SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 182839, June 02, 2014

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. JOSE GARCIA AND CHILDREN NORA GARCIA,
JOSE GARCIA, JR., BOBBY GARCIA AND JIMMY GARCIA AND HEIRS OF ROGELIO GARCIA
NAMELY: CELEDONIO GARCIA, DANILO GARCIA, ELSA GARCIA, FERMIN GARCIA, HEHERSON
GARCIA, GREGORIO GARCIA, IMELDA GARCIA AND JANE GARCIA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve this petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the decision2 dated September 26, 2007 and
the resolution3 dated May 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71356.
These challenged CA rulings reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Roxas, Isabela, dismissing Civil Case No. Branch 23-500-96 for lack of cause of action.
The Factual Background
The facts of the case, gathered from the records, are briefly summarized below.
The subject of the present case is a parcel of residential land with all its improvements (subject
property) located in Barrio Olango, Mallig, Isabela. The land is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
(TCT) No. T-44422 under the name of Jose Garcia Sr. (Jose Sr.) who acquired the subject
propertyduring his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987.
The marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya produced the following children: Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy,
all surnamed Garcia, who are the respondents in the present case.
Sometime in 1989, the spouses Rogelio and Celedonia Garcia (Spouses Garcia) obtained a loan
facility from the petitioner, Philippine National Bank (petitioner bank), initially for P150,000.00. The
loan was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over their property covered by TCT No. 177585. The
spouses Garcia increased their loan to P220,000.00 and eventually to P600,000.00. As security for the
increased loan, they offered their property covered by TCT No. 75324 and the subject property
covered by TCT No. T-44422.
Jose Sr. agreed to accommodate the spouses Garcia by offering the subject property as additional
collateral security for the latters increased loan. For this purpose, Jose Sr. executed Special Powers of
Attorney (SPAs) dated April 14, 1992 and October 6, 1993, respectively, expressly authorizing the
Spouses Garcia to apply for, borrow, or secure any loan from the petitioner bank, and to convey and
transfer the subject property by way of mortgage. Jose Sr. also executed an Amendment of Real
Estate Mortgage in favor of the petitioner bank. The SPAs and the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage
are both inscribed on TCT No. T-44422. All of these transactions, however, were without the
knowledge and consent of Jose Sr.s children.
On maturity of the loan on April 20, 1994, the spouses Garcia failed to pay their loan to the petitioner
bank despite repeated demands.
On January 12, 1996, the respondents filed before the RTC a Complaint for Nullity of the Amendment
of Real Estate Mortgage, Damages with Preliminary Injunction against the spouses Garcia and the
petitioner bank. They claimed that the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage was null and void as to
respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy as they were not parties to the contract.

The respondents alleged that the subject property was a conjugal property of Jose Sr. and his
deceased spouse, Ligaya, as they acquired the subject property during their marriage; that upon
Ligayas death, Jose Sr., together with his children Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy, by law, became
owners pro indiviso of the subject property; that the petitioner bank was at fault for not including Jose
Sr. as payee to the check representing the loan despite its knowledge that Jose Sr. was a signatory to
the real estate mortgage; that the real estate mortgage executed by Jose Sr. could not bind his
children as they did not give their consent or approval to the encumbrance; and that the real estate
mortgage was also void as to Jose Sr. since he never benefitted from the loan.
In their answer, the Spouses Garcia alleged that Jose Sr. was indebted to them in the amount of
P133,800.00. To settle this indebtedness, Jose Sr. volunteered to give the subject property as
additional security for their (the Garcias) loan to the petitioner bank.
The petitioner bank, on the other hand, claimed that the mortgage was made in good faith and for
value, and maintained that the respondents complaint stated no cause of action against it. It alleged
that the real estate mortgage over the properties was duly registered and inscribed on their titles and
was thus binding on the whole world.
In the course of the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31,
1996 authorizing Jose Sr. to act as their attorney-in-fact during the pretrial of the case.
The Ruling of the RTC
The RTC dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action. The court held that the subject property
was a conjugal property since it was acquired by Jose Sr. during his marriage with his now deceased
wife. As a conjugal property, it is presumed that upon the death of his spouse, one-half of the
property passed on to Jose Sr., while the other half went to Jose and his children as co-owners and
as forced heirs of his deceased spouse. Without the consent of the children, the trial court ruled that
the conjugal property could only be transferred or encumbered to the extent of Jose Sr.s share in the
conjugal partnership, plus his share as an heir in the other half pertaining to the estate of his
deceased spouse.
The RTC nevertheless declared that by virtue of the SPA executed by Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy
in this suit, they are already estopped from questioning the mortgage and from alleging lack of
consent or knowledge in the transaction. It held Jose Sr. liable as an accommodation party and upheld
the petitioner banks right to collect the debt.
The respondents disagreed with the RTC ruling and elevated the case to the CA via an ordinary
appeal.cra1awredjgc
The Ruling of the CA
On September 26, 2007, the CA upheld the trial courts finding that the subject property was conjugal,
but reversed and set aside its ruling in so far as it declared valid and binding the Amendment of Real
Estate Mortgage between the petitioner bank, on one hand, and the spouses Garcia and Jose Sr., on
the other hand, with respect to respondents Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy. Relying on the Courts
ruling in Nufable v. Nufable,4 the CA ruled that the encumbrance Jose Sr. made over the entire
conjugal property, without his childrens conformity, was null and void because a mere part owner
could not alienate the shares of the other co-owners.
The CA also declared that the conjugal property could only be liable to the extent of Jose Sr.s shares;
Jose Sr.s acts could not affect his childrens pro-indiviso shares in the subject property. It disagreed
with the trial courts estoppel theory and held that their execution of the SPA should not be construed
as acquiescence to the mortgage transaction. Lastly, it ruled that Jose Sr. could not escape liability
from the mortgage since he voluntarily bound himself as the Spouses Garcias accommodation
mortgagor.cra1awredjgc
The petition

The petitioner bank disputes the CAs finding that the subject property was conjugal in nature. It
argues that, as can be gleaned from TCT No. T-44422, the subject property was registered in the
name of Jose Sr. alone, who was described in the title as widower and not married. The
petitioner bank posits that as a mortgagee in good faith, it had the right to rely on the mortgagors
certificate of title; in the absence of any indication that could arouse suspicion, it had no obligation to
undertake further investigation and verify whether the property was conjugal or was acquired during
marriage or thereafter.
Since the subject property belonged to Jose Sr., insofar as petitioner bank as mortgagee was
concerned, Jose Sr. had the right under Article 428 of the Civil Code to mortgage it without the
consent of his children. Accordingly, the mortgage in its entirety should be declared valid.cra1awredjgc
The Comment
The respondents state that the issues raised by petitioner bank are essentially factual; hence, they are
beyond the competence of this Court in a petition for review. They submit that in a certioraripetition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be entertained because the Court is
not a trier of facts.cra1awredjgc
The Courts Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The petition before us raises both questions of fact and of law. Whether petitioner bank is a mortgagee
in good faith and for value and whether the subject property was conjugal, are factual issues that this
Court cannot look into as our examination would entail going into factual matters and records of the
case. In Rule 45 petitions, only questions of law may be put into issue. Questions of fact cannot be
entertained.5
Although there are exceptions to the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition
forcertiorari, the petitioner bank failed to show that this case falls under any of the established
exceptions. Too, since the CA partially affirmed the findings of the trial court and absent any indication
that these courts committed a serious error in its findings, this Court is bound by these courts
findings.6
Moreover, even if we were to review the factual issues raised by the petitioner bank, we still find no
reason to depart from the CAs ruling.
The Subject Property is Conjugal
a. All property acquired during marriage
is presumed conjugal
Since Jose Sr. and Ligaya were married prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, their property
relations were governed by the conjugal partnership of gains as provided under Article 119 of the Civil
Code. Under Article 160 of the Civil Code, all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership, unless it can be proven that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the
wife.
In his testimony, Jose Sr. admitted that at the time he acquired the land through sale, he was already
married. The material portion of his testimony is as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

Upon the death of your wife did you and your wife ever own a piece of land?
Yes, sir.
Where is that land situated?
In Centro, District 2, Mallig[,] Isabela.
Is that land titled in your names?
Yes, sir.

Q:
A:
Q:
A:
Q:
A:

xxxx
You and your wife acquired that piece of land?
Yes, sir.
xxxx
May we know from you[,] Mr. Witness, how did you acquire this parcel of land presently
embraced and covered by TCT No. T-44422?
I purchased that piece of land from the Baniqued Family during my incumbency as Municipal
Mayor, sir.
What was your civil status at the time you purchased that piece of land?
I was already married, sir. (Emphasis ours, TSN, July 24, 1997, Jose Garcia Sr.) 7

Because of the petitioner banks failure to rebut the allegation that the subject property was acquired
during the formers marriage to Ligaya, the legal presumption of the conjugal nature of the property,
in line with Article 160 of the Civil Code, applies to this property. Proof of the subject propertys
acquisition during the subsistence of marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption operative. 8
b. Registration of the subject property in
the name of one spouse does not destroy
the presumption that the property is conjugal
The petitioner bank claims that the CA failed to consider that the subject property was registered in
the name of Jose Sr. alone. Likewise, it raises the argument that Jose Sr.s change of status in the
subject propertys title from married to widower prior to the constitution of the real estate
mortgage showed that the property was no longer conjugal.
We do not consider this argument persuasive.
Registration of a property alone in the name of one spouse does not destroy its conjugal nature.What
is material is the time when the property was acquired.9 The registration of the property is not
conclusive evidence of the exclusive ownership of the husband or the wife. Although the property
appears to be registered in the name of the husband, it has the inherent character of conjugal
property if it was acquired for valuable consideration during marriage. 10 It retains its conjugal nature.
In order to rebut the presumptive conjugal nature of the property, the petitioner must present strong,
clear and convincing evidence of exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. 11 The burden of proving
that the property belongs exclusively to the wife or to the husband rests upon the party asserting it.
In the present case, aside from its allegation that the subject property is no longer conjugal and its
assertion that it is a mortgagee in good faith, the petitioner bank offered no evidence, convincing to
this Court, that the subject property exclusively belonged to Jose Sr. As stated earlier, the petitioner
bank failed to overcome the legal presumption that the disputed property was conjugal. Thus, the
conclusion of both lower courts that the subject property was conjugal property holds. Factual
findings of the CA affirming those of the trial court are binding on this Court unless there is a clear
showing that such findings are tainted with arbitrariness, capriciousness or palpable error.12
The conjugal partnership was converted
into an implied ordinary co-ownership
upon the death of Ligaya
Upon the death of Ligaya on January 21, 1987, the conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved
and terminated pursuant to Article 175(1) of the Civil Code, 13 and the successional rights of her heirs
vest, as provided under Article 777 of the Civil Code, which states that [t]he rights to the succession
are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership was converted into an implied ordinary co-ownership between
the surviving spouse, on the one hand, and the heirs of the deceased, on the other.14 This resulting
ordinary co-ownership among the heirs is governed by Article 493 of the Civil Code which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
of the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. (Emphasis
supplied)ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Under this provision, each co-owner has the full ownership of his part or share in the co-ownership
and may, therefore, alienate, assign or mortgage it except when personal rights are involved. Should a
co-owner alienate or mortgage the co-owned property itself, the alienation or mortgage shall remain
valid but only to the extent of the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership.15 In Carvajal v. Court of Appeals,16 the Court
said:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even
substitute another person in its enjoyment,the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by mandate of the same article, to the portion
which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-ownership. He
has no right to sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate part of the thing in
common to the exclusion of the other co-owners because his right over the thing is
represented by an abstract or Ideal portion without any physical adjudication.3 An individual
co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned
in common until its actual partition by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the coowner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by
all the co-owners.4 What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be
limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. [emphasis supplied].
In the present case, Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over the entire subject property after the
death of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the conjugal partnership. While under Article 493 of the
Civil Code, even if he had the right to freely mortgage or even sell his undivided interest in the
disputed property, he could not dispose of or mortgage the entire property without his childrens
consent. As correctly emphasized by the trial court, Jose Sr.s right in the subject property is limited
only to his share in the conjugal partnership as well as his share as an heir on the other half
of the estate which is his deceased spouses share. Accordingly, the mortgage contract is void
insofar as it extends to the undivided shares of his children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy) because
they did not give their consent to the transaction. 17
Accordingly, the Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage constituted by Jose Sr. over the entire property
without his co-owners consent is not necessarily void in its entirety. The right of the petitioner bank
as mortgagee is limited though only to the portion which may be allotted to Jose Sr. in the event of a
division and liquidation of the subject property.cra1awlaw1ibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we hereby AFFIRM the Decision dated September 26, 2007of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71356. Costs against petitioner Philippine National Bank.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191031, October 05, 2015
DOLORES L. HACBANG AND BERNARDO J. HACBANG, Petitioners, v. ATTY. BASILIO H.
ALO,Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:*
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the 13 October 2009 Decision and the 21
January 2010 resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CV No. 83137.1 The CA affirmed the
Quezon City Regional Trial Court's (RTC) dismissal of the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. Q
99-366602 for lack of cause of action.
ANTECEDENTS
On 3 April 1937, Bishop Sofronio Hacbang (Bishop Sofronio) died leaving several properties behind.
Among these was Lot No. 8-A of subdivision Plan Psd-6227 located at Espaa Street, San Juan,
Rizal,3 covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. (19896) 227644 (the subject lot).
Bishop Sofronio was survived by his parents, Basilio and Maria Hacbang, and his siblings: Perfecto
Hacbang, Joaquin Hacbang, Lucia Teresita Hacbang, and Dolores Hacbang Alo. Petitioner Dolores L.
Hacbang is the grandchild of Perfecto while petitioner Bernardo Hacbang (Bernardo) is a son of
Joaquin. The respondent Basilio Alo is the son of Dolores.
Bishop Sofronio left a will denominated as Ultima Voluntad y Testamento. He left one-half of his
properties to his parents and devised the other half - including the subject lot - to his sister Dolores.
The pertinent portions of his will read:cralawlawlibrary
FOURTH: By these presents I give, name, declare and institute as heirs my parents BASILIO HACBANG
and MARIA GABORNY DE HACBANG of one-half of all my properties, whether real, personal or mixed,
in whatever place they may be found, whether they were acquired before or after the execution of this
testament, including all the properties that at the time of my death I may have the power to dispose
of by will, and which properties consist of the following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Fifty (50) percent of the shares of stock that I own in the "SAMAR NAVIGATION CO. INC."
A parcel of land with its camarin situated in the Municipality of Carigara, Province of Leyte.
A parcel of land in the Barrio of Pinamopuan, of the Municipality of Capoocan, Province of Leyte.
A parcel of land with house and planted to coconuts in the Barrio of Sorsogon, Municipality of Sta.
Margarita, Province of Samar.
FIFTH: The other remaining half of my properties wherever they may be located, by these
presents I give, cede and hand over to my sister Dolores Hacbang,which properties are more
particularly described as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Fifty (50) percent of my stockholdings in the "SAMAR NAVIGATION CO. INC."
A piece of land with one house where the Botica San Antonio is located, in the Municipality of
Calbayog, Province of Samar.
A piece of land with house in Acedillo St., Municipality of Calbayog, Province of Samar.

A piece of land with 1 camarin in the barrio of Sorsogon, Municipality of Sta. Margarita, Province of
Samar.
Six (6) Parcels of land located in "NEW MANILA," Municipality of San Juan, Province of Rizal, in 7 th St.,
described as follows: Block 7, Lots 16, 18, 20 and 22, and in 3rd Street, Block 3, Lots 4 and 6.
A piece of land situated in Espana St., Municipality of San Juan del Monte of the Province of
Rizal, marked as Lot 8-A, Block 17, of 1,403 square meters in area.4chanrobleslaw
On 16 April 1937, a petition for the probate of Bishop Sofronio's will and the settlement of his estate
was filed before the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila. The petition was docketed as SP.
PROC. No. 51199.
On 21 May 1937, the CFI admitted Bishop Sofronio's will to probate. 5
The records are bare with respect to what happened next. They show, however, that the CFI ordered
the proceedings to be archived on 2 November 1957.
On 24 September 1971, the Register of Deeds of Quezon City appears to have issued TCT No.
169342 over the subject lot in the name of respondent Basilio H. Alo. TCT No. 169342 cancelled TCT
No. 117322/T-500. However, this Court cannot determine the circumstances surrounding the issuance
of TCT No. 169342 or the relationship between TCT No. 117322/T-500 and TCT No. (19896) 227644
due to the inadequacy of the documents on record.
On 17 March 1975, Dolores Hacbang Alo moved to revive the settlement proceedings because the CFI
had not yet completed adjudicating the properties.
On 23 May 1975, the CFI denied the motion for revival because the order to archive "had long become
final and executory."6
On 1 February 1999, petitioners Dolores L. Hacbang and Bernardo filed a petition to cancel TCT No.
169342 on the ground that it was fraudulently secured. In support of their allegations, they submitted
the 5 March 1997 Investigation Report of Land Registration Authority (LRA) Investigator Rodrigo I. Del
Rosario. The report concluded that TCT No. 117322 was of "doubtful authenticity" and was neither
derived from TCT No. 117322 nor issued by the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City on 24 September
1971 at 2:30 PM.
In his Answer dated 18 August 1999, Basilio denied all allegations of irregularity and wrongdoing. He
also moved to dismiss the petition because the petitioners were neither heirs nor devisees of Bishop
Sofronio and had no legal interest in the subject lot.
On 7 January 2003, the RTC dismissed the petition because the petitioners had no right to prosecute
the case on the subject lot. The RTC noted that Bishop Sofronio's will had already been admitted into
probate in 1937; thus, the intrinsic validity of the will is no longer in question. Though the settlement
proceedings were archived, Bishop Sofronio already designated his heirs: Bishop Sofronio's parents
were compulsory heirs entitled to half of his estate while the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang
Alo, was devised the remaining half (the free portion). Thus, the petitioners, who are neither
compulsory nor testamentary heirs, are not real parties in interest.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the RTC denied on 19 August 2003.
The petitioners appealed to the CA, arguing that: (1) Bishop Sofronio's will did not validly transfer the
subject property to Dolores Hacbang Alo; (2) the probate of the will is not conclusive as to the validity
of its intrinsic provisions; and (3) only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests title on the
properties from the estate on the distributees. 7 The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R CV No. 83137.
They further argued that the distribution of the estate should be governed by intestate succession
because: (1) the subject property was not adjudicated; and (2) the settlement proceedings were

archived and dismissed. Thus, all the properties passed on to and became part of the estate of Bishop
Sofronio's parents. The petitioners concluded that they had legal interest in the subject lot as
representatives of their ascendants, the other children of Bishop Sofronio's parents.
In his appeal brief, the respondent insisted that the petitioners do not have a clear legal right to
maintain the suit because: (1) as collateral relatives, they cannot invoke the right of representation to
the estate of Bishop Sofronio; and (2) they are not real parties in interest and have no right of action
over the subject lot.
On 13 October 2009, the CA affirmed the RTC's order of dismissal. The CA held that the admission of
Bishop Sofronio's will to probate precluded intestate succession unless the will was intrinsically invalid
or failed to completely dispose of his estate. Contrary to the petitioners' contention, the settlement
proceedings were not dismissed but archived; the will did not lose its validity merely because the
proceedings were archived. Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate.
The CA denied the petitioners' claim to a right of inheritance by representation. It held that the
presence of Bishop Sofronio's parents during his death excluded his brothers and sisters from being
compulsory heirs; the petitioners cannot represent those who are hot entitled to succeed. Considering
that they are neither compulsory nor testamentary heirs, petitioners have no legal interest in the
subject property.
The petitioners moved for reconsideration which the CA denied on 21 January 2010. The denial paved
the way for the petitioners to file the present petition for review on certiorari.
THE PETITION
The petitioners argue: (1) that the CA erred when it failed to rule on the validity of TCT No. 169342;
(2) that the probate proceedings of the estate was dismissed, not archived; and (3) that the CA erred
when it used Bishop Sofronio's will as basis to declare that they are not real parties in interest.
In his Comment, the respondent maintained that the petitioners had no right over the property and
moved to dismiss the present petition.
OUR RULING
At the outset, this Court observes that the parties and even the lower courts erroneously applied the
provisions of the present Civil Code to the will and the estate of Bishop Sofronio. The law in force at
the time of the decedent's death determines the applicable law over the settlement of his
estate.8Bishop Sofronio died in 1937 before the enactment of the Civil Code in 1949. Therefore, the
correct applicable laws to the settlement of his estate are the 1889 Spanish Civil Code and the 1901
Code of Civil Procedure.
In any case, under both the Spanish Code and our Civil Code, successional rights are vested at the
precise moment of the death of the decedent. Section 657 of the Spanish code
provides:cralawlawlibrary
Art. 657. Los derechos a la sucesion de una persona se transmiten desde el momento de su
muerte.9chanrobleslaw
The inheritance vests immediately upon the decedent's death without a moment's interruption. This
provision was later on translated and adopted as Article 777 of our Civil Code. 10
As a consequence of this principle, ownership over the inheritance passes to the heirs at
the precisemoment of death - not at the time the heirs are declared, nor at the time of the partition,
nor at the distribution of the properties. There is no interruption between the end of the decedent's
ownership and the start of the heir/legatee/devisee's ownership.
For intestate heirs, this means that they are immediately entitled to their hereditary shares in the

estate even though they may not be entitled to any particular properties yet. For legatees and
devisees granted specific properties, this means that they acquire ownership over the legacies and
devises at that immediate moment without prejudice to the legitimes of compulsory heirs.
Undoubtedly, Bishop Sofronio did not die intestate. He left a will that was probated in 1937. He left
half of his properties to his parents and the remaining half to his sister Dolores Hacbang Alo. The
admission of his will to probate is conclusive with respect to its due execution and extrinsic validity.11
Unfortunately, the settlement proceedings were never concluded; the case was archived without any
pronouncement as to the intrinsic validity of the will or an adjudication of the properties. Because of
this, the petitioners posit that intestate succession should govern. They maintain that the entire
inheritance should have gone to Bishop Sofronio's parents, the petitioners' ascendants. Thus, they
claim to have a legal interest in the subject lot as representatives of the other children of Bishop
Sofronio's parents.
We do not find the petitioners' argument meritorious.
Our jurisdiction has always respected a decedent's freedom to dispose of his estate, whether under
the Spanish Civil Code or under the present Civil Code. Article 763 of the Spanish Code
provides:cralawlawlibrary
Art. 763. El que no tuviere herederos forzosos puede disponer por testamento de todos sus bienes o
de parte de ellos en favor de cualquiera persona que tenga capacidad para adquirirlos. El que tuviere
herederos forzosos solo podra disponer de sus bienes en la forma y con las limitaciones que se
establecen en la section quinta de este capitulo.chanrobleslaw
This provision states that a person without compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate, either in part
or in its entirety, in favor of anyone capacitated to succeed him; if the testator has compulsory heirs,
he can dispose of his property provided he does not impair their legitimes. This provision was later
translated and adopted as Article 842 of our Civil Code. 12
Our jurisdiction accords great respect to the testator's freedom of disposition. Hence, testate
succession has always been preferred over intestacy.13 As much as possible, a testator's will is treated
and interpreted in a way that would render all of its provisions operative. 14 Hence, there is no basis to
apply the provisions on intestacy when testate succession evidently applies.
Even though the CFI archived the settlement proceedings, there is no indication that it declared any of
the dispositions in the will invalid. The records are understandably bare considering the probate
proceedings were initiated as early as 1937. Nonetheless, we find no reason to doubt the intrinsic
validity of the will.
Bishop Sofronio was free to dispose of his estate without prejudice to the legitimes of his compulsory
heirs. Bishop Sofronio's only compulsory heirs were his parents. 15 Their legitime was one-half of
Bishop Sofronio's estate.16 Considering that Bishop Sofronio gave his parents half of his estate, then
he was free to dispose of the free portion of his estate in favor of his sister, Dolores Hacbang Alo.
Thus, his will was intrinsically valid.
The CFPs failure to adjudicate the specific properties is irrelevant because Bishop Sofronio did not just
name his heirs; he also identified the specific properties forming part of their inheritance. The
dispositions in the will rendered court adjudication and distribution unnecessary.
The petitioners' contention that only a final decree of distribution of the estate vests title to the land of
the estate in the distributees is also incorrect. Again, ownership over the inheritance vests upon the
heirs, legatees, and devisees immediately upon the death of the decedent.
At the precise moment of death, the heirs become owners of the estate pro-indiviso. They become
absolute owners of their undivided aliquot share but with respect to the individual properties of the
estate, they become co-owners. This co-ownership remains until partition and distribution. Until then,

