SR TOC

Proceedings of OMAE 2004

23rd Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering Conference
Proceedings
of OMAE04
Vancouver, Canada,
June 20-25,
2004
23rd International Conference on Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering
June 20-25, 2004, Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada

OMAE2004/S&R-51573
OMAE2004-51573
INDUSTRIAL IMPLEMENTATION OF RISK BASED INSPECTION PLANNING
LESSONS LEARNED FROM EXPERIENCE
(2) THE CASE OF STEEL OFFSHORE STRUCTURES

Michael Havbro Faber

Swiss Federal institute of Technology

HIL E12.1, ETH Honggerberg

80993 Zurich

Switzerland
Email: faber@ibk.baug.ethz.ch

Antoine Rouhan & Jean Goyet

Bureau Veritas
Marine Division - Research Department

Tour Manhattan, 5/6 Place de lIris - La Defense

2

92077 Paris La Defense

Cedex
France
Email: antoine.rouhan, jean.goyet@bureauveritas.com

ABSTRACT
Risk Based Inspection (RBI) planning methods for structures have been under development for years. They have now
reached a maturity allowing their use in an industrial context.
The first applications of detailed RBI where devoted to single
components and lately applied in a more extensive way to a set
of components, using generic approaches. As being the second
part of a report on industrial application of RBI, this present paper focuses on RBI for fixed steel offshore structures. The challenge here is the full implementation of the method to a whole
set of offshore platforms. General questions arise, such as how
to use detailed RBI planning that builds inspection plans of details to establish inspection campaigns for a given platform and,
in a more general way, how to go from detailed RBI planning to
inspection campaigns for a set of platforms. Also, several more
technical issues have been raised during the studies, such as fatigue computations, push-over analyses, risk acceptance criteria
and scheduling phases. This paper presents part of the experiences gained using and applying these RBI methods to a specific
field of jackets.

are addressed, generic approaches are used. The paper is divided into four parts corresponding to the main five steps of the
methodology [1]. These five steps are:
1. Collection of information which is a key task to define inputs
together with
2. The risk screening meeting;
3. Detailed RBI which addresses inspection plan for each relevant tubular joint connection of a given platform;
4. A first scheduling phase for a given structure;
5. Finally the last step consists in establishing the inspection
campaign for the set of platforms (i.e. the whole field), given
the results of the first scheduling phase.
The detailed RBI analysis is the methodological core task that
builds inspection plans for all details, here welded joints of tubular connections.

2 COLLECTION OF INFORMATION - RISK SCREENING

2.1 Collection of information
This task is in fact quite time demanding. The kind and
amount of requested information is significant and often must be
sought at different sources, such as engineering companies and
construction/building companies. The collection of information
includes at least the following items:

1 INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the specificities of the Risk Based Inspection Planning methodology when applied to an offshore field
composed of jacket structures. As a high number of components
1

Copyright c 2004 by ASME

2.2 Risk Screening

The aim of the risk screening is to identify the structural components contributing mostly to the risks, define consequences of failure and consequences of inspection and repair.
Items cover fatigue but also corrosion, dents, scour, debris and
marine fouling, etc. All consequences may be determined by
studying accessibility, mode of access for inspection and repair
of critical locations, conditioned by the Inspection, Maintenance
and Repair (IMR) policy of the owner. The risk screening may
be split into different phases. The first one is the preparation
of the risk screening meeting, by establishing sheets to be filled
in advance, using the knowledge gained from the collection of
information task. Experience shows that the sheets must not include too many items. The second phase is the completion of
these sheets together with the operator during a risk screening
meeting. Experience shows that a good risk screening meeting
must involve only key people regarding IMR policy and risk experts. When too many people are involved, discussion tend to
diverge, leading to inefficient meetings. Operators feedback on
the items of the sheets is to be asked for before the risk screening
meeting to gain efficiency.

