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North American Olens Process Engineering, Equistar Chemicals LP, A LyondellBasell Company, 8805 North Tabler Road, Morris, IL 60450, USA
Mechanical and Discipline Engineering, Equistar Chemicals LP, A LyondellBasell Company, Channelview, TX, USA
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history:
Received 31 January 2011
Received in revised form
15 April 2011
Accepted 28 April 2011
Processes that utilize multistage compression systems (olens plant compression systems, gas processing, integrated refrigeration systems, etc.) have the potential for overpressure due to single or
multiple check-valve failure. Catastrophic equipment failure resulting from overpressure can potentially
occur due to compression system discharge, interstage, and/or suction check-valve failure, coincident
with compressor shutdown. Depending on system design and application, overpressure values
approaching or exceeding 300% of equipment design are possible, while for some equipment, even
limited overpressure can result in catastrophic vessel failure due to brittle fracture. Additional hazards
associated with compression system fail-to-check scenarios include risks associated with excessive are
loading and compressor rotor reverse rotation. In the case of an ethylene refrigeration compressor at
a typical ethylene plant, rotor reverse rotation can potentially exceed overspeed limits.
This paper provides risk assessment results based on analyses performed on the three primary
compression systems in six ethylene plants. The methodologies used for risk identication screening,
detailed risk assessment and evaluation of system dynamics are all presented. Alternative methods for
mitigating risks are also discussed, along with check-valve reliability data. An overview of applicable
overpressure protection requirements dened in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is provided.
This paper will be of interest to anyone who designs or operates multistage compression systems in the
chemical, petrochemical or rening industries.
2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords:
Compressors
Check valves
Overpressure hazards
1. Introduction
B
B
Check-valve locations
Other design factors
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
Differential pressure
Flow rate
Rotor mass
Bearing design
Seal design
1
It must be noted that the percent overpressure compared to the MAWP and
potential consequences are for existing equipment built prior to 1998 when the
allowed stresses for certain ferritic steels was increased by Code. The overpressure
consequences described in this paper are thus based on stresses dened within
Code predating 1998.
723
724
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
2nd Suc
1st Suc
40
10
0.28
0.13
6,000
150,000
% of
Brittle Frac.
MAWP Failure Risk ?
153%
No
162%
No
272%
Yes
45%
No
113%
No
191%
Yes
28%
No
63%
No
43%
No
96%
No
75%
No
167%
Yes
From Quench
Tower
Rotor coast-down
Interstage piping and equipment ow resistance
The impact of the following:
- Relief and vent valve capacity
- Minimum ow valve capacity
- Actuation response time
- Trip valve closure timing (as applicable)
- Continuing feed (in the case of the process gas compressor)
-
To
Flare
To
Flare
Min. Flow
2nd
1st
1st
Suction
Drum
3rd
2nd
Suction
Drum
3rd
Suction
Drum
3rd
Disc.
Drum
Check
Valve
To
Flare
To
Driers
5th
Disc.
Drum
4th
5th
5th
Suction
Drum
MOV
Valve
Check
Valve
Potential Check
Valve Location
PCV
4th
Suction
Drum
6
5
4
3
2
Min. Flow
Caustic
Tower
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
725
726
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
5000
140%
120%
100%
3000
80%
60%
2000
4000
40%
1000
20%
0%
25
50
75
100
125
150
RPM
Fig. 3. Process gas compressor trip dynamics e system pressure for a typical conguration with non-functional are vent valves.
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
727
5000
800
700
4000
500
3000
400
2000
300
600
200
1000
100
0
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
RPM
Fig. 4. Process gas compressor trip dynamics e are loading with non-functional are vent valves.
120%
5000
100%
80%
3000
60%
2000
40%
4000
1000
20%
0%
0
0
25
50
75
100
125
150
RPM
Fig. 5. Process gas compressor trip dynamics e system pressure for a typical conguration with functional are vent valves.
728
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
5000
800
4500
700
4000
3500
500
3000
2500
400
2000
300
1500
600
200
1000
100
500
0
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
Fig. 6. Process gas compressor trip dynamics e are loading with functional are vent valves.
rotation will reverse. Due to the large mass of the compressor and
turbine rotor, rotation speeds will be limited but they can reach
critical speed and remain in the critical speed range for several
minutes, presenting a risk of potential bearing and seal damage.
5000
160%
140%
100%
3000
80%
2000
60%
4000
120%
40%
1000
20%
0%
25
50
75
100
125
150
RPM
Fig. 7. Process gas compression system dynamics e pressure dynamics with caustic tower overhead check valve.
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
729
From
Quench
Tower
Min. Flow
1st
3rd
2nd
1st
Suction Check
Drum Valve
2nd
Suction
Drum
3rd
Suction
Drum
Check
Valve
3rd
Disc.
Drum
Check
Valve
Check
Valve
To
Driers
Potential Check
Valve Location
Min. Flow
Check
Valve
4th
4th
Suction
Drum
5th
Disc.
