CITY of WICHITA Plaintiff-Appellee V Brad HERSHBERGER Defendant-Appellant

CITY OF WICHITA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brad..., 1999 WL 35017146...
1999 WL 35017146 (Kan.App.) (Appellate Brief)

Court of Appeals of Kansas.
CITY OF WICHITA, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Brad HERSHBERGER, Defendant-Appellant.
No. 98-82234-A.
May 3, 1999.
Appeal from the District Court of the County of Sedgwick of the State of Kansas,
District Court Judges Clark Owens and Rebecca Pilshaw, Case No. 98 CR 1811
Brief of Accused
Brad: Hershberger, Trustee, for the federal life cestui que, Trust Brad Hershberger., c/o P.O. Box 781094, Wichita,
Kansas, (Address used without prejudice), No phone number.
Oral argument: 30 minutes
*i TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE ......................................................................................................
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ..................................................................................................
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS .................................................................................................
IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ...........................................................................................
IV. A) In regard to timely probable cause hearings ............................................................................
1
3
9
19
19
K.S.A. 22-2202. Definitions.

(3) Arraignment
(4) Arrest
(14) Magistrate
(16) Preliminary examination
K.S.A. 22-2901. Appearance before the magistrate.
K.S.A. 12-4111. Law enforcement officers; employment; powers.
K.S.A. 12-4403. Time of arraignment.
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v MCLAUGHLIN, 111 S.Ct. 1661
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103; 95 S.Ct. 854
Miranda v. State of Arizona, 86 SCt 1602.
Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 2, 5.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn. 387 (1871); Long v The State, 12 Ga. 293, 318 (1852) Moses v State, 6 Ga.App. 251, 64
S.E. 699 (1909);
Hill v Smith, 59 S.E. 475 (Va. 1907) Folson v Piper, 192 Iowa 1056, 186N. W. (1922); Edger v Burke,
28
96Md. 715, 54 Atl. 986 (1903); Bryan v Comstock, 220 S.W. 475. ......................................................
K.S.A. 22-2902. Preliminary examination.
United States Constitution, Article IV, 1. Full faith and credit clause.
15 Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS Search and seizure. .....................
20
*ii Amendment 4 to the Constitution of the UNITED STATES SEARCHES AND SEIZURES. ...
20
Gamier v Squires, 62 Kan. 321, 62 Pac. 1005 (1900); Kroeger v Passmore, 36 Mont. 504, 93 Pac. 805 (1908).
Sinclair Refining Co. v Meek, 62 Ga.App. 850, 10 S.E. 76, (1940), citing 3 Bl. Com. 127;
12 Amer. & Eng Ency of Law, 721; 19 Cyc. 319.
2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
Ex Parte Rhodes, 202 Ala. 68, 79 So. 462, 465; citing Sarah Way's Case, 41 Mich., 304, 1 N.W. 1023 (1879), et al.
Also cited and affirmed in Pinkerton v Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579, 583 (1889); State v Williams, 45 Ore.
314, 77 Pac. 965, 969 (1904); Adair v Williams, 24 Ariz. 422, 210 Pac. 853, 8567 (1922).
Tillman v Beard, 121 Mich. 475, 80 N.W. 248 (1899).
Pinkerton v Verberg, 78 Mich. 573, 44 N.W. 579, 582 (1889); Larson v Feeney. 196 Mich. 1, 162 N.W. 275 (1917).
Vol. 2 of Ruling Case Law, Arrest, Constitutional Requirements as to Warrants; 2 R.C.L 463, 21.
4 Bl. Comm. 292.
Shanley v Wells, 71 III. 78, 82 (1873).
1 Hale's P.C., 589; 2 Hawkin's P.C., ch. 13, sec. 8; I Burns, J., 287; 4 Blackstone 292; 9 Bacon, Abrid., 468; I Chitty
Cr. Law, 15; Clark's Criminal Procedure, 39, Russell, Crimes, vol. 3, page 83; 4 Amer. And Eng. Ency. of Law, 902,
Commonwealth v Krubeck, 8 Penn. Dist. Rep. 521, 522 (1899).
Allor v Wayne Co., 43 Mich. 76, 97, 4 N.W. 492, 495 (1880).
Earl of Halsbury, The Laws of England, vol. 38, 3rd Ed., Pt. 4 1266, p. 765, London, 1962
Southern Ry. Co v Shirley, 11 Ky. 863, 90 S.W. 597, 599 (1906); citing: 12 Am. & Eng Ency of Law
21
(2d Ed 233); the burden is upon the defendant to show that the arrest was by authority of law. ..........
McAleer v Good, 216 Pa. 473, 65 Atl. 934, 935 (1907); Mackie v Ambassador Hotel & Inv Co., 123 Cal App 215, 11
P.2d 3, 6 (1932).
*iii State v Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51, 56, 171 N.W.2d 695 (1969);
Butler v State, 212 So.2d 573, 577
Sergeant v Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 244 Iowa 185, 52 N.W.2d 86, 92 (1952).
Citing Maxwell v Maxwell, 189 Iowa 7, 177 N.W. 541 (1920).
Markey v Griffin, 109 Ill.App. 212 (1903).
Gamier v Squires, 62 Kan. 321, 62 P. 1005,
Holland v Lutz, 194 Kan. 712, 401 P.2d 1015, 1019 (1965).
1 Coke 177; 4 Bouvier's Institutes, n. 3828.
Boesch v Kick, 98 N.J.Law 183, 119 Atl. 1 (1922); 25 A.L.R. 1516; 5 Am. Jur. 2d, Arrest 22 p. 712
Hotzei v. Simmons, 258 Wis 234, 45 N.W.2d 688, 690 (Tex. Civ. App., 1951).
Meints v Huntington, 276 Fed. 245, 250 (1921) ...................................................................................
22
Hopkins v Clemson College, 221 U.S. 636, 642 (1910);
Johnson v Lankford, 245 U.S. 541, 546 (1917).
Smith v State, 208 So.2d 746, 747 (Miss., 1968)
Morrow v State, 140 Neb. 592, 300 N.W. 843, 845 (1941)
Liberis v Harper, 89 Fla. 477; 104 So. 853, 855 (1925).
Camara v Municipal court, 387 U.S. 523, 541 State v Paulick, 277 Minn. 140, 151 N.W.2d 591, 596 (1967). Cox v
Perkins, 151 Ga. 632, 107 S.E. 863, 865 (1921)
2 R.C.L. Arrest, 7, p. 700; citing Leiqhton v Hall, 31 III. 108. 5 American Jurisprudence, 2d Ed., Arrest, 8, p.
702
Mullins v Sander, 189 Va 624, 54 S.E.2d 116, 120 (1949), citing, 22 Am. Jur., False Imprisonment, 20, p. 366; 35
C.J.S., False Imprisonment, 30, 31, pp. 545-547; Also: Peckham v Warner Bros. Pictures, 36 Cal.App.2d 214, 97
Pac.2d 472, 474 (1939); Oxford v. Berry, 204 Mich. 197, 170 N.W. 83, 88 (1918).
Gamier v Souires, 62 Kan. 321, 62 Pac. 1005, 1007 (1900).
Kominskv v Durand, 64 R.I. 387, 12 Atl.2D 652, 655 (1940).
Kirk v Garrett. 84 Md. 383, 406, 35 Atl 1089, 1092 (1896); citing 1 Hil. Torts, pp. 213-14, 9.
*iv 18 U.S.C. 3041. 18 U.S.C.A. Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 5, p. 29 Also see: Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn.
387 (1871); Long v The State, 12 Ga. 293, 318 (1852) Moses v State, 6 Ga.App. 251, 64 S.E. 699 (1909); Hill v Smith.
59 S.E. 475 (Va. 1907) Folson v Pioer, 192 Iowa 1056, 186N. W. 28 (1922);
Edqer v Burke, 96Md. 715, 54 Atl. 986 (1903); Bryan v Comstock, 220 S.W. 475
Pastor v Regan
Bass v State, 92 N.Y.S.2d 42, 42, 196 Misc. 177 (1949)
Ulvestad v Dolphin et al, 152 Wash. 580, 278 Pac 681, 684 (1929)
Brock v Stimson, 108 Mass. 520 (1871), citing: Hefler v Hunt, 129 Me 10, 112 A 675,(1921)
Keefe v Hart, 213 Mass 476, 100 N.E. 558 (1913) ...............................................................................
23
Madson v Hutchison, Sheriff, et al., 49 Idaho 358, 290 Pac. 208 (1930)
People v McGurn, 341 III. 632, 173 N.E. 754, 757 (1930)
State v Parker, 75 N.C. 249 (1876)
11 Ruling Case Law, False Imprisonment, 15, pp. 801-02. Also see: Williams v Zelzah Warehouse, 126 Cal.App. 28,
14 Pac.2d 177 (1932)
Muscoe v Commonwealth, 86 Va. 443, 10 S.E. 534, 536 (1890)
Robertson v State, 198 S.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Tenn., 1947)

Town of Blacksburg v Beam, 104 S.C. 146, 88 S.E. 441 (1916); Allen v State. 197 N.W. 808, 810-11 (Wis 1924)
6A C.J.S. Arrest, 16 p. 30. Roberts v Dean, 187 So. 571, 575 (Fla. 1939)
Graham v State, 143 Ga. 440, 85 S.E. 328, 331 (1915).
City of Columbus v Holes, 152 N.E.2d 301, 306 (Ohio App. 1958)
State v Gum, 68 W.Va 105, 69 S.E 463, 464 (1910)
State v Rousseau, 40 Wash 2d 92, 241 P.2d 447, 449 (1952);
Porter v State, 124 Ga. 297, 52 S.E. 283, 287 (1905) ...........................................................................
State v Mobley, 240 N.C. 476, 83 S.E.2d 100, 102 (1954)
Walter Anderson, A Treatise on the Law of Sheriffs, Cononers and Constables, vol. 1 166, p. 160 (1941)
*v Sarah Way's Case, 41 Mich. 299, 305, 1 N.W. 1021 (1879); People v McGurn, 341 III 632, 173 N.E. 754, 759
(1930)
K.S.A. 12-4602 ....................................................................................................................................
K.S.A. 22-3610. Hearing on appeal; exception
K.S.A. 22-2905. Proceedings after the preliminary examination.
K.S.A. 12-4205a. Complaint and notice to appear in municipal court;
K.S.A. 8-2106. Traffic citation; procedure.
K.S.A. 8-2106(f)
K.S.A. 8-2106(g)
IV. B) In regard to the right to remain silent and the right not to give Fingerprint and mugshots
prior to conviction consider the following: .........................................................................................
24
25
25
State v. Boudette, 791 P.2d 1063

Miranda v Arizona, 384 US. 436
Haves v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811:
IV. C) In regard to the prosecuting attorney's failure to timely file an information or complaint in the
office of the clerK of the district court, ..............................................................................................
IV. D) In regard to the fact that Accused was never arraigned as shown by the transcripts of record ..
27
27
Araersinqer v. Hamlin, 407 US 23; 32 L Ed2d 530.
Stultz v. Stultz, 94 A.2d 527.
Anderson v. Tavlorcraft. Inc., 197 F.Supp 872, 874; United States v. Hoerner, 157 F.Supp 563, 567; Durabilit Steel
Locker Co. v. Berger Mfg. Co., 21 F.2d 139; Davies v. Superior Court for San Diego County, 228 C.A.2d 535; Aker v.
Siibaugh, 113 P.2d 814; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 142 N.W.2d 508, 511; National Sur. Corp. v. Shoemaker, 195 N.W.2d 134.
Cactus Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., v. MA/ Montmartre, her engines, tackle, etc., et al., Orient Leasing Co., Ltd., v. Corinth
Pipeworks. S.A., Cross, 756 F.2d 1103, 1110 (1985).
IV. E) Accused sent the DIRECTOR OF VEHICLES BETTY MCBRIDE a revocation of signature
28
to the license in March of 1995, as evidenced by Accused's NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR
AGENCY INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE (R. EIGHT, 112-127) filed *vi September 17,
1998 (Letter to the Director of the DRIVER CONTROL BUREAU GARY CARTER): GARY
CARTER has not responded as of this date. The lower Courts failed to compel any discovery for
Accused and the palintiff refused to produce any of the information (Brady evidence) demanded by
Accused. ..............................................................................................................................................
In regard to public officers' fiduciary duty to speak consider the following portion of well established law; where
one has a duty to speak and neglects to do so or performs incompletely such (in)action can only be construed to be
fraud:
Strong v. Repide, 213 US 419; Griswold v Hazard, 141 US 260.
American Surety Co. v West State Bank 4 SW2d 312
Donovan v Aeolian Co, 200 NE 815
Hillel v Motor Haulage Co. 1 App Div2d 782
Hays v. Meyers, 107 SW 287
State v. McIntire, 46 NC 1
Farrar v Churchill 135 US 609, Avery v Cleary 132 US 604

Colvin v Warren, 163 SE 268
Cooper Process Co. v Chicago Bonding & Ins. Co., 262 F 66
Tyler v Savage, 143 U.S. 79
Guastella v Wardell 198 So2d 227; Burton v Maupin 281 SW 83
Atwood v Chapman 68 Me 38
Childress v Nordman 78 SE2d 757
Stevens v Marco, 305 P2d 669
Gould v York County Mut. F. Ins. Co., 47 Me 403
Colvin v Warren 163 SE 268
Jenkins v McCormick, 184 Kan 842
Villalon v Bowen, 273 P2d 409
Strong v Repide, 213 US 419 Johnson v. Johnson 372 SW2d 598
Sellers v Sellers, 428 P2d 23
Sparks v Guaranty State Bank, 182 Kan 165
Eisenschmidt v Conway, 155 P2d 24
Pashley v Pacific Electric R. Co., 153 P2d 325
*vii Sparks v Guaranty State Bank, 182 Kan 165; Bushey v Coffman, 103 Kan 209
Equitable L. Ins. Co. v Halsey, S.&Co. 312 US 41
American Bonding Co. v Fourth Nat. Bank 91 So 480
Kimball v Pacific Gas & E. Co. 30 P2d 39
Stackpole v Hancock, 24 So 914
Mason v Salomon 311 P2d 652
Crompton Beedle, 75 A 331
Tooker v Alston 159 F 599
Portland Cement Co. v White, 238 SW2d 368
Jones v Herring 16 SW2d 325
Gilliiand v Mt. Vernon Hotel Co. 321 P2d 558
Rothmiller v Stein, 38 NE 718
Chicora Fertilizer Co. v Dunan, 46 A 347;
Crompton v Beedle 75 A 331
Chiodo v Garramone, 11 Misc 2d 743
Harrison v State 270 US 632
Steinaer v Roberts, 131 NE2d 238
Hadley v Clinton County Importing Co. 13 Ohio St 502
Holland v Lentz 397 P2d 787
Gregory v Consolidated Utilities, 53 SW2d 854
IV. F) District Court Judge CLARK OWENS acknowledged during oral argument of Accused's
MOTION TO DISMISS that a privilege and a right are not identical in meaning. The following
well established law shows that the word occupation as used in connection with the licensing
thereof and the imposition of taxes thereon is identical in meaning with the word privilege and
includes any business, trade, profession, pursuit, vocation, or calling; consider the following in regard
to the use of an automobile for the right of passage versus the privilege of trafficking, see Accused's
PETITION TO ARREST JUDGMENT (R. ONE, 49-53): ...............................................................
30
Marbury v. Madison ............................................................................................................................

Newbill v. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SW2d 658.
See 29 Harv. L Rev. 437; Cf. Amenta v. Keath, 197 S.W. 686..............................................................
32
32
Dallas v.Gill, 199 S.W. 631, 635.

