Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
and Humanities
(A Peer-Reviewed Interdisciplinary Biannual International Journal)
Volume 2, Issue 1
June 2013
Tumkur University
B H Road, Tumkur 572103
Karnataka, India
Volume 2, Issue 1
June 2013
Editor-in-Chief
Prof. D Shivalingaiah
Registrar, Tumkur University
Editor
Ashwin Kumar A P
Assistant Professor,
Department of Studies and Research in English,
Tumkur University
Coordinator of the Editorial Office
Dr. Priya Thakur
Assistant Professor,
Department of Studies and Research in History and Archaeology,
Tumkur University
Patron and Advisor
Prof. A H Rajasab
Vice Chancellor, Tumkur University
Honorary Advisors
Prof. K.M. Chander, Mysore
Prof. Alok Tripathi, Assam University.
Dr. A.V. Prasanna, Bangalore
Dr. P. Subrahmanya Yadapadithaya, Mangalore
Dr. Ravindra Gadkar, Shivamogga
Dr. Sanjeeb Kumar Singh, Indian Museum, Kolkata.
ISSN: 2277-7997
Tumkur University
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Contents
Editorial
Editor-in-Chief
In Search of a Concept of Education:
Liberal Education and the Case of India
Shashikala Srinivasan
31
50
66
73
95
110
122
Communities in Conflict:
Fighting for the Sacred Cow
Elizabeth Thomas
130
148
Editorial
Editor-in-Chief
With this issue we have overhauled the Journal on two fronts: we have brought in a new layout and
design to enable easy reading. We have attempted to bring it closer to the format of a book that can be
easily carried around. The second aspect of the change is we have tried to introduce a thematic focus
to the issue. Although not explicitly stated, most articles in this issue deal with the question of culture
and conceptuality. Interrogating several disciplines like education, literature, politics, feminist theory,
history and cinema studies, the articles here try to understand the salience of culture and cultural
difference more sharply.
In the last two decades the human sciences have taken a veritable cultural turn. However, and
happily at that, there seems to be no consensus on what constitutes such a cultural turn. In the AngloAmerican world it is largely understood as referring to the extra-material and extra-economic forces
that determine human behaviour and social arrangements. In large parts of the Non-Western world,
the cultural turn is seen as a recognition of the Western bias in our contemporary knowledge systems.
Consequently, the importance of culture is in providing a rallying point to reinsert narratives from
outside the dominant systems of thought; this dominant system being the broadly historicalmaterialist model of explanation for social phenomena and normative political principles for
evaluation of political and social action.
The criticism against historical-materialist conception of culture was that such a conception reduces
culture to another ideological aspect of society, alongside religion and dogma. Alternatives to such
rigidly historical-materialist approaches have tried to show the relative autonomy of the domain of
culture and in some instances, how this relatively autonomous domain has the capacity to influence
the material conditions in turn. In some senses, the idea of the relative autonomy of culture is what is
at the heart of contemporary Anglo-American and much of Indian, Cultural Studies.
On another front, anthropological approaches have been concerned with describing other cultures. A
lot has been written on the problem of otherness and the tendency of anthropology to create exotic
descriptions of other cultures using concepts from the disciplinary practices of Western knowledge
systems. In response to this attack, anthropological approaches have tried to be more reflexive and
engaged deeply with the question of fit between other cultures, and specific categories and concepts
that are used to describe such cultures.
However, a nagging doubt remains: in all these attempts, cultures, that is specific cultures, have not
been taken as experientially significant units.
What is it to treat cultures as experientially significant units? How is this different from treating
culture as a domain which is relatively autonomous from the domain of material conditions? How is
the task of treating cultures as experientially significant units different from formulating better
descriptions of cultures at the object-level?
These and such questions animate the articles appearing in the present issue of IJSSH. While there is
no readymade solution to this question, we can appreciate the emphasis of these articles: examining
the category habits of specific cultures, giving articulation to our life with concepts and engaging with
existing descriptions of cultures with new tools and perspectives are some of the ways in which these
articles have attempted to forge a new understanding about the cultural turn in the human sciences.
In delineating his conception of subjectivity, Seth borrows from Heideggers The Age of the
World Picture. In the essay Heidegger reflects on the essence of modern science in order to
apprehend the metaphysical foundation of the modern age and observes that crucial to apprehending
this foundation is the emergence of Man as the new subject in which Man becomes a relational centre
of the world. It is possible for man to become the relational centre of that which is, Heidegger marks,
only when the comprehension of the whole changes. This change manifests itself in the world
emerging as an object that is now available for study and man emerging as a subject, and grasping the
world as a picture - as a system. Heidegger notes that the world picture does not change from an old
one into a new, modern one, but rather the fact that the world is conceived as a picture, becomes a
picture at all, is what distinguishes the modern age.
Drawing from Heideggers insight, Seth poses the question what if modern knowledge failed
to produce a subject and the world as picture failed to emerge in India. Seth indeed suggests that it
did not and at points even suggests that this was because another subjectivity, corresponding to
indigenous modes of relating to knowledge, was diverting and frustrating the impact of modern
education. Seth interprets the long standing complaint against Indian students that they regard
western education more from a utilitarian point of view, often learning by rote, thereby defeating the
very purpose of modern education which is premised on the idea that knowledge, for it to be so, must
be truly understood, as reflecting the anxiety of the failure of modern western education to produce
the subject it posited in the first place. He thus reads the discourses and debates in education in India
which, he points out, came to be haunted by a spectre of nominalism, as perturbations on the surface
of this knowledge, half-acknowledgements that the foundational assumptions underpinning and
enabling modern knowledge could not in fact be assumed (195). This failure, he warns, is not to be
read as another argument of lack, or incompleteness of modernity but as exposing the limits of
modern, western knowledge and the presuppositions it makes. In other words, he claims, his is an
attempt to problematize the very knowledge by which we judge absence and incompleteness. Thus,
according to Seth, to the extent that modern knowledge did not remake Indians, it proved to be
inadequate in knowing India.
At a glance, the statement bears a close resemblance to the narrative of lack which has by
now been rehearsed several times in our context and which Seth clearly wants to distance himself
10
11
12
The German word bilden which originally referred to Gods creation of human beings in His
image is given a more active content by German mystics like Meister Eckhardt and others who
believed that the Universal Spirit that emanated from the creator and was present in every being
became impure through its contact with bodily matter and thus had to be purified before it could be
reintegrated with the creator. The process itself was described as an "odyssey," during which an
individual must "sculpt away impurities" until the soul becomes a "work of art," or virtuous by
attaining self-recognition (gnothi seauton). Referring to this sculpting metaphor, the mystics called
such introspection bilden (Cocalis 1978). Thus, from the doctrine that God created human beings in
his image followed the possibility of imitatio Christi or the imago dei where man carries within his
soul the image of God after whom he fashions and cultivates himself, with his highest aim being to
become an image of God.
However, from being confined to medieval Christian mystic traditions, the concept of Bildung
becomes dislodged from its theological frame and is laiticized in the eighteenth century, becoming
available to all. Thus, the active process of self-fashioning and moulding that the copy, through
constant self-creation, is engaged in, in order to approach the original becomes with secularization of
the concept, rising up to humanity through culture, the basic definition that Herder initially gives
Bildung. This normative aspect that is built into the idea of modern education as articulated through
Bildung is best captured later by Heidegger who dismisses the current understandings of Bildung as a
cultivation of subjective qualities as a result of nineteenth century misinterpretations and instead
holds that once given back its original power as a word, it is the word that comes closest to capturing
the Greek paideia.
The German word Bildung ["education," literally "formation"] comes closest to capturing the word
(paidia), but not entirely. In this case, of course, we need to restore to Bildung its original power as
a word, and we have to forget the misinterpretation to which it fell victim in the late nineteenth
century. Bildung ["formation"] means two things. On the one hand formation means forming people in
the sense of impressing on them a character that unfolds. But at the same time this "forming" of people
"forms" (or impresses a character on) people by antecedently taking measure in terms of some
paradigmatic image, which for that reason is called the proto-type [Vor-bild]. Thus at one and the same
time "formation" means impressing a character on people and guiding people by a paradigm. The
contrary of paidia is (apaideusia), lack of formation, where no fundamental bearing is awakened and
unfolded, and where no normative proto-type is put forth. (Heidegger 1998, 1667)
We see here that Bildung is understood actively as a kind of forming that is supposed to direct
humans towards pre-given goals which constitute humanity. What is the normative prototype (the
pre-given goal) that constitutes the fundamental bearing which needs to be unfolded and which
Heidegger identifies as essential to the idea of formation? Here, the theological origins of the concept
13
Previously restricted to Christian theology and medieval mysticism, where Bildung was the
part of the knowledge of redemption and the sharing in Gods grace, now the concept re-emerges as
an active device for the eighteenth century Europeans to think through, work out and arrive at the
idea of the secular, autonomous individual. How is the concept crafted, reworked and fleshed out and
used as a device to express the intellectual and pedagogic articulations of self-formation for newly
secularizing times? Understanding this process will tell us why the modern research university as an
institution was thought about in a particular light in this period and took the shape it did. In the next
section, I explore the relation between Bildung and the idea of education that developed with the
active usage of the concept during this period. We see here that in the debates that follow Bildung is
both a pre-supposition even while it is freshly reworked, crafted and given shape to suit newer needs.
Bildung and the Idea of Education: A Theory of Self-formation
Whatever the differences among individual figures, eighteenth century Western thinkers on
Bildung who drew their educational ideal from the Greek Paideia, explicitly formulated education in
14
15
16
17
Declaring that all education originates from the inner soul of man, all external arrangements
or events can only initiate but not cause education, thereby distinguishing Bildung from any other
model of formation which was for external reasons and therefore served as a means to an end,
Humboldt did more to canonize and institutionalize the concept of Bildung than anybody else.
Between 1790 and 1810, Humboldt sought to lay the conditions under which Bildung could flourish,
unhindered by any external interference even if self-formation could only take place in a dynamic
relation to the external world of action. How does the concept of Bildung undergo transformation
through Humboldt, such that it can now create an institutional space for itself, becoming the driving
force of pedagogy and defining the purpose of the university?
In his essay Limits of State Action (1993), which greatly influenced John Stuart Mill, Humboldt
attempts to work out the limits of the State such that Bildung of the person could take place without
any obstacles. Humboldt was writing at a time when the universities in Germany (like in France and
England), were mostly tied to the Church and regarded as notorious for festering unscholarly activities
and as a social ill. Since the universities were seen as completely unsuited to the demands of the
prevailing times, the Prussian state encouraged several schools, emphasizing practical and technical
training for utilitarian purposes. 27 It is against these utilitarian institutions on the one hand and the
State and Church on the other that Humboldt fleshes out the ideal of Bildung and the idea of the
university.
Stating that The true end of Man, or that which is prescribed by the eternal and immutable
dictates of reason, and not suggested by vague and transient desires, is the highest and most
harmonious development of his powers to a complete and consistent whole, Humboldt argues that
the pre-condition for different faculties to develop in spontaneous cooperation is freedom and
diversity of situations. How does one achieve this without any hindrance and interference from
various institutional bodies? In order to ensure the first condition of freedom necessary for individual
18
Humboldts primary concern here, as Sorkin (1983) points out, is to assert the political
sovereignty of man in which the inward development of man, the development of the capabilities of
the person, his self-education, is given a priority over man as citizen, for, the person, Humboldt argues,
is always more than a citizen. Such a person whose capacities have been allowed to develop to the
fullest and capable of self-expression and self-determination would be more than a mere subject of the
State, even while being most useful to the State. when required and perhaps, ultimately concern
himself/herself with the activity of the State.
Thus, by paring down the States power, Humboldt delineates a programme that will help
meet the first condition for self-formation the freedom of the individual. The second condition which
requires the presence of diversity of situations can be made possible only through social interplay
since forming oneself requires developing social bonds. It is in fulfilling this second condition of
forming social bonds that Humboldt recognizes the importance of intermediate institutions which
stand between the State and citizens, thereby recognizing the institutional setting where true
exchange and development of individuals could happen, without interference from State, leading to
the formation of the modern university embodied in the University of Berlin.
Humboldt not only lays out the conditions for Bildung, but in a fragment written in 1793-94,
titled Theory of Bildung, (Humboldt 2000) sketchily works out a theory of Bildung that at a
rudimentary level tries to conceptualize how the linking of the self to the world through which selfformation occurs, would take place. Emphasizing the relation between the external and internal,
between the self and the world, Humboldt notes that man is naturally driven to move beyond himself
to external objects and that it is crucial that he should not lose himself in this alienation but rather
reflect back into his inner being the clarifying light and comforting warmth of everything he
undertakes outside himself. He must, thus, bring objects/matter closer to himself and impress his
mind on them, bringing the two into close resemblance.
The impetus to link the self/mind to the world and the constant reworking of the relationship
between the internal and external, with movement directed outwards towards the world only to be
directed back to oneself such that ones own powers are honed, runs throughout the fragment.
Pointing out that within man there are several faculties to represent the same object - as a concept of
reason, as an image of imagination and as an intuition the senses, Humboldt argues that these are
different tools to grasp Nature, but the purpose is not to be acquainted with nature from all sides but
to hone his own innate powers of which these diverse views are differently shaped effects brought
into unity in the concept of the world: It is precisely this unity that determines the concept of the
19
Kant lays out the contours of the process of self-formation and its end, necessary to which is a
theoretical orientation to the domain of actions and practices. Humboldt lays down the rudimentary
theory of Bildung, emphasizing the importance of the objectual world in self-formation and draws the
limits of the state by laying down the external constraints such that Bildung of the individual could
take place unhindered. However, it is Hegel who astutely works out what Bildung is in terms of the
experience of the individual consciousness, represented as the historical development of the Spirit in
various stages. If, as Gadamer says, what constitutes the essence of Bildung is not alienation as such
but a return to oneself which presupposes alienation to be sure, then it is in Hegel this it is most
explicitly brought to surface, though th e theme runs through in Kant and Humboldt too.
One of the central problems to which Hegel and other German Idealists were responding to is
the problem of alienation. The nature of alienation is what is often seen as the ultimate problem in
Western philosophical tradition: the subject-object duality (or the disconnection between
knowledge and truth).28 In other words, for consciousness, its object (world) is other than itself. This
gulf/split between the subject and object is a precondition of the possibility of human knowledge and
the arrival of knowledge is the erasure of this gulf.