Drum
Check
Valve
Caustic
Tower
5
4
3
2
From
Hydrocarbon
Stripper
160%
4000
140%
3500
120%
3000
100%
2500
80%
2000
60%
1500
40%
1000
20%
500
0%
0
0
40
80
120
160
200
240
RPM
Fig. 9. Process gas compression system dynamics e pressure dynamics for an alternate conguration.
730
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
FLARE
1st Stage
Users
2nd Stage
Users
1st
Suction
Drum
3rd Stage
Users
2nd
Suction
Drum
4th Stage
Users
3rd
Suction
Drum
4th
Suction
Drum
Check
Valve
Check
Valve
Check Valve or
Interlocked
Isolation Valve
Check
Valve
1st
2nd
Check
Valve
3rd
4th
Refrigerant
Receiver
Minimum Flow
to Suction
Drums
Refrigerant
Users and
Drums
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
731
FLARE
2nd Stage
Users
1st Stage
Users
3rd Stage
Users
3rd
Suction
Drum
2nd
Suction
Drum
1st
Suction
Drum
Check
Valve
Check
Valve
Check Valve or
Isolation Valve
(manual or
automatic)
Check
Valve
1st
2nd
3rd
Refrigerant
Receiver
Minimum Flow to
Suction Drums
Refrigerant Users
and Drums
250%
200%
150%
100%
50%
0%
0
10
20
30
40
2nd Suction
1st Suction
50
60
732
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
Check Valve
Flow Area
% of maximum
100
50
33
20
15
10
5
Plant B
Equipment
MAWP
%
140
138
130
111
Check Valve
Flow Area
% of maximum
100
33
10
5
Equipment
MAWP
%
164
163
155
141
visually inspected. The authors are aware of the gross failure of four
separate check valves in a single process gas compression system
during a single compressor trip event, the cause of which was
primarily attributable to maintenance inadequacies. Other inuencing factors were fouling and material selection. Risk reduction
claims dependent on proper check-valve functionality should only
be made for properly designed, selected and maintained check
valves. Critical service check valves should be subject to inspection,
refurbishing and testing during every major turnaround.
Industry data on check-valve reliability (Center for Chemical
Process Safety, 1989), independent of check-valve type, application and maintenance practices, indicates failure rates no better
than 1/100 years with an average failure frequency rate of 1/52
years and a failure frequency range between 1/17 and 1/394 years.
Nuclear industry check-valve failure rates (Hart & Gower, 2000;
Hart, McElhaney, & Casada, 1994; McElhaney, 1997) are comparable, as follows:
B
B
B
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
B
B
B
B
733
734
B
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
Isolation Interlock e Install compressor discharge and/or interstage isolation valve to trip closed on compressor shutdown supplementing check-valve back-ow prevention
B
Pros:
- Low-cost alternative.
- Mitigates overpressure, are loading and reverse rotation
hazards.
Cons:
- Projected catastrophic failure frequency is higher than
allowed by industry risk mitigation standards.
- Check-valve failures are covert (latent) and detected only via
inspection during turnaround or as a result of an incident.
- Due to common mode failure risks associated with
compressor surge, operating history must be considered and
the addition of, or improvements to, anti-surge controls may
be necessary.
Pros:
- Completely mitigates overpressure risks.
Cons:
- Typically the highest cost alternative.
- Doesnt address reverse rotation risks.
Pros:
- Potentially low-cost alternative.
- Achieves Code compliance.
Cons:
- Determining adequate relief capacity is subject to signicant
calculation uncertainty. Due to this uncertainty, appropriate
conservatism must be considered when dening relief valve
capacity requirements.
- Excessive are loading can result, which can then compromise the relieving capacity of other relief valves e in
particular, rst-stage suction relief valves in a process gas
compressor.
Pros:
- Typically, reduced cost when compared to equipment
replacement.
- Mitigates overpressure, are loading and reverse rotation
hazards.
- Can achieve Code compliance per UG-140 if properly designed.
Cons:
- Trip valve closure timing requirements are subject to
uncertainty. Rapid closure is frequently required, particularly on ethylene refrigeration systems.
- Inadvertent isolation valve closure can occur while the
compressor is running (process upset consequences and
compressor surge risks may necessitate compressor trip
upon closure detection).
- Additional costs may be entailed in order to upgrade minimum
ow controls/valves and trip detection instrumentation.
- Larger, SIL 3 applications are costly if required.
C. Thompson, R. King / Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries 24 (2011) 722e735
Hart, K., & Gower, D. (2000). The use of check valve performance data to support new
concepts (PRA, condition monitoring) for check valve programs. Nuclear Industry
Check Valve Group.
Hart, K., McElhaney, K. L., & Casada, D. A. Efforts by the nuclear industry to evaluate
check valve failures. Presented at the third NRC/ASME valve and pump
symposium, Washington, D.C., July 1994.
735