policy in general is poor, and that policy makers react to, and pursue policies based on,

policy makers refer specifically to the

President and leading members of Congress; influence refers to a new or altered policy,
or resorting to an existing position on an issue where a change was previously declared
desirable
I am concerned with whether increased levels of
knowledge would lead to different opinions and more public engagement, and
public opinion and news stories more easily, and more frequently, on domestic issues than foreign policy. Throughout this paper

. Again, I am not disputing that opinions matter on foreign policy issues, instead

ultimately

different policies

. The Context Much research on foreign policy making focuses on domestic political, structural, cultural, and legal restrictions on foreign policy makers (see e.g Hagan 1995 for a summary). 1 Of course different

domestic structures and institutions are cemented over time, and resistant to anything more than slow, incremental, change. Leader know these, learn to act within them, and are cognizant that these areas change only slowly, and in small increments, over time.
Opinion can move faster. America has a unique set of domestic institutions and politically influential sources, including a radio and TV media sector unlike any other in scope and reach. So, while it may appear intuitive that increased understanding of issues could
alter opinion, a brief reflection on this complex issue leaves most of us agreeing that such a premise is contingent upon recipients receptivity to facts that may counter pre-existing beliefs (overcoming cognitive dissonance), as well as recipients ideological
convictions, among other factors. One may counter that any information, however, skewed, is knowledge, and thus a legitimate basis for opinion and action in a democratic society where free speech is guaranteed, thus returning us to the question of whether there
are genuine underlying views that would not change when confronted with facts? I return to some of these arguments later. 4 The traditional study of foreign policy opinion focuses either on polls and protests which then force policy makers to address expressed
concerns, or on the medias influence on opinion makers and the interested public, who then influence the policy making process.

latent on foreign policy issues,

Powlick and Katz find public opinion

generally

awakened only in times of large-scale media attention; they also argue that when influential elites differ with government policy, government has serious problems managing

public opinion (think i.e. health care in 2009/2010, or Iraq war in 2004/2005).2 Compared to half a century ago getting the scoop and setting the agenda and winning supporters is more important than working with, even supporting, U.S. foreign policy, as e.g. Cohen,
1962, found the media did in the 1950s. 3 Twenty years ago OHeffernan (1991) found that the media itself had become a significant force shaping our culture and politics, and its independent of government. Fast forward 20 years and his statement that media
create a reality a paradigmof the world within which policy makers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) , members of Congress, the public, terrorists, corporations, other governments use as their map of the world they want to change is even more
accurate; largely irrefutable. 4 The media (broadly speaking) not merely scrutinizes government, but also examines foreign governments, and sets their own policy agendas (e.g. MSNBC evening shows advocating for the democrats) or promotes certain governing

Most Americans today get their information from cable

TV online media sites, and talk radio, all
dominated by agenda-pushing ideologues
entities (Fox programming pushing issues for Republicans). This is crucial in an e-wired society.

of which are

(progressive liberals and far-right conservatives).5 Nielsen ratings confirm the switch from network news to ideologically dominated cable shows, where a majority of hosts appear to revel in distortions, alterations, or omitted facts for the purpose of promoting an

debates among pundits and Monday-morning politicalquarterback citizen-commentators result in a frightening display of conspiracies, halftruths, emotional outbursts, and selective phraseology;
substituting for proper
ideology 5 agenda. Awash with iconography and rife with contradictions,

all frequently

research and analysis Propaganda, not information or analysis, results in assertions and
innuendoes
.

pointing to this is rather than why is this Thus, the hodgepodge of extracts which serve to distort reality and reinforce misperceptions and myths largely cater to, rather than challenge, audiences preexisting beliefs, in the

process relegating accuracy and truthfulness to an afterthought. Misperception or knowledge. Perception is received and interpreted verbal and visual information that leads to a certain image. 6 Misperception refers to when, for a number of different reasons,
information received about the behavior of others diverges from reality; when a message is not interpreted as intended by the disseminator, e.g. a government, company, or individual. Humans naturally prefer consistency and simplicity over the complex reality, often
erecting filters that stop inconstant and contradictory information, leading people to hear what they like and expect. In other words, information is either incorrectly interpreted or altered so as to conform to what one expects based on preconceived notions and
worldviews (e.g. when leisure is valued as highly as work and the observer perceives this as laziness). Studies show this phenomena occurring when individuals, ostensibly learning from history, draw incorrect inferences from previous events that they believe
resemble contemporary developments.7 Some research indicates that the American public reacts reasonably well to informed foreign policy debate.8 Yet, one must wonder if that is possible in an era of polarization and 6 ideologically driven media content. There

filtered acceptance of information is growing as an increasing number of people

choose to get their news only from sources reflective of their own ideology that tend to
problem of

, and

reinforce their pre-existing political perspectives

, 9 e.g. from Keith Olberman and Bill Maher on the political left, or Rush Limbaugh and Glenn Beck on the right. This

increasingly prevalent situation stifles dialogue while encouraging attacks. Receptivity only to information that conforms to ones expectations increases the likelihood of accepting and disseminating distortions of reality, such as stories with omitted or misrepresented

an increased focus on domestic and entertainment

oriented news, and the concomitant and precipitous decline in media coverage of foreign
policy, results in less attention paid by of citizens to international news
leaves fewer opportunities for lazy citizens to encounter substantive political
information
facts, to other audiences, either through the media or interpersonal communication (word of mouth). Furthermore,

(down 25 percent from 2002). This combination also

as a matter of course, 10 leaving the casual person even more receptive to misperceptions and myths whenever a foreign affairs issue finally draws their attention. These developments may be in response to consumer demand,

as some find that Americans largely think foreign policy is less important than domestic issues, where importance [of an issue] motivated selective exposure and selective elaboration: when given the opportunity to choose, people chose to acquire information

Lingering misperceptions and distortions can

become permanently incorrect interpretations of
policies
about policies toward which they had more personally important attitudes, and they chose to think more about these policies 11

events or

, resulting in myths. A myth is a popular belief or story associated with a person,

institution, or occurrence; it is established, formulated, and repeated over time, and when heard evokes a certain response or association.12 Publicly held 7 misperceptions, myths, and distortions can result in support for candidates and policies that contradict widely
held American values and objectives; or worse, even if unintended, directly harm average Americans financial well-being, security, and quality of life. Myths, Opinions, Knowledge In presenting his widely cited 1961 model Rosenau argued that less than a quarter of
the population could understand what was happening internationally, and yet even today, when nearly everyone who wants has the necessary tools to learn about any international issue, that number appears to have dropped further. Cable TV, the web, and cell
phones make our lives more enjoyable, allowing people to gather information and research almost any issue. Thus, one could argue there should be no excuse for saying I dont know or I dont understand, but in reality such responses are understandable and,
frankly, logical. That ordinary citizens, reporters, and various talk show hosts can generate rumors, distortions, and even lies, using slogans, rhetoric, and web-postings to spur interests from other citizens, means

the explosion of

information emanating from our high-tech devices also makes it increasingly difficult to
distinguish fact from fiction

. A 2007 Pew Research Center national study revealed how Americans overall knowledge showed no significant difference compared to 18 years earlier. 13 The Pew 1989 and

2007 studies of public knowledge of foreign affairs are among the few who ask about what people know rather than just what they think or believe. My own, limited, 2009 college freshmen survey showed similar and disappointing results; a 1994 study showed
Americans were much less knowledgeable that citizens in other rich democracies, and another large study revealed a majority of Americans cannot define liberal, conservative, various constitutional rights such as free speech, or a host of other fundamentals of our
political system; whereas people knew much more about celebrities and trivia. 14 The 2007 Pews study also finds no signs that overall increased educational qualifications in the U.S. since 1989 had any effect on overall knowledge of foreign affairs. The average
score of 1,500 randomized respondents to a 23-question foreign affairs quiz was 12; only 10% achieved 90% correct answers. The survey provides further evidence that changing news formats are not having a great deal of impact on how much the public knows
about national and international affairs. And there is no clear connection between news formats and what audiences know. 15 But, Older Americans - particularly those 50 years old or older - did better than younger people. Whites scored better than blacks,
while more affluent Americans knew more than those with lower household incomes. 16 Yet, it is noteworthy that two-thirds of the highest scoring group were college graduates; the finding by Pew in 2007 that income, race, age and education are related to higher
levels of knowledge are consistent with previous findings in other studies in the 1980s.17 From this we can infer that opinion matters for voting since more older than younger people respond in polls, and more older, affluent, college educated, white citizens, as a
percentage, vote, thus lending greater significance to their views from a policy makers perspective. But why are we so lacking in understanding international affairs? Being the sole democratic superpower since World War II contributes a partial but reasonable
explanation of dismal levels of public knowledge. The rest of the world has traditionally come to the US every religion, language, race and ethnicity is represented within its borders leaving many Americans without a perceived need to learn about other regions

Americans limited knowledge of world

affairs is neither justifiable nor defensible, and it may carry implications for US domestic
and foreign policies
Global economic and political integration--with the
relative rise in
Chinas, influence- makes it critically important to avoid
and policies, at least not the way the rest of the world studies and follows American culture and politics. While perhaps understandable,

in a global and interdependent world.

Europes, and increasingly

misunderstanding of what other countries do, whether and why certain US policies are
pursued and how all this influence Americans lives
,

. People appear less informed than they care to admit, and some studies confirm exaggerated self-reporting

those
who perceive themselves knowledgeable also tend, generally speaking, to participate
more in the political process
on how much news people watch.18 Perhaps those who consider themselves informed or well-informed may be referencing what they think it means to be an informed citizen, or they exaggerate to not appear ill-informed. Furthermore,

. Party affiliation was not a determinant of knowledge among top-scorers, but more self-declared democrats were found in the lowest scoring group, which raises the heretofore

unanswered question of whether less distortion and misperceptions are disseminated among right-wing media outlets. Yet caution is advised, as age, income and education were much stronger indicators of knowledge, and a college degree with training in
discriminating and evaluating ideas appears the best way to ensure an ability to discriminate among propaganda and information, and ultimately promote better understanding of international affairs and foreign policy. All these surveys are nonetheless indicative of a
strange phenomenon: America is world leaders in so many areas, yet its citizens have a dismal awareness of the world they dominate. Bennett et all (1996) show that Germans are most knowledgeable about foreign policy, that British, French and Canadian citizens
also know more than Americans, and that education was correlated with knowledge of foreign affairs.19 It is probably no exaggeration to say that many Americans know more about their favorite football team whose fortunes hardly affect their jobs, security or

, Americans
knowledge of foreign policy and global affairs remains very limited This lack of
awareness is even more surprising when one considers that most issues today are what
scholars call intermestic : they overlap domestic and international affairs. Pollution
personal finances than they do about what or where we export, who invests and creates jobs in the U.S. Thus, notwithstanding, 24/7 news, the internet, and a proliferation of related sources of information
.20

and trade are

obvious examples, yet people often fail to recognize how most
products, whether manufactured goods, services, or jobs, are today marketed, sold and
bought globally
Joesph Nyes terms soft (economic, social)
and hard
policy areas
soft policy is important the linkages of various
economic and trade areas, and how decisions in one are affect another, are far more
perhaps

. Noting the distinction between for lack of better distinctions, while giving credit to

(security, military)

, I would argue that today the

difficult to comprehend This contributes to

.

more

, at times,

, but

self-defeating advocacy

because the linkages, cause-and-effect, are not evident Obama, yielding to unions,
imposed tariffs (taxes) on Chinese tires, was met with a 105% tax on American poultry
exports to China
.

select

. Congress imposed a 50 per gallon tariff on Brazilian sugar-cane ethanol after easily surrendering to farm-lobbyists and primary-induced politics, further thickening the gravy-related by throwing billions of tax dollars

to subsidize corn based ethanol, which also cuts into the food supply and raises corn-based food prices for all Americans. An argument may be had that we need to accept different levels of knowledge, just as people differ in other areas of life, and that having a

its dangerous if citizens believe its sufficient to

assume that all is well as long as policy makers
understand complicated foreign
policy issue or a relationship
Uninformed
relatively informed quarter or so of the populace is sufficient to ensure policy debate and accountability. Yet

and their staff

be it political, economic, or other, and that it matters little if the public is uninformed, or whether their perceptions are distorted.

citizens become ill-informed leaders

most American policy
makers reach top positions lacking any knowledge of foreign affairs
. A look at recent presidents and elected representatives reveals that

, let allow experience.21 The circle is perpetuated as rising

stars often receive incomplete or slanted the information from peers and superiors. It is appropriate to retain a degree of deference to those we elect, but remember that voting alone does not absolve us of our responsibilities to acquire accurate information.

Better informed citizens are more likely to hold elected officials accountable
better informed citizenry also mean better informed future leaders
s

. Conversely,

. 22 Therefore,

a general public

lacking in understanding of foreign affairs provides the elite (policy makers, media)
greater opportunity to manipulate public opinion and diminish transparency

2NC International/Foreign Policy Education

Impacts

Laundry List
There is also an external impact to foreign policy education it is the only
way to shift the focus of institutions to global issues
Garcel-vila 05 [Jocelyne Gacel-vila - Ph.D. in Higher Education specialized in
Internationalization of Higher Education. Master of Arts by the University of Paris, specialized in
Foreign Languages and Civilizations. Tenured professor and researcher at the University of
Guadalajara since 1997. The Internationalisation of Higher Education: A Paradigm for Global
Citizenry, Journal of Studies in International Education, Vol. 9 No. 2, Summer 2005 121-136]
bjs
humankind entered into an
accelerated process of multidimensional changes encompassing the fields of economy, finance, science and technology, communications,
education, culture, and politics. This new context is characterised by a relationship of increasing
interdependence and competitiveness between nations, modifying the traditional paradigm of interstate relations. No country escaped
THE CHALLENGES OF EDUCATION IN THE GLOBAL CONTEXT One major factor in the final stages of the 20th century is that

this process, nor the inherent challenges. However, although the processes of globalisation and modernisation developed simultaneously throughout the planet, this development has been generated in an

there are the globalisers and the globalised, which brought the end of the 20th
an atmosphere of exclusion and marginalisation, with
offshoots of violence, wars, ethnic conflicts, terrorism, racism and intolerance,
unequal, divergent, and contradictory manner. In summary,

century to a situation of profound and increasing inequality between nations

pandemics, increases in delinquency and organised crime, rising unemployment and

underemployment, and a degradation of the environment and natural resources . At the start of the
21st century, a large part of humanity is every day poorer and further away from development and modernity (Lopz Segrera, 2001). As far as education is concerned, there is a common consensus that its quality
has, in general, diminished, in accordance with the current belief that individual abilities should be restricted to mere technical-productive functions.
face and the environment

This is the setting

that all of us now

in which we will have to act in the future; and where, of course, educators and

institutions of higher education have to play a part.