Hegel, in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1977), conceptualizes the education of individual
consciousness to science as an erasure of this duality. This stage is reached through the dissolution of
internal contradiction which takes the form of negative determination and is resolved at a higher
level of comprehension, resulting in a new shape which appears one step closer to the truth29. Thus
the dualities which begin as oppositions, the consciousness realizes are linked at their very base and
are mutually constitutive. However, the dualities are erased but not by going back into some innocent
unity of subject and object but through the negative dialectics between consciousness and selfconsciousness which unites the oppositions at a higher level of comprehension. This process of
Bildung, or negative dialectic, which involves a particular form of reflexivity, for Hegel, leads to
genuine science. Hegel shows how at the core of formation lies the concept of self-consciousness, a
necessary condition for Bildung to take place.
Conclusion: Observations, Findings and Further Questions
What does my elaborate rendering of the model of education as represented by Bildung
attempt to do? When we say liberal education and the university of culture does not take root in
postcolonial contexts such as ours, what we seem to be saying is that a there is a thick notion of
education which is not taking root. That this thick notion of education finds it difficult to take root in
non-western contexts like ours does not imply that there is something wrong with our social fabric.
What it does indicate is that when we try to understand the reasons for the articulation of crisis in our
centres of higher learning, we need to go beyond locating it in terms of social and institutional failure
20
21
The scholarship on the university and higher education in India works with the categories of the
Western model of the university and the non-western one, where Western universities are cast as
models worthy of being emulated. By the West, the scholarship largely refers to European, English
and American. I retain this use.
2
The history of the idea and institution of the university is a rich body of study in the West. Rothblatt
(1997) points out that the question is not whether the university requires an idea or not but that
historically, it has been assigned one and for two centuries a particular kind of debate has gone on,
revived in every generation, concerning the role and purpose of a university and the education it
provides (1). The list of works that engage with the idea of the university and liberal education is too
long to mention here but among the more recent works, one can immediately recall Nussbaum 1997;
Derrida 2004; Pelikan 1992; Bloom 1987; Readings 1996; Kweik 2006; Lovlie, Mortensen, and
Nordenbo 2003; Hancock 1999. Newmans The Idea of the University, Martin Heideggers Rectorial
Address, Jaspers The Idea of the University continue to inspire though I have not referred to them
here. I have dealt specifically with the German idea of the university which was articulated with much
passion towards the end of the eighteenth century, in the last section.
3
See Robert Pippins eloquent and incisive speech on Liberation and Liberal Arts: The Aims of
Education, given to an incoming class in 2000 at the University of Chicago (Pippin 2000). Liberal
education, unlike the utilitarian theory of education, conceives of goals as intrinsic to itself and to the
development of the idea of personhood. Marxist and feminists accounts of liberal education, despite
their critique, presuppose the theoretical concept of the free individual whose potential for self4
22
Readings observes that the university ceases to be the producer and preserver of national culture,
with the central idea of culture being replaced by excellence, an empty vacuous word with no
referent. Thus, with a lack of any serious role, Reading observes, the University of Culture (as he calls
the modern, Humboldtian university) has given way to the University of Excellence, tilted towards a
market-oriented model, with the older ideals of a unifying national culture, Bildung, the liberal subjectcitizen and the nation-state no longer relevant and asks how best to reside in the ruins of reason and
culture, post the critique of Enlightenment values and modernity (Readings 1996). However, the
problem in postcolonial contexts such as ours is not that the University of Culture is giving way to the
University of Excellence as Readings frames it, but that the University of Culture and the
corresponding idea of liberal education never takes root, except in some minimal, nominal form.
6
See for example, the prolific literature around the crisis in the university in the Indian context. A
quick glance at various media articles, reports, reviews and scholarly writings on the subject reveals a
rather depressing and gloomy picture of our university system it is always in decline, disarray,
decay crisis, shambles, mortgaged or a system in atrophy and is acutely in need of reform,
rejuvenation and transformation. The former HRD Minister Arjun Singh, in the Times of India
described higher education in India as a sick child,(Higher Education Is a Sick Child, 2007) The
National Knowledge Commission note on higher education refers to the quiet crisis in the
universities that is not discernible because there are pockets of excellence, and scholars point out that
the success of a few professional and technical institutions is masking the crisis that runs deep in our
universities (The National Knowledge Commission Note on Education 2006). That we dont have real
universities, our universities have failed to be centres of knowledge production, our students prefer
going abroad for higher education in huge numbers, our universities neither produce employable
students nor train students to pursue higher studies in basic sciences, our students take up higher
education largely for utilitarian reasons and do not understand the protocols of knowledge are only
some of the anxieties around the institution of the university in India. See Kapur and Mehta 2004;
Kapur 2008; Agarwal 2006; Vaidyanathan 2008. Refer to Deshpande 2008; Chatterjee 2002, for a
different, more cautious response to the perception of crisis, especially in social science research. For a
more recent debate on the quality of college education in India, see Thane Richards article (Thane
2013) and the interesting responses to it in Kafila.org.
7
Indeed, when the National Knowledge Commission recommends 1500 universities by 2015 in India,
it is not clear what exactly they are reproducing, especially when under their own admission our
8
23
See in particular Seth 2007, 1845, where he examines the growing concern with cramming and
instrumentalism in late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Interestingly, more or less similar
complaints can be heard against the undergraduate student today. However, the explanation
forwarded today is that the students are from disadvantaged castes and therefore are not motivated
enough, are less bright and pursue higher education only in order to gain employment. The fact that
these concerns were expressed in the beginning of the twentieth century when it was likely that the
Indian students referred to were largely upper caste makes it clear that caste is immaterial to the
issue.
10
The Beginning of modern higher education is traced back to the establishment of Hindu College in
1817 in Calcutta by Raja Rammohan Roy. By 1853, the number of colleges had risen to 25. Post the
recommendation of Wood Education Dispatch in 1854, three universities in the Presidency towns of
Bombay, Calcutta and Madras were set up in 1857. The main function of these universities was to
conduct examinations and award degrees, while teaching work was to be done in the affiliated
colleges. This was an adoption of the London University model. With the rapid rise in enrolment,
Punjab University at Lahore (1882) and the University of Allahabad (1887) were also established.
After this, no new university was set up in the Nineteenth Century. By 1902, there were five
universities and 191 affiliated colleges with a total enrolment of 17,650 students. See (Kuppusamy
2009, 518).
11
This is a paradigmatic case. I have chosen this because it best represents in one conversation the
kind of concerns that dominated the debate around university education, knowledge and learning at
that time.
12
Said (1978) notes that Orientalism should be seen as imposing a limit on European thinking about
the Orient. Thus rather than reduce Orientalism to a body of knowledge that crudely serves some
imperial interests, one should ask what makes Europeans perceive the Orient the way they do and
what are the elements structuring the cultural experience of the West such that its self-description and
other-description have certain features (Dhareshwar 2005, 194206).
13
Modern academia and scholarship trace the origin of the modern university to the idea of the
Humboldtian University in the early nineteenth century. Many scholars emphasize the importance of
the Humboldtian idea all over the continent in the nineteenth century, with the idea eventually
crossing the Atlantic to have a tremendous influence on the Anglo-American world as well. The idea of
the university is seen to have caused a fundamental transformation in the very structure of academic
knowledge, resulting in the creation of modern disciplines as the new social and intellectual forms
through which knowledge would be classified and produced. See Howard (2006); Readings (1996);
Kweik (2006) among several others who emphasize this point. In the Indian context, we have
combined the liberal arts college idea from British universities like Oxford and Cambridge, with the
idea of the Humbodtian research university, pioneered in Germany in the early nineteenth century, as
it is in most postcolonial nations, including the United States.
14
24
R. W. Southern (Southern 1995,11) points out that the theory of knowledge on which the scholastic
system was based that is to say, the idea that knowledge was a reconquest of that which had been
freely available to mankind in a pre-lapsarian state encouraged the expectation of a slowly enlarging
body of authoritative doctrine growing from century to century, and needing in this stage of the world
only to be harvested and organized. If this was a true account of the function of the schools, it would be
equally applicable to natural sciences as to the science of theology, law, logic and grammar. They all
exemplified the slow recovery of that intuitive knowledge of all things with which the human race had
been endowed with at creation, and which - despite the ravages of sin it was slowly recovering and
combining in a single system the knowledge lost by Adam and Eve. It is this closed conception that is
contrasted with the idea of knowledge as open and unfinished and in the future.
16
Wissenschaft, though normally translated as science, referred to the systematic pursuit of any body
of knowledge organized on definite principles, including history and philology. Thus, it included not
just the natural sciences like physics but also what we would call human sciences today.
17
When I say Bildung developed as an apolitical theory, I mean that it provided a theory of education
which was education of the self, not subordinate to either the state (education for citizenship) or
market (education for the industry). Thus, the question was how to create conditions such that
Bildung could take place, without the state or market being obstacles in the process. Hence, the
centrality of Humboldts Limits of State Action [1792].
18
My account of Bildung largely draws from Humboldts Limits of State Action, (1993); Kants What is
Enlightenment (1784) and Hegels Phenomenology of Spirit (1977), besides several secondary sources
on Bildung, mainly Kosellecks On the Anthropological and Semantic Structure of Bildung in
Koselleck 2002; Kweik 2006; Sorkin 1983; Dumont 1994; Gadamer 2004.
19
Mcdowell sees Bildung as a central process through which innate potentialities in human beings is
transformed into second nature, into habits of thought and action. It is through this one acquires
conceptual capacities, thereby becoming responsible to space of reasons.
20
21
Free self-formation for all was the slogan of the times! (Koselleck 2002, 181)
Raymond Geuss (2001, 71) points out that Humboldts The Limits of State Action is one of the most
influential (yet most neglected) texts on the history of liberalism. This is despite the fact, he admits,
that there was no liberalism as a political movement and no concept of liberalism when Humboldt
wrote his work. However, he points out that this anachronism is useful to capture the early moments
of liberalism. One could argue that though antecedents of liberal education predate liberalism, what is
common to both of them is the theoretical presupposition that the essence of human nature is
freedom.
22
Indeed, some of Humboldts ideas are pre-figured in Adam Smith whose idea of education as public
good does not derive from the argument that education should be for national prosperity, economic
self-interest or for increasing economic productivity, as is commonly thought today. He instead makes
an argument for why education is the only effective remedy for the ills of a modern commercial
society and is essential for introducing one to a variety of situations and to help hone ones
intellectual activities, to counter the mutilation and deformation caused due to uniform, repetitive
23
25
Perhaps implicit in Beistas observation that Kant makes freedom central to the idea of modern
education, is that the connection between education and freedom is not available before Kant.
25
Kant makes it clear that the nomenclature higher and lower is adopted with reference to the
Government rather than the learned professions. Philosophy (the lower faculty) is further divided into
historical sciences comprising history, geography, linguistics, humanities and pure rational sciences
comprising pure mathematics, pure Philosophy, metaphysics of nature and of morals. Currently we
could take Philosophy to mean Human and Natural Sciences, all of which are under Philosophy at the
time Kant is writing. (Kant 1992, 45). Here, Philosophy refers to a certain theoretical orientation that
characterizes the Sciences
26
By the last decade of the century, intellectual endeavors had shifted to scientific academies and
there was call from various sides demanding the abolition of universities. The numbers of universities
were seen as too many in number, and an unnecessary burden on state finances, especially since with
secularization, the financial support to these universities which originally came from the church had
reduced. Public support to these universities had weakened to such an extent that during the
Napoleonic era, twenty two universities disappeared, in what has been termed as a mass death of
universities (Ziolkowski 1990, 218308).
27
The concept of alienation itself needs to be unpacked. Here alienation could mean two things a)
self-alienation where human beings are alienated from God. b) alienation between mind and World /
subject and object. Does alienation happen when consciousness develops self-consciousness, a certain
form of reflexivity? Thus, Pippin (1989) points out, modern philosophy is animated by the activity of
reflection, a turning around the mind to examine itself. This form of reflexivity is integral to the
process of Bildung.
28
Hegel works with the assumption that the world is rational and hence is intelligible to us. Thus any
intelligibility or tension is not part of the world but is generated by our conceptual lenses/tensions.
29
References:
Agarwal, Pawan. 2006. Higher Education in India: The Need for Change. ICRIER.
Altbach, P. G., and V. Selvaratnam. 1989. From Dependence to Autonomy: The Development of Asian
Universities. Springer.
Asad, Talal. 1993. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam.
Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Bahti, Timothy. 1987. Histories of the University: Kant and Humboldt. MLN 102 (3) (April): 437.
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Enlightenment?
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This paper continues my attempt to understand our life with concepts (Dhareshwar 2010;
2012): not only the concepts that have come to us from the west, but indirectly the conceptual
capacities that we have not paid much attention to but which bear the imprint of a form of life, whose
actuality, feasibility and accessibility are all questions that we have had neither the courage nor the
epistemic resources to formulate and confront. So although my reflections will target critique,
genealogy and ethical action, we will find ourselves entangled in a few more concepts: life-form, form
of life, social, theoretical, practical, but also the concept of concept and action; leaning on them
alternately to illumine each and in the process clarify the trajectory embodied in my title. But it will
turn out (I hope) that the trajectory is to be thought less in term of temporal phases than as theoretical
and practical possibilities in our conceptual or, to introduce a term which will be explained later, our
practitional space, thinking through whose deep nexus is the task facing our present.
Critique
I want to propose that the kind of Marxism that gained dominance in India was at odds with
(perhaps even destructive of) our practical and non-discursive ways of going about in the world. So is
perhaps the more diffuse formation called liberalism. But let me focus on Marxism both because it
presents a more structured target and because it still holds out intellectual potential of a certain sort
that has a bearing on our life with concepts. This is what we need to think through. Marxism, as a
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This fitting is entirely obscure. Now, various elements of what we have been calling thought
structures had to be part of the practice of independent producers meeting to exchange their products
as value, for example, the idea of contract. It would be odd to describe the idea of contract or the idea
of equal exchange without which there would not have been the phenomenon of fetishism as most
fitting. My point is not that therefore these are ideologies. Rather these thought structures cannot be
separated from the material phenomenon that renders the social opaque or oblique (they together
form the explanandum). If the analysis of the secret of the value-form is a successful instance of Marxs
theory of the social tracking or conceptualizing the nexus of the natural and the social in its most
oblique existence there is a counter-part to that task that Marx needs to undertake in order to give us
an adequate and new materialist understanding of the reified form of life (if it is one) we find
ourselves in. In the same way as reification is objective or has a semblance of objectivity and yet
subsists on the social that it renders opaque and oblique, a conjoined account of the subject-form that
similarly subsists on practical form of life that it nevertheless renders invisible has to be produced to
complete our understanding of the reified or fetishized semblance of a form of life that capitalism is.