the individual heirs cannot claim any rights over a specific property from the estate. This is because
the heirs do not know which properties will be adjudicated to them yet. Hence, there is a need for a
partition before title over particular properties vest in the distributee-heirs.
However, heirs, legatees, and devisees bequeathed specific properties do not require Court
adjudication to identify which particular properties become theirs; the testator had already identified
these. From the very moment of the testator's death, title over these particular properties vests on
the heir, legatee, or devisee.
On 3 April 1937, title over the subject lot passed on to the respondent's mother, Dolores Hacbang Alo,
at the exact moment of her brother's death. From that moment on, she was free to dispose of the
subject lot as a consequence of her ownership.
On the other hand, Bishop Sofronio's parents, Basilio and Maria Gaborny Hacbang, never acquired the
title over the subject lot. Thus, it never became part of their estate. Clearly, the petitioners - who
claim to represent the children of Basilio and Maria Gaborny in the spouses' estate -have no legal right
or interest over the subject lot.
Every ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action - an act or omission that violates the
rights of the plaintiff.17 A cause of action requires:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) a legal right in favor of the plaintiff;ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
(2) a correlative duty of the defendant to respect the plaintiffs right; and
(3) an act or omission of the defendant in violation of the plaintiffs right. 18
Every action must also be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest: the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment. 19 These fundamental requirements are not
merely technical matters; they go into the very substance of every suit.
The petitioners came to the courts praying for the annulment of the respondent's title yet they failed
to show that they are entitled to even ask for such relief. They have no right over the subject lot and
the respondent has no legal obligation to them with respect to the subject lot. Even if we assume that
the respondent fraudulently or irregularly secured his certificate of title, the bottom-line is that the
petitioners have no legal standing to sue for the cancellation of this title. This right only belongs to the
rightful owner of the subject lot.
Judicial power is the duty of the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable.20 Courts settle real legal disputes involving the rights and
obligations between parties. If either of the parties is not the real party in interest, the Court cannot
grant the reliefs prayed for because that party has no legal right or duty with respect to his opponent.
Further litigation becomes an academic exercise in legal theory that eventually settles nothing - a
waste of time that could have been spent resolving actual justiciable controversies.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. Costs against the
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Peralta,** Del Castillo, Leonen, and Jardeleza,*** JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Baguio City
FIRST DIVISION
ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR,

G.R. No. 174489

SEBASTIAN M. BALTAZAR,
ANTONIO L. MANGALINDAN,
ROSIE M. MATEO,

Present:

NENITA A. PACHECO,
VIRGILIO REGALA, JR.,

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

and RAFAEL TITCO,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

Petitioners,

BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO, and

- versus LORENZO LAXA,

Respondent.

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:
April 11, 2012

x-------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
It is incumbent upon those who oppose the probate of a will to clearly establish that the decedent was not of
sound and disposing mind at the time of the execution of said will. Otherwise, the state is duty-bound to give
full effect to the wishes of the testator to distribute his estate in the manner provided in his will so long as it is
legally tenable.[1]

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari[2] of the June 15, 2006 Decision[3] of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 which reversed the September 30, 2003 Decision [4] of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga in Special Proceedings No. G-1186. The assailed CA Decision
granted the petition for probate of the notarial will of Paciencia Regala (Paciencia), to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit, the
decision in SP. PROC. NO. G-1186 dated 30 September 2003, is hereby SET ASIDE and a new
one entered GRANTING the petition for the probate of the will of PACIENCIA REGALA.
SO ORDERED.[5]

Also assailed herein is the August 31, 2006 CA Resolution [6] which denied the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.

Petitioners call us to reverse the CAs assailed Decision and instead affirm the Decision of the RTC which
disallowed the notarial will of Paciencia.

Factual Antecedents

Paciencia was a 78 year old spinster when she made her last will and testament entitled Tauli Nang Bilin o
Testamento Miss Paciencia Regala[7] (Will) in the Pampango dialect on September 13, 1981. The Will, executed
in the house of retired Judge Ernestino G. Limpin (Judge Limpin), was read to Paciencia twice. After which,
Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental witnesses that the document is her last will and
testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at the end of the said document on page 3 [8] and then on the
left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.[9]

The witnesses to the Will were Dra. Maria Lioba A. Limpin (Dra. Limpin), Francisco Garcia (Francisco)
and Faustino R. Mercado (Faustino). The three attested to the Wills due execution by affixing their signatures
below its attestation clause[10] and on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof,[11] in the presence of Paciencia
and of one another and of Judge Limpin who acted as notary public.
Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to respondent Lorenzo R.
Laxa (Lorenzo) and his wife Corazon F. Laxa and their children Luna Lorella Laxa and Katherine Ross Laxa, thus:
xxxx
Fourth - In consideration of their valuable services to me since then up to the present
by the spouses LORENZO LAXA and CORAZON F. LAXA, I hereby BEQUEATH, CONVEY and
GIVE all my properties enumerated in parcels 1 to 5 unto the spouses LORENZO R. LAXA and
CORAZON F. LAXA and their children, LUNA LORELLA LAXA and KATHERINE LAXA, and the
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa both of legal age, Filipinos, presently residing at
Barrio Sta. Monica, [Sasmuan], Pampanga and their children, LUNA LORELLA and KATHERINE
ROSS LAXA, who are still not of legal age and living with their parents who would decide to
bequeath since they are the children of the spouses;
xxxx
[Sixth] - Should other properties of mine may be discovered aside from the properties
mentioned in this last will and testament, I am also bequeathing and giving the same to the
spouses Lorenzo R. Laxa and Corazon F. Laxa and their two children and I also command them
to offer masses yearly for the repose of my soul and that of D[]a Nicomeda Regala, Epifania
Regala and their spouses and with respect to the fishpond situated at San Antonio, I likewise
command to fulfill the wishes of D[]a Nicomeda Regala in accordance with her testament as
stated in my testament. x x x[12]

The filial relationship of Lorenzo with Paciencia remains undisputed. Lorenzo is Paciencias nephew
whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.
[13]

Paciencia lived with Lorenzos family in Sasmuan, Pampanga and it was she who raised and cared for Lorenzo

since his birth. Six days after the execution of the Will or on September 19, 1981, Paciencia left for the United
States of America (USA). There, she resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on January 4, 1996.

In the interim, the Will remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than four years after the death of Paciencia or on April 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition [14] with
the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of Letters of
Administration in his favor, docketed as Special Proceedings No. G-1186.

There being no opposition to the petition after its due publication, the RTC issued an Order on June 13,
2000[15] allowing Lorenzo to present evidence on June 22, 2000. On said date, Dra. Limpin testified that she was
one of the instrumental witnesses in the execution of the last will and testament of Paciencia on September 13,
1981.[16] The Will was executed in her fathers (Judge Limpin) home office, in her presence and of two other
witnesses, Francisco and Faustino.[17] Dra. Limpin positively identified the Will and her signatures on all its four
pages.[18] She likewise positively identified the signature of her father appearing thereon. [19] Questioned by the
prosecutor regarding Judge Limpins present mental fitness, Dra. Limpin testified that her father had a stroke in
1991 and had to undergo brain surgery.[20] The judge can walk but can no longer talk and remember her
name. Because of this, Dra. Limpin stated that her father can no longer testify in court.[21]

The following day or on June 23, 2000, petitioner Antonio Baltazar (Antonio) filed an opposition [22] to
Lorenzos petition. Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencias Will belong to Nicomeda Regala
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to Lorenzo.[23]

Barely a month after or on July 20, 2000, Antonio, now joined by petitioners Sebastian M. Baltazar,
Virgilio Regala, Jr., Nenita A. Pacheco, Felix B. Flores, Rafael Titco, Rosie M. Mateo (Rosie) and Antonio L.
Mangalindan filed a Supplemental Opposition[24] contending that Paciencias Will was null and void because
ownership of the properties had not been transferred and/or titled to Paciencia before her death pursuant to
Article 1049, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code.[25] Petitioners also opposed the issuance of Letters of Administration
in Lorenzos favor arguing that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident
of the USA.[26] Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.[27]

Later still on September 26, 2000, petitioners filed an Amended Opposition[28] asking the RTC to deny
the probate of Paciencias Will on the following grounds: the Will was not executed and attested to in accordance
with the requirements of the law; that Paciencia was mentally incapable to make a Will at the time of its
execution; that she was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the
execution of the Will had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some

other persons for his benefit; that the signature of Paciencia on the Will was forged; that assuming the signature
to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery; and, that Paciencia did not intend the document to be
her Will. Simultaneously, petitioners filed an Opposition and Recommendation[29] reiterating their opposition to
the appointment of Lorenzo as administrator of the properties and requesting for the appointment of Antonio in
his stead.

On January 29, 2001, the RTC issued an Order[30] denying the requests of both Lorenzo and Antonio to
be appointed administrator since the former is a citizen and resident of the USAwhile the latters claim as a coowner of the properties subject of the Will has not yet been established.

Meanwhile, proceedings on the petition for the probate of the Will continued. Dra. Limpin was recalled
for cross-examination by the petitioners. She testified as to the age of her father at the time the latter notarized
the Will of Paciencia; the living arrangements of Paciencia at the time of the execution of the Will; and the lack of
photographs when the event took place. [31]

Aside from Dra. Limpin, Lorenzo and Monico Mercado (Monico) also took the witness stand. Monico,
son of Faustino, testified on his fathers condition. According to him his father can no longer talk and express
himself due to brain damage. A medical certificate was presented to the court to support this allegation. [32]

For his part, Lorenzo testified that: from 1944 until his departure for the USA in April 1980, he lived in
Sasmuan, Pampanga with his family and his aunt, Paciencia; in 1981 Paciencia went to the USA and lived with
him and his family until her death in January 1996; the relationship between him and Paciencia was like that of
a mother and child since Paciencia took care of him since birth and took him in as an adopted son; Paciencia
was a spinster without children, and without brothers and sisters; at the time of Paciencias death, she did not
suffer from any mental disorder and was of sound mind, was not blind, deaf or mute; the Will was in the
custody of Judge Limpin and was only given to him after Paciencias death through Faustino; and he was already
residing in the USA when the Will was executed.[33] Lorenzo positively identified the signature of Paciencia in
three different documents and in the Will itself and stated that he was familiar with Paciencias signature because
he accompanied her in her transactions.[34] Further, Lorenzo belied and denied having used force, intimidation,
violence, coercion or trickery upon Paciencia to execute the Will as he was not in the Philippines when the same
was executed.[35] On cross-examination, Lorenzo clarified that Paciencia informed him about the Will shortly
after her arrival in the USA but that he saw a copy of the Will only after her death.[36]

As to Francisco, he could no longer be presented in court as he already died on May 21, 2000.

For petitioners, Rosie testified that her mother and Paciencia were first cousins. [37] She claimed to have
helped in the household chores in the house of Paciencia thereby allowing her to stay therein from morning until
evening and that during the period of her service in the said household, Lorenzos wife and his children were
staying in the same house.[38] She served in the said household from 1980 until Paciencias departure for
the USA on September 19, 1981.[39]

On September 13, 1981, Rosie claimed that she saw Faustino bring something for Paciencia to sign at
the latters house.[40] Rosie admitted, though, that she did not see what that something was as same was placed
inside an envelope.[41] However, she remembered Paciencia instructing Faustino to first look for money before
she signs them.[42] A few days after or on September 16, 1981, Paciencia went to the house of Antonios mother
and brought with her the said envelope. [43] Upon going home, however, the envelope was no longer with
Paciencia.[44]Rosie further testified that Paciencia was referred to as magulyan or forgetful because she would
sometimes leave her wallet in the kitchen then start looking for it moments later.[45] On cross examination, it
was established that Rosie was neither a doctor nor a psychiatrist, that her conclusion that Paciencia
was magulyan was based on her personal assessment,[46] and that it was Antonio who requested her to testify
in court.[47]

In his direct examination, Antonio stated that Paciencia was his aunt. [48] He identified the Will and
testified that he had seen the said document before because Paciencia brought the same to his mothers house
and showed it to him along with another document on September 16, 1981. [49] Antonio alleged that when the
documents were shown to him, the same were still unsigned.[50] According to him, Paciencia thought that the
documents pertained to a lease of one of her rice lands, [51] and it was he who explained that the documents
were actually a special power of attorney to lease and sell her fishpond and other properties upon her departure
for the USA, and a Will which would transfer her properties to Lorenzo and his family upon her death.[52] Upon
hearing this, Paciencia allegedly uttered the following words: Why will I never [return], why will I sell all my
properties? Who is Lorenzo? Is he the only [son] of God? I have other relatives [who should] benefit from my
properties. Why should I die already?[53] Thereafter, Antonio advised Paciencia not to sign the documents if she
does not want to, to which the latter purportedly replied, I know nothing about those, throw them away or it is
up to you. The more I will not sign them.[54] After which, Paciencia left the documents with Antonio. Antonio
kept the unsigned documents
and eventually turned them over to Faustino on September 18, 1981.[55]

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On September 30, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision[56] denying the petition thus:

WHEREFORE, this court hereby (a) denies the petition dated April 24, 2000; and (b)
disallows the notarized will dated September 13, 1981 of Paciencia Regala.
SO ORDERED.[57]

The trial court gave considerable weight to the testimony of Rosie and concluded that at the time
Paciencia signed the Will, she was no longer possessed of sufficient reason or strength of mind to have
testamentary capacity.[58]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC Decision and granted the probate of the Will of Paciencia. The
appellate court did not agree with the RTCs conclusion that Paciencia was of unsound mind when she executed
the Will. It ratiocinated that the state of being magulyan does not make a person mentally unsound so [as] to
render [Paciencia] unfit for executing a Will.[59]Moreover, the oppositors in the probate proceedings were not able
to overcome the presumption that every person is of sound mind. Further, no concrete circumstances or events
were given to prove the allegation that Paciencia was tricked or forced into signing the Will.[60]
Petitioners moved for reconsideration[61] but the motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution [62] dated
August 31, 2006.

Hence, this petition.

Issues

Petitioners come before this Court by way of Petition for Review on Certiorari ascribing upon the CA the
following errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT ALLOWED THE PROBATE
OF PACIENCIAS WILL DESPITE RESPONDENTS UTTER FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION
11, RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSIONS NOT IN
ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONERS
FAILED TO PROVE THAT PACIENCIA WAS NOT OF SOUND MIND AT THE TIME THE WILL WAS
ALLEGEDLY EXECUTED[63]

The pivotal issue is whether the authenticity and due execution of the notarial Will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate.

Our Ruling

We deny the petition.

Faithful compliance with the formalities
laid down by law is apparent from the face of the Will.

Courts are tasked to determine nothing more than the extrinsic validity of a
Will in probate proceedings.[64] This is expressly provided for in Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which
states:
Rule 75
PRODUCTION OF WILL. ALLOWANCE OF WILL NECESSARY.
Section 1. Allowance necessary. Conclusive as to execution. No will shall pass
either real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the proper court.
Subject to the right of appeal, such allowance of the will shall be conclusive as to its
due execution.

Due execution of the will or its extrinsic validity pertains to whether the testator, being of sound mind,
freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law.[65]These formalities are enshrined in
Articles 805 and 806 of the New Civil Code, to wit:
Art. 805. Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end
thereof by the testator himself or by the testator's name written by some other person in his
presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another.
The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental
witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, except the last,
on the left margin, and all the pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the
upper part of each page.
The attestation shall state the number of pages used upon which the will is written,
and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other
person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses, and that the latter witnessed and signed the will and all the pages thereof in the
presence of the testator and of one another.
If the attestation clause is in a language not known to the witnesses, it shall be
interpreted to them.
Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and
the witnesses. The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file
another with the Office of the Clerk of Court.

Here, a careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the formalities laid
down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental witnesses and the notary public, are all
present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the
testatrix and her instrumental witnesses signed the Will in the presence of one another and that the witnesses
attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even the
petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they question her state
of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said act.
The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at
the time of the execution of the will lies on the shoulders of
the petitioners.

Petitioners, through their witness Rosie, claim that Paciencia was magulyan or forgetful so much so
that it effectively stripped her of testamentary capacity. They likewise claimed in their Motion for
Reconsideration[66] filed with the CA that Paciencia was not only magulyan but was actually suffering from
paranoia.[67]

We are not convinced.

We agree with the position of the CA that the state of being forgetful does not necessarily make a
person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to execute a Will. [68] Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being
of unsound mind. Besides, Article 799 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 799. To be of sound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full
possession of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or
unshattered by disease, injury or other cause.
It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making the will to know the
nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and the character of
the testamentary act.

In this case, apart from the testimony of Rosie pertaining to Paciencias forgetfulness, there is no
substantial evidence, medical or otherwise, that would show that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of
the execution of the Will. On the other hand, we find more worthy of credence Dra. Limpins testimony as to the
soundness of mind of Paciencia when the latter went to Judge Limpins house and voluntarily executed the
Will. The testimony of subscribing witnesses to a Will concerning the testators mental condition is entitled to
great weight where they are truthful and intelligent.[69] More importantly, a testator is presumed to be of sound

mind at the time of the execution of the Will and the burden to prove otherwise lies on the oppositor. Article 800
of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 800. The law presumes that every person is of sound mind, in the absence of
proof to the contrary.
The burden of proof that the testator was not of sound mind at the time of making his
dispositions is on the person who opposes the probate of the will; but if the testator, one
month, or less, before making his will was publicly known to be insane, the person who
maintains the validity of the will must prove that the testator made it during a lucid interval.

Here, there was no showing that Paciencia was publicly known to be insane one month or less before
the making of the Will. Clearly, thus, the burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind lies upon the
shoulders of petitioners. However and as earlier mentioned, no substantial evidence was presented by them to
prove the same, thereby warranting the CAs finding that petitioners failed to discharge such burden.

Furthermore, we are convinced that Paciencia was aware of the nature of her estate to be disposed of, the
proper objects of her bounty and the character of the testamentary act. As aptly pointed out by the CA:
A scrutiny of the Will discloses that [Paciencia] was aware of the nature of the
document she executed. She specially requested that the customs of her faith be observed
upon her death. She was well aware of how she acquired the properties from her parents and
the properties she is bequeathing to LORENZO, to his wife CORAZON and to his two (2)
children. A third child was born after the execution of the will and was not included therein as
devisee.[70]
Bare allegations of duress or influence of fear or threats,
undue and improper influence and pressure, fraud and
trickery cannot be used as basis to deny the probate of a
will.

An essential element of the validity of the Will is the willingness of the testator or testatrix to execute
the document that will distribute his/her earthly possessions upon his/her death.Petitioners claim that Paciencia
was forced to execute the Will under duress or influence of fear or threats; that the execution of the Will had
been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence by Lorenzo or by some other persons for his
benefit; and that assuming Paciencias signature to be genuine, it was obtained through fraud or trickery. These
are grounded on the alleged conversation between Paciencia and Antonio on September 16, 1981 wherein the
former purportedly repudiated the Will and left it unsigned.

We are not persuaded.

We take into consideration the unrebutted fact that Paciencia loved and treated Lorenzo as her own son
and that love even extended to Lorenzos wife and children. This kind of relationship is not unusual. It is in fact

not unheard of in our culture for old maids or spinsters to care for and raise their nephews and nieces and treat
them as their own children. Such is a prevalent and accepted cultural practice that has resulted in many family
discords between those favored by the testamentary disposition of a testator and those who stand to benefit in
case of intestacy.

In this case, evidence shows the acknowledged fact that Paciencias relationship with Lorenzo and his
family is different from her relationship with petitioners. The very fact that she cared for and raised Lorenzo and
lived with him both here and abroad, even if the latter was already married and already has children, highlights
the special bond between them. This unquestioned relationship between Paciencia and the devisees tends to
support the authenticity of the said document as against petitioners allegations of duress, influence of fear or
threats, undue and improper influence, pressure, fraud, and trickery which, aside from being factual in nature,
are not supported by concrete, substantial and credible evidence on record. It is worth stressing that bare
arguments, no matter how forceful, if not based on concrete and substantial evidence cannot suffice to move
the Court to uphold said allegations.[71] Furthermore, a purported will is not [to be] denied legalization on
dubious grounds. Otherwise, the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its foundation, for
even if a will has been duly executed in fact, whether x x x it will be probated would have to depend largely on
the attitude of those interested in [the estate of the deceased].[72]
Court should be convinced by the evidence presented
before it that the Will was duly executed.

Petitioners dispute the authenticity of Paciencias Will on the ground that Section 11 of Rule 76 of the
Rules of Court was not complied with. It provides:
RULE 76
ALLOWANCE OR DISALLOWANCE OF WILL
Section 11. Subscribing witnesses produced or accounted for where will contested. If
the will is contested, all the subscribing witnesses, and the notary in the case of wills executed
under the Civil Code of the Philippines, if present in the Philippines and not insane, must be
produced and examined, and the death, absence, or insanity of any of them must be
satisfactorily shown to the court. If all or some of such witnesses are present in
the Philippines but outside the province where the will has been filed, their deposition must be
taken. If any or all of them testify against the due execution of the will, or do not remember
having attested to it, or are otherwise of doubtful credibility, the will may nevertheless, be
allowed if the court is satisfied from the testimony of other witnesses and from all the evidence
presented that the will was executed and attested in the manner required by law.
If a holographic will is contested, the same shall be allowed if at least three (3)
witnesses who know the handwriting of the testator explicitly declare that the will and the
signature are in the handwriting of the testator; in the absence of any competent witnesses,
and if the court deem it necessary, expert testimony may be resorted to. (Emphasis supplied.)

They insist that all subscribing witnesses and the notary public should have been presented in court
since all but one witness, Francisco, are still living.

We cannot agree with petitioners.