- when available, previous underwater surveys, including marine growth measurements and all inspection reports available;
- all drawing documents as built, including detailed engineering;
- last up-to-date weight reports, including revamping of the
process/structure parts, additions of new risers or bridges for
example;
- Py-Tz curves for the mechanical properties of the soil, at the
location of the jacket;
- when available, up-to-date meteocean data. Two kinds of
data are necessary, one for fatigue, one for push-over analyses;
- weld profile control during construction;
- inspection philosophy and operators expectations from the
RBI analysis. All projects have shown that each operator
has its own views on the way to operate, maintain and inspect its units. This includes operational constraints, time
windows for inspection campaigns and procedures for the
inspections of the structures on the field, etc. Therefore, the
type of outcome of the inspection plan must be made in close
cooperation with the operator. This is a preamble to detailed
RBI, and may be part of risk screening meetings.
- risk acceptance criteria. These are not always defined for the
structural parts and must be established at the beginning of
the project.
- consequences. In the generic approaches, these take the
form of relative costs and interest rate. The definition of the
relative cost of failure, cost of repair and cost of inspection
must be made early in accordance with the operators philosophy of inspection and maintenance of the whole field. A
fatigue failure of unmanned platforms may in general have
less impact than a fatigue failure of a process platform. All
this must be considered depending on the availability of the
platforms of the field in case one or part of them is lost.
- inspection techniques used. The risk based inspection
methodology uses the probability of detection curves of
the above water and underwater NDT techniques used by
the operator or the surveyor asked for. Given the ones
used, the corresponding PoD curves, found in the ICON
database [2, 3] for example, are input in the detailed RBI
computations.
- repair philosophy. As an example, operators may decide to
grind defects with a small depth, whereas to monitor or reweld larger cracks. This has an impact on the decision tree
used in the detailed RBI analysis.

3 APPLICATION OF DETAILED RBI TO JACKET

STRUCTURES

Fatigue analysis

Risk Acceptance Criteria

Pushover analysis

Detailed RBI

Inspection campaign for each structure

Inspection campaign for the whole set of structure

Figure 1. OVERVIEW OF RISK BASED INSPECTION PLANNING.

The application of detailed RBI to jacket structures comprises several steps. The methodology used is widely described
in [49]. Basic inputs for the detailed RBI are fatigue lives of
tubular connections, push-over analyses of the jacket given fatigue failure of a given tubular joint and risk acceptance criteria. The two first steps must be made one after another, because

Collection of information is a very important and involving task

that must not be underestimated. Most of the activity is concentrated at the beginning of the project, but still running throughout
the project.
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Copyright c 2004 by ASME

push-over analyses are made for the most critical joints from the
fatigue point of view. Also, the risk acceptance criteria for one
detail is conditioned by the reserve strength ratio RSR given by
the push-over analysis. An overview of these steps and interaction between them is presented figure 1. The next sections
present basically the main steps needed for the complete detailed
RBI analysis of a given jacket structure, with emphasis on experience gained from projects.

average thickness (mm)

Marine growth - circumferential compressed

3.1

Fatigue computations
Considering jackets structures, one of the main mode of failure is fatigue in tubular connections. A main idea in the generic
approach of the detailed RBI methodology is to use the fatigue
lives computed at the design stage as a main indicator of the required inspection effort. During the studies, it is found that this
alone is not appropriate. First because fatigue is not always computed at the design stage and thus not always available. A second
barrier arise when comparing assumptions used for design computations and current state of the platform. Main differences are:

150
140
130
120
110
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0

design profile: 50mm then 0

Platform 1
Platform 2
platform 3

10

20

30

40
50
depth (m)

60

70

80

Figure 2. TYPICAL MARINE GROWTH PROFILES.

- the weights on the deck, mainly due to revamping. This

changes the global weight and the position of the centre of
gravity of the structure. As most of the time revamping increases the total weight of the structure, it increases also the
first natural period of vibration. This may change the nature
of the engineering computations, since the API recommends
to perform dynamic spectral analysis when the first natural
period exceeds 3.0 seconds. Otherwise, a simple deterministic approach may be used.
- the marine growth profile. When API [10] is used, the marine growth profile is 50mm from the mean sea level to -20 m
above, then 0 cm for other depths. The records performed
during inspection campaigns show generally a different profile. Depending on the age of the platform, the cleaning performed and its location, different types of profiles are found.
In case of no cleaning, the thickness of marine growth tends
to stabilise with time, but may exceed significantly the design profile. In the fatigue analyses performed, the basic
idea is to anticipate the increase of marine growth over time:
the last profile measured on site was increased. Such typical
profiles are presented in figure 2. The effects of this increase
of marine fouling are mainly (1) an increase of weight of
the structure leading to a higher first natural period and (2)
an increase of hydrodynamic forces on the structure. One
has also to note that the hydrodynamic coefficients Cd and
Cm depend on the apparent diameter of the tubular members (through the Keulegan-Carpenter number), and so are
directly linked to the thickness of marine growth. In the
studies performed, the curves of the API RP2A-WSD giving the hydrodynamic coefficients Cd and Cm were used to
determine the hydrodynamic coefficients.
- knowledge about the loading due to the environment. It is

