INCSEA

INCSEA agreements are conducted by the Navy and signed by the Navy
Department of State 1972 [DOS, Agreement Between the Government of The United
States of America and the Government of The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas,
http://www.state.gov/t/isn/4791.htm#, accessed 7/24/16, ge]
In the late 1960s, there were several incidents between forces of the U.S. Navy and the Soviet Navy. These included planes of the two nations passing
near one another, ships bumping one another, and both ships and aircraft making threatening movements against those of the other side. In March
1968 the United States proposed talks on preventing such incidents from becoming more serious. The Soviet Union accepted the invitation in

The
Agreement was signed by Secretary of the Navy John Warner and Soviet Admiral
Sergei Gorshkov during the Moscow summit meeting in 1972. Specifically, the agreement provides for: steps
November 1970, and the talks were conducted in two rounds -- October 1, 1971, in Moscow and May 17, 1972, in Washington, D.C.

to avoid collision; not interfering in the "formations" of the other party; avoiding maneuvers in areas of heavy sea traffic; requiring surveillance ships
to maintain a safe distance from the object of investigation so as to avoid "embarrassing or endangering the ships under surveillance"; using accepted
international signals when ships maneuver near one another; not simulating attacks at, launching objects toward, or illuminating the bridges of the
other partys ships; informing vessels when submarines are exercising near them; and requiring aircraft commanders to use the greatest caution and
prudence in approaching aircraft and ships of the other party and not permitting simulated attacks against aircraft or ships, performing aerobatics over
ships, or dropping hazardous objects near them. The agreement also provides for: (1) notice three to five days in advance, as a rule, of any projected
actions that might "represent a danger to navigation or to aircraft in flight"; (2) information on incidents to be channeled through naval attaches
assigned to the respective capitals; and (3) annual meetings to review the implementation of the Agreement. The protocol to this agreement grew out
of the first meeting of the Consultative Committee established by the agreement. Each side recognized that its effectiveness could be enhanced by
additional understandings relating to nonmilitary vessels. In the protocol signed in Washington, D.C., on May 22, 1973, each party pledged not to make
simulated attacks against the nonmilitary ships of the other. Like other confidence-building measures, the Incidents

at Sea
Agreement does not directly affect the size, weaponry, or force structure of the parties. Rather, it serves to enhance mutual
knowledge and understanding of military activities ; to reduce the possibility of conflict by accident, miscalculation, or the
failure of communication; and to increase stability in times of both calm and crisis. In 1983, Secretary of the Navy John Lehman
cited the accord as "a good example of functional navy-to-navy process" and credited this area of

Soviet-American relations with "getting better rather than worse." In 1985, he observed that the frequency of incidents was "way down from what it was
in the 1960s and early 1970s."

INCSEA is a navy to navy agreement anything else isnt INCSEA

Winkler 14 - PhD, is a retired US Navy Commander and historian serving as Director of
Programs at the Naval Historical Foundation in Washington, DC [David, 2014, Canadian Naval
Review, Breaking News: Incidents at Sea Did Not End with the Cold War!, Vol 9 No. 4,
http://www.navalreview.ca/wp-content/uploads/public/vol9num4/vol9num4art4.pdfaccessed
7/14/16, ge]
The second article is by retired US Navy Captain and Staff Judge Advocate Pete Pedrozo. He argues against an accord because: (1) PLAN is not a bluewater navy as the Soviet Navy was and thus isnt deserving of the elevated stature that INCSEA would render; (2) US and Chinese views on
international law differ and cannot be reconciled; (3) INCSEA is a navy-to-navy accord and many of the issues with China
have involved non-navy units; (4) INCSEA is a Cold War instrument not appropriate for the relationship that the United States is trying to forge with
China; (5) Chinas actions in the South China Sea undermine its credibility as a responsible state actor; and (6) international regulations and regional
arrangements have been implemented to supplant the communications mechanisms associated with INCSEA.11

Secretary of Navy is a senior military official - doesnt meet diplomatic engagement