Therefore, it is crucial for 21st-century society to seek out alternatives to these political

and economic practices, which are expressions of the power held by a mere few countries and international businesses. International organisations such as the United Nations and the World Bank have begun to
warn that although the developed world can attract private capital, build a solid banking and financial system, and invest in human capital, it will not keep on growing if it continues to marginalize much of humanity
(such as women and ethnic minorities) and does not adopt a policy of inclusion. Ultimately, without parallel social progress over the medium and long term, satisfactory standards of living become impossible as
well. In other words, cautioned the philosopher Morin (2001), The hegemonic system of production is destructive, devastating and, in the final instance, causes anti-development. If conceived solely in a
technicaleconomic form, development is not sustainable. We need a richer and more complex notion of development that is not simply material but also intellectual, emotional and moral (p. 74). To face these
problems, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has prescribed sustainable human development. This concept is broader than simple economic growth because it encompasses human, cultural,
and educational dimensions. Moreover, the United Nations International Conference on Financing for Development (Monterrey, Mexico, March 2002) emphasised the urgent need for an element of solidarityla
mondialisation de la solidarit (the globalisation of solidarity)1 and respect for the Kyoto accords. In light of the pressing problems faced by world society in the 21st century, these concepts are not only a
response to ethical demands but are also a political imperative (Lopz Segrera, 2001). These ideas have inspired the 1998 United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organizations (UNESCO) World
Declaration on Higher Education for the Twenty-First Century, declaring that higher educationand education in generalshould serve a world order that enables the development of a more equitable, tolerant,

education is at the centre of all social change, new approaches to educational policy
are then needed, because without education there can be no change in mentalities and
society. And without a change in paradigm for international relations, there can be no solidarity among nations. In all countries, the new global context has
prompted a greater demand for education and is forcing institutions of higher learning to reconsider their mission, tasks, and responsibilities, as
well as to develop innovative strategies to improve their relevance and function, leading to the following question: How can
institutions of higher education adequately prepare their graduates to live and participate as global citizens and professionals? To be relevant in the new global
and responsible society. If we agree that
and process

environment, todays education must conceptualise everything with the age of

globalisation and within the environment and complexity of the planet. Knowledge of the world itself has become a vital
intellectual necessity , just as the solution to international problems requires a global
approach and planning process . To achieve this, however, we must reform mentality, and therefore a change in
educative paradigms. Educational strategies in the 21st century must begin with a common foundation, which would include the search for a standard of teaching competitive on an
international level but adapted to local conditions. In this new global environment, one of the basic and fundamental functions of a university should then be the fostering of a global consciousness among
students, to make them understand the relation of interdependence between peoples and societies, to develop in students an understanding of their own and other cultures and respect for pluralism. All these
aspects are the foundations of solidarity and peaceful coexistence among nations and of true global citizenship. In this context, the objective of

internationalisation must be

focused on an updating of academic content , making global phenomena understandable while promoting intercultural understanding and sustainable
human development. The internationalisation of the main functions of

the university should then help spur the development of a

global consciousness (Oxford Dictionary of New Words, 1991), defined as comprehension of and receptivity to foreign
cultures, and the availability of certain knowledge of, and information about, socioeconomic concerns and
ecology. In fact, internationalisation in this context appears to be the key strategy to develop this kind
of education. This is why it is relevant to link the internationalisation our way of thinking: a reform that is paradigmatic and not programmatic. The development of a
new consciousnessa global consciousnessamong people is a key aspect of this reform, however, it requires a change in process to the response to
crucial questions, such as What kind of education is required in the 21st century to face the challenges of globalisation? How can
internationalisation contribute to developing educational programs adequate for the
needs of this century? What are the characteristics and elements of an internationalised curriculum to educate global and multicultural citizens? What types of
policies and institutional strategies must institutions of higher education follow to
internationalise their main functions? What are the strengths and weaknesses of international activities in universities, as well as the outlook for the
internationalisation process in the world? What role should education play in international cooperation and international relations to foster a world citizenry?

Empathy/Racism/Sexism/World Skills
International education is crucial in the 21st century it creates a cognitive
shift towards more empathic citizens
Garcel-vila 05 [Jocelyne Gacel-vila - Ph.D. in Higher Education specialized in
Internationalization of Higher Education. Master of Arts by the University of Paris, specialized in
Foreign Languages and Civilizations. Tenured professor and researcher at the University of
Guadalajara since 1997. The Internationalisation of Higher Education: A Paradigm for Global
Citizenry, Journal of Studies in International Education, Vol. 9 No. 2, Summer 2005 121-136]
bjs
the international
dimension of universities should constitute a key educational resource for training citizens
with a critical perspective and the adequate preparation to work and live effectively and successfully in a global
context. It represents an educational reform whose ideals are the driving force behind
the political, ethical, and intercultural nature of the social relationships that support the
formation of a critical citizenry by developing global consciousness and perspective in university graduates. The
INTERNATIONALISATION AS A NEW PARADIGM FOR THE EDUCATION OF THE 21ST CENTURY Based on the above-described conceptual framework,

international curriculum should therefore focus on developing in university graduates respect for humanitys differences and cultural wealth, as well as a sense of political responsibility, turning them into defenders

Internationalisation strategies are therefore crucial for the education of the 21st century
and constitute a crucial and an important tool in bringing to fruition the new educational vision proposed by Delors (1997), the four
of democratic principles of their society, and true architects of social change.

pillars of the education of the future, and French philosopher Morin (2001) of the seven complex lessons in education for the future. According to these proposals, and especially the one described by Morin, if
we conclude from the evidence that there is a serious, deepening gap between, on one hand, our disjunctive, fragmented, shared knowledge, and on the other hand, the realities and problems that are each day
more poly-disciplinary, transversal, multidimensional, transnational, and global, then the education of the future must teach the following four basic dimensions: the context, the global, the multidimensional, and
the complex. Morin described the seven areas of knowledge that should be taught by the education of the future, as follows: detecting error and illusion, principles of pertinent knowledge, teaching the human
condition, teaching earth identity, confronting uncertainties, understanding each other, and ethics for the humane genre. The main function of future education would be therefore to foster a general intelligence
capable of interconnecting these dimensions and fostering the development of the intellectual capacities in individuals. Furthermore, Morin stressed that one of the basic functions of
to

education

is

promote world understanding, ethics, and culture , as cultures must learn from one

another, and that comprehension between humans is the first requirement for intellectual and moral solidarity on earth. Needless to say, international
education is one of the rare educational strategies that has the potential for fostering
these perspectives in students , based on a deep reform of the curriculum of higher
education (Mestenhauser, 1998). To achieve these goals, the international curriculum should favour the holistic
formation of the individual and be based on an integral, humanistic, and socioreconstructive curricular structure. Its
objective would be to help students develop a global perspective. One model for such a curriculum could be borrowed from Hanveys (1982) very interesting work that described the five dimensions of a global
perspective in the following way: perspective consciousness, state-of-the-planet awareness, cross-cultural awareness, knowledge of global dynamics, and awareness of human choices. In Hanveys (1982) words,

A global perspective has the potential to be conducive to a cognitive change: from national thought to
that of an international nature; from a traditional way of thinking to a rational one.

The result would not mean a loss of identity, but the

acquisition of a broader worldview . Nations would begin to understand that their own
interests and activities cannot be separated from those of others, and they would pay more attention to
human problems that transcend international, regional and local interests. The concept of
interdependence would begin to be recognized, and the connections, consequences and
vulnerabilities of the global system would be understood. The role of the nation-state as the principal player in interstate politics would
be called into question when faced with the need for a coordinated, global system. The individual would become a citizen of the world , with a
sharper awareness of his own and foreign cultural perspectives, and with a stronger empathy for other cultures . [S]he would be
informed about the state of the planet and the principle social and political happenings around the globe, thereby taking on a greater commitment to the
construction of a better world. (p. 37) C. Bennett (1995) depicted the six objectives of a global and multicultural curriculum that can serve as a
basic model, to be used as a common root in general education curriculum: understanding multiple historical perspectives; developing cultural
consciousness; developing intercultural competence; combating racism, sexism, prejudice, and all forms of
discrimination; raising awareness of the state of the planet and global dynamics; and developing
social action skills. A concurrence with Hanveys global perspective is obvious. This kind of content in the general education curriculum could be ideal for internationalization-at-home
strategies. These curriculum objectives concur greatly with what Morin described as the anthropological, cultural, intercultural, ecological, and civic-terrestrial consciousness and also with the four pillars of the

education for the 21st century depicted in Delors (1997): to learn how to learn, to learn how to live with others, to learn to be, to learn how to do. Another concurrence between international education and
UNESCOs 21stcentury educational vision is that it stresses that, besides providing students with a higher level of professional and academic competence, which is characteristic of the knowledge society, todays
education has to foster in students intellectual capacities and cognitive abilities making them able to contribute to a social, economic, and political environment that is global, interdependent, and multicultural.

individuals will find themselves faced with the challenges of adapting to new
responsibilities, the need for participation, pluralism, and the change in values. For this reason, rather
Indeed, in the new century,

than simply providing students with professional training for an ever-changing job market, universities must educate for the acquisition of competence and for employability. As a result, to be successful,
professionals will each day be required to develop more and more cognitive skills such as abstraction, systematic thought, experimental investigation, and teamwork. Once again, in this particular aspect,

international education and experience seem to offer a great potential to enhance these kind of
cognitive skills , demanded by this new context. On this point, Mestenhauser (1998) demonstrated in his article titled Internationalisation of Higher Education: A Cognitive Response to the
Challenges of the Twenty-First Century that international education supports the development of certain
intellectual abilities that are not generally acquired in the traditional classroom but that coincide with the necessities and the demands of
21st-century society. Indeed, when the students leave their own cultural environmentfor study abroad or academic programs based on intercultural communication techniques with
content that highlights the international and global dimension of human and social interaction they have the possibility to develop a capacity for adaptation
and flexibility as they are faced with rapidly changing situations and the opportunity to broaden their cultural and intellectual
horizons and to adapt to different kinds of people. Mestenhauser (1998) demonstrated that international
education promotes such cognitive skills as the following: ability to recognize differences,
understanding the difference between emic and etic thinking, ability to make cognitive
alterations/shifts , ability to recognize knowledge gap, ability to communicate crossculturally , ability to recognize scarce knowledge, ability to think comparatively, ability to change selfperception, ability to know how to compare ones own country, possessing knowledge about other cultures,
possessing diagnostic skills, understanding differentiation, ability to recognize trends in other cultures,
understanding cognitive complexity and cognitive integration , understanding a variety
of learning styles, and understanding the difference between product and process learning. Thus, in other words, all these aspects make
international education one of the key strategies for the 21st-century education.

A2: International Education Inev

Success of broader international education relies on recognizing its
importance
Garcel-vila 05 [Jocelyne Gacel-vila - Ph.D. in Higher Education specialized in
Internationalization of Higher Education. Master of Arts by the University of Paris, specialized in
Foreign Languages and Civilizations. Tenured professor and researcher at the University of
Guadalajara since 1997. The Internationalisation of Higher Education: A Paradigm for Global
Citizenry, Journal of Studies in International Education, Vol. 9 No. 2, Summer 2005 121-136]
bjs
despite its essentially contemporary nature, we
cannot overlook the fact that, to date, the above-mentioned potential and qualities of international
education have not yet been recognized. Generally speaking, present-day educational systems in Latin America, and Mexico in
INTERNATIONALISATION: REALITY AND PERSPECTIVE Unfortunately,

particular, accord little importance to intercultural and international perspective and even neglect longterm strategies. Universities in Mexico largely underestimate the personal
and intellectual growth stimulated by contact and empathy with other cultures. A simple tour dhorizon of the higher education environment in the early 21st century leads us to
realise that we are still far away from an international university and an international dimension integrated into the mainstream of the educational process. In this context, it is
relevant to observe the evolution of universities over the centuries, in an effort to understand their present state. Indeed, a look back on the history of universities reminds us that
higher education institutions have gone through different eras, the two primary of which are usually described as convergence and divergence. The first era took place during
the times of the medieval universalist model and gave rise to the cosmopolitan university that sought to unify the world through knowledge, at a time when knowledge knew no
boundaries. The second era developed during the Reformation and gave birth to the diversification of university models. This trend grew stronger during the Industrial
Revolution and the economic expansion of capitalist countries, up to the present time, and emphasised the national character of educational systems and objectives. In fact, we

Nevertheless, as
a result of globalisation, universities are showing clear signs of a new period of convergence. On
the other hand, Kerr (1990) pointed out that there might exist a potential conflict between the national and
international character of universities. Kerr contended that there is a potential conflict between the university as a political
organisation forced to follow a national agenda, and the university as an intellectual
institution that participates in international academic networks and transcends national borders. This idea is also
may say that todays university still remains trapped in a national environment and is a national organisation, no longer international by nature.

expressed by Trow (as cited in Scott, 1998) who introduced the concept of the public life and private life of universities. Because most universities are public institutions, he
said, they must follow a political agenda that involves such priorities as broader access to students, financial austerity, and the need for greater diversification to meet the market

universities
continue to be influenced by protectionist nationalist feelings. They are under constant
pressure to meet immediate market demands, and they largely respond to national dynamic and local interests.
demands. These are just some of the pressures that weigh on universities today. As a result, we may say that at the beginning of the 21st century,

Similarly, the current dominant paradigmthat is, competitivenesstends to reinforce a survivalist mentality, which favours approaches that focus on the present and
disregards strategies for the future as well as long-term solutions. Thus, educational institutions may be led to neglect development of visionary responses, which could mean
that global trends will leave them behind. The concept of private life described by Trow (1973) refers to the intellectual role of the university, which is centred on teaching and the

the intellectual role played by the university expands and flourishes

at its best in an international context, thus reinforcing the idea that knowledge has no borders. Trow concluded that, until now,
universities have functioned internationally through their private lives rather than their
public lives and emphasised that these two aspects may act in opposition to each other and block the internationalisation of higher education. Nevertheless,
what is new and remarkable about the new global context is that the imperatives of globalisation, on one hand,
and the growing demand for higher education in the knowledge society on the other, are producing a
synergy that yields to a greater internationalisation of educational systems. These trends are stressed
search for knowledge. According to Trow,

by the strategic value of knowledge in the progress of society, linguistic unification through the use of English, decreasing importance accorded to religious and political schools

In a
society based on knowledge, the strategic value of knowledge will increase; therefore, the value of universities will
increase as well, given that they are the source of nearly all knowledge being produced. This fact emphasises the universitys international character because its
intellectual and academic functions are essentially international. This is why there is a strategic aspect to research that stresses that no antagonism exists
between a universitys national and international vocations, and that, on the contrary, these two
functions are compatible and essential in the new global environment. Thus, despite their intrinsic nature as
national organisations, universities must find a way to be national and international. This situation
must compel the different stakeholders to create a relationship between institutional objectives and the
need for a greater opening to the outside world. As a result, today the momentum of these globalizing trends
heralds an era of partial reconvergence among the different educational systems. One way for
of thought, the role of new information and communication technologies, and the existence of exchange programmes on an unprecedented scale and scope.

todays university to meet the challenges of a globalised society may be to rescue its internationalist past and make use of global affinities and international networks to build

the
international environment is the forerunner of reconciliation, a successful combination
of, or a convergence between, the universitys public life and its private life.
models for transnational cooperation. These models could help universities take back the internationalist and universalist role they once played. In other words,