The subject as the bearer of rights and interests, the social as the fetishised object-mediated
relationships, nature as utility go together to form this semblance as a form of life. The place for
understanding ideology would be within this conjoined picture of commodity form and subject form.
No thought structure philosophical, literary or law is by itself ideological.
In Thesis X, Marx had asserted: The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the
standpoint of the new is human society or social humanity4 (emphasis added). Standpoint is the right
term, since what is involved is the theoretical ability to conceptualize the social. But the social as Marx
so emphatically and insightfully insisted in the Theses is practical: All social life is essentially
practical, says Thesis VIII (emphasis original). The domain of economics is eminently a practical
domain. In fact, the practical is, as it were, the genus of which ethics, economics, erotics, dietetics, etc.,
could be seen as species. How is it then that one domain, oekonomia, attained such dominance, even
perhaps subordinating or colonizing the others? Marxs theory of the social elaborated as a critique
of political economy, gives a logical reconstruction of the process that makes possible the emergence
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36
So we find, as though the letter was written to exemplify them, the three domains: dietetics,
economics and erotics, three major domains, as Foucault puts it, in which the practice of the self is
actualized in this period with, as we see, constant cross-referencing from one to the other (Foucault
2005, 161) One inhabits the domains successively or simultaneously or even overlappingly. That is to
say, there is a kind of integratedness to them that is a result of the fact that they appear as domains of
application for the practice of the self (Foucault 2005, 162) Ethics as problematization takes shape in
these domains. Another way of putting it would be to see how action in these domains are supported
and clarified by reflection in an integrated way: problematization completes action into experience.
According to Foucaults later works, the care of the self form of life is characterized by such
problematizations, whether that takes place in the sociality elaborated by the philosophical schools
that are so central to the Greek culture or in the sociality structured by the reflective familial milieu
that we find in the Roman period.
But these domains, these problematizations and these actions begin to be broken down,
rebundled or transformed in a peculiar way with the emergence and spread of Christianity. The
extraordinarily detailed genealogical picture of the ancient world that Foucault draws is meant to
highlight the later emergence of domains such as sexuality, economy and politics that are ontologically
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Here are the theses that lay stress on the practical and the social.
VIII) All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to mysticism find their
rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice.
IX) The highest point reached by contemplative materialism, that is, materialism which does not
comprehend sensuousness as practical activity, is contemplation of single individuals and of civil
society.
X) The standpoint of the old materialism is civil society; the standpoint of the new is human society, or
social humanity.
3 On the sense of the a priori involved see (Thompson 2008, 6, 19; Rdl 2007, 20-48). As Thompson
convincingly argues, the predications we learn to make about life-forms (bobcats breed in spring)
are a priori (Thompson 2008). It seems to me that the point carries over to the predications we
understand or use in practical form of life too (a delicate late cut; he asked for teertha).
Ideology is an ability that in the reified form of life (if it is a form of life) can raid any thought
structure to open up anythingnature, self, whateverfor justification. It is not that a particular piece
of discourse borrowed from here or there does this; first, the marking out or opening of an area as
needing justification, then comes grafting from whatever discursive resources (theories, philosophies)
onto that space. It is interesting to figure out how all the familiar entities and sites--the state, market,
family, and many more-- that got opened up this way. It is by now such a ubiquitous and natural
phenomenon that it is hard even to come up with a startling example that reveals how odd this
operation of ideability really is. A good example would be nature seen through environmentalism.
Another example would be the self and the folk psychology that come in with it, drawn from all sorts
of sources (philosophy, psychology, economics, pop existentialism and pop psychoanalysis, spiritual
mysticism). I need to get in touch with my deeper self. She is guilt-tripping me. You need to look
4
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out for yourself. I need my space. He is weak-willed. Think, finally, of the fate of Marxism itself in
many regimes or movements that call themselves socialist.
Marx was too historicist in his characterization of Aristotles cognitive limitation caused by his social
world. So in way he did not pay attention to the way Aristotle was trying to understand actional frame
through his concepts of poesies, techne, and praxis.
5
Although Foucault does use norm and normative quite frequently, the sense in which I am using this
term is not captured by them. His governmentalization comes closest, but he is not consistent with
that usage. Although normativization is the mechanism underlying the many domains he is doing a
genealogy of, he never explicitly theorizes it. Nor does Nietzshe even though he had developed a nose
for hunting out normativity from the strangest nooks of European culture. While Nietzsche did use
fiction (made up philology, for example), his target was the real moralization that Western culture was
undergoing. Thus it is wrong to see him, as Bernard Williams does (Williams 2002), as offering just so
stories like the state of nature story.
6
When Foucault proposed this in the first volume of his History of Sexuality, there was much outrage,
some even calling Foucault an essentialist (of the orientalist type). Whereas I believe this was the
insight that allowed Foucault to diagnose the experience-insulating structures of normativized
domains (see the next note), which for him included the positive or liberatory discourse of
homosexuality.
7
That Foucault was trying to get hold of these ontologically peculiar domains and entities was
completely obscured by the vapid and anodyne doctrine of constructivism to which it got assimilated
in the Anglophone academia. To a small extent, Foucault himself contributed to this by the emphasis in
his early work on discourse and the incantation about power/knowledge. Thus the radically new
question about normativity he was trying to pose never quite saw the day.
8
The theio-practical project, as Remy Brague puts it (approvingly), of theology was to transform the
practical domain of politics and economics (Brague: 2007, pp. 6-7). Like many of the concepts and
terms of Greek intellectual life, economy too was theologized (see Agamben, 2011). Brague explicitly
and Agamben more confusingly seem interested in renewing theology. Unlike in Heidegger and
Foucault (and to a lesser extent the early Derrida), who were trying to overcome theology and its
pernicious secular manifestations in intellectual life, the recent interest in theology, inspired by
Schmitts political theology, seems rather shallow. The waters of theology are deep and murky and the
post-colonial scholars who, drawn perhaps by the eclectic writings of Agamben, Badiou, and even
Zizek (all of whom have been rediscovering Biblical themes and figures), have wandered into it seem
unaware of what theology is, leave alone the implication of doing theology.
9
10
To use a phrase from his power/knowledge days, where it wasnt clear what it was referring to. It
was therefore interpreted in all sorts of ways, as, for example, knowledge produced by the
marginalized groups.
11
First step toward gaining a deeper insight into how a form of life that has practical knowledge as its
integrating matrix is to see action as a unit like a predicate, embedded in what we might call practition,
in the same way as concepts are seen as embedded in propositions or judgments. Consequently,
action-explanation is a primitive unit of a life-form like (Fregean) predication. That is to say, acting
(action, doing or carrying out of an action), action-understanding and action-explanation need to be
understood in the same way as Frege made us understand predication. There is a distinct yet related
12
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In the way Michael Thompson (2008) understands life form and form of life.
Wittgenstein in Philosophical Investigations (1958, 227) Correct prognoses will generally issue
from the judgment of those with better knowledge of mankind. Can one learn this knowledge? Yes;
some can. Not, however, by taking a course in it, but through experience.Can someone else be a
mans teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right tipThis is what learning
and teaching are like here.
14
A word needs to be said about Gandhis English terminology which for understandable reason
seems seeped in theology. Like in the sentence he translates from the Gita he uses faith to translate
shraddha. Similarly, when he is elaborating the path of karma-yoga, the phrases he often uses
service and dignity of labourseem like ideas of protestant doctrine. This is a terminological
overlay rather than the actual theologization, if you like, of the concepts. As I hope this section brings
out, Gandhis idea of ethical action has little in common with morality, notwithstanding his often
careless use of the language of morality.
15
Reading the action-theoretic concepts of those matrices as properties of the world, as orientalist
scholarship did and the current social sciences continue to do, is a cognitive mistake of a serious kind
with disastrous consequences. The cognitive blindness to a different form of knowledge mars much of
the current scholarship on Indias past. Sheldon Pollocks much hailed work (Pollock 2006) provides a
perfect illustration. He keeps noting the kavya-prashasti (poetry, inscriptional announcements)
phenomenon and the repetition of puranic place names across what he calls the Sanskrit cosmopolis.
His focus is apparently the spread of Sanskrit (and its replacement later with vernaculars). It is
unclear what his question is. Is he asking why Sanskrit spread the way it did (in contrast to the spread
of Latin in Europe)? Or is it a how question? And what exactly is the relationship between the
phenomenon he notes and the spread of language? The more difficult but central question, as we have
seen, has to do with the practical form of life. Once we have a grasp of that it would not be difficult to
understand the replication, nesting, elaboration and creation of practitional matrix. The kavyaprashasti phenomenon and the repetition of place names are simply a fall out of this process. Even the
distinction between Sanskrit and vernacular cosmopolis would seem ill-motivated when the cultural
salience is provided by the practitional matrix. So, for example, the vacanakaras of 12 th c were both
replicating and elaborating a matrix. What they were doing is no different from what the Dasas did
later or what the philosophers like Shankara did earlier. Language drops out as a factor. Incidentally, I
am very tempted to argue that anubhava mantapa is not a place name. It is a metaphor of the same
kind as my practitional matrix. That it has been turned into a place name is now understandable!
16
References:
Agamben, Giorgio. (2011). The kingdom and the glory: For a theological geneaology of Economy and
Government. (Lorenzo Chiesa, Trans.). Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Brague, Rmi. (2007). The law of god: The philosophical history of an idea. (L. Cochrane Trans.).
Chicago: Chicago University Press.
Balagangadhara, S.N. (1994). The heathen in his blindness . . . Asia, the west and the dynamic of
religion. Leiden, New York & Cologne: EJ Brill.
Berman, H.J. (1983). Law and revolution: The formation of the western legal tradition. Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press.
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Here Heimsath says Hindus could revolt (presumably against the now ubiquitous
background of an oppressive social milieu) by adopting the role of a sanyasi. Further, the sanyasi
was tolerated or even revered if his unorthodoxy caught the popular imagination. So, the sanyasi
was a figure who gave up certain practices or at any rate was unorthodox about them. Heimsath no
longer argues for the primacy of Hindu scriptures as such orthodoxy is read broadly to mean those
practices which are followed by the majority. This view sets up several contradictions. After all,
individual natives had the choice of rejecting one set of practices and adopting sanyas. For this
rejection the majority who still follow those very practices would often revere him. The householder
does not reject his own practices in order to revere the sanyasi. His practices, although at odds with
the sanyasis, continue to be appropriate to him. The sanyasi on the other hand does not advocate the
reform of a householders practice. We see the native holding an attitude of tolerance towards
diversity in practices rather than a desire to find a norm. However Heimsath does not acknowledge
this distinction. He argues as if the sanyasis rejection of one set of practices is a sign of the immorality
of those practices. Heimsath further argues:
Individual outrage against particular social customs and religious beliefs has always been a feature of
Indian society, despite the high value that has always been placed on continuity, order, and the
wisdom of social precedent. (Heimsath 1964: 9)
Even as he articulates the native relationship to practices Heimsaths evaluative discourse
renders it opaque. He says individual outrage has always been a part of Indian society despite the value
placed on continuity. This suggests that the value on continuity in some ways prevents the individual
from showing his outrage easily. Two of the natives distinctions are present in a distorted form within
this description. The native relates to practices as the concern of the individual, and the native
attempts to preserve the continuity and diversity of practices. However the native does not pit one
observation against the other, and hence would not link the two with a despite. Rather the natives
attitude suggests that a practice is nobodys business but the practitioner, and that diversity in
practices is of no evaluative consequence.
On the other hand Heimsath asserts precisely this evaluation: The individual is able to voice
his outrage even though he is caught in a society, which places high value on continuity. In Heimsaths
description Indian society has some legitimately outraged individuals and a large number of others
who form the orthodox society and hamper this outraged individuals expression of individual
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Now it turns out that within the evaluative discourse of reform, individual rage against social
customs is of less value than community rage against social problems. Individual rage leads only to
solutions like mysticism, but community rage might have brought better solutions like overturning
social structures. Within this limited evaluative discourse then, Heimsath argues that Bhakti
movements failed to transform social life because they leaned towards mysticism. This evaluative
discourse is severely limited to the extent that it can only describe the overall impact of individual
bhaktas like Kabir or Mira as failures.
Heimsaths analysis is geared towards answering one kind of question: why does bhakti not
bring in a mass social change? If the individual bhakta was able to reject social norms, why did his
example not lead to a social revolution? Why does Miras rebelliousness not change the position of the
Rajasthani woman? Why does Kabirs poetry not end the evils of the caste system? Within reform
discourse it looks as if there is a contradiction in the fact that Mira was immensely popular and that
her message of rebelliousness could not have mass appeal. And yet what could explain her
popularity today if not a mass appeal? There is no room in this formulation to ask why there should
be such expectations of these individuals in the first place. Does anything in their works suggest that
they were interested in social revolution? Or is it the limitedness of reform discourse, which can only
see social critique in relation to social revolution and not in relation to individual growth?
III
Women and Bhakti
Mira the Mertani, was what the 16 th century princess was called by her immediate circle. Born
into the royal family of Merta, one of the smaller kingdoms of Rajasthan, she was given in marriage to
Bhoj Raj, the heir apparent of the relatively more powerful kingdom of Mewar. Hagiographies of Mira
segue a few sketchy biographical details with narratives of miracles and end with her unexplained and
miraculous disappearance, allegedly by merging into the statue of Krishna, at a temple in Dwarka.
The interest in Mira is first and foremost for the quality of her poetry. Written in a simple
meter, and easily set to tune, her songs continue to be sung and retain their quality of immediacy. Each
composition articulates an expression, an attitude or an experience, related to her feelings for her
Ishta.16 The songs sometimes touch upon her relations with the rest of the world, who sometimes aid
and sometimes hinder her expressions of love for Krishna. Many of her songs are directly addressed to
him, in others she addresses her female companions and sometimes she addresses the world at large.
Mira herself is centrally present in her compositions, giving a careful account of what is happening to
her, her moods emotions and feelings, in relation to her special condition of being married as she
insisted she was, to her Ishta, the idol of Krishna.
Reform discourse locates Mira as a female Bhakti saint and a standard encyclopaedia
discussion on bhakti poet-saints17 suggests that they reject asceticism and remain house-holders.
