Republic of the Philippines

COURT OF APPEALS
Manila

FOURTH DIVISION
JOSEPH TAY a.k.a. TAY
CHUN SUY,
Petitioner-Appellee,
- versus CAPT. CHARLES DEEN, JR.,
ANA
ZUNIGA,
PATRICIA
ANNE ROMEY,
Respondents-Appellants.

CA-G.R. SP No. 128139

Members:
TOLENTINO, Chairperson
GARCIA, and
BUESER, JJ.
Promulgated:
July 17, 2013

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
BUESER, J.:
Captain Charles Deen, Jr., Ana Zuniga, and Patricia Anne
Romey (appellants) are before this Court with an appeal under Rule
44 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the Order of
the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 109 in the case
entitled Joseph Tay a.k.a. Tan Chun Suy vs. Hon. MTC Judge Eliza
B. Yu, Ferdinand Santos OIC of MTC Branch 47, Pasay City,
Charles D. Deen, Jr., Ana M. Zuniga, Patricia Anne M. Romey,
Jennifer G. Inopea, Office of the Solicitor General dated March 12,
2012, the dispositive portions of which reads WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
GRANTED. The resolution of dismissal dated August 1, 2011 and
orders dated July 29 and June 23, 2011 are nullified and/or
annulled and this case is remanded to the court a quo, MeTC Br.
47, Pasay City, Criminal Case No. M-PSY-11-13939-CR for
further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128139

DECISION
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and its Order dated June 14, 2012 denying appellants' motion for
reconsideration.
The Facts
Joseph Tay was booked on PAL Flight PR306 bound from
Manila to Hongkong. Upon check in, he was assigned economy seat
no. 68H. He accepted the seat assignment and did not inform the
check in counter that he preferred a choice economy seat.
Thereafter, passengers boarded the aircraft. Appellee saw that
the front row economy seats were not occupied and being a frequent
traveler and a regular passenger of PAL for the last 30 years, he
knew that passengers are allowed to occupy vacant seats, so he sat
at seat no. 31 E., instead of his assigned seat number, without
informing any of the flight attendants. A crew member approached
him and asked him to go back to his assigned seat.
Appellee
refused. He was then informed that seat no. 31 E is a choice
economy seat and is subject to the payment of additional charges.
Appellee claims that the steward was arrogant and demanded
him to vacate the seat. When he refused and asked to be shown the
policy of PAL from the Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines or
from any appropriate government agency authorizing additional
charges, the steward called the attention of other flight attendants
saying in a loud and threatening voice Wala na yun. Off load na siya
due to security risk. Thereafter, he heard the pilot announce, over
the public system, that there is a trouble maker on board the aircraft.
Suddenly, the door of the aircraft opened and two (2) police officers
came to remove him from the plane to be brought to a police station.
He pleaded with a stewardess and asked how much he should pay
for seat no. 31 E. The latter arrogantly replied, Sorry, it is no longer
our business. You are now under police custody. We are now
turning you over to police for investigation and detention.
Appellants, on the other hand, claimed that appellee was
politely approached by flight attendant Patricia Anne Romney
(appellant Romney), and was requested to occupy his assigned

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128139

DECISION
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seat. Appellee, instead of heeding the request, tauntingly and

insultingly retorted What if I do not want to? Surprised, appellant
Romney walked away and went to talk to flight purser Ana Zuniga
(appellant Zuniga). The appellee followed appellant Romney and
threatened to have her terminated at the same time pointing a finger
at her. Appellants Romney and Zuniga explained to the appellee that
seat no. 31 E is a choice economy seat and has additional charges.
Appellee became more unreasonable and asked why he should pay
the additional fee. He demanded to see the policy of PAL from the
Civil Aviation Authority of the Philippines or from any appropriate
government agency authorizing additional charges. He started
shouting and threatening to have the cabin crews terminated. At this
point the commander of the aircraft, Captain Charles Deen, Jr.
(appellant Captain), was informed of the situation. The latter went
out of the cockpit, approached appellee and asked him what the
problem was. Appellee arrogantly retorted You are the problem, all
of you! Due to complainant's behavior, the aircraft was stalled and
the flight delayed, infuriating other passengers, who started shouting
Get out, get out!
It is not true that appellant Captain ordered for
the arrest of the appellee nor did he announce over the public system
that there is a trouble maker on board. He merely apologized to the
passengers for the delay and informed them there is a security
problem on board. Since the appellee was unreasonable and could
not be pacified, it left appellant Captain no other choice but to have
security disembark the appellee. In fact, the appellee refused to
return to his assigned seat even when the Airport Police and
Philippines National Police entered the aircraft. It was the growing
impatience of the other passengers, who were still shouting Get out,
get out!, that finally made the appellee stand up and leave, causing
the economy passengers to clap and cheer. Afterwards, appellant
Captain executed a Journal Report for PAL Flight 306, also signed by
appellant Zuniga, narrating the incident that transpired.
Subsequently, appellee filed a complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Pasay City accusing appellants of committing
various crimes, among which was the crime of grave coercion,
alleging that appellants forced him to leave the plane and delivered
him to the authorities.
In a Resolution dated February 4, 2011, the Investigating