found that most of the time, sea states and wind statistics
on site are computed using mathematical models, because
of the lack of measurements. When measurements are available at the design stage, the period of time over which they
are performed is general short compared to design assumption (100 year return period wave for example). It is found
that environmental measurements (such as wave height and
direction, wind speed and direction) on existing platforms
(after some years of production) can be used to update the
environmental knowledge, leading to changes in the data.
- fatigue data. Depending on the fabrication requirements on
the profile control of the welded joints, X or X SN curves
may be used. The use of one or the other curve changes
significantly the fatigue life, thus impacts directly on the inspection plan. This knowledge is important and care must
be taken during the task of collection of information.
- soil data. The soil characteristics obtained during in-situ
measurement for design are updated after the piles have been
installed, by using pile driving records.
As all the above mentioned aspects must be combined, it
becomes clear that building an inspection campaign for a given
installed platform using only fatigue lives found at design stage
is not necessarily appropriate. However, the use of these values
(combined with generic approaches for example) may be applied
to establish inspections plans at the design stage in its final phase.
This lead us to perform, in a systematic way, new fatigue computations using dynamic spectral fatigue analyses, updated weight
and actual marine growth profiles. This work-flow is presented
in figure 3. In order to quantify fatigue lives of the tubular connections, a structural finite element model using beam elements
is built. Main inputs to this model are:
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Copyright c 2004 by ASME

during the storm season;

Geometry, soil characteristics

When possible, the same software package has to be used

both for fatigue and push-over analyses. Otherwise, another
computer model must be build. In order to assess the structural
effect of a fatigue failure, both intact and damaged structures are
used for the push-over analysis. This gives two Reserve Strength
Ratio values RSRintact and RSRdamaged . From these, the RIF is
computed:

Marine growth profile

Weights (revamping)

Need to be
updated

Environmental loads

RIF
Spectral fatigue computations

(1)

For the specific set of platforms considered in the present

study, the push-over analyses have shown that the RIF values in
all cases are close to 1 0. Thus, the residual ultimate capacity
of the structures is essentially unaffected by one fatigue failure
(These results may not be representative for other platforms) due
to significant redundancy. Consequently the annual probability
of structural collapse is very small and inspection planning taking basis in only the requirements to the maximum annual probability of collapse would yield inspections with very long time
intervals if any inspections at all. However, as an indirect means
of considering the cost impact of the inspection plans seen over
the life cycle of the structure, inspections plans have been based
on a maximum acceptable annual probability of fatigue failure
corresponding to 10 3 per annum. This can be seen as a pure
serviceability criteria also implemented in the Danish sector of
the North-Sea, see e.g. Faber et al. [5].
An example of push-over analysis on a test platform is presented in figure 4. It shows horizontal displacements in the X
direction during collapse computations, using the USFOS software [14].

Figure 3.

OVERVIEW OF FATIGUE ISSUES.

-

RSRdamaged
RSRintact

Geometry, soil mechanical properties;

Up to date weights, including revamping phases;
Up to date marine growth profile;
Environmental loadings (wave directional scatter diagrams).

In a specific study, the dynamic analysis shows that for most

loaded platforms the first period of vibration is higher than 3.0
seconds (typically platforms with process equipment), whereas
for others (typically well-head platforms) the first period of vibration is very often lower than 3.0 seconds. For most loaded
platforms, the spectral dynamic analysis is fully justified. For
others, it was decided to keep the same engineering procedure,
so that global results are homogeneous.

3.2

Push-over analyses
To evaluate the consequences of a given fatigue failure, an
ultimate strength analysis is performed [1012]. The model
(see [13] for more details) used assumes that a fatigue failure
corresponds to a detached node. Then, using this new geometric
configuration, a push-over analysis is made. Inputs in this kind
of analysis are different from those of fatigue analysis:
- Wind loading and wave loading correspond to the ones of
the in-place analysis (i.e. a 100 year return-period); corresponding scatter diagrams are to be provided;
- Soil capacity must be more detailed, including soil layers
and pile capacity;
- The characteristic values of yield strength are used;
- Weights, equipments and piping are considered full, so that
the maximum load on the deck is effective. Revamping is
also to be considered;
- Changes in marine growth is considered, depending on the
ability of extreme waves to partially remove marine growth

Figure 4. PUSH-OVER ANALYSIS OF A DAMAGED JACKET

STRUCTURE.