We note that the inability of Faustino and Judge Limpin to appear and testify before the court was
satisfactorily explained during the probate proceedings. As testified to by his son, Faustino had a heart attack,
was already bedridden and could no longer talk and express himself due to brain damage. To prove this, said
witness presented the corresponding medical certificate. For her part, Dra. Limpin testified that her father, Judge
Limpin, suffered a stroke in 1991 and had to undergo brain surgery. At that time, Judge Limpin could no longer
talk and could not even remember his daughters name so that Dra. Limpin stated that given such condition, her
father could no longer testify. It is well to note that at that point, despite ample opportunity, petitioners neither
interposed any objections to the testimonies of said witnesses nor challenged the same on cross
examination. We thus hold that for all intents and purposes, Lorenzo was able to satisfactorily account for the
incapacity and failure of the said subscribing witness and of the notary public to testify in court. Because of this
the probate of Paciencias Will may be allowed on the basis of Dra. Limpins testimony proving her sanity and the
due execution of the Will, as well as on the proof of her handwriting. It is an established rule that [a] testament
may not be disallowed just because the attesting witnesses declare against its due execution; neither does it
have to be necessarily allowed just because all the attesting witnesses declare in favor of its legalization; what is
decisive is that the court is convinced by evidence before it, not necessarily from the attesting witnesses,
although they must testify, that the will was or was not duly executed in the manner required by law.[73]

Moreover, it bears stressing that [i]rrespective x x x of the posture of any of the parties as regards the
authenticity and due execution of the will x x x in question, it is the mandate of the law that it is the evidence
before the court and/or [evidence that] ought to be before it that is controlling. [74] The very existence of [the
Will] is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed [testatrix] has willed that [her] estate be distributed in the
manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given full
effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby.[75] This, coupled with Lorenzos established
relationship with Paciencia, the evidence and the testimonies of disinterested witnesses, as opposed to the total
lack of evidence presented by petitioners apart from their self-serving testimonies, constrain us to tilt the
balance in favor of the authenticity of the Will and its allowance for probate.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated June 15, 2006 and the Resolution dated
August 31, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 80979 areAFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR.,
namely: CONRADO B. URETA, MACARIO B.
URETA, GLORIA URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO
B. URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA
URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B. URETA,
LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF
POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., namely:
MIGUEL T. URETA, RAMON POLICRONIO T.
URETA, EMMANUEL T. URETA, and
BERNADETTE T. URETA,
Petitioners,
- versus HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely:
TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO URETACASTILLO, IGNACIO F. URETA, SR.,
EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE F. URETA,
LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA,
ZALDY F. URETA, and MILA JEAN URETA
CIPRIANO;
HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA PARADERO,
namely: WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO
U. PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS,
CRISTINA P. CORDOVA, EDNA P.
GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO
M. URETA;
VICENTE M. URETA;
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely:
EDITA T. URETA-REYES and LOLLIE T.
URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M. URETA;
ADELA URETA-GONZALES; HEIRS OF
INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely: BENILDA
V. URETA, ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK
RICARDO V. URETA, and ENRIQUE V.
URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA; JORGE
URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U.
TARAN; and BENEDICT URETA,

G.R. No. 165748

Respondents.
x--------------------------------------------------x
HEIRS OF LIBERATO M. URETA, namely:
G.R. No. 165930
TERESA F. URETA, AMPARO URETACASTILLO, IGNACIO F. URETA, SR.,
EMIRITO F. URETA, WILKIE F. URETA,
LIBERATO F. URETA, JR., RAY F. URETA,
ZALDY F. URETA, and MILA JEAN URETA
CIPRIANO;
HEIRS OF PRUDENCIA URETA PARADERO,
namely: WILLIAM U. PARADERO, WARLITO
U. PARADERO, CARMENCITA P. PERLAS,
CRISTINA P. CORDOVA, EDNA P.
GALLARDO, LETICIA P. REYES; NARCISO
M. URETA;
VICENTE M. URETA;
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO M. URETA, namely:
EDITA T. URETA-REYES and LOLLIE T.
URETA-VILLARUEL; ROQUE M. URETA;
ADELA URETA-GONZALES; HEIRS OF
INOCENCIO M. URETA, namely: BENILDA
V. URETA, ALFONSO V. URETA II, DICK
RICARDO V. URETA, and ENRIQUE V.
URETA; MERLINDA U. RIVERA; JORGE
URETA; ANDRES URETA, WENEFREDA U.
TARAN; and BENEDICT URETA,
Petitioners,
- versus
HEIRS OF POLICRONIO M. URETA, SR.,
namely: CONRADO B. URETA, MACARIO B.
URETA, GLORIA URETA-GONZALES, ROMEO
B. URETA, RITA URETA-SOLANO, NENA
URETA-TONGCUA, VENANCIO B. URETA,
LILIA URETA-TAYCO, and HEIRS OF
POLICRONIO B. URETA, JR., namely:
MIGUEL T. URETA, RAMON POLICRONIO T.
URETA, EMMANUEL T. URETA, and
BERNADETTE T. URETA,

Respondents.

Present:
VELASCO, JR., J., Chairperson,
PERALTA,
ABAD,
MENDOZA, and
SERENO,* JJ.

Promulgated:
September 14, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

These consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure assail the April 20, 2004 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its October 14,
2004 Resolution[2] in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 71399, which affirmed with modification the April 26, 2001
Decision[3] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9, Kalibo, Aklan (RTC) in Civil Case No. 5026.
The Facts
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta (Alfonso) begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Narciso,
Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda, Benedicto, Jorge, and
Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest of Alfonsos children and
their descendants (Heirs of Alfonso).
Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned several fishpens, a fishpond, a sari-sari
store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying and selling of copra. Policronio, the eldest,
was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish schooling and instead worked on his fathers lands.
Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia,
and Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was then a municipal judge, suggested
that in order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make it appear that he had sold some
of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four (4) Deeds of Sale covering several
parcels of land in favor of Policronio,[4] Liberato,[5] Prudencia,[6] and his common-law wife, Valeriana
Dela Cruz.[7] The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969, in favor of Policronio, covered six parcels
of land, which are the properties in dispute in this case.
Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration was given,
Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.
When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the administrator of his fathers estate. He
was later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by her daughter, Carmencita Perlas. Except for a
portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred to Policronio were tenanted by the Fernandez
Family. These tenants never turned over the produce of the lands to Policronio or any of his heirs, but
to Alfonso and, later, to the administrators of his estate.
Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of parcel 5, neither
Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonsos heirs executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, [8] which included
all the lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale that were previously executed by Alfonso

for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronios eldest son, representing the Heirs of Policronio, signed the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
After their fathers death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name covering the six
parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed on October 25,
1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.
Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition involving Alfonsos estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995 issue of the
Aklan Reporter.
Believing that the six parcels of land belonged to their late father, and as such, excluded from
the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the Heirs of Policronio sought to amicably settle the matter with
the Heirs of Alfonso. Earnest efforts proving futile, the Heirs of Policronio filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Ownership, Recovery of Possession, Annulment of Documents, Partition, and
Damages[9] against the Heirs of Alfonso before the RTC on November 17, 1995 where the following
issues were submitted: (1) whether or not the Deed of Sale was valid; (2) whether or not the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition was valid; and (3) who between the parties was entitled to damages.
The Ruling of the RTC
On April 26, 2001, the RTC dismissed the Complaint of the Heirs of Policronio and ruled in favor of the
Heirs of Alfonso in a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the preponderance of evidence tilts in favor
of the defendants, hence the instant case is hereby DISMISSED.
The counterclaims are likewise DISMISSED.
With costs against plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC found that the Heirs of Alfonso clearly established that the Deed of Sale was null and
void. It held that the Heirs of Policronio failed to rebut the evidence of the Heirs of Alfonso, which
proved that the Deed of Sale in the possession of the former was one of the four (4) Deeds of Sale
executed by Alfonso in favor of his 3 children and second wife for taxation purposes; that although tax
declarations were issued in the name of Policronio, he or his heirs never took possession of the subject
lands except a portion of parcel 5; and that all the produce were turned over by the tenants to Alfonso
and the administrators of his estate and never to Policronio or his heirs.

The RTC further found that there was no money involved in the sale. Even granting that there
was, as claimed by the Heirs of Policronio, 2,000.00 for six parcels of land, the amount was grossly
inadequate. It was also noted that the aggregate area of the subject lands was more than double the
average share adjudicated to each of the other children in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition; that the
siblings of Policronio were the ones who shared in the produce of the land; and that the Heirs of
Policronio only paid real estate taxes in 1996 and 1997. The RTC opined that Policronio must have
been aware that the transfer was merely for taxation purposes because he did not subsequently take
possession of the properties even after the death of his father.
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, on the other hand, was declared valid by the RTC as all the
heirs of Alfonso were represented and received equal shares and all the requirements of a valid extrajudicial partition were met. The RTC considered Conrados claim that he did not understand the full
significance of his signature when he signed in behalf of his co-heirs, as a gratutitous assertion. The
RTC was of the view that when he admitted to have signed all the pages and personally appeared
before the notary public, he was presumed to have understood their contents.
Lastly, neither party was entitled to damages. The Heirs of Alfonso failed to present testimony
to serve as factual basis for moral damages, no document was presented to prove actual damages,
and the Heirs of Policronio were found to have filed the case in good faith.
The Ruling of the CA
Aggrieved, the Heirs of Policronio appealed before the CA, which rendered a decision on April
20, 2004, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The appealed Decision,
dated 26 April 2001, rendered by Hon. Judge Dean R. Telan of the Regional Trial Court
of Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 9, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION:
1.) The Deed of Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta, Sr., dated 25 October 1969,
covering six (6) parcels of land is hereby declared VOID for being ABSOLUTELY
SIMULATED;
2.) The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated 19 April 1989, is ANNULLED;
3.) The claim for actual and exemplary damages are DISMISSED for lack of
factual and legal basis.
The case is hereby REMANDED to the court of origin for the proper partition
of ALFONSO URETAS Estate in accordance with Rule 69 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. No costs at this instance.
SO ORDERED.

The CA affirmed the finding of the RTC that the Deed of Sale was void. It found the Deed of Sale to be
absolutely simulated as the parties did not intend to be legally bound by it. As such, it produced no
legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. The CA also noted that Alfonso
continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the execution of the Deed of Sale, as it was
undisputed that he remained in possession of the subject parcels of land and enjoyed their produce
until his death.
Policronio, on the other hand, never exercised any rights pertaining to an owner over the
subject lands from the time they were sold to him up until his death. He never took or attempted to
take possession of the land even after his fathers death, never demanded delivery of the produce from
the tenants, and never paid realty taxes on the properties. It was also noted that Policronio never
disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his children, as they were, in fact, surprised to discover
its existence. The CA, thus, concluded that Policronio must have been aware that the transfer was only
made for taxation purposes.
The testimony of Amparo Castillo, as to the circumstances surrounding the actual arrangement
and agreement between the parties prior to the execution of the four (4) Deeds of Sale, was found by
the CA to be unrebutted. The RTCs assessment of the credibility of her testimony was accorded
respect, and the intention of the parties was given the primary consideration in determining the true
nature of the contract.
Contrary to the finding of the RTC though, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
due to the incapacity of one of the parties to give his consent to the contract. It held that before
Conrado could validly bind his co-heirs to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, it was necessary that he
be clothed with the proper authority. The CA ruled that a special power of attorney was required under
Article 1878 (5) and (15) of the Civil Code. Without a special power of attorney, it was held that
Conrado lacked the legal capactiy to give the consent of his co-heirs, thus, rendering the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition voidable under Article 1390 (1) of the Civil Code.
As a consequence, the CA ordered the remand of the case to the RTC for the proper partition of the
estate, with the option that the parties may still voluntarily effect the partition by executing another
agreement or by adopting the assailed Deed of Partition with the RTCs approval in either case.
Otherwise, the RTC may proceed with the compulsory partition of the estate in accordance with the
Rules.
With regard to the claim for damages, the CA agreed with the RTC and dismissed the claim for
actual and compensatory damages for lack of factual and legal basis.
Both parties filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration, which were denied by the CA for
lack of merit in a Resolution dated October 14, 2004.

In their Motion for Reconsideration, the Heirs of Policronio argued that the RTC violated the best
evidence rule in giving credence to the testimony of Amparo Castillo with regard to the simulation of
the Deed of Sale, and that prescription had set in precluding any question on the validity of the
contract.
The CA held that the oral testimony was admissible under Rule 130, Section 9 (b) and (c),
which provides that evidence aliunde may be allowed to explain the terms of the written agreement if
the same failed to express the true intent and agreement of the parties thereto, or when the validity of
the written agreement was put in issue. Furthermore, the CA found that the Heirs of Policronio waived
their right to object to evidence aliunde having failed to do so during trial and for raising such only for
the first time on appeal. With regard to prescription, the CA ruled that the action or defense for the
declaration of the inexistence of a contract did not prescribe under Article 1410 of the Civil Code.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Alfonso argued that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should
not have been annulled, and instead the preterited heirs should be given their share. The CA reiterated
that Conrados lack of capacity to give his co-heirs consent to the extra-judicial settlement rendered the
same voidable.
Hence, the present Petitions for Review on Certiorari.
The Issues
The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Policronio in G.R. No. 165748 are as
follows:
I.
Whether the Court of Appeals is correct in ruling that the Deed of
Absolute Sale of 25 October 1969 is void for being absolutely fictitious and in
relation therewith, may parol evidence be entertained to thwart its binding
effect after the parties have both died?
Assuming that indeed the said document is simulated, whether or not the
parties thereto including their successors in interest are estopped to question
its validity, they being bound by Articles 1412 and 1421 of the Civil Code?
II.
Whether prescription applies to bar any question respecting the validity of
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 25 October 1969? Whether prescription
applies to bar any collateral attack on the validity of the deed of absolute sale
executed 21 years earlier?
III.

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly ruled in nullifying the Deed of

Extrajudicial Partition because Conrado Ureta signed the same without the
written authority from his siblings in contravention of Article 1878 in relation
to Article 1390 of the Civil Code and in relation therewith, whether the
defense of ratification and/or preterition raised for the first time on appeal
may be entertained?
The issues presented for resolution by the Heirs of Alfonso in G.R. No. 165930 are as follows:
I.
Whether or not grave error was committed by the Trial Court and Court of
Appeals in declaring the Deed of Sale of subject properties as absolutely
simulated and null and void thru parol evidence based on their factual
findings as to its fictitious nature, and there being waiver of any objection
based on violation of the parol evidence rule.
II.
Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in holding that Conrado
Uretas lack of capacity to give his co-heirs consent to the Extra-Judicial
Partition rendered the same voidable.
III.
Granting arguendo that Conrado Ureta was not authorized to represent his
co-heirs and there was no ratification, whether or not the Court of Appeals
was correct in ordering the remand of the case to the Regional Trial Court for
partition of the estate of Alfonso Ureta.
IV.
Since the sale in favor of Policronio Ureta Sr. was null and void ab initio, the
properties covered therein formed part of the estate of the late Alfonso Ureta
and was correctly included in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition even if no
prior action for nullification of the sale was filed by the heirs of Liberato
Ureta.
V.
Whether or not the heirs of Policronio Ureta Sr. can claim that estoppel based
on Article 1412 of the Civil Code as well as the issue of prescription can still
be raised on appeal.
These various contentions revolve around two major issues, to wit: (1) whether the Deed of
Sale is valid, and (2) whether the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is valid. Thus, the assigned errors
shall be discussed jointly and in seriatim.
The Ruling of the Court
Validity of the Deed of Sale

Two veritable legal presumptions bear on the validity of the Deed of Sale: (1) that there was
sufficient consideration for the contract; and (2) that it was the result of a fair and regular private
transaction. If shown to hold, these presumptions infer prima facie the transactions validity, except
that it must yield to the evidence adduced.[10]
As will be discussed below, the evidence overcomes these two presumptions.
Absolute Simulation
First, the Deed of Sale was not the result of a fair and regular private transaction because it was
absolutely simulated.
The Heirs of Policronio argued that the land had been validly sold to Policronio as the Deed of
Sale contained all the essential elements of a valid contract of sale, by virtue of which, the subject
properties were transferred in his name as evidenced by the tax declaration. There being no
invalidation prior to the execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, the probity and integrity of
the Deed of Sale should remain undiminished and accorded respect as it was a duly notarized public
instrument.
The Heirs of Policronio posited that his loyal services to his father and his being the eldest among
Alfonsos children, might have prompted the old man to sell the subject lands to him at a very low
price as an advance inheritance. They explained that Policronios failure to take possession of the
subject lands and to claim their produce manifests a Filipino family practice wherein a child would take
possession and enjoy the fruits of the land sold by a parent only after the latters death. Policronio
simply treated the lands the same way his father Alfonso treated them - where his children enjoyed
usufructuary rights over the properties, as opposed to appropriating them exclusively to himself. They
contended that Policronios failure to take actual possession of the lands did not prove that he was not
the owner as he was merely exercising his right to dispose of them. They argue that it was an error on
the part of the CA to conclude that ownership by Policronio was not established by his failure to
possess the properties sold. Instead, emphasis should be made on the fact that the tax declarations,
being indicia of possession, were in Policronios name.
They further argued that the Heirs of Alfonso failed to appreciate that the Deed of Sale was
clear enough to convey the subject parcels of land. Citing jurisprudence, they contend that there is a
presumption that an instrument sets out the true agreement of the parties thereto and that it was
executed for valuable consideration,[11] and where there is no doubt as to the intention of the parties
to a contract, the literal meaning of the stipulation shall control. [12] Nowhere in the Deed of Sale is it
indicated that the transfer was only for taxation purposes. On the contrary, the document clearly

indicates that the lands were sold. Therefore, they averred that the literal meaning of the stipulation
should control.
The Court disagrees.
The Court finds no cogent reason to deviate from the finding of the CA that the Deed of Sale is
null and void for being absolutely simulated. The Civil Code provides:
Art. 1345. Simulation of a contract may be absolute or relative. The former takes place
when the parties do not intend to be bound at all; the latter, when the parties conceal
their true agreement.
Art. 1346. An absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void. A relative simulation,
when it does not prejudice a third person and is not intended for any purpose contrary
to law, morals, good customs, public order or public policy binds the parties to their
real agreement.

Valerio v. Refresca[13] is instructive on the matter of simulation of contracts:

In absolute simulation, there is a colorable contract but it has no substance as
the parties have no intention to be bound by it. The main characteristic of an absolute
simulation is that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce
legal effect or in any way alter the juridical situation of the parties. As a result, an
absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is void, and the parties may recover from
each other what they may have given under the contract. However, if the parties state
a false cause in the contract to conceal their real agreement, the contract is relatively
simulated and the parties are still bound by their real agreement. Hence, where the
essential requisites of a contract are present and the simulation refers only to the
content or terms of the contract, the agreement is absolutely binding and enforceable
between the parties and their successors in interest.
Lacking, therefore, in an absolutely simulated contract is consent which is essential to a valid
and enforceable contract.[14] Thus, where a person, in order to place his property beyond the reach of
his creditors, simulates a transfer of it to another, he does not really intend to divest himself of his title
and control of the property; hence, the deed of transfer is but a sham. [15] Similarly, in this case,
Alfonso simulated a transfer to Policronio purely for taxation purposes, without intending to transfer
ownership over the subject lands.
The primary consideration in determining the true nature of a contract is the intention of the
parties. If the words of a contract appear to contravene the evident intention of the parties, the latter
shall prevail. Such intention is determined not only from the express terms of their agreement, but
also from the contemporaneous and subsequent acts of the parties. [16] The true intention of the parties
in this case was sufficiently proven by the Heirs of Alfonso.
The Heirs of Alfonso established by a preponderance of evidence [17] that the Deed of Sale was
one of the four (4) absolutely simulated Deeds of Sale which involved no actual monetary

consideration, executed by Alfonso in favor of his children, Policronio, Liberato, and Prudencia, and his
second wife, Valeriana, for taxation purposes.
Amparo Castillo, the daughter of Liberato, testified, to wit:
Q: Now sometime in the year 1969 can you recall if your grandfather and his children
[met] in your house?
A: Yes sir, that was sometime in October 1969 when they [met] in our house, my
grandfather, my late uncle Policronio Ureta, my late uncle Liberato Ureta, my uncle
Francisco Ureta, and then my auntie Prudencia Ureta they talk[ed] about, that idea
came from my uncle Francisco Ureta to [sell] some parcels of land to his children to
lessen the inheritance tax whatever happened to my grandfather, actually no money
involved in this sale.
Q: Now you said there was that agreement, verbal agreement. [W]here were you
when this Alfonso Ureta and his children gather[ed] in your house?
A: I was near them in fact I heard everything they were talking [about]
xxx
Q: Were there documents of sale executed by Alfonso Ureta in furtherance of their
verbal agreement?
A: Yes sir.
Q: To whom in particular did your grandfather Alfonso Ureta execute this deed of sale
without money consideration according to you?
A: To my uncle Policronio Ureta and to Prudencia Ureta Panadero.
Q: And who else?
A: To Valeriana dela Cruz.
Q: How about your father?
A: He has.[18]

The other Deeds of Sale executed by Alfonso in favor of his children Prudencia and Liberato,
and second wife Valeriana, all bearing the same date of execution, were duly presented in evidence by
the Heirs of Alfonso, and were uncontested by the Heirs of Policronio. The lands which were the
subject of these Deeds of Sale were in fact included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition executed by
all the heirs of Alfonso, where it was expressly stipulated:
That the above-named Amparo U. Castillo, Prudencia U. Paradero, Conrado B.
Ureta and Merlinda U. Rivera do hereby recognize and acknowledge as a fact that the
properties presently declared in their respective names or in the names of their
respective parents and are included in the foregoing instrument are actually the
properties of the deceased Alfonso Ureta and were transferred only for the purpose of
effective administration and development and convenience in the payment of taxes
and, therefore, all instruments conveying or affecting the transfer of said properties
are null and void from the beginning.[19]

As found by the CA, Alfonso continued to exercise all the rights of an owner even after the
execution of the Deeds of Sale. It was undisputed that Alfonso remained in possession of the subject
lands and enjoyed their produce until his death. No credence can be given to the contention of the
Heirs of Policrionio that their father did not take possession of the subject lands or enjoyed the fruits
thereof in deference to a Filipino family practice. Had this been true, Policronio should have taken
possession of the subject lands after his father died. On the contrary, it was admitted that neither
Policronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands from the time they were sold to him,
and even after the death of both Alfonso and Policronio.
It was also admitted by the Heirs of Policronio that the tenants of the subject lands never
turned over the produce of the properties to Policronio or his heirs but only to Alfonso and the
administrators of his estate. Neither was there a demand for their delivery to Policronio or his heirs.
Neither did Policronio ever pay real estate taxes on the properties, the only payment on record being
those made by his heirs in 1996 and 1997 ten years after his death. In sum, Policronio never exercised
any rights pertaining to an owner over the subject lands.
The most protuberant index of simulation of contract is the complete absence of an attempt in
any manner on the part of the ostensible buyer to assert rights of ownership over the subject
properties. Policronios failure to take exclusive possession of the subject properties or, in the
alternative, to collect rentals, is contrary to the principle of ownership. Such failure is a clear badge of
simulation that renders the whole transaction void. [20]
It is further telling that Policronio never disclosed the existence of the Deed of Sale to his
children. This, coupled with Policronios failure to exercise any rights pertaining to an owner of the
subject lands, leads to the conclusion that he was aware that the transfer was only made for taxation
purposes and never intended to bind the parties thereto.
As the above factual circumstances remain unrebutted by the Heirs of Policronio, the factual findings
of the RTC, which were affirmed by the CA, remain binding and conclusive upon this Court. [21]
It is clear that the parties did not intend to be bound at all, and as such, the Deed of Sale
produced no legal effects and did not alter the juridical situation of the parties. The Deed of Sale is,
therefore, void for being absolutely simulated pursuant to Article 1409 (2) of the Civil Code which
provides:
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
xxx
(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

xxx
For guidance, the following are the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent
contracts:
1) As a general rule, they produce no legal effects whatsoever in accordance with the
principle "quod nullum est nullum producit effectum."
2) They are not susceptible of ratification.
3) The right to set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived
or renounced.
4) The action or defense for the declaration of their inexistence or absolute nullity is
imprescriptible.
5) The inexistence or absolute nullity of a contract cannot be invoked by a person
whose interests are not directly affected.[22]
Since the Deed of Sale is void, the subject properties were properly included in the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso.
Absence and Inadequacy of Consideration
The second presumption is rebutted by the lack of consideration for the Deed of Sale.
In their Answer,[23] the Heirs of Alfonso initially argued that the Deed of Sale was void for lack
of consideration, and even granting that there was consideration, such was inadequate. The Heirs of
Policronio counter that the defenses of absence or inadequacy of consideration are not grounds to
render a contract void.
The Heirs of Policronio contended that under Article 1470 of the Civil Code, gross inadequacy
of the price does not affect a contract of sale, except as it may indicate a defect in the consent, or that
the parties really intended a donation or some other act or contract. Citing jurisprudence, they argued
that inadequacy of monetary consideration does not render a conveyance inexistent as liberality may
be sufficient cause for a valid contract, whereas fraud or bad faith may render it either rescissible or
voidable, although valid until annulled.[24] Thus, they argued that if the contract suffers from
inadequate consideration, it remains valid until annulled, and the remedy of rescission calls for judicial
intervention, which remedy the Heirs of Alfonso failed to take.

