Ormoc Sugar Company Inc.

vs Ormoc City et al
Equal Protection
Facts:
In 1964, Ormoc City passed a bill which read: There shall be paid to the City Treasurer on any
and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company Incorporated, in
Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per export sale to the United
States of America and other foreign countries. Though referred to as a production tax, the
imposition actually amounts to a tax on the export of centrifugal sugar produced at Ormoc Sugar
Company, Inc. For production of sugar alone is not taxable; the only time the tax applies is when
the sugar produced is exported. Ormoc Sugar paid the tax (P7,087.50) in protest averring that
the same is violative of Sec 2287 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides: It shall
not be in the power of the municipal council to impose a tax in any form whatever, upon goods
and merchandise carried into the municipality, or out of the same, and any attempt to impose an
import or export tax upon such goods in the guise of an unreasonable charge for wharfage, use
of bridges or otherwise, shall be void. And that the ordinance is violative to equal protection as
it singled out Ormoc Sugar As being liable for such tax impost for no other sugar mill is found in
the city.
ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a violation of equal protection.
HELD: The SC held in favor of Ormoc Sugar. The SC noted that even if Sec 2287 of the RAC
had already been repealed by a latter statute (Sec 2 RA 2264) which effectively authorized
LGUs to tax goods and merchandise carried in and out of their turf, the act of Ormoc City is still
violative of equal protection. The ordinance is discriminatory for it taxes only centrifugal sugar
produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinances enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true, was the only sugar central
in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to
future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to
exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the
coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to
the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the
entity to be levied upon.
Philippine Judges Association vs Pete Prado
Facts:
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a privilege
granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciarys use of the postal service (issuance of court

processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn
from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of
Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need
is the high expense allotted to the judiciarys franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be
sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order to
cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by
removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking
privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from
the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons
or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking privileges from
other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its operation largely
relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of
age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause
requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it
recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.

Tiu v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 278 (1999)

The constitutionality and validity of EO 97-A, that provides that the grant and enjoyment of the
tax and duty incentives authorized under RA 7227 were limited to the business enterprises and
residents within the fenced-in area of the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ), was
questioned.

Nature of the case: A petition for review to reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals which
upheld the constitutionality and validity of the E.O. 97-A.
Facts of the case: The petitioners assail the constitutionality of the said Order claiming that they
are excluded from the benefits provided by RA 7227 without any reasonable standards and thus
violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution. The Court of Appeals upheld the validity
and constitutionality and denied the motion for reconsideration. Hence, this petition was filed.
Issue: WON E.O. 97-A violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
Arguments: Petitioners contend that the SSEZ encompasses (1) the City of Olongapo, (2) the
Municipality of Subic in Zambales, and (3) the area formerly occupied by the Subic Naval Base.
However, EO 97-A, according to them, narrowed down the area within which the special
privileges granted to the entire zone would apply to the present fenced-in former Subic Naval
Base only. It has thereby excluded the residents of the first two components of the zone from
enjoying the benefits granted by the law. It has effectively discriminated against them, without
reasonable or valid standards, in contravention of the equal protection guarantee.
The solicitor general defends the validity of EO 97-A, arguing that Section 12 of RA 7227 clearly
vests in the President the authority to delineate the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. He adds
that the issuance fully complies with the requirements of a valid classification.
Decision: Panganiban J., The Court held that the classification was based on valid and
reasonable standards and does not violate the equal protection clause.
The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The
classification must also be germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those
belonging to the same class.
Classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions, (2) be germane to the
purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all
members of the same class.
Ruling: Petition denied. The challenge decision and resolution were affirmed.