This is further explained as a general rejection of institutionalized religion and a central focus on
inner devotion which lays the groundwork for more egalitarian attitudes towards women and lower-
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The familiar tropes of caste and gender enter the narrative to highlight the plight of the female
bhakta. Her difficulties are variously listed as the obstacles of the home, family tensions, meaningless
household chores, her role and status as a married woman and the absent Ishta. 18 The template of
reform places the bhaktas rejection of her given role in life, as a rejection of the society, which
produces these roles. Further her rejection is seen as a failure to bring about revolution because she
advocates this only at an individual level:
While it is tempting to see womens participation within the bhakti movement as a revolt against the
patriarchal norms of the time, there is little evidence to support this perspective. Injustices and the
patriarchal order itself were not a major focus of these poet-saints. Women bhaktas were simply
individuals attempting to lead lives of devotion. Staying largely within the patriarchal ideology that
upheld the chaste and dutiful wife as ideal, these women transferred the object of their devotion and
their duties as the lovers or wives to their Divine Lover or Husband. (Women in World History)
This explains the continued existence of the problems bhaktas struggled against. It does so
by suggesting that the bhakta in some ways failed to address the problems they were apprised of.
This is actually a serious accusation against a bhakta. Within the society in which she exists the bhakta
is surrounded by individuals who do not have egalitarian attitudes and who do not see the problems
with oppressive hierarchies of caste and patriarchy. However, by suggesting that the bhakta, through
her individual effort recognizes these problems, the narrative lays the bhakta wide open to the charge
of hypocrisy. The suggestion is that the bhakta finds devotion of more value even though she
recognizes the problems of caste and gender. Such a position is very difficult to defend without naming
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The example of Mira directly contradicts this reading, as she was a 16 th century Bhakta from
the north who did in fact leave family and home. However the explanation seems to hinge on a prior
understanding of the north which takes from the movement its radical edge in relation to womens
involvement in bhakti. In short, the accounts of bhakti, over the last few decades seem to share a
common template which first pitches the bhakta against his oppressive social milieu and then looks
for explanations as to why this does not lead to wide spread social change.
In Rewriting History Uma Chakravarti (Chakravarti 1998) speaks about Dalit Reform and
recounts the history of the Bhakti movements in Maharashtra using the same template. In this case the
analysis remains inconclusive as she finds that there are many historical exceptions to the conclusion
that Brahmins opposed Bhakti, or that Bhakti came up in opposition to Brahmanism. Finally she
concludes:
Bhakti has remained a rich reservoir of living ideas, even when it has lost its vitality, providing an
ideology to be dipped into by those seeking an alternative to Brahmanic ritual and the caste system, it
has more appeal for Brahmana reformers than for Dalit radicals. It is not an uncritical legacy for those
who wish to transform the material location of the Dalits, and those at the receiving end of the caste
system (Chakravarti 1998, 24).
This account of Bhakti turns it into yet another kind of failure the failure to be progressive
and speak for social equality. Chakravarti finds that the Bhakti movement does not completely
emancipate the Dalits. Again, this makes Bhakti literature a contradictory body of progressive
thought, which does not bring about any convincing social change, and the bhakta becomes a failed
social reformer.
IV
The Life of Mira
Let us now look at the life and compositions of Mira to see if an alternative reading could be
made, which does not end up in the traps and limitations of the reform narrative on Bhakti. There are
two iconic stories about the childhood of Mira. At the age of four she had an interaction with a visiting
devotee, whose idol of Krishna she was greatly attracted to. The legend goes that she expressed a
desire to posses the idol which he initially refused, as one does not part with ones Ishta, but
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Keeping Mira locked in her chambers is only one of the ineffective ways in which the family
tries to restrain her, but Mira cannot be restrained, because she is unashamed of her relationship with
Krishna, and considers that relationship more real than the one with her husband. Mira never
articulates any complaints about the way in which the relationship between a man and his wife is
conceived by her milieu. She merely rejects the prince as her husband. Her relationship with Krishna
allows her to put all her other assets at stake:
My friend, I went to the market and bought the Dark One.
You claim by night, I claim by day.
Actually I was beating a drum all the time I was buying him.
You say I gave too much; I say too little.
Actually, I put him on a scale before I bought him.
What I paid was my social body, my town body, my family body, and all my inherited jewels.
Mira says: The Dark One is my husband now.
Be with me when I lie down; you promised me this in an earlier life. (Bly)
The fact that a husband may demand ones social body town body family body and all her
inherited jewels is not a point of contestation. And having paid that price Mira has claimed her
husband, as he had promised her in an earlier life. Like the women around her, Mira too sees marriage
as a bond lasting over several lifetimes. It is clear from these examples that Mira does not articulate
any dissatisfaction with the social structures of her times; rather she is distressed by the
misinterpretation of her duties by the women in her family and the misunderstanding of her
intentions by society at large. In fact her relationship to Krishna is articulated clearly in terms of those
very duties and roles that the reform historian would see as oppressive to her gender.
In some ways, to argue that Miras songs critique her social context would be like arguing that
Shakespeares comedies critique homophobia. While there is a criticism of her social context, her
works reveal a very particular kind of criticism. She is disappointed with those around her who do not
accept the nature of her relationship to Krishna, a relationship over which she herself harbours no
doubts. The questions raised about the bhaktas social role seem to have no meaning in the context of
Miras compositions.
One cannot ask why Miras songs do not significantly alter the position of Rajasthani women
because there is nothing in her songs to suggest that she saw herself in any other position. The only
conflict she had was in the identification of her husband. She identified Krishna as her husband and
remained faithful to him all her life, while all those around her identified Bhoj Raj as her husband and
accused her of infidelity.
No one knows my invisible life. Pain and madness for Rama.21
Our wedding bed is high up in the gallows.
Meet him? If the dark healer comes, we'll negotiate the hurt.
I love the man who takes care of cows. The cowherd. Cowherd and dancer.
My eyes are drunk, worn out from making love with him.
We are one. I am now his dark color.
People notice me, point fingers at me. They see my desire, since I'm walking about like a lunatic.
I'm wiped out, gone.
Yet no one knows I live with my prince, the cowherd.
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Miras expressions in this composition are of effacing the self into her Ishta. Repeatedly the
culmination of her relationship with Krishna is to become one with him. Far from carving out an
identity for herself as a person who brings about social change, her primary concern is always to be
wiped out, gone.
Her central focus in all her compositions is on the relationship between herself and Krishna.
His beauty, her devotion, his greatness, her persecution, her longing, his distance from her: these form
complimentary pairs, within which she expresses herself. Her poems allow access to her experience of
one who has submitted entirely to her Ishta, and her works, minimally, can show others, who have not
achieved such devotion how to achieve it. One must efface the self without a care for social, family or
personal pressures. This is the learning at the core of Miras works, the learning for which she is still
sung and remembered in contemporary India. This attitude of effacement of the self does not allow for
the role of messiah to the masses, or social reformer. There is no hint of any desire to improve society
in any of Miras works and she remains uniquely involved in her relationship with Krishna.
A study of her compositions suggests that Mira had concerns, which were far removed from
social reform. Her songs were primarily an offering to Krishna, but because of their content they could
also allow others, who did not have as keen a sense of devotion as her, a glimpse into the extent of
devotion it is possible to have. That is the only teaching that can possibly be extracted from her works.
They serve as an example to the reader of the kind and intensity of devotion that is possible and
desirable, because although Mira suffered at the hands of society there is no mistaking the tone of
ecstasy in her poems suggesting she also had access to a deeper and more fulfilling contentment.
V
There is a central difference between the Bhakti literature of reform discourse and the
compositions of a bhakta. Bhakti literature is mapped on a template of reform and social
improvement, it highlights those works which speak about the bhaktas rejection of social norms and
suggests that the bhakta is in some ways a reformer, although this can only lead to the conclusion that
the bhakta failed to reform his or her society.
The bhaktas work on the other hand uses domestic metaphors, and his or her existing social
context to depict a particular state of mind or attitude to which he or she has access due to his or her
special status of being a bhakta. This in turn helps his or her audience produce in their own minds a
similar, if not identical, attitude.
In the first variety of reading bhakti literature becomes a body of literature, which has
exquisite compositions marvelled at for their beauty, but also recognised as artefacts from another
time. And of course the framing narrative also suggests that they are failed artefacts, in that they were
not able to achieve the task their composer set out to do, which was to effect a large-scale change in
the social arena.
In the second variety of reading, bhakti literature is a piece of living tradition, which can still
be used and consumed so as to arouse a particular feeling or attitude in the mind. The 21 st century
reader of the bhaktas compositions, many require some help with language and context, which has
become out-dated or changed over time, but once this is provided, the composition again becomes a
tool to access an attitude or gain insight into a state of mind.
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A very comprehensive discussion on the relationship between language and experience can be found
in Skinner 1989.
2
For a complete discussion on the phenomenon of Hinduism see S.N. Balagangadhara 1994.
One in which the colonial tries to educate the native into the correct use of the concepts, in the
attempt to civilise him.
4
See Hazarika 2011 (unpublished) for an alternative description of this inter-cultural interaction.
That the framework here is more important than the actual facts, is indicated by the fact that the
period of bhakti is seen to extend from the 14th to the 16th century. This firmly leaves out one of the
greatest Bhaktas of the 19th century Ramakrishna Paramahamsa, who is accommodated in texts books
under the title of Hindu revivalism due to his undeniable fondness for elaborate pujas to Kali,
something that reform discourse frowned upon as idol worship.
8
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See Jalki 2009, for a statistical analysis of Vachanas the bhakti literature of Karnataka. Jalki
demonstrated that less than 4% of all the vachanas even mention the names of castes, and an even
smaller number actually criticise specific caste practices.
10
Heimsath found Reform in Bhakti and Sikhism (Heimsath 1964, 9), Suresh Chandra finds protest
which leads to reform, in the concept of Ahimsa (Malik 1977) Devahuti reads dissent in Emperor
Ashokas actions (Malik 1977, 84) and B. Saraswati finds reform ideas in the mystic Kabir (Malik
1977, 167).
11
His method was to translate certain Sanskrit texts into Bengali and English. Very often the
interpretation would be in the preface to the texts where Roy would present his reasons for
translating this particular text and highlight sections dealing with monotheism polythesism and idol
worship. See Ghose, J.C., 1901.
12
13
See Skinner 1989 for a discussion on how discourse expands. Also Koselleck, 2002
For example the piece titled A conversation between an advocate and an opponent of Sati. See Ghose,
J.C., 1901.
14
For the expansion in reform discourse from priests in general to brahmins in particular see
Hazarika 2011 (unpublished). This becomes important because, it is a well known but little mentioned
fact that not all pujaris at all temples belong to the Brahmin caste group. The conflation was merely
an extension of the early colonial tendency to identify all temple caretakers as the priestly classes in
relation to their own experience of priests in catholic and protestant churches.
15
16
17
Although one could argue that for Mira above all, her Ishta was always uniquely present for her,
which is what triggers her rejection of the rest of her relationships in the first place. She does write
very often of separation from her beloved, but on the other hand she writes just as often of union
with him.
18
Sources differ on her precise age, but agree that it was much later than the normal age which would
have been between 8 and 10 years, and definitely before the onset of puberty.
19
There are differences among biographers as to her husbands reaction to this. Some suggest her
extraordinary devotion led him to accept her decision, while others suggest that he was highly
displeased.
20
21
Krishna was an avatar of Vishnu, as was Rama, hence the inter-changeable names.
64
Reference:
Alston, A.J. 1980 The Devotional Poems of Mirabai, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Balagangadhara, S.N. 1994. The Heathen in his Blindness... Asia, the West, and the Dynamic of Religion.
Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill.
Barnstone, Willis. 1999. To touch the sky: Poems of Mystical, Spiritual and Metaphysical Light. New
York: New Directions.
Bly, Robert and Jane Hirshfield. 2004. Mirabai: Ecstatic Poems. Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press.
Bose, Mandakranta. Ed. 2000. Faces of The Feminine. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Cutler, Norman..1987. Songs of Experience. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Embree, Ainslie Thomas, Stephen N. Hay and William Theodore De Bary. 1988. Sources of Indian
Tradition. New York: Columbia University Press.
Garlington, Bill. 2010. The Rebellious Rajput Rani. Arts Dialogue. http://bahai-library.com/bafa /g
/garlingt.htm (accessed April 14, 2012).
Ghose, J.C., ed. 1901. The English Works of Raja Rammohun Roy. 2 vols. Calcutta: Srikanta Roy.
Goetz, Hermann. 1966. Mira Bai: Her Life and Times. Bombay: Sriprakashan
Hawley, John Stratton. 2000. The Bhakti Voices: Mirbai, Surdas, and Kabir in Their Times and Ours.
Oxford: OUP.
Heimsath, Charles.1964. Indian Nationalism And Hindu Social Reform. Bombay: Oxford University
Press.
Jalki, Dunkin. 2009. Vachanas as Caste Critiques: Orientalist Expression of Native Experience.
(unpublished Ph.D thesis) Manipal University.
Keay, F.E. 1920. A History of Hindi Literature. Calcutta: Association Press.
Kishwar, Madhu. 2001. Traditional Female Moral Exemplars in India. http://www.infinity
foundation.com/mandala/s_es/s_es_kishw_EAA.htm. (accessed April 15, 2012).
Koselleck, Reinhart. 2002. The Practice of Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts. Trans.
Todd Samuel Presner. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
Kurl, Shreprakash. 1973. Trans. The devotional poems of Mirabai. Calcutta: Writers Workshop, 1973.
(http://home.infionline.net /~zddisse/mirabai.html#anchor480881) (Accessed April 15, 2012)
Malik, S.C., ed. 1977. Dissent Protest and Reform. Shimla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies.
Martin-Kershaw, Nancy. 2000. Mira Bai in the Academy. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Pathan, Sufiya. 2009. A Historical and Theoretical Investigation into Communalism. (un-published
Ph.D. Thesis). Manipal University.
Ranawat, Soubhagya Kuwari. 2009. Meera Charita. Ujjain: Mrityunjay Singh Sisodia.
Schelling, Andrew. 1991. For Love of the Dark One: Songs of Mirabai, Prescott, Arizona: Broken Moon
Press.
Skinner, Quentin. 1989. Language and Political Change. In Political Innovation and Conceptual Change,
6-23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vaudeville, Charlotte. 1993. A Weaver Named Kabir. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Werner, Karel. 1993. Love Divine: Studies in Bhakti and Devotional Mysticism. Surrey: Curzon Press.
Women in World History. 2010. Bhakti Poets: Introduction.
http://chnm.gmu.edu/wwh/modules/lesson1/lesson1.php?s=1 (accessed April 15, 2012)
65
A Fight For Harmony: Secularism and Its Problems in the Bababudangiri Hill
Rajaram Hegde
Professor, Dept of History and Archeology, Kuvempu University, Shankaraghatta, Shimoga. Karnataka,
India
rajaramainakai@gmail.com
Sadanand J.S.