It is further argued that even granting that the sale of the subject lands for a consideration of
2,000.00 was inadequate, absent any evidence of the fair market value of the land at the time of its
sale, it cannot be concluded that the price at which it was sold was inadequate. [25] As there is nothing
in the records to show that the Heirs of Alfonso supplied the true value of the land in 1969, the
amount of 2,000.00 must thus stand as its saleable value.
On this issue, the Court finds for the Heirs of Alfonso.
For lack of consideration, the Deed of Sale is once again found to be void. It states that
Policronio paid, and Alfonso received, the 2,000.00 purchase price on the date of the signing of the
contract:
That I, ALFONSO F. URETA, x x x for and in consideration of the sum of TWO
THOUSAND (2,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, to me in hand paid by
POLICRONIO M. URETA, x x x, do hereby CEDE, TRANSFER, and CONVEY, by way of
absolute sale, x x x six (6) parcels of land x x x.[26] [Emphasis ours]

Although, on its face, the Deed of Sale appears to be supported by valuable consideration, the RTC
found that there was no money involved in the sale. [27] This finding was affirmed by the CA in ruling
that the sale is void for being absolutely simulated. Considering that there is no cogent reason to
deviate from such factual findings, they are binding on this Court.
It is well-settled in a long line of cases that where a deed of sale states that the purchase price has
been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void for lack of consideration.
[28]

Thus, although the contract states that the purchase price of 2,000.00 was paid by Policronio to

Alfonso for the subject properties, it has been proven that such was never in fact paid as there was no
money involved. It must, therefore, follow that the Deed of Sale is void for lack of consideration.
Given that the Deed of Sale is void, it is unnecessary to discuss the issue on the inadequacy of
consideration.
Parol Evidence and Hearsay
The Heirs of Policronio aver that the rules on parol evidence and hearsay were violated by the
CA in ruling that the Deed of Sale was void.
They argued that based on the parol evidence rule, the Heirs of Alfonso and, specifically,
Amparo Castillo, were not in a position to prove the terms outside of the contract because they were
not parties nor successors-in-interest in the Deed of Sale in question. Thus, it is argued that the
testimony of Amparo Castillo violates the parol evidence rule.

Stemming from the presumption that the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties to the contract, it is
also argued that the parol evidence rule may not be properly invoked by either party in the litigation
against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the
written instrument in question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right
originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.[29]
Their arguments are untenable.
The objection against the admission of any evidence must be made at the proper time, as
soon as the grounds therefor become reasonably apparent, and if not so made, it will be understood
to have been waived. In the case of testimonial evidence, the objection must be made when the
objectionable question is asked or after the answer is given if the objectionable features become
apparent only by reason of such answer.[30] In this case, the Heirs of Policronio failed to timely object
to the testimony of Amparo Castillo and they are, thus, deemed to have waived the benefit of the
parol evidence rule.
Granting that the Heirs of Policronio timely objected to the testimony of Amparo Castillo, their
argument would still fail.
Section 9 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an agreement have
been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and
there can be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms of
written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement;
(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties thereto;
(c) The validity of the written agreement; or
(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The term "agreement" includes wills.
[Emphasis ours]

Paragraphs (b) and (c) are applicable in the case at bench.

The failure of the Deed of Sale to express the true intent and agreement of the parties was
clearly put in issue in the Answer [31] of the Heirs of Alfonso to the Complaint. It was alleged that the
Deed of Sale was only made to lessen the payment of estate and inheritance taxes and not meant to
transfer ownership. The exception in paragraph (b) is allowed to enable the court to ascertain the true
intent of the parties, and once the intent is clear, it shall prevail over what the document appears to be
on its face.[32] As the true intent of the parties was duly proven in the present case, it now prevails
over what appears on the Deed of Sale.
The validity of the Deed of Sale was also put in issue in the Answer, and was precisely one of
the issues submitted to the RTC for resolution. [33] The operation of the parol evidence rule requires the
existence of a valid written agreement. It is, thus, not applicable in a proceeding where the validity of
such agreement is the fact in dispute, such as when a contract may be void for lack of consideration.
[34]

Considering that the Deed of Sale has been shown to be void for being absolutely simulated and for

lack of consideration, the Heirs of Alfonso are not precluded from presenting evidence to modify,
explain or add to the terms of the written agreement.
The Heirs of Policronio must be in a state of confusion in arguing that the Heirs of Alfonso may
not question the Deed of Sale for not being parties or successors-in-interest therein on the basis that
the parol evidence rule may not be properly invoked in a proceeding or litigation where at least one of
the parties to the suit is not a party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in question and
does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation
established thereby. If their argument was to be accepted, then the Heirs of Policronio would
themselves be precluded from invoking the parol evidence rule to exclude the evidence of the Heirs of
Alfonso.
Indeed, the applicability of the parol evidence rule requires that the case be between parties
and their successors-in-interest. [35] In this case, both the Heirs of Alfonso and the Heirs of Policronio
are successors-in-interest of the parties to the Deed of Sale as they claim rights under Alfonso and
Policronio, respectively. The parol evidence rule excluding evidence aliunde, however, still cannot apply
because the present case falls under two exceptions to the rule, as discussed above.
With respect to hearsay, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the rule on hearsay was
violated when the testimony of Amparo Castillo was given weight in proving that the subject lands
were only sold for taxation purposes as she was a person alien to the contract. Even granting that
they did not object to her testimony during trial, they argued that it should not have been appreciated
by the CA because it had no probative value whatsoever.[36]
The Court disagrees.

It has indeed been held that hearsay evidence whether objected to or not cannot be given
credence for having no probative value. [37] This principle, however, has been relaxed in cases where, in
addition to the failure to object to the admissibility of the subject evidence, there were other pieces of
evidence presented or there were other circumstances prevailing to support the fact in issue. In TopWeld Manufacturing, Inc. v. ECED S.A.,[38] this Court held:
Hearsay evidence alone may be insufficient to establish a fact in an injunction
suit (Parker v. Furlong, 62 P. 490) but, when no objection is made thereto, it is, like
any other evidence, to be considered and given the importance it deserves. (Smith v.
Delaware & Atlantic Telegraph & Telephone Co., 51 A 464). Although we should warn of
the undesirability of issuing judgments solely on the basis of the affidavits submitted,
where as here, said affidavits are overwhelming, uncontroverted by competent
evidence and not inherently improbable, we are constrained to uphold the allegations
of the respondents regarding the multifarious violations of the contracts made by the
petitioner.

In the case at bench, there were other prevailing circumstances which corroborate the
testimony of Amparo Castillo. First, the other Deeds of Sale which were executed in favor of Liberato,
Prudencia, and Valeriana on the

same

day as

that

of Policronios

were

all

presented in

evidence. Second, all the properties subject therein were included in the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition of the estate of Alfonso. Third, Policronio, during his lifetime, never exercised acts of
ownership over the subject properties (as he never demanded or took possession of them, never
demanded or received the produce thereof, and never paid real estate taxes thereon). Fourth,
Policronio never informed his children of the sale.
As the Heirs of Policronio failed to controvert the evidence presented, and to timely object to
the testimony of Amparo Castillo, both the RTC and the CA correctly accorded probative weight to her
testimony.
Prior Action Unnecessary
The Heirs of Policronio averred that the Heirs of Alfonso should have filed an action to declare
the sale void prior to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. They argued that the sale should
enjoy the presumption of regularity, and until overturned by a court, the Heirs of Alfonso had no
authority to include the land in the inventory of properties of Alfonsos estate. By doing so,
they arrogated upon themselves the power of invalidating the Deed of Sale which is exclusively vested
in a court of law which, in turn,can rule only upon the observance of due process. Thus, they
contended that prescription, laches, or estoppel have set in to militate against assailing the validity of
the sale.
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.

A simulated contract of sale is without any cause or consideration, and is, therefore, null and
void; in such case, no independent action to rescind or annul the contract is necessary, and it may be
treated as non-existent for all purposes. [39] A void or inexistent contract is one which has no force and
effect from the beginning, as if it has never been entered into, and which cannot be validated either by
time or ratification. A void contract produces no effect whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone;
it does not create, modify or extinguish the juridical relation to which it refers. [40] Therefore, it was not
necessary for the Heirs of Alfonso to first file an action to declare the nullity of the Deed of Sale prior
to executing the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Personality to Question Sale
The Heirs of Policronio contended that the Heirs of Alfonso are not parties, heirs, or
successors-in-interest under the contemplation of law to clothe them with the personality to question
the Deed of Sale. They argued that under Article 1311 of the Civil Code, contracts take effect only
between the parties, their assigns and heirs. Thus, the genuine character of a contract which
personally binds the parties cannot be put in issue by a person who is not a party thereto. They
posited that the Heirs of Alfonso were not parties to the contract; neither did they appear to be
beneficiaries by way of assignment or inheritance. Unlike themselves who are direct heirs of Policronio,
the Heirs of Alfonso are not Alfonsos direct heirs. For the Heirs of Alfonso to qualify as parties, under
Article 1311 of the Civil Code, they must first prove that they are either heirs or assignees. Being
neither, they have no legal standing to question the Deed of Sale.
They further argued that the sale cannot be assailed for being barred under Article 1421 of the
Civil Code which provides that the defense of illegality of a contract is not available to third persons
whose interests are not directly affected.
Again, the Court disagrees.
Article 1311 and Article 1421 of the Civil Code provide:
Art. 1311. Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, x x
x
Art. 1421. The defense of illegality of contracts is not available to third persons whose
interests are not directly affected.

The right to set up the nullity of a void or non-existent contract is not limited to the parties, as
in the case of annullable or voidable contracts; it is extended to third persons who are directly affected
by the contract. Thus, where a contract is absolutely simulated, even third persons who may be
prejudiced thereby may set up its inexistence. [41] The Heirs of Alfonso are the children of Alfonso, with
his deceased children represented by their children (Alfonsos grandchildren). The Heirs of Alfonso are

clearly his heirs and successors-in-interest and, as such, their interests are directly affected, thereby
giving them the right to question the legality of the Deed of Sale.
Inapplicability of Article 842
The Heirs of Policronio further argued that even assuming that the Heirs of Alfonso have an
interest in the Deed of Sale, they would still be precluded from questioning its validity. They posited
that the Heirs of Alfonso must first prove that the sale of Alfonsos properties to Policronio substantially
diminished their successional rights or that their legitimes would be unduly prejudiced, considering
that under Article 842 of the Civil Code, one who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate
provided that he does not contravene the provisions of the Civil Code with regard to the legitime of
said heirs. Having failed to do so, they argued that the Heirs of Alfonso should be precluded from
questioning the validity of the Deed of Sale.
Still, the Court disagrees.
Article 842 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 842. One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose by will of all his estate or any
part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed.
One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not
contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.
This article refers to the principle of freedom of disposition by will. What is involved in the case
at bench is not a disposition by will but by Deed of Sale. Hence, the Heirs of Alfonso need not first
prove that the disposition substantially diminished their successional rights or unduly prejudiced their
legitimes.
Inapplicability of Article 1412
The Heirs of Policronio contended that even assuming that the contract was simulated, the
Heirs of Alfonso would still be barred from recovering the properties by reason of Article 1412 of the
Civil Code, which provides that if the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause does not constitute
a criminal offense, and the fault is both on the contracting parties, neither may recover what he has
given by virtue of the contract or demand the performance of the others undertaking. As the Heirs of
Alfonso alleged that the purpose of the sale was to avoid the payment of inheritance taxes, they
cannot take from the Heirs of Policronio what had been given to their father.
On this point, the Court again disagrees.
Article 1412 of the Civil Code is as follows:

Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not
constitute a criminal offense, the following rules shall be observed:
(1)

When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover
what he has given by virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the
others undertaking;

(2) When only one of the contracting parties is at fault, he cannot recover what he
has given by reason of the contract, or ask for the fulfillment of what has been
promised him. The other, who is not at fault, may demand the return of what he
has given without any obligation to comply with his promise.

Article 1412 is not applicable to fictitious or simulated contracts, because they refer to
contracts with an illegal cause or subject-matter.[42] This article presupposes the existence of a cause,
it cannot refer to fictitious or simulated contracts which are in reality non-existent. [43] As it has been
determined that the Deed of Sale is a simulated contract, the provision cannot apply to it.
Granting that the Deed of Sale was not simulated, the provision would still not apply. Since the
subject properties were included as properties of Alfonso in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, they
are covered by corresponding inheritance and estate taxes. Therefore, tax evasion, if at all present,
would not arise, and Article 1412 would again be inapplicable.
Prescription
From the position that the Deed of Sale is valid and not void, the Heirs of Policronio argued
that any question regarding its validity should have been initiated through judicial process within 10
years from its notarization in accordance with Article 1144 of the Civil Code. Since 21 years had
already elapsed when the Heirs of Alfonso assailed the validity of the Deed of Sale in 1996,
prescription had set in. Furthermore, since the Heirs of Alfonso did not seek to nullify the tax
declarations of Policronio, they had impliedly acquiesced and given due recognition to the Heirs of
Policronio as the rightful inheritors and should, thus, be barred from laying claim on the land.
The Heirs of Policronio are mistaken.
Article 1410 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1410. The action for the declaration of the inexistence of a contract does not
prescribe.
This is one of the most fundamental characteristics of void or inexistent contracts. [44]
As the Deed of Sale is a void contract, the action for the declaration of its nullity, even if filed 21 years
after its execution, cannot be barred by prescription for it is imprescriptible. Furthermore, the right to

set up the defense of inexistence or absolute nullity cannot be waived or renounced. [45] Therefore, the
Heirs of Alfonso cannot be precluded from setting up the defense of its inexistence.
Validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
The Court now resolves the issue of the validity of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Unenforceability
The Heirs of Alfonso argued that the CA was mistaken in annulling the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
due to the incapacity of Conrado to give the consent of his co-heirs for lack of a special power of
attorney. They contended that what was involved was not the capacity to give consent in behalf of the
co-heirs but the authority to represent them. They argue that the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is
not a voidable or an annullable contract under Article 1390 of the Civil Code, but rather, it is an
unenforceable or, more specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403 (1) and 1317 of the
Civil Code. As such, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not be annulled but only be rendered
unenforceable against the siblings of Conrado.
They further argued that under Article 1317 of the Civil Code, when the persons represented
without authority have ratified the unauthorized acts, the contract becomes enforceable and binding.
They contended that the Heirs of Policronio ratified the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition when Conrado
took possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his siblings, and when another
parcel was used as collateral for a loan entered into by some of the Heirs of Policronio. The Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition having been ratified and its benefits accepted, the same thus became
enforceable and binding upon them.
The Heirs of Alfonso averred that granting arguendo that Conrado was not authorized to
represent his co-heirs and there was no ratification, the CA should not have remanded the case to the
RTC for partition of Alfonsos estate. They argued that the CA should not have applied the Civil Code
general provision on contracts, but the special provisions dealing with succession and partition. They
contended that contrary to the ruling of the CA, the extra-judicial parition was not an act of strict
dominion, as it has been ruled that partition of inherited land is not a conveyance but a confirmation
or ratification of title or right to the land. [46] Therefore, the law requiring a special power of attorney
should not be applied to partitions.
On the other hand, the Heirs of Policronio insisted that the CA pronouncement on the invalidity
of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition should not be disturbed because the subject properties should
not have been included in the estate of Alfonso, and because Conrado lacked the written authority to

represent his siblings. They argued with the CA in ruling that a special power of attorney was required
before Conrado could sign in behalf of his co-heirs.
The Heirs of Policronio denied that they ratified the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition. They
claimed that there is nothing on record that establishes that they ratified the partition. Far from doing
so, they precisely questioned its execution by filing a complaint. They further argued that under Article
1409 (3) of the Civil Code, ratification cannot be invoked to validate the illegal act of including in the
partition those properties which do not belong to the estate as it provides another mode of acquiring
ownership not sanctioned by law.
Furthermore, the Heirs of Policronio contended that the defenses of unenforceability,
ratification, and preterition are being raised for the first time on appeal by the Heirs of Alfonso. For
having failed to raise them during the trial, the Heirs of Alfonso should be deemed to have
waived their right to do so.
The Court agrees in part with the Heirs of Alfonso.
To begin, although the defenses of unenforceability, ratification and preterition were raised by
the Heirs of Alfonso for the first time on appeal, they are concomitant matters which may be taken
up. As long as the questioned items bear relevance and close relation to those specifically raised, the
interest of justice would dictate that they, too, must be considered and resolved. The rule that only
theories raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party thereto on appeal should refer to
independent, not concomitant matters, to support or oppose the cause of action. [47]
In the RTC, the Heirs of Policronio alleged that Conrados consent was vitiated by mistake and
undue influence, and that he signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition without the authority or
consent of his co-heirs.
The RTC found that Conrados credibility had faltered, and his claims were rejected by the RTC
as gratuitous assertions. On the basis of such, the RTC ruled that Conrado duly represented his
siblings in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
On the other hand, the CA annulled the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition under Article 1390 (1)
of the Civil Code, holding that a special power of attorney was lacking as required under Article 1878
(5) and (15) of the Civil Code. These articles are as follows:
Art. 1878. Special powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases:
xxx
(5) To enter into any contract by which the ownership of an immovable is transmitted
or acquired either gratuitously or for a valuable consideration;

(15) Any other act of strict dominion.

xxx

Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may
have been no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They
are susceptible of ratification.

This Court finds that Article 1878 (5) and (15) is inapplicable to the case at bench. It has been
held in several cases[48] that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a conveyance of real property
resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from one to the other, but rather, it is
a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an heir is renouncing in favor of another
heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely a designation and segregation of that part
which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition cannot, therefore, be considered as an
act of strict dominion. Hence, a special power of attorney is not necessary.
In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are
affected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the statute of frauds does not apply to
partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved considering that such transaction is not
a conveyance of property resulting in change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of
that part which belongs to each heir.[49]
Neither is Article 1390 (1) applicable. Article 1390 (1) contemplates the incapacity of a party to
give consent to a contract. What is involved in the case at bench though is not Conrados incapacity to
give consent to the contract, but rather his lack of authority to do so. Instead, Articles 1403 (1), 1404,
and 1317 of the Civil Code find application to the circumstances prevailing in this case. They are as
follows:
Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into in the name of another person by one who has been given no
authority or legal representation, or who has acted beyond his powers;
Art. 1404. Unauthorized contracts are governed by Article 1317 and the principles of
agency in Title X of this Book.
Art. 1317. No one may contract in the name of another without being authorized by
the latter, or unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legal
representation, or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it

is ratified, expressly or impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed,
before it is revoked by the other contracting party.

Such was similarly held in the case of Badillo v. Ferrer:

The Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Sale is not a voidable or an annullable
contract under Article 1390 of the New Civil Code. Article 1390 renders a contract
voidable if one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the contract or if the
contracting partys consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue
influence or fraud. x x x
The deed of extrajudicial parition and sale is an unenforceable or, more
specifically, an unauthorized contract under Articles 1403(1) and 1317 of the New Civil
Code.[50]
Therefore, Conrados failure to obtain authority from his co-heirs to sign the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to give consent so as to render the
contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but unenforceable against Conrados coheirs for having been entered into without their authority.
A closer review of the evidence on record, however, will show that the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition is not unenforceable but, in fact, valid, binding and enforceable against all the Heirs of
Policronio for having given their consent to the contract. Their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial
Partition has been proven by a preponderance of evidence.
Regarding his alleged vitiated consent due to mistake and undue influence to the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition, Conrado testified, to wit:
Q: Mr. Ureta you remember having signed a document entitled deed of extra judicial
partition consisting of 11 pages and which have previously [been] marked as Exhibit I
for the plaintiffs?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Can you recall where did you sign this document?
A: The way I remember I signed that in our house.
Q: And who requested or required you to sign this document?
A: My aunties.
Q: Who in particular if you can recall?
A: Nay Pruding Panadero.
Q: You mean that this document that you signed was brought to your house by your
Auntie Pruding Pa[r]adero [who] requested you to sign that document?

A: When she first brought that document I did not sign that said document because I
[did] no[t] know the contents of that document.
Q: How many times did she bring this document to you [until] you finally signed the
document?
A: Perhaps 3 times.
Q: Can you tell the court why you finally signed it?
A: Because the way she explained it to me that the land of my grandfather will be
partitioned.
Q: When you signed this document were your brothers and sisters who are your coplaintiffs in this case aware of your act to sign this document?
A: They do not know.
xxx
Q: After you have signed this document did you inform your brothers and sisters that
you have signed this document?
A: No I did not. [51]
xxx
Q: Now you read the document when it was allegedly brought to your house by your
aunt Pruding Pa[r]adero?
A: I did not read it because as I told her I still want to ask the advise of my brothers
and sisters.
Q: So do I get from you that you have never read the document itself or any part
thereof?
A: I have read the heading.
xxx
Q: And why is it that you did not read all the pages of this document because I
understand that you know also how to read in English?
A: Because the way Nay Pruding explained to me is that the property of my
grandfather will be partitioned that is why I am so happy.
xxx
Q: You mean to say that after you signed this deed of extra judicial partition up to the
present you never informed them?
A: Perhaps they know already that I have signed and they read already the document
and they have read the document.
Q: My question is different, did you inform them?
A: The document sir? I did not tell them.
Q: Even until now?

