1.

Calalas v CA (Torts)
Calalas v CA. G.R. No. 122039 May 31, 2000 VICENTE
CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA
and FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education
at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a
wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to
let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left
rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner
of the Isuzu truck.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. RTC Dumaguete rendered judgment against Salva holding that the
driver of the Isuzu truck was responsible
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same
court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage
to his jeepney.
2. CA reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in
an action for breach of contract of carriage since the cause of action was
based on such and not quasi delict.
Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate
cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be
to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers
In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?
RULING:
No.

The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On
the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage.
Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual
1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor
2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of
the action
3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party, obligation is created by law itself)
Breach of contract / culpa contractual
1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation
2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor (here, the common carrier) failed to transport
his passenger safely to his destination
3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and
the function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost
diligence.
1. Jeepney was not properly parked;
2. Overloading of passengers.
2. FGU Insurance Corp. v. CA
Facts:
On April 21, 1987, a car owned by private respondent FILCAR Transport Inc.,
rented to and driven by Dahl-Jensen, a Danish tourist, swerved into the right
and hit the car owned by Lydia Soriano and driven by Benjamin Jacildone.
Dahl-Jensen did not possess a Philippine drivers license. Petitioner, as the
insurer of Sorianos car, paid the latter P25,382.20 and, by way of
subrogation, sued FILCAR, Dahl-Jensen, and Fortune Insurance Corporation,
FILCARs insurer, for quasi-delict. The trial court dismissed the petition for

failure to substantiate the claim for subrogation. The Court of Appeals

affirmed the decision, but on the ground that only Dahl-Jensens negligence
was proven, not that of FILCAR. Hence, this instant petition.
Issues:
(1) Whether an action based on quasi-delict will prosper against a rent-a-car
company and, consequently, its insurer for fault or negligence of the car
lessee in driving the rented vehicle
(2) Whether the ruling in MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation v. Vda. de Caldo is
applicable in the case at bar
Held:
(1) We find no reversible error committed by respondent court in upholding
the dismissal of petitioner's complaint. The pertinent provision is Art. 2176 of
the Civil Code which states: "Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation
between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . . ". To sustain a claim based
thereon, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the
plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of
cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the
damage incurred by the plaintiff. We agree with respondent court that
petitioner failed to prove the existence of the second requisite, i.e., fault or
negligence of defendant FILCAR, because only the fault or negligence of
Dahl-Jensen was sufficiently established, not that of FILCAR. It should be
noted that the damage caused on the vehicle of Soriano was brought about
by the circumstance that Dahl-Jensen swerved to the right while the vehicle
that he was driving was at the center lane. It is plain that the negligence was
solely attributable to Dahl-Jensen thus making the damage suffered by the
other vehicle his personal liability. Respondent FILCAR did not have any
participation therein. Respondent FILCAR being engaged in a rent-a-car
business was only the owner of the car leased to Dahl-Jensen. As such, there
was no vinculum juris between them as employer and employee. Respondent
FILCAR cannot in any way be responsible for the negligent act of DahlJensen, the former not being an employer of the latter.
(2) Petitioner's insistence on MYC-Agro-Industrial Corporation is rooted in a
misapprehension of our ruling therein. In that case, the negligent and
reckless operation of the truck owned by petitioner corporation caused
injuries to several persons and damage to property. Intending to exculpate
itself from liability, the corporation raised the defense that at the time of the
collision it had no more control over the vehicle as it was leased to another;
and, that the driver was not its employee but of the lessee. The trial court

was not persuaded as it found that the true nature of the alleged lease
contract was nothing more than a disguise effected by the corporation to
relieve itself of the burdens and responsibilities of an employer. We upheld
this finding and affirmed the declaration of joint and several liability of the
corporation with its driver.
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