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128139

DECISION
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Prosecutor, with the conformity of the Assistant City Prosecutor and

the City Prosecutor, dismissed the charges for lack of probable
cause.
Appellee filed a motion for reconsideration and it was granted in
a Resolution dated May 19, 2011. Hence, an Information was filed
with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasay (MeTC), against the
appellants, charging them with the crime of grave coercion.
Appellants filed a motion for judicial determination of probable cause
and to dismiss.1 On June 26, 2011, the appellee filed an
opposition/comment. On August 1, 2011, the appelee filed a motion
asking for a period of 15 days within which to file a supplemental
opposition/comment to the said motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and to dismiss however, this was mooted by the
MeTC's Resolution promulgated on the same date granting
appellants' motion to dismiss becauseUnder Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, and
citing the jurisprudence in Allado vs. Diokno, there is a need for the
trial court to conduct a personal determination of probable cause,
and until then, no warrant of arrest should be issued, and if one had
been issuedm the warrant should be recalled. Under Rule 112,
Section 6 (b) in relation to paragraph (a) of the same section of the
Rules of Court, the trial court has the power to dismiss the
complaint against the accused when on its face it clearly fails to
establish probable cause.
xxx
All told, it is plain and clear that there is no sufficient evidence
on record to sustain the finding of probable cause to hold the
accused for trial for the crime of Grave Coercion. The case must
be dismissed.

Aggrieved, appellee elevated the case to the trial court via a

petition for certitorari contending that the MeTC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in
dismissing the Information on the ground of lack of probable cause.
He claimed he was denied of his Constitutional right to due process
when the MeTC dismissed the complaint without trial on the merits.
1

Records, pp. 192-206.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128139

DECISION
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The Trial Court's Ruling

On March 12, 2012, the trial court issued the first assailed
Order, viz A careful examination of the above orders, to wit: June 2;
July 29, 2011 and Resolution dated August 29, 2011 were issued
without petitioner's time to comment and/or oppose and was an
outright affront on petitioner's right to due process.
xxx
Suffice it to say that parties, prosecution and defense, were
not able to present their evidence as the same was struck down by
the questioned orders of the Public respondent.

Appellants' subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied.

Hence, this appeal.
Issue
Whether or not the trial court erred in granting appellee's
petition for certiorari on the ground that appellee's right to
due process had been violated.
This Court's Decision
A special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court may be resorted to only where there is a clear showing that the
court had acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the
power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of
passion and hostility.2
The trial court erred in granting appellee's petition for certiorari
on the ground that appellee's right to due process was violated.
2

Punongbayan vs. Punongbayan, G.R. no. 158642, December 10, 2004.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128139

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There is no question that the essence of due process is a

hearing before conviction and before an impartial and disinterested
tribunal but due process as a constitutional precept does not always,
and in all situations, require a trial-type proceeding. The essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard
and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense.
"To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard,
either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process. Appellee filed a comment3 to
appellants' motion for judicial determination of probable cause and to
dismiss dated June 22, 2011 on June 26, 2011. Clearly then,
appellee was given the opportunity to be heard and there was no
denial of due process.
Rule 112, Section 6 (b) in relation to paragraph (a) of the same
section of the Rules of Court, provides that the trial court has the
power to dismiss the complaint against the accused when on its face
it clearly fails to establish probable cause.
In addition, this issue had been settled in the case of Crespo vs
Mogul4, to wit Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any
disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal
of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of
criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot
impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole
judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of
the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A
motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed
to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does
not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the
accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon
instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of
the investigation.

Verily, it bears reiterating that the trial court is not bound to

3
4

Records, pp. 218-235.

L-53373, June 30, 1987.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128139

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adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice, since it is mandated

to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case and it may
either agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of
Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone
would be an abdication of the trial courts duty and jurisdiction to
determine a prima facie case.
This was precisely what the MeTc did when it granted
appellants' motion to dismiss, and it correctly did so. The MeTc
made an independent assessment of the merits of the case based on
the affidavits and counter-affidavits, documents, or evidence
appended to the Information. This assessment should be embodied in
the written order disposing of the motion to dismiss or the motion to
withdraw the information.5
A reading of the Resolution of the MeTC dated August 1, 2011 6
shows that its assessment of the merits of the case was clearly
embodied therein.
Certainly, no abuse of discretion was committed by the MeTC
when it issued the aforesaid resolution. Judge Eliza B. Yu did not
commit a patent, gross and prejudicial error of law or fact that would
amount to a grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction. Neither
did she capriciously disregard a settled law and jurisprudence.
We agree with the MeTC that the dismissal of the case is
warranted because there is no probable cause.
We went over the records of the case and found that there is
indeed absolute lack of evidence to support the presence of probable
cause for grave coercion.
The elements of grave coercion are as follows - 1) that a person
is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law,
or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; 2)
that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, threats, or
5
6

Cerezo vs. People,G.R. No. 185230, June 1, 2011.