A: Until now I did not inform them.[52]

This Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the finding of the RTC that Conrados explanations
were mere gratuitous assertions not entitled to any probative weight. The RTC found Conrados
credibility to have faltered when he testified that perhaps his siblings were already aware of the Deed
of Extra-Judicial Partition. The RTC was in the best position to judge the credibility of the witness
testimony. The CA also recognized that Conrados consent was not vitiated by mistake and undue
influence as it required a special power of attorney in order to bind his co-heirs and, as such, the CA
thereby recognized that his signature was binding to him but not with respect to his co-heirs. Findings
of fact of the trial court, particularly when affirmed by the CA, are binding to this Court. [53]
Furthermore, this Court notes other peculiarities in Conrados testimony. Despite claims of
undue influence, there is no indication that Conrado was forced to sign by his aunt, Prudencia
Paradero. In fact, he testified that he was happy to sign because his grandfathers estate would be
partitioned. Conrado, thus, clearly understood the document he signed. It is also worth noting that
despite the document being brought to him on three separate occasions and indicating his intention to
inform his siblings about it, Conrado failed to do so, and still neglected to inform them even after he
had signed the partition. All these circumstances negate his claim of vitiated consent. Having duly
signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, Conrado is bound to it. Thus, it is enforceable against him.
Although Conrados co-heirs claimed that they did not authorize Conrado to sign the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition in their behalf, several circumstances militate against their contention.
First, the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was executed on April 19, 1989, and the Heirs of Policronio
claim that they only came to know of its existence on July 30, 1995through an issue of the Aklan
Reporter. It is difficult to believe that Conrado did not inform his siblings about the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition or at least broach its subject with them for more than five years from the time he
signed it, especially after indicating in his testimony that he had intended to do so.
Second, Conrado retained possession of one of the parcels of land adjudicated to him and his
co-heirs in the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition.
Third, after the execution of the partition on April 19, 1989 and more than a year before they
claimed to have discovered the existence of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition on July 30, 1995, some
of the Heirs of Policronio, namely, Rita Solano, Macario Ureta, Lilia Tayco, and Venancio Ureta executed
on June 1, 1994, a Special Power of Attorney[54] in favor of their sister Gloria Gonzales, authorizing her
to obtain a loan from a bank and to mortgage one of the parcels of land adjudicated to them in the
Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition to secure payment of the loan. They were able to obtain the loan using
the land as collateral, over which a Real Estate Mortgage [55] was constituted. Both the Special Power of

Attorney and the Real Estate Mortgage were presented in evidence in the RTC, and were not
controverted or denied by the Heirs of Policronio.
Fourth, in the letter dated August 15, 1995, sent by the counsel of the Heirs of Policronio to
the Heirs of Alfonso requesting for amicable settlement, there was no mention that Conrados consent
to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was vitiated by mistake and undue influence or that they had
never authorized Conrado to represent them or sign the document on their behalf. It is questionable
for such a pertinent detail to have been omitted. The body of said letter is reproduced hereunder as
follows:
Greetings:
Your nephews and nieces, children of your deceased brother Policronio Ureta, has
referred to me for appropriate legal action the property they inherited from their
father consisting of six (6) parcels of land which is covered by a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated October 25, 1969. These properties ha[ve] already been transferred to the
name of their deceased father immediately after the sale, machine copy of the said
Deed of Sale is hereto attached for your ready reference.
Lately, however, there was published an Extra-judicial Partition of the estate of Alfonso
Ureta, which to the surprise of my clients included the properties already sold to their
father before the death of said Alfonso Ureta. This inclusion of their property is
erroneous and illegal because these properties were covered by the Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of their father Policronio Ureta no longer form part of the estate of
Alfonso Ureta. Since Policronio Ureta has [sic] died in 1974 yet, these properties have
passed by hereditary succession to his children who are now the true and lawful
owners of the said properties.
My clients are still entitled to a share in the estate of Alfonso Ureta who is also their
grandfather as they have stepped into the shoes of their deceased father Policronio
Ureta. But this estate of Alfonso Ureta should already exclude the six (6) parcels of
land covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of Policronio Ureta.
My clients cannot understand why the properties of their late father [should]
be included in the estate of their grandfather and be divided among his brothers and
sisters when said properties should only be divided among themselves as children of
Policronio Ureta.
Since this matter involves very close members of the same family, I have counseled
my clients that an earnest effort towards a compromise or amicable settlement be first
explored before resort to judicial remedy is pursued. And a compromise or amicable
settlement can only be reached if all the parties meet and discuss the problem with an
open mind. To this end, I am suggesting a meeting of the parties on September 16,
1995 at 2:00 P.M. at B Place Restaurant at C. Laserna St., Kalibo, Aklan. It would be
best if the parties can come or be represented by their duly designated attorney-infact together with their lawyers if they so desire so that the problem can be discussed
unemotionally and intelligently.
I would, however, interpret the failure to come to the said meeting as an indication
that the parties are not willing to or interested in amicable settlement of this matter
and as a go signal for me to resort to legal and/or judicial remedies to protest the
rights of my clients.
Thank you very much.[56]

Based on the foregoing, this Court concludes that the allegation of Conrados vitiated consent
and lack of authority to sign in behalf of his co-heirs was a mere afterthought on the part of the Heirs
of Policronio. It appears that the Heirs of Policronio were not only aware of the existence of the Deed of
Extra-Judicial Partition prior to June 30, 1995 but had, in fact, given Conrado authority to sign in their
behalf. They are now estopped from questioning its legality, and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is
valid, binding, and enforceable against them.
In view of the foregoing, there is no longer a need to discuss the issue of ratification.
Preterition
The Heirs of Alfonso were of the position that the absence of the Heirs of Policronio in the
partition or the lack of authority of their representative results, at the very least, in their preterition
and not in the invalidity of the entire deed of partition. Assuming there was actual preterition, it did
not render the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition voidable.Citing Article 1104 of the Civil Code, they aver
that a partition made with preterition of any of the compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, but the
heirs shall be proportionately obliged to pay the share of the person omitted. Thus, the Deed of ExtraJudicial Partition should not have been annulled by the CA. Instead, it should have ordered the share
of the heirs omitted to be given to them.
The Heirs of Alfonso also argued that all that remains to be adjudged is the right of the
preterited heirs to represent their father, Policronio, and be declared entitled to his share. They
contend that remand to the RTC is no longer necessary as the issue is purely legal and can be resolved
by the provisions of the Civil Code for there is no dispute that each of Alfonsos heirs received their
rightful share. Conrado, who received Policronios share, should then fully account for what he had
received to his other co-heirs and be directed to deliver their share in the inheritance.
These arguments cannot be given credence.
Their posited theory on preterition is no longer viable. It has already been determined that the
Heirs of Policronio gave their consent to the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and they have not been
excluded from it. Nonetheless, even granting that the Heirs of Policronio were denied their lawful
participation in the partition, the argument of the Heirs of Alfonso would still fail.
Preterition under Article 854 of the Civil Code is as follows:
Art. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in
the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the
death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be
effectual, without prejudice to the right of representation.

Preterition has been defined as the total omission of a compulsory heir from the inheritance. It
consists in the silence of the testator with regard to a compulsory heir, omitting him in the testament,
either by not mentioning him at all, or by not giving him anything in the hereditary property but
without expressly disinheriting him, even if he is mentioned in the will in the latter case. [57] Preterition
is thus a concept of testamentary succession and requires a will. In the case at bench, there is no will
involved. Therefore, preterition cannot apply.
Remand Unnecessary
The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition is in itself valid for complying with all the legal requisites,
as found by the RTC, to wit:
A persual of the Deed of Extra-judicial Partition would reveal that all the heirs
and children of Alfonso Ureta were represented therein; that nobody was left out; that
all of them received as much as the others as their shares; that it distributed all the
properties of Alfonso Ureta except a portion of parcel 29 containing an area of 14,000
square meters, more or less, which was expressly reserved; that Alfonso Ureta, at the
time of his death, left no debts; that the heirs of Policronio Ureta, Sr. were represented
by Conrado B. Ureta; all the parties signed the document, was witnessed and duly
acknowledged before Notary Public Adolfo M. Iligan of Kalibo, Aklan; that the
document expressly stipulated that the heirs to whom some of the properties were
transferred before for taxation purposes or their children, expressly recognize and
acknowledge as a fact that the properties were transferred only for the purpose of
effective administration and development convenience in the payment of taxes and,
therefore, all instruments conveying or effecting the transfer of said properties are null
and void from the beginning (Exhs. 1-4, 7-d).[58]
Considering that the Deed of Sale has been found void and the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition
valid, with the consent of all the Heirs of Policronio duly given, there is no need to remand the case to
the court of origin for partition.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 165748 is DENIED. The petition in G.R. No. 165930
is GRANTED. The assailed April 20, 2004 Decision and October 14, 2004Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71399, are hereby MODIFIED in this wise:
(1)

The Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition, dated April 19, 1989, is

VALID, and
(2)

The order to remand the case to the court of origin is hereby DELETED.

SO ORDERED.

WE CONCUR:

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 184148, June 09, 2014
NORA B. CALALANG-PARULAN AND ELVIRA B. CALALANG, Petitioners, v. ROSARIO
CALALANG-GARCIA, LEONORA CALALANG-SABILE, AND CARLITO S. CALALANG, Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated December 21, 2007 and
Resolution2 dated July 25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 72531. The CA modified the Decision3 dated July 10, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 21, of Malolos, Bulacan, in Civil Case No. 370-M-91.
The facts, as culled from the records, follow:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In a Complaint4 for Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed with the RTC of Malolos,
Bulacan on June 10, 1991, the respondents Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, and
Carlito S. Calalang asserted their ownership over a certain parcel of land against the petitioners Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan and Elvira B. Calalang. The said lot with an area of 1,266 square meters and
specifically identified as Lot 1132, Cad. 333, Bigaa Cadastre situated in Brgy. Burol 2 nd, Municipality of
Balagtas, Province of Bulacan, was allegedly acquired by the respondents from their mother

Encarnacion Silverio, through succession as the latters compulsory heirs.

According to the respondents, their father, Pedro Calalang contracted two marriages during his
lifetime. The first marriage was with their mother Encarnacion Silverio. During the subsistence of this
marriage, their parents acquired the above-mentioned parcel of land from their maternal grandmother
Francisca Silverio. Despite enjoying continuous possession of the land, however, their parents failed to
register the same. On June 7, 1942, the first marriage was dissolved with the death of Encarnacion
Silverio.
On November 6, 1967, Pedro Calalang entered into a second marriage with Elvira B. Calalang who
then gave birth to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan and Rolando Calalang. According to the respondents, it
was only during this time that Pedro Calalang filed an application for free patent over the parcel of
land with the Bureau of Lands. Pedro Calalang committed fraud in such application by claiming sole
and exclusive ownership over the land since 1935 and concealing the fact that he had three children
with his first spouse. As a result, on September 22, 1974, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-28715 in favor of Pedro Calalang only.
On February 17, 1984, Pedro Calalang sold the said parcel of land to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan as
evidenced by a Deed of Sale6 executed by both Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang. Accordingly, the
Register of Deeds of Bulacan cancelled OCT No. P-2871 and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 283321 in the name of Nora B. Calalang-Parulan. On December 27, 1989, 7 Pedro Calalang died.
The respondents assailed the validity of TCT No. 283321 on two grounds. First, the respondents
argued that the sale of the land was void because Pedro Calalang failed to obtain the consent of the
respondents who were co-owners of the same. As compulsory heirs upon the death of Encarnacion
Silverio, the respondents claimed that they acquired successional rights over the land. Thus, in
alienating the land without their consent, Pedro Calalang allegedly deprived them of their pro
indivisoshare in the property. Second, the respondents claimed that the sale was absolutely simulated
as Nora B. Calalang-Parulan did not have the capacity to pay for the consideration stated in the Deed
of Sale.
In their Answer,8 the petitioners argued that the parcel of land was acquired during the second
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang. They stressed that OCT No. P-2871 itself stated
that it was issued in the name of Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang]. Thus, the
property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Pedro Calalang and Elvira B. Calalang.
The petitioners likewise denied the allegation that the sale of the land was absolutely simulated as
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan was gainfully employed in Spain at the time of the sale. Moreover, they
alleged that the respondents did not have a valid cause of action against them and that their cause of
action, if any, was already barred by laches, estoppel and prescription. By way of counterclaim, the
petitioners also sought the payment to them of moral and exemplary damages plus costs of suit for
the filing of the clearly unfounded suit.
On July 10, 2001, the trial court rendered decision in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion
of the RTC decision reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants in the
following manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs, their rightful share to three-fourth
(3/4) of one-half (1/2) or a total of 474.75 square meters at 158.25 square meters for each of the
three plaintiffs, namely: Rosario, Leonora, and Juanito all surname[d] Calalang, of the real property
covered by TCT No. 283321 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan corresponding to their shares in the
conjugal estate of the late Encarnacion S. Calalang [sic];
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages; P50,000.00 for
attorneys fees and another P50,000.00 for litigation expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaims.

With costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.9
The trial court declared that the parcel of land was jointly acquired by the spouses Pedro Calalang and
Encarnacion Silverio from the parents of the latter. Thus, it was part of the conjugal property of the
first marriage of Pedro Calalang. When this marriage was dissolved upon the death of Encarnacion
Silverio on June 7, 1942, the corresponding shares to the disputed property were acquired by the
heirs of the decedent according to the laws of succession. In particular, the trial court allocated half of
the disputed property to Pedro Calalang as his share in the conjugal partnership and allocated the
other half to the three respondents and Pedro Calalang to be divided equally among them. The trial
court then ordered all of Pedros share to be given to Nora B. Calalang-Parulan on account of the sale.
The trial court also ruled that because the application for free patent filed by Pedro Calalang was
attended by fraud and misrepresentation, Pedro Calalang should be considered as a trustee of an
implied trust.
Aggrieved by the adverse ruling, the petitioners appealed the case to the CA which rendered the
assailed Decision on December 21, 2007. The dispositive portion of the CA decision reads,
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated July 10, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, and against the defendants in
the following manner:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. Ordering the defendants to reconvey in favor of the plaintiffs, their rightful share to the property
owned by their common father Pedro Calalang, equivalent to one-half (1/2) portion of the whole area
or 633 square meters to be divided equally by the three plaintiffs, namely: Rosario, Leonora and
Carlito, all surnamed Calalang, each getting an area of 211 square meters of the property covered
by TCT No. 2883321 of the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan corresponding to their shares in the property
of their late father Pedro Calalang;
2. Ordering defendants to pay plaintiffs the amount of P50,000.00 for moral damages; P50,000.00
for attorneys fees and another P50,000.00 for litigation expenses.
3. Dismissing the defendants counterclaims.
With costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.
SO ORDERED.10cralawlawlibrary
The CA reversed the factual findings of the trial court and held that Pedro Calalang was the sole and
exclusive owner of the subject parcel of land. Firstly, it held that there was insufficient evidence to
prove that the disputed property was indeed jointly acquired from the parents of Encarnacion Silverio
during the first marriage. Secondly, the CA upheld the indefeasibility of OCT No. P-2871. It held that
although the free patent was issued in the name of Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba
[Calalang] this phrase was merely descriptive of the civil status of Pedro Calalang at the time of the
registration of the disputed property. Thus, contrary to the ruling of the trial court, upon the death of
Encarnacion Silverio on June 7, 1942, the respondents did not acquire any successional rights to the
parcel of land which was exclusively owned by Pedro Calalang. However, applying the rules of
succession, Pedros heirs namely, Rosario Calalang-Garcia, Leonora Calalang-Sabile, Carlito Calalang,
Nora B. Calalang-Parulan, Elvira B. Calalang, and Rolando Calalang, succeeded Pedro to the land in
equal shares upon his death. Thus, the CA ordered the petitioners to reconvey in favor of the
respondents their rightful shares to the land. The CA ruled that the sale by Pedro Calalang to Nora B.
Calalang-Parulan was fraudulent and fictitious as the vendee was in bad faith and the respondents
were unlawfully deprived of their pro indiviso shares over the disputed property. As regards the issue
of prescription, the CA ruled that the prescriptive period for reconveyance of fraudulently registered

real property is ten years. Since the property was registered in the name of Nora in 1984 and the
action for reconveyance was filed in 1991, the action has not yet prescribed.
On January 23, 2008, petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration. The CA, however, denied their
motion in its Resolution dated July 25, 2008.
Hence, this petition raising the sole issue:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Whether or not the court a quo gravely erred in rendering its December 21, 2007 Decision modifying
the July 10, 2001 Decision of the trial court, and in issuing its July 25, 2008 Resolution denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated January 23, 2008. 11
Essentially, the only issue in this case is whether Pedro Calalang was the exclusive owner of the
disputed property prior to its transfer to his daughter Nora B. Calalang-Parulan.
The petitioners argue that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the second
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang as evidenced by OCT No. P-2871 which was issued
to Pedro Calalang during the subsistence of his marriage to Elvira B. Calalang. On the other hand, the
respondents claim that the disputed property was transferred by their maternal grandmother,
Francisca Silverio, to their parents, Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion Silverio, during the latters
marriage. Thus, the respondents argue that it belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first
marriage of Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio.
The petition is meritorious.
Preliminarily, we note that the resolution of the issue in this case requires a reevaluation of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties in order to trace the title of the disputed
property. What is involved is indeed a question of fact which is generally beyond the jurisdiction of
this Court to resolve in a petition for review on certiorari .12 However, a recognized exception to the
rule is when the RTC and CA have conflicting findings of fact as in this case. 13 Here, while the trial
court ruled that the disputed property belonged to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage of
Pedro Calalang with Encarnacion Silverio, the court a quo declared that the evidence proved the sole
and exclusive ownership of the disputed property of Pedro Calalang.
We have carefully reviewed the records of this case and sustain the finding of the CA that Pedro
Calalang is the sole and exclusive owner of the disputed property.
The trial court ruled that the respondents were able to establish that Lot 1132, Cad. 333 originated
from the parents of Encarnacion, and therefore said property either became property of Encarnacion
in her own right or jointly with her husband Pedro Calalang in 1936. In so ruling, the trial court relied
on the testimony of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that her parents built a nipa house on the subject lot and
lived there before and after World War II. The trial court further noted that Rosarios testimony was
corroborated by her cousin and adjacent neighbor Manolo Calalang. 14
However, as correctly pointed out by the CA, a close perusal of the records of this case would show
that the records are bereft of any concrete proof to show that the subject property indeed belonged to
respondents maternal grandparents. The evidence respondents adduced merely consisted of
testimonial evidence such as the declaration of Rosario Calalang-Garcia that they have been staying
on the property as far as she can remember and that the property was acquired by her parents
through purchase from her maternal grandparents. However, she was unable to produce any
document to evidence the said sale, nor was she able to present any documentary evidence such as
the tax declaration issued in the name of either of her parents. Moreover, we note that the free patent
was issued solely in the name of Pedro Calalang and that it was issued more than 30 years after the
death of Encarnacion and the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains of the first marriage.
Thus, we cannot subscribe to respondents submission that the subject property originally belonged to
the parents of Encarnacion and was acquired by Pedro Calalang and Encarnacion.
We likewise cannot sustain the argument of the petitioners that the disputed property belongs to the
conjugal partnership of the second marriage of Pedro Calalang with Elvira B. Calalang on the ground

that the title was issued in the name of Pedro Calalang, married to Elvira Berba [Calalang].
The contents of a certificate of title are enumerated by Section 45 of Presidential Decree No. 1529,
otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 45. Statement of personal circumstances in the certificate. Every certificate of title shall set
forth the full names of all persons whose interests make up the full ownership in the whole land,
including their civil status, and the names of their respective spouses, if married, as well as their
citizenship, residence and postal address. If the property covered belongs to the conjugal partnership,
it shall be issued in the names of both spouses.
A plain reading of the above provision would clearly reveal that the phrase Pedro Calalang, married to
Elvira Berba [Calalang] merely describes the civil status and identifies the spouse of the registered
owner Pedro Calalang. Evidently, this does not mean that the property is conjugal. InLitam v.
Rivera,15 we declared:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Further strong proofs that the properties in question are the paraphernal properties of Marcosa Rivera,
are the very Torrens Titles covering said properties. All the said properties are registered in the name
of Marcosa Rivera, married to Rafael Litam. This circumstance indicates that the properties in
question belong to the registered owner, Marcosa Rivera, as her paraphernal properties, for if they
were conjugal, the titles covering the same should have been issued in the names of Rafael Litam and
Marcosa Rivera. The words married to Rafael Litam written after the name of Marcosa Rivera, in
each of the above mentioned titles are merely descriptive of the civil status of Marcosa Rivera, the
registered owner of the properties covered by said titles.
It must likewise be noted that in his application for free patent, 16 applicant Pedro Calalang averred that
the land was first occupied and cultivated by him since 1935 and that he had planted mango trees,
coconut plants, caimito trees, banana plants and seasonal crops and built his house on the subject
lot. But he applied for free patent only in 1974 and was issued a free patent while already married to
Elvira B. Calalang. Thus, having possessed the subject land in the manner and for the period required
by law after the dissolution of the first marriage and before the second marriage, the subject
property ipso jure became private property and formed part of Pedro Calalangs exclusive property.17
It was therefore excluded from the conjugal partnership of gains of the second marriage. 18
As the sole and exclusive owner, Pedro Calalang had the right to convey his property in favor of Nora
B. Calalang-Parulan by executing a Deed of Sale on February 17, 1984. The CA therefore erred in
ruling that Pedro Calalang deprived his heirs of their respective shares over the disputed property
when he alienated the same.
It is hornbook doctrine that successional rights are vested only at the time of death. Article 777 of
the New Civil Code provides that [t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of
the death of the decedent. In Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc.,19 we proclaimed the fundamental
tenets of succession:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The principle of transmission as of the time of the predecessors death is basic in our Civil Code, and is
supported by other related articles. Thus, the capacity of the heir is determined as of the time the
decedent died (Art. 1034); the legitime is to be computed as of the same moment (Art. 908), and so
is the inofficiousness of the donation inter vivos (Art. 771). Similarly, the legacies of credit and
remission are valid only in the amount due and outstanding at the death of the testator (Art. 935),
and the fruits accruing after that instant are deemed to pertain to the legatee (Art. 948).
Thus, it is only upon the death of Pedro Calalang on December 27, 1989 that his heirs acquired their
respective inheritances, entitling them to their pro indiviso shares to his whole estate. At the time of
the sale of the disputed property, the rights to the succession were not yet bestowed upon the heirs of
Pedro Calalang. And absent clear and convincing evidence that the sale was fraudulent or not duly
supported by valuable consideration (in effect an inofficious donation inter vivos), the respondents
have no right to question the sale of the disputed property on the ground that their father deprived

them of their respective shares. Well to remember, fraud must be established by clear and convincing
evidence. Mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud. 20 The Complaint for
Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property must therefore be dismissed.cra1awlaw1ibrary
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 21,
2007 and Resolution dated July 25, 2008 of the Thirteenth Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 72531 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. 370-M-91, or the Complaint for
Annulment of Sale and Reconveyance of Property filed by the respondents with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 21 of Malolos, Bulacan, on June 10, 1991, is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Reyes, JJ., concur.cral