Copyright c 2004 by ASME

3.3

Risk acceptance criteria

The main risk considered concerns the loss of the platform.
Thus, the risk acceptance criteria are set regarding the consequences of the loss of the facility. Normally, risk acceptance
criteria address the following type of risks:

2. define number of Monte-Carlo simulations for each generic

variable;
3. establish probabilistic models of SN curve and fracture mechanics models;
4. compute generic database of inspection plans;
5. compute inspection plan for each detail, given its own characteristics: RSR, FDF, thickness, cost of failure, cost of repair and inspection, interest rate, etc.

- risks to personnel
- economical risks
- environmental risks

The approach is based on the constant threshold approach,

where inspection times are defined once the annual probability
of failure exceeds a constant threshold value, provided that this
value is lower than the risk acceptance criteria. Figure 5 presents
an example of how a generic inspection plan is built: for a given
set of values of the generic parameters, the annual probability
of failure increase with time. When a given threshold (horizontal lines) is reached, an inspection is scheduled. Under the assumption that no defect is detected from the inspection, the annual probability of failure given the inspection result is updated
and computed from the previous inspection time until the annual
probability of fatigue failure reaches again the given threshold
(i.e. a next inspection is scheduled). Figure 5 presents the case
for two different threshold values (namely 1 010 3 and 4 010 3),
for the same set of generic parameters values. Experience shows

For each platform, targets are different. This is the case when
considering:
- a process platform, which is critical from the production and
from a risk to personnel point of view. Even if no living
quarter is part of it, this is generally considered as a manned
type of platform. Risks to the environment may be important;
- a living quarter platform, which is critical from the risks to
personnel point of view, but may also be critical from the
production point of view if the remote commands of other
platforms are part of it. Risks to the environment are negligible;
- a wellhead platform. Depending on the level of activity onboard risk to personnel may be high to low; depending on
its productivity and on the productivity of other wellheads
around, economical risks may be small or high. Risks to the
environment may be important;

0.01

Annual probability of failure

Thus, risk acceptance criteria can only be set when knowledge

about the way the field is operated is available. This kind of information is established as part of the collection of information
together with the risk screening meeting. Then overall facility
risk acceptance criteria can be established based on the Fatal Accident Rate, the accepted maximum annual probability of a given
pollution of gas release and the maximum annual probability of
platform loss. The component related risk acceptance criteria are
derived from the overall facility risk acceptance criteria. These
are expressed in terms of the maximal annual probability of fatigue failure for all components. A simple way to proceed for
jacket structures is to state that the risk acceptance criteria are
the same for all individual components.

0.001

0.0001

1e-005

1e-006

Detailed RBI
The previous tasks are mainly devoted to provide the main
inputs to the detailed RBI analysis. The detailed RBI performed
is based on the generic approach. Its scientific background description can be found in this paper [5]. The main steps are:

10

15

Years

20

25

30

35

3.4

Figure 5. EXAMPLE OF GENERIC INSPECTION PLAN GENERATION.

that a significant number of samples have to be generated to build

the database particularly regarding large FDF values. This is due
to the fact that large FDF values lead to low annual probabilities
of failure. Thus to obtain a correct estimation of these probabilities and consequently correct inspection plans, enough samples

1. define generic parameters, such as Fatigue Design Factor

FDF value, thickness of the tubular wall. The FDF is defined as the fatigue life of the detail divided by the service
life on the unit;
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Copyright c 2004 by ASME

must be generated. This leads to both time consuming computations and quite significant amounts of generated data. An example of the accuracy of annual probabilities of failures (without
inspections) for a set of typical FDF values is given figure 6.
A total of 5 million samples where used for these computations.
Once the database is build, detailed RBI computation is a simple

annual proabaility of failure

0.01

FDF=0.900
FDF=1.482
FDF=2.441
FDF=4.019
FDF=6.619
FDF=10.900

0.001

0.0001

1e-05

Figure 7. TYPICAL DETAILED RBI OUTPUT.

1e-06
0

10

15
20
time in year

25

30

35

Only the joints that have been selected for detailed RBIare part
of the outcome. This allows operators to concentrate on the most
critical joints.

Figure 6. INFLUENCE OF NUMBER OF SIMULATION ON ACCURACY.