Records, pp. 57-79.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128139

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intimidation; and 3) that the person who restrains the will and liberty
of another has no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is
not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. 7
The foregoing elements are not present in the case at bar.
It is not disputed that appellee purchased an ordinary economy
seat, but instead of taking his assigned seat number, he occupied a
choice economy seat, with bigger leg room, without paying its
additional charges. His act of refusing to transfer, when asked to do
so, triggered the events that followed. His continued disobedience,
not only from the request of the attendants but of the Captain himself,
caused trouble and flight delay. No one was spared from his arrogant
attitude. He refused to heed even the request of the Airport Police
Department and the Philippine National Police for him to disembark.
It was only after the other passengers started shouting did he obey.
While it is true that the appellee was prevented from boarding flight
PR 306 because of the disembarkation order of appellant Captain,
the second and third elements are missing. We find that violence,
threat or intimidation were not committed by the appellants and
appellant Captain had every right to ask appellee to leave aircraft.
We agree with the MeTC that First, the complaint-affidavit is unsubstantiated by any direct
evidence. It consisted of mere allegations of private complainant
Chan Suy Tay. xxx
Second, the complaint-affidavit did not specify who commit
the alleged acts of grave coercion as stated in the information as
none of the herein accused were ever identified and named therein.
xxx
Third, all the elements of Grave Coercion under Article 286 of
the Revised Penal Code are not established xxx.
There was
reasonable cause to believe that it was complainant who caused
disturbance inside the aircraft. He took a different seat from his
boarding pass. In doing this, he violated the PAL's CESS policy.
xxx He who is the cause of the cause is the cause of the evil
caused applies to the herein complainant as to why he was refused
7

Navarra vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 176291, December 4, 2009.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128139

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to be boarded by PAL. His presence in the aircraft, causing a public

disturbance and delaying the flight, is inimical to the interest of both
the other passengers and the plane. Therefore, it was justified that
he be off loaded which he did not protest at all. xxx His complaint
and the affidavit of his witnesses did not state the attendance of
force, violence or intimidation by herein accused to make them
liable for grave coercion. They failed to adduce evidence that said
complainant was prevented by all the accused from doing
something not prohibited by law or was compelled to do something
against his will, be it right or wrong. Neither is there evidence that
all the accused restrained the will and liberty of complainant. The
alleged acts of the unidentified PAL steward, stewardess and pilot
are justified and proper under PAL's Choice Economy Seat
Surcharge (CESS) policy duly approved by Auronautics Board and
PAL's Operations Manual. xxx
Lastly, complainant alleged that he is bound for Hong Kong
on PAL Flight PR 300 on April 1, 2010 because he will attend
important business meeting and to close and sign two (2) contracts
in the amount of Ten Million Dollars ($10,000,000.00) and Fifteen
Million Dollars ($15,000,000.00), yet this Court observes that he
bought the economy class ticket.
Common observation and
experience dictate that a big shot businessman who will sign Fifteen
Million Dollars ($15,000,000.00) contracts will board either a
business or first class plane accommodation, and not go to an
economy class then take a choice Economy Seat without prior
permission, much more without payment and when asked for
transfer of seat with alternative to pay, will argue with the steward
and demand the document authorizing additional charges. This
casts doubt as to the credibility of the complainant. There is no
standard by which the weight of conflicting evidence can be
ascertained. We have to test the truth of human testimony to our
knowledge, observation, and experience.

We would like to stress that the purpose of the mandate of the

judge to first determine probable cause is to insulate from the very
start those falsely charged with crimes from the tribulations,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.8
All told, the dismissal of the information is clearly warranted. No
grave abuse of discretion was committed by the MeTC and the trial
court erred in granting the petition for certiorari.
8

Santos vs. Orda, Jr., G.R. No. 189402, May 6, 2010.

CA-G.R. SP NO. 128139

DECISION
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WHERFORE, the assailed Orders dated March 12, 2012 and

June 14, 2012 are set aside and the Resolution dated August 1, 2011
of the Metropolitan Trial Court is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

DANTON Q. BUESER
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

AMELITA G. TOLENTINO
Associate Justice

RAMON R. GARCIA
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court.

AMELITA G. TOLENTINO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Fourth Division