Professor, Dept of Political Science, Kuvempu University, Shankaraghatta, Shimoga. Karnataka, India
janekere@gmail.com
Discussions of religious syncretism in India routinely fall into two binds: one of
assuming the religious nature of the conflict and the other of assuming a conflicting
relationship between two purportedly religious communities. Therefore, even when
secular accounts evoke religious harmony as a value, it presupposes religious rivalry
between communities thereby exacerbating the conflict rather than solving it. The
solution may well lie in an intellectual programme with the goal of arriving at a better
understanding of Indian traditions rather than a political programme steeped in
rights-based claims.
Keywords: Syncretism, secularism, fundamentalism, coexistence, harmony.
Introduction
Bababudangiri is exalted as a place of religious harmony, where Hinduism and Islam have
coexisted for last several hundreds of years. There is a durgah, in the form of a cave, situated at the top
of the hill which is also known as Guru Dattatreya Bababudanswamys Dargah. This cave is held to be
a place associated simultaneously with Dattatreya and Hazrath Dada Hayath Meer Khalandar. The
former is a well-known puranic personality, supposed to be a combined form of trimurtis (Brahma,
Vishnu and Mahesvara).1 Religious syncretism is a popular secular term that describes the above
phenomenon. This syncretism at Bababudangiri presupposes a peaceful coexistence of two rival
religions, a miracle that can only happen in India. This part of Indian culture, according to secularists,
offers a solution to the Semitic world of religious rivalry. However, ironically enough, this very place is
gripped by communal strife for last few decades. Those who are committed to secular principles think
that this place is threatened by the communal forces, especially Hindu fundamentalism. The
Hindutvavadins on the other hand hold the view that the stand taken by the secularists is not neutral;
it is biased in favour of Muslims. For both of them Bababudangiri exemplifies how Indian secular fabric
is endangered by the religious fundamentalism. The problem, viewed from this angle, provides
justification for the secular state to interfere in order to protect both Hindu and Muslim rights over
this place.
This framework of analysis, though apparently adequate to understand the nature of the
dispute, raises some problems that require explanation. They are:
1) How is it that the same religious groups which are pitted against one another now, coexisted
peacefully in a syncretism-milieu till about 1975?; 2) why the practices of two religions now appear to
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67
Thus, the idea of syncretism seemed to solve the problem of deciding over the legal matters
concerned with this shrine. The implication of the court judgement was to show Bababudangiri as a
model for a peaceful coexistence of Hinduism and Islam. But contrary to the fond hope expressed by
the court, its decision on the issue turned Bababudangiri into a virtual battle ground between the
Hindutvavadins and the secular forces. In this way, the idea of coexistence of two religions also
seemed to create problems. We should note that the court decisions and administrative measures
could not contain the rival claims not because of lack of commitment, but because of lack of clarity
over the issue. What follows throws some light on this quandary.
Fight for religious rights:
The above decision leads to a new kind of struggle of Hindutvavadins, who legitimise their
position through the language of religious rights. The Hindus and the Shahkhadri had used the
uniqueness of this shrine as a weapon for dislodging the Government decision and Muslim claims. The
District Court, while deciding over the matter in 1978 clearly considered the petitioners of this case as
representatives of the entire Hindu community. The judgement also made it clear that neither the
disciples nor the devotees of a particular religion or faith can claim exclusive right to worship in this
shrine. The Hindutvavadins based their movement on this decision to push forth their demands when
the administration was enlisting the pre-1975 rituals in this shrine.
Though some practices were enlisted as Hindu practices to be presented before the court the
Hindutvavadins were not too happy with the list. They thought it missed some of the important
practices of Hinduism like homa-havana, a Hindu archak and pujas in the model of Hindu temples.
However, no one could provide the exact indicators of what constitute specifically Hindu practices. For
Hindutvavadins the very idea of Hindu-Muslim syncretism, so dear to secularists, amounts to losing
ground to Muslims. Their grievance was that this shrine originally belonged to the Datta cult, which
was occupied by the Muslims in the medieval period resulting in the disappearance of earlier Hindu
practices. Thus the Muslim elements in this shrine were not there as a result of syncretism, but were
indicative of a historical takeover of this shrine, originally Hindu, by the Muslim conquerors. To begin
with, the Hindutvavadins started fighting for justice by insisting on the revival of Hindu rituals which
had disappeared due to the Muslim occupation, and ended up by calling for the liberation of this shrine
from the Muslims. It is on this ground that they reject the secular interpretation which according to
them, would perpetuate the status quo.
68
69
70
71
Bharatiya Janata party, Letter to District Commissioner, 4/3/99; Jagratha Praja Samiti, letter no title
Chickmagalur dated 4th December 1978 ; Jagratha Praja Samiti, Letter to the Chief Minister,
September 19th 1978
3
Case OS.No 25/1978 Order of the Civil Court of Chickmagalur The Honble court in 1980 declared
that shrine is a religious institution of holy place of worship belonging to Hindus and Mohammedans
alikeNeither the disciples nor devotees of a particular religion or faith can claim exclusive right to
worship at the said institution. .
4
The Judgement, The High Court of Karnataka Regular First Appeal No 119/1980 dated March 26,
1991. This case was between The Karnataka Board of Wakf appellant B.S Nagaraja Rao,
Chandrashekar, and the State of Karnataka, the Commission of Religious and Charitable Endowments
and Sajjade Nashin as respondent.
5
Vishwa Hindu Parishat, Letter to the Honble Home Minister, includes this information according to
which a care taker was appointed by Hyder Ali in 1717. Sometime in the Middle Ages the place
slipped into the hands of Sufi saints and during Tipu Sultans time and part of the shrine came to be
called Dargah.
6
References:
Hunter, William Wilson. 1887, Imperial Gazetteer of India Vol. xiv. London, Trbner & co.
Kamath, Suryanath. 1998.Malenadina Mooru Nathapantha Kendragalu, Ithihasa Darshana.pp.207-10.
Kamath, Suryanath, 1999. Ithihasa Darshana, p.207
Rao, C. Hayavadana. 1930. Mysore Gazetteer: Kadur District, Vol.5, Govt. Press.
The Hindu, Tuesday, November 3, 2008.
The Times of India, August 5, 2008.
72
College of Arts and Letters, San Diego State University, San Diego, USA.
skannan@mail.sdsu.edu
The Streedharmapaddhati of Tryambakayajvan (1665-1750) is an eighteenth century
text that delineates the duties of women. This paper attempts to understand the texts
rationale. This is important in the context in which the text has been read previously:
as patriarchal and as representative of Hindu patriarchy. I discuss the work of Julia
Leslie, scholar and historian who introduced and commented on this text and argue
that the text can be viewed differently sans the textualisation in Leslies approach. I
then locate the Streedharmapaddhati within the context of the dharmashastras and
examine its statements through gender as a category of analysis. This is followed by a
study of the text using a theory of ritual. I argue that the text needs to be viewed as
embedded in the philosophical context of Indian self-transformative practices and thus
endorsing the path of streedharma, one path among the many that led to
enlightenment within traditional Indian philosophy.
Keywords: Streedharmapaddhati, patriarchal, feminist, dharmashastra.
Introduction:
In 1989, the late Julia Leslie introduced to the academic world, a text from the eighteenth
century, dedicated to delineating womens daily duties. Her book The Perfect Wife was comprehensive
with translation, transliteration and commentary and perhaps that is the reason why the text,
Streedharmapaddhati has not been written about in recent times. There has been no attempt to study
the Streedharmapaddhati(Stdp from now on) thence, excepting for one critique of Leslies approach
(See Sugirtharajah: 2001). Several books 1 excerpt the text, however, to show the patriarchal nature of
Indias culture or religion/Hinduism. In this context, my study of the text will dialogue with Leslies
work, a feminist predecessor and also present my thesis on it. I will argue that we should look at
Stdpas a text embedded in the philosophical context of Indian self-transformative practices. In the first
section, I will attempt an evaluation, revision and extension of Leslies work by showing which of her
positions come across as anachronistic and why, causing problems of textualization. My second
section theorizes the genre of the dharmashastras and locates Stdpwithin it, in relation to other texts
in that genre. The third section will explore gender as a category of analysis and the fourth section will
attempt to understand the text in terms of rituals. I suggest that we view the Stdp as a text endorsing
streedharma, one path towards enlightenment among the many conceived within the Indian
intellectual traditions. My methodology is difficult to cull out at this stage, but it is neither excessively
philological, nor entirely textual; the aim is to arrive at a balanced theoretical view of the Stdpthat
allows its logic to become more apparent. My reading of the textcould well be seen as a feminist
reading but with a considerable amount of questioning of and alteration to current trends therein.
The Stdp begins by paying obeisance to Gods and Goddesses and interestingly enough,
Tryambaka himself offers comparisons of the duties of men and women in order to contextualize his
work on womens duties. The text is applicable to married women but also lists rules for widows. The
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Dharmashastra Texts
It is impossible in the given space to go into the details of the table above. But it may suffice to
suggest that the dharmashastra genres attitude towards women can be understood differently: as
fulfilling needs of pedagogy, as a guide to filial piety by upholding the structure of family, as embedded
in epistemological findings and as results of philosophical explorations and so on. The dharmashastras
are a result of philosophical thought conducted elsewhere and earlier. Thus, Tryambaka doesnt have
to be a mimamsaka or philosopher to compose a dharmashastra text; he is embedded in the tradition
anyway. He is merely recording the results of epistemological findings in the form of suggestions. We
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78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
Notes:
See for e.g. Shadow Lives: Writings on Widowhood.2007.Eds. Preeti Gill and Uma Chakravarti.
Cambridge University Press/ Zubaan Publications.
2This is phrased in the Vedas as a quest into the nature of the Brahman and in other texts, the ways in
which to reach Him are elucidated.
3Alternatives to this are many. For instance, we see in the work of TalalAsad, an identification of
critical reason emerging from within traditions, a feature also found in Indian philosophical debates.
4GauriVishvanathan also points to the different way of reading that had developed during the 19 th
century, a time when Indian interaction with the British had intensified. The period is rife with
critiques of book worms and the skepticism of knowledge gained through reading of books; they are
widely available in the cartoons and popular media of the time.
5The discussion of the relationship between feminism and postcolonialism explores the problems of
location and universalism well. See Mohanty Under Western Eyes (1989). But these discussions had
just begun when Leslie was writing on the Stdp. Hence, it is probable that Leslie thought it sufficed to
read the Stdp by referencing it with other dharmashastras and epics. But the result is an isolationist
and a colonial-style reading of the text as also argued by Sugirtharajah (2001).
6Leslies methodology of reading kavyas and dharmashastras together is a necessary integrationist
view that often helps. But the characters she picks up from the kavyas are always negative ones. She
constantly picks Gandhari andYudhisthira and such others instead of the more vocal characters like
Draupadi.The Dharmashastras, according to Leslie are a mixture of reality and utopia. Her examples
for this are the prohibitions on wearing no blouse during the day, and no earrings during love-making
(p. 3). This understanding of such practical suggestions and their details is accurate. The attempt in
the dharmashastras is usually to consider as many practical possibilities of an event as possible.
7In my unpublished PhD thesis titled AkkaMahadevi: A Saint, Rebel and Poet?:A Study in Tradition
and its Feminist Understandings. 2011.
8Tryambakas definition of sushrushana in his conclusive chapter every action that brings pleasure to
ones husband (p. 313) is indeed the ideal of filial piety. By the same standard, hurting parents is said
to cause suffering according to both Hindu and Buddhist beliefs about reincarnation. That a woman
should obey her husband and put his wishes before any dharmashastric obligations even is
emphasized repeatedly in Tryambakas conclusion.Tryambakas reference to the virtuous patni (p.
41)who gets a preferential treatment also follows from this logic; she is of pleasant demeanour and
sweet words.The importance of filial duty is, in general, greatly stressed in all the dharmashastra texts.
Its rules apply not just to women, but to men and to others as well with respect to their station in life.
1
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91
argues that in Leslies work we are offered a picture of a fixed and unchanging
tradition and a frozen Hindu patriarchy. (2001, 7)
20Many historians find this change awkward and insist that it needs accounting for. I agree with them.
Streedharma as a path may have replaced the upanayana in later times due to its social relevance.
21It is significant in this light that unmarried women dressed differently until a few decades ago, at
least in the Karnataka region; they did not wear sarees and tended to remain in the apparently maiden
dress: a blouse and skirt. What this demonstrates is that the saree from left side down was not only
worn first on the day of the marriage, but also that those unmarried did not wear it.
22Note here the meaningful insistence in some temples even to this day that men should not wear their
shirts for entry and women enter only in a saree.
23The dharmashastrins, however, differ on the right age for marriage of girls. There is no consensus on
the age of marriage in both the dharmashastras and Puranas. As Leslie herself points out, Savitri is
aged 18 when she sets off in search of her husband alone. Other dharmashastrins set the limit to age 3
or 4 or 3 months from the beginning of the menstruation.
24The two sexes were probably treated as different because of the social roles they performed. Leslie
compares them at many stages and expresses puzzlement that the two sexes do not perform the same
activities; men do not have to perform household tasks (p. 58).
25Tryambaka suggests that black earth be used by the women and the shudras for cleansing. But the
dharmashastras are also flexible: if one is unable to findthen any colour will do (p. 72). Another
such verse says that women should use teeth-cleaning twigs shorter than the shudras (p 78) and that
for shudras and women, the bath is silent, without mantras, according to the Gita (p. 83). The
arbitrary nature of the ruling becomes evident when one sees in the Smritichandrika that one may
use grass, leaves, water or ones fingers (p. 79). Other verses say that women and shudras require
half the amount of purification ritual as required for the twice-born man. Leslie notices inconsistency
in grouping women and shudras: no particular number of lumps of earth prescribed for women,
shudras and boys who have not undergone initiation. (p. 73).
26To understand why this was so, we need the help of Balagangadharas concept of non-normative
cultures. He argues that there was no prescriptive ought in heathen/pagan cultures and that it was
naturalized, that the normative talk, the moral talk, is a way of talking about experience but is not
itself an experience. (Balagangadhara, 2002)
27Note here that menstruation is considered as positive and negative in different parts of India and in
different traditions. In Rajasthan, menstruating women are considered auspicious and sow the first
seeds of the planting season. In other parts of India, menstruating women are believed to be harmful
to plants and impure. In Tantra, it is again seen positively but not so in mainstream ascetic traditions.
28When Tryambaka says in a verse that a womens mouth can never be impure, Leslies asks what the
relationship of the text to reality may have been. However, her speculation that womens mouths
cannot be ruled as impure because she has to be available for the mans kissing/sexual advances,
seems like an excessive reading.
29Sugirtharajah in her critique of Leslie says the bhakti traditions are more lenient and that Leslie
could have picked these texts up instead of the Stdp. I disagree.