4 INSPECTION CAMPAIGN FOR INDIVIDUAL STRUCTURES

Once the step of establishing the detailed RBI is finished,
one has to group all inspection times for all details of a given
platform into inspection campaigns. This is the first step to define inspection campaigns. The experience shows that a good
way to proceed is the following.For each year, one counts the
number of nodes to be inspected on the platform. This gives for
each year the inspection effort. Sometimes, years with a significant number of inspections appear clearly. Starting from the most
important ones to the less important ones, inspection campaigns
are defined and, when negligible, adjacent inspection times are
shifted to the nearest scheduled inspection campaign. It is clear
that each time an inspection is shifted one has to ensure that the
risk acceptance criteria are always fulfilled. This can be ensured
quite easily, since most critical components have their inspection
times defined by the threshold given by the risk acceptance criteria. They are the ones to look for when shifting inspection times.
An example is given figure 9.
The methodology used addresses mainly fatigue damage and
is based on a probabilistic approach. As a consequence, damages
which cannot be clearly assessed by a probabilistic approach
such as dropped objects and ship impacts are not used in the RBI
analysis. They also should be part of the asset integrity management plan as recorded events and inspection should be scheduled

task and the output is a set of inspection times for each considered component.
3.5

Tag system
The components must be given a unique identification or ID,
sometimes called tag system. This ID is sometimes given by the
operator. For jackets, it cannot simply be a node number, because
of multiple incidences. However, the fatigue life of details is an
output from the finite element computations. Thus the initial tag
numbers are basically the ones given by the finite element mesh
numbers. Unless the tag is given in electronic format, it has to be
converted manually.
3.6

Outputs from detailed RBI

The detailed RBI analysis produces several outputs. For
each detail that is concerned, an inspection plan is build. When
using the constant threshold approach, the total expected cost is
plotted against the threshold value.A typical output is presented
on figure 7. Another output is established using 3D visualisation means, so that the tubular connection and the corresponding
weld is highlighted and its location on the platform easily identified. This is presented on a single sheet and details relative to the
history of the platform, the tubular node properties and inspection times are presented. A typical sheet is shown in figure 8.
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Copyright c 2004 by ASME

accordingly. Consequently, they are considered in the final inspection plan only, together with cathodic protection measurements, painting, scour, debris, etc.

5 INSPECTION CAMPAIGN FOR A WHOLE FIELD

A final step in establishing the inspection campaigns is to
merge all previous inspection plans into a single one for a set
of platforms. The same exercise can be applied again, but considering all components of all concerned structures. However,
this step can be more difficult, when operators constraints have
to be taken into account. For example, inspection campaigns
may be either devoted to the concerned joints of all jackets or,
if the policy of the operator is to inspect a given number of
Figure 9. EXAMPLE OF INSPECTION SCHEDULING FOR ONE
STRUCTURE.

platform faces for each platform per campaign (inspection operational constraints), some other arrangements have to be taken
into account when possible.


 

   
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6 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, part of the report on experience gained during
Risk Based Inspection studies for jacket structures is presented.
The main steps of an RBI project are reviewed, and main findings
exposed. The generic approach is found to be efficient for the
application on both FPSOs and jackets facilities.
During the studies, new challenges where faced. This is
quite a normal process when dealing with the application of new
methodologies. It is clear from these experiences that the needs
for the RBI studies are quite different from usual design requirements. This is mainly due to the fact that the RBI framework
allows to consider assumptions that do not accept usual rules and
allow operator to concentrate the inspection effort on the most
critical points of the structure, given its history and actual state.
Application of RBI is also presented in the first paper of this report, with emphasis on hull structures [1].
A next step for the development of the RBI methodology
is first considerations and then applications of the unified approach, allowing a full RBI analysis of an offshore unit, whatever its complexity. Thus process and structure will be part of a
single analysis for a whole unit.
Our report on industrial application of RBI is composed of
two papers on the application of Risk Based inspection Planning
methods on both FPSOs and jacket structures. These applications are based on the same methodology and a common framework, using the generic approach which has been proven to be efficient in both cases. However, some differences arise in practice:
differences in fatigue computations, in consequences, in risk acceptance criteria settings and most of all, in establishing the final

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Copyright c 2004 by ASME

offshore structure. In Proceedings of the eighth (1998)

International Offshore and Polar Engineering Conference,
vol. 1, pp. 392399.
[13] Faber M.H., Srensen J.D., 1999. Aspects of inspection
planning in quality and quantity. In Proceedings ICASP
8, pp. 739746.
[14] Tore H. Sreide, Jrgen Amdahl, Ernst Eberg, Tore
Holmas, yvind Hellan, 1988. USFOS - A Computer Program for Progressive Collapse Analysis of Steel Offshore
Structures. Theory Manual. SINTEF Structural Engineering. SINTEF Report STF71-F88038.

inspection plans, since constraints are specific to each type of facility. One should note that using the same approach for both
type of projects is of great value because of the similarities in
concepts and the practical application.

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