A2: Cant Engage Institutions

Public opinion shapes foreign policy decision-making but only if the public
is well-informed
Weatherford Knecht 06 [Tom Knecht - Associate Professor of Political Science at Westmont.
Stephen Weatherford professor of political science at University of California Santa Barbara.
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: The Stages of Presidential Decision Making, International
Studies Quarterly 50:3 (September 2006), pp. 705-27.] bjs
scholars have begun to challenge the elite-centric model, arguing that public opinion
responds rationally to international events and policies (Kusnitz 1984; Wittkopf 1990; Holsti 1992, 2004; Jentleson 1992; Mayer 1992; Page and Shapiro
1992). In contrast to much of the pioneering work on opinion and foreign policy, these studies demonstrate a strong correlation
between public opinion and foreign policy choice, indeed sometimes a closer connection than in domestic
issue areas (Page and Shapiro 1992; Monroe 1998). More importantly, the revisionist literature contends that
public opinion can potentially influence foreign policy decisions. The public's views may
Recently,

set a region of acceptability that bounds politically feasible options (Russett 1990: 110; cf. Powlick 1991; Sobel
or even determines foreign policy decisions (Small 1988; Bartels 1991; Hartley and Russett 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992). This stronger view
political elites are ultimately accountable to the public, rational politicians attempt
to gain an advantage at the polls by enacting policies favored by the public.2 We can sharpen the empirical implications of this debate by considering how elected
officials estimate the potential political consequences of policies. How Do Policy Makers Estimate the Electoral Consequences of Policies? Presidents consider the
potential reactions of the public when making foreign policy decisions for several
reasons. The most prominent is that leaders in democracies are held accountable in regular elections.
Research on elections and voting shows that a substantial portion of the public takes foreign policy
issues and accomplishments into account in choosing between candidates, and the literature on audience costs
integrates the idea into a larger theory of foreign policy making (Aldrich, Sullivan, and Borgida 1989; Ninic and Hinckley 1991;
Fearon 1994; Smith 1998). The president's need to maintain or increase political capital can also influence
foreign policy decisions (Neustadt 1960; Light 1982; Sullivan 1991; for an opposite view, see Edwards 1991). The key component in political capital is approval ratings, as
2001)

contends that as

presidents able to maintain high levels of approval are likely to be more influential in dealing with Congress. Unpopular foreign policies can quickly erode political capital and weaken the prospects for the
administration's foreign and domestic agendas alike. Public opinion is also important to lame-duck presidents. A president worried about his place in history may use the last years of his tenure to enhance his

good reasons to take the public's views

into account does not yet clarify how presidents would go about estimating the electoral
impacts of their foreign policy choices. It is, for instance, often the case that the general public has only vaguely
public support or to set the electoral stage for his heir apparent by initiating popular foreign policies. Having

formed preferences on the concrete aspects of overseas issues at the time the White
House must select a policy course.

Moreover, it is not the public's current views that are critical to politicians' calculations, but the potential that the public will

respond negatively when the next election rolls around. Rather than assuming that the public's policy preferences are fixed, and asking what impact those preferences have on presidents' decisions, instead

we might question how policy makers' anticipation of future preferences shape their
decisions.3,Arnold (1990:11; cf. Kingdon 1989:6068) introduces the notion of potential preferences and emphasizes that politicians' skill at estimating potential policy preferences is more art
than science. Although experts in public opinion can show how to use scientific methods to measure current preferences, legislators rarely employ such methods outside of electoral campaigns. In thinking about
what sort of information is most needed in this situation, it is useful to distinguish between the popularity of a policy proposal and the salience of the issue (Jones 1994; Kollman 1998; Soroka 2003). Kollman

politicians generally have quite good information about the popularity of particular
policies: the public's preference for one policy direction over another tends to be stable, and conventional
public opinion polls provide reliable information about popularity (Jacobs 1992; Page and Shapiro 1992; Herbst 1993; Jacobs and Shapiro 1995).4
Moreover, because such sentiments are relatively constant, politicians can learn from historical
experience. Since Vietnam, for example, politicians understand that a drawn-out, costly war is likely to alienate the public. Elites frequently rely on a fairly accurate type of folk-wisdom when
determining the prospective popularity of policies (Foyle 1999). However, the salience or relative importance of a policy issue is
something about which politicians need information, but they generally cannot learn this from
conventional opinion polls or experience. Politicians want to know what proportion of constituents, when voting in the next election, will weigh the actions of their elected representatives on a
particular policy issue. More salient policy issues will weigh more heavily on voting decisions than will less salient policy issues (Kollman
1998:9). Although, as Kollman notes, public opinion polls do not regularly track the salience of policy issues ,
(1998) points out that

policy makers are attentive to the prominence of the issue in the public's informational environment, specifically its visibility in the media's coverage of public affairs. Our empirical analysis uses this indicator to
gauge variations in the salience of foreign policy issues.

Policy Discussions Good

A2: Policy Disempowerment

No alternatives to policy analysis only the aff creates an effective form
that avoids their offense and can actually influence policymakers
Shulock 99 [Nancy - associate Vice Presidentfor Academic Affairs and Assistant Pro- fessor of
Public Policy and Administration at California State University, Sacramento. The Paradox of
Policy Analysis: If It Is Not Used, Why Do We Produce Much of It?, Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Spring, 1999), pp. 226- 244. JSTOR] bjs
CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF POLICY ANALYSIS This article posed a paradox: Why does our society continue to
invest heavily in policy analysis amid consensus that analysis is not used? Through theoretical argument
and empirical analysis I have suggested that a resolution lies in a new understanding of policy analysis. From a nontraditional, interpretive perspective, I conclude that analysis is, in fact, used extensively. My view

Kirp [1992] practically sounds the death knell for

policy analysis but stops short of recommending any changes, placing the blame squarely on the shoulders of policymakers.
belies the pessimism of many critics of the current state of the profession. In "The End of Policy Analysis," David

Kirp laments "the retreat from analysis in public life." He attributes this retreat to "deep, structural, and permanent" changes in American politics and policy "that are abidingly hostile to the possibilities of analysis."
We have, according to Kirp, witnessed the "triumph of the postmodern sensibility in the domain of policy," which favors anecdotes over policy substance, pessimism over the incrementalist's optimism, passion
over reason, and media sound bites over reasoned political discourse. In Kirp's view, policy analysis, as traditionally conceived and practiced, has a "proper place in public decisionmaking," but sadly, one that is
not now honored (p. 694). Echoing this theme some four years later, Terry Davies [1996], director of Resources for the Future's Center for Risk Management, complains that "the value of objective policy analysis,

Davies seems intent that

policymakers should be force-fed policy analysis in spite of their "know nothing
approach to policy" (p. 1). In a "Message from the Director" in the Center's Winter 1996 Newsletter Davies asserts that: [T]he Center for Risk Management is committed to the
especially in the U.S. Congress, is falling almost as fast as the exchange value of the U.S. dollar...." More defiant than Kirp,

propositions that policymakers and citizens are better off knowing the facts and that the consequences of policy initiatives should be examined before the policies are enacted. Unlike some other institutions, we

Davies gives lip service to postmodernism

do not think that a catchy anecdote is a substitute for in-depth policy analysis. (p. 1) Although
with his
acknowledgment that there is no such thing as purely objective research, he asserts that "within these constraints, we are committed to searching for the truth...." (p. 1). He concludes with the promise to forge
ahead, regardless of the demand for the work products of his staff: The value others attach to our work will fluctuate, but we adhere to a faith that there will always be a place for knowledge and information, even

Another set of critiques of traditional policy analysis argues that new forms of
policy analysis must be devised to remedy the deficiencies of the traditional form. This view sees the lack of demand for the
product as an indication that the product needs to change. Two types of deficiencies of traditional policy analysis are usually presented- an overreliance on a
positivist framework and an antidemocratic tendency. A certain consensus appears to be taking shape about some of the possible forms a
in times of radical change. (p. 1)

new policy analysis would take-all generally prescribing greater participation by the analyst with those potentially affected by the policies under consideration. Dan Duming [1993] offers a four-part typology of
"participatory policy analysis" calling for various degrees of shared responsibility between analysts and citizens (or "stakeholders") for generating information and turning it into advice. Each would involve a
greater or lesser degree of transformation in the analyst's role. White [1994] offers another typology, describing three revisionist views of policy analysis, each responding in its own way to the challenge posed by
Thomas Kuhn's [1962] claim that all bodies of knowledge are "theory laden." All three emphasize the need for discourse in the analytical enterprise, as a means to interpret the plurality of values and arguments

The critiques and accompanying prescriptions for a reinvented policy analysis place heavy new
demands on the policy analyst as well as on our political institutions. Many of these demands
are highly unrealistic and are acknowledged as such even by their proponents. These difficulties may
explain the attitudes of Kirp [1992] and Davies [1996]- it is improbable that political "outsiders" can be become equal
available to apply to any policy issue.

partners in political debate with experts and "insiders," and that social scientists can shed their value predispositions and become
equally able to present competing worldviews. Perhaps it is more likely that attitudes valuing traditional analysis will simply resurface. In my view,

none of these radical

changes is necessary . As interesting as our politics might be with the kinds of changes outlined by proponents of participatory and critical policy analysis , we do not
need these changes to justify our investment in policy analysis. Policy analysis already
involves discourse, introduces ideas into politics, and affects policy outcomes. The
problem is not that policymakers refuse to understand the value of traditional policy analysis or that policy
analysts have not learned to be properly interactive with stakeholders and reflective of multiple and
nontechnocratic perspectives. The problem, in my view, is only that policy analysts, policymakers, and
observers alike do not recognize policy analysis for what it is. Policy analysis has
changed, right along with the policy process, to become the provider of ideas and frames, to help sustain the
discourse that shapes citizen preferences, and to provide the appearance of rationality in an increasingly complex political environment. Regardless of
what the textbooks say, there does not need to be a client in order for ideas from policy analysis to
resonate through the policy environment.'0 Certainly there is room to make our politics more inclusive. But those critics who see
policy analysis as a tool of the power elite might be less concerned if they understood
that analysts are only adding to the debate-they are unlikely to be handing ready-made
policy solutions to elite decisionmakers for implementation. Analysts themselves might be more contented if they started appreciating the appropriation of their

cynics disdainful of the

purported objectivism of analysis might relax if analysts themselves would acknowledge that they
are seeking not truth, but to elevate the level of debate with a compelling, evidence-based
presentation of their perspectives. Whereas critics call, unrealistically in my view, for analysts to present competing perspectives on an issue or to "design a discourse among multiple
ideas by the whole gamut of policy participants and stopped counting the number of times their clients acted upon their proposed solutions. And the

perspectives," I see no reason why an individual analyst must do this when multiple perspectives are already in abundance, brought by multiple analysts. If we would acknowledge that policy analysis does not

Policy analysis is used, far

more extensively than is commonly believed. Its use 10 could be appreciated and expanded
if policymakers, citizens, and analysts themselves began to present it more accurately, not
as a comprehensive, problem-solving, scientific enterprise, but as a contributor to
informed discourse. For years Lindblom [1965, 1968, 1979, 1986, 1990] has argued that we should understand policy analysis for the limited tool that it is-just one of several routes to
social problem solving, and an inferior route at that. Although I have learned much from Lindblom on this odyssey from traditional to interpretive policy analysis, my point is different. L indblom
sees analysis as having a very limited impact on policy change due to its ill-conceived reliance on science and its deluded
attempts to impose comprehensive rationality on an incremental policy process. I, with the benefit of recent insights of Baumgartner , Jones, and
others into the dynamics of policy change, see that even with these limitations, policy analysis can have a major
occur under a private, contractual process whereby hired hands advise only their clients, we would not worry that clients get only one perspective.

impact on policy. Ideas, aided by institutions and embraced by citizens, can reshape the policy
landscape. Policy analysis can supply the ideas.

A2: Info Overload/Info Processing

Info oversaturation is inevitable and good debate creates the skills
necessary to translate ideas and information across differences
Mitchell 10 [Gordon R. - Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the
Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, where he also directs the William
Pitt Debating Union. Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,
Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 13, No. 1, 2010, pp. 95120] bjs
The axiom of all rhetoric is the principle of
insufficient reason, says Hans Blumenberg.13 In this formulation, when a pressing situation calls for action, but all
the facts are not yet in, rhetoric lends practical guidance to those seeking to navigate uncharted
waters. In Lloyd Bitzers shopworn terminology, such rhetorical situations are meaning vacuums that invite, even
call discourse to the scene as fitting remedies for the imperfect state of affairs.14 Yet the current
era of content abundance15 seems to invert this commonly held sense of the rhetorical
situation, as we struggle to stay afloat in the wake of new waves of facts , figures, and
testimony churned out by todays proliferating sites of knowledge production.16 According to Richard Lanham,
were drowning in this endemic state of surplus information , struggling to marshal
sufficient attention to make sense of it all.17 To capture this sense of inundation, Damien Pfister coins the term
hyperpublicity to describe the massive expansion in the capacity of personal media to
record, archive, and make searchable thoughts, events, and interactions in publicly accessible databases. In this meaning-saturated
environment, which has double potential to enrich and threaten public life,18 the challenge
has less to do with figuring out how to make practical decisions based on scarce shreds of evidence (rhetoric
filling a lack) and more to do with sorting through ever-expanding mounds of evidence whose
relevance to pressing decisions may not be immediately apparent (rhetoric responding to a surplus). The
official U.S. intelligence community routinely faces such inverted rhetorical situations when it is
Evidence and Argument Fields in Intelligence Community Deliberations

called upon to deliver consensus judgments such as National Intelligence Estimates. To reach such judgments, analysts must comb through terabytes of digital data from sigint
(signals intelligence gathered from satellites and other monitoring devices), humint (human intelligence drawn from informants and agents), as well as a burgeoning supply of
open source intelligence (data in the public domain). As the community is composed of 16 separate agencies and entities that each serve diff erent customers and pursue
distinct approaches to intelligence analysis, heterogeneous perspectives often complicate the process of sorting the proverbial wheat from the chaff . As Simon and Hart explain,

the basic problem stems from moving knowledge created using evidence and analysis in one
group or organisation into another. This is not a trivial undertaking, because the process, language and ultimate purpose of the created

knowledge often differ radically between the originating and receiving organisations. As a result, analyses involving jihadist perceptions or technical details concerning
chemical, biological or nuclear weapons can often generate interpretive or semantic differences between originating and receiving organisations as to what a word,
measurement or outcome actually means.19 Here, centrifugal forces of professional specialization and horizontal knowledge diff usion scatter the pool upon which analysts
draw data. Simultaneously, centripetal forces oblige these same analysts to synthesize vast sums of diverse information and render coherent arguments on complex and
multifaceted issues. This challenge stems from a tension borne from the push brought about by the splintering of the intelligence community into disparate agencies, on the one
hand, and the pull of institutional directives requiring coordination of intelligence products, on the other.