30Leslies title The Perfect Wife suits the Stdp since it is clearly for the householder wife and not the
parivrajakawoman or the prostitute.
31Even Sugirtharajahobjects that Leslie uses a very patriarchal text to make her analysis. But we have
been able to understand Stdp without assuming or claiming that it is a patriarchal text. Here is where
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References
Asad, Talal. 2003. Formations of the Secular: Christianity, Islam, Modernity. Stanford University Press.
Balagangadhara S N. 1987. Comparative Anthropology and Action Sciences- An essay on knowing to
act and acting to know.Philosophica 40 (2): 77107.
Balagangadhara S N. 2002. Notes on Normativity and Normative Experience.Unpublished Paper.
Black, Brian. 2007. The Character of the Self in Ancient India: Priests, Kings, and Women in the Early
Upanishads. New York: State University of New York.
Buhler, G.The Laws of Manu.Halsall History Web Site Page. Also available at:
http://www.hindubooks.org/manusmriti.pdf
Dalmiya, Vrinda and Linda Alcoff. 1993.Are Old Wives Tales Justified? in Feminist Epistemologies.
Eds. Linda Alcoff and Elizabeth Potter. New York: Routledge. 217-244.
Jamison, W Stephanie.1996. Sacrificed Wife/Sacrificer's Wife: Women, Ritual and Hospitality in Ancient
India. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leslie, Julia. 1989. The Perfect Wife (Stridharmapaddhati). By Tryambakayajvan. New Zealand: Penguin
Books.
Mani, Lata. 2008, 1989fp. Production of an official discourse on Sati in Early Nineteenth century
Bengal In Women and Social Reform in India.Eds. Sarkar and Sarkar.Indian University Press.
Menski, Werner. 2003b. Hindu Law: Between Tradition and Modernity. Oxford, New York: OUP.
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1997. Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship and Colonial
Discourses. In Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation and postcolonial perspectives. Eds.
McClintock and Shohat. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Ramaswamy, Vijaya. 1997. Walking Naked: Women, Society, Spirituality.New Delhi: OUP.
Riley, Denise. 1988. AmI That Name?Feminism and the Category of 'Women' in History. Minneapolis:
University of Minnesota Press.
Sangari, Kumkum&SudeshVaid. 1989. EdsRecasting Women: Essays in Colonial History. Delhi: Kali for
Women
Shankaracharya.2005 (fp 1921).Vivekachudamani. Trans. Swami Madhavananda. Kolkata:
AdvaitaAshrama.
Staal, Frits. 1996. (1990 fp). Ritual and Mantras: Rules without Meaning. Delhi: MotilalBanarsidas
Publishers.
Sugirtharajah, Sharada. Courtly Text and Courting Sati Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion.Vol. 17.
No 1 (Spring 2001) pp 5-32.
Viswanathan, Gauri. The Beginning of English Literary Study in British India.Oxford Literary Review
9:1-2 (1987) 2-26.
94
Words are powerful things. They reveal our thoughts, give us power in our relationships with
those around us, and reveal our identity to the world. Authors speak of having a voice, and we grow to
recognize their voices through the words on a page. But words are merely the tools of a language that
communicates our identity, both personal and cultural. Because those identities are so much a part of
who we are, we guard our languages well.
As the primary bearer of culture, language holds great power, and as such it is inseparable
from ideas of politics and influence. In examining some of the political aspects of language, it seems as
if expedience and a fear of the other has far too often led the way when it comes to national decisions
on language policy. This paper will look at language through the lenses of history, politics and culture,
to discover what it is that language represents to us, on both a personal and national level. It will offer
examples of nations which have, as a result of conquest, stolen a peoples language as a way of
subjugation, as well as more benign examples of language loss or gain by assimilation into a larger
culture.
This paper also examines historical thoughts on the meaning of a national languageas both
a way to unite a nation, and a way to separate from other nations as well as examining multi-lingual
96
Languages have evolved throughout history due to the influences of or conquest by other
those who spoke other languages.Examples of this evolution are found world-wide as we examine the
development of modern European languages from what is known by linguists as the Proto-IndoEuropean language..
Linguistic comparisons can offer great examples of similarities that stand as evidence for
common origin. Languages as seemingly diverse as English, Spanish and Hindi are all descended from
the common branch of Indo-European languages, and show great similarities in many basic words
such as you (t in Spanish, and tum in Hindi), my or mine(me in both Spanish and Hindi) and words
like who, what or why(Quin, qu, por qu in Spanish, and kuan, kyakyo [pronounced cue] in Hindi).
Although, the origins of these languages, followed back far enough, seem to disappear into the
mists of time, it is clear that all languages have not only common roots, but have been greatly
influenced by all other languages with which they came in contact. There is a Biblical story found in
the book of Genesis that offers explanation for ourmyriad human languages:
Now the whole earth used the same language and the same wordsAnd they said
Come let us build for ourselves a city, and a tower whose top will reach into heaven, and let us make
for ourselvesa name; lest we be scattered over the face of the whole earthAnd the Lord said, Behold,
they are one people, and they all have the same languageand now nothing which they purpose to do
will be impossible for them. Come let Us go down and there confuse their language, that they may not
understand one anothers speech. (Gen. 1: 1, 4, 6-7)
97
98
During the early years of American colonization, Native American languages were learned by
somesettlers as a way to communicate and spread Christianity among the indigenous people. The
Reverend John Eliot came to America in 1631, and after learning the language, began preaching to the
Massachusetts Indians in 1646 in their own tongue.By 1663 he had printed the first New Testament in
their language, and began to use it for the purposes of education. Missionaries were originally very
aware of the benefits of teaching the indigenous people in their own languages, and in the early 19th c.
books written in the Chippewa language were being used in mission schools very effectively (Reyhner,
1993).
At the end of the Civil War, President Grantin an effort to end the Indian Wars appointed
a commission to decide how best to assimilate the Indian and bring about a peaceful resolution to the
hostilities faced by the army on the frontier (Reyhner, 1993, p. 36). These commissioners were
convinced that the key to solving the problem was in offering to Native American children a "White
99
However, not everyone went along with these ideas of "effective teaching." In 1871, the
American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions published an editorial in their monthly
newspaper Iapi Oaye(The Word Carrier) that stated:
It is sheer laziness in the teacher to berate his [Native American] scholars for not understanding
English, when he does not understand enough [of their language] to tell them the meaning of a single
one of the sentences he is trying to make them understand properly, though they have no idea of the
sense. The teacher with his superior mind should be able to learn a half a dozen languages while these
children are learning one. Even though the teacher's object was only to have them master English, he
had better teach it to them in [their native language], so that they may understand what they are
learning. -(cited in Reyhner, 1993, p. 39)
In 1868, the president of Dartmouth University, the Rev. Asa Dodge Smith, also spoke to this
idea of teaching Native American children without the use of their own language. He is quoted as
saying that "the idea of reaching and permanently elevating the great mass of any people whatever, by
first teaching them a foreign tongue, is too absurd to ever have been entertained by sane men"
(Reyhner,1993,p. 38). Unfortunately, no one was listening. Teachers and administrators who knew
nothing about their students language or way of life oversaw reservation schools, and use of English
alone as the language of instruction was strongly enforcedsometimes by a leather strap (p. 39), and
sometimes by a mouthful of lye soap (Kapralos 2008, p. 2).
This forced assimilation of Native American children continued into the 20 th century, but even
when the boarding schools closed, the stigma attached to these languages remained entrenched in
American culture. While persecution and prejudice has waxed and waned over the subsequent
decades, both Native Americans and new immigrants have dealt with their identity as a part of the
Exteriority to the Totality of American culture. Although there is some current good news regarding
Native American languagesthat were once greatly marginalizedand in some cases threatened with
extinctionwe will return to the topic later, and now examine attitudes toward the Immigrant in
American culture since the end of the 19 th century.
Language and the Immigrant
Two things are essentialTo speak, to read, to write the English Language and to have a Bank
Account. Then with the American Flag flying over your home, YOU ARE SAFE and your children are
safe. Then you count. Without these two essentials, you dont count. In Rome do as the Romans do. In
America do as the Americans do. Save Money. Get ahead.
-Advertisement for Middlesex Trust Co. Lowell Massachusetts (1919)
100
101
Bilingual education in both Greek and Latin was common in childrens educationduring the
days of the Roman Empire (Garcia 2009, p. 13). Seen as a form of enrichment,it was encouraged
among future citizens of Rome, enabling them to become more productive members of their
communities.Throughout history it was common for school books to be written in a language other
than the common language that children speak at home, with students reading sacred texts in one
language, and commentaries written in another (Garcia p. 13). St. Augustine, a Medieval (354-430 CE)
philosopher and theologian, learned Latin in his birthplace of Thagaste, located in a Berber-speaking
region of North Africa. Greek was taught in his school, thoughhating the languageAugustine never
really learned it (Augustine, 1992). Knowledge of more than one language has been the historical
norm among the educated for centuries.
It is only during the 20th century that bilingual education seems to become an issue, as a
result of "modernist development[al] ideological frameworks that imagined, constructed, and
narrated a nation-state into being one language, and thus considered bilingualism to be a problem"
(Garcia 2009, p.14). In the 1920s, bilingualism came to be seen as a language handicap. Psychological
studies began to appear that showed bilingual children as inferiorscoring lower on intelligence
102
103
104
Of approximately two hundred nations around the globe, fewer than fifty recognize more than
one official language, yet at the same many nations are functionally bilingual or multi-lingual, rather
than simply monolingual (Tucker, 1999). A few of those nations are made up of multiple language
groupsone of the largest is Papua New Guinea which linguist say is represented by over 870
different languages. It is common there for a child to speak multiple languagesone at home, another
at school, and still another in the local marketplace. If that child continues onto a formal education, you
can add a fourthtypically Englisha situation that is not at all unusual in many parts of the world
(Tucker, 1999).
Canada is an officially bilingual nation, with many languages represented on a daily basis. The
Canadian constitution requires the government to offer official documents and government services in
both of its official languages. Approximately 25% of the population speaks French almost exclusively,
with many more speaking both languages. The Canadian Territory of Nunavut is approximately 85%
Innuit, with its official languages listed as French, English and the Innuit dialects of Inuktitut and
Inuinnaqtun. In many of the more isolated areas, the indigenous people have retained their original
languages, although most speak either French, Englishor sometimes both. Additionally, according to
the 2011 Canadian census, immigrants add even more languages to the mixover 200 languages are
reported by residents as a mother tongue spoken in the home (Statistics Canada, 2011).
India is an additional example of a functional multi-lingual society. With the second largest
population on the planet, India is home to over 200 minor languageswith 18 recognized by the
Indian Constitution as official languages. Hindi was recognized first as India declared her
independence from Great Britain in 1947, but with much of the existing government infrastructure
and many of the wealthier, more educated citizens speaking English, it was also declared a national
language. Over time, other languages were added, and each Indian state has the authority to add their
own official languages, making India effectively multi-lingual, with many Indian citizens using one
language at home and another in the marketplace (Sharma, 2001).
South Africa is also an officially multi-lingual nation, with 11 official languages and many more
that are unofficial, along with many European and Asian languages spoken as well.
105
106
Language and identity are so closely linked that it can easily be said that the language that we
speak is "crucial to our identity to the degree to which we define ourselves by it" (May 2008, p.135).
Forimmigrants, their language both separates them from those in their new home, and ties themto a
family and community left behind. To take their mother tongue from them as some have done in the
past, or as some call for today, isin essenceto take away a piece of their soul, heritageand identity.
Language marks our identity within the larger world by linking us to all others who speak as we do.
Language is, and has always been the means by which we construct and analyze what we call
reality (Lakoff, 2000, p.20). For the speakers of the nearly 6,900 languages spoken around the world,
that may be true today. Yet 3,500 of those languagesare spoken byonly 0.2% of the global population,
and according David Harrison (2007), by the end of this century most of those will have likely
disappeared, as their last speakers die. When these languages die, they will take with them the voices
and knowledge of a culture. What will happen to their reality then? Words may be absorbed into
another culture, and may hold onto a certain level of meaning, but when the last speaker of language
dies, there is an inexplicable loss to all of humanity.According to Harrison, language death typically
begins with political or social discrimination against a language or its speakers. This may take the form
of official state policies to suppress speech, or it may be benign neglect (Harrison, 2007, loc.100).
Through this paper, we have seen manyillustrations of this sort of language suppression, whether
through conquest, discrimination, or politics. We have seen what Dussel (2011) would describe as the
victimizationof these speakers, and theirestablishmentas Alterity, as their language is first
diminished, then finallystolen away.
Throughout global historyespecially over the last centuriesas populations and migrations
have increased exponentially, there has been a steady increase in the rate of language and cultural
death.But does this really matter? Language is just air after allit is not a gun, it has no power on its
own (Lakoff, 2000, p. 21). Yet we have seen that this is not true. Words are exceptionally powerful
they change hearts and minds, altering the way we view the world around us. Languageand its
meaningsalso changes as it moves from one culture to another, and one generation to the next. The
great novel of today may be as unintelligible to the average person in 500 years as great works such
asthe Old English Beowulfareto English speakers today.
Political language changes with culture, as well, and the ideas of antiquity do not always
translate easily outside the culture that gave them birth. If we would understand anothers words, we
must understand the culture from whence those ideas came, and yet words themselves are the key to
that understanding. We must learn to listen before we judge, and accept before it is too late.
107
References
Augustine, St. Confessions. (1992). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Baugh, A. C., & Cable, T. (1993). A history of the English language (4th edition ed.). Upper Saddle River,
NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc.
Bergman, M., Watrous-Rodriguez, K., & Chalkley, K. (2008). Identity and language. Hispanic Journal of
Behavioral Sciences, 30(1), 40-68.
Botz-Borstein,T. (2006). Ethnophilosophy, compara-tive philosophy, pragmatism: Toward
a
philosophy of ethnoscapes. Philosophy east and west, 56 (1). 153- 171. doi:
10.1353/pew.2006.0006
Bryson, B. (1990). The mother tongue: English and how it got that way. New York: HarperCollins
Publishers.
Crawford, J. (1992). Hold your tongue-- bilingualism and the politics of "English only". Reading, MA:
Addison Wesley Publishing Company.
Crowly, T. (1989). Standard English and the politics of language. Urbana and Chicago: University of
Illinois Press.
Dussel, E. (2011). Politics of liberation: A critical world history. London: SCM Press.
Garcia, O. (2009). Bilingual education in the 21st century-- A global perspective. Malden, MA: WileyBlackwell.
