Aristotle

Alexander of Aphrodisias1

Asclepius of Tralles2

Saint Thomas Aquinas

Avicenna Latinus

Sancti Thomae de Aquino

Sententia libri Metaphysicae
PROOEMIUM
[81566] Sententia Metaphysicae, pr.
Sicut docet philosophus in politicis suis, quando aliqua plura
ordinantur ad unum, oportet unum eorum esse regulans, sive regens, et
alia regulata, sive recta. Quod quidem patet in unione animae et
corporis; nam anima naturaliter imperat, et corpus obedit. Similiter
etiam inter animae vires: irascibilis enim et concupiscibilis naturali
ordine per rationem reguntur. Omnes autem scientiae et artes
ordinantur in unum, scilicet ad hominis perfectionem, quae est eius
beatitudo. Unde necesse est, quod una earum sit aliarum omnium
rectrix, quae nomen sapientiae recte vindicat. Nam sapientis est alios
ordinare. Quae autem sit haec scientia, et circa qualia, considerari
potest, si diligenter respiciatur quomodo est aliquis idoneus ad
regendum. Sicut enim, ut in libro praedicto philosophus dicit, homines
intellectu vigentes, naturaliter aliorum rectores et domini sunt: homines
vero qui sunt robusti corpore, intellectu vero deficientes, sunt
naturaliter servi: ita scientia debet esse naturaliter aliarum regulatrix,
quae maxime intellectualis est. Haec autem est, quae circa maxime
intelligibilia versatur. Maxime autem intelligibilia tripliciter accipere
possumus. Primo quidem ex ordine intelligendi. Nam ex quibus
intellectus certitudinem accipit, videntur esse intelligibilia magis.
Unde, cum certitudo scientiae per intellectum acquiratur ex causis,
causarum cognitio maxime intellectualis esse videtur. Unde et illa
scientia, quae primas causas considerat, videtur esse maxime aliarum
regulatrix. Secundo ex comparatione intellectus ad sensum. Nam, cum
sensus sit cognitio particularium, intellectus per hoc ab ipso differre
videtur, quod universalia comprehendit. Unde et illa scientia maxime
est intellectualis, quae circa principia maxime universalia versatur.
Quae quidem sunt ens, et ea quae consequuntur ens, ut unum et multa,
potentia et actus. Huiusmodi autem non debent omnino indeterminata
remanere, cum sine his completa cognitio de his, quae sunt propria
alicui generi vel speciei, haberi non possit. Nec iterum in una aliqua
particulari scientia tractari debent: quia cum his unumquodque genus
entium ad sui cognitionem indigeat, pari ratione in qualibet particulari
scientia tractarentur. Unde restat quod in una communi scientia
huiusmodi tractentur; quae cum maxime intellectualis sit, est aliarum
regulatrix. Tertio ex ipsa cognitione intellectus. Nam cum unaquaeque
res ex hoc ipso vim intellectivam habeat, quod est a materia immunis,
oportet illa esse maxime intelligibilia, quae sunt maxime a materia
separata. Intelligibile enim et intellectum oportet proportionata esse, et

Prima Philosophia

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TRACTATUS PRIMUS
I CAPITULUM DE INQUISITIONE SUBIECTI
PRIMAE PHILOSOPHIAE AD HOC UT
OSTENDATUR IPSA ESSE DE NUMERO
SCIENTIARUM
Postquam, auxilio Dei, explevimus tractatum de
intentionibus scientiarum logicarum et naturalium et
doctrinalium, convenientius est accedere ad cognitionem
intentionum sapientialium.
Incipiamus ergo, auxiliante Deo, et dicamus quod scientiae
philosophicae, sicut iam innuimus in aliis libris, dividuntur
in speculativas et activas, et iam innuimus differentiam
inter eas. Et diximus quod io speculativae sunt illae in
quibus quaerit perfici virtus animae speculativa per
acquisitionem intelligentiae in effectu, scilicet per
adeptionem scientiae imaginativae et creditivae de rebus
quae non sunt nostra opera nec nostrae dispositiones. In his
ergo finis est certitudo sententiae et opinionis : sententia
enim et opinio non sunt ex qualitate 15 nostri operis nec ex
qualitate initii nostri operis secundum quod est initium
operis. Practicae vero sunt illae in quibus primum quaerit
perfici virtus animae speculativa per adeptionem scientiae
imaginativae et creditivae de rebus quae sunt nostra opera,
ad hoc ut secundario proveniat perfectio virtutis practicae in
moribus.
20 Et diximus quod speculativae comprehenduntur in tres
partes, in naturales scilicet et doctrinales et divinas; et quod
suum subiectum naturalium est corpora, secundum quod
moventur et quiescunt, et quod de eis inquiritur est
accidentalia quae accidunt eis proprie secundum hunc
modum; et quod suum subiectum doctrinalium est 25 vel
quod est quantitas pure, vel quod est habens quantitatem, et
dispositiones eius quae inquiruntur in eis sunt ea quae
accidunt quantitati ex hoc quod est quantitas, in definitione
quarum non invenitur species materiae nec virtus motus; et
quod divinae scientiae non inquirunt nisi res separatas a

Alexander was a Peripatetic philosopher and commentator, active in the late second and early third century CE. He continued the tradition of writing close commentaries on Aristotle's work established in the first century BCE by Andronicus of Rhodes, the editor of Aristotle's
esoteric writings, which were designed for use in his school only. This tradition reflected a gradual revival of interest in Aristotle's philosophy, beginning in the late second century BCE, and helped to reestablish Aristotle as an active presence in philosophical debates in later
antiquity. Aristotle's philosophy had fallen into neglect and disarray in the second generation after his death and remained in the shadow of the Stoics, Epicureans, and Academic skeptics throughout the Hellenistic age. Andronicus edition of what was to become the Corpus
Aristotelicum consolidated a renewed interest in Aristotle's philosophy, albeit in a different form: active research was replaced by learned elucidations of The Philosopher's difficult texts. The commentaries themselves served as material for the exposition of Aristotle's work to a
restricted circle of advanced students. Hence each generation of teachers produced their own commentaries, often relying heavily on their predecessors work. Thus, the scholastic treatment of authoritative texts that was to become characteristic of the Middle Ages had already
started in the first century BCE. Alexander, due to his meticulous and philosophically astute exegesis of a wide range of Aristotle's texts, in logic, physics, psychology, metaphysics and ethical topics, became known as the exemplary commentator throughout later antiquity and
the Arabic tradition. He is often referred to simply as the commentator, later sharing this title with Averroes. Because there is little evidence on Alexander's life and activities, his commentaries and his short treatises on topics related more or less closely to Aristotelian doctrine
provide all the information we have about him as a philosopher and a man. As these writings show, his main contemporary opponents were the Stoics, but there is also some evidence of a controversy with Galen. Alexander is not only regarded as the best of the ancient
commentators but also as the last strictly Aristotelian one, whose aim was to present and defend Aristotle's philosophy as a coherent whole, well suited to engage contemporary philosophical discussions. The later commentators were members of the Neoplatonist schools and
were concerned to document the substantial agreement of Platonic and Aristotelian thought, and to integrate Aristotle's work into their Neoplatonist philosophical system. But they continued to consult and discuss Alexander's work, a fact that probably accounts for its survival.
2
(Died c. 560570) A native of Tralles, he was a pupil of Ammonius; he wrote a commentary on the Arithmetica of Nichomachus and another on the Metaphysica of Aristotle. He was a fellow-pupil of the medicine teacher Asclepius and contemporary of Simplicius.