Surmounting this complex

epistemological dilemma requires more than sheer information processing power; it

demands forms of communicative dexterity that enable translation of ideas across
differences and facilitate cooperative work by interlocutors from heterogeneous backgrounds. How can
such communicative dexterity be cultivated? Hart and Simon see structured
argumentation as a promising tool in this regard. In their view, the unique virtue of rigorous
debates is that they support diverse points of view while encouraging consensus formation.
This dual function of argumentation provides both intelligence producers and policy consumers
with a view into the methodologies and associated evidence used to produce analytical product,
effectively creating a common language that might help move knowledge across
organisational barriers without loss of accuracy or relevance.20 Hart and Simons insights, coupled with the
previously mentioned institutional initiatives promoting switch-side debating in the intelligence community, carve out a new
zone of relevance where argumentation theorys salience is pronounced and growing. Given

the centrality of evidentiary analysis in this zone, it is useful to revisit how argumentation scholars have theorized the functions of evidence in debating contexts. In the words of
Austin Freeley,

evidence is the raw material of argumentation. It consists of facts, opinions and objects that are used to generate
evidence becomes the factual foundation for the claims of the advocates.

proof.21 Here,
22 When an
interlocutor attempts to forward claims based on data, the process of advancing from evidence to conclusion is argument.23 What are the different types of evidence? Which
are most persuasive in certain situations? How can evidence be misused? What doesnt count as legitimate evidence? In the field of argumentation, scholars have long
grappled with these questions, often by developing idiosyncratic taxonomies of evidence usage.24 So, for example, one textbook breaks down types of evidence into three
categoriesexamples, statistics, and authorityand three sourcesoriginal, hearsay, and written.25 An earlier eff ort identifies three forms of data that provide proof for a
claim as unwritten, ordinary, and expert.26 In a blistering critique, Dale Hample questions the usefulness of these projects: The typologiesfor they are indeed pluraldiff er
from textbook to textbook and have never been defended as having any phenomenal reality for anyone not taking an argumentation exam.27 One factor accounting for the
limited conceptual appeal of these evidence taxonomies is that such schemes are tied tightly to the practical activity associated with their development

intercollegiate debating. Since as Dean Fadely points out, the bedrock of contest debate is evidence,28 it is only natural that many of these taxonomical
efforts are designed to support student classroom work. For example, the preface to Robert and Dale Newmans 1969 Evidence explains, This book is designed
primarily for students of exposition, discussion, persuasion, and argument who must
buttress their speeches or essays with evidence.29 Such a pedagogical orientation underwrites
the practical dimension of evidence studies, where the emphasis rests on cultivating invention skills sufficient to enable
students to research, deploy, and defend evidenced claims in argumentative situations.30

A2: Debate doesnt equal real world change

Wrong, the government is accessable but it depends upon the deliberative
and switch-side processes the debate fosters debaters can influence the
government - the 2008 EPA Water Wars debates prove
Mitchell 10 [Gordon R. - Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the
Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, where he also directs the William
Pitt Debating Union. Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,
Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 13, No. 1, 2010, pp. 95120] bjs
Public Debates in the EPA Policy Process The preceding analysis

of U.S. intelligence community debating

initiatives highlighted how analysts are challenged to navigate discursively the heteroglossia of
vast amounts of different kinds of data flowing through intelligence streams. Public policy planners are
tested in like manner when they attempt to stitch together institutional arguments from
various and sundry inputs ranging from expert testimony, to historical precedent, to public comment. Just as intelligence managers
find that algorithmic, formal methods of analysis often dont work when it comes to the task of interpreting and synthesizing copious

the argumentative turn in

public-policy planning elaborates an approach to public-policy analysis that foregrounds
deliberative interchange and critical thinking as alternatives to decisionism, the formulaic
amounts of disparate data, public-policy planners encounter similar challenges. In fact,

application of objective decision algorithms to the public policy process. Stating the matter plainly, Majone suggests, whether in
written or oral form, argument is central in all stages of the policy process. Accordingly, he notes, we

miss a great deal if

we try to understand policy-making solely in terms of power, influence, and bargaining, to the exclusion of
debate and argument.51 One can see similar rationales driving Goodwin and Daviss EPA debating
project, where debaters are invited to conduct on-site public debates covering
resolutions crafted to reflect key points of stasis in the EPA decision-making process. For
example, in the 2008 Water Wars debates held at EPA headquarters in Washington, D.C., resolutions were
crafted to focus attention on the topic of water pollution, with one resolution focusing on downstream
states authority to control upstream states discharges and sources of pollutants, and a second resolution exploring
the policy merits of bottled water and toilet paper taxes as revenue sources to fund water infrastructure projects. In
the first debate on interstate river pollution, the team of Seth Gannon and Seungwon Chung from Wake Forest
University argued in favor of downstream state control, with the Michigan State University team of Carly
Wunderlich and Garrett Abelkop providing opposition. In the second debate on taxation policy, Kevin
Kallmyer and Matthew Struth from University of Mary Washington defended taxes on bottled water and toilet paper, while their
opponents from Howard University, Dominique Scott and Jarred McKee, argued against this proposal.

Reflecting on the

project, Goodwin noted how the intercollegiate debate 57 differs both from insular contest tournament
debating, where the main focus is on the pedagogical benefit for student participants, and first-generation rhetoric of science
scholarship, where critics concentrated on unmasking the rhetoricity of scientific artifacts circulating in what many perceived to be
purely technical spheres of knowledge production.58 As a form of demand-driven rhetoric of science,

debating connects directly with

the communication fields performative tradition of

switch-side

argumentative

engagement in public controversy a different route of theoretical grounding than rhetorical criticisms tendency to
locate its foundations in the English fields tradition of literary criticism and textual analysis.59 Given this genealogy, it is not
surprising to learn how

Daviss response to the EPAs institutional need for rhetorical expertise

took the form of a public debate proposal, shaped by Daviss dual background as a
practitioner and historian of intercollegiate debate . Davis competed as an undergraduate policy debater for
Howard University in the 1970s, and then went on to enjoy substantial success as coach of the Howard team in the new millennium.
In an essay reviewing the broad sweep of debating history, Davis notes, Academic debate began at least 2,400 years ago when the
scholar Protagoras of Abdera (481411 bc), known as the father of debate, conducted debates among his students in Athens.60 As
John Poulakos points out, older Sophists such as Protagoras taught Greek students the value of dissoi logoi, or pulling apart

complex questions by debating two sides of an issue.61 Th e few surviving fragments of Protagorass work suggest that his notion
of dissoi logoi stood for the principle that two accounts [logoi] are present about every thing, opposed to each other, and further,
that humans could measure the relative soundness of knowledge claims by engaging in give-and-take where parties would make
the weaker argument stronger to activate the generative aspect of rhetorical practice, a key element of the Sophistical tradition.62
Following in Protagorass wake, Isocrates would complement this centrifugal push with the pull of synerchsth, a centripetal
exercise of coming together deliberatively to listen, respond, and form common social bonds.63 Isocrates incorporated
Protagorean dissoi logoi into synerchsth, a broader concept that he used flexibly to express interlocking senses of (1) inquiry, as
in groups convening to search for answers to common questions through discussion;64 (2) deliberation, with interlocutors gathering
in a political setting to deliberate about proposed courses of action;65 and (3) alliance formation, a form of collective action typical at
festivals,66 or in the exchange of pledges that deepen social ties.67 Returning once again to the Kettering-informed sharp

the EPA debating

initiative, a fusion of debate with deliberative functions. Echoing a theme raised in this essays earlier
discussion of intelligence tradecraft , such a fusion troubles categorical attempts to classify debate
and deliberation as fundamentally opposed activities. The significance of such a finding is amplified by the
distinction between debate and deliberation, one sees in Isocratic synerchsth, as well as in

frequency of attempts in the deliberative democracy literature to insist on the theoretical bifurcation of debate and deliberation as an
article of theoretical faith. Tandem

initiatives

also

analysis of the EPA and intelligence community debating

brings to light

dimensions of contrast at the third level of Isocratic synerchsth,

formation . The intelligence communitys Analytic Outreach initiative invites

alliance

largely one-way

communication flowing from outside experts into the black box of classified intelligence
analysis. On the contrary, the EPA debating program gestures toward a more expansive
project of deliberative alliance building. In this vein, Howard Universitys participation in the
2008 EPA Water Wars debates can be seen as the harbinger of a trend by historically
black colleges and universities

(hbcus)

to catalyze their debate programs in a strategy that

evinces Daviss dual-focus vision . On the one hand, Davis aims to recuperate Wiley Colleges tradition of
competitive excellence in intercollegiate debate, depicted so powerfully in the feature film The Great Debaters, by starting a wave of
new debate programs housed in hbcus across the nation.68 On the other hand, Davis sees potential for these new programs to

This dual-focus
vision recalls Douglas Ehningers and Wayne Brockriedes vision of total debate programs that b lend switch-side
complement their competitive debate programming with participation in the EPAs public debating initiative.

intercollegiate tournament debating with forms of public debate designed to contribute to wider
communities beyond the tournament setting.69 Whereas the political telos animating Daviss dual-focus vision certainly embraces
background assumptions that Greene and Hicks would find disconcertingnotions of liberal political agency, the idea of debate
using words as weapons70there is little doubt that the project of pursuing environmental protection by tapping the creative
energy of hbcu-leveraged dissoi logoi differs significantly from the intelligence communitys effort to improve its tradecraft through
online digital debate programming. Such difference is especially evident in light of the EPAs commitment to extend debates to public
realms, with the attendant possible benefits unpacked by Jane Munksgaard and Damien Pfister:

Having a public

debater argue against their convictions , or confess their indecision on a subject and subsequent embrace
of argument as a way to seek clarity, could shake up the prevailing view of debate as a
war of words . Public uptake of the possibility of switch-sides debate may help lessen the
polarization of issues inherent in prevailing debate formats because students are no
longer seen as wedded to their arguments. This could transform public debate from a tussle
between advocates, with each public debater trying to convince the audience in a Manichean struggle about the truth of their side,

to a more inviting exchange focused on the content of the others argumentation and the
process of deliberative exchange.71 Reflection on the EPA debating initiative reveals a striking
convergence among (1) the expressed need for dissoi logoi by government agency
officials wrestling with the challenges of inverted rhetorical situations, (2) theoretical claims by scholars regarding the centrality
of argumentation in the public policy process, and (3) the practical wherewithal of intercollegiate
debaters to tailor public switch-side debating performances in specific ways requested by
agency collaborators. These points of convergence both underscore previously articulated theoretical assertions
regarding the relationship of debate to deliberation, as well as deepen understanding of the political role of deliberation in

institutional decision making. But they also suggest how decisions by rhetorical scholars about whether to contribute switch-side
debating acumen to meet demand-driven rhetoric of science initiatives ought to involve careful reflection. Such an approach mirrors
the way policy planning in the argumentative turn is designed to respond to the weaknesses of formal, decisionistic paradigms of
policy planning with situated, contingent judgments informed by reflective deliberation.

A2: Debate = neocons

The claims that debaters become neoconservatives that further US
imperialism is nothing more than an assertion debate creates an
environment conducive to preventing all forms of fundamentalism and has
several prominent examples of such
Mitchell et al 07 [ Gordon Mitchell is Associate Professor of Communication at the University of
Pittsburgh. Eric English, Stephen Llano, Catherine E. Morrison, John Rief & Carly Woods graduate students in the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh. Debate
as a Weapon of Mass Destruction, Communication and Critical/Cultural Studies Vol. 4, No. 2,
June 2007, pp. 221-225] bjs
while the pedagogical benefits of switch-side debating for participants are compelling,10
some worry that the technique may perversely and unwittingly serve the ends of an aggressively
militaristic foreign policy. In the context of the 1954 controversy, Ronald Walter Greene and Darrin Hicks suggest that
the articulation of the debate community as a zone of dissent against McCarthyist tendencies developed
into a larger and somewhat uncritical affirmation of switch-side debate as a technology of liberal
participatory democracy. This technology is part and parcel of the post-McCarthy ethical citizen, prepared to discuss issues from multiple viewpoints.
The problem for Greene and Hicks is that this notion of citizenship becomes tied to a
normative conception of American democracy that justifies imperialism. They write, The production and
Second,

management of this field of governance allows liberalism to trade in cultural technologies in the global cosmopolitan marketplace at the same time as it creates a field of
intervention to transform and change the world one subject (regime) at a time.11 Here, Greene and Hicks argue that this new conception of liberal governance, which

switch-side technique, serves as a normative tool for

judging other polities and justifying forcible regime change. One need look only to the
Bush administrations framing of war as an instrument of democracy promotion to grasp how the switch-side
epitomizes the ethical citizen as an individual trained in the

technique can be appropriated as a justification for violence . It is our position , however , that rather
than acting as a cultural technology expanding American exceptionalism, switch-side
debating originates from a civic attitude that serves as a bulwark against
fundamentalism of all stripes . Several prominent voices r eshaping the national dialogue
on homeland security have come from the academic debate community and draw on its animating spirit
of critical inquiry. For example, Georgetown University law professor Neal Katyal served as lead
plaintiffs counsel in Hamdan, which challenged post-9/11 enemy combat definitions.12
The foundation for Katyals winning argument in Hamdan was laid some four years before, when he
collaborated with former intercollegiate debate champion Laurence Tribe on an
influential Yale Law Journal addressing a similar topic.13 Tribe won the National Debate Tournament in 1961 while
competing as an undergraduate debater for Harvard University. Thirty years later, Katyal represented Dartmouth College at the same tournament and finished third. The
imprint of this debate training is evident in Tribe and Katyals contemporary public
interventions , which are characterized by meticulous research, sound argumentation, and a
staunch commitment to democratic principles . Katyals reflection on his early days of debating at Loyola High School in Chicagos
North Shore provides a vivid illustration. I came in as a shy freshman with dreams of going to medical school. Then Loyolas debate team opened my eyes to a different world:

Katyal recounts, the most important preparation for my career came

from my experiences as a member of Loyolas debate team.14 The success of former
debaters like Katyal, Tribe, and others in challenging the dominant dialogue on homeland security
points to the efficacy of academic debate as a training ground for future advocates of
one of argumentation and policy. As

progressive change . Moreover, a robust understanding of the switch-side technique and

the classical liberalism which underpins it

would

help prevent misappropriation of the

technique to bolster suspect homeland security policies . For buried within an inner-city
debaters files is a secret threat to absolutism: the refusal to be classified as with us or
against us, the embracing of intellectual experimentation in an age of orthodoxy, and reflexivity in the face of fundamentalism. But by now, the irony of our story
should be apparent*the more effectively academic debating practice can be focused toward these
ends, the greater the proclivity of McCarthys ideological heirs to brand the activity as a
weapon of mass destruction.

A2: Mitchell
Mitchell changed his mind believes switch-side and the process of debate
is beneficial
Mitchell 2002 [Gordon R. - Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in
the Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, where he also directs
the William Pitt Debating Union. http://www.ndtceda.com/archives/200211/0136.html]
Politically I have moved quite a bit since 1998, when I wrote that debate institutions
should pay more attention to argumentative agency, i.e. cultivation of skills that facilitate translation of
critical thinking, public speaking, and research acumen into concrete exemplars of democratic
empowerment. Back then I was highly skeptical of the "laboratory model" of "preparatory
pedagogy," where students were kept, by fiat, in the proverbial pedagogical bullpen.
Now I respect much more the value of a protected space where young people can
experiment politically by taking imaginary positions , driving the heuristic process by
arguing against their convictions. In fact, the integrity of this space could be
compromised by "activist turn" initiatives designed to bridge contest round advocacy
with political activism. These days I have much more confidence in the importance
and necessity of switch-side debating, and the heuristic value for debaters of arguing
against their convictions. I think fashioning competitive debate contest rounds as
isolated and politically protected safe spaces for communicative experimentation
makes sense. However, I worry that a narrow diet of competitive contest round debating could starve students of
opportunities to experience the rich political valence of their debating activities.