Gross, A. (2010). Systematically distorted communication: An impediment to social and political
change. Informal Logic, 30 (4), 335-360. Retrieved March 11, 2012 from
http://www.ojs.uwindsor.ca/ojs/leddy/index.php/informal_logic/article/.../2436
Harrison, D. K. (2007). When languages die- The extinction and erosion of the worlds languages and the
erosion of human knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kindle ebook.
Howard, J. (2008). America inquisition: The hunt for japanese american disloyalty in world war
II. Arkansas Historical
Quarterly, 67(2), 209-211. Retrieved March 8, 2012
from http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=a9h&AN=34058211&site=eho
st-live
Huntington, S. P. (2004). Who are we? : The challenges to America's national identity. New York: Simon
& Schuster.
Kapralos, K. (2008). Tulalip ancestors' language alive in spirit.Herald Net.Retrieved from
http://www.heraldnet.com/article/20080517/NEWS01/643248491
Lakoff, R. T. (2000). The language war. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Lepore, J. (2002). A is for American: Letters and other characters in the newly United States. New York:
Knopf.
Statistics Canada. (2011). Linguistic characteristics of Canadians. (Retrieved from http://www
12.statcan.gc.ca/census-recensement/2011 /as-sa/98-314-x/98-314-x2011001-eng.cfm
108
Retrieved
March
8,
2012
from
Wiley, T. G., & Wright, W. E. (2004). Against the undertow: Language-minority education policy and
politics in the "age of accountability". Educational Policy, 18(1), 142-168
Figures cited
Figure 1- Caren, E. (Ed.). (2000). Baseball Extra- A newspaper history of the glorious game from its
beginnings to the present. Edison, NJ: Castle Books.
109
One invention crucial for cinema to develop as an audio-visual media, with its own industrial
and cultural practices, was the development of the audion tube in 1909. Developed by Lee De Forest,
who would also contribute to the development of sound recording, the audion tube was a device useful
in amplification of sound. The wartime efforts in radio transmission and wireless communication
facilitated the scope of innovating new workable technologies engaging with sound. The different
sound recorders that were developed for recording radio transmissions were, after the war, being
adapted for alternative uses. The telecommunication industry and researchers involved saw this
change of circumstance as an opportunity to attempt again the integration of film and sound. These
inventions were the background against which the cinematic apparatus was transitioning to sound,
111
112
113
114
115
However, the scope and nature of these new sound technologies was not the sole determining
factor for the success of a particular device. Rather, the easy availability of spare parts of these new
machines was a crucial factor in underscoring the success of these systems in the Indian market.
Usually the distributor was responsible for providing both service and durability of parts as
116
The 1928 ICC Report mentions the need for continuing with the duty on imported films as it
would encourage the local film industry. The report also recommends that the machinery associated
with cinema should be exempted from duty as the expenditure on machines forms a small part of the
general expenditure of producers and exhibitors (ICC Report 1928: 75). Further, the proprietor of
Cinema B R Oberoi recommended, along with the rest of the Indian film community, a reduction in
custom duty on camera, sound recording sets, etc. as this would enable a spurt in the local film
production13. Interestingly, the debate around reduction in duty leads the discussion in a completely
unanticipated direction. The Filmland editorial continues to talk about how a cheaper alternative is
possible by supporting local inventions that would work as well as other imported machines.
According to the same article, a local recording set would cost Rs. 8000 to assemble as against Rs.
13,200 for an imported one, as mentioned above, and cites the example of a local invention that has
been developed in Lahore whose result is not so good at present but there is enough scope for
improvement. [page 2], referring to the Fezi Sound Recording System.
This discussion around local technological innovation is part of a changing attitude of
perceiving a local context for technology. Some of the devices constantly mention how they are
suitable for a local climate. The publicity material for Parmeko amplifiers describes it as an amplifier
specially prepared for tropical climates14 while Mellaphone Quality Sound Equipment is described as
specially built for the Indian climate. The transformers are protected from the climatic [sic] effects. 15
In the next section, I will examine the provenance of this local context in the debates around
technology, and how the two documented local inventions Fezi Sound Recording System and
Csystophone acquire meanings and contexts way beyond what it initially set out to represent.
Sound Technology: A Case for Local Innovation?
In a Filmland article titled The Effects of the Talkie Revolution, the writer N Roy says that the
most important development with the coming of talkies is the idea of nationalism. Roy's context was
Europe and how it had affected the continent with emerging linguistic identity 16. The advent of talkies
generated a similar response in India as well and not only did it trigger a response amongst the
filmmakers to make films in local languages but there were also claims that the new technology could
be fabricated locally, providing a much-needed fillip to innovation and enterprise. This decade came to
be known for the bourgeois intervention and role in developing the new studios and even raising
funds and creating public venture companies. Instances of similar interventions are seen in the new
sound recording technologies as well.
However, local acknowledgement and appreciation of these new technologies is deliberated
through diverse socio-political concerns and, as the instances below indicate, leads to conflicting
117
This double recording system was used to produce Elephanta Movietone's 1932 talkie
Pakdaman Raqasa or Innocent Dancing Girl directed by Shah G. Agha. The sound was recorded by Nazir
Mohammed and the film was advertised with perfect and clear recording. A year later, B. R. Oberai
who was also the scenarist for the film, gave an impartial perspective about the reality of local sound
systems. They employed the services of Mr. Nazir Mahammed as Sound Engineer, who had never
recorded a Talkie drama in his life time and recorded the picture on a locally-made recording
equipment, Fezi Sound System, which was a new and untried set. Hence the recording was most
defective. (Cinema 1933)
The same editorial where Fezi system was mentioned, subsequently mentions B.D.
Chatterjee's Csystophone, a sound projecting system, with the additional information that it had been
installed at Chabighar Calcutta and was operating quite satisfactorily. If the merits of the articles and
advertisements of this period are to be believed, then, Csystophone managed to have a far larger
impact than Fezi sound system. Bamadas Chatterjee was a research scholar from Calcutta University
who built a sound projecting system that could be attached to an existing silent cinema projector. He
also wrote an article in Filmland where he describes in great technical details of the scientific
processes involved in recording and projecting sound for films. However, he concludes his article with
a cryptic reference to the unsuitability of foreign devices in India:
it is generally found that the type and impregnated paper insulation adopted by some manufacturers
abroad is unreasonable for Indian climate. (Filmland September 3 1932)
Csystophone found many takers in theatres of smaller towns and cities. A Csystophone
advertisement describes how within six months nine machines have been sold in different cities
118
However, Varieties Weekly's edition for the same day looks at the same news in a matter-offact tone:
The proprietors of the above house [Rupabani] are new-comers in this trade and I feel pity that they
are being misled by interested parties... Such misleading statements help none. With due respects to
Mr. Chatterjee and to his efforts as a honest [sic] businessman I cannot but help calling spade a spade.
(Varieties Weekly January 21 1933]
Conclusion
After 1933, little is heard about these sound systems. Their chequered fate underscores the
fate of most technologies pioneered independent of the big conglomerates involved in this business.
Within a few years, the prominent and prolific studios had acquired the well-known Western Electric
and RCA sound systems. Within a few years after the talkie feature films were being made, the form
and method of engaging with this novel aspect had become more organised. There are two reasons for
this particular trend in the 1930s. First, the distribution network of technology and other equipment
required for filmmaking was becoming independent and established in the twentieth century. This is
different from the case of photography which Sudhir Mahadevan describes in detail. He states that the
procurement of photography-related equipment in the nineteenth century was located in apothecary
and shops for imported goods even though photography was an important colonial administrative tool
apart from being a vocation for the colonial officers and local dilettantes. Second, the new and earlier
studios engaged in making talkies were becoming more than a mere conceptual enterprise. With the
bourgeoisie support and added legitimacy to the cinematic form with a technologically-advanced
apparatus, the studios of 1930s attempted to create an industrial model for making films.
Technology becomes an important mode of thinking about the history of cinema in India,
especially in the current year which marks the centenary of filmmaking in the country. Indian
encounter with cinema goes back even further as India was already part of a global network of film
exhibition and exchange. Lumires cinematograph arrived in Bombay en route to its journey to South
East Asia and Australia. The centenary celebrations and early cinema discourse uphold the notion of
an indigenous industry that not just survived but managed to be successful in spite of support and
encouragement from the colonial government. This mode of thinking and writing about the early
cinema forgoes the networks in which local cinema and film industry were already enmeshed. The
introduction of sound technology, however, the local film industries attains a self-reliance as local
talkies superseded imported films in terms of both popularity and number within a few years after its
release. Therefore, in this centenary year the history of Indian cinemas transition to sound needs to be
reconsidered and examined to get a better sense of our cinematic past.
119
Lee de Forest and Phonofilm: Virtual Broadway. Accessed May 19, 2013.
http://encyclopedia.jrank.org/articles/pages/2064/Lee-de-Forest-and-Phonofilm-VirtualBroadway.html.
120
121
123
124
A little familiarity with the current developments in the area of studies in self, theology, or
individuality would cast sufficient doubt about using these concepts in understanding India. 5 With this
in mind, we can ask of Pollock: What makes the concepts such as monism and theology acceptable as
scientific explanations and not concepts such as empire? It might be argued that the notion of empire is
based, in its origin, on a local event such as Roman Empire, and hence not useful in understanding the
Indian past. But consider this example to bring out the fallacy here: even the theories of Einstein are
based on his daily experience (and not that of, say, Adolf Hitler), limited to the locality he lived in (and
not Bangalore, for instance). Does that mean that we have to discard it as not useful to understand
Asia? Pollock has no answers to provide for these questions. Hence, his argument that western
concepts are being used to describe India not only remains futile (because we do not know what to
make of it), but also ad hoc at best (because there is no theory to support his claims). Further, not
having a theory at this stage of his argument makes him inconsistent while some European concepts
cannot be used, some others can be used, to describe India.
A Theory to Rescue Pollocks Claim
The moral of the story thus far is that Pollocks call to know what existed in pre-colonial India
will work only if we develop a theory that will deal with Indian and Western culture and the cultural
differences between the two. History and historiography that Pollock employs will create a long list of
objects supposed to have existed in the pre-colonial India.6 His The Language of the Gods... (2006)
looks indeed like a long list of such facts. Some of them are indeed breathtakingly refreshing. However,
he fails to see the importance of those facts or notice their implications that undercut some of his own
arguments in the book.
The alternative we are gesturing towards should be able raise our intuitions about cultural
differences into a researchable question with testable hypotheses: what makes differences between
125
This is not a question of language use. It is a question of being cut off from a tradition, which
still at some level shapes our experience. More importantly, we have no way of accessing this
experience today. That is, even though our experience is shaped by this tradition, we are not aware of
it. Our language use, of the kind described by Balagangadhara here, gives hints to both how the
tradition shapes our experience and our lost access to it. Will the boring task of excavating the precolonial Indian data that Pollock suggests as a way of understanding colonialism, help us in this
situation? Here is Balagangadharas answer to this question.
126
127
As in the following instance: As in South Asia, the nature, control, and dissemination of literacy
crucially affected the creation of vernacular European literary cultures; and, as in South Asia, literacy
in western Europe had a specific history, infected by factors peculiar to that world (Pollock 2006:
439).
3
In all these featureschronology, polity, the localization of the global the southern Asian and
western European cases show quite remarkable parallels. We will then be in a position to consider the
factors that make them different and give one the character of a vernacularization of necessity and the
other a vernacularization of accommodation (Pollock 2000: 607).
4
5See,
for instance, Foucault (1985), Bernard Williams(1993), Balagangadhara (2005), essays in Bloch,
Keppens et al. (2010).
6Pollock
7There
is a theory that can almost rescue Pollocks work and make his claims about understanding
colonialism useful. The theory I am referring to is the research that has developed around S.N.
Balagangadharas The Heathen in His Blindness (2005). This research will rescue Pollocks work
because it has a theory of culture and cultural differences (Balagangadhara 2005, 2012). More
importantly, Balagangadharas research programme offers, or at least is an attempt tooffer, an
alternative to the current social sciences, which, as Pollock notes, generalize European forms of life
and experience.
Cora Diamond discusses different kinds of conceptual losses. One is where we have certain words
and use them, but are unable to give them a truly intelligible use. Another one is where we lack the
capacity to use certain words, but, if we had it, we could make intelligible to ourselves important parts
of our life and experience (Diamond 1988: 258).
8
Reference
Balagangadhara, S.N. 2005. 'The Heathen in his Blindness': Asia, the West and the Dynamic of the
Religion. Delhi: Manohar. (First pub. 1994).
-----. Reconceptualizing India Studies. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Bloch, Esther, Marianne Keppens, and RajaramHegde, ed. 2010.Rethinking Religion in India. London
and New York: Routledge.
128
129
Arguments are made constantly in favour of and against such legislations. On the one hand,
many see the proposed ban as an attack against minorities. They point out that cow sacrifice and
consumption of beef have been practiced in India for centuries from the Vedic period onwards, even
before the arrival of Islam and Christianity (thus opposing the controversial argument that cow
slaughter is a practice put in place by foreign rulers and followed by non-Hindus) (Jha 2004).
Introduction of such legislation is opposed not only because it is an infringement into everyday social
practices of specific groups, but also because it tends to provide false descriptions of Indian society.
Recent academic debates looking into the issue focus largely on the increasing communalization of
society, leading to issues such as cow slaughter being used as tools for political mobilization. 7 It is
argued that particular political interests are being furthered by protecting Brahminical practices
(Rajashekhar and Somayaji 2006). In fact, many point out that the cow is not sacred for all Brahmins in
India either. The practice thus does not neatly overlap with the interest of any one group at a panIndian level. However, the debate in the Indian context from pre-independence to the present
represents cow slaughter as a problem for the overarching community of all Hindus (S. Chigateri
2011).
Most arguments favouring the legislations are based on the figure of the holy cow or sacred
cow. They claim that the special place for the cow in Hinduism is not an argument that has come up in
recent times. When the Bill came up for discussion in the Karnataka Assembly, the then ruling BJP
government used quotes attributed to the Mughal emperor Akbar to justify the ban 8, thus claiming
that the ban on the slaughter of cows has been a norm in one form or another through the centuries. 9
Despite the statements about the cows sacredness, most legal prohibitions are justified on economic
grounds. Citing the Jan Sanghs anti cow-slaughter campaign in 1966-67, Christophe Jaffrelot says that
the Hindutva groups have found it useful to base arguments that tie the sanctity of the cow with the
economic utility of the animal (Jaffrelot 2008). The VHP in 1966 created the Sarvadaliya Goraksha
Maha-Abhiyan Samiti (SGMS) in order to mobilize the Hindus and force the Congress-led government
to reform the Constitution by making cow-slaughter illegal. The Jan Sangh, while supporting the VHPs
campaign placed more emphasis on the economic aspect. According to Jaffrelot, the Jan Sanghs
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
Very recently, the Congress led government in the state has withdrawn the bill and restored the 1964
Act. See http://www.asianage. com/india/karnataka-congress-govt-reverses-bjp-rules-tough-lawcow-slaughter-444
3
This became apparent in conversations with activists in the Karnataka West Coast and Bangalore.
http://www.indianexpress.com/news/gujarat-cow-slaughter-ban-comes-into-force-today/ 864513
Article 48 of the Constitution reads thus: Organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry: The
State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and
shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter,
of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle.