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153736 : August 12, 2010]
SPOUSES NICANOR TUMBOKON (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY: ROSARIO SESPEE AND
THEIR CHILDREN, NAMELY: NICANOR S. TUMBOKON, JR., NELIA S. TUMBOKON, NEMIA T.
SEGOVIA, NOBELLA S. TUMBOKON, NABIGAIL T. TAAY, NAZARENE T. MONTALVO, NORGEL
S. TUMBOKON, NEYSA S. TUMBOKON, SILVESTRE S. TUMBOKON, NORA T. MILCZAREK,
NONITA T. CARPIO, NERLYN S. TUMBOKON, AND NINFA T. SOLIDUM, PETITIONERS, VS.
APOLONIA G. LEGASPI, AND PAULINA S. DE MAGTANUM, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The question presented in this appeal is whether the ruling in a criminal prosecution for qualified theft
(involving coconut fruits) bound the complainant (petitioners herein) and the accused (respondents
herein) on the issue of ownership of the land, which was brought up as a defense, as to preclude the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) or the Court of Appeals (CA) from adjudicating the same issue in a civil case
filed prior to the promulgation of the decision in the criminal case.
Under contention herein are the ownership and possession of that parcel of land with an area of
12,480 square meters, more or less, situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly Barangay San Isidro,
in the Municipality of Ibajay, Province of Aklan. The land - planted to rice, corn, and coconuts - was
originally owned by the late Alejandra Sespee (Alejandra), who had had two marriages. The first
marriage was to Gaudencio Franco, by whom she bore Ciriaca Franco, whose husband was Victor
Miralles. The second marriage was to Jose Garcia, by whom she bore respondent Apolonia Garcia

(Apolonia), who married Primo Legaspi. Alejandra died without a will in 1935, and was survived by
Apolonia and Crisanto Miralles, the son of Ciriaca (who had predeceased Alejandra in 1924) and Victor
Miralles; hence, Crisanto Miralles was Alejandra's grandson.
The ownership and possession of the parcel of land became controversial after Spouses Nicanor
Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee (petitioners) asserted their right in it by virtue of their purchase of it
from Cresenciana Inog, who had supposedly acquired it by purchase from Victor Miralles. The tug-ofwar over the property between the petitioners and the respondents first led to the commencement of
a criminal case. The Spouses Nicanor Tumbokon and Rosario Sespee filed a criminal complaint for
qualified theft against respondents Apolonia and Paulina S. Magtanum and others not parties herein,
namely: Rosendo Magtanum, Antonio Magtanum, Ulpiano Mangilaya, charging them with stealing
coconut fruits from the land subject of the present case. [1] The criminal case, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 2269, was assigned to Branch III of the erstwhile Court of First Instance (CFI) of Aklan. [2]
After trial, the CFI found the respondents and their co-accused guilty as charged in its decision dated
June 10, 1972. The respondents appealed (C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR), but the CA affirmed their
conviction on February 19, 1975, whereby the CA rejected respondent Apolonia's defense of ownership
of the land.[3]
In the meanwhile, on September 21, 1972, or prior to the CA's rendition of its decision in the criminal
case, the petitioners commenced this suit for recovery of ownership and possession of real property
with damages against the respondents in the CFI. This suit, docketed as Civil Case No. 240 and
entitled Spouses Nicanor P. Tumbokon and Rosario S. Sespee v. Apolonia G. Legaspi, Jesus
Legaspi, Alejandra Legaspi, Primo Legaspi, Jose Legaspi, and Paulina S. de Magtanum, was assigned
also to Branch III of the CFI, and involved the same parcel of land from where the coconut fruits
subject of the crime of qualified theft in Criminal Case No. 2269 had been taken.
On February 17, 1994, the RTC, which meanwhile replaced the CFI following the implementation of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act,[4] rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners herein, holding and
disposing thus:
After a careful study of the evidence on record, the Court finds that the plaintiffs were able to
establish that plaintiff Rosario Sespee Tumbokon purchased the land in question from Cresenciana
Inog on December 31, 1959 (Exh. "C"). Cresenciana Inog, in turn, acquired the land by purchase from
Victor Miralles on June 19, 1957 (Exh. "B"). Seven (7) years before, on May 8, 1950, the land was
mortgaged by Victor Miralles to Cresenciana Inog as shown by a Deed of Pacto de Retro (Exh. "A"),
and from 1950 up to 1959, Cresenciana Inog was in continuous and peaceful possession of the land in
question. xxx
x x xx
WHEREFORE, finding preponderance of evidence in favor of the plaintiffs, judgment is hereby rendered
as follows:
1. The plaintiffs are hereby declared the true and lawful owners, and entitled to the possession of the
parcel of land of 12,480 square meters in area, declared in the name of plaintiff Rosario S. Tumbokon,
under Tax Declaration No. 29220, situated in Barangay Buenavista (formerly San Isidro), Ibajay,
Aklan;
2. The defendants are ordered and directed to vacate the land in question, and restore and deliver the
possession thereof to the plaintiffs; and
3. No pronouncement as to damages, but with costs against the defendants.
SO ORDERED.[5]
The respondents appealed to the CA.

On May 15, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC and dismissed the complaint, [6] opining and
ruling thus:
The appellees trace their acquisition of the subject lot to the admitted primal owner Alejandra
Sespee through her supposed sale of it to her son-in-law Victor Miralles, who sold this to
Cresenciana Inog, and who in turn sold it to the appellees. In the process, they presented the Deed of
Absolute Sale (Exh. "B", June 19, 1957) executed by Victor Miralles in favor of Cresenciana Inog but
wherein it is provided in the said instrument that:
That this parcel of land abovementioned was inherited from the deceased Alejandra Sespee, by the
party of the First Part being the sole heir of the said Alejandra Sespee, having no other brothers or
sisters.
This claim of being the sole heir is obviously false and erroneous for Alejandra Sespee had more
than one intestate heir, and Victor Miralles as a mere son-in-law could not be one of them.
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory claim that Victor Miralles
instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespee. This supposed sale was oral, one that can of course
be facilely feigned. And it is likely to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and devoid of the
standard particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale made, who were present,
or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof that Victor Miralles exercised the
rights and performed the obligations of an owner for no tax declarations nor tax receipt has been
submitted or even adverted to.
The testimonial evidence of the appellants as to ownership, the sale and possession is inadequate,
with even the appellant Nicanor Tumbokon stating that:
Q Did you come to know before you purchase (sic) the property from whom did V. Miralles acquired
(sic) the land?
A No, sir.
xxx
Q And you did not come to know out (sic) and why V. Miralles came to possess the land under
litigation before it was sold to C. Inog?
A All I was informed was V. Miralles became automatically the heir of A. Sespee after the death of
the wife which is the only daughter of A. Sespee.
Q How did you know that V. Miralles became automatically the heir of the land after the death of his
wife?
A He is the only son-in-law. (TSN, pp. 2-3, Feb. 26, 1974; emphasis supplied)
While Victor Miralles may have been in physical possession of the lot for a while, this was not as owner
but as mere Administrator as was clearly appearing in tax declaration no. 21714 ("Exhs. "J", "1").The
corroboration in this by Lourdes Macawili (TSN, June 7, 1973) does not help the appellees (herein
petitioners) any for she never knew the source of the property. Neither does the testimony of Crisanto
Miralles succor the appellees (petitioners). He was the son of Victor Miralles and the husband of the
said Cresenciana Inog, the supposed buyer, owner and possessor of the land in question from 19501957, and yet Crisanto Miralles could only say:
Q Are there improvements on the land in question?
A I do not know because I did not bother to go to the land in question. (TSN, p. 4, Aug. 18, 1973;
emphasis supplied)]
These strongly suggest that the sales and claim of possession were shams, and are further demolished
by the following testimonies:

Q After the death of Alejandra Sespee who inherited this land in question?
A Apolonia.
Q At present who is in possession of the land in question?
A Apolonia Legaspi.
Q From the time that Apolonia Legaspi took possession of the land up to the present do you know if
anybody interrupted her possession?
A No sir. (tsn, Urbana Ta-an Vda. de Franco, p. 7, Nov. 24, 1977)
x x x
Q Now, since when did you know the land in question?
A Since I was at the age of 20 yrs. old. (TSN; Crispina Taladtad, p. 3; Jan. 20, 1977; [she was 74 yrs.
old at the time of this testimony]).
x x x
Q And for how long has Apolonia Garcia Legaspi been in possession of the land in question?
A Since the time I was at the age of 20 yrs. old when I was been (sic) invited there to work up to the
present she is in possession of the land.
Q You said that you know Cresenciana Inog, do you know if Cresenciana Inog has ever possessed the
land in question?
A Never.
Q You also said that you know Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife Rosario Tumbokon, my question is do
you know if this Nicanor Tumbokon and his wife Rosario have ever possessed and usufructed this land
under litigation?
A No, sir.
Q You also stated a while ago that you know Victor Miralles, do you know if Victor Miralles had ever
possessed this under litigation?
A No, he had not. (p. 9, ibid; emphasis supplied)
Thus neither do We buy the appellee's contention that ownership of the disputed land was acquired by
their predecessors-in-interest thru lapse of time. Acquisitive prescription requires possession in the
concept of owner, and they have not been able to prove even mere possession.
As proponents it was incumbent upon the appellees to prove that they were the owners of the lot and
that they were being unlawfully deprived of their possession thereof. But this they failed to do. It is a
basic rule in evidence that each party must prove his affirmative allegation. Since the burden of
evidence lies with the party who asserts the affirmative allegation, the plaintiff or complainant has to
prove this affirmative allegations in the complaint and the defendant or the respondent has to prove
the affirmative allegation in his affirmative defenses and counterclaim.(AKELCO vs. NLRC, G.R. No.
121439, Jan 25,2000)
But this hoary rule also cuts both ways. Appellants too must also prove the allegations to support their
prayer to declare the litigated lot the exclusive property of the defendants Apolonia G. Legaspi and
Paulina S. Magtanum; (Answer, p. 6, record). Apolonia Legaspi however is only one of the putative
intestate heirs of Alejandra Sespee, the other being Crisanto Miralles who stands in the stead of
Ciriaca, his predeceased mother and other daughter of the decedent. But then no judgment can be
made as to their successional rights for Crisanto Miralles was never impleaded. Neither is there a proof
that can convince that Paulina S. Magtanum who is merely a niece of the decedent, should also be
declared a co-owner of the inherited lot.
Because of said inadequacies, We cannot rule beyond the holding that the appellees (petitioners) are
not the owners and therefore not entitled to the recovery of the litigated lot.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and in its place judgment is
rendered DISMISSING the Complaint.
SO ORDERED.[7]
Hence, the petitioners appeal by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
The issues to be resolved are the following:
1.

Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. CV 45672 reversing the decision of the RTC in
Civil Case No. 240 was supported by law and the evidence on record;

2.

Whether or not the decision in C.A.-G.R. No. 13830-CR affirming the decision of the
CFI of Aklan in Criminal Case No. 2269 had the effect of res judicata on the issue of
ownership of the land involved in Civil Case No. 240, considering that such land was
the same land involved in Criminal Case No. 2269.

Ruling
The petition has no merit.
A
Reversal by the CA was supported
by law and the evidence on record
The CA correctly found that the petitioners' claim of ownership could not be legally and factually
sustained.
First of all, the petitioners adduced no competent evidence to establish that Victor Miralles, the
transferor of the land to Cresenciana Inog (the petitioners' immediate predecessor in interest) had any
legal right in the first place to transfer ownership. He was not himself an heir of Alejandra, being only
her son-in-law (as the husband of Ciriaca, one of Alejandra's two daughters). Thus, the statement in
the deed of absolute sale (Exhibit B) entered into between Victor Miralles and Cresenciana Inog, to the
effect that the "parcel of land was inherited from the deceased Alejandra Sespee" by Victor Miralles
"being the sole heir of the said Alejandra Sespee, having no other brothers or sisters," was
outrightly false.
Secondly, a decedent's compulsory heirs in whose favor the law reserves a part of the decedent's
estate are exclusively the persons enumerated in Article 887, Civil Code, viz:
Article 887. The following are compulsory heirs:
(1) Legitimate children and descendants, with respect to their legitimate parents and ascendants;
(2) In default of the foregoing, legitimate parents and ascendants, with respect to their legitimate
children and descendants;
(3) The widow or widower;
(4) Acknowledged natural children, and natural children by legal fiction;
(5) Other illegitimate children referred to in article 287.

Compulsory heirs mentioned in Nos. 3, 4, and 5 are not excluded by those in Nos. 1 and 2; neither do
they exclude one another.
In all cases of illegitimate children, their filiation must be duly proved.
The father or mother of illegitimate children of the three classes mentioned, shall inherit from them in
the manner and to the extent established by this Code. (807a)
Only two forced heirs survived Alejandra upon her death, namely: respondent Apolonia, her daughter,
and Crisanto Miralles, her grandson. The latter succeeded Alejandra by right of representation because
his mother, Ciriaca, had predeceased Alejandra. Representation is a right created by fiction of law, by
virtue of which the representative is raised to the place and the degreeof the person represented, and
acquires the rights which the latter would have if she were living or if she could have inherited.
[8]
Herein, the representative (Crisanto Miralles) was called to the succession by law and not by the
person represented (Ciriaca); he thus succeeded Alejandra, not Ciriaca. [9]
The foregoing undeniable facts rendered the hearsay testimony of Nicanor Tumbokon to the effect
that he had been informed that Victor Miralles had "bec[o]me automatically the heir" of Alejandra
"after the death of his wife," the wife being "the only daughter" and he "the only son-in-law" a plain
irrelevancy.
Thirdly, Victor Miralles' supposed acquisition of the land by oral sale from Alejandra had no competent
factual support in the records. For one, the oral sale was incompatible with the petitioners' anchor
claim that he had acquired the land by inheritance from Alejandra. Also, the evidence that the
petitioners adduced on the oral sale was insufficient and incredible, warranting the CA's rejection of
the oral sale under the following terms:
This also damages and puts to serious doubt their other and contradictory claim that Victor Miralles
instead bought the lot from Alejandra Sespee. This supposed sale was oral, one that can of
course be facilely feigned. And it is likely to be so for the claim is sweeping, vacuous and
devoid of the standard particulars like what was the price, when and where was the sale
made, who were present, or who knew of it. The record is bereft too of documentary proof
that Victor Miralles exercised the rights and performed the obligations of an owner for no
tax declarations nor tax receipt has been submitted or even adverted to.[10]
With Victor Miralles lacking any just and legal right in the land, except as an heir of Ciriaca, the
transfer of the land from him to Cresenciana Inog was ineffectual. As a consequence, Cresenciana
Inog did not legally acquire the land, and, in turn, did not validly transfer it to the petitioners.
B
Bar by res judicata is not applicable.
The petitioners submit that the final ruling in the criminal case had already determined the issue of
ownership of the land; and that such ruling in the criminal case barred the issue of ownership in the
civil case under the doctrine of res judicata.
The submission has no merit.
Res judicata means a matter adjudged, a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing or matter
settled by judgment.[11] The doctrine of res judicata is an old axiom of law, dictated by wisdom and
sanctified by age, and founded on the broad principle that it is to the interest of the public that there
should be an end to litigation by the same parties over a subject once fully and fairly adjudicated. It
has been appropriately said that the doctrine is a rule pervading every well-regulated system of
jurisprudence, and is put upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law: the one,
public policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to
litigation - reipublicae ut sit finis litium; the other, the hardship on the individual that he should be
vexed twice for one and the same cause - nemo debet bis vexari pro una et eadem causa. A contrary

doctrine will subject the public peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the
gratification of the litigious disposition on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public
tranquillity and happiness.[12]
Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment or decree on the merits rendered by a court of
competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits and on
all points and matters determined in the previous suit. [13] The foundation principle upon which the
doctrine rests is that the parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once;
that when a right or fact has been judicially tried and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction,
so long as it remains unreversed, should be conclusive upon the parties and those in privity with them
in law or estate.[14]
For res judicata to bar the institution of a subsequent action, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the former judgment must be final; (2) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the parties; (3) it must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be
between the first and second actions (a) identity of parties, (b) identity of the subject matter, and (c)
identity of cause of action.[15]
The doctrine of res judicata has two aspects: the first, known as bar by prior judgment, or estoppel by
verdict, is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon the sameclaim,
demand, or cause of action; the second, known as conclusiveness of judgment, also known as the rule
of auter action pendant, ordains that issues actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again
be raised in any future case between the same parties involving a different cause of action and has the
effect of preclusion of issues only.[16]
Based on the foregoing standards, this action is not barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
First of all, bar by prior judgment, the first aspect of the doctrine, is not applicable, because the
causes of action in the civil and the criminal actions were different and distinct from each other. The
civil action is for the recovery of ownership of the land filed by the petitioners, while the criminal
action was to determine whether the act of the respondents of taking the coconut fruits from the trees
growing within the disputed land constituted the crime of qualified theft. In the former, the main issue
is the legal ownership of the land, but in the latter, the legal ownership of the land was not the main
issue. The issue of guilt or innocence was not dependent on the ownership of the land, inasmuch as a
person could be guilty of theft of the growing fruits even if he were the owner of the land.
Conclusiveness of judgment is not also applicable. The petitioners themselves commenced both
actions, and fully and directly participated in the trial of both actions. Any estoppel from assailing the
authority of the CA to determine the ownership of the land based on the evidence presented in the
civil action applied only to the petitioners, who should not be allowed to assail the outcome of the civil
action after the CA had ruled adversely against them.
Moreover, the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment is subject to exceptions, such as where there is
a change in the applicable legal context, or to avoid inequitable administration of justice. [17] Applying
the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgments to this case will surely be iniquitous to the respondents
who have rightly relied on the civil case, not on the criminal case, to settle the issue of ownership of
the land. This action for recovery of ownership was brought precisely to settle the issue of ownership
of the property. In contrast, the pronouncement on ownership of the land made in the criminal case
was only the response to the respondents having raised the ownership as a matter of defense.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is denied, and the decision rendered on May 15,
2001 by the Court of Appeals is affirmed.
Costs of suit to be paid by the petitioners.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 192531, November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner, v. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM AND SCANMAR
MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010 Decision 1 of
the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10,
entitledBernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime Services, Inc.],
declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended by PD
626.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services,
Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was enrolled under the
government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). 3 Unfortunately, on June 2, 2008, an accident
occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which led to his untimely death the
following day.4

John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome,
John's biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for death benefits
under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La Union. However, the
SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 2009 5 addressed to petitioner, denied the claim,
stating:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
We regret to inform you that we cannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer
considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on
documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed to the Employees' Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed the
ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner's entitlement
to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John's
primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their
great grandfather, petitioner's grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by virtue of the Decision 7in
Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4, 1985, which
decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the agencies, it is Cornelio who
qualifies as John's primary beneficiary, not petitioner.
Neither, the ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John's secondary beneficiary even if it were
proven that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the "dependent
spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries. In their
absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children,
the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided;
that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when
there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the
covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate
parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C. Colcol.
Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the status as the legitimate parent of the
deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall
now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626, as
amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the deceased
and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the
ECC.10Hence, the instant petition.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS

I.
II.

III.

The Honorable ECC's Decision is contrary to evidence on record.

The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims
of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due course /
denying petitioner's otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration. 11

In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but legally
adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate cases, to
receive the benefits under the ECP?ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC's factual findings
are not consistent with the
evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner's claim for death benefits is that
even though she is John's biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent,
Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent, Mr.
Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security benefits.
Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume him to be alive
and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary beneficiary of the
deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary under the Social Security
law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the benefit legally provided by law to
the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agencies
over matters falling under their jurisdiction. [12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had overlooked a
crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner- Cornelio's death certificate. 13
Based on Cornelio's death certificate, it appears that John's adoptive father died on October 26,
1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which
attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the
adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits
claims to the legitimate
parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in
view of John's work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended, which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

ART. 167. Definition of terms. - As used in this Title unless the context indicates
otherwise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the
primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules and
regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising therefrom as
prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation,
interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
RULE XV - BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition, (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined at the
time of employee's death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the employee's death until he
remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural children, who are unmarried
not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is
incapacitated and incapable of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or
acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent acknowledged natural child shall be
considered as a primary beneficiary only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified
and eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or more acknowledged
natural children, they shall be counted from the youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding
five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1) The legitimate parents wholly dependent upon the employee for regular
support;cralawlawlibrary
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are unmarried, not gainfully employed,
and not over 21 years of age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and incapable
of self - support due to physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired during minority.
(Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner's claim on the ground that she is no longer the
deceased's legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the adoption
decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the status of a
legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
Rule XV, Sec. l(c)(l) of the Amended
Rules on Employees' Compensation
deviates from the clear language of
Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code,
as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as amended, it

is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. In net effect,
the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Pertinent
in elucidating on this point is Article 7 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not
be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and
the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are
not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. (Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco
Corporation16that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the
statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the
law because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of
the basic law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation is
patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code
when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz v.
Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation. Amicus
curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In accordance
therefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should be understood to have a general and
inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one: Ubi lex non
distinguit, nee nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense than
it is used and intended is not warranted by any rule of interpretation. Besides, he further states that
when the law intends to use the term in a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term with the word
collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not
only collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context
indicates that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense which as already
discussed earlier, is not so in the case at bar.(Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted Article
167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly
limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents" should,
therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption.
When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent parents" are
parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption, who are in need of support or
assistance.