Delib Democracy/Informed Citizenry

Deliberative Democracy/Informed Citizenry Impact

Deliberative citizenship is necessary to change government from the
outside and solving existential crises
Mitchell 10 [Gordon R. - Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies in the
Department of Communication at the University of Pittsburgh, where he also directs the William
Pitt Debating Union. Switch-Side Debating Meets Demand-Driven Rhetoric of Science,
Rhetoric & Public Affairs Vol. 13, No. 1, 2010, pp. 95120] bjs
Yet this

essay highlights how rhetorical scholarships relevance can be credibly

established by outsiders, who seek access to the creative energy flowing from the classical Greek
rhetorical lexicon in its native mode, that is, as a tool of invention designed to spur and hone rhetorical
performance. Analysis of the intelligence community and EPA debating initiatives shows
how this

is the case, with government agencies calling for assistance to animate

rhetorical processes such as

dissoi logoi ( debating

different sides ) and synrchesth (the performative

coming together deliberately for the purpose of joint inquiry, collective choice-making, and
renewal of communicative bonds).74 This demand-driven epistemology is different in kind from
the globalization project so roundly criticized by Gaonkar. Rather than rhetoric venturing out from its
own academic home to proselytize about its epistemological universality for all knowers, instead here we have actors not
formally trained in the rhetorical tradition articulating how their own deliberative objectives call
for incorporation of rhetorical practice and even recruitment of strategically located
allies75 to assist in the process. Since the productivist content in the classical Greek vocabulary serves as a critical
resource for joint collaboration in this regard, demand-driven rhetoric of science turns Gaonkars original
critique on its head. In fairness to Gaonkar, it should be stipulated that his 1993 intervention challenged the way rhetoric of
task of

science had been done to date, not the universe of ways rhetoric of science might be done in the future. And to his partial credit,
Gaonkar did acknowledge the promise of a performance-oriented rhetoric of science, especially one informed by classical thinkers
other than Aristotle.76 In his Ph.D. dissertation on Aspects of Sophistic Pedagogy, Gaonkar documents how the ancient sophists
were the greatest champions of socially useful science,77 and also how the sophists essentially practiced the art of rhetoric in a
translational, performative register: Th e sophists could not blithely go about their business of making science useful, while science
itself stood still due to lack of communal support and recognition. Besides, sophistic pedagogy was becoming increasingly
dependent on the findings of contemporary speculation in philosophy and science. Take for instance, the eminently practical art of
rhetoric. As taught by the best of the sophists, it was not simply a handbook of recipes which anyone could mechanically employ to
his advantage. On the contrary, the strength and vitality of sophistic rhetoric came from their ability to incorporate the relevant
information obtained from the on-going research in other fields. 78 Of course, deep trans-historical differences make uncritical
appropriation of classical Greek rhetoric for contemporary use a fools errand. But to gauge from Robert Harimans recent reflections
on the enduring salience of Isocrates, timely,

suitable, and eloquent appropriations can help us

postmoderns forge a new political language suitable for addressing the complex raft of
intertwined problems facing global society. Such retrospection is long overdue, says Hariman,
as the history, literature, philosophy, oratory, art, and political thought of Greece and Rome have never been more accessible or

some of the most venerable elements of the

ancient Greek rhetorical traditionthose dealing with debate and deliberation can be
less appreciated.79 This essay has explored ways that

retrieved and adapted to answer calls in the contemporary milieu for cultural
technologies capable of dealing with one of our times most daunting challenges . This
challenge involves finding meaning in inverted rhetorical situations characterized by an
endemic surplus of heterogeneous content.

Solves Public Concerns/Gov overreach

Deliberative democracy allows citizens to shape government action to
preferences and prevents government overreach
Nibatchi 09 [Tina Nabatchi, Department of Public Administration, Maxwell School of Citizenship
and Public Affairs. Addressing the Citizenship and Democratic Deficits: The Potential of
Deliberative Democracy for Public Administration, The American Review of Public
Administration OnlineFirst, published on May 18, 2010] bjs
A discussion about the specific design of these and other deliberative democracy processes is beyond the scope of this article; however, it is useful to identify similarities and

deliberative processes include a focus on action, an

appeal to values, the absence of preexisting commitments, mutuality of focus, the free exchange of
knowledge and information, and activities occurring within small groups, although the overall process may involve several thousand participants
differences among the processes. Key features shared among

(Lukensmeyer & Brigham, 2005; Torres, 2003). Salient differences among the processes include, but are not limited to, who participates in deliberation, how participants
exchange information and make decisions, the link between the deliberations and policy or public action, and the point of connection to the policy process (Bingham, Nabatchi,

deliberative democracy processes offer a concrete way to

bring together citizen views and insights in a way that is both inclusive and sensitive to value
plurality. Deliberative democracy fosters cooperation and mutual understanding rather
than winning and losing (as adversarial democracy seems to); it purports to give all citizens a voice rather than just the most powerful or the most
numerous (as tends to occur in majoritarian democracy); and it encourages citizens to make decisions based on
public reasons that can be supported through deliberation rather than on individual prejudices that
thrive in the privacy of the voting booth. (Levinson, 2002) Thus, on the whole, deliberative processes engage and transform individual
preferences and values such that policy decisions represent more than the aggregation
of individual interests. In doing so, deliberative democracy provides institutional designs that
might allow public administration to better rediscover and reflect the publicness in public affairs. These
& OLeary, 2005; Fung, 2006). Despite their differences,

assertions are made clear in the following discussion about the potential benefits of deliberative democracy. Advocates assert that beyond its normative or intrinsic value,
deliberative democracy also has instrumental value for both participants and for public governance. The individual instrumental benefits are largely captured in the argument that

deliberative democracy has an educative effect on participants (Elster, 1998; Fung, 2003; Mansbridge, 1980, 1995;
Pateman, 1970). The major psychological quality that deliberative participation is expected to produce and develop is
political efficacy (Pateman, 1970, see also Finkel, 1985; Mansbridge, 1995; Morrell, 1998, 2005). However, other scholars extend these individual benefits,
arguing that it can make for better citizens by fostering and increasing political sophistication,
interest, trust, respect, empathy, and sociotropism, or public spiritedness (Luskin & Fishkin, 2003). In addition, participation is thought to be a
circular causal process (Finkel, 1985) whereby the more individuals participate, the better able they become to
do so (Pateman, 1970, pp. 42-43). The theory is that the deliberation helps participants cultivate skills such as
eloquence, rhetorical ability, empathy, courtesy, imagination, and reasoning capacity (Fearon, 1998). Through the
active exchange of ideas, and the voicing of and listening to preferences expressed in an ideal speech situation (Habermas,
1984, 1990), deliberation can help people clarify, understand, and refine their own preferences and positions on issues (Elster, 1998). Even if preferences are not transformed,

collective discussions may create greater understanding among persons with divergent
preferences, as well as more tolerance for opposing views because people may begin to think beyond their own selfinterest, to include greater concern for others and their community (Benhabib, 1996; Cooke, 2000; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004). In this way, deliberative democracy can
help create Hannah Arendts concept of an enlarged mentality. To the extent that deliberative democracy has these educative effects, advocates assert that it is able to reduce

informed citizenry is able to function effectively and

collaboratively through open and conveniently organized processes . . . public alienation toward
government and toward public administration is reduced (Frederickson, 1991, p. 415). Stated differently, when
citizens become more involved in assessing public services, the public confidence deficit in the
government will be alleviated (Kettl, 1998). Deliberative democracy is also argued to have
the citizenship deficit. The idea is that if an

instrumental benefits for modern government . Specifically, the procedures and preconditions of deliberative
result in better decisions and improve the quality of governance (Button & Ryfe,
2005; Elster, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2006; Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004; Young, 2000). Because deliberation deemphasizes the
aggregation of and/or bargaining among preestablished preferences and individual interests (Button & Ryfe, 2005),
democracy are argued to

it can reveal private information, add new and different types of information to the discussion, force
justification of demands, and increase consensus. This can help recognize weaker
political groups and break the cycle of political inequality, improve the justice of
decisions, legitimize the ultimate choice, and make for Pareto-superior decisions (Elster, 1998; Fearon, 1998; Fung, 2003, 2006;
Gutmann & Thompson, 1996, 2004). The generation of legitimate outcomes may lead to increased buy-in and
longer-term support of policy implementation (Fearon, 1998) and generally improve the effectiveness
of public action (Fung, 2003, 2006). Advocates claim that deliberative democracy is better able to handle the
problems of modern governance, because it recognizes that administrative legitimacy requires active
accountability to citizens , from whom the ends of government derive. Accountability, in turn, requires a shared
framework for the interpretation of basic values, one that must be developed jointly by
bureaucrats and citizens in real world situations. (Stivers, 1990, p. 247) In short, because the institutional designs of
deliberative democracy are inclusive and sensitive to the value plurality inherent in complex policy issues, they can
help rediscover the publics preferences and ameliorate the democratic deficit.

Environment
Informed citizenry is crucial to solving global ecological threats it allows
us to create solutions at the local and state level but only if we have
debates about the nitty gritty and complexities of policies
Fien and Tilbury 02 [John Fien - Professor at RMIT University where he is responsible for
facilitating the development of teaching and research to further the social change processes that
underlie sustainable development. A member of the Australian National Commission for
UNESCO. Daniella Tilbury is dean of sustainability at the University of Gloucestershire. The
global challenge of sustainability, Education and Sustainability: Responding to the Global
Challenge] bjs
the role of education
was described by Schumacher
as the
greatest resource for achieving a just and ecological society
The Brundtland Report
The 1980 World Conservation Strategy was
about the role of education
in bringing about such changes
long-term task of environmental education is to foster
attitudes and
behaviours compatible with this ethic.
Sustainable living must be the new pattern for all levels:
Achieving sustainability:

It was a quarter of a century ago, that education

(1973, p. 64)

. Since then, a series of major international reports have emphasized the

critical role education can play in the search for sustainable living.

, (WCED 1987) argued that teachers had a crucial role to play in helping to bring about the extensive social changes (p. xiv)

necessary for sustainable development.

more explicit

. It argued that: A new ethic, embracing plants and animals as well as people is required for human societies to live in harmony with the natural world on which they

depend for survival and well-being. The

or reinforce

new

(IUCN, UNEP & WWF 1980, sect. 13) This message was reiterated by Caring for the Earth which identified educations vital role in ensuring that

people learn, accept and live by the principle of living sustainably.

individuals, communities, nations and the world.

the attitudes and practices of many people. We will need to ensure

sustainably

To adopt

the new pattern will require

that education programs reflect the importance of

an ethic for

a significant change in

living

. (IUCN, UNEP & WWF 1991 p. 5) Agenda 21, the internationally agreed report of the Earth Summit, committed countries to promoting environmental sustainability through education. Chapter 36 on Promoting education, public

awareness and training was one of the few aspects of Agenda 21 that did not provoke contention at the Earth Summit. Countries from both North and South agreed that education was critical for promoting sustainable development and increasing the capacity of the
people to address environment and development issues (UNESCO-UNEP 1996). This view was reiterated in the Discussion Paper for the Thessalonikki Conference on Environment and Society: Education and Public Awareness for Sustainability, which stated that:

It is widely agreed that education is the most effective means that society possess for
confronting the challenges of the future
education,
must
be a vital part of all efforts to imagine and create new relations among people and to
foster greater respect for the needs of the environment.
. Education, to be certain, is not the whole answer to every problem. But

in its broadest sense,

(UNESCO 1998, p. 15) In May 1996, the Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) (set up

by the UN to monitor the follow-up of decisions taken at the Earth Summit) met for its Fourth Session in New York. The noteworthy feature of this session was that Chapter 36 of Agenda 21 was considered for the first time since 1992. The CSD Session concluded
that: In order to change unsustainable production and consumption patterns and lifestyles, it (is) essential to give great emphasis to the role of education for sustainable development, including environmental economics as well as environmental awareness.

a
fundamental prerequisite for sustainable development is an
effective
educational system at all levels,
non-formal
and informal modes of teaching and learning
vital to bringing about
changes towards sustainable development
(UNESCO-UNEP 1996, pp.2-3) It referred to education for sustainability as a lifelong process, that needs to be understood as part of a broad new vision of education, (p. 2). The CSD met again in May 1998 and reiterated that
adequately financed and

that is relevant to the implementation of all chapters of Agenda 21, (p. 7). At this meeting, the CSD also stressed the need to recognize
(e.g., within the family and community) as

. It saw the need for a broader, participatory approach for education for sustainability which took into account local needs and values.

This comprehensive view of education for sustainability has also been gaining ground at the international and national policy level for some time. For example, the British Government Panel on Sustainable Development (1995) argued that: Clearly environmental
education far transcends the boundaries of formal Education. The business, commercial and professional communities and the voluntary sector have vital roles in continuing environmental education and training. Sustainable development involves society as a
whole. (BGPSD 1995, p. 6) These international conference documents have led to regional action plans and national policies taking on board the new vocabulary of education for sustainability and acknowledging the need to educate and mobilize all sectors of

it is
highly likely ones favourite view of sustainable development
may not be
represented in these document
it is likely that the views expressed will be a
compromise This is the nature
that seek to accommodate all views
society in the task of living sustainability. They not only reflect a growing recognition of the vital role education needs to play in the attainment of sustainability but also serve to define the components of a new educational approach. However,
that

or philosophy of education

s. Indeed,

of international reports

but find it impossible to transcend ethnic,

linguistic, gender and other hegemonies (Gough 1999). It is also the nature of national and provincial policies that are developed within particular local frames of power and social interest. Therefore, they need to be read contextually and strategically as well as
textually (Singh 1995, 1998; Fien 2000) as catalysts for local innovation, educational reform and resistance to unsustainable development processes. Educational Responses to Sustainability Although the concept of sustainability first emerged in the early 1980s, it
was not until the early 1990s, that the term began to form part of the vocabulary of education. IUCN The World Conservation Union refers to education for sustainable living, while others have used terms such as education for sustainability (National Forum on
Partnerships Supporting Education about the Environment, USA 1996), education for sustainable development (UNESCOUNEP 1996), and education for a sustainable future (UNESCO-EPD 1997). Some contributors to this book also use terms such as
environmental education for sustainability or simply environmental education or development education to refer to their particular educational responses to the challenge of sustainability. There have been several attempts to define the characteristics of an
educational response to sustainability and also much discussion as to how this might differ from conventional approaches to environmental education (e.g., see: Sterling/EDET Group 1992; Fien 1993a/b; Tilbury 1995, 1997; Huckle and Sterling 1996). The British
Environment and Development Education and Training Groups report entitled Good Earth-Keeping: Education, Training and Awareness for a Sustainable Future defines the nature of education for sustainability as follows: We believe that

education for sustainability is a process

levant to all people
a
process rather than a fixed goal.
it will always accompany the building of
relationships between individuals, groups and their environment
, which is re

It may precede and

and that, like sustainable development itself, it is

. All people, we believe, are capable of being educators and learners in

pursuit of sustainability. (Sterling/EDET Group 1992, p. 2) In its report, the EDET Group affirmed the validity of the different approaches to environmental education in achieving sustainable development. Tilbury (1995) and Fien (1997) argue that education for
sustainability must differ significantly from much of the nature study work carried out under the environmental education banner. Education with the objective of achieving sustainability varies from previous approaches to environmental education in that it focuses
sharply on developing closer links among environmental quality, human equality, human rights and peace and their underlying political threads.