*viii Comm. v. Stodder. 2 Cush, 562; Hatfield v. Straus, 82 N.E. 172; See Johnson v. New York, 186, 78 N.E. 715.
See I Elliott. Roads and Streets, 3 ed., 544. Baltimore v. Baltimore Trust etc. Co., 166 U.S. 673; Nolan v. Riechman,
225 Fed. 812; Ex parte Dickey 85 S.E. 781.
McPhee etc. Col. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 158 Fed. 5; Sullivan v. Cent. III. Public Service Co., 122 N. E. 58; Auto
Transit Co. v Fr Worth (1915), 182 SW 685.
State v. Van Daalan, 11 N.W.2d 523, 527.
Drauahon v. Fox-Pelletier Corporation, 126 S.W.2d 329, Vol. 53 C.J.S., West Publishing (1987), LICENSES 2 pg
321.
K.S.A. 77-502. Definitions ..................................................................................................................
33
(c) License means a franchise, permit certification, approval, registration, charter or similar form of authorization
required by law for a person to engage in a profession or occupation.
K.S.A. 8-1430. License and license to operate a motor vehicle defined.
K.S.A. 8-2,128. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE ACT Definitions. 265 U.S. 145
Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 47 ALR 457...................................................................
34
Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 22.
Ex Parte Hoffert 148 NW 20.
State Ex Rel. Steohan v. Parrish 257 Kan. 294 (1995), 891 P.2d 445.
State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 60 C.J.S. 94 pg 581.
Desser v. Wichita (1915) 96 Kan 820; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 22.
Bogue v Bennett, 60 NE 143,
Desser v. Wichita (1915) 96 Kan 820; also see Ex Parte Hoffert 148 NW 20; State v. Flagg
42 P 1023; State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073 State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 60 C.J.S. 94 pg 581.
Schactman v. Dulles 225 F2d 938, 941 35
Thompson v. Smith 154 S.E. 579.
See 29 Harv. L. Rev. 437; Cf. Argenta v. Keath, 197 S.W. 686.
Dallas v. Gill, 199 S.W. 631, 635.
*ix Comm. v. Stodder. 2 Cush, 562; Hatfield v. Straus, 82 N.E. 172; See Johnson v. New York, 186, 78 N.E. 715. See
I Elliott, Roads and Streets, 3 ed., 544.
Baltimore v. Baltimore Trust etc. Co., 166 U.S. 673; Nolan v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812; Ex parte Dickey 85 S.E. 781.
McPhee etc. Col. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 158 Fed. 5; Sullivan v. Cent. III. Public Service Co., 122 N. E. 58; 33 Harv
L Rev. 1058.
Shapiro v. Thompson 394 U.S. 618; .....................................................................................................
36
State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett 223 Kan. 618.
Dunn v. Blumstein 405 U.S. 330; Aptheker v. Secretary of State 378 U.S. 500; State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett 223
Kan. 618.
Chicago v. Collins 51 N.E. 907 J. & A. Freilberg Co. v. Dawson 255 U.S. 288.
Miranda v. State of Arizona, 86 SCt 1602.
Miller v. US, 230 F 486, 489.
People v Blue 544 P 2d 385.
Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 2, 5.
Dillon v. Rogers, 36 Tex. 153.
Schactman v. Dulles 225 F2d 938, 941.
Shear v. Cullen, 481 F. 945 .................................................................................................................
37
K.S.A 16-111; 79-102; 79-3109d(a).
McCloud v U.S. 229 US 416; U.S. v Heinszen & Co, 206 U.S. 370; Dobley v U.S., 182 US 222; Haver v Yacker, 9
Wall 32; Downes v Bidwell 182 US 303; U.S. v Rice, 4 Wheat 246; see the Hague Conference at 32 Statutes At Large
of Congress, Chapter 2 p1803-1821,
Executive Order No. 10834, August 21, 1959, 24 F.R. 6865
4 U.S.C.1
K.S.A. 73-702
K.S.A. 73-701
Ruhstrat v. People, 57 N.E. 41, 1 Bouviers' Law Dictionsary, Rawles Rev., 799
IV. G) Accused was denied the right to compel witnesses on behalf of Accused to disclose what use of
an automobile justifies the levying of taxes associated with motor vehicle registration and licensure /
extrinsic Brady evidence. In regard to the fact that Accused was *x denied discovery, .........................
38
McNutt v. G.M. 56 S.Ct. 789, 80 L.Ed 1135; Thomson v. Gaskiel, 62 S.Ct. 673, 83 LEd. 111 ...............
3, 10, 15, 18-20 of the BILL OF RIGHTS of the CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF
KANSAS .............................................................................................................................................
1, 4, 5, 6, 14 of the BILL OF RIGHTS of the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
United States v. Baqley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)
SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY RULES.
38
39
10, BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KANSAS 5 and 6, BILL
OF RIGHTS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, Amendment 5. - CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EMINENT DOMAIN Amendment 6. - FURTHER
GUARANTIES IN CRIMINAL CASES
K.S.A. 12-4103 ...............................................................................................................................
K.S.A. 12-4410 Discovery, depositions:
K.S.A. 22-3212 (b) Discovery and Inspection:
K.S.A. 22-4709 Inspection of Record Information on Individuals:
K.S.A. 22-4711 Prior Record Information; Rights and Duties:
Kansas Open Record Act, K.S.A. 45-215 et seq,
K.S.A. 45-218 (d).
K.S.A. 22-3201. The charge.
5 USC 552 & 552a Freedom of Information Act
Jersey City v. Hague, 115 A.2d 8
public purpose
Dillon's Rule ...............................................................................................................................
due process of law
Brady evidence
unclean hands
Brady v. State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963)
*xi United States v. Bagley, 105 S.Ct. 3375, 473 U.S. 667 (1985)
SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY DISCIPLINARY RULES
Oiler v. Kincheioe's, INC., 235 Kan. 440 (1984); 681 P.2d 630
Minaenback v Minaenback, 176 Kan 471.
Art. 1, 5 of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS. Object of tax.
Loan Assoc. v. Tooeka, 20 WALL 655
40
41
In regard to the fact that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only together do
they have any force (one must remember that a city ordinance always quotes or is modeled after a statute) consider
the following excerpt (R. EIGHT, 95-103) of Accused's PETITION TO ARREST JUDGMENT:
22-3502. Arrest of judgment.
22-3201. The charge. ... The complaint, information or indictment shall state for each count the
42
official or customary citation of the statute, rule and regulation or other provision of law which the
defendant is alleged to have violated. .................................................................................................
K.S.A. 77-421(b):
U.S. vs. Frontier Airlines Inc. 563 F. 2d 1008 (1977)
Bruns v. Kansas State Bd of Technical Professions, 255 KAN. 728 (1994).
U.S. vs. Mersky, 361 U.S. 438.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21, 26, 39 L. Ed. 2d 812 (1974)
United States v. Reinis, 794 F 2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 1986) ..................................................................
U.S. v. Murphy, 809 F2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1987)
K.S.A. 8-2,140. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL DRIVERS' LICENSES ACT. Same; rules and regulations.
Art. 1, 5 of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS. Object of tax.
Art. 1, 3 of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS. Power of governor.
43
Art. 1, 4 of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS. Same; require information.

3, Bill of Rights, Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS, Right of peaceable assembly; petition;
US v Lacher 134 US 624
K.S.A. 21-3203 Ignorance or mistake.
*xii K.S.A. 84-9-105 KANSAS COMMENT 1983
This section, which does not vary from the 1972 Official Text, is designed to explain the sense in
which certain key terms are used in Article 9. The use of terms applicable to pre-UCC security forms
might imply that prior law referable to that form is still selected which have no common law or
statutory roots associating them to a particular form of security transaction. Other key definitions
are found in the next section, in 84-1-201, and often as part of the substantive section involved. Since
the UCC heavily uses words of art, with the drafters telling us (as in Alice in Wonderland) that
words mean whatever we want them to mean, it is imperative that the practitioner be sensitive to
the statutory definitions which apply in a given case. Sometimes Noah Webster would be shocked.
For example, the term buyer in 84-1-201(9) is not broad enough to include a lender, while the
term purchaser in 84-1-201(32) and (33) is broad enough. UCC cases can stand or fall on such fine
definitional distinctions. ......................................................................................................................
44
K.S.A. 84-2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause.
KANSAS COMMENT 1983
... This section does not define unconscionablility. However, in Wille v. Southwestern bell Tel. C., 219 K. 775, (1976),
the court put some meat on this statutory skeleton by identifying the factors which should be considered in making
a determination of unconscionability. These include: (1) use of adhesion contracts. (2) significantly excessive price,
(3) denial of basic rights and remedies. (4) penalty clause. (5) hiding disadvantageous clauses in fine print. (6) using
incomprehensible language, (7) overall imbalance in obligations. (8) exploitation of other party, and (9) inequality of
bargaining power...
K.S.A. 84-2-302
K.S.A. 77-421b
K.S.A 77-416. ...the subject of rules and regulations is products and services.
IV. H) In regard to Accused's demands to qualify his signature, consider the following excerpt (R. ONE, 49-53) of
Accused's:
K.S.A. 60-212(f)
K.S.A, 84-1-207
Bouvier's Law Dictionary: ...................................................................................................................
Compromise: ...It may, however, be considered settled that letters or admissions containing the expression in
substance that they are to be without prejudice will not be admitted in evidence.;
45
4 C. & P. 462; L.R. 6 Ch 827, 8 Sc. N. R. 741. *xiii fruit of an illegal search / exploratory search without warrant
The accused person shall be permitted to inspect all matters relevant to the case.
IV. I) In regard to the charging instruments listing a misnomer as applied to Accused, consider the
following excerpt (R. ONE, 34-38) of Accused's .................................................................................
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS:
46
McNutt v. G.M. 56 S.Ct. 789, 80 L.Ed 1135; Thomson v. Gaskiel, 62 S.Ct. 673, 83 L.Ed. 111.
K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1) through (6)
failed to bring the Rem within their jurisdiction
subrogated
confidence game ..............................................................................................................................
subrogee
fictitious Plaintiff
47
status crime Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341
false demonstration In re Heins' Estate, 22 P.2d 549
K.S.A. 60-210(a), (d)
K.S.A. 17-5224
given name
family name
doing business
forum state
doctrine of idem sonans holds that where one's name is misspelled but sounds correct when uttered, that said
misspelling is harmless error unless a party is mislead to his prejudice.
misnomer, K.S.A. 22-3207
surrogate
special visitation
federal life cestui que Trust BRAD HERSHBERGER
*xiv Robben V. Benson et al., 185 P. 200, also see King v. Slepka 146 P.2d 1002.
Peak v. State 163 N.E.2d 584 (1960) ..................................................................................................
48
fictitious name: A feigned name taken by a person, differing in some essential particular from his true name,
with the implication that it is meant to deceive or mislead. Pollard v. Fidelity F. Ins. Co., 47 N.W. 1060; Carlock v.
Caqnacci, 26 P. 597; Mangan v. Schuylkill County, 116 A. 920, 921, see Black's 4th. fiction of law. Something known
to be false is assumed to be true. Ryan v. Motor Credit Co., 23 A.2d 607, 621; see Black's Law Dictionary 4th and
6th
IV. J) In regard to findings of fact and conclusions of law relative to Court decisions consider the
following excerpt (R. ONE, 62-67) of Accused's: ................................................................................
PETITION TO ALTER AND AMEND THE JUDGMENT BY THE
ADDITION OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
48
60-259(f)
Rule 165 REASONS FOR DECISIONS
K.S.A. 60-252. Findings by the court.
K.S.A. 77-621. Scope of review.
IN RE MARRIAGE OF BRADLEY, 258 Kan. 39 (1994), 899 P.2d 471
STATE v. MEZINS, 4 Kan. App. 2d 292, 293 (1980), 605 P.2d 159:
MIESv. MIES. 217 Kan. 269 (1975), 535 P.2d 432:
CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................
49
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v MCLAUGHLIN, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991) rush to judgment

Oiler v. Kincheloe's. INC., 235 Kan. 440 (1984); 681 P.2d 630
Minqenback v Minqenback, 176 Kan 471
APPENDIX ...................................................................................................................
Exhibit 1A: Affidavit of Gordon: Bakken
Exhibit 2A: Accused's notice of exigent circumstance to BOEING management, drafted in jail.
Exhibit 3A: BOEING Notice of termination mailed to Accused.
*xv Exhibit 4A: District Court Clerk's TABLE OF CONTENTS RECORD ON APPEAL
52
*1 Brad: Hershberger, herein after Accused, the aggrieved party who is a transient living man without any commercial
nexus and without any political capacity, reserves all rights at all times and waives no rights at any time. Appellant
does not agree to appear as a subrogee for the legal fiction Defendant / Appellant BRAD HERSHBERGER (styled in
all capital letters). Accused is present only as Trustee for the federal life cestui que Trust BRAD HERSHBERGER.
Accused proceeds in this matter only upon special visitation and not generally and not in the privileged capacity of pro
se (in the nature of an attorney). Appellant is uncertain of the nature of the jurisdiction because the Appellee has failed
to prove the jurisdiction on the record. The court need not be reminded that parties acting in their own behalf are held:
...to less stringent standard than formal pleadings by lawyers. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519. Accused may receive
all correspondence regarding this matter, without prejudice, in care of the captioned Post Office's address. Accused
would show the Court as follows:
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The Accused man Brad: Hershberger was arrested, without warrant, allegedly for failing to use a turn signal, and Accused
was incarcerated in the SEDGWICK COUNTY ADULT DETENTION FACILITY for a period of 21 days in solitary
confinement from February 19, 1998 through March 12, 1998 with no *2 access to paper, pencil or telephone and
without any probable cause hearing in contradistinction to COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v MCLAUGHLIN, 111 S.Ct. 1661
(1991). The arresting officers' and jailers' neglect to provide Accused any probable cause, bail and arraignment hearings
was the direct cause of Accused's absence from work and the reason that Accused was terminated from the job that
Accused had held for 13.5 years. Accused has been unjustly prejudiced monetarily and defamed in character within the
community. Accused was scandalously denied any due process of law. Despite Accused's diligent demands, the Plaintiff
failed its fiduciary duty to create on the record the foundation of their colorable and prima facia cause of action to thereby
prove the jurisdiction of the Court. In regards to said arrest the legal fiction defendant BRAD HERSHBERGER (styled
in all capital letters) was convicted on the allegation of FAIL TO SIGNAL CHANGE FROM DIRECT COURSE,
Ordinance 11.28.040(b) by Judge RICHARD SHULL of the CITY OF WICHITA MUNICIPAL COURT, case no. 98TM-4251, and again on appeal by Judge CLARK OWENS and trial Judge REBECCA PILSHAW of the DISTRICT
COURT of the COUNTY OF SEDGWICK, case no. 98 CR 1811. All said Judges either ignored or summarily over ruled
all verbal and written defenses and arguments advanced by Accused, therefore Accused moves this Court to exercise its
fiduciary duty to proceed in a de novo review upon all issues and queries advanced by Accused herein and as shown
within the record to thereby remove any possible delusion in the mind of Accused as to his rights as arrestee of the instant
matter and as to what specific proven use of an automobile was conducted by Accused which creates the liability to the
taxes associated to the Plaintiff's purely statutory crime where there is no living flesh and blood injured party.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
All of Accused's pleadings were summarily overruled, also including post-trial pleadings in demand of findings of fact
and conclusions of law. The plaintiff and the lower courts all failed to provide any case law in rebuttal to the plethora of
well established law which support the arguments and demands advanced by Accused. The lower Courts have completely
evaded and swept under the rug all *3 issues and controversies advanced by Accused; it appears that their silence should
be equated with fraud. Therefore this Court has a fiduciary duty to handle this matter under the de novo standard of
review. This Court should independently rule upon all of Accused's pleadings and issues outlined below and thereby
remove any possible delusion in the mind of Accused. All of the presiding lower Court Judges of this matter should be
reprimanded for their rush to judgment and breach of fiduciary duty to properly adjudicate this matter; Accused was not
granted a single extension of time in the District Court.
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

Paragraphs A through J in IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES correspond directly to the issues shown below
also listed as paragraphs A through J.
A) During the incarceration of Accused from February 19, 1998 to March 12, 1998 the arresting officer, jailers and the
Plaintiff failed to provide Accused a probable cause hearing before a magistrate.
i) a) Does this work an estoppel upon the Plaintiff's complaint advanced by City Prosecutor SHARON DICKGRAFE?
b) By operation of law, does the Plaintiff's whole justification / cause of action fail?
c) Can the complaint against Accused be sustained?
d) Is Accused entitled to arrest of judgment?
ii) Does the Plaintiffs' denial of timely probable cause hearing and arraignment for Accused, which is an action under color
of law and custom and policy / abuse of authority given the officers and jailers by the law, operate to convert the Plaintiffs
into trespassers ab initio and render the arresting officers and all persons aiding and abetting therein wrongdoers from the
beginning and thereby the Plaintiff stands as if he never had any authority at all to act?
iii) Does the Plaintiffs' denial of timely probable cause hearing and arraignment for Accused make the search of Accused
and Accused's property invalid and any evidence obtained inadmissible?
*4 iv) Accused refused to reveal his given and family names upon arrest of the instant matter; did this in any way relieve
the arresting officers and jailers of their collective duty to provide a timely probable cause hearing (also encompassing
bail and arraignment) for Accused as a John Doe?
B)
i) Is Judge OWENS's assertion that one's right to remain silent does not include stating one's name merely his personal
view on what is in the public interest of the state, and therefore said ruling is immaterial as a bona fide basis for denying
Accused's motion(s) to dismiss and continuous demands to be released immediately from this false imprisonment?
ii) The driver's license issued to Accused expired in May of 1996 and Accused's signature thereon is accompanied with
the expression without prejudice, and in March of 1995 Accused mailed to the DRIVER CONTROL BUREAU a
revocation of signature of the driver's license. Therefore, Accused is not a licensee and Accused invoked the right to
remain silent upon arrest and Accused was never provided a probable cause hearing. Under said circumstance could
Accused refrain from saying or writing his name with impunity upon arrest? see State v. Boudette, 791 P.2d 1063.
iii) Where one holds a valid driver's license and he invokes the right to remain silent can he refrain from saying or
writing his name with impunity?
iv) What state granted licenses, privileges or immunities accepted by an American impinge upon that man's right to
exercise absolutely silence upon arrest?
v) Miranda provides the guidelines officers must follow for the interrogation of an arrestee to be admissible evidence.
Assuming arguendo that asking an arrestee his name does not come within the scope of interrogation, where and how
does the duty arise for the arrestee to identify himself upon request of arresting officers and jailers? See Miranda v Arizona,
384 U.S. 436.
vi) Is it the burden of the injured party to identify the Accused?
*5 vii) Accused refused to voluntarily provide fingerprints or mugshots; prior to conviction did the arresting officers,
jailers and District Court Judges have any bona fide authority to order Accused to give or the jailers to take Accused's
fingerprints and mugshot? See Haves v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811.
10
C) During the incarceration of Accused from February 19, 1998 to March 12, 1998 the arresting officer or prosecuting
attorney failed to file an information or complaint in the office of the clerk of the district court, charging the crime for
which Accused was arrested and Accused was never served a uniform notice to appear.
i) Do said failures work an estoppel upon the Plaintiff's complaint advanced by City Prosecutor SHARON
DICKGRAFE?
ii) Is the conviction of Accused an illegal sentence because Accused was never served a uniform notice to appear and
therefore judgment should be arrested?
D) The transcripts of record show that Accused was never arraigned; Accused was never asked how he pleads or if he
understands the charges.
i) Is the conviction of Accused an illegal sentence because Accused was never arraigned and therefore judgment should
be arrested?
E) Accused sent the DIRECTOR OF VEHICLES BETTY MCBRIDE a revocation of signature to the license in
March of 1995, as evidenced by Accused's NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR AGENCY INFORMATION AND
KNOWLEDGE filed September 17, 1998 (Letter to the Director of the Driver Control Bureau GARY CARTER):
GARY CARTER has not responded as of this date.
i) Can the agencies silence only be equated with fraud and or ratification of the said revocation?
ii) Does the agencies silence and failures to respond to Accused's correspondence prior to this instant matter and within
this instant matter work an estoppel upon the Plaintiff's cause of action?
*6 F) District Court Judge CLARK OWENS acknowledged during oral argument of Accused's MOTION TO
DISMISS that a privilege and a right are not identical in meaning.
Well established law shows that the word occupation as used in connection with the licensing thereof and the imposition
of taxes thereon is identical in meaning with the word privilege and includes any business, trade, profession, pursuit,
vocation, or calling.
The record does not demonstrate any commercial nexus of Accused and the record shows Accused is not a licensee; yet
Judge CLARK OWENS, upon his unsupported conclusions of law and fact, threatened to throw the book at Accused if
Accused were to be brought before the Court to answer a future traffic complaint, in spite of Accused's assertion that
Accused has always in the past and will continue in the future to use the highways, as of natural right, exclusively for the
ordinary purpose of passage and not for any privileged purpose of traffic or public service.
i) Are Judge OWENS's and Judge PILSHAW's rulings (mostly summary denials) merely their personal view on what is in
the public interest of the state. and therefore said rulings are immaterial as a bona fide basis for denial of the motions to
dismiss advanced by Accused before trial and at trial?
ii) Does Judge OWENS and Judge PILSHAW have a fiduciary duty to produce, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-252; 77-621(b)
and Rule 165, findings of fact and conclusions of law upon their interpretation and application of the definition of the
word privilege verses right and thereby unveil their apparent unrebuttable conclusive presumption that Accused uses
the highways for an undisclosed privileged activity?
11
iii) Does the Plaintiff and the Court have fiduciary duties to correct any apparent or possible delusion on the part of
Accused in regards to the application of the law researched by Accused and as Accused assert that it should be applied
to Accused's specific set of facts?
iv) Should by operation of law, the Courts' the Appellees' and their fellow servants' silence be construed to affirm that
Accused's research is current *7 law today and that Accused's conclusions of law as shown within the record are correct
and therefore Accused is entitled to arrest of judgment?
G) Judge OWENS and Judge PILSHAW did not allow Accused to depose the Director of the Driver Control Bureau
GARY CARTER by direct examination in Court or by separate deposition, or even by compelling the agency to answer
the queries within Accused's discovery pleadings of record. Accused was denied the right to compel said public servant
on behalf of Accused to disclose what use of an automobile justifies the levying of taxes associated with motor vehicle
registration and licensure / extrinsic Brady evidence.
i) Do the parties contend that where a private automobile is not used for the production of income that a license / privilege /
occupation tax does lie without savoring of confiscation as should have already been determined in reports drafted by
the Plaintiff's agencies pursuant to the Private Property Protection Act K.S.A. 77-701 et seq.?
ii) Because Accused was absolutely denied discovery / was absolutely denied the fundamental right to know the nature
and cause of the action through verbal and or written testimony from witnesses which Accused determined would be
beneficial to his defense through the production of Brady evidence, is Accused entitled to arrest of judgment?
iii) Can the state require a private American to maintain a driver's license and pay registration taxes when he uses his
automobile exclusively for the purpose of passage and not for any purpose of production of income or public service without
said tax savoring of confiscation?
iv) Does the agencies silence and failures to respond to Accused's correspondence prior to this instant matter and within
this instant matter work an estoppel upon the Plaintiff's cause of action?
v) Is the subject ordinance, the statute upon which it relies and its implementing regulation (if it exists) unconstitutional
on its face as one can not determine from a collective reading whether the activity that is being regulated is traffic /
commerce or passage / right of noncommercial travel or both?
*8 vi) Is the subject ordinance, the statute upon which it relies and its implementing regulation (if it exists)
unconstitutional as applied to Accused and his specific set of facts as shown by Accused's affirmed testimony at trial?
H) It is Accused's practice to always qualify his signature to ensure that all rights are reserved.
i) Because Accused has qualified his signature with the expression without prejudice on the expired driver's license
has Accused sufficiently preserved his rights at the common law to thereby not be subject to a purely statutory crime
(e.g. FAIL TO SIGNAL CHANGE FROM DIRECT COURSE) and associated taxes where there is no flesh and blood
injured party?
ii) Accused is not a licensee, the driver's license had expired and Accused previously revoked his signature of the license
through correspondence to the DIRECTOR OF VEHICLES BETTY MCBRIDE, can Accused be held liable to the
instant statutory crime and associated taxes where there is no flesh and blood injured party?
iii) Did the Court commit plain error in failing to compel the production of the said expired driver's license to evidence
that Accused's signature thereon is qualified with the expression without prejudice?
12
iv) Did the Court commit plain error in failing to allow Accused to correct his excusable neglect and mistake of failing to
qualify his signature as originally intended with the expression without prejudice upon the District Court's personal
recognizance bond?
I) Accused is uncertain as to the nature of the jurisdiction and continues to challenge the Plaintiff to prove the jurisdiction
(venue, subject matter and in personam) on the record. Accused moved the Court for an Order of dismissal, pursuant to
K.S.A. 60-212(b)(1) through (6), of the instant matter. Notice that on all documents advanced by the Plaintiff that the
defendants name is styled in all capital letters, also see exhibits A through E (R. FOUR, 1-5).
i) Is BRAD HERSHBERGER (spelled in all CAPITAL letters) a fictitious name created by the Plaintiff or one of
its fellow agencies? e.g.:
*9 A feigned name taken by a person, differing in some essential particular from his true name, with the implication
that it is meant to deceive or mislead. Pollard v. Fidelity F. Ins. Co., 47 N.W. 1060; Carlock v. Cagnacci, 26 P. 597; Manqan
v. Schuylkill County, 116 A. 920, 921, see Black's 4th
ii) Is BRAD HERSHBERGER is a fiction of law? e.g.: Something known to be false is assumed to be true. Ryan v.
Motor Credit Co., 23 A.2d 607, 621; see Black's Law Dictionary 4th and 6th
iii) Is BRAD HERSHBERGER is a fictitious business trust / federal life cestui que Trust created by the Plaintiff or
one of its fellow agencies? What evidence demonstrates that said trust was created with Accused's knowing and willful
intent or consent?
iv) Is the Plaintiff is attempting, within an in rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction, to use legal duress and coercion upon
Accused to thereby entrap Accused by his unwitting answers / statements to the Court's queries, and which the Court will
construe as a consent to a subrogation of the motor vehicle code liabilities of the captioned legal fiction / defendant
BRAD HERSHBERGER (spelled in all CAPITAL letters) to the prejudice of Accused / living flesh and blood man?
v) Has the Plaintiff failed to state a claim upon which relief should be granted with respect to Accused and thereby
Accused / Trustee is entitled to arrest of judgment?
J) i) Did the Court commit plain error in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in regards to all issues
shown above and within Accused's pleadings of record as demanded in Accused's post-trial pleadings?
III. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
A) On February 19, 1998, while passing as of natural right (not for any privileged purpose of production of income
or traffic) through the City of Wichita in an automobile (R. TWO, 25), Accused was pulled over by Wichita Police
Officer STEVEN JERRELL for allegedly failing to use a turn signal to change lanes. Officer JERRELL and Officer
HEATHER CARMADY arrested Accused without warrant, because Accused invoked his right to remain silent at
the scene. Accused was incarcerated for a period of 21 days in the SEDGWICK COUNTY ADULT DETENTION
CENTER from February 19, 1998 to March 12, 1998 (R. *10 SIX, 2). In spite of Accused's persistent demands directed
to the jailers and the Municipal Court Judges to be released from this false imprisonment and for them to immediately
provide a probable cause hearing before a magistrate / district court judge pursuant to County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
the Municipal Judges and jailers never provided a preliminary hearing / probable cause hearing and arraignment or even
brought Accused before a magistrate / district court judge. Accused was incarcerated in disciplinary detention, 23 hours
a day in solitary confinement (R. SIX, 19). Accused was never provided pencil, paper or any phone call. Accused was
never read a Miranda notice. Accused was assaulted and battered by the jailers and, initially, tortured by long periods of
13
solitary confinement in a holding cell which maintained a cold temperature about the same as the outside winter air by
way of a leaky exterior door. Accused's shoes and coat were taken from Accused during these periods specifically to cause
physical discomfort. The scandalous treatment Accused received upon arrest and the outrageous government conduct
by the arresting officers and jailers is described in the transcript of record SIX, 18-23. The jailers through unauthorized
physical force did steal ink and electronic impressions of Accused's fingerprints and a photograph (mugshot) of Accused's
face; Accused refused to volunteer said property. Accused signed nothing; and never identified himself, that being the
burden of the injured party. See the attached affidavit of Gordon: Bakken in regards to this incarceration exhibit 1A.
B) On March 5, 1998, a fellow inmate provide Accused a sheet of paper and a prestamped envelope. Accused drafted,
in good faith, the attached NOTICE, exhibit 2A, dated 3/5/98 which stated Accused's exigent circumstance and wherein
Accused requested unpaid excused emergency personal leave from BOEING. Both Accused's parents went to BOEING
and hand delivered the said notice to Accused's supervisor. BOEING never made a direct response thereto. Due to said
absence, BOEING fired Accused by way of a NOTICE OF TERMINATION dated 3/17/98 (retroactive to 2/19/98)
exhibit 3A. (R. SIX, 8, 16)
C) On March 12. 1998, Accused was released from the SEDGWICK COUNTY ADULT DETENTION CENTER.
At the scene of the arrest and during said *11 incarceration (false imprisonment) Accused never identified himself or
signed anything (R. TWO, 9). Accused was never served with a uniform notice to appear (R. TWO, 6, 10). The jailers of
the SEDGWICK COUNTY ADULT DETENTION CENTER and their fellow servants have stolen Accused's winter
coat and dress clothes worn by Accused the night of the arrest; Accused refuses to bow to the public servants' demand
that Accused give his signature in exchange for the clothes and thereby ratify their fraud.
D) Accused did not make a voluntary appearance in regards to the instant matter. The Court should not construe that
Accused has appeared because any alleged appearance by Accused was induced by actual and or constructive fraud of
the Plaintiff and or the lower Courts. The Municipal Court has scandalously billed Accused for continuances which were
never requested by Accused. Accused believed if he were to ignore the CITY OF WICHITA'S pretended cause of action
that ultimately a bench warrant would probably issue for Accused's arrest; therefore, under threat, duress and coercion,
on August 13, 1998, Accused, in a special visitation, advanced a MOTION TO DISMISS in the Municipal Court of the
CITY OF WICHITA (R. EIGHT, 78-90). The presiding Judge RICHARD SHULL stated upon Accused's query that
had Accused failed to present himself for a hearing on the matter that Accused would have eventually being forcible
brought before the Court in chains, see the Municipal Court transcript (R. FIVE, 1-42) created by a Court Reporter
retained by Accused.
Accused advanced within the said MOTION TO DISMISS the resjudicate principle that when an accused invokes his
right to absolute silence upon arrest and said arrestee is not charged in a timely probable cause hearing said denial of
timely due process of law works an estoppel upon a Plaintiff's cause of action; in other words, when one fails to perform
part of his duty and it impinges upon the rights of a citizen, he is said to be a trespasser from the beginning for his whole
justification fails, and he stands as if he never had any authority at all to act. As stated above, Accused, as a John Doe
warrantless arrestee, was scandalously denied a probable cause hearing before a magistrate, and Accused was never given
any phone call, Accused was simply falsely imprisoned for 21 days in *12 solitary confinement and released without
having identified himself or signing anything. Judge RICHARD SHULL summarily over ruled Accused's MOTION
TO DISMISS, see Municipal Court transcript (R. Five, 1-42).
E) Accused, the aggrieved party, timely advanced an appeal of the instant matter to the District Court of the COUNTY
OF SEDGWICK (R. ONE, 17) which was heard by Judge CLARK OWENS and trial Judge REBECCA PILSHAW.
Accused advanced numerous pleadings as shown by the record and listed in the Clerk's TABLE OF CONTENTS
RECORD ON APPEAL, see appendix exhibit 4A.
14
On September 11, 1999 in the District Court before Judge Clark Owens, Accused advanced a MOTION TO DISMISS
(R. ONE, 22-33; R. XCRPT SIX, 2-9) which is similar to Accused's Municipal Court motion to dismiss described directly
above in III. D, 2. Judge Owens summarily overruled the MOTION TO DISMISS (R. ONE, 39; R. SIX, 35). In
addition, Accused had the Clerk of the District Court issue subpoenas to Municipal Court Judge Richard Shull and
Judge Harold Flaigle (R. EIGHT 91-94; R. XCRPT SIX, 11) to summons them to the September 11, 1999 hearing so that
they could account for why they left Accused to rot in solitary confinement for 21 days without a probable cause hearing
or conviction of any crime. But scandalously Judge Owens advise Shull and Flaigle to ignore the Clerk's (Court's) lawful
service of process under the guise that Judge Owens needed to make an initial threshold finding to determine if it was
necessary to have evidence put on these issues (R. xcrpt SIX, 11). Accused thoroughly voiced his objection in that the
Municipal Court is not a Court of record therefore only the Municipal Court Judges themselves could provide first hand
testimony (Brady evidence) as to what they did or did not do in securing timely due process of law for Accused while
Accused was incarcerated (R. SIX, 11, 19, 20). Judge Owens never made any findings or determinations supported with
well established law as to whether or not he would compel the attendance of any witness on behalf of Accused; Judge
Owens failed to reveal the authority which empowers him to refuse to enforce the said lawful subpoenas. It appears that
Judge Owens has committed reversible error in exercising his belief that a City's cause of action *13 against an accused
can never merit being estopped, no matter how much an arrestees rights are trampled. Judge Owens stated:
I'm finding that I don't even have to reach the issue as to whether you were or were not illegally detained factually,
because it would be irrelevant to the issues of this case. (R. SIX, 34)
Judge Owens exercised unconscionable dilatory tactics by attempting to engage Accused in an off-point lengthy
speculation (R. SIX, 24-30) on how the law enforcement system is supposed to bond someone out of jail if they don't
know their name. Judge Owens refused to discuss the necessity of a probable cause hearing, as held in RIVERSIDE
v MCLAUGHLIN, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991) and a plethora of other case law, and as applied to Accused; a bond is not
necessary unless there is a probable cause determination that one has committed a crime.
Judge Owens breached his fiduciary duty by his refusal to acknowledge the fact that if at a probably cause hearing for a
John Doe Accused it is determined that there is no probable cause that the accused committed an alleged crime, then he will
be immediately released and therefore no bond would be necessaryl Therefore the Accused's actual name would be irrelevant
(as would any booking procedure) and the accused would be released as a John Doe. See (R. SIX, 28).
Judge Owen stipulated that Accused was never provided a probable cause hearing before a magistrate at R. xcrpt SIX, 30:
The Accused: I have a question. Does the record in front of you today indicate that a District Court Judge gave me a
probable cause hearing and arraignment within 48 hours?
The Court: I don't have anything here that would indicate you appeared in front of a District Court Judge.
Judge Owens threatened Accused with the maximum jail time in the event that Accused was brought before him on
a future driver's license violation (R. SIX, 37). Therefore Accused asked Judge Owens (see xcrpt R. SIX, 38, 39): The
Accused: How does a state suspend driver's licenses that are already expired?
The Court: They can do that, because they suspend your privileges to drive, regardless of the license itself. So, they will
terminate the driving privileges because of the violations.
The Accused: Would you agree that it a privilege, is not a right?
The Court: That's certainly right.
15
The Accused: That's correct, right?

*14 The Court: Yes. It is a granting of a privilege to the citizens. It is not a right they have.
The Accused: ... it says right here in C.J.S. Vol. 53, that a license authorizing a person to practice a profession or to
carry on a particular business is not a contract which vests a right but merely the grant of a privilege. Such a license is
not protected by the constitutional prohibition as to the impairment of the obligation of contract. The word occupation
as used in connection wit the licensing thereof and the imposition of taxes thereon is identical in meaning with the
word privilege and includes any business, trade, profession, pursuit, vocation or calling. A privilege is the exercise of an
occupation or business which requires a licence from some proper authority designated by some general law, as not free
to all, or any, without such license. ...
The Court: Really that doesn't pertain to these issues right now. I just want to give you some advice because you were
concerned about what this did to your life and your time away from you employment and all that. But if your are going
to be one that refuses to be licensed but will still drive your car - it is a lot like the abortion protestors. They know it
is against the law, what they're doing...
Accused knows that the definitions of privilege, license, traffic, the tax classification of one's automobile as a motor
vehicle and the application of these terms to Accused has everything to do with whether or not Accused is subject to
the statutory code to begin with / whether or not sufficient nexus of Accused can be proven to raise the jurisdiction of
the Court. The Constitutions guarantee that one has the right to know the nature and cause of the action. Therefore,
Accused attempted to obtain an extension of time to discover the foundation of the plaintiff's prima facia instruments
(R. SIX, 43, 44):
The Accused: Judge, I had an additional pretrial dispositive motion.
MS. DICKGRAFE: Not that I received.
The Accused: I can make several motions to the Court.
THE COURT: You need to give the City advance notice. We can take those up. In fact, you better get them filed by
tomorrow.
The Accused: That was the other issue, Judge. I am claiming what you were bringing up under the fact I'm not a licensee,
because of that I'm not bound to the statutory crime, how (did) I become subject to it. That's why I wanted the motion
for discovery in this matter, and the Court setting doesn't allow enough time to do that. So, I would like on the Court's
own motion to extend that time out where I would have adequate time to submit to her my paperwork and to get my
discovery done.
THE COURT: The case is going to trial next Thursday, so you need to be prepared for it.
The Accused: You are denying me adequate time to do discovery in this matter?
THE COURT: I think you have plenty of time from now until next Thursday and the time you have had to today.
*15 The Accused: Her response when she receives the paperwork, I'm supposed to have time to provide this discovery.
16
On September 17, 1999 in the District Court before Judge Clark Owens, Accused advanced a pleading titled MOTION
FOR CONTINUANCE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE TIME FOR DISCOVERY AND ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA
DUCES TECUM(S) AND MOTION AND DEMAND FOR DISCOVERY (R. EIGHT, 95-103).
Therein Accused continues to challenge jurisdiction because he is uncertain as to the nature of the jurisdiction and
challenges the plaintiff to prove the jurisdiction (venue, subject matter and in personam) on the record. Because Accused
has authority and unalienable right to know the nature and cause of the instant accusations in the above captioned statutory
cause, Accused moved the Court to compel the plaintiffs specific performance to produce upon the following pleadings
also advanced on September 17, 1999:
i) FIRST NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR INTERROGATORIES AND REQUEST FOR ADMISSIONS (R.
EIGHT, 104-108);
ii) FIRST NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS (R. EIGHT, 109-111);
iii) NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR AGENCY INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE (Letter to GARY CARTER)
(R. EIGHT, 112-127)
iv) SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM of DIRECTOR OF THE DRIVER CONTROL BUREAU GARY CARTER of
the DIVISION OF VEHICLES (see attached to MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE...) (R. EIGHT, 127)
Accused motioned for continuance to provide necessary time to compel attendance of DIRECTOR OF THE DRIVER
CONTROL GARY CARTER to testify on behalf of Accused and thereby avoid a rush to judgment.
The answers and production of documents to the above queries and requests should make more definite and certain the
accusatory instrument of the plaintiff in regards to:
(a) the jurisdiction of this tribunal invoked over Trustee by the accusatory instrument and process of plaintiff,
(b) the venue in which the process of plaintiff was issued and served, and
(c) the subject matter of the case / object (revenue taxable activity) of the tax / basis and purpose statement / concise
statement of the principle reasons the *16 (necessary) implementing regulation(s) of the ordinance(s) or statute(s) were
adopted by the agency.
Judge OWENS overruled the MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE TIME FOR
DISCOVERY AND ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM(S) AND MOTION AND DEMAND FOR
DISCOVERY and the associated pleading listed above (R. SEVEN, 7). Judge OWENS noted Accused's objection for
the record (R. SEVEN, 7).
On September 17, 1998, the matter preceded to trial before Judge REBECCA PILSHAW. Judge PILSHAW began the
hearing by complaining that Accused had corrected his signature by adding the expression without prejudice by his
signature on the appearance bond of the matter which was already a matter of record. Accused stated that he had a right
to correct his excusable neglect because Accused always qualifies his signature with said expression to reserve his rights,
just as Accused had done upon the expired driver's license which was secreted from the proceedings to hide this fact.
Judge PILSHAW removed and replaced the corrected appearance bond with an unaltered copy from the microfiche
file (R. TWO, 3-5). Judge PILSHAW also denied Accused's motion for continuance of time for discovery (R. TWO, 5).
Accused advanced his SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS and was denied oral argument; Judge PILSHAW summarily
overruled the motion (R. TWO, 5). Then Accused stated that he had never been provided an opportunity to object
17
to the sufficiency of the complaint and that the plaintiff had only just now produced the complaint even though it is
required to be made a part of the District Court record upon notice of appeal being filed from the Municipal Court.
Judge PILSHAW nastily responded to her associates Why don't you go call some court guards in case we need them, all
right (R. TWO, 6), and then Judge PILSHAW had the plaintiff call her first witness. Only after the plaintiff presented
her case was Accused handed the complaint at which point Accused stated My initial objection is the fact this is the
first time I've ever seen this ticket, and I would object to the sufficiency of the Complaint. THE COURT: Overruled.
The Accused: I haven't even stated what my objection is, though. (R. TWO, 10, 11).
*17 Accused queried the arresting officer STEVEN JERRELL; The Accused: What evidence do you have that I was
using the automobile in question for the production of income or for hire? MS. DICKRAFE: Your Honor, I'm going to
object. That's not relevant. THE COURT: Sustained. The Accused: It is absolutely relevant. THE COURT: Sustained. I
determine if it's relevant. The Accused: With your present knowledge, am I a licensee? MS. DICKGRAFE: Your Honor,
I would object That's not relevant. THE COURT: Sustained. (R. TWO, 13). However, in the trial at the Municipal
Court the officer answered the questions; the officer stated that he did not have any evidence that Accused was using
the automobile for the production of income, and he stated that the subject driver's license was in fact expired (R. muni.
xcrpt FIVE, 1-42). Accused further queried the officer; The Accused: did I give you permission to search that car? Officer
JERRELL: No, you did not. (R. TWO, 15). The Accused: Is it your allegation that people that do not have a driver's
license and that are using an automobile merely for the purpose of the natural right of passage and not for the production
of any income are subject to your statutory crime of fail to signal turn? Officer JERRELL: Yes. (R. TWO, 16). The
Accused: I have a case law that says that a driver is on who use a car to carry out the prosecution of business. Do you
have any evidence that I was using the automobile for business. JERRELL: No.
Accused took the witness stand and stated, The Accused: I was in an automobile traveling as of right for the purpose
passage, not for the production of income, as I always have, all my life. I'm not a licensee. I can't produce that which I
do not have.... it is my understanding and knowledge from my research that I do not have a legal obligation to reveal
my identity to a police officer who enforces ordinances for statutory crimes were there is no injured party. There was no
one physically injured or property damaged, and I'm unaware of having waived my rights at the common law to where
I can be subject to a crime where there is no injured party. And I was not a driver, as he would suggest, or an operator,
because an operator is one that is licensed to have an automobile on the highways for hire, and the driver is the one that
actually drives the automobile fore hire. But you can be both, and I am neither. Therefore, I'm not subject to the *18
municipal codes. The evidence before the Court, whatever it may be, because I'm being denied discovery in a rush to
judgment, and my ability to challenge apparently presumed conclusions of law and fact that create the liability upon me.
Because I was born a free man, so something had to come about in my life at some point that would have terminated
my rights to be(come) subject to the municipal code. And the court is denying me due process of law because they are
making conclusive presumptions of fact or liability without allowing me to demonstrate the commercial nature of their
charge. And I believe what ever the evidence has (the court) has taken silent judicial notice of has been obtained through
fraud, misrepresentation; and I think if the Court looks farther that any of the documents they may have or be tak(ing)
silent judicial notice of would produce- and I would complain that's the whole point. I'm complaining to the foundation
of the charging document and all other instruments before the Court that create this liability. The foundation would
have original signatures or should, by me, that creates this liability. And 1 demand that those be produced so that the
Court can--and I can review those and to see if there was proper notice given about the liabilities associated at the time
someone signs those documents. I allege that any document you would find with my signature would be qualified with
the phrase without prejudice, which at the beginning of this hearing you were complaining that I was marking on your
court file - THE COURT: Excuse me, Mr. Hershberger. Have a seat. You're done. I have given you an opportunity to
testify. Your are proselytizing from the witness stand. You can have a seat. You're done.(R. TWO, 25-27).
Judge REBECCA PUSHAW convicted the legal fiction Defendant / BRAD HERSHBERGER (styled in all CAPITAL
letters) of the charge of FAIL TO SIGNAL CHANGE FROM DIRECT COURSE, Ordinance 11.28.040(b) and
then pronounced sentence from the bench. (R. TWO, 27). Accused behaved with pleasant demeanor throughout all
18
hearings, however trial Judge REBECCA PILSHAW was consistently impatient and exhibited a nasty demeanor
towards Acccused throughout all hearings of the instant matter. All of Accused's pleadings for discovery (also including
pleadings for extension of time for discovery by way *19 of depositions, written interrogatories and production of
documents), plead defenses, motions for arrest of judgment, and pleadings for findings of fact and conclusions of law were
arrogantly and summarily over ruled (see the District Court's seven rulings at R. ONE, 39, 42, 68, 69, 70, 71-72; R.
EIGHT, 128-129).
On October 30, 1999, Accused advanced the following post-trial pleadings: (R. ONE, 43-55; Overruled R. ONE, 68):
PETITION TO ARREST JUDGMENT (R. ONE, 57-61; Overruled R. ONE, 69):
PETITION TO STRIKE ORDER FILED September 30, 1998
AND IN SUPPORT THEREOF
PETITION TO COMPELL PRODUCTION OF THE SUBJECT DRIVER'S LICENSE
TO EVIDENCE ACCUSED'S PRIOR RESERVATION OF RIGHTS, THE SIGNATURE
THEREON IS ACCOMPANIED BY THE EXPRESSION WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND
PETITION TO COMPELL DIRECTOR GARY CARTER OF THE DRIVER CONTROL
BUREAU TO GIVE DEPOSITION BY WAY OF WRITTEN INTERROGATORS
(R. ONE, 62-67; Overruled R. ONE, 70):
Judge PILSHAW merely counted off the page numbers of each of the above listed post-trial pleadings and overruled
them. Judge PILSHAW denied Accused oral argument upon the pleadings; Accused's objection was noted for the record
(R. THREE, 2, 3). After summary denial of Accused's post trial pleadings, Accused timely filed Notice of Appeal (R.
ONE, 73).
IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

The issues listed as paragraphs A through J in II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES correspond directly to the arguments
shown below also listed as subparagraphs A through J.
A) Municipal Court Judge RICHARD SHULL and District Court Judge CLARK OWENS summarily denied
Accused's motion(s) to dismiss (R. EIGHT, 78-90 and R. ONE, 20-33 respectively); Accused exposed the Plaintiff's
outrageous government conduct and scandalous administrative failure to provide Accused timely due process of law
in contradistinction to 15 Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS (Search and seizure),
Amendment 4 to the Constitution of the UNITED STATES, (Searches and seizures) COUNTY OF *20 RIVERSIDE v
MCLAUGHLIN, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991), which mandates probable cause hearing and arraignment within 48 hours; K.S.A.
22-2901 requires a hearing without unnecessary delay before the nearest available magistrate / district court judge, and
numerous other case law were advanced. A probable cause hearing was never provided. Municipal Judge SHULL refused
to provide any case law in contradistinction to the plethora of case law offered by Accused (see municipal transcript R.
FIVE, 1-42). District Judge CLARK OWENS refused to provide any case law in contradistinction to the plethora of
case law offered by Accused (see transcript R. SIX, 35-42). The Plaintiff has unclean hands because the record shows that
Accused was arrested and jailed without timely due process of law as held in Riverside. The Plaintiff's incarceration of
Accused under color of law and custom and policy was the direct cause that Accused was absent from work and therefore
19
terminated from Accused's job. This has created undue hardship and worked a manifest injustice upon Accused. Due
to said denial of timely due process of law:
In regard to timely probable cause hearings consider the following excerpt (R. ONE, 20-33) of Accused's pleading:
MOTION TO DISMISS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT INCORPORATED

1) Accused was arrested without warrant and incarcerated for a period of 21 days in the SEDGWICK COUNTY ADULT
DETENTION CENTER from February 19, 1998 until March 12, 1998. Accused was never bought before a magistrate /
district court judge or provided a probable cause hearing and arraignment. The Plaintiff's deprivation of Accused's
liberty appears to equate with false imprisonment due to the Plaintiffs' said administrative failure to secure for Accused
timely due process of law in contradistinction to 15 Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS
(Search and seizure), Amendment 4 to the Constitution of the UNITED STATES, (Searches and seizures) COUNTY OF
RIVERSIDE v MCLAUGHLIN, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991), which mandates probable cause hearing and arraignment within
48 hours; K.S.A. 22-2901 *21 requires a hearing without unnecessary delay before the nearest available magistrate:
COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v MCLAUGHLIN. 111 S.Ct. 1661, emphasis added, in pertinent part at:
Pg. 1662: In order to satisfy Fourth Amendment requirement of a prompt judicial determination of probable cause for a
warrantless arrest, a jurisdiction that chooses to combine probable cause determinations with other pretrial proceedings
must do so as soon as is reasonably feasible but in no event later than 48 hours after arrest; providing reasonable cause
determination within such time frame will generally immunize jurisdiction from systemic challenges. Pg. 1663: Even if
probable cause hearing is held within 48 hours of a warrantless arrest, arrestee may establish Fourth Amendment violation
if he or she can prove that his or her probable cause determination was delayed unreasonably: examples of unreasonable
delay are delays for purpose of gathering evidence to justify arrest, delay motivated by ill will against arrested individual,
or delay for delay's sake;
Where individual arrested without a warrant does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, burden of
proof shifts to government to demonstrate existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance which
cannot include intervening weekends or fact that in a particular cause it may take longer than 48 hours after arrest to
consolidate pretrial proceedings.
Although county was entitled to combine probable cause determination following warrantless arrests with arraignment it
was not immune from systemic challenges for failure to afford prompt probable cause determination, where county's current
policy was to offer combined proceeding within two days, exclusive of Saturday, Sundays, or holidays, and thus delays
could exceed 48-hour period permissible under the Fourth Amendment.
Pg. 1669; But flexibility has it limits; Gerstein (Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103; 95 S.Ct. 854) is not a blank check. A State
has no legitimate interest in detaining for extended periods individuals who have been arrested without probable cause.
Pg. 1670: The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than 48 hours to consolidate pretrial proceedings does
not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance. Nor, for that matter, do intervening weekends. A jurisdiction that chooses to
offer combined proceedings must do so as soon as is reasonably feasible but in no event later than 48 hours after arrest.
In COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v MCLAUGHLIN, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991), at page 1671, the Court recognized that
Justice Scalia urges that 24 hours is a more appropriate outer boundary for providing probable cause determinations.
Therefore, Accused moves this Court to take Judicial Notice of Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion, because it appears
that it more accurately supports the Fourth amendment to wit, in pertinent part at:
20
*22 Pg. 1672: It was clear, moreover, that the only element bearing upon the reasonableness of delay was, not such
circumstances as the pressing need to conduct further investigation, but the arresting officer's ability, once the prisoner
had been secured to reach a magistrate who could issue the needed warrant for further detention.
Pg. 1673: We discussed and relied upon this common-law understanding in Gerstein, ..., holding that the period of
warrantless detention must be limited to the time necessary to complete the arrest and obtain the magistrate's review.
Pg. 1674: The timing is specifically addressed in the previously quoted passage of the opinion, which makes clear that
promptly after arrest means upon completion of the administrative steps incident to arrest.
Pg. 1675: It was the purpose of the Fourth amendment to put this matter beyond time, place, and judicial predilection,
incorporating the traditional common-law guarantees against unlawful arrest. The Court says not a word about these
guarantees, and they are determinative. Gerstein's approval of a brief period of delay to accomplish administrative
steps incident to an arrest is already a questionable extension of the traditional formulation, though it probably has little
practical effect and can perhaps be justified on de minimus grounds. To expand Gerstein, however, into an authorization
for 48 hour detention related neither to obtaining of a magistrate nor the administrative completion of the arrest
seems to me utterly unjustified. Mr. McLaughlin was entitled to have a prompt impartial determination that there was
reason to deprive him of his liberty, not according to a schedule that suits the State's convenience in piggybacking various
proceedings, but as soon as his arrest was completed and the magistrate could be procured...
Pg. 1676: With one exception no federal court considering the question has regarded 24 hours as an inadequate amount
of time to complete arrest procedures, and with the same exception every court actually setting a limit for probable-cause
determination based on those procedures has selected 24 hours.
Pg. 1677: And while the American Bar Association in its proposed rules of criminal procedure initially required that
presentment simply be made without unnecessary delay, it has recently concluded that no more than six hours should
be required, except at night. Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, 10 U.L.A. App., Criminal Justice Standard 10-4.1
(Spec.Pamph.1987).
2) The right of due process of law which encompasses probable cause hearing and arraignment within 48 hours, can not
be abrogated by K.S.A. 22-2902 as held in the following authorities:
Where rights secured by Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 86 SCt 1602.
No right granted or secured by the Constitution of the United States can be impaired or destroyed by a state enactment,
whatever may be the source from *23 which the power to pass such enactment may have been derived Iowa Motor
Vehicle Asso. v Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 2, 5.
The Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land and anything repugnant to it is void Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). The requirement of bringing an arrested person directly to a court or judge
is due process of law, ands as such this procedure cannot be abrogated by statute. Also see: Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn.
387 (1871); Long v The State, 12 Ga. 293, 318 (1852) Moses v State, 6 Ga.App. 251, 64 S.E. 699 (1909);Hill v Smith, 59
S.E. 475 (Va. 1907) Folson v Piper, 192 Iowa 1056, 186N.W. 28 (1922); Edaer v Burke, 96Md. 715, 54 Atl. 986 (1903);
Bryan v Comstock, 220 S.W. 475.
3) The case laws of various states shown below constitute a portion of the relevant well established law on the subject of
Search and Seizure I Arrest and should be persuasive in this matter pursuant to United States Constitution, Article
IV, 1. Full faith and credit clause.
21
United States Consitution, Article IV, 1. Full faith and credit clause. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe
the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Because Accused has been arrested and jailed without timely due process of law it appears that:
a) The complaint against Accused cannot be sustained.
b) The search of Accused and his property is invalid and any evidence obtained is inadmissible.
c) The Plaintiffs' action under color of law and custom and policy / abuse of authority given him by the law, operates
to convert the Plaintiffs into trespassers ab initio and renders the arresting officers and all persons aiding and abetting
therein wrongdoers from the beginning and the Plaintiff stands as if he never had any authority at all to act.
Therefore, by operation of law, the Plaintiffs whole justification fails. For the judicial machinery to remain impartial and
to be in harmony with the clean hands doctrine the Court should not ratify the Plaintiff's bad faith, apparent malicious
motives, self-serving purposes and outrageous government conduct in the denial of timely due process of law for Accused.
The Plaintiff's incarceration of Accused *24 under color of law and custom and policy was the direct cause that Accused
was absent from work and therefore terminated from his job. This has created undue hardship upon Accused and worked
a manifest injustice upon Accused.
Therefore, the Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief should be granted and thereby Accused is entitled
to an arrest of judgment. The following plethora of cites constitute a portion of the relevant well established law on the
subject of Search and Seizure / Arrest:
15 Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS Search and seizure.
Amendment 4 to the Constitution of the UNITED STATES SEARCHES AND SEIZURES.
It is the undoubted right of every person in this community not to be deprived of liberty without due process of law,
and if the defendant has been arrested without due process of law, the indictment against her cannot be sustained. ... It has
long been recognized that arrests without warrant are justified in cases of treason, felon or breach of the peace, in which
actual or threatened violence is an essential element. 1 Hale's P.C., 589; 2 Hawkin's P.C., ch. 13, sec. 8; I Burns, J., 287; 4
Blackstone 292; 9 Bacon, Abrid., 468; I Chitty Cr. Law, 15; Clark's Criminal Procedure, 39, Russell, Crimes, vol. 3, page
83; 4 Amer. And Eng. Ency. of Law, 902 Commonwealth v Krubeck, 8 Penn. Dist. Rep. 521, 522 (1899). The constitution
has also provided that no one shall be deprived liberty without due process of law, and has provided that no warrant
shall issue except upon oath or affirmation establishing probable cause. It has been settled for centuries, and the doctrine
has been recognized here, that except in cases of reasonable belief of treason or felony, or breach of the peace committed
in presence of an officer there is no due process of law without a warrant issued by a court or magistrate upon a proper
showing or finding. Allor v Wayne Co., 43 Mich. 76, 97, 4 N.W. 492, 495 (1880).
The requirement of bringing an arrested person directly to a court or judge is due process of law, ands as such this procedure
cannot be abrogated by statute. Also see: Judson v. Reardon, 16 Minn. 387 (1871); Long v The State, 12 Ga. 293, 318
(1852) Moses v State, 6 Ga.App. 251, 64 S.E. 699 (1909);Hill v Smith, 59 S.E. 475 (Va. 1907) Folson v Piper, 192 Iowa
1056, 186N.W. 28 (1922); Edaer v Burke, 96Md. 715, 54 Atl. 986 (1903); Bryan v Comstock, 220 S.W. 475
The rule of burden of proof is the same in a criminal proceeding, where any arrest made without a warrant if challenged by
the defendant is presumptively invalid, and the burden is upon the state to justify it as one not only authorized by statute, but
22
also as one not violative of constitutional provisions. The invalidity of the arrest will render the search invalid and the evidence
obtained inadmissible. State v Mastrian, 285 Minn. 51, 56, 171 N.W.2d 695 (1969); Butler v State, 212 So.2d 573, 577.
*25 If there was an unnecessary delay [in arraigning the claimant before a Justice of the Peace], then the arrest itself
became unlawful on the theory that the defendants were trespassers ab initio and so continued down to the time when the
plaintiff was lawfully held under a warrant of commitment, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff was guilty of an crime
(numerous cases cited). In Pastor v Regan, supra, it is said that; The rule laid down in the Six Carpenters' case, 8 Coke
146, that if a man abuses an authority given him by the law he becomes a trespasser ab initio, has never been questioned.
Bass v State, 92 N.Y.S.2d 42, 42, 196 Misc. 177 (1949)
Nor is a police officer authorized to confine a person indefinitely whom he lawfully arrested. It is his duty to take him
before some court having jurisdiction of the offense and make a complaint against him. ... Any undue delay is unlawful
and wrongful, and renders the officer himself and all persons aiding and abetting therein wrongdoers from the beginning.
Ulvestad v Dolphin et al, 152 Wash. 580, 278 Pac 681, 684 (1929)
Thus when one fails to perform part of his duty and it impinges upon the rights of a citizen, he is said to be a trespasser from
the beginning for his whole justification fails, and he stands as if he never had any authority at all to act. Brock v Stimson,
108 Mass. 520 (1871), citing: Hefler v Hunt, 129 Me 10, 112 A 675, (1921)
Official illegality is quite as reprehensible as private violations of law. The law of the land must be accepted by everyone as
the only rule which can be allowed to govern the liberties of citizens, whatever may be their ill desert. Sarah Way's Case, 41
Mich. 299, 305, 1 N.W. 1021 (1879); People v McGurn, 341 III 632, 173 N.E. 754, 759 (1930)
To summarize, the following are the basic requisites needed to make a valid warrant:
i) A warrant is to be issued by a judicial officer and signed by him.
ii) It must state the facts that show the matter to be within the jurisdiction of the judicial officer issuing it.
iii) It cannot be based upon belief or suspicion, but upon probable cause.
iv) It must state the offense committed and the facts that constitute a crime.
v) It must be supported by an affidavit of a formal charge made under oath.
vi) It must truly name the person to be arrested, or describe him sufficiently to identify him.
IV. B) Judge OWENS arbitrarily stated that Accused's right to remain silent does not include refusing to reveal one's
name, and therefore Accused could not be rewarded with a dismissal of the charge due to Accused's absolute silence.
Judge OWENS and Judge SHULL have failed their duty to provide case law in contradistinction to the plethora of
case law advanced by Accused and which support their unfounded assertions in dental of Accused's motions to dismiss.
The record shows that Accused is not a licensee because the state's *26 driver's license issued to Accused expired and
furthermore in March of 1995 Accused revoked his signature on said license; see Accused's NOTICE AND DEMAND
FOR AGENCY INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE (R. EIGHT, 112-127) which was mailed to the DIRECTOR
GARY CARTER of the DRIVER CONTOL BUREAU of the STATE OF KANSAS. As of this date DIRECTOR
CARTER continues to neglect his fiduciary duty by his failure to respond to said letter. Accused has no knowledge that
Accused has a duty to speak.
23
Accused is not a licensee (e.g. The driver's license issued to Accused expired in May of 1996 and Accused's signature
thereon is accompanied with the expression without prejudice, and in March of 1995 Accused mailed to the DRIVER
CONTROL BUREAU a revocation of signature of the driver's license) and Accused invoked the right to remain silent
upon arrest and Accused was never provided a probable cause hearing. Under said circumstance could Accused refrain
from saying or writing his name with impunity upon arrest?
State v. Boudette, 791 P.2d 1063:
Portion of traffic-law-enforcement statute requiring stopped motorists to identify themselves to police officers, which
required unlicensed motorist to give evidence of his identity, was unconstitutionally vague; statute gave no notice of
what type of identification, other than driver's license, should suffice to avoid arrest and in failing to do so, encouraged
arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. US.C.A.
Const.Amends. 5, 14; A.R.S. 28-1075, subd. B.
Miranda v Arizona, 384 U.S. 436:
Pg 444, Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he
does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an attorney, either retained or
appointed. Pg. 480 If the individual desires to exercise his privilege, he has the right to do so. This is not for the authorities
to decide.
Accused refused to voluntarily provide fingerprints or mugshots; prior to conviction did the arresting officers, jailers and
District Court Judges have any bona fide authority to order Accused to give or the jailers to take Accused's fingerprints
and mugshot?
Haves v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811:
The Supreme Court, Justice White, held that, where there was no probable cause to arrest the petitioner, no consent to the
journey to the police station and no prior *27 judicial authorization for detaining him, the investigative detention at the
station for fingerprinting purposes violated the petitioner's rights under the Fourth Amendment; hence the fingerprints
were inadmissible fruits of an illegal detention.
IV. C) In regard to the prosecuting attorney's failure to timely file an information or complaint in the office of the clerk of
the district court, consider the following excerpt (R. ONE, 43-55) of Accused's pleading:
PETITION TO ARREST JUDGMENT

3) After the preliminary hearing, the prosecuting attorney did not (timely) file an information or complaint in the office
of the clerk of the district court, charging the crime for which Accused was bound over. A written complaint was not
evidenced in the Municipal Court trial and the Plaintiff's UNIFORM NOTICE TO APPEAR was only produced on
the morning just before the District Court trial in contradistinction to the following statutes and in spite of Accused's
pleadings of record for discovery. Accused was denied the opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of the complaint prior
to trial or at trial.
K.S.A. 12-4602.
K.S.A. 22-3610. Hearing on appeal; exception.
24
K.S.A. 22-2905. Proceedings after the preliminary examination.

K.S.A. 12-4205a. Complaint and notice to appear in municipal court.
K.S.A. 8-2106. Traffic citation; procedure.
The arresting officer did not convey to Accused the information required pursuant to K.S.A. 8-2106(f), therefore it
appears that Officer Steven Jerrell is guilty of misconduct and should be removed from office pursuant to K.S.A.
8-2106(g).
IV. D) In regard to the fact that Accused was never arraigned as shown by the transcripts of record consider the following
excerpt (R. ONE, 49-53) of Accused's pleading: PETITION TO ARREST JUDGMENT
6) Accused was never arraigned. The transcripts will show that he was never asked how he pleads or if he understands
the charges. The conviction of Accused is an illegal sentence and therefore judgment should be arrested.
In an opinion by Douglas, J., expressing the view of six members of the court, it was held that absent a knowing and
intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether classified as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,
*28 unless he was represented by counsel at his trial. ... Another guarantee is the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation. Still another, the right of confrontation. And another, compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in one's favor. We have never limited these rights to felonies or to lesser but serious offenses. ... [I]t was recently stated It
is simply not arguable, nor has any court ever held, that the trial of a petty offense may be held in secret, or without notice
to the accused of the charges, or that in such cases the defendant has no right to confront his accusers or to compel the
attendance of witnesses in his own behalf. Aroersinger v. Hamlin, 407 US 23; 32 LEd2d 530.
An appearance induced by fraud as no efficacy. Stultz v. Stultz, 94 A.2d 527.
An appearance is not be inferred except as a result of acts from which an intent to do so may properly be inferred.
Anderson v. Taylorcraft. Inc., 197 F.Supp 872, 874; United States v. Hoerner, 157 F.Supp 563, 567; Durabilit Steel Locker
Co. v. Berger Mfg. Co., 21 F.2d 139; Davies v. Superior Court for San Diego County, 228 C.A.2d 535; Aker v. Sijbaugh,
113 P.2d 814; Rhodes v. Rhodes, 142 N.W.2d 508, 511; National Sur. Corp. v. Shoemaker, 195 N.W.2d 134.
By the filing of this claim without any jurisdictional objection - and without any prior objection in the pleadings - the
MONTMARTRE has appeared. Cactus Pipe & Supply Co., Inc., v. M/V Montmartre, her engines, tackle, etc., et al.,
Orient Leasing Co., Ltd., v. Corinth Pipeworks. S.A., Cross, 756 F 2d 1103 1110 (1985).
IV. E) Accused sent the DIRECTOR OF VEHICLES BETTY MCBRIDE a revocation of signature to the license
in March of 1995, as evidenced by Accused's NOTICE AND DEMAND FOR AGENCY INFORMATION AND
KNOWLEDGE (R. EIGHT, 112-127) filed September 17, 1998 (Letter to the Director of the DRIVER CONTROL
BUREAU GARY CARTER): GARY CARTER has not responded as of this date. The lower Courts failed to compel
any discovery for Accused and the palintiff refused to produce any of the information (Brady evidence) demanded by
Accused.
i) Can the Plaintiff's and agencies silence only be equated with fraud and or ratification of the said revocation?
ii) Does the Plaintiff's and agencies silence and failures to respond to Accused's correspondence prior to this instant
matter and within this instant matter work an estoppel upon the Plaintiff's cause of action?
25
In regard to public officers' fiduciary duty to speak consider the following portion of well established law; where one has
a duty to speak and neglects to do *29 so or performs incompletely such (in)action can only be construed to be fraud:
Fraud may be committed by a suppression of the truth as well as by the suggestion of falsehood. Strong v. Repide,
213 US 419; Griswold v Hazard, 141 US 260. It is, therefore, equally competent for this Court to relieve against fraud
whether it is committed by suppression of the truth by concealment or by suggestion of falsehood. American Surety
Co. v West State Bank 4 SW2d 312. One who expressly contracts that he will disclose all relevant facts is bound to do so;
and failure to perform it vitiates the transaction regardless of whether he intended to deceive or not. Gould v York County
Mut. F. Ins. Co., 47 Me 403. It is well-settled principle of the law of fraud, applied particularly by courts of equitable
jurisdiction, that it is the duty of a person in whom confidence is reposed by virtue of the situation of trust arising out of a
confidential or fiduciary relationship, to make a full disclosure of any and all material facts within his knowledge relating
to a contemplated transaction with the other party to such relationship and any concealment or failure to disclose such
facts is a fraud. Strong v Repide, 213 US 419. Where a confidential relationship exist between the parties to a transaction,
there is no privilege of nondisclosure, and if a party to the relationship fails to make full disclosure of all material facts,
the nondisclosure has the effect of a material misrepresentation. Sellers v Sellers, 428 P2d 230. A party of whom inquiry
is made concerning the facts involved in a transaction must not, according to well-settled principles, conceal or fail to
disclose any pertinent or material information in replying thereto or he will be chargeable with fraud. Sparks v Guaranty
State Bank, 182 Kan 165. The reason for the rule is simple and precise. Where one responds to an inquiry, it is his duty to
impart correct information. Thus, one who responds to an inquiry is guilty of fraud if he denies all knowledge of a fact which
he knows to exist, Eisenschmidt v Conway, 155 P2d 241; if he gives equivocal, evasive, or misleading answers calculated to
convey a false impression, even though they are literally true as far as they go, Sparks v Guaranty State Bank, 182 Kan
165; or if he fails to disclose the whole truth. It is a general principle in the law of fraud that where there is a duty to speak,
the disclosure must be full and complete. Pashley v Pacific Electric R. Co., 153 P2d 325. It is firmly established that a
partial and fragmentary disclosure, accompanied with the willful concealment of material and qualifying facts, is not a true
statement, and is as much a fraud as an actual misrepresentation, which, in effect, it is. Sparks v Guaranty State Bank, 182
Kan 165; Bushey v Coffman, 103 Kan 209. Telling half a truth has been declared to be equivalent to concealing the other
half. Eouitable L Ins. Co. v Halsey, S.&Co. 312 US 410. Even though one is under no obligation to speak as to a matter, if
he undertakes to do so, either voluntarily or in response to inquiries, American Bonding Co. v Fourth Nat-Bank 91 So 480
he is bound not only to state truly what he tells, but also not to suppress or conceal any facts within his knowledge which
will materially qualify those stated. If he speaks at all, he must make a full and fair disclosure. Sparks v Guaranty State
Bank, 182 Kan 165. Thus, one having full *30 information, and representing that he has, is guilty of fraud if he, with
intent to deceive, overreach or prevent investigation, discloses a part of his information only, and by words or conduct
leads the one with whom he contract to believe that he has made a full disclosure; and if the party with whom he is
dealing is induce to enter into the contract in reliance upon the disclosures made and in ignorance of the true facts, equity
will grant relief. Stackpole v Hancock, 24 So 914. Concealment becomes a fraud where it is effected by misleading and
deceptive talk Mason v Salomon 311 P2d 652, acts or conduct Crompton Beedle, 75 A 331, where it is accompanied by
misrepresentations Tooker v Alston 159 F 599, or where, in addition to a party's silence, there is any statement, word,
or act on his part which tends affirmatively to a suppression of the truth, to a covering up or disguising of the truth, or to a
withdrawal or distraction of a party's attention from the real facts; then the line is overstepped, and the concealment becomes
a fraud. Portland Cement Co. v White, 238 SW2d 368. Such conduct is designate active concealment, and it produces
the same result in law as positive misrepresentation. Jones v Herring 16 SW2d 325. Likewise, resort to any trick or artifice
to prevent an adversary from discovering the truth is equivalent to active misrepresentation. Gilliland v Mt. Vernon Hotel
Co. 321 P2d 558. It has been said that the least degree of misrepresentation constitutes very potent evidence of fraud
under such circumstances Rothmiller v Stein, 38 NE 718, and that a single word, a nod, a wink, a shake of the head, or
a smile, intended to induce the belief in the existence of a nonexisting fact, may be sufficient. Chicora Fertilizer Co. v
Dunan, 46 A 347; Crompton v Beedle 75 A 331. It has been held that matters which are merely collateral need not relate
directly to the nature and character of the subject matter of the contract, but that it is sufficient if they are so closely
connected with the contract that the parties would not, except for the representations, have entered into it, and that by
26
such representations they were induced to enter into it to the knowledge of the other party. Chiodo v Garramone, 11 Misc
2d 743. It is an old adage that half a truth is a lie. Hadley v Clinton County Importing Co. 13 Ohio St 502.
IV. F) District Court Judge CLARK OWENS acknowledged during oral argument of Accused's MOTION TO DISMISS
that a privilege and a right are not identical in meaning.
Well established law shows that the word occupation as used in connection with the licensing thereof and the imposition
of taxes thereon is identical in meaning with the word privilege and includes any business, trade, profession, pursuit,
vocation, or calling.
The record does not demonstrate any commercial nexus of Accused and the record shows Accused is not a licensee; yet
Judge CLARK OWENS, upon his unsupported conclusions of law and fact, threatened to throw the book at Accused
if Accused were to be brought before the Court to answer a future traffic complaint, in spite of Accused's assertion
that Accused has always in the past *31 and will continue in the future to use the highways, as of natural right,
exclusively for the ordinary purpose of passage and not for any privileged purpose of traffic or public service. It appears
that District Court Judge CLARK OWENS has a fiduciary duty to produce, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-252; 77-621(b) and
Rule 165, findings of fact and conclusions of law upon his threat, interpretation and application of the definition of
the word privilege verses right and thereby unveil his apparent unrebuttable conclusive presumption that Accused
uses the highways for an undisclosed privileged activity or Judge OWENS and Judge PILSHAW should arrest judgment
of the instant matter. Accused's pleadings of record and testimony support Accused's objections and it appears that
the authorities support Accused's affirmed belief that one's conduct of exercising his un-a-lien-able affirmative public
easement of access and necessity is proper conduct without state granted and assigned nonexempt tax registration, driver's
license and state sanctioned motor vehicle insurance. In response to Judge OWENS's threat, Accused read numerous
cites into the record which qualify the terms privilege and right (R. SIX, 35-42). Additionally, the authorities contained
in Accused's PETITION TO ARREST JUDGMENT are provided in support of Accused's objections to this spurious
action and in support of Accused's affirmed good faith belief that Accused's conduct of exercising Accused's un-a-lienable affirmative public easement of access and necessity is proper conduct without state granted and assigned nonexempt
tax registration, driver's license and state sanctioned motor vehicle insurance. The Plaintiff and Judge OWENS and
Judge PILSHAW have never offered any contradictory case law in pretrial hearings or at trial. The record does not
demonstrate any commercial nexus on Accused's part and the record shows that Accused is not a licensee; in spite of
Accused's affirmed testimony at trial that demonstrates that Accused has always in the past and will continue in the
future to use the highways, as of natural right, exclusively for the ordinary purpose of passage and not for any privileged
purpose of traffic or public service. Judge OWENS and Judge PILSHAW have failed to produce, pursuant to K.S.A.
60-252; 77-621(b) and Rule 165, findings of facts and conclusions of law to state the controlling facts required by K.S.A.
60-252, and *32 the legal principles controlling the decision, to substantiate and provide integrity to their denials of the
motions to dismiss advanced by Accused. In regard to privilege versus right consider the following excerpt (R. ONE,
49-53) of Accused's pleading:

5) District Court Judge CLARK OWENS acknowledged in open court that a privilege and a right are not identical
in meaning. Well established law shows that the word occupation as used in connection with the licensing thereof and
the imposition of taxes thereon is identical in meaning with the word privilege and includes any business, trade, profession,
pursuit, vocation, or calling.
F1) The Constitution of the United States is the supreme law of the land and anything repugnant to it is void Marbury
v. Madison.
27
F2) The right to travel / noncommercial passage without permission from municipal corporations is well established
fundamental principle. Furthermore, it is a resjudicata principle that tax classification of property is based upon it's use
and not upon the physical description or the owners status:
It will be observed from the language of the ordinance that a distinction is to be drawn between the terms operator
and driver the operator of the service car being the person who is licensed to have the car upon the streets in the business
of carrying passengers for hire; while the driver is the on who actually drives the car. However in the actual prosecution of
business, it is possible for the same person to be both operator and driver. Newbill v. Union Indemnity Co., 60 SW2d 658.
Municipal ordinances limiting and regulating the operation of motor vehicles for hire within the municipality have been
generally upheld. See 29 Harv. L. Rev. 437; Cf. Aroenta v. Keath, 197 S.W. 686. The nature of the permission granted
under such regulations has formerly been deemed a license. Dallas v. Gill, 199 S.W. 631, 635. It would therefore seem
that although the municipality may, in the exercise of the police power, make reasonable regulations governing traffic
in the streets it may neither prohibit equal opportunities of access nor grant private vested rights which will interfere with
the public right of passage. Comm. v. Stodder, 2 Cush, 562; Hatfield v. Straus, 82 N.E. 172; See Johnson v. New York.
186, 78 N.E. 715. See I Elliott, Roads and Streets, 3 ed., 544. The privilege of using the streets for private gain is thus,
in its inception, dependent upon public need, and, in its continuance, dependent upon public convenience. Baltimore
v. Baltimore Trust etc. Co., 166 U.S. 673; Nolan v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812; Ex *33 parte Dickey 85 S.E. 781. Such
privilege strictly would seem to be a license rather than a franchise, which is essentially a vested property right derived
from the sovereign. McPhee etc. Col. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 158 Fed. 5; Sullivan v. Cent. III. Public Service Co., 122 N.
E. 58; 33 Harv L. Rev. 1058. All freemen, when they form a social compact, have equal rights, and no man, or set of men,
is entitled to exclusive separate public emoluments, or privileges except in consideration of public services. As a license
authorizing a person to practice a profession, or to carry on a particular business, is not a contract which vests a right, but
merely the grant of a privilege, such a license is not protected by the constitutional prohibition as to the impairment of
the obligation of contract, Auto Transit Co. v Fr Worth (1915), 182 SW 685. The word occupation as used in connection
with the licensing thereof and the imposition of taxes thereon is identical in meaning with the word privilege and includes
any business, trade, profession, pursuit, vocation, or calling. State v. Van Daalan, 11 N.W.2d 523, 527. A privilege is the
exercise of an occupation or business which requires a license from some proper authority, designated by some general
law, and is not free to all, or any, without such license. Draughon v. Fox-Pelletier Corporation, 126 S.W.2d 329, Vol. 53
C.J.S., West Publishing (1987) LICENSES 2 pg 321.
K.S.A. 77-502. Definitions.
(c) License means a franchise, permit certification, approval, registration, charter or similar form of authorization
required by law for a person to engage in a profession or occupation.
K.S.A. 8-1430. License and license to operate a motor vehicle defined. License' or license to operate a motor vehicle
means any driver's license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under, or granted by, the laws
of the state, including:
(b) the privilege of any person to drive a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license; ...
K.S.A. 8-2,128. (UNIFORM COMMERCIAL DRIVER'S LICENSE ACT) SAME: Definitions.
(I) driver's license means any driver's license or any other license or permit to operate a motor vehicle issued under,
or granted by the laws of this state, including;
(2) the privilege of any person to drive a motor vehicle whether or not such person holds a valid license; or...
28
The order of the Railroad Commision violated none of plaintiffs' Federal constitutional rights, for, while the public
highways of the state are open and free to all persons for traverse and communication at all times, nvertheless the state may
properly impose reasonable conditions and regulations upon any particular individuals who desire to use such highways
as the chief situs of their business of transporting persons or property thereover as a business for hire. ... If *34 the
state may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favor, it may, in like manner, compel
a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guaranties embedded in the Constitution of the United States may thus be
manipulated out of existence. ... Acts generally lawful may become unlawful when done to accomplish an unlawful end
and a constitutional power cannot be used by way of condition to attain an unconstitutional result. The regulation in
question is quite as great an interference as a tax of the kind that repeated decisions have held void. It cannot be justified
under that somewhat ambiguous term of police powers.... Distinguishing between activities that may be engaged in
as a matter of right and those like the use of the streets that are carried on by government permission, it is said: in the
latter case the power to exclude altogether generally includes the lesser power to condition, and may justify a degree of
regulation not admissible in the former, 265 U.S. 145.
Frost v. Railroad Commission, 271 U.S. 583, 47 ALR 457.
It is not the type of vehicle, but the peculiar nature of the business conducted upon and over the public highways, that
justifies the classification of the statute for licensing purposes Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R.
22. Thus self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means
by which they are propelled Ex Parte Hoffert 148 NW 20. Where public property is not involved a tax exemption must
be based upon the use of the property and not on the basis of ownership alone, State Ex Rel. Stephan v. Parrish, 257 Kan.
294 (1995), 891 P.2d 445. In view of this rule a statutory provision that the supervising officials may exempt such persons
when the transportation is not on a commercial basis means that they must exempt them, State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 60
C.J.S. 94 pg 581. It is held that a tax upon common carriers by motor vehicles is based upon a reasonable classification,
and does not involve any unconstitutional discrimination, although it does not apply to private vehicles, or those used
by the owner in his own business, and not for hire Desser v. Wichita (1915) 96 Kan 820; Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v
Railroad Comrs., 75 A.L.R. 22. In the opinion Mr. Chief Justice Johnston said: The streets are provided for the public
in general for purposes of travel and transportation, and cited the case of Bogue v Bennett, 60 NE 143, holding void a
city ordinance which prohibited traction engines and vehicles not propelled by animal power from using the streets. The
Indiana court used this language: But vehicles, whether moved by animal, steam, or other power which do not require
a specially constructed track, may be run upon the streets and alleys of a municipal corporation, without first obtaining
the consent of the governing body thereof.... In the language of Judge Cooley: ... A highway established for the general
benefit of passage and traffic must admit of new methods of use whenever it is found that the general benefit requires
them; and if the law should preclude the adaptation of the use to the new methods, it would defeat, in greater or less
degree, the purpose for which highways are established, Desser v. Wichita (1915) 96 Kan 820; also see Ex Parte Hoffert
148 NW 20; State v. Flagg 242 P 1023; State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073 State v. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; 60 C.J.S. 94 pg 581.
Undoubtedly the *35 right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is
an attribute of personal liberty and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or throughout the territory of any State is
a right secured by the 14th Amendment and by other provisions of the Constitution. Schactman v. Dulles 225 F2d 938,
941. The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary
course of life and business is a common right which he has under his right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess
property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right in so doing to use the ordinary and usual conveyances
of the day; and under the existing modes of travel includes the right to drive a horse-drawn carriage or wagon thereon, or
to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purposes of life and business. It is not a mere privilege, like the
privilege of moving a house in the street, operating a business stand in the street, or transporting persons or property
for hire along the street, which a city may permit or prohibit at will. ... Fundamental personal rights, such as the right of
a person to travel the public highways of the state, are not less sacred and valuable rights, or less subject to the protection
of a court of equity, in a proper case than are property rights. An injunction suit is often more appropriate and effective
method of resisting the invasion of an interference with such a personal right under color of void statute or ordinance
29
than any common-law remedy, and where the remedy at law is not as complete and as fully adequate as an injunction
suit, or where the threatened or attempted enforcement of a void statute or ordinance will do irreparable injury to a person in
interfering with the exercise of such a common fundamental personal right, a suit for injunction will lie. And, by irreparable
injury is meant an injury of such a nature that fair and reasonable redress may not be had in a court of law, and that to
refuse the injunction would be a denial of justice. Thompson v. Smith 154 S.E. 579. Municipal ordinances limiting and
regulating the operation of motor vehicles for hire within the municipality have been generally upheld. See 29 Harv. L.
Rev. 437; Cf. Argenta v. Keath, 197 S.W. 686. The nature of the permission granted under such regulations has formerly
been deemed a license. Dallas v. Gill, 199 S.W. 631, 635. It would therefore seem that although the municipality may,
in the exercise of the police power, make reasonable regulations governing traffic in the streets it may neither prohibit
equal opportunities of access nor grant private vested rights which will interfere with the public right of passage. Comm.
v. Stodder. 2 Cush, 562; Hatfield v. Straus, 82 N.E. 172; See Johnson v. New York. 186, 78 N.E. 715. See I Elliott. Roads
and Streets, 3 ed., 544. The privilege of using the streets for private gain is thus, in its inception, dependent upon public
need, and, in its continuance, dependent upon public convenience. Baltimore v. Baltimore Trust etc. Co., 166 U.S. 673;
Nolan v. Riechman, 225 Fed. 812; Ex parte Dickey 85 S.E. 781. Such privilege strictly would seem to be a license rather
than a franchise, which is essentially a vested property right derived from the sovereign. McPhee etc. Col. v. Union Pac.
R.R. Co., 158 Fed. 5; Sullivan v. Cent. III. Public Service Co., 122 N. E. 58; 33 Harv L. Rev. 1058. A more stringent test
has emerged, however, in cases involving suspect classifications or fundamental interest. Here the courts peel away
the protective presumption *36 of constitutionality and adopt an attitude of active and critical analysis, subjecting the
classification to strict scrutiny. The burden of proof to justify the classification falls upon the state, Shapiro v. Thompson
394 U.S. 618; State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett 223 Kan. 618. This test has been used to strike down classifications based
on infringements of fundamental rights, such as the right to travel freely, Dunn v. Blumstein 405 U.S. 330; Aptheker v.
Secretary of State 378 U.S. 500; State ex rel. Schneider v. Liggett 223 Kan. 618. A right which is free and open to all is not
subject to a license, Chicago v. Collins 51 N.E. 907 or tax, J. & A. Freilberg Co. v. Dawson 255 U.S. 288.
F3) A right, i.e. the right to travel, cannot be converted by the state into a privilege whereupon a tax and a license may lie.
Where rights secured by Constitution are involved, there can be no rule making or legislation which would abrogate
them. Miranda v. State of Arizona, 86 SCt 1602. The claim and exercise of a constitutional right cannot be converted
into a crime. Miller v. US, 230 F 486, 489. The police power of a state is subject to the Bill of Rights of both the
federal and state constitutions, and must not violate its inhibitions People v Blue 544 P 2d 385. A state statute, even
though enacted under the police power, must yield to the Constitution of the United States No right granted or secured
by the Constitution of the United States can be impaired or destroyed by a state enactment, whatever may be the source
from which the power to pass such enactment may have been derived Iowa Motor Vehicle Asso. v Railroad Comrs., 75
A.L.R. 2, 5.
F4) In the event that the state does convert Accused's right to travel into a privilege, Accused can engage in the right to
noncommercial travel / passage with impunity, see Dillon v. Rogers, 36 Tex. 153.
F5) For the state to prevail upon a criminal prosecution of Accused, the state would have to prove willfulness on
the part of Accused to breech a known duty or responsibility. Accused has a perfect defense against any charge of
willfulness as Accused has thoroughly briefed the Courts and the tax collectors of the fact that Accused's conduct
relies upon the well established law held in opinions of the state and federal supreme Courts, ruling in pertinent part,
that [t]he right to travel is a well-established common right that does not owe its existence to the federal government.
It is recognized by the courts as a natural right. Schactman v. Dulles 225 F2d 938, 941.
F6) Accused asserts there is no injured party in the CITY OF WICHITA criminal traffic complaint against Accused
and that there is a 99% probability that there will be no injured party within a future spurious action also erroneously
advanced by the tax collectors against Accused in a frivolous traffic complaint since Accused does not use for the
30
production of income Accused's conveyances *37 and therefore Accused is not subject to the tax collectors' commercial /
traffic regulations.
For a crime to exist, there must be an injured party. There can be no sanction or penalty imposed on one because of
this exercise of a constitutional right. Shear v. Cullen, 481 F. 945.
F7) The tax collectors should be equitably estopped from advancing a traffic complaint against Accused or compelling
Accused to contract with them as they have no right of action since they are actually civilly dead bankrupt corporations,
relative to legal tender (gold and silver coin), evidenced by their exclusive practice of discharging their own debts with
limited liability through their privileged use of federal reserve notes / direct obligations of the UNITED STATES, instead
of paying-off their debts with valuable consideration / money as defined at K.S.A 16-111; 79-102; 79-3109d(a). Vol
2, p 46, 47. As the bankrupt tax collectors have no actual money / legal tender / valuable consideration, they can only
enter into nude contracts. Therefore:
nudum pactum est ubi nulla subest causa praeter conventionem; sed ubi subest causa, fit obligatio, et parit actionem /
A naked contract is where there is no consideration except the agreement: but where there is a consideration, it becomes
an obligation and gives a right of action.
F8) Under International Law, as held in McCloud v U.S. 229 US 416; U.S. v Heinszen & Co. 206 U.S. 370; Dobley v U.S.,
182 US 222; Haver v Yacker. 9 Wall 32; Downes v Bidwell 182 US 303; U.S. v Rice, 4 Wheat 246; see the Hague Conference
at 32 Statutes At Large of Congress, Chapter 2 p1803-1821, the tax collectors / agents of the STATE OF KANSAS /
long arm jurisdiction of the DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA / foreign jurisdiction relative to Accused / are a foreign de
facto insurgent government which is attempting to tax Accused in the foreign land of Kansas State in contradistinction to
International law as laid down in the Hague Conference. The comparison can be drawn from McCloud (1913) where the
Supreme Court held that the U.S. military, as a de facto insurgent government in the Philippine Islands could not collect
duties upon cargo imported by foreign residents doing business in the ports of the Philippines. So even if Accused was
trafficking, it appears that for a tax to lie the trafficking would have to be effectively connected to the corporation named
the UNITED STATES. The tax *38 collectors have failed to produce any such evidence. The STATE OF KANSAS
Courts' jurisdiction appear to be of a military nature due to the fact that the flags being flown therein have a gold fringe
and are described pursuant to Executive Order No. 10834, August 21, 1959, 24 F.R. 6865 in contrast to the American
flag of the republic described at 4 U.S.C.1 and the State flag description at 73-702 and the directive at K.S.A. 73-701
which states in pertinent part: A state flag be and the same is hereby adopted to be used on every and all occasions,
when the state is officially represented, ... Furthermore:
Under what is called international law, the law of the flag, a ship owner who sends his vessel into a foreign port gives
notice by his flag to all who enter into contracts with the ship master that he intends the law of the flag to regulate those
contracts, and that they must either submit to its operation or not contract with him or his agent at all. Ruhstrat v.
People, 57 N.E. 41, 1 Bouviers' Law Dictionsary, Rawles Rev., 799; see 4 of the MOTION TO DISMISS.
IV G)Judge OWENS and Judge PILSHAW did not allow Accused to depose the Director of the Driver Control Bureau
GARY CARTER by direct examination in Court or by separate deposition, or even by compelling the agency to answer
the queries within Accused's discovery pleadings of record. Accused was denied the right to compel said public servant
on behalf of Accused to disclose what use of an automobile justifies the levying of taxes associated with motor vehicle
registration and licensure / extrinsic Brady evidence.
In regard to the fact that Accused was denied discovery, consider the following excerpt (R. EIGHT, 95-103) of Accused's
pleading:
MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE TIME FOR DISCOVERY
31
AND
ISSUANCE OF SUBPOENA DUCES TECUM(S)
AND
MOTION AND DEMAND FOR DISCOVERY
Trustee demands to discover from Plaintiff material facts and other evidence which will exonerate or tend to mitigate
the Plaintiff's claim. The Plaintiff shall produce the following documents upon Trustee's request, pursuant to the *39
principals of due process of law, 3, 10, 15, 18-20 of the BILL OF RIGHTS of the CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE
OF KANSAS, 1, 4, 5, 6, 14 of the BILL OF RIGHTS of the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES Brady v.
State of Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985), SUPREME COURT ATTORNEY
DISCIPLINARY RULES.
Pursuant to the limitations imposed upon the Plaintiff and this tribunal by the 10, BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF KANSAS and 5 and 6, BILL OF RIGHTS OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES.
Trustee has authority and unalienable right to know the nature and cause of the instant accusations in the above captioned
statutory cause, and moves the Court to compel the Plaintiff's specific performance to produce upon Trustee's pleadings:
The answers and production of documents to the above queries and requests should make more definite and certain the
accusatory instrument of the Plaintiff in regards to:
(a) the jurisdiction of this tribunal invoked over Trustee by the accusatory instrument and process of Plaintiff,
(b) the venue in which the process of Plaintiff was issued and served, and
(c) the subject matter of the case / object (revenue taxable activity) of the tax / basis and purpose statement / concise
statement of the principle reasons the (necessary) implementing regulation(s) of the ordinance(s) or statute(s) were
adopted by the agency.
2) Because the Plaintiff and GARY L. CARTER of the DRIVER CONTROL BUREAU of the DIVISION OF
VEHICLES, and this Court are agents of the STATE OF KANSAS, they have fiduciary duties to Trustee, as beneficiary
of the Public trust, to exercise their offices with honesty and fidelity. Therefore the Court should grant this motion(s) and
compel the Plaintiff's specific performance upon the said fundamentally secured specific requests. By operation of law
through imputed privity of knowledge, as held in the doctrines of respondeat superior, and *40 master and servant, the
Plaintiff's fellow-servant agencies of the STATE OF KANSAS are proper parties for this demand due to their collective
and common enforcement of the motor vehicle statutes and regulations which are the delegation of authority for CITY
OF WICHITA ordinances. The following are relevant statutory authorities:
K.S.A. 12-4103:
K.S.A. 22-3212 (b) Discovery and Inspection:
32
K.S.A. 22-4709 Inspection of Record Information on Individuals:

K.S.A. 22-4711 Prior Record Information; Rights and Duties:
K.S.A. 45-215 et seq,
K.S.A. 45-218 (d):
K.S.A. 22-3201. The charge.
5 USC 552 Freedom of Information Act.
3) Failure of Plaintiff and GARY L. CARTER of the DRIVER CONTROL BUREAU to timely provide Trustee
the information and knowledge demanded prior to trial, to make more definite and certain the accusatory instruments
and accusations of Plaintiff in the aforesaid respects for clarification of the venue and jurisdiction of the statute(s) /
disclosure of the use of the public highways or activities intended to be regulated depended upon by the Plaintiff and the
venue and jurisdiction invoked by the Plaintiff in the above captioned tribunal, should be considered an attempt by the
Plaintiff to withhold full disclosure of the nature and cause of the accusations brought by the Plaintiff and will make
it impossible for Trustee to meaningfully and legally to respond to or defend against the accusations and process made
and issued or caused to be issued by the Plaintiff. The refusal of the Plaintiff and GARY CARTER of the DRIVER
CONTROL BUREAU to collectively produce upon Trustee's specific requests will constitute a breach of their oaths to
the Constitution having violated their trustee and fiduciary duties to the natural persons of Kansas State to administer
their office and execute their duties with honesty and fidelity, see Jersey City v. Hague. 115 A.2d 8, which should entail
good faith disclosure of the basis and purpose of the subject statutory scheme(s) which must be limited to a valid public
*41 purpose in harmony with Dillon's Rule as defined in Black's Law Dictionary and thereby ensure timely due
process of law for those accused but presumptively innocent. The failure of the Plaintiff to specifically perform as requested
(and provide Brady evidence) will constitute a failure to exhaust administrative remedies on the part of the Plaintiff and
therefore the Plaintiff's claim should be dismissed for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and for
unclean hands in failing to fairly prosecute.
No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of a law, which shall distinctly state the object of the same; to which object
only such tax shall be applied. Art. 1, 5 of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS. Object of tax.
A tax says Webster's Dictionary, is a rate or sum of money assessed on the person or property of a citizen by
government for the use of the nation or the state. taxes are burdens or charges imposed by the legislature upon persons
or property to raise money for public purposes. ... [T]here can be no lawful tax which is not laid for a public purpose, an
object which is within the purpose for which governments are established ..... Though the line which distinguishes the public
use for which taxes may be assessed from the private use for which they may not, is not always easy to discern, yet it is the
duty of the courts where the case falls clearly within the latter class, to interpose when properly called on for the protection
of the rights of the citizen, and aid to prevent his private property from being unlawfully appropriated to the use of others.
Loan Assoc. v. Topeka, 20 WALL 655
In regard to the fact that neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only together do they have
any force (one must remember that a city ordinance always quotes or is modeled after a statute) consider the following
excerpt (R. EIGHT, 95-103) of Accused's pleading:
33
4) The Plaintiff's complaint does not charge a crime as required pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3201 and 22-2905; Accused's
substantial rights have been prejudiced thereby.
This prima facia evidence of the original document lists ordinances alleged to have been violated but no regulation as
required pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3201 and K.S.A. 3502.
The Plaintiff will probably respond that the CITY OF WICHITA does not have implementing regulations for their
ordinances. Either they should have their own *42 regulations or they rely on the KANSAS ADMINISTRATIVE
REGULATIONS (K.A.R.) which implement KANSAS STATUTES ANNOTATED (K.S.A.). The K.S.A. are the
delegation of authority for the city ordinances. The ordinances also fail to list any implementing regulation. Furthermore,
the officer's sentence fragments on the face of the said ticket does not convey sufficient information and knowledge
to inform one what specific activity is intended to be regulated. The following authorities reveal that a statute and its
implementing regulation are of no force and effect without the other. Since the Plaintiff is a public officer and thereby a
fiduciary of the public trust he has a duty to Accused, to exercise his office with honesty and fidelity, and must expedite
truthfully disclosure of the agencies secret (code; codified) law through a concise statement of the principal reasons that
they adopted the rules and regulations / the basis and purpose of the statutes and regulations:
K.S.A. 22-3201. The charge
The complaint, information or indictment shall state for each count the official or customary citation of the statute,
rule and regulation or other provision of law which the defendant is alleged to have violated.
K.S.A. 77-421(b):
When requested to do so, the state agency shall prepare a concise statement of the principal reasons for adopting the rule
and regulation or amendments thereto.
This provision thus requires the agency to include in the rule a Concise statement of why the rule was adopted and
what it is intended to accomplish. The statement is a summary of what, in the legislative process, would be gleaned from
the hearings and the statement of the position which make up the legislative history. The basis and purpose statement is
a very significant portion of a regulation when an issue arises as to its application and scope. Thus in the matter before us,
these Statements are the basic factors in an examination of the interrelation of the two regulations concerned. U.S. vs.
Frontier Airlines Inc. 563 F. 2d 1008 (1977)
A policy which is, in fact, a rule and regulation under K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 77-415(4) is a nullity and of no force or effect
under K.S.A. 77-425 unless it has been filed and published as a rule or regulation as required by law. Bruns v. Kansas
State Bd of Technical Professions, 255 KAN. 728 (1994).
...Once promulgated, these regulations, called for by the statute itself, have the force of law, and violations thereof incur
criminal prosecutions, just as if all the details had been incorporated into the congressional language. The result is that
neither the statute nor the regulations are complete without the other, and only together do they have any force. In effect,
therefore, the construction *43 of one necessarily involves the construction of the other. U.S. vs. Mersky, 361 U.S. 438.
An individual cannot be prosecuted for violating the Act unless he violates an implementing regulation.
California Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21. 26. 39 L Ed. 2d 812 (1974) This contention ignores the principles of
California Bankers and Reinis. These cases hold that the Act does not by itself impose affirmative duties on depositors,
and that an individual may be prosecuted only for violations of the Act's implementing regulations. United States v. Reinis,
794 F 2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 1986)
34
The reporting act is not self-executing it can impose no reporting duties until implementing regulations have been
promulgated. U.S. v. Murphy, 809 F2d 1427 (9th Cir. 1987)
K.S.A. 8-2,140. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL DRIVERS' LICENSES ACT. Same; rules and regulations.
The secretary may adopt any rules and regulations necessary to carry out the provisions of this act.
Art. 1, 5 of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS. Object of tax. No tax shall be levied except in pursuance of a
law, which shall distinctly state the object of the same; to which object only such tax shall be applied.
Art. 1, 3 of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS. Power of governor. The supreme executive power of the state
shall be vested n a governor who shall see that the laws are faithfully executed.
Art. 1, 4 of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS. Same; require information. He may require information in
writing from the officers of the executive department, upon any subject relating to their respective duties. 3, Bill of
Rights, Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS, Right of peaceable assembly; petition; the people have the right to
assemble, in a peaceable manner, to consult for their common good, to instruct their representatives, and to petition the
government, or any department thereof, for the redress of grievances.
There can be no constructive offenses, and before a man can be punished, his case must be plainly and unmistakably within
the statute. US v Lacher 134 US 624
K.S.A. 21-3203 Ignorance or mistake.
(2) A person's reasonable belief that his conduct does not constitute a crime is a defense if: (a) The crime is defined by
an administrative regulation or order which is not known to him and has not been published in the Kansas administrative
regulations or an annual supplement thereto, as provided by law; and he could not have acquired such knowledge by
the exercise of due diligence pursuant to facts known to him; or...
(c) He acts in reliance upon an order or opinion of the supreme court of Kansas or a United States appellate court later
overruled or reversed; K.S.A. 84-9-105 KANSAS COMMENT 1983
This section, which does not vary from the 1972 Official Text, is designed to explain the sense in which certain key terms
are used in Article 9. The use of *44 terms applicable to pre-UCC security forms might imply that prior law referable to
that form is still selected which have no common law or statutory roots associating them to a particular form of security
transaction. Other key definitions are found in the next section, in 84-1-201, and often as part of the substantive section
involved. Since the UCC heavily uses words of art, with the drafters telling us (as in Alice in Wonderland) that words
mean whatever we want them to mean, it is imperative that the practitioner be sensitive to the statutory definitions which
apply in a given case. Sometimes Noah Webster would be shocked. For example, the term buyer in 84-1-201(9) is not
broad enough to include a lender, while the term purchaser in 84-1-201(32) and (33) is broad enough. UCC cases can
stand or fall on such fine definitional distinctions.
K.S.A. 84-2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause.
KANSAS COMMENT 1983
... This section does not define unconscionablility. However, in Wille v. Southwestern bell Tel. C., 219 K. 775, (1976),
the court put some meat on this statutory skeleton by identifying the factors which should be considered in making a
35
determination of unconscionability. These include: (1) use of adhesion contracts, (2) significantly excessive price, (3) denial
of basic rights and remedies, (4) penalty clause, (5) hiding disadvantageous clauses in fine print, (6) using incomprehensible
language. (7) overall imbalance in obligations, (8) exploitation of other party, and (9) inequality of bargaining power....
It follows then, that where one does not allege violation of both statute and regulation no crime has been charged. The
combination should reveal the exact activity or one's use of property which subjects one to regulation and taxation
through licensure. Accused has attempted in good faith to discern what activity, use of property, or public service the
Plaintiff alleges that Accused conducted with his automobile and or other nexus which constructively subjects Accused to
the Plaintiffs ordinances. Is the Plaintiff regulating those who use their automobile exclusively for passage and not for
any public service? Or does the basis and purpose of the subject ordinances only regulate those who use an automobile for
traffic / commerce? The Court has not afforded Accused a reasonable opportunity, in violation of K.S.A. 84-2-302 and
prompt due process of law, to discover the extrinsic ultimate material facts which are peculiarly within the Plaintiff's and
its fellow servant agencies knowledge and which are difficult for Accused to ascertain, i.e. the object of the legislature /
legislative purpose / public purpose / basis and purpose of the registration, license and insurance statutes. If the Plaintiff
and its fellow servant agencies had complied with Accused's numerous requests, pursuant to K.S.A. 77-421b, for the
agency to produce *45 concise statements of the principle reasons they adopted the rules and regulations or amendments
thereto which implement the statutes, ordinances and or agency custom and policy, the actual basis and purpose of their
regulations should have been revealed; i.e. the subject of rules and regulations is products and services, pursuant to K.S.A
77-416.
IV. H) In regard to the fact that Accused has always timely reserved his rights by accompanying his signature with the
expression without prejudice, consider the following excerpt (R. ONE, 49-53) of Accused's pleading:
PETITION TO STRIKE ORDER FILED September 30, 1998 ... Accused's signature qualified with the term(s) as
provided by the Uniform Commercial Code provides the following remedy:
Without Prejudice associated with my signature means that I have reserved all my rights to the remedies available to
me in this court, and that I have exercised the remedy provided in K.S.A. 84-1-207 (U.C.C., 1-207), whereby I reserve
my rights not to be compelled to perform under any contract or agreement that I have not entered into knowingly,
voluntarily and intentionally. I have not and will not accept the liability associated with the compelled benefit of any
unrevealed contract or commercial agreement. It also prevents any such qualified document or instrument from being
admitted as evidence.
Bouvier's Law Dictionary:
Compromise: ...It may, however, be considered settled that letters or admissions containing the expression in substance
that they are to be without prejudice will not be admitted in evidence;
4 C. & P. 462; L.R. 6 Ch 827; 8 Sc. N. R. 741.
2) Accused moves the Court for an Order compelling the Plaintiff to produce the expired driver's license issued to Accused
and which was seized by the arresting officer in his illegal search of the subject automobile. The search was illegal
because Accused did not give permission for Officer Jerrell to search the car. Officer Jerrell's testimony at trial created
the presumption that the license exists but it was not produced into evidence. It would follow that the Court is taking
silent judicial notice that Accused is subject to the attendant liabilities of said license. Accused objected to the fact that
there were no foundational documents with original signatures in evidence of the prima facia evidence offered *46 by
Plaintiff or testified to by the arresting Officer. Accused objected that none of his discovery demands for Brady evidence
were upheld by the Court. Accused moves the Court to suppress the said expired license in regards to its associated
liabilities as fruit of an illegal search / exploratory search without warrant. However, the license is Brady evidence in
36
favor of Accused, in regards to demonstrating that Accused qualified his signature thereon with the expression without
prejudice; and thereby supports Accused's affirmed assertion that he similarly intended to qualify his signature upon
the appearance bond but merely forgot to do so when the document was originally drafted. Well established law holds
that where one of a party's letters or documents of a matter are qualified to be without prejudice the whole matter is
without prejudice to that party. Therefore the Court and the Plaintiff have an affirmative duty to produce said license
which should work as Brady evidence to the benefit of Accused.
IV. I)In regard to the charging instruments listing a misnomer as applied to Accused, consider the following excerpt (R.
ONE, 34-38) of Accused's of Accused's pleading:
SECOND MOTION TO DISMISS:

Accused is uncertain as to the nature of the jurisdiction and continues to challenge the Plaintiff to prove the jurisdiction
(venue, subject matter and in personam) on the record; see McNutt v. G.M. 56 S.Ct. 789, 80 L.Ed 1135; Thomson v.
Gaskiel, 62 S.Ct. 673, 83 L.Ed. 111. Accused moved the Court for an Order of dismissal, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-212(b)
(1) through (6), of the instant matter.
1) The Plaintiff and the Court have failed to bring the Rem within their jurisdiction. The Rem is not within the jurisdiction
of the Court because Accused has not subrogated himself to assume the Plaintiff's fictitious claim of a debt. As held in the
negotiable instrument laws, for a bona fide debt to exist there must be a perfected security instrument recorded within
the office of the Secretary of State or in the public records of the Court, In the instant matter this would most likely be
*47 the recording of a certificate of title of the subject automobile in the Plaintiff's name. Such instrument is only in
the records of the Department of Vehicles.
2) It appears that the Plaintiff desires to induce and execute a confidence game upon Accused through an intentional
deceptive use of words to misrepresent the ultimate material facts and their actual authority and thereby trick Accused
into subrogating their claim of the (fictitious) debt associated with the alleged statutory violation. Accused refuses to
accept the position of subrogee in regard to someone's or some fictitious person's debt; i.e. the captioned defendant
BRAD HERSHBERGER spelled in all capital letters.
What legal justification does the Plaintiff advance for spelling Accused's names in all capital letters? That is if Accused
is the living flesh and blood man the Plaintiff intends to address. It appears that the Plaintiff is attempting to attach
tax liabilities to Accused who has no commercial nexus, through accusatory instruments which list a fictitious Plaintiff
thereon by spelling / punctuating Accused's name in all capital letters. This fraudulent personation, equates with a status
crime, Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct. 1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758, and with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341. There
is nothing in the record to support the tax collectors' and the Court's use of this false demonstration, In re Heins' Estate,
22 P.2d 549 which appears to be calculated to deceive in violation of K.S.A. 60-210(a), (d) and 17-5224 and principles of
good faith conduct. The Plaintiffs and the Courts' manipulation of the material fact of Accused's actual given name and
family name, to that of a possible stealthy quasi corporate name which is allegedly doing business within the forum state,
could affect the outcome of this matter to the prejudice of Accused. The doctrine of idem sonans holds that where one's
name is misspelled but sounds correct when uttered, that said misspelling is harmless error unless a party is mislead to his
prejudice; see Black's Law Dictionary 6th Edition. Therefore, the doctrine of idem sonans does not lie for the Plaintiff as
an excuse for the captioned defendant BRAD HERSHBERGER (spelled in all CAPITAL letters) which is a misnomer,
K.S.A. 22-3207, relative to Accused, Brad Hershberger, a living flesh and blood man. Accused does not consent to be a
surrogate defendant for the captioned *48 defendant BRAD HERSHBERGER which spells its name in all capital
letters. Based upon the facts stated herein, Accused proceeds in this matter upon special visitation and only as Trustee
for the federal life cestui que Trust BRAD HERSHBERGER. It is a well established principal that the trustee is held
harmless of liabilities arising out of the trust.
37
The law of a case determined by an appeal does not apply to a new trial of the case in which substantially different facts
are presented. Names which have the same pronunciation prima facie designate the same person but the prima facie case
so shown is liable to be much shaken by the very slightest proof of facts which produce a doubt of identity. Robben V.
Benson et al., 185 P. 200, also see King v. Slepka 146 P.2d 1002. Use of fictitious names is not to be encouraged by the
courts since it lends itself too readily to fraud by reason of concealment involved and is too likely to be used against public
interest or a private interest, particularly those of creditors or other interested parties. Although a fictitious name may
be used honestly in one's private affairs, its very use puts on notice a person who has knowledge of such use that there is
a purpose to conceal something, and if it involves a public official, who is dealing in property connected with his official
duties, there is every reason to conclude that motive is not in the public interest. Peak v. State 163 N.E.2d 584 (1960).
Notice that on all pleadings and documents advanced by the Plaintiff have the defendants name styled in all capital
letters, also see exhibits A through E (R. FOUR, 1-5).
IV. J) Did the Court commit plain error in failing to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law in
regards to all issues shown above and within Accused's pleadings of record as demanded in Accused's
post-trial pleadings?
In regard to the fact that the lower Courts failed to make findings of fact and conclusions of law upon Accused's demands
and in contradisinction to well established law consider the following excerpt (R. ONE, 62-67) of Accused's pleading:

Comes now Brad Hershberger, the aggrieved party, hereinafter Accused, waives no rights at any time and reserves
all rights at all times. In the event that Accused's MOTION TO ARREST JUDGMENT is denied, Accused *49 moves
the Court to alter and amend its JOURNAL ENTRY, pursuant to 60-259(f), by the addition of findings of fact and
conclusions of law, pursuant to K.S.A. 60-252; 77-621(b) and Rule 165. In support thereof Accused would show the
Court as follows:
1) Neither presiding Judge CLARK OWENS or REBECCA PHILSHAW stated from the bench controlling facts and
legal principles controlling the Court's decisions to overrule the defenses advanced by Accused or Accused's demands
for discovery. The JOURNAL ENTRY filed September 30, 1998 is of questionable integrity because it does not state
any controlling facts or legal principles controlling the Court's decision of the instant matter in contradistinction to the
following: K.S.A. 60-252; 60-259(f); 77-621 (b) and Rule 165.
IN RE MARRIAGE OF BRADLEY, 258 Kan. 39 (1994), 899 P.2d 471;
STATE v. MEZINS, 4 Kan. App. 2d 292, 293 (1980), 605 P.2d 159;
MIES v. MIES, 217 Kan. 269 (1975), 535 P.2d 432.
CONCLUSION
In summary, the Accused man Brad: Hershberger was arrested, without warrant, allegedly for failing to use a turn signal,
and Accused was incarcerated in the SEDGWICK COUNTY ADULT DETENTION FACILITY for a period of 21
days in solitary confinement from February 19, 1998 through March 12, 1998 with no access to paper, pencil or telephone
and without any probable cause hearing in contradistinction to COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v MCLAUGHLIN. 111 S.Ct.
1661 (1991). The arresting officers' and jailers' neglect to provide Accused any probable cause, bail and arraignment
38
hearings was the direct cause of Accused's absence from work and the reason that Accused was terminated from the
job that Accused had held for 13.5 years. Accused has been unjustly prejudiced monetarily and defamed in character
within the community. Accused was scandalously denied any due process of law. Despite Accused's diligent demands,
the Plaintiff failed its fiduciary duty to create on the record the foundation of their colorable and prima facia cause
of action to thereby prove the jurisdiction of the Court. In regards to said arrest the legal fiction defendant BRAD
HERSHBERGER (styled in all capital letters) was convicted on the allegation of FAIL TO SIGNAL CHANGE
FROM DIRECT COURSE, Ordinance 11.28.040(b) *50 by Judge RICHARD SHULL of the CITY OF WICHITA
MUNICIPAL COURT, case no. 98-TM-4251, and again on appeal by Judge CLARK OWENS and trial Judge
REBECCA PILSHAW of the DISTRICT COURT of the COUNTY OF SEDGWICK, case no. 98 CR 1811. All said
Judges either ignored or summarily over ruled all verbal and written defenses and arguments advanced by Accused,
therefore Accused moves this Court to exercise its fiduciary duty to proceed in a de novo review upon all issues and
queries advanced by Accused herein and as shown within the record to thereby remove any possible delusion in the mind
of Accused as to his rights as arrestee of the instant matter and as to what specific proven use of an automobile was
conducted by Accused which creates the liability to the taxes associated to the Plaintiff's purely statutory crime where
there is no living flesh and blood injured party.
IN ADDITION, for the good cause shown and in the interests of fundamental fairness, Accused moves the Court to
correct the lower Courts' rush to judgment(s) and arrest the Municipal and District Court judgments of 98CR1811.
Accused moves the Court provide Accused attorney fees and the costs of this action and any and all other relief deemed
just, proper and in accord with equity and good conscience in the securing of Accused's substantive and substantial rights
whether available remedies are specifically pled of record or not, since Oiler v. Kincheloe's. INC., 235 Kan. 440 (1984);
681 P.2d 630 reveals such pleading is not required for relief to issue and provide other relief in harmony with Mingenback
v Mingenback, 176 Kan 471:
If the facts put in issue and established by evidence entitle the party to any relief in the power of the court to give
although not demanded, it is the duty of the court to give it and its power to do so is not conditioned upon the form of
the prayer. Equity will give whatever relief the facts warrant.
The distinguishing feature of equity jurisdiction is that it possesses full power to apply settled rules to unusual conditions
and to mold its decree so as to do equity between the parties.
Novum judicium non dat novum jus, sed declarat antiquum; quia judicium est juris dictum et per judicium jus est noviter
revelatum quod diu fuit velatum /A new adjudication does not make a new law, but declares the old; because adjudication is
the utterance of the law, and by adjudication the law is newly revealed which was for a long time hidden.
*51 I the under signed (without the UNITED STATES) affirm under the penalty of perjury under the laws of the
United States of America that the above is true, correct and complete to the best of my knowledge.
Appendix not available.

End of Document
39

CITY of WICHITA Plaintiff-Appellee V Brad HERSHBERGER Defendant-Appellant

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CITY of WICHITA Plaintiff-Appellee V Brad HERSHBERGER Defendant-Appellant

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CITY OF WICHITA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brad..., 1999 WL 35017146...

1999 WL 35017146 (Kan.App.) (Appellate Brief)

K.S.A. 22-2202. Definitions.

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Robertson v State, 198 S.W.2d 633, 635-36 (Tenn., 1947)

State v. Boudette, 791 P.2d 1063

Araersinqer v. Hamlin, 407 US 23; 32 L Ed2d 530.

Stultz v. Stultz, 94 A.2d 527.

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Farrar v Churchill 135 US 609, Avery v Cleary 132 US 604

Marbury v. Madison ............................................................................................................................

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Dallas v.Gill, 199 S.W. 631, 635.

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Art. 1, 4 of the Constitution of the STATE OF KANSAS. Same; require information.

K.S.A. 84-2-302. Unconscionable contract or clause.

KANSAS COMMENT 1983

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CITY OF WICHITA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brad..., 1999 WL 35017146...

COUNTY OF RIVERSIDE v MCLAUGHLIN, 111 S.Ct. 1661 (1991) rush to judgment

CITY OF WICHITA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brad..., 1999 WL 35017146...

I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

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The Accused: That's correct, right?

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IV. ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES

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MOTION TO DISMISS MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT INCORPORATED

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CITY OF WICHITA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Brad..., 1999 WL 35017146...

PETITION TO ARREST JUDGMENT