Moreover, the same Article 167 (j), as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the
phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article 167
provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on
dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary
beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents,
then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants." The manner by which
the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was
intended to cover all parents - legitimate, illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption.
Rule XV, Section l(c)(l) of the
Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation is in contravention
of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional
guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the parents of an
illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires
public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner.18 In other
words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may
not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate
governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all
persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification." 20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate
parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to
the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not
germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest that
requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and the
rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate, and the
policy of PD 626 - that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate benefits in the
event of work-connected disability or death -will be better served if Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is
not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones, there
can be no other course of action to take other than to strike down as unconstitutional the phrase
"illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section l(c)(l) of the Amended Rules on Employees'
Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John's
dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended
illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefits by equating
dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC in its
assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still claimed death
benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to those
who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. It was only in the assailed

Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendo that the ECC did not
overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the deceased's legitimate
parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental authority, petitioner can still
qualify as John's secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adopted John, then about two (2) years old, petitioner's parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed, aside
from Cornelio's death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years after
the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John's minority at the time of his adopter's death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under such
circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the biological parents.
Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a personal relationship and that
there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,[21 who was then left to care for the minor
adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is not a
novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act, provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Section 20. Effects of Rescission. - If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights
and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished, (emphasis
added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned. The manner herein of terminating the adopter's parental authority, unlike the grounds for
rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the adopter and the
adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the biological parents,
simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to fend for himself at such a
tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted after
Cornelio's death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall govern
contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We are guided by
the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 8552 24 wherein the paramount consideration is
the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this disposition. It is, after all, for the best
interest of the child that someone will remain charged for his welfare and upbringing should his or her
adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee is still
in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no
one else could reasonably be expected to perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee's
biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by virtue
of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely eliminated. To
demonstrate, the biological parents, in some instances, are able to inherit from the adopted, as can be
gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the following
rules:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur
with the adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by the parents or
ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;cralawlawlibrary

xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or
intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol's death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family Code,
the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his parents and
relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession to the
estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of an
SSS covered employee do not form part of the estate of the adopted child, the pertinent provision on
legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological parents and
those by adoption vis-a-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted.
In the same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring's adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a minor
child whose second chance at a better life under the care of the adoptive parents was snatched from
him by death's cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child's quality of life might have been better off
not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end. Thus, We hold that
Cornelio's death at the time of John's minority resulted in the restoration of petitioner's parental
authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner's dependence on John can be
established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the records,
petitioner, prior to John's adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984, leaving her to
care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright future to her growing
children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio's adoption of John and Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelio's death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly reported
"Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this very address was used in
John's Death Certificate25cralawred executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or Loss of
Life accomplished by the; master of the vessel boarded by John. 26 Likewise, this is John's known
address as per the ECC's assailed Decision.27 Similarly, this same address was used by petitioner in
filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with the ECC. Hence, it
can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over John, petitioner indeed
actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his benefits
under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not cover
compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of beneficiaries
who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John's deliberate act of indicating
petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner as his dependent.
Consequently, the confluence of circumstances - from Cornelio's death during John's minority, the
restoration of petitioner's parental authority, the documents showing singularity of address, and John's
clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary - effectively made petitioner, to Our mind,
entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio's adoption of
John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits stemming from
John's death as a dependent parent given Cornelio's untimely demise during John's minority. Since the
parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program
shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the Employees'

Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary beneficiary of the deceased covered
employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P. Bartolome.
No costs.

SECOND DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF

CRISTINA AGUINALDO- SUNTAY; EMILIO A.M.
SUNTAY III,

G.R. No. 183053

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,

- versus -

NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY,

PEREZ,* JJ.

Respondent.
Promulgated:

June 16, 2010

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Unlike Pope Alexander VI[1] who, faced with the impasse between Spain and Portugal, deftly and
literally divided the exploration, or more appropriately, the riches of the New World by issuing
the Inter Caetera,[2] we are confronted with the difficult, albeit, all too familiar tale of another family
imbroglio over the estate of a decedent.[3]
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949, [4] reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. [5]

Before anything else, we disentangle the facts.

On June 4, 1990, the decedent, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina), married to Dr. Federico
Suntay (Federico), died intestate. In 1979, their only son, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (Emilio I),
predeceased both Cristina and Federico. At the time of her death, Cristina was survived by her
husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III
(Emilio III) and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.

During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children,
namely: herein respondent, Isabel; Margarita; and Emilio II, all surnamed Cojuangco-Suntay. Emilio Is
marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of
wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita Suntay Taedo (Nenita), by two different women, Concepcion Mendoza
and Isabel Santos, respectively.

Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby, nine
months old, by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I.
Nenita is an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I and was likewise brought up by the spouses
Federico and Cristina.

As previously adverted to, the marriage between Emilio I and Isabel was annulled.
[6]

Consequently, respondent and her siblings Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother on Balete

Drive, Quezon City, separately from their father and paternal grandparents.

Parenthetically, after the death of Emilio I, Federico filed a petition for visitation rights over his
grandchildren: respondent Isabel, Margarita, and Emilio II. Although the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court in Quezon City granted the petition and allowed Federico one hour of visitation
monthly, initially reduced to thirty minutes, it was altogether stopped because of a manifestation filed
by respondent Isabel, articulating her sentiments on the unwanted visits of her grandparents.

Significantly, Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, or on September 27, 1993,
adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita. [7]

On October 26, 1995, respondent filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in
her favor, containing the following allegations:

[A]t the time of [the decedents] death, [she] was a resident of the Municipality of
Hagonoy, Province of Bulacan; that the [decedent] left an estate of real and personal
properties, with a probable gross value of P29,000,000.00; that the names, ages and
residences of the surviving heirs of the [decedent] are: (1) Federico C. Suntay, 89
years old, surviving spouse and a resident of x x x; (2) Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay, 36
years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; (3) Margarita CojuangcoSuntay, 39 years old, legitimate granddaughter and a resident of x x x; and (4) Emilio
Cojuangco-Suntay, 35 years old, legitimate grandson and a resident of x x x; and that
as far as [respondent] knew, the decedent left no debts or obligation at the time of her
death.[8]

Disavowing the allegations in the petition of his grandchild, respondent Isabel, Federico filed his
opposition on December 21, 1995, alleging, among others, that:

[B]eing the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and
he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of
conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the
administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their
grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the
petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son[,] namely:
Emilio III and Nenita S. Taedo; that he is better situated to protect the integrity of the
estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife[,] he was already the one who
managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate as stated in
the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabels allegation that some of the
properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue. [9]

Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico
filed a Manifestation dated March 13, 1999, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of
the decedents estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to
the letters of administration.

Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio IIIs Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially
echoed the allegations in his grandfathers opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III,
was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.
Additionally, Emilio III averred his own qualifications that: [he] is presently engaged in aquaculture
and banking; he was trained by the decedent to work in his early age by involving him in the activities
of the Emilio Aguinaldo Foundation which was established in 1979 in memory of her grandmothers
father; the significant work experiences outside the family group are included in his curriculum vitae;
he was employed by the oppositor [Federico] after his graduation in college with management degree
at F.C.E. Corporations and Hagonoy Rural Bank; x x x.[10]

In the course of the proceedings, on November 13, 2000, Federico died.

After the testimonies of both parties witnesses were heard and evidence on their respective
allegations were adduced, the trial court rendered a decision on November 9, 2001, appointing herein
petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristinas intestate estate, to wit:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco[-]Suntay

Opposition[-]in[-]Intervention is GRANTED.

is

DENIED

and

the

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III is hereby appointed administrator
of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the
execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P200,000.00,
conditioned as follows:

(1)
inventory;

To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete

(2)
To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts,
legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;

(3)
To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at
any other time when required by the court, and

(4)

To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in
his favor.

SO ORDERED.[11]
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the
decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed
respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina, to wit:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9,
2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said
court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel
Cojuangco[-]Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of

Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her
filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P200,000.00) Pesos.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.[12]

The motion for reconsideration of Emilio III having been denied, he appeals by certiorari to this Court,
raising the following issues:

A. IN THE APPOINTMENT OF AN ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE UNDER SECTION 6

OF RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE CIVIL CODE
APPLIES; and

B. UNDER THE UNDISPUTED FACTS WHERE HEREIN PETITIONER WAS REARED BY THE
DECEDENT AND HER SPOUSE SINCE INFANCY, WHETHER ARTICLE 992 OF THE NEW
CIVIL CODE APPLIES SO AS TO BAR HIM FROM BEING APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR
OF THE DECEDENTS ESTATE.[13]

In ruling against the petition of herein respondent, the RTC ratiocinated, thus:

Evidence objectively assessed and carefully evaluated, both testimonial and

documentary, the court opines that it is to the best interest of the estate of the
decedent and all claimants thereto, that the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay III, be
appointed administrator of the estate in the above-entitled special proceedings.

Based on the evidence and demeanor of the parties in court, [respondents immediate]
family and that of the decedent are apparently estranged. The root cause of which, is
not for this court to ascertain nor is this the right time and the proper forum to dwell
upon. What matters most at this time is the welfare of the estate of the decedent in
the light of such unfortunate and bitter estrangement.

The Court honestly believes that to appoint the petitioner would go against the wishes
of the decedent who raised [Emilio III] from infancy in her home in Baguio City as her
own child. Certainly, it would go against the wishes of the surviving spouse x x x who
nominated [Emilio III] for appointment as administrator.

As between [respondent] and the oppositor [Federico], the latter is accorded

preference as the surviving spouse under Sec 6(a), Rule 78, Rules of Court. On the
basis of such preference, he vigorously opposed the appointment of the petitioner and
instead nominated [Emilio III], his grandchild and adopted child. Such nomination,
absent any valid and justifiable reason, should not be imperiously set aside and
insouciantly ignored, even after the oppositor [Federico] has passed away, in order to
give effect to the order of preference mandated by law. Moreover, from the viewpoint
of the estate, the nomination of [Emilio III] appear[s] intrinsically meritorious. For the
benefit of the estate and its claimants, creditors, as well as heirs, the administrator
should be one who is prepared, academically and by experience, for the demands and
responsibilities of the position. While [respondent], a practicing physician, is not
unqualified, it is clear to the court that when it comes to management of real estate
and the processing and payment of debts, [Emilio III], a businessman with an
established track record as a manager has a decided edge and therefore, is in a
position to better handle the preservation of the estate. [14]

In marked contrast, the CA zeroed in on Emilio IIIs status as an illegitimate child of Emilio I
and, thus, barred from representing his deceased father in the estate of the latters legitimate mother,
the decedent. On the whole, the CA pronounced that Emilio III, who was merely nominated by
Federico, and which nomination hinged upon the latters appointment as administrator of the
decedents estate, cannot be appointed as the administrator of the decedents estate for the following
reasons:[15]

1. The appointment of Emilio III was subject to a suspensive condition, i.e., Federicos
appointment as administrator of the estate, he being the surviving spouse of Cristina, the decedent.
The death of Federico before his appointment as administrator of Cristinas estate rendered his
nomination of Emilio III inoperative;

2. As between the legitimate offspring (respondent) and illegitimate offspring (Emilio III) of
decedents son, Emilio I, respondent is preferred, being the next of kin referred to by Section 6, Rule
78 of the Rules of Court, and entitled to share in the distribution of Cristinas estate as an heir;
3. Jurisprudence has consistently held that Article 992 [16] of the Civil Code bars the illegitimate
child from inheriting ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother.
Thus, Emilio III, who is barred from inheriting from his grandmother, cannot be preferred over
respondent in the administration of the estate of their grandmother, the decedent; and

4. Contrary to the RTCs finding, respondent is as much competent as Emilio III to administer
and manage the subject estate for she possesses none of the disqualifications specified in Section 1,
[17]

Rule 78 of the Rules of Court.

The pivotal issue in this case turns on who, as between Emilio III and respondent, is better
qualified to act as administrator of the decedents estate.

We cannot subscribe to the appellate courts ruling excluding Emilio III in the administration of
the decedents undivided estate. Mistakenly, the CA glosses over several undisputed facts and
circumstances:

1. The underlying philosophy of our law on intestate succession is to give preference to the
wishes and presumed will of the decedent, absent a valid and effective will;

2. The basis for Article 992 of the Civil Code, referred to as the iron curtain bar rule, [18] is quite
the opposite scenario in the facts obtaining herein for the actual relationship between Federico and
Cristina, on one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, was akin to the normal relationship of legitimate
relatives;

3. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico,
who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

4. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as
forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;

5. Cristinas properties forming part of her estate are still commingled with that of her
husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership, albeit terminated upon her death,
remains undetermined and unliquidated; and

6. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the
latters estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, not simply representing his deceased
illegitimate father, Emilio I.

From the foregoing, it is patently clear that the CA erred in excluding Emilio III from the
administration of the decedents estate. As Federicos adopted son, Emilio IIIs interest in the estate of
Cristina is as much apparent to this Court as the interest therein of respondent, considering that the
CA even declared that under the law, [Federico], being the surviving spouse, would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from his share in the
conjugal partnership. Thus, we are puzzled why the CA resorted to a strained legal reasoning Emilio
IIIs nomination was subject to a suspensive condition and rendered inoperative by reason of Federicos
death wholly inapplicable to the case at bar.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named

in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to
give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case.[19] Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies
in the sound discretion of the trial court. [20] In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this
case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their
grandmothers, Cristinas, estate.

In the case of Uy v. Court of Appeals,[21] we upheld the appointment by the trial court of a coadministration between the decedents son and the decedents brother, who was likewise a creditor of
the decedents estate. In the same vein, we declared in Delgado Vda. de De la Rosa v. Heirs of
Marciana Rustia Vda. de Damian[22] that:

[i]n the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the

interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule
out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity
demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the
estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including
another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita Taedo, but who was likewise adopted
by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering
the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and
Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one
direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

One final note. Counsel for petitioner meticulously argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code,
the successional bar between the legitimate and illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in
this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate the contrary Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of
the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent and her husband as their own son, reared from
infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and eventually legally adopted by decedents
husband, the original oppositor to respondents petition for letters of administration.

We are not unmindful of the critiques of civilists of a conflict and a lacuna in the law
concerning the bone of contention that is Article 992 of the Civil Code, beginning with the eminent
Justice J.B.L. Reyes:

In the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 the right of representation was admitted only within
the legitimate family; so much so that Article 943 of that Code prescribed that an
illegitimate child can not inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives
of his father and mother. The Civil Code of the Philippines apparently adhered to this
principle since it reproduced Article 943 of the Spanish Code in its own Art. 992, but
with fine inconsistency, in subsequent articles (990, 995 and 998) our Code allows the
hereditary portion of the illegitimate child to pass to his own descendants, whether
legitimate or illegitimate. So that while Art. 992 prevents the illegitimate issue of a
legitimate child from representing him in the intestate succession of the grandparent,
the illegitimates of an illegitimate child can now do so. This difference being
indefensible and unwarranted, in the future revision of the Civil Code we shall have to
make a choice and decide either that the illegitimate issue enjoys in all cases the right
of representation, in which case Art. 992 must be suppressed; or contrariwise
maintain said article and modify Articles 995 and 998. The first solution would be more
in accord with an enlightened attitude vis--vis illegitimate children.[23]

Manresa explains the basis for the rules on intestate succession:

The law [of intestacy] is founded on the presumed will of the deceased Love, it is said,
first descends, then ascends, and, finally, spreads sideways. Thus, the law first calls
the descendants, then the ascendants, and finally the collaterals, always preferring
those closer in degree to those of remoter degrees, on the assumption that the
deceased would have done so had he manifested his last will Lastly, in default of
anyone called to succession or bound to the decedent by ties of blood or affection, it is
in accordance with his presumed will that his property be given to charitable or
educational institutions, and thus contribute to the welfare of humanity.[24]

Indeed, the factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate
succession, i.e., love first descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her
legitimate and illegitimate grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally
raised the status of Emilio III from an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar
circumstances of this case, painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal

presumption in Article 992 of the Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between
legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a deceased.

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a
final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of
Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long
deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata[25] on the same issue remains good law:

[T]he declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the
evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had
hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of
distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. x x x. If there is a controversy

before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy
shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned
has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in
a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within
such time as the court directs.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina
Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel
Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78,
Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other

persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent
Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice

Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I
certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 180269, February 20, 2013]
JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR., SUBSTITUTED BY HIS HEIRS, NAMELY: FELICIDAD CUDIAMAT VDA.
DE CASILANG, JOSE C. CASILANG, JR., RICARDO C. CASILANG, MARIA LOURDES C.
CASILANG, CHRISTOPHER C. CASILANG, BEN C. CASILANG, DANTE C. CASILANG, GREGORIO
C. CASILANG, HERALD C. CASILANG; AND FELICIDAD Z. CASILANG, MARCELINA Z.
CASILANG, JACINTA Z. CASILANG, BONIFACIO Z. CASILANG, LEONORA Z. CASILANG, AND
FLORA Z. CASILANG, Petitioners, v. ROSARIO Z. CASILANG-DIZON, MARIO A. CASILANG,
ANGELO A. CASILANG, RODOLFO A. CASILANG, AND ATTY. ALICIA B. FABIA, IN HER
CAPACITY AS CLERK OF COURT AND EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF PANGASINAN AND/OR HER
DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE, Respondents.
DECISION

REYES, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CV No. 79619, which reversed and set aside the Decision 2 dated April 21, 2003 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D.
Antecedent Facts
The late spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio) and Francisca Zacarias (Francisca) had eight (8) children,
namely: Felicidad Casilang (Felicidad), Ireneo Casilang (Ireneo), Marcelina Casilang (Marcelina),
Jacinta Casilang (Jacinta), Bonifacio Casilang (Bonifacio), Leonora Casilang (Leonora), Jose Casilang
(Jose) and Flora Casilang (Flora). Liborio died intestate on October 11, 1982 at the age of 83,
followed not long after by his wife Francisca on December 25, 1982. Their son Bonifacio also died in
1986, survived by his child Bernabe Casilang (Bernabe), while son Ireneo died on June 11, 1992,
survived by his four (4) children, namely: Mario Casilang (Mario), Angelo Casilang (Angelo), Rosario
Casilang-Dizon (Rosario) and Rodolfo Casilang (Rodolfo), herein respondents.
The estate of Liborio, which left no debts, consisted of three (3) parcels of land located
in BarangayTalibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan, namely: (1) Lot No. 4676, with an area of 4,164 square
meters; (2) Lot No. 4704, containing 1,164 sq m; and (3) Lot No. 4618, with 897 sq m.
On May 26, 1997, respondent Rosario filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Calasiao,
Pangasinan a complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 847, to evict her uncle,
petitioner Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that Lot No. 4618 was owned by her father Ireneo,
as evidenced by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 555 issued in 1994 under her fathers name. On April 3,
1997, the respondents executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim3 whereby they
adjudicated Lot No. 4618 to themselves. In the same instrument, respondents Mario, Angelo and
Rodolfo renounced their respective shares in Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario.
In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the lawful, absolute, exclusive owner and in actual
possession of the said lot, and that he acquired the same through intestate succession from his late
father.4 For some reason, however, he and his lawyer, who was from the Public Attorneys Office,
failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial conference, and Jose was declared in default; thus, the
adverse judgment against him.5
On February 18, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment finding Rosario to be the owner of Lot No. 4618,
and ordering Jose to remove his house, vacate Lot No. 4618, and pay Rosario P500.00 in monthly
rentals from the filing of the complaint until she was placed in possession, plus attorneys fees of
P5,000.00, litigation expenses and costs. On March 23, 1998, the MTC issued a writ of execution; and
on August 28, 1998, a Writ of Demolition6 was issued.
On June 2, 1998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 children of Liborio and Francisca, 7 filed with the
RTC of Dagupan City a Complaint,8 docketed as Civil Case No. 98-02371-D for Annulment of
Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with Damages against the respondents. On June
10, 1998, the petitioners moved for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary
restraining order, which the RTC however denied on June 23, 1998.
Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by
Ireneos children over Lot No. 4618, as well as TD No. 555, and by necessary implication its
derivatives, TD No. 15177 (for the lot) and TD No. 15176 (for the house), both of which were issued in
1998 in the name of Rosario Casilang-Dizon. 9
The petitioners alleged in their complaint that all eight (8) children of Liborio entered into a verbal
partition of his estate, pursuant to which Jose was allotted Lot No. 4618 as his share; that Ireneo
never claimed ownership of Lot No. 4618, nor took possession of it, because his share was the
southwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No. 4676, containing an area of 1,308 sq m, 10 of which he took
exclusive possession during his lifetime; that Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood,
where he built his familys semi-concrete house just a few steps away from his parents old bamboo

hut; that he took in and cared for his aged parents in his house until their deaths in 1982; that one of
his children has also built a house on the lot. 11 Jose, said to be the most educated of the Casilang
siblings, worked as an insurance agent.12 The complete disposition of the intestate estate of Liborio
per the parties verbal partition appears as follows:
1. Lot No. 4676, with 4,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 534 in Liborios name, 13 was verbally
partitioned among Marcelina (236 sq m), Leonora (1,965 sq m), Flora (655 sq m), and Ireneo,
represented by his children, the herein respondents-defendants (1,308 sq m), as shown in aDeed of
Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all the Casilang
siblings and their representatives.
2. Lot No. 4704, with 1,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 276 in Liborios name, 14 was divided among
Jacinta and Bonifacio, who died in 1986 and is now represented by his son Bernabe; and
3. Lot No. 4618, containing 897 sq m, declared since 1994 under TD No. 555 in Ireneos name, 15 is
now the subject of the controversy below. Jose insists that he succeeded to it per verbal partition,
and that he and his family have always occupied the same peacefully, adversely and exclusively even
while their parents were alive.16
For her part, Rosario alleged in her answer with counterclaim, 17 which she filed on September 15,
1998, that:
a) She is the actual and lawful owner of Lot No. 4618 with an area of 897 square meters, having
acquired the same by way of a Deed of Extra judicial Partition with Quitclaim dated 3 April 1997 which
was duly executed among herein Appellant ROSARIO and her brothers, namely, MARIO, ANGELO and
RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG;
b) Her ownership over subject property could be traced back to her late father IR[E]NEO which the
latter inherited by way of intestate succession from his deceased father LIBORIO sometime in 1992;
that the residential house described in herein Appellee JOSEs complaint is an illegal structure built by
him in 1997 without her (ROSARIOs) knowledge and consent; that in fact, an ejectment suit was filed
against Appellee JOSE with the Municipal Trial Court in Calasiao, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 847;
c) The subject lot is never a portion of Appellee JOSEs share from the intestate of his deceased father,
LIBORIO; that on the contrary, the lot is his deceased brother IR[E]NEOs share from the late
LIBORIOs intestate estate; that in fact, the property has long been declared in the name of the late
IR[E]NEO as shown by Tax Declaration No. 555 long before his children ROSARIO DIZON, MARIO[,]
ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG, executed the Deed of Partition dated 18 February
1998; that Appellee JOSE had actually consumed his shares which he inherited from his late father,
and after a series of sales and dispositions of the same made by him, he now wants to take
Appellants property;
d) Appellee JOSE is never the rightful owner of the lot in question and has not shown any convincing
proof of his supposed ownership; that the improvements introduced by him, specifically the structures
he cited are the subject of a Writ of Demolition dated 28 August 1998 pursuant to the Order [dated]
17 August 1998 of the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan;
e) No protestation or objection was ever made by Appellee JOSE in Civil Case No. 847 (Unlawful
Detainer case) where he was the defendant; that the truth was that his possession of the subject
property was upon the tolerance and benevolence of his late brother IR[E]NEO during the latters
lifetime and that Appellant ROSARIO;
f) The RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff would just be doing her job if she and her
deputies would implement the writ of execution/demolition issued by the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan
since it is its ministerial duty to do so;
g) The Appellees have no cause of action; not having shown in their complaint the basis, the reason

and the very core of their claim as to why the questioned document should be nullified. 18 (Citation
omitted)
In their reply19 to Rosarios aforesaid answer, the petitioners asserted that the MTC committed a grave
error in failing to consider a material factthat Jose had long been in prior possession under a claim of
title which he obtained by partition.
At the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the parties entered into the following
stipulations:
1. That the late LIBORIO is the father of FELICIDAD, MARCELINA, JUANITA, LEONORA, FLORA and
IR[E]NEO, all surnamed CASILANG[;]
2. That the late LIBORIO died in 1982; That the late LIBORIO and his family resided on Lot [No.]
4618 up to his death in 1982; That the house of the late LIBORIO is located on Lot [No.] 4618;
3. That Plaintiff JOSE used to reside on the lot in question because there was a case for ejectment
filed against him;
4. That the house which was demolished is the family house of the late LIBORIO and FRANCISCA
ZACARIAS with the qualification that it was given to the defendants;
5. That the action involves members of the same family; and
6. That no earnest efforts were made prior to the institution of the case in court. 20
Ruling of the RTC
After a full trial on the merits, the RTC in its Decision21 dated April 21, 2003 decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against
the defendants as follows:
1. Declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 null and void;
2. Declaring plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject Lot [No.]
4618 and as such, entitled to the peaceful possession of the same;
3. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. attorneys fees in the amount of
[P]20,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of [P]5,000.00, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC affirmed Joses ownership and possession of Lot No. 4618 by virtue of the oral partition of the
estate of Liborio by all the siblings. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim23 dated
January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all the eight (8) Casilang siblings and their legal
representatives?with Ireneo represented by his four (4) children, and Bonifacio by his son Bernabe?
petitioners Jose, Felicidad, Jacinta and Bernabe, acknowledged that they had already received their
respective shares of inheritance in advance,24 and therefore, renounced their claims over Lot No.
4676 in favor of co-heirs Marcelina, Leonora, Flora and Ireneo, as follows:
[W]e hereby RENOUNCED, WAIVED AND QUITCLAIM, all our rights, interests and participations over
the WHOLE parcel of land [Lot No. 4676], left by the late, LIBORIO CASILANG, in favor of our coheirs, namely[:] MARCELINA Z. CASILANG-PARAYNO, LEONORA Z. CASILANG-SARMIENTO, FLORA Z.
CASILANG, MARIO A. CASILANG, ANGELO A. CASILANG, ROSARIO A. CASILANG- DIZON AND
RODOLFO A. CASILANG[.]25