Issues such as food security, poverty,

sustainable tourism, urban quality, women, fair trade, green consumerism, ecological
public health and waste management as well as those of climatic change, deforestation,
land degradation, desertification, depletion of natural resources and loss of biodiversity
are primary concerns

for both environmental and development education. Matters of environmental quality and human development are central to education for sustainability, for as Julian Agyeman (1999) argues, we cannot

have environmental quality without human equality. These concerns differ substantially from those of litter, nature study and the planting of trees in the school grounds and other apolitical and aesthetic work that has often been the focus of much school-level
environmental education in the past. Studies of the geophysical and biophysical world are a necessary but not sufficient prerequisite for learning to live sustainably. The concrete links between social justice and ecological sustainability, identified at the Earth
Summit undermine the primacy of what some have termed the ecological foundations of environmental education and suggest a broadening and deepening of the concepts of environment and environmental education. Education about bio-diversity (and other

education for
sustainability invites us to question the assumptions of dominant discourses in
education,
initiating people into the concepts and skills needed
for finding scientific and technological solutions to environmental problems
nature-based themes) now needs to be immersed in concepts of human rights, equity and democracy which are the core issues of sustainability (Fien 1998). Others such as Huckle (1996) point to how

particularly those objectives, content and teaching methods which favour

without addressing their root social

political and economic causes. This approach is guided by a techno-centric rationality and behaviourist goals of reductionist Western science (Greenall Gough 1993) which often ignores the issues of justice and ecological sustainability. Indeed, eco-feminists, such
as Carolyn Merchant (1980) and Vandana Shiva (1989), have identified western science and its patriarchal assumptions and attitudes to nature, women and development as a major cause of environmental exploitation and the increasing marginalization of many of
the worlds people. Fien (1995) emphasizes this critique of the assumptions upon which education has developed and the consequent call by Vandana Shiva (1989) for a new environmental science based upon indigenous ways of knowing, the relationship between
ecology and everyday life and a vision of science as a servant of social and ecological change. Fien concludes that, viewed from this perspective, education for sustainability would embrace alternative epistemologies, and would value diverse ways of knowing,

.
as a participatory process
involve all areas of
Such forms of education have the power to guide people in

identify with the people and communities it purports to serve and respect community-based approaches to social change. This new outlook would extend the focus of education (and environmental education) from schools into the community

Education
civil society

would no longer be interpreted solely as an academic subject for schools but

, including businesses and public services.

reflection and action on

different

which would

interpretations of sustainable development

(Huckle 1996).

This

process of critical enquiry , encourages people to explore the complexity and

implications of sustainability as well as the economic
environmental forces that
in questions

foster or impede

, political, social, cultural,

technological and

sustainable development. This entails involving people

about the ownership of common property resources, issues of international and intergenerational equity,

most importantly, engagement in debates

investigations

into regional and national ecological footprints

and,

about qualitative versus quantitative growth.

Deliberative democracy is the only system for solving global environment

crises critical skills are key to preventing otherwise inevitable extinction
events
Baber and Bartlett 09 [Walter F. Baber is Professor in the Graduate Center for Public Policy
and Administration at California State University, Long Beach. Robert Bartlett - Professor,
Department Chair and Gund Chair of the Liberal Arts (2006). B.A. , Indiana University; M.P.A.,
Indiana University; Ph.D. Global Democracy and Sustainable Jurisprudence: Deliberative
Environmental Law, MIT Press] bjs
From Thinking Locally to Acting Globally As a general matter, it is widely believed that international politics suffers from a democracy deficit (Wallace 2001). This deficit is a consequence of the fact that the
decisions made within international institutions are driven by democratic concerns only to the extent that domestic foreign policy in the various nations is the result of democratic politics. International democracy,
so it might be argued, will never be more than a theoretical possibility in the absence of a sovereign and democratically elected legislature at the global level (Slaughter 2004). Recent explorations of the idea of

Deliberative democracy is particularly well suited to the task of

environmental protection (Baber and Bartlett 2005; Meadowcraft 2004). Deliberative 10 Chapter 1 democracy, operating at the boundary
deliberative democracy, however, hold out a different hope.

between the state and civil society,

is a political practice that can generate broader public support for more

ecologically sound policies while enhancing the institutional capacities of public

agencies (Meadowcraft 2004). As we have seen, the challenges of popular participation, environmental
knowledge building, and institutional adequacy are even more acute at the international
level than they are within states. To see how deliberative democracy might help us confront these challenges, a more complete understanding of the concept is necessary. Deliberative democracy is a
concept that defies easy definition. The deliberative democracy movement has been spawned by a growing realization that contemporary liberalism has lost something of its democratic character.

Modern democracies, confronted by cultural pluralism, social complexity, vast inequities of wealth and influence, and ideological biases that discourage fundamental change,
have allowed their political institutions to degenerate into arenas for strategic
gamesmanship in which there is little possibility for genuine deliberation (Bohman 1996, 1824). True democracy is impossible where
citizens are mere competitors with no commitments beyond their own narrow self-interests. How to move beyond mere interest is a matter of considerable debate.
Elsewhere (Baber and Bartlett 2005) we have described three distinct approaches to deliberative democracypublic reason, ideal discourse, and full liberalism. Our ultimate objective in this book is to suggest

how deliberative democracy might inform our thinking about the international democracy deficit in general and the challenge of developing an international environmental jurisprudence in particular. Public
reason is an approach to deliberative democracy advanced most prominently by John Rawls (1993, 1999a, 1999b, 2001). Rawls ventured beyond fundamental rights and goals of distributive justice by using only
the Kantian pursuit of universalizable principles and the perspective of the least favored (I. Shapiro 2001). The intuition at work is that if persons would agree to a policy principle when they might be the ones most

public reason is the reason

of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one
another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution (Rawls 1993, 214). Deliberation is a search for binding
adversely affected by it, they should agree to it in every other circumstance as well (applying the transivity principle of rationality). For Rawls,

precommitments to political values that are fundamentally important but limited in scope (Bartlett Toward an International Environmental Jurisprudence 11 and Baber 2005). In this form of deliberation, one
reasons from the little one knows in the original position (wherein all information about ones personal situation is hidden by a veil of ignorance) in pursuit of unanimity based on reasons with which anyone

individual interests are neither compromised nor reconciled.

They are eliminated as reasons that can justly be offered in defense of ones positions (36
similarly situated would freely agree. In this mode of deliberation,

38). The conception of individual citizens advanced by Rawlss theory of public reason is the most difficult approach of the three we will deal with because it diverges the most dramatically from our everyday
experience. Rawlss well-ordered society is populated by people who are equal . . . autonomous ... reasonable and possessed of the capacity for social cooperation (Rawls 1993, 306). Furthermore, they view
society as a fair system of cooperation over time, from one generation to the next (15). Also, they aspire to be both rational in a technical sense and reasonable in a broader political sense. This is because
merely reasonable agents would have no ends of their own they would want to advance through fair cooperation; merely rational agents lack a sense of justice and fail to recognize the independent validity of the
claims of others (52). Because they share these characteristics, the citizens of a well-ordered society would readily commit themselves to abide by the principles of justice flowing from a discourse in which they
(or their representatives) were guided by the regulative concept of the veil of ignorance. This concept requires decision makers to ignore virtually all information about their positions in society, their individual
interests, and even which generation they represent (Rawls 1999c). The approach taken by Rawls has both advantages and difficulties. Some critics of deliberative democracy have complained that deliberation
of this sort has a sedative effect that curbs the behavior (and thus the in- fluence) of the historically disadvantaged. They also argue that some citizens are better at articulating their arguments than others, so
much so that well-educated white males are destined to prevail in the deliberative environment (Sanders 1997). The Rawlsian approach, however, sedates all participants with the same dosage of the same drug.
Although Rawls acknowledges that we all have a right to products of our own abilities, they can justly provide us only what we become entitled to by taking part in a fair social process (Rawls 1993, 284).

fine debating skills,

covered by that injunction.

Presumably,
whether innate or acquired, are
Others have suggested that Rawlss conception of
public reason is too narrow because it is based upon the assumption that peoples preferences 12 Chapter 1 are determined prior to political interaction and do not change as a result of such interaction (Offe
1997). But this is true only to the extent that Rawlss theory embodies an attempt to justify collective decisions by appealing to reasons that can be adopted by people simply by virtue of their common citizenship
and the shared interests implied by that common status (Evans 1999). Indeed, the greatest problem with Rawlss approach to public reason may be that, rather than counting too little on change, it counts on
change far more than is reasonable. Deliberative democracy of the kind he advocates requires a radical equality of access for individuals, groups, and interests that have been historically excluded from decision
making (Rawls 1999a, 580581) If actually achieved, such a circumstance would unsettle, if not subvert, existing understandings about the dimensions and boundaries of political conflict (Knight and Johnson

deliberative democracy
relies on a shared political culture and is rooted less in government institutions than in
civic society. For Habermas, deliberation is a process of testing the competing validity claims put forward by citizens in search of a general consensus based upon reasons that are shared, not
1994, 289). A second form of deliberative democracy, ideal discourse, is most closely associated with the work of Jrgen Habermas. In this view,

merely public. In ideal discourse, individual interests are the source of these competing validity claims. But those interests are not regarded as givens, the fundamental stuff of politics. Interests must be open to
change because citizens engaged in ideal discourse are committed to search for a genuine meeting of the minds, rather than the modus vivendi that less demanding approaches, such as full liberalism (discussed
next), might allow (Baber and Bartlett 2005, 3536). The view of citizens in the ideal discourse situation adopted by Habermas shares much with that of Rawls, but differs in some important ways. Habermas
speaks of personally autonomous participants in deliberative discourse who are free and equal, each of whom is required to take the perspective of everyone else, and who thus project themselves into the
understandings of self and the world of all others (Habermas 1995, 117). They do not, however, adopt this attitude out of any commitment to abstract principles of justice produced in a reflective equilibrium free
of ideology and interest. These citizens are committed to advancing their normative validity claims in forms that can be treated like truth claims; that is, in forms that can be subjected to empirical evaluation
(Habermas 1990). There is no mechanism of impartiality at work. Indeed, Habermas (1995) criticizes Rawls for his willingness to purchase the neutrality Toward an International Environmental Jurisprudence 13 of
his conception of justice at the cost of forsaking its cognitive validity claim. It is as if Habermas is invoking the second clause of Rawlss own maxim that justice is the first virtue of social institutions just as truth is
of systems of thought (Rawls 1999c, 3). The reasonableness Habermas seeks is born of a social and cultural commitment to an inclusive and rational discourse (Habermas 1995) based upon the justified
supposition of a legitimate order (Habermas 1996, 68). It is true that the processes of internalization that structure the normative foundations of the values espoused by citizens are not free of repressive and
reactionary tendencies (Habermas 1996). It is also true that those who constitute the politically interested and informed class of the public may be disinclined to seriously submit their view to discussion

Ultimately, however, the consciousness of their own autonomy gives rise to an

authority of conscience that becomes an integral part of the politically informed and
active citizens motivational foundation (Habermas 1996, 67). This commitment to intellectual honesty would seem to be an essential element of the ideal
(Habermas 1998d).

discourse situation, conceived of as a rational and noncoercive discourse designed to test empirically the truth-value of competing normative claims. Finally, full liberalism is a widely shared perspective
exemplified most clearly by the ideas of James Bohman, Amy Gutmann, and Dennis Thompson. Their work can be viewed as an attempt to reconcile the divergent approaches of Rawls and Habermas in ways
that make deliberative democracy more feasible in a complex and normatively fragmented society. Bohman describes a politics characterized by equality of both access and influence, good-faith bargaining, and
plurality rule accompanied by continuing minority acceptance of the fairness of the process. Thus, in full liberalism ones individual interests are the primary source of individual preferences and motivation. But the
reasons a citizen offers to others in support of his or her policy positions must transcend personal interests, at least to some extent. They must be public reasons, but only in the limited sense that their
acceptability is not dependent on membership in some particular social group (Baber and Bartlett 2005, 3435). The theory of full liberalism is, in many ways, less demanding than either public reason or ideal
discourse (Baber 2004). For example, Bohman assumes that citizens in a democracy are unavoidably divided by deepseated normative differences he describes as cultural pluralism (Bohman 1994). He also
doubts the possibility that any form of public reason or 14 Chapter 1 any view of the common good can ever command a consensus in communities as complex as the modern democracies. In Bohmans view,
community biases and the exclusion of many from effective political participation are unavoidable, at least to some extent (Bohman 1996, 238). Finally, Bohman argues that knowledge and information are
always scarce resources in a complex society, and that neither innate capacities nor acquired knowledge can ever be evenly or widely distributed. Consequently, citizens in pluralistic democracies will inevitably

This does not suggest that deliberative

democrats should surrender to the injustices currently observable in democratic life. Bohman
surrender their autonomy to experts, delegates, and other forms of the division of labor (168).

supports an equalization of deliberative resources and capacities as far as that is possible, as do other deliberative democrats (Cohen 1997; Gutmann and Thompson 1996). But as Dryzek has pointed out, some

The point of providing support

to the disadvantaged in the context of public deliberation is not to equalize their position with the other interest groups jostling for influence but, rather, t o ensure
that they can make effective use of their political liberties (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 305, 277). Strict equality is neither
degree of inequality may not only be unavoidable, it also may actually serve as grist for the deliberative contest (Dryzek 2000, 172173).

necessary nor desirable from the point of view of maintaining the critical edge brought to deliberation by the disadvantaged. After all, it is not as if deliberation under full liberalism is a search for one correct
solution. Having rejected the notion of a singular form of public reason, it is not surprising that theorists of full liberalism should find themselves in the company of the majority of representative democrats who,
from Burkes time, have regarded political questions as inevitably controversial ones without a right answer (Pitkin 1967). The objects of deliberation, in their view, are the interests of specific persons who have a

deliberative democrats do not try to specify a

single form of citizenship. They search for models of representation that support the giveand-take of serious and sustained moral argument within legislative bodies, between
right to help define them. Politics is recognizably democratic when it gives them that right. These

legislators and citizens, and among citizens themselves (Gutmann and Thompson 1996, 131). In this way, deliberative democracy is not so much a search for ethically or empirically defensible solutions as it is a
process of personal development for citizens. John Dryzek Toward an International Environmental Jurisprudence 15 has argued that, in the face of ideologies and structural forces that perpetuate distorted views

should seek the competence of citizens themselves to recognize and oppose

such forces, which can be promoted through participation in authentically democratic politics (Dryzek 2000, 21). Thus, one might
say that the most important product of deliberative democracy is neither just principles nor
of the political world, we

rational policies but, rather, the critical capacities of the citizens themselves . It might further be argued
that

this objective is the most important one that collective-will formation can pursue . After all, to

the extent that permanent solutions to the ecological crisis require significant changes

of collective consciousness, preserving our species and its environment may be

possible only through such a process of social evolution.