Central Bank Employees Association vs BSP

Facts:
RA 7653 otherwise known as the New Central Bank Act took effect July 3 1993, effectively
replacing the earlier Central Bank of the Philippines (established 1949) by the Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas. On June 8 2001, petitioner Central Bank (now BSP) Employees Association Inc.
filed a petition against the Executive Secretary of the Office of the President to restrain BSP

from implementing the last proviso in Section 15 (i), Article II of RA 7653 which pertains to
establishment of a Human resource management system and a compensation structure as part
of the authority of the Monetary Board. Employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below
shall be in accordance with the rates in the salary standardization act. Petitioner contends that
the classifications is not reasonable, arbitrary and violates the equal protection clause. The said
proviso has been prejudicial to some 2994 rank- and file BSP employees. Respondent on the
other hand contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection clause, provided
that it is construed together with other provisions of the same law such as the fiscal and
administrative autonomy of the Bangko Sentral and the mandate of its monetary board. The
Solicitor General, as counsel of the Executive Secretary defends the provision, that the
classification of employees is based on real and actual differentiation and it adheres to the
policy of RA 7653 to establish professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to
prevailing laws and policies of the government.
Issue: Whether or not the contended proviso if RA 7653 violates the equal protection of laws,
hence unconstitutional.
Held: Yes the proviso is unconstitutional as it operate on the salary grade or the officer
employee status, it distinguishes between economic class and status with the higher salary
grade recipients are of greater benefit above the law than those of mandated by the Salary
Standardization Act. Officers of the BSP receive higher wages that those of rank-and-file
employees because the former are not covered by the salary standardization act as provided by
the proviso.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation
engaged in the business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and
opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with
the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer
for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court
impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim (Lim), Hon.
Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed
that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is
entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF,
AND
FOR
OTHER
PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:

(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair,
unreasonable
and
oppressive
exercise
of
police
power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows
operators of all kinds of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the
Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment
of the City Council acting as agent of Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section
16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated
power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes
the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is
unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the
rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Due process requires the
intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.
Requisites for the valid exercise
of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the
Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear
that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive
upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the

purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private
property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an
arbitrary intrusion into private rights a violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and
moral values of the community. Granting for the sake of argument that the objectives of the
Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for the
accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can
be achieved through means less restrictive of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable
restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of businesses
or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation
to the accomplishment of its purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated
establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of the
community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication
nor will it arrest the spread of sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral
welfare of the community. While a motel may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it
cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of ill-repute or as a
nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it
can instead impose reasonable regulations such as daily inspections of the establishments for
any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to
suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license
fees. In other words, there are other means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its
purposes, the governmental interference itself, infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a
persons fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality
unlawful taking

employed

is

It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any
reasonable purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property
without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of
individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when
the government confiscates or physically occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when
the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.

What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a

taking if it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has been called upon to
sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his
property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3)
months from its approval within which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any
place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure
of the establishment, a permanent deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless
the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed business, the structure
which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the
Ordinance leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes
with
reasonable
expectations
for
use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to
convert into allowed businesses are confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in
cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also equivalent to a
taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning
ordinance, although a valid exercise of police power, which limits a wholesome property to a
use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without just
compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may
not, by zoning, be destroyed without compensation. Such principle finds no support in the
principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units which have
always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular
taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down
establishments. Ordinances such as this, which make possible abuses in its execution,
depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated arbitrary
will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are
unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance should have established a rule by which its impartial
enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the standards to
ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and
adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards
to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without
infringing the due process clause. These lawful establishments may be regulated, but not
prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal
Protection Clause

In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses,
hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. By definition, all are commercial
establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No reason
exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other
similar establishments. The classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is arbitrary as it does not
rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in
the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area. A noxious establishment does not become
any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as
prostitution one of the hinted ills the Ordinance aims to banish is not a profession exclusive
to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant
to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local
government units to regulate, and not prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1
thereof.
With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging
houses, and other similar establishments, the only power of the City Council to legislate relative
thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds from cities
the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of
such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause
authorizing the abatement of nuisances without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a
nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property and may be
summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are
injurious to the rights of property, health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business.
If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted for that purpose. A
motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of
P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the statute had already converted the residential
Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot,
dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery or
funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force and effect,
it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict
with or repugnant to the general law.

Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs
personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm. The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is
discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council
under the Code had no power to enact the Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.