Thus, Jose expressly renounced his share in Lot No. 4676, which has an area of 4,164 sq m, because
he had already received in advance his share in his fathers estate, Lot No. 4618 with 897 sq m:
To the mind of the court, Jose Casilang could have not [sic] renounced and waived his rights and
interests over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his, while the other lot, Lot [No.]
4704, was divided between sister Jacinta Casilang and brother Bonifacio Casilang[,] Sr., who was
represented by his son. In the same [way] as testified to by plaintiffs Felicidad Casilang and Jacinta
Casilang, they signed the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim wherein they waived and
renounced their rights and interests over Lot [No.] 4676 because they have already received their
share, which is Lot [No.] 470[4].26
The RTC found baseless the claim of Rosario that Lot No. 4618 was an inheritance of her father Ireneo
considering that a tax declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership. The RTC even noted that the
tax declaration of Ireneo started only in 1994, although he had been dead since 1992. Such being
the case, the heirs of Ir[e]neo Casilang has [sic] no basis in adjudicating unto themselves Lot No.
4618 and partitioning the same by executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim.27
Appeal to the CA
Undeterred, Rosario appealed to the CA averring that: (1) the lower court erred in declaring the Deed
of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 as null and void; and (2) the lower court
erred in declaring Jose as the lawful owner and possessor of the subject Lot No. 4618. 28
In the now assailed decision, the CA reversed the RTC by relying mainly on the factual findings and
conclusions of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847, viz:
Per the records, the above described property was subject of Civil Case No. 847 decided by the MTC of
Calasiao, First Judicial Region, Province of Pangasinan which rendered a judgment, supra, in favor of
Appellant ROSARIO ordering herein Appellee JOSE and all persons claiming rights under him to vacate
the land of Appellant ROSARIO. It was found by the MTC that the latter is the owner of the subject
parcel of land located at Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan; that the former owner of the land is the late
IRENEO (who died on 11 June 1992), father of Appellant ROSARIO; that Extra Judicial Partition with
Quitclaim was executed by and among the heirs of the late IRENEO; that MAURO [sic], ANGELO and
RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG waived and quitclaimed their respective shares over the subject
property in favor of Appellant ROSARIO; that Appellee JOSE was allowed by the late IRENEO during
his lifetime to occupy a portion of the land without a contract of lease and no rentals being paid by the
former; that Appellant ROSARIO allowed Appellee JOSE to continue occupying the land after the Extra
Judicial Partition with Quitclaim was executed.29
Moreover, noting that the decision in Civil Case No. 847 in favor of Rosario was issued on February
18, 1998 while the petitioners complaint in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D was filed on June 2, 1998, the
CA concluded that the latter case was a mere afterthought:
If the latter has really a strong and valid reason to question the validity of the Deed of Extra Judicial
Partition with Quitclaim, supra, he could have done it soon after the said Deed was executed on 3 April
1997. However, curiously enough, it was only when the MTC ordered his eviction from the subject
property that he decided to file the instant case against the Appellants. 30
Petition for Review in the Supreme Court
Now in this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners maintain that:
IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY [OF] THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION AND QUITCLAIM DATED
APRIL 3, 1997, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY VIOLATED THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT
OF JOSE Z. CASILANG[,] SR. AS DIRECT COMPULSORY HEIR. 31

Our Ruling and Discussions

There is merit in the petition.
Inferior courts are empowered to
rule on the question of ownership
raised by the defendant in an
ejectment suit, but only to resolve
the issue of possession; its
determination is not conclusive on
the issue of ownership.
It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary action of ejectment and a
plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land. What really distinguishes an
action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana) and from a reinvindicatory
action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the question of possession de facto.
Unlawful detainer suits (accion interdictal) together with forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment
suit that may be filed to recover possession of real property. Aside from the summary action of
ejectment, accion publiciana or the plenary action to recover the right of possession and
accionreinvindicatoria or the action to recover ownership which also includes recovery of possession,
make up the three kinds of actions to judicially recover possession. 32
Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Summary Procedure governs the two forms of
ejectment suit, the purpose being to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or
right to possession of the property. They are not processes to determine the actual title to an estate.
If at all, inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in
such suits, only to resolve the issue of possession and its determination on the ownership issue is not
conclusive.33 As thus provided in Section 16 of Rule 70:
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.When the defendant raises the defense of ownership in his
pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership,
the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession.
It is apropos, then, to note that in contrast to Civil Case No. 847, which is an ejectment case, Civil
Case No. 98-02371-D is for Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession; it is
anaccion reinvindicatoria, or action to recover ownership, which necessarily includes recovery of
possession34 as an incident thereof. Jose asserts his ownership over Lot No. 4618 under a partition
agreement with his co-heirs, and seeks to invalidate Ireneos claim over Lot No. 4618 and to declare
TD No. 555 void, and consequently, to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim executed
by Ireneos heirs.
It is imperative to review the CAs
factual conclusions since they are
entirely contrary to those of the
RTC, they have no citation of specific
supporting evidence, and are
premised on the supposed absence
of evidence, particularly on the
parties verbal partition, but are
directly contradicted by the
evidence on record.
It must be noted that the factual findings of the MTC, which the CA adopted without question, were
obtained through Summary Procedure and were based solely on the complaint and affidavits of
Rosario, after Jose had been declared in default. But since a full trial was had in Civil Case No. 98-

02371-D, the CA should have pointed out the specific errors and weaknesses in the RTCs factual
conclusions before it could rule that Jose was unable to present any evidentiary support to establish
his title, and that his continued possession of Lot No. 4618 was by mere tolerance of Rosario. At
most, however, the CA only opined that it was conjectural for the RTC to conclude, that Jose had
already received his inheritance when he renounced his share in Lot No. 4676. It then ruled that the
RTC erred in not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847that Joses possession over
subject property was by mere tolerance. Said the appellate court:
Given the claim of the Appellee that Lot [No.] 4618 was orally given/assigned to him by his deceased
father LIBORIO, or that his claim was corroborated by his sisters (his co-plaintiffs-Appellees), or that
their claim is indubitably tied up with the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim over Lot No.
4676, still We cannot fully agree with the pronouncement of the court a quo that Appellee JOSE could
not have renounced and waived his rights and interest over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes that Lot [No.]
4618 is not his. Wanting any evidentiary support, We find this stance as conjectural being
unsubstantiated by law or convincing evidence. At the most and taking the factual or legal
circumstances as shown by the records, We hold that the court a quo erred in not considering the
findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847 ruling that herein Appellee JOSEs possession over subject
property was by mere tolerance. Based as it is on mere tolerance, Appellee JOSEs possession
therefore could not, in any way, ripen into ownership. 35 (Citations omitted)
By relying solely on the MTCs findings, the CA completely ignored the testimonial, documentary and
circumstantial evidence of the petitioners, obtained by the RTC after a full trial on the merits. More
importantly, the CA did not point to any evidence of Rosario that Ireneo had inherited Lot No. 4618
from Liborio. All it did was adopt the findings of the MTC.
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and unless the case falls under any of the well-defined
exceptions, the Supreme Court will not delve once more into the findings of facts. In Sps. Sta. Maria
v. CA,36 this Court stated:
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the Court of
Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the
latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or
impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions
of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court;
(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record. 37 (Citation omitted)
In the instant case, the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are starkly contrasting. Moreover, we
find that the CA decision falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) above, which warrants another
review of its factual findings.
The evidence supporting Rosarios claim of sole ownership of Lot No. 4618 is the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Quitclaim, which she executed with her brothers Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo. There is no
question that by itself, the said document would have fully conveyed to Rosario whatever rights her
brothers might have in Lot No. 4618. But what needs to be established first is whether or not Ireneo
did in fact own Lot No. 4618 through succession, as Rosario claims. And here now lies the very crux
of the controversy.
A review of the parties evidence
shows that they entered into an oral
partition, giving Lot No. 4618 to
Jose as his share, whereas Rosario

presented no proof whatsoever that

her father inherited Lot No. 4618
from his father Liborio.
Rosarios only proof of Ireneos ownership is TD No. 555, issued in his name, but she did not bother to
explain why it was dated 1994, although Ireneo died on June 11, 1992. Liborios ownership of Lot No.
4618 is admitted by all the parties, but it must be asked whether in his lifetime Liborio did in fact
transmit it to Ireneo, and if not, whether it was conveyed to him by Liborios heirs. It is imperative for
Rosario to have presented proof of this transfer to Ireneo, in such a form as would have vested
ownership in him. We find, instead, a preponderance of contrary evidence.
1. In his testimony, Jose claimed that his parents bamboo house in Lot No. 4618 disintegrated from
wear and tear; so he took them in to his semi-concrete house in the same lot, which was just a few
steps away, and he cared for them until they died; shortly before Liborios death, and in the presence
of all his siblings, his father Liborio assigned Lot No. 4618 to him as his inheritance; his house was
demolished in 1998 as a result of the ejectment case filed against him; but his family continued to live
thereat after reconstructing the house; Ireneo and his family did not live in Lot No. 4618; although
Joses job as an insurance agent took him around Pangasinan, he always came home to his family in
his house in Lot No. 4618, which he used as his permanent address; only Lot No. 4676 was included in
the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated January 8, 1998 because Lot No. 4618 had already been
distributed to Jose, and Lot No. 4704 had already been assigned to Jacinta and Bonifacio as their
share in their fathers estate.38
2. Joses testimony was corroborated by petitioners Felicidad,39 Jacinta,40 Leonora,41 and Flora,42who
all confirmed that their brother Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 from his childhood up to the
present, that he took their aged parents into his house after their bamboo house was destroyed, and
he attended to their needs until they died in 1982. The sisters were also one in saying that their
father Liborio verbally willed Lot No. 4618 to Jose as his share in his estate, and that their actual
partition affirmed their fathers dispositions. Jacinta claimed that she and Bonifacio have since taken
possession of Lot No. 4704 pursuant to their partition, and have also declared their respective portions
for tax purposes.43 Flora corroborated Jacinta on their taking possession of Lot No. 4704, as well as
that Jose built his house on Lot No. 4618 next to his parents and they came to live with him in their
old age. Flora affirmed that Exhibit F correctly reflects their verbal partition of Lot No. 4676, and
that she was fully in accord with it. She added that Felicidad and Marcelina had since constructed
their own houses on the portions of Lot No. 4676 assigned to them. 44 Felicidad mentioned that in their
partition, Ireneo was given a portion of Lot No. 4676, while Lot No. 4704 was divided between Jacinta
and Bonifacio, and Jose alone got Lot No. 4618. Leonora confirmed that they were all present when
their father made his above dispositions of his estate.
3. Benjamin Lorenzo, a long-time neighbor of the Casilangs testified that Joses house stands on Lot
No. 4618 and Ireneo did not live with his family on the said lot but was a tenant in another farm some
distance away.45
4. For her part, Rosario merely asserted that her father Ireneo succeeded to Lot No. 4618 from
Liborio, as shown in TD No. 555 (Exhibit 1); that she and her brothers extra-judicially settled
Ireneos estate, and that they each waived their shares in her favor; and, that she has been paying
taxes on Lot No. 4618. Rosario admitted, however, that Jose has lived in the lot since he was a child,
and he has reconstructed his house thereon after its court-ordered demolition. 46 But Rosario on crossexamination backtracked by claiming that it was her father Ireneo and grandfather Liborio who built
the old house in Lot No. 4618, where Ireneo resided until his death; he even planted various fruit
trees. Yet, there is no mention whatsoever to this effect by any of the witnesses. Rosario also
contradicted herself when she denied that Jose lived there because his job as insurance agent took
him away often and yet admitted that Joses house stands there, which he reconstructed after it was
ordered demolished by the MTC. Inexplicably, Rosario disclaimed knowledge of Ireneos share in Lot
No. 4676, although she was a signatory, along with her brothers and all the petitioners, in the deed of
partition of the said lot, whereby she got 1,308 sq m. Rosario also admitted that taxes were paid on
the lot only beginning in 1997, not before.47

5. Benjamin Dizon, husband of Rosario, testified that Rosario was losing appetite and sleep because
of the case filed by Jose; that Ireneo died in another farm; that Ireneo had a house in Lot No. 4618
but Jose took over the house after he died in 1992. 48 Respondent Angelo, brother of Rosario, claimed
that when he was 13 or 14 years old, he heard his grandfather tell his father Ireneo that he would
inherit Lot No. 4618. On cross-examination, Angelo insisted that his father had always lived with his
family in his grandfathers house in Lot No. 4618, that Jose did not live there but was given another
lot, although he could not say which lot it was; he admitted that his grandmother lived with Jose when
she died, and Ireneos share was in Lot No. 4676. 49
6. On rebuttal, Jose recounted that after his four children were married, Ireneo lived as a tenant in
another farm; that during a period of illness he lived in Manila for some time, and later resided in
Cagayan with his two married sons; and lastly on his return, worked as a tenant of the Maningding
family for about 10 years in Calasiao, staying in a hut one kilometer away. Jose also claimed that
Ireneo had asked Liborio for a portion of Lot No. 4676, a lot which is bigger than Lot No. 4618 by
several hundreds of square meters.50
7. On sur-rebuttal, Rosario claimed that her grandparents, father and mother lived in Lot No. 4618
when she was a child until she married and left in 1976; that her uncle Jose asked permission from
Liborio to be allowed to stay there with his family. She admitted that Jose built his house in 1985,
three years after Liborio died, but as if to correct herself, she also claimed that Jose built his house in
Lot No. 4676, and not in Lot No. 4618. (Contrarily, her aunt Leonora testified that Jose built his
house in Lot No. 4618 while their parents were alive.)51 Moreover, if such was the case, Rosario did
not explain why she filed Civil Case No. 847, if she thought her uncle built his house in Lot No. 4676,
and not in Lot No. 4618.52 Rosario also claimed that Ireneo always came home in the evenings to his
father Liborios house from the Maningding farm, which he tenanted for 10 years, but obviously, by
then Liborios house had long been gone. Again, confusedly, Rosario denied that she knew of her
fathers share in Lot No. 4676.
From the testimonies of the parties, we are convinced that the conclusion of the RTC is well-supported
that there was indeed a verbal partition among the heirs of Liborio, pursuant to which each of his eight
children received his or her share of his estate, and that Joses share was Lot No. 4618.
The parties verbal partition is valid,
and has been ratified by their taking
possession of their respective
shares.
The validity of an oral partition is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In Vda. de Espina v. Abaya,53 this
Court declared that an oral partition is valid:
Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition. An agreement of partition
may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the property owned in
common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of Frauds has no operation in this kind
of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of property but simply a segregation and designation
of the part of the property which belong to the co-owners.54
In Maestrado v. CA,55 the Supreme Court upheld the partition after it found that it conformed to the
alleged oral partition of the heirs, and that the oral partition was confirmed by the notarized quitclaims
executed by the heirs subsequently.56 In Maglucot-Aw v. Maglucot,57 the Supreme Court elaborated on
the validity of parol partition:
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforce
[sic] oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,
equity will [in] proper cases[,] where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking
of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set
off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus,

it has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties
went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition
agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with
the possession in severalty.
In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the ground of
estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of land divided by parol
partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of individual ownership were
exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement and decree it to be valid and effectual
for the purpose of concluding the right of the parties as between each other to hold their respective
parts in severalty.
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition.
A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have stated that a
part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation of the statute of frauds.
It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between tenants in common, and a part
performance, a court of equity would have regard to and enforce such partition agreed to by the
parties.58
Joses possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is well borne out by the records. It is
also consistent with the claimed verbal partition with his siblings, and fully corroborated by his sisters
Felicidad, Jacinta, Leonora, and Flora, who further testified that they each had taken possession of
their own shares and built their houses thereon.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse claimant
establishes a better right.59 Moreover, under Article 541 of the Civil Code, one who possesses in the
concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he possesses with a just title, and he
cannot be obliged to show or prove it. Similarly, Article 433 of the Civil Code provides that actual
possession under a claim of ownership raises a disputable presumption of ownership. Thus, actual
possession and exercise of dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with an
alleged partition are considered strong proof of an oral partition 60 which the Court will not hesitate to
uphold.
Tax declarations and tax receipts
are not conclusive evidence of
ownership.
It is settled that tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not conclusive evidence of ownership.
They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership,61 but when coupled with proof of actual possession of
the property, they can be the basis of claim of ownership through prescription. 62 In the absence of
actual, public and adverse possession, the declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove
ownership.63 We have seen that there is no proof that Liborio, or the Casilang siblings conveyed Lot
No. 4618 to Ireneo. There is also no proof that Ireneo himself declared Lot No. 4618 for tax purposes,
and even if he or his heirs did, this is not enough basis to claim ownership over the subject property.
The Court notes that TD No. 555 was issued only in 1994, two years after Ireneos death. Rosario
even admitted that she began paying taxes only in 1997. 64 More importantly, Ireneo never claimed
Lot No. 4618 nor took possession of it in the concept of owner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 19, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and the
Decision dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, Branch 41 in Civil Case No.
98-02371-D is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 185745, October 15, 2014
SPOUSES DOMINADOR MARCOS AND GLORIA MARCOS, Petitioners, v. HEIRS OF ISIDRO
BANGI AND GENOVEVA DICCION, REPRESENTED BY NOLITO SABIANO, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
annul and set aside the Decision2 dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution3 dated December 4, 2008
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 89508, which affirmed the Decision 4dated
March 26, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 47, in Civil
Case No. U-6603.
The Facts
On June 26, 1998, the heirs of Isidro Bangi (Isidro) and Genoveva Diccion (Genoveva) (respondents),
filed with the RTC a complaint,5 docketed as Civil Case No. U-6603, for annulment of documents,
cancellation of transfer certificates of titles, restoration of original certificate of title and recovery of
ownership plus damages against spouses Dominador Marcos (Dominador) and Gloria Marcos (Gloria)
(petitioners). Likewise impleaded in the said complaint are spouses Jose Dilla (Jose) and Pacita Dilla
(Pacita), Ceasaria Alap (Ceasaria), and spouses Emilio Sumajit (Emilio) and Zenaida Sumajit
(Zenaida).
In their complaint, the respondents averred that on November 5, 1943, their parents, Isidro and
Genoveva, bought the one-third portion of a 2,138-square meter parcel of land situated in San
Manuel, Pangasinan and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22361 (subject property)
from Eusebio Bangi (Eusebio), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the latter. OCT
No. 22361 was registered in the name of Alipio Bangi (Alipio), Eusebios father. After the sale, the
respondents claimed that Isidro and Genoveva took possession of the subject property until they
passed away. The respondents then took possession of the same.
Further, the respondents alleged that sometime in 1998, they learned that the title to the subject
property, including the portion sold to Isidro and Genoveva, was transferred to herein petitioner
Dominador, Primo Alap (Primo), Ceasarias husband, Jose, and Emilio through a Deed of Absolute Sale
dated August 10, 1995, supposedly executed by Alipio with the consent of his wife Ramona Diccion
(Ramona). The respondents claimed that the said deed of absolute sale is a forgery since Alipio died in
1918 while Ramona passed away on June 13, 1957.
Consequently, by virtue of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995, OCT No. 22361
was cancelled and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 47829 was issued to Dominador, Primo, Jose
and Emilio. On November 21, 1995, Primo, Jose and Emilio executed another deed of absolute sale
over the same property in favor of herein petitioners. TCT No. T-47829 was then cancelled and TCT
No. T-48446 was issued in the names of herein petitioners. The respondents claimed that the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 21, 1995 was likewise a forgery since Primo could not have signed the
same on the said date since he died on January 29, 1972.
Thus, the respondents sought the nullification of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995
and November 21, 1995 and, accordingly, the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-47829 and T-48446. The
respondents likewise sought the restoration of OCT No. 22361.
In their answer, herein petitioners, together with the spouses Jose and Pacita, Ceasaria and the
spouses Emilio and Zenaida, denied the allegations of the respondents, claiming that they are the
owners of the subject property, including the one-third portion thereof allegedly sold by Eusebio to the
respondents parents Isidro and Genoveva. They averred that the subject property was originally
owned by Alipio; that after his death, his children Eusebio, Espedita and Jose Bangi inherited the
same. That on May 8, 1995, Espedita and Jose Bangi executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with
quitclaim wherein they waived their rights over the subject property in favor of Eusebios children
Ceasaria, Zenaida, Pacita and herein petitioner Gloria.
They further claimed that their father Eusebio could not have validly sold the one-third portion of the
subject property to Isidro and Genoveva. They explained that Eusebio supposedly acquired the parcel
of land covered by OCT No. 22361 by virtue of a donation propter nuptias from his father Alipio when
he married Ildefonsa Compay (Ildefonsa) in 1928. They claimed that the donationpropter nuptias in
favor of Eusebio was fictitious since Alipio died in 1918 and that, in any case, the said donation, even
if not fictitious, is void since the same was not registered.

They also averred that they had no participation in the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
August 10, 1995, claiming that it was a certain Dominador Quero, the one hired by herein petitioner
Gloria to facilitate the transfer of OCT No. 22361 in their names, who caused the execution of the
same.
Subsequently, the respondents and Ceasaria and the spouses Emilio and Zenaida entered into a
compromise agreement wherein Ceasaria and spouses Emilio and Zenaida acknowledged the right of
the respondents over the subject property and admitