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Francisco vs. House of Representeatives G.R. No. 160261

>FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2 impeachment proceedings were filed against Supreme Court Chief
Justice Hilario Davide. The justiciable controversy in this case was the constitutionality of the subsequent filing
of a second complaint to controvert the rules of impeachment provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr. with the House of Representatives is constitutional, and whether the resolution thereof is a political
question h; as resulted in a political crisis.
HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings which were
approved by the House of Representativesare unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment
complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.
REASONING:In passing over the complex issues arising from the controversy, this Court is ever mindful of
the essential truth that the inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial
branches of government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part of
the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people.
At the same time, the corollary doctrine of checks and balances which has been carefully calibrated by the
Constitution to temper the official acts of each of these three branches must be given effect without destroying
their indispensable co-equality. There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another. Both are
integral components of the calibrated system of independence and interdependence that insures that no branch
of government act beyond the powers assigned to it bythe Constitution.
The framers of the Constitution also understood initiation in its ordinary meaning. Thus when a proposal
reached the floor proposing that A vote of at least one-third of all the Members of the House shall be
necessary to initiate impeachment proceedings, this was met by a proposal to delete the line on the ground
that the vote of the House does not initiate impeachment proceeding but rather the filing of a complaint does.
Having concluded that the initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third of the members
of the House of Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5) of
Article XI becomes clear. Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated, another impeachment complaint
may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
The Court in the present petitions subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved on the merits only the main issue
of whether the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally
imposed one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did not go about assuming jurisdiction where it had none, nor

indiscriminately turnjusticiable issues out of decidedly political questions. Because it is not at all the business of
this Court to assert judicial dominance over the other two great branches of the government.

Randolf S. David v. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 (and other
consolidated cases)

DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
I. THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA
People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017, implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of
national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the Philippines and Commander-inChief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed
forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the
Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of
lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of
the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that
the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military
officers, leftist insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some members of the political opposition in
a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reins of government as a clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without warrants on February 24, 2006 on their
way to EDSA. Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily Tribune, which was perceived to be antiArroyo, was searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on February 25, 2006. Seized from the
premises in the absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except the security guard of the building
were several materials for publication. The law enforcers, a composite team of PNP and AFP
officers, cited as basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless search and seizure was
Presidential Proclamation 1017 issued by then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the exercise of
her constitutional power to call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted pursuant to PP 1017
valid?

III. THE RULING

[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017,
were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure provides [for the following circumstances of valid warrantless arrests]:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.

Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner
Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the charges of inciting to sedition and violation of
BP 880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was their observation that some rallyists were
wearing t-shirts with the invective Oust Gloria Now and their erroneous assumption that petitioner
David was the leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest Prosecutor ordered his immediate
release on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that petitioner David was not wearing the
subject t-shirt and even if he was wearing it, such fact is insufficient to charge him with inciting to
sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the Daily Tribunes offices conducted
pursuant to PP 1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised
Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the conduct of search and seizure. Section 4
requires that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause in connection with one specific offence
to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce. Section 8 mandates that the search of a house,
room, or any other premise be made in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of
his family or in the absence of the latter, in the presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section 9 states that the warrant must direct that it be
served in the daytime, unless the property is on the person or in the place ordered to be searched , in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be served at any time of the day or night. All these rules
were violated by the CIDG operatives.

235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT
Amendment by Substitution
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 otherwise known as the Expanded Value
Added Tax (EVAT) Law. Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from the House of

Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB
11197 and that it passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 readings in Senate for after
the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could have done is amend HB 11197 by striking
out its text and substituting it with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Senate
version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its ironic however to note that Tolentino and copetitioner Raul Roco even signed the said Senate Bill.)
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm.
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, holding that such consolidation was
consistent with the power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated in the
HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9 justices, is that the initiative must come from the
HoR. Note also that there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version rather than having
the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills are concerned. This practice of amendment by
substitution has always been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of form. There is no
showing that it would make a significant difference if Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)
FACTS:
Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that laws to
be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of mandamus to
compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementations and administrative
orders.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.
HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the general public

adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such
notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis nominem
excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The word
shall therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due
process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically
informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general application which have not
been published have no force and effect.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
FACTS:
This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that
while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees themselves
declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their
publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate
to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on
the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable

only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of
the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom
of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.
The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.
J. Cruz:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark,
deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their
existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper
notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked
blade is drawn.

Miller vs Mardo Miller v Mardo 2 SCRA 398 BILL MILLER, petitioner-appellee, ATANACIO A. MARDO,
and MANUEL GONZALES, respondents-appellants
FACTS: These appeals, although originating from different Courts of First Instance, are here treated together in
this single decision because they present but one identical question of law, namely, the validity of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission under the authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it
confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide claims of
laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with
Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner
and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957,
on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without being paid separation pay. He prayed for
judgement for the amount due him as separation pay plus damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief
Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an
answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition (Civil Case No. 759)
praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from proceeding with the case, for the reason that said
Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. The court then

required the Hearing Officer and Gonzales to answer and, as prayed for, issued a writ of preliminary injunction.
The latter file their separate motions to dismiss the petition, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper
venue, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it being argued that pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. 997
and 1241, as implemented by Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A,
regional offices of the Department of labor have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting
money claims arising from violations of labor standards or working conditions. Said motions to dismiss were
denied by the court. Answers were then filed and the case was heard. Thereafter, the court rendered a decision
holding that Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as well as Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A issued pursuant thereto, did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act
conferring on courts of first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims arising from
violations of labor standards. The question of venue was also dismissed for being moot, the same having been
already raised and decided in a petition for certiorari and prohibition previously filed with this Court in G.R.
No. L-14007 (Mardo, etc. v. De Veyra, etc.) which was dismissed for lack of merit in our resolution of July 7,
1958. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, respondents Hearing Officer and Gonzales
interposed the present appeal now before us.

Miller vs Mardo Miller v Mardo 2 SCRA 398 BILL MILLER, petitioner-appellee, ATANACIO A. MARDO,
and MANUEL GONZALES, respondents-appellants FACTS: These appeals, although originating
from different Courts of First Instance, are here treated together in this single decision because
they present but one identical question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20A, prepared and submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the
authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it confers
jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said Plan to decide
claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc. In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel
Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint (IS1148) against Bill Miller (owner and manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller
from December 1, 1956 to October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily
dismissed, without being paid separation pay. He prayed for judgement for the amount due him
as separation pay plus damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer Atanacio
Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to file an answer.
Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a petition (Civil Case No. 759)
praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from proceeding with the case, for the
reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction to hear and decide the subject matter of the
complaint. The court then required the Hearing Officer and Gonzales to answer and, as prayed
for, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. The latter file their separate motions to dismiss the
petition, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it being argued that pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as
implemented by Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A,
regional offices of the Department of labor have exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases

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affecting money claims arising from violations of labor standards or working conditions. Said
motions to dismiss were denied by the court. Answers were then filed and the case was heard.
Thereafter, the court rendered a decision holding that Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as well
as Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A issued pursuant
thereto, did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts of first instance
original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims arising from violations of labor
standards. The question of venue was also dismissed for being moot, the same having been
already raised and decided in a petition for certiorari and prohibition previously filed with this
Court in G.R. No. L-14007 (Mardo, etc. v. De Veyra, etc.) which was dismissed for lack of merit in
our resolution of July 7, 1958. From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio,
respondents Hearing Officer and Gonzales interposed the present appeal now before us.