A2: Unrealistic
Deliberative democracy can be effective even if it is scaled up its
pragmatic and realistic even in a world of global capitalism
Baber and Bartlett 09 [Walter F. Baber is Professor in the Graduate Center for Public Policy
and Administration at California State University, Long Beach. Robert Bartlett - Professor,
Department Chair and Gund Chair of the Liberal Arts (2006). B.A. , Indiana University; M.P.A.,
Indiana University; Ph.D. Global Democracy and Sustainable Jurisprudence: Deliberative
Environmental Law, MIT Press] bjs
So what we seek, then, is nothing less than collective choice without sovereignty, reliable
knowledge without abstraction, and effective implementation without coercion. Reasons
for rejecting this agenda abound. Only the necessities of human survival can be offered in its defense. But
pessimism at the outset is unwarranted in light of the fact that popular government
appears to be succeeding at the level of the nation-state . After all, effective environmental
law at the international level only requires us to perform the same basic functions that
domestic governments perform the legislative, administrative, and adjudicatory functions (Sands and Peel 2005).
We must remember that whether the international institutions and process that eventually develop to satisfy these functional
requirements resemble their municipal counterparts is less important than that they be fully democratic and ecologically sustainable.
In later chapters, we

offer a specific proposal for global collective will formation, such that general
commitments to abstract principles of environmental protection can be developed into more concrete and
specific obligations that would allow organizations and individuals to assert and answer claims
in coherent ways. A deliberatively democratic approach suggests both a jurisdictional and a
jurisprudential rationale for the resolution of environmental disputes by international tribunals, namely, by
reference to a juristically democratic kind of transnational common law. Specifically, we imagine certain institutions
innumerable citizenconstituted policy juries that deliberate hypothetical cases, at least one global codifying agency,
and a resulting cosmopolitan and transnational common lawthat can provide for
scaling up deliberative democracy to the global level, by offering processes that can
integrate local knowledge and contextual ecological science in ongoing global
democratic will

formation. Imperatives

of the current world order of states and global

capitalism pose challenges, but success would not be contingent on these being
abolished or ignored or wished away . Our intent is to advance a proposal that is entirely
realistic and pragmatic, in the hardest-headed senses of those words . But both of those words
come with philosophical and ideological baggage that immediately entangles, potentially introducing a level of complexity and
confusion into the understanding of terms that most ordinary people use in relatively unproblematic ways. Essential to our argument
that follows is a functional analysis of the requirements of international law and of the necessity of freeing ourselves from the
constraints imposed by assump- 20 Chapter 1 tions about how those requirements should be met. Essential

as well is an
analysis of the merits of a foundation in philosophical pragmatism for both deliberative
democratic theory and international relations theory and the necessity of freeing ourselves from the constraints imposed by
assumptions about the pluralist and statist context of international politics. These are the tasks of the next three chapters, before we
turn explicitly to an exploration of how we might cultivate a transnational common law.

A2: Iraq Disproves

Even if deliberation didnt prevent invading Iraq, it was imperfect
deliberation and laid the ground work for more effective deliberation
Gutmann and Thompson 04 [Amy Gutmann is the eighth president of the University of
Pennsylvania and Christopher H. Browne Distinguished Professor of Political Science in the
School of Arts and Sciences and Professor of Communication. Dennis F. Thompson, is the
Alfred North Whitehead Professor of Political Philosophy at the Faculty of Arts and Sciences
and in the John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is the founding Director of Harvard's
university-wide ethics program, now the Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics. Why Deliberative
Democracy?]bjs
To go to war is the most consequential decision a nation
can make. Yet most nations, even most democracies, have ceded much of the power to make that decision to their chief
executives--to their presidents and prime ministers. Legislators are rarely asked or permitted to issue
declarations of war. The decision to go to war, it would seem, is unfriendly territory for pursuing the kind of
reasoned argument that characterizes political deliberation. Yet when President George W.
Bush announced that the United States would soon take military action against Saddam Hussein, he
and his advisors recognized the need to justify the decision not only to the American
people but also to the world community. Beginning in October 2002, the administration found itself engaged in
WHAT DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY MEANS

argument with the U.S. Congress and, later, with the United Nations. During the months of preparation for the war, Bush and his
colleagues, in many different forums and at many different times, sought to make the case for a preventive war against Iraq.1
Saddam Hussein, they said, was a threat to the United States because he had or could soon have weapons of mass destruction,
and had supported terrorists who might have struck again against the United States. Further, he had tyrannized his own people and
destabilized the Middle East. In Congress and in the United Nations, critics responded, concurring with the judgment that Hussein
was a terrible tyrant but challenging the administration on all its arguments in favor of going to war before exhausting the nonmilitary
actions that might have controlled the threat. As the debate proceeded, it became clear that almost no one disagreed with the view
that the world would be better off if Saddam Hussein no longer ruled in Iraq, but many doubted that he posed an imminent threat,
and many questioned whether he actually supported the terrorists who had attacked or were likely to attack the United States.

This debate did not represent the kind of discussion that deliberative democrats hope for,
and the deliberation was cut short once U.S. troops began their invasion in March 2003.
Defenders and critics of the war seriously questioned one another's motives and deeply suspected that the reasons offered were
really rationalizations for partisan politics. The

administration, for its part, declined to wait until

nonmilitary options had been exhausted, when a greater moral consensus might have been reached. But the
remarkable fact is that even under the circumstances of war, and in the face of an alleged imminent threat, the government
persisted in attempting to justify its decision, and opponents persevered in responding with reasoned critiques of a preventive war.

The critics are probably right that no amount of deliberation would have prevented the
war, and the supporters are probably right that some critics would never have defended going to war even if other nonmilitary
sanctions had ultimately failed. Yet the deliberation that did occur laid the foundation for a more
sustained and more informative debate after the U.S. military victory than would
otherwise have taken place. Because the administration had given reasons (such as the threat
of the weapons of mass destruction) for taking action, critics had more basis to continue to dispute
the original decision, and to challenge the administration's judgment. The imperfect
deliberation that preceded the war prepared the ground for the less imperfect
deliberation that followed. Thus even in a less than friendly environment, deliberative
democracy makes an appearance, and with some effect. Both the advocates and the foes
of the war acted as if they recognized an obligation to justify their views to their fellow citizens .
(That their motives were political or partisan is less important than that their actions were responsive to this obligation.) This
problematic episode can help us discern the defining characteristics of deliberative democracy if we attend to both the presence and
the absence of those characteristics in the debate about the war.

T Version

State Accessible for Af Americans

State is accessible only if we foster the skills necessary for advocacy
Omi and Winant 13 Michael Omi and Howard Winant. (Resistance is futile?: a response to Feagin and Elias, Ethnic and Racial
Studies, Special Issue: Symposium Rethinking Racial Formation Theory, Volume 36, Issue 6, pg. 961-973)

white racist rule in the USA appears unalterable and permanent. There is little sense that the
white racial frame evoked by systemic racism theory changes in significant ways over historical time. They dismiss important rearrangements and
In Feagin and Eliass account,

reforms as merely a distraction from more ingrained structural oppressions and deep lying inequalities
that continue to define US society (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21). Feagin and Elias use a concept they call surface flexibility to argue that white elites frame racial realities in ways that suggest change, but are
merely engineered to reinforce the underlying structure of racial oppression. Feagin and Elias say the phrase racial democracy is an oxymoron a word defined in the dictionary as a figure of speech that
combines contradictory terms. If they mean the USA is a contradictory and incomplete democracy in respect to race and racism issues, we agree. If they mean that people of colour have no democratic rights or

we disagree. The USA is a racially despotic country in many ways, but in our view it is also in many respects a racial
democracy, capable of being influenced towards more or less inclusive and redistributive economic
policies, social policies, or for that matter, imperial policies. What is distinctive about our own epoch in the USA (post-Second World War to the present) with respect to race and racism? Over the past
political power in the USA,

decades there has been a steady drumbeat of efforts to contain and neutralize civil rights, to restrict racial democracy, and to maintain or even increase racial inequality. Racial disparities in different institutional
sites employment, health, education persist and in many cases have increased. Indeed, the post-2008 period has seen a dramatic increase in racial inequality. The subprime home mortgage crisis, for
example, was a major racial event. Black and brown people were disproportionately affected by predatory lending practices; many lost their homes as a result; race-based wealth disparities widened

It would be easy to conclude, as Feagin and Elias do, that white racial dominance has been
continuous and unchanging throughout US history. But such a perspective misses the
tremendously.

dramatic twists and turns in racial politics that have occurred since the Second World War and the civil rights era. Feagin and Elias claim
that we overly inflate the significance of the changes wrought by the civil rights
movement, and that we overlook the serious reversals of racial justice and persistence of huge
racial inequalities (Feagin and Elias 2012, p. 21) that followed in its wake. We do not. In Racial Formation we wrote about racial reaction in a chapter of that name, and
elsewhere in the book as well. Feagin and Elias devote little attention to our arguments there; perhaps because they are in substantial agreement with us. While we argue that the right
wing was able to rearticulate race and racism issues to roll back some of the gains of
the civil rights movement, we also believe that there are limits to what the right could achieve in the
post-civil rights political landscape. So we agree that the present prospects for racial justice are
demoralizing at best. But we do not think that is the whole story. US racial conditions have
changed over the post-Second World War period, in ways that Feagin and Elias tend to downplay or neglect. Some of the major reforms of the
1960s have proved irreversible ; they have set powerful democratic forces in motion . These
racial (trans)formations were the results of unprecedented political mobilizations, led by the black movement, but not confined to blacks alone. Consider the desegregation
of the armed forces, as well as key civil rights movement victories of the 1960s: the Voting Rights Act, the Immigration and
Naturalization Act (Hart- Celler), as well as important court decisions like Loving v. Virginia that
declared anti-miscegenation laws unconstitutional. While we have the greatest respect for the late Derrick Bell, we do not believe that his
interest convergence hypothesis effectively explains all these developments. How does Lyndon Johnsons famous (and possibly apocryphal) lament upon signing the Civil Rights Act on 2 July 1964 We have
lost the South for a generation count as convergence?

The US racial regime has been transformed in significant ways . As

Antonio Gramsci argues, hegemony proceeds through the incorporation of opposition (Gramsci 1971, p. 182). The civil rights reforms can be seen as a classic example of this process; here the US racial regime
under movement pressure was exercising its hegemony. But Gramsci insists that such reforms which he calls passive revolutions cannot be merely symbolic if they are to be effective: oppositions must win

we think there were important if partial victories

that shifted the racial state and transformed the significance of race in everyday life. And
yes, we think that further victories can take place both on the broad terrain of the state and on the more
immediate level of social interaction: in daily interaction, in the human psyche and across civil society . Indeed we have argued that in many ways the most
important accomplishment of the anti-racist movement of the 1960s in the USA was the politicization of the
social. In the USA and indeed around the globe, race-based movements demanded not only the inclusion of racially
defined others and the democratization of structurally racist societies, but also the
recognition and validation by both the state and civil society of racially-defined
real gains in the process. Once again, we are in the realm of politics, not absolute rule. So yes,

experience and identity. These demands broadened and deepened democracy itself.
They facilitated not only the democratic gains made in the USA by the black movement and its allies, but also the
political advances towards equality, social justice and inclusion accomplished by other new social movements: second-wave feminism, gay liberation, and the environmentalist and anti-war movements among
others.

By no means do we think that the post-war movement upsurge was an unmitigated

success. Far from it: all the new social movements were subject to the same rearticulation (Laclau and Mouffe 2001, p. xii) that produced the racial ideology of colourblindness and its variants; indeed
all these movements confronted their mirror images in the mobilizations that arose from the political right to counter them. Yet even their incorporation and containment, even their confrontations with the various

even the need to develop the highly contradictory ideology of

colourblindness, reveal the transformative character of the politicization of the social. While it is not possible here to explore so
backlash phenomena of the past few decades,

extensive a subject, it is worth noting that it was the long-delayed eruption of racial subjectivity and self-awareness into the mainstream political arena that set off this transformation, shaping both the democratic

use of racial
categories can be imprecise. This is not their problem alone; anyone writing about race and
racism needs to frame terms with care and precision, and we undoubtedly get fuzzy too from
time to time. The absence of a careful approach leads to racial lumping and
essentialisms of various kinds. This imprecision is heightened in polemic. In the Feagin and Elias essay the
term whites at times refers to all whites, white elites, dominant white actors and very
exceptionally, anti-racist whites, a category in which we presume they would place themselves. Although the terms black, African American and Latino appear, the
term people of colour is emphasized, often in direct substitution for black reference points. In the USA today it is important not to frame race in a
bipolar manner. The black/white paradigm made more sense in the past than it does in
the twenty-first century. The racial make-up of the nation has now changed dramatically.
and anti-democratic social movements that are evident in US politics today. What are the political implications of contemporary racial trends? Feagin and Eliass

Since the passage of the Immigration Reform Act of 1965, the USA has become more coloured. A majorityminority national demographic shift is well underway. Predicted to arrive by the mid-twenty-first
century, the numerical eclipse of the white population is already in evidence locally and regionally. In California, for example, non-Hispanic whites constitute only 39.7 per cent of the states population. While the
decline in the white population cannot be correlated with any decline of white racial dominance, the dawning and deepening of racial multipolarity calls into question a sometimes implicit and sometimes explicit
black/white racial framework that is evident in Feagin and Eliass essay. Shifting racial demographics and identities also raise general questions of race and racism in new ways that the systemic racism approach
is not prepared to explain.3 Class questions and issues of panethnicizing trends, for example, call into question what we mean by race, racial identity and race consciousness. No racially defined group is even
remotely uniform; groups that we so glibly refer to as Asian American or Latino are particularly heterogeneous. Some have achieved or exceeded socio-economic parity with whites, while others are subject to
what we might call engineered poverty in sweatshops, dirty and dangerous labour settings, or prisons. Tensions within panethnicized racial groups are notably present, and conflicts between racially defined
groups (black/brown conflict, for example) are evident in both urban and rural settings. A substantial current of social scientific analysis now argues that Asians and Latinos are the new white ethnics, able to
work toward whiteness4 at least in part, and that the black/white bipolarity retains its distinct and foundational qualities as the mainstay of US racism (Alba and Nee 2005; Perlmann 2005; Portes and Rumbaut
2006; Waters, Ueda and Marrow 2007). We question that argument in light of the massive demographic shifts taking place in the USA. Globalization, climate change and above all neoliberalism on a global scale,
all drive migration. The countrys economic capacity to absorb enormous numbers of immigrants, low-wage workers and their families (including a new, globally based and very female, servant class) without
generating the sort of established subaltern groups we associate with the terms race and racism, may be more limited than it was when the whitening of Europeans took place in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries. In other words this arguments key precedent, the absorption of white immigrants of a different color (Jacobson 1998), may no longer apply. Indeed, we might think of the assimilationist model itself as
a general theory of immigrant incorporation that was based on a historically specific case study one that might not hold for, or be replicated by, subsequent big waves of immigration. Feagin and Eliass systemic
racism model, while offering numerous important insights, does not inform concrete analysis of these issues. It is important going forward to understand how groups are differentially racialized and relatively
positioned in the US racial hierarchy: once again racism must be seen as a shifting racial project. This has important consequences, not only with respect to emerging patterns of inequality, but also in regard to
the degree of power available to different racial actors to define, shape or contest the existing racial landscape. Attention to such matters is largely absent in Feagin and Eliass account. In their view racially
identified groups are located in strict reference to the dominant white racial frame, hammered into place, so to speak. As a consequence, they fail to examine how racially subordinate groups interact and
influence each others boundaries, conditions and practices. Because they offer so little specific analysis of Asian American, Latino or Native American racial issues, the reader finds her/himself once again in the
land (real or imaginary, depending on your racial politics) of bipolar US racial dynamics, in which whites and blacks play the leading roles, and other racially identified groups as well as those ambiguously
identified, such as Middle Eastern and South Asian Americans (MEASA) play at best supporting roles, and are sometimes cast as extras or left out of the picture entirely.