QUINTO vs. COMELEC, 1 DECEMBER 2009

Congress enacted RA 8436 on December 22, 1997. On January 23, 2007. it enacted RA 9369,
amending theprevious act.Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer
election laws, COMELEC issued ResolutionNo. 8678,4 the Guidelines on the Filing of
Certificates of Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of OfficialCandidates of Registered Political
Parties in Connection with the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections.Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.-a)
Any person holding a public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy.
b)
Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered resigned upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other elective office or position.
SEC. 5. Period for filing Certificate of Candidacy.- The certificate of candidacy shall be filed on
regular days, from November 20 to 30, 2009, during office hours, except on the last day, which
shall be until midnight.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment they file
their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold appointive
positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections,5 filed the instant
petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted Section 4(a) of
Resolution No. 8678 as null and void.
ISSUES:
1.Do petitioners have locus standi?
2.Do the second proviso in paragraph 3, Section 13 of RA 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code, and Section 4(a) of RA 8678 violate the equal protection clause?
HELD:
1.The transcendental nature and paramount importance of the issues raised and the compelling
state interest involved in their early resolution the period for the filing of CoCs for the 2010
elections has already started and hundreds of civil servants intending to run for elective offices
are to lose their employment, thereby causing imminent and irreparable damage to their means

of livelihood and, at the same time, crippling the government's manpower further dictate that the
Court must, for propriety, if only from a sense of obligation, entertain the petition so as to
expedite the adjudication of all, especially the constitutional, issues. The Court, nevertheless,
finds that, while petitioners are not yet candidates, they have the standing to raise the
constitutional challenge, simply because they are qualified voters. A restriction on candidacy,
such as the challenged measure herein, affects the rights of voters to choose their public
officials. The Court, in this case, finds that an actual case or controversy exists between the
petitioners and the COMELEC, the body charged with the enforcement and administration of all
election laws. Petitioners have alleged in a precise manner that they would engage in the very
acts that would trigger the enforcement of the provision they would file their CoCs and run in the
2010 elections. Given that the assailed provision provides for ipso facto resignation upon the
filing of the CoC, it cannot be said that it presents only a speculative or hypothetical obstacle to
petitioners' candidacy.
BIRAOGO V. PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION
FACT:
E.O No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) of 2010 was signed by President
Aquino. The said PTC is a mere branch formed under the Office of the President tasked to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration
and submit their findings and recommendations to the President, Congress and the
Ombudsman. However, PTC is not a quasi-judicial body, it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve,
settle or render awards in disputes between parties. Its job is to investigate, collect and asses
evidences gathered and make recommendations. It has subpoena powers but it has no power
to cite people in contempt or even arrest. It cannot determine for such facts if probable cause
exist as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners contends the Constitutionality of the E.O. on the grounds that.

It violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of Congress to create a public

office and appropriate funds for its operation;
The provisions of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity, and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new office was inexistent like the Truth Commission;
The E.O illegally amended the Constitution when it made the Truth Commission and
vesting it the power duplicating and even exceeding those of the Office of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ.
It violates the equal protection clause
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the said E.O is unconstitutional.
RULING:

Yes, E.O No. 1 should be struck down as it is violative of the equal protection clause. The Chief
Executives power to create the Ad hoc Investigating Committee cannot be doubted. Having
been constitutionally granted full control of the Executive Department, to which respondents
belong, the President has the obligation to ensure that all executive officials and employees
faithfully comply with the law. With AO 298 as mandate, the legality of the investigation is
sustained. Such validity is not affected by the fact that the investigating team and the PCAGC
had the same composition, or that the former used the offices and facilities of the latter in
conducting the inquiry.

Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia

Nature of the Case: Petition for Review of Republic Act (R.A.) 9262
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod
City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled
An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective
Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She claimed to
be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support and also a victim of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set
forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to
comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time allowance to answer, the
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO
on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal
protection clauses, and the validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an
invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition
for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the
petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of
constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity and that the petition constitutes a
collateral attack on the validity of the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is
discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to
protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional
because it allows an undue delegation of judicial power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction,
inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and
jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of constitutionality must be

raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in
the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope
Workerkers Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions
which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to
existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class. Therefore, RA9262 is
based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of
due process is in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may
have in support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be impugned as violative
of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioners contention that
by not allowing mediation, the law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the
family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum of the
Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator. This is so
because violence is not a subject for compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials. Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any branch of the
Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.
The same holds true with the issuance of BPO. Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.