6
7http://www.outlookindia.com/article.aspx?
8
219505
One cannot quiet establish the veracity of such statements at this stage, and there is little evidence
other than the speculative to suggest why such bans came into place, or what justification was used for
it.
9
10
http://blogs.outlookindia.com/default.aspx? ddm=10&pid=2695
At the face of it the implication is that sacred implies something particular and actions such as
worshipping, or making use or killing (or sacrificing) are mutually exclusive, that is, if the cow is
believed to be sacred then, one cannot tolerate its being killed.
11
Prior to the Arya Samaj, in the 1860s the Sikh Kuka movement is supposed to have actively agitated
against cow slaughter in the Punjab region.
12
See the British Intelligence note on Anti Kine Killing Agitation, pages 87-122 (Dharampal and
Mukundan 2002)
13
An interesting incident is related by Sandra Freitag about the Rani of Majhauli who deputed an agent
to buy 80 heads of cattle being taken by butchers. She also agreed to give local butchers rent free land
if they gave up their trade in cattle (Freitag 1990, 153).
14
15
See (Bilgrami 2003) on Gandhis thought on moral principles and exemplary actions.
Immediately after independence, Nehru wrote a letter to Rajendra Prasad expressing his anxiety
about the revivalist phenomena. He too asks the question about how to counter the sectarian outlook
while also retaining the economic aspects of the cow slaughter debates.
16
The use of universalization is not to suggest that henceforth everyone started practicing it but to
indicate a particular conceptual use of the practice as a core and essential Hindu religious practice.
17
This was also the time when many conflicts emerged about sacred spaces for different
communities and places like Ayodhya became sacred in a particular sense.
18
Thakur Dass Bhargava, who moved the amendment against cow slaughter, is also known to have
spoken in the parliament against untouchability and was part of many social reform committees
including the age of consent committee.
19
144
21
http://lawandotherthings.blogspot.in/2012/02/ guest-post-by-anup-surendranath-anti.html
The suggestion is not that cow protection is some sort of a sacred ritual. But that the role of rituals
can be borrowed to understand the role of cow protection in India.
22
Also see (Polly Hazarika 2011). Polly Hazarikas work on the 19 th century reform discourse and its
postcolonial assessment shows some of the crucial shifts in the understanding of practices with the
colonial encounter. She argues that practices whose primary goal was to produce ethical self-reflection
and thus effect a transformation in the individual came to be associated with groups or communities in
their goal for identity formation. In the colonial understanding diverse practices where marked by
diversity of doctrines and beliefs which was the basis of the diversity of the groups. S N
Balagangadhara has made a very persuasive and detailed case for the way in which action heuristics
work in Indian cultures and how they differ from moral norms.
23
References
Ambedkar, B. R. 1990. Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches, Vol. 7. Mumbai: Education
Department, Govt. of Maharashtra.
Amin, Shahid. 2002. On Retelling the Muslim Conquest of North India. In History and the Present,
edited by Anjan Ghosh and Partha Chatterjee. New Delhi: Permanent Black.
Asad, Talal. 1993. Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam.
Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Balagangadhara S N. 1987. Comparative anthropology and action sciences: an essay on knowing to act
and acting to know. PHILOSOPHICA (GENT), 40(2), 77-107.
Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar. 2004. From Plassey to Partition: A History of Modern India. Orient Blackswan.
Bapu, Prabhu. 2012. Hindu Mahasabha in Colonial North India, 1915-1930: Constructing Nation and
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2277 7997
Balu@ugent.be
This article discusses Humboldtian ideas and higher education from the point of view
of Europe. However, it is possible to see the deep resonances and equally importantly
the dissonances with the Indian context.
Keywords: Humboldt, higher education, pedagogy, fact, value,
Introduction
Humboldt:
Humboldt has three axes: the State, the German Nation and Education. People should develop
their individual capacities and powers and grow fully. In this autonomous process, education provides
people with the knowledge necessary for complete self-expression. Such people would constitute the
German Nation. A nation of people like these would have another relationship to the State than those
of being mere subjects. Education itself (or, better put, research) is an individual process that occurs in
solitude and in freedom (Einsamigkeit und Freiheit). It is important to note too that the idea of
higher education was formulated in explicit opposition to the utilitarian ideas, especially the idea
that educational institutions should be of use to society.
Higher (in higher education)
versus mundane
In the Humboldtian vision, the university, as an institution, was an institution of higher learning.
Not in the sense that only those with a secondary education could enter the university. This is a postHumboldtian development, during which period universities became institutions for certification.
Instead, the notion higher referred to two things: to the content of university education and to the
goal of scientific research. What one learns, or should learn in the university has to do with the higher
capacities and faculties of the humankind; here, the contrast set is the world of the mundane. In
contrast to the world of the mundane, there existed a higher world, the world of education, which
formed and gave shape and expression to the good, the noble and the excellent abilities of the
humankind. That is why the university education was seen as higher education.
versus utilitarian
There is another sense in which the University education is higher. In being trained by such an
institution, mankind pursued the highest goal of all: the search for truth. Here, the contrast set is the
utilitarian and the instrumental. Unlike in the professional schools, where people strove to learn some
or another skill that would be of utilitarian benefit to themselves and of instrumental benefit to the
society at large, in the university, people pursued only one thing and for its own sake: truth. Truth
liberates and knowledge was synonymous with truth. Unencumbered by instrumental and utilitarian
concerns, one pursued truth for its own sake in the universities. In this sense too was the university
seen as an institution of higher learning. Such an institution, the Humboldtian vision insists, is an
ivory tower.
Humboldts legacy: higher education today
Even though the ideas of self-cultivation, self-development and self-expression continue to
be a part of the western commonsense, it fails to motivate people involved in higher education to any
significant extent. Even where they do, these ideas do not constitute arguments for curricular reforms
and do not form the basis for curriculum planning at the university level.
Furthermore, today, utilitarian ideas are determining the educational landscape: of what use
are the universities to a knowledge economy, when there are technical schools that provide people
with economically useful skills or when there are huge R&D branches of industrial firms or where the
global competition between nations has become decisive to the welfare of each nation? Unlike
yesterday though, today, slogans have replaced clear thinking and profound visions.
In the late sixties of the twentieth century, the notion of the university as an ivory tower
came under withering attack. Of course, this Humboldtian notion became entwined with the ideas of a
sociologist, Karl Mannheim, about the free floating intelligentsia and the well-known philosophical
distinction between facts and values. Most of the criticisms during the sixties invariably ran these
three totally different themes together: (a) the social scientist had to be an engaged and committed
intellectual; (b) s/he could not claim to pursue value free enquiries into society and human beings;
(c) the universities had become irrelevant to society by isolating themselves from the social concerns
of their day, i.e. the university had become an ivory tower. Here, as elsewhere, the ideologues of the
sixties were incoherent; but this very incoherence guaranteed their popularity in the society at large.
Even though nobody quite knows why, being an ivory-tower intellectual is a bad thing today.
Today, instead of having a vocation or a calling, the universities appear to have accepted
their institutional role of providing certifications as their end-goal. Today, one speaks about the core
business of a university, its products and the need for quality control of the same. Of course, there is
a suspicion in the outside world that the internal auditors of the universities (namely, the academic
staff) are rarely interested in the quality of the education. Consequently, external auditors, the
visitation commissions, are called in to certify the educational content of the universities: such
commissions are to declare that there is no tampering, no fraud and no cheating in the education
process. Not so long ago, the Flemish minister of education even willed an audit commission into life
to oversee that the non-financial accounts of the universities were properly kept following the visit of
these external auditors. In other words, because universities appear merely to certify, a further
certification of the certifier and the certification process is but a natural evolution. Needless to say, the
universities appear to embrace this (social) goal enthusiastically: witness the pride with which they
speak of their internal quality control.
Einsamigkeit
Research in natural sciences has challenged one of the core values of the Humboldtian vision:
research-in-solitude (Einsamigkeit). Today, doing research in groups has evolved as the most
efficient way of conducting scientific enquiry. Individual creativity or freedom is not compromised by
doing research in groups; indeed, it appears, it is just the other way round. Except for most humanities
and a few social sciences, collective research has long since replaced individual research-in-solitude.
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ideas of knowledge today? The third dimension: Why should one introduce pedagogic innovations, like
those that stimulate active and autonomous learning, in education today?
First dimension: motivations for learning
The empirical answer to this question is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is impossible to
suggest that all the students (or even a majority of them) enter an institution with a single
psychological motive, namely, to seek truth. Some enter the university because they seek truth, some
others do so because they need a degree and yet others because they do not know what else to do. On
the other hand, if we look at how the teachers speak, their expectations are clear: one speaks either of
having a group of motivated students or unmotivated and uninterested students in their class
rooms. Often, one hears them complain of the current generation of students as being thoroughly
unmotivated. This teacher-speak tells us that the presupposition of the University teachers is that the
students who come to study in the Universities should have the motivation to study before they enter
the portals of higher education. From this ambiguity, one can only conclude that the University
teachers do not see themselves either capable of or wanting to motivate students to seek truth.
According to them, this is something that the earlier education should accomplish. It is unclear though
how any kind of education (be it in the family circles or in the lap of secondary education) could instil
a single motive in all the students entering the University.
Of course, one possibility is to restrict the entry of students into higher education to only
those who have the motive to seek truth. However, it runs against two difficulties. The first is that of
testing the students for their motives: we have no clear ideas about what motives are anymore than
how we can test for their existence. While this is an empirical difficulty, there is also a conflict between
any such restriction and our modern democratic value, namely, the need to make the education
democratic. That is, there is a very strong feeling that education should be accessible to all those in a
society who seek it. Entrance tests and numerus clausus in an educational institution (like, say, for
Medicine or Law) do not test the students for their motive but for their pre-acquired skills and
knowledge.
Second dimension: seeking the truth
In the increasingly instrumentalist society we are living in, knowledge has lost the preeminent role it once had. Today, one often hears of the need for a University to justify its existence
(measured in cost-benefit terms) to the rest of society. As a consequence, one speaks often in terms of
a research University as against a University that merely teaches. The former, however, is measured
and quantified: in terms of the research money that the researchers bring in and in terms of citations
in the citation indices. Research that is quantified in terms of money is mostly (if not exclusively)
privately funded research: in principle, such research is not oriented towards seeking truth. Articles
indexed in the citation indices do not simply express the over-riding concern of the researcher to
contribute towards human knowledge. The motives, here as elsewhere, are multiple in nature.
Moreover, the current scientific journals (for the most part) are not communications of learned
societies: they are commercial concerns that intend being profitable. If we look at all these things, it is
almost impossible to suggest that the Humboldtian value is central to the higher education of today.
Third dimension: pedagogic innovations
Why the emphasis on the need to introduce pedagogic innovations? Quite apart from the
vague feeling of the pedagogists that innovations are important by virtue of the fact that innovations
are important, there are two additional reasons: the need to strengthen the existing motivation of the
student and the need to develop efficient teaching methods. The notion of efficiency has been
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weave a new Humboldtian vision around one such being: the teacher. In this new Humboldtian vision,
the teacher plays a role that s/he never played in the original Humboldtian ideas about higher
education. S/he becomes an equal participant in the process of education by playing an explicitly active
role.
Much the same way the student has a goal in an education process, namely, to learn, the
teacher too has a goal, namely to teach. One learns to seek the truth and the other teaches to seek
truth. The teacher does not presuppose a pre-existent motivation in the student; in fact, s/he is
indifferent to the multiple motives present among the students. The teacher provides a goal for the
student, induces the student to search for truth, and instils in that student a capacity to reach that goal
as well. The teacher does not merely provide information for the student to choose and pick but
actively participates in the learning process by convincing the student that pursuing the goal of
seeking truth is the ultimate goal of higher education. Far from being a mere (pre)condition for
learning, the teacher becomes an equal partner in the educational process of the student. Pedagogy, in
this new Humboldtian vision, is not subordinated to psychology, but becomes as crucial to the learning
process as the presence of the learner.
The student learns autonomously, but this autonomy is taught by the teacher and is acquired
by the student at the end of a particular phase in the learning process. Through the active intervention
of the teacher in the learning process, the student slowly acquires the ability to learn autonomously.
Autonomy, then, is the end-product of higher education and not its presupposition. The teacher
becomes an exemplar for the student to follow because the former embodies the unity of facts and
values, namely, knowledge.
Consequently, the University does not merely become an institution that functions as a
reservoir of information. It becomes that social institution which builds bonds between two
generations. Next to the family, it is the social institution par excellence that guarantees continuity in
society. In the same way the existence of the family as a social structure does not require justification
for its existence, neither does the University need one. By virtue of this, the primary concern of the
University shifts from its current focus, which is to administratively manage this institution so that it
efficiently caters to its clients. Instead, the University shares the basic concern of the family: the need
to form the individual human being. Indeed, the teacher becomes a surrogate parent, the university
becomes a surrogate family and the individual families entrust their children to the University to
guide and form them. A covenant comes into existence between the family and the University instead
of a teaching contract between the student and the University.
Pedagogical innovations become interesting only to the extent they succeed in the goal of
inculcating the value of searching for truth in the student. Even while education retains its democratic
character, the recruitment of right teachers becomes the basic concern of the University and the
society. Not everyone with a doctoral degree and many scientific articles to his/her credit can become
a teacher. Teaching, then, will cease being a mere career but, instead, becomes what it should always
be: a vocation and a calling.
In some senses, we can generalize the earlier points to encompass the entire education
system. We could say that there is a division of labour in society: between individual families on the
one side and the educational institutions on the other. This division of labour has the making of an
individual human being into an autonomous creature as its end goal. Autonomy can be partially
defined by taking recourse to a cognitive notion: someone is autonomous to the extent s/he can
search for truth. The higher education, then, completes the process that actually begins in a family. A
visitation commission to judge an institution of learning is just about as absurd as a visitation
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Published by
The Registrar
Tumkur University
Vishwavidya Nilaya Karyalaya
B.H. Road, Tumkur 572 103. Karnataka. India.
Phone: +91 816 2254546; Fax: +91 816 2270719