We still want to

acknowledge that blacks have been catching hell and have borne the brunt of the racist
reaction of the past several decades. For example, we agree with Feagin and Eliass critique of the
reactionary politics of incarceration in the USA. The new Jim Crow (Alexander 2012) or even the new slavery that the present system practises is something
that was just in its beginning stages when we were writing Racial Formation. It is now recognized as a national and indeed global scandal. How is it to be understood? Of course there are substantial debates on

beyond Feagin and Eliass

denunciation of the ferocious white racism that is operating here, deeper political
implications are worth considering. As Alexander (2012), Mauer (2006), Manza and Uggen (2008) and movement groups like Critical Resistance and the Ella Baker
Center argue, the upsurge over recent decades in incarceration rates for black (and brown) men expresses the fear-based, law-andorder appeals that have shaped US racial politics since the rise of Nixonland (Perlstein 2008) and the Southern strategy. Perhaps even more central, racial repression aims at restricting
the increasing impact of voters of colour in a demographically shifting electorate. There is a lot more
to say about this, but for the present two key points stand out: first, it is not an area where Feagin and Elias and we have any sharp disagreement, and second, for all the horrors and
injustices that the new Jim Crow represents, incarceration, profiling and similar
practices remain political issues. These practices and policies are not ineluctable and
this topic, notably about the nature of the prison-industrial complex (Davis 2003, p. 3) and the social and cultural effects of mass incarceration along racial lines. But

unalterable dimensions of the US racial regime. There have been previous waves of
reform in these areas. They can be transformed again by mass mobilization, electoral
shifts and so on. In other words, resistance is not futile . Speaking of electoral shifts and the formal political arena, how should
President Barack Obama be politically situated in this discussion? How do Feagin and Elias explain Obama? Quite amazingly, his name does not appear in their essay. Is he a mere token, an oreo, a shill for
Wall Street? Or does Obama represent a new development in US politics, a black leader of a mass, multiracial party that for sheer demographic reasons alone might eventually triumph over the white peoples
party, the Republicans? If the President is neither the white mans token nor Neo, the One,5 then once again we are in the world of politics: neither the near-total white despotism depicted by Feagin and Elias, nor
a racially inclusive democracy. President Obama continues to enjoy widespread black support, although it is clear that he has not protected blacks against their greatest cumulative loss of wealth in history. He has
not explicitly criticized the glaring racial bias in the US carceral system. He has not intervened in conflicts over workers rights particularly in the public sector where many blacks and other people of colour are
concentrated. He has not intervened to halt or slow foreclosures, except in ways that were largely symbolic. Workers and lower-middle-class people were the hardest hit by the great recession and the subprime
home mortgage crisis, with black families faring worst, and Latinos close behind (Rugh and Massey 2010); Obama has not defended them. Many writers have explained Obamas centrism and unwillingness to
raise the issue of race as functions of white racism (Sugrue 2010). The black community and other communities of colour as well remains politically divided. While black folk have taken the hardest blows from
the reactionary and racist regime that has mostly dominated US politics since Reagan (if not since Nixon), no united black movement has succeeded the deaths of Malcolm and Martin. Although there is always
important political activity underway, a relatively large and fairly conservative black middle class, a black bourgeoisie in Fraziers (1957) terms, has generally maintained its position since the end of the civil rights
era. Largely based in the public sector, and including a generally centrist business class as well, this stratum has continued to play the role that Frazier and before him, Charles S. Johnson. William Lloyd
Warner, Alison Davis and other scholars identified: vacillation between the white elite and the black masses. Roughly similar patterns operate in Latino communities as well, where the working towards
whiteness framework coexists with a substantial amount of exclusion and super-exploitation. Alongside class issues in communities of colour, there are significant gender issues. The disappearance of blue-collar
work, combined with the assault by the criminal justice system chiefly profiling by the police (stop and frisk) and imprisonment, have both unduly targeted and victimized black and brown men, especially youth.

Women of colour are also targeted, especially by violence, discrimination and assaults on their reproductive rights (Harris-Perry 2011); profiling is everywhere (Glover 2009). Here again we are in the realm of
racial politics. Debate proceeds in the black community on Obamas credibilty, with Cornel West and Tavis Smiley leading the critics. But it seems safe to say that in North Philly, Inglewood or Atlantas Lakewood
section, the president remains highly popular. Latino support for Obama remains high as well. Feagin and Elias need to clarify their views on black and brown political judgement. Is it attuned to political realities or
has it been captured by the white racial frame? Is Obamas election of no importance? *** In conclusion, do Feagin and Elias really believe that white power is so complete, so extensive, so sutured (as Laclau
and Mouffe might say) as they suggest here? Do they mean to suggest, in Borg-fashion, that resistance is futile? This seems to be the underlying political logic of the systemic racism approach, perhaps
unintentionally so. Is white racism so ubiquitous that no meaningful political challenge can be mounted against it? Are black and brown folk (yellow and red people, and also others unclassifiable under the alwaysabsurd colour categories) utterly supine, duped, abject, unable to exert any political pressure? Is such a view of race and racism even recognizable in the USA of 2012? And is that a responsible political position

racial
conflict, both within (and against) the state and in everyday life, is a fundamentally political
process. We think that they would also accept our claim that the ongoing political realities of race provide extensive
evidence that people of colour in the USA are not so powerless , and that whites are not
so omnipotent, as Feagin and Eliass analysis suggests them to be. Racial formation theory allows us to see that there are contradictions in racial oppression. The racial formation approach
to be advocating? Is this what we want to teach our students of colour? Or our white students for that matter? We suspect that if pressed, Feagin and Elias would concur with our judgement that

reveals that white racism is unstable and constantly challenged, from the national and indeed global level down to the personal and intra-psychic conflicts that we all experience, no matter what our racial identity

there have been enormous increases in racial

inequality in recent years. But movement-based anti-racist opposition continues, and
sometimes scores victories. Challenges to white racism continue both within the state and in civil society. Although largely and properly led by people of colour, anti-racist
movements also incorporate whites such as Feagin and Elias themselves. Movements may experience setbacks, the reforms for
which they fought may be revealed as inadequate, and indeed their leaders may be co-opted or even eliminated, but racial
might be. While racism largely white continues to flourish, it is not monolithic. Yes,

subjectivity and self-awareness, unresolved and conflictual both within the individual psyche and the body politic,
abides. Resistance is not futile.

Engagement with institutions, although imperfect, is necessarytheir

fatalism is the right wings plan working
Reed 08 Adolph Reed is the Professor of Political Science at the University of Pennsylvania. (Race and the New Deal Coalition,
www.thenation.com/article/race-and-new-deal-coalition#axzz2ZcPH3kri)
But the fact is, most

New Deal programs were anything but race-neutral--or, for that matter, gender-neutral--in
their impact. Some, like the initial Social Security old-age pension program, were established on a racially invidious, albeit officially raceneutral, basis by excluding from coverage agricultural and domestic workers, the categories that included nearly 90 percent of black workers at the
time. Others, like the CCC, operated on Jim Crow principles. Roosevelt's housing policy put the weight of federal support behind creating and
reproducing an overtly racially exclusive residential housing industry. That so much of recent liberal and left discussion of the New Deal has been
charged by the imperatives of current

political debates has given it an unfortunate either/or quality . In

reality, the New Deal was both racially discriminatory and a boon to many black
Americans. Blacks benefited relatively less than whites from many social policy
initiatives. Worse, postwar urban renewal--one of the main conduits of federal resources to the local level--actively intensified racial
disadvantage as blacks and Puerto Ricans were displaced for federally supported redevelopment at a rate more than 500 percent greater than their
share of the national population. But benefiting relatively less does not mean not benefiting. The Social
Security exclusions were overturned, and black people did participate in the WPA, Federal Writers' Project, CCC and other classic New Deal initiatives,
as well as federal income relief. Moreover, the National Labor Relations Act facilitated the Congress of Industrial Organizations' efforts, from which
blacks also benefited substantially. Black

Americans' emergence as a significant constituency in the

Democratic electoral coalition helped to alter the party's center of gravity and was one of
the factorsas was black presence in the union movementcontributing to the success of the
postwar civil rights insurgency. One lesson to take from reflecting on the New Deal is that
political institutions and the politics rooted in them can have significant and far-reaching
consequences. The right understands this well . When Newt Gingrich and his protofascist comrades
took over Congress in 1994, they sneeringly boasted that they intended to take the federal government
back to the 1920s. This was not only because they were bent on eliminating redistributive social programs. They also wanted
to extirpate from the culture the idea that government can be an active force for making
most people's lives better . By crippling public institutions, they leave us without any
rudder or focus for an effective politics . We need to remember that in the lived experience of
younger Americans today, public power and government capacity have been only
dismissed and disparaged. Both Democratic presidential candidates qualify their embrace

of federal activism and temporize with fealty to market forces and calls to personal
responsibility. Therefore, the nostalgic identification that those of us who are older or who grew up in left, union or Democratic activist
households feel for the New Deal era will not transfer well to others. I've seen this with my own students. To those young people who encounter the

We can use the New

Deal as part of a discussion about what government can do and how its actions can
change the playing field in progressive ways . What we need most of all , though, is to
era, unions may have been necessary then; federal intervention and regulation may have been appropriate then.

articulate a politics steeped in a vision like that of the industrial democracy that fed the
social movements that pushed the New Deal to be as much as it was.

State Accessible for LGBTQ

State is accessible for LGBTQ recent ruling and trajectory prove
Edgar 8 ENGAGING WITH THE STATE: CITIZENSHIP, INJUSTICE, AND THE PROBLEM WITH QUEER Edgar, Gemma. is a
research fellow at The Australia Institute Gay and Lesbian Issues and Psychology Review4.3 (2008): 176-187.
http://search.proquest.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/docview//21403791/7D43C20E17E146FCPQ/1?accountid=14667

One response to the worry that LGBTI individuals and other minorities will be subsumed
by heteronormativity is that the inclusion of LGBTI and other non-mainstream individuals
into the body politic also reconstitutes citizenship . It is my position that the work performed by Twenty10
evidences the ability of citizenship claims to both challenge heteronormativity and
redress redistributive injustice. Twenty10 engages with the state through the receipt of
both Federal and NSW State Government funding. In a Marshellian vein it takes advantage of the
redistributive capacity of the state in order to provide programmes that redress both the
socio-economic and identity based disadvantages experienced by its young people.
Financial support from government has allowed Twenty10 to provide significant services
to its young people, including: medium term supported accommodation; counselling;
case management; social and support groups; family support services; and communitybased early intervention. That is, a politics of citizenship, of engaging with the state, has
allowed Twenty10 to attempt to address injustices of both redistribution and recognition.
One example of this work is Twenty10's provision of six medium-term, LGBTI specific units. As medium-term housing, these units offer the
young people who live in them a safe and secure place to live for 3-18 months. I interviewed one
young person who was living in one of these apartments. She described what it was like as: I guess it just feels more
familiar and safe you know ... I've been to like different youth centres that aren't queer and like here I just feel like I can make myself at home and
like feel safe ... And it's just nice to have queer people all around you like you know people that you identify with (God Pie).13 God Pie's comments highlight the value of LGBTI
specific accommodation for queer young people, which is that 'mainstream' services are not always safe places for LGBTI people. LGBTI specific accommodation is one way to

These units, however, would be extremely difficult for

Twenty10 to provide if it did not have the financial support of the state. In this example, we can see how
create safer places for LGBTI individuals experiencing homelessness.

relying upon a mechanism to redistribute economic resources is a valuable way to address redistributive injustice experienced by LGBTI young people. More, however, is

By funding Twenty10, the Government recognises

the citizenship of LGBTI young people. Receiving government funding is a symbol of
community inclusion, as well as being a redress to redistributive injustice. If you are concerned about
community embrace, acknowledgment and ultimately, belonging, then it matters that the welfare of young LGBTI people is
supported by the government, because it means that they are being acknowledged.
Another example of how engaging with the state has allowed Twenty10 to address the
injustices experienced by their young people is their community-based early intervention
programme called Ready or Not. Ready or Not is funded through the Federal Government's
Reconnect programme. This funds Twenty10 staff to travel throughout NSW to conduct
training sessions with key community members, such as police, teachers and health,
youth and welfare workers. This training is intended to resource communities so that
queer young people are less likely to become isolated. The idea is that if key community members know how to work with
occurring in this example than just a response to redistributive injustice.

and support queer young people, then these young people are less likely to turn up on the doorstep of Twenty10 needing help. Ready or Not is one way Twenty10 attempts to
create community change, and it is able to provide it only because of the financial support of the state. One staff member explained the impact of it as: ... the Ready Or Not
training ... we certainly get our message across and we do talk about, we talk about how homophobia hurts, so we talk about things like, increased rates of suicidality and a
whole range of things, so we don't just gloss it over so it's in a nice little tidy package, so people find it palatable. But at the same time I think the way that we do it, in that
professional way has more of an impact, people can actually take it and I kind of think that by the way that we are doing, I think if we were running around with banners here and

Ready or Not again highlights the

advantages of Twenty10's relationship with the state. In this example, Twenty10 addresses injustices of both recognition and
there, that maybe that would make people a little bit more defensive about hearing our message.

redistribution because by challenging heteronormativity and homophobia (recognition), they are also attempting to address the causes of LGBTI youth homelessness
(redistribution). What is occurring is not to do with LGBTI individuals conforming to the demands of the state. Rather, the 'mainstream' community is being challenged by
Twenty10 staff to itself change. Rather than the demand that young LGBTI people must become 'like' the majority, the majority itself is what is being disrupted. Ready or Not fits
squarely with the argument that engaging with the 'mainstream' in order to make it more accepting, and relying upon the state to do so, can reconstitute citizenship and is hence
an effective way to address both recognition and redistributive based injustice. Twenty10 is, I would posit, only able to provide LGBTI specific housing and the Ready or Not
programme because it presents a face that is not "at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant" (Halperin, 1995, p. 62). That is, Twenty10 appears to be the good gay

However, Twenty10
still confronts heteronormative notions of citizenship through challenging youth and
community workers to recognise the needs of LGBTI young people. Further, Twenty10
uses state funds to assist young LGBTI people experiencing homelessness. It also
provides further services, including: counseling, case management, social and support
groups and family support services. All of these examples highlight how a reliance upon
the state can help to address the injustices of redistribution and recognition experienced
by LGBTI young people. As queer theorists warn us, there are costs to this and the constraints of the purchaser-provider contracts required by
government evidence this. But the idea of citizenship as always being heteronormative and exclusionary
is difficult to maintain when citizenship tools are able to provide a response to the
injustices experienced by the young people at Twenty10. Twenty10 would not be able to
do this work if it engaged in the style of politics suggested by queer, that is, if it was suspicious of the state. As Altman writes, "queer
citizen that the governmental thesis warns us of, in that it works in the 'mainstream' community and relies upon the state to support it.

theories are relatively unhelpful in constructing this sort of politics because of their lack of emphasis on political institutions as distinct from discourse" (2001, p. 158). It is
Twenty10's emphasis on political institutions, its demand to fully belong, that has allowed it to do the work it does.