Williams 1984 - MA, International Relations, Boston University; BES Industrial Management,
Johns Hopkins University. He is career military intelligence officer with extensive command and
staff experience in Europe [Wade, March, The National War College, Strategic Studies Report
Abstract,
http://www.solami.com/dialogue.pdf, accessed7/24/16, ge]
Synopsis of Significant US-Soviet Military-to-Military Contacts i. visits/Exchanges by Senior
Military Officials a. Secretary of Defense - Minister of Defense - There have been no exchanges at this
level in the post-war era (with the partial exception of the CSAF visit to Moscow discussed below). - Secretary Brown did meet Minister of Defense
Ustinov on the fringes of the SALT II Summit (June 1979, in Vienna). b. Chairman of the JCS and Soviet Chief of General Staff - Also no exchanges at
this level. - General Jones and Marshal Ogarkov did, however, meet on the fringes of the SALT II Summit. c. Service Chiefs - General Nathan F.
Twining, as CSAF, visited Moscow with a group of Air Force officers in June 1956. visit was hosted by then Minister of Defense, Marshal of the Soviet
Union Zhukov. d. Visits between CINCUSAREUR and CINCGSFG. - Took place regularly during immediate post WWII period; were discontinued as
Cold War developed. - CINCUSAREUR accepted CINCGSFG invitation for September 1973. - Return visit by CINCGSFG took place in 1977. e. Contacts
between US Army Chief of Military History and Soviet Chief of the Institute of Military History. - Began when Soviet history chief (General-Lieutenant
Zhilin) invited US Army Chief of Military History (BG Collins) to visit Moscow in May 1970. - Zhilin made return visit to US in June 1971. - Two other
reciprocal visits were made, the last being when Zhilin returned to the US in April 1978. 39 2. visits by Military College Students a. A 10-man (8 of
them students) National War College delegation, led by NDU President, LTG Gard, visited Moscow, Leningrad and Volgograd in April 1977. b. Return

visit by a 5-man (i student) Soviet delegation was made in September 1977. c. An unofficial trip (i.e., tourist status, not by invitation of Soviets) was
made by NDU students in April 1983, as part of NDU field studies program. Group was led by NDU President, LTG Pustay. d. NDU proposes similar
trip for April 1984. 3. Exchanges of Military Lecturers a. In 1977, a US general officer, BG John Bard, delivered lectures to Soviet military audiences. b.
Also in 1977, two Soviet Generals delivered lectures to military audiences here in the US. 4. Exchange Ship Visits a. Two Soviet destroyers visited

Incidents at Sea
Talks a. Initiated for the purpose of establishing measures to prevent incidents involving US and Soviet aircraft and naval vessels at sea;
Boston in May 1975. b. Two US destroyers (LEAHY and TATTNALL) visited Leningrad at about the same time. 5.

presently the only institutionalized contact we have with Soviet senior military officials. b. Initiated in Moscow in 1971. US delegation was headed by
then Under Secretary of Navy
talks were in Moscow in May 1982.

John Warner. c. Meetings take place annually, rotating between Moscow and Washington; last

Even if military actors are acting diplomatically it is still military to military

engagement
Mabus 9 secretary of the navy [Ray, March, SUBJ/DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY SUPPORT
TO THE DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM, http://www.public.navy.mil/bupersnpc/reference/messages/Documents/ALNAVS/ALN2013/ALN13074.txt, accessed 7/24/16, ge]
2. Since 1882, our Attache Corps has served with distinction at our Embassies overseas and played a critical role in the success of
every major military campaign of the past century. Budget constraints and the decreased availability of conventional forces
underscore the importance of our Attaches to provide in-country presence, sustain our global partnerships and maintain access
for our operational forces. As the principal military advisors in foreign countries to U.S. Ambassadors, Combatant Commanders,
and the leadership of the Department of Defense (DoD), these multitalented Sailor and Marine diplomats serve

on the leading edge of U.S. foreign policy. Supported

by our exceptional enlisted corps of Operations Coordinators,

Operations Non- commissioned Officers, and Operations Assistants, Attaches

engagement, theater security cooperation, and U.S.

deeply value their service.

facilitate military-to-military

defense activities. I have observed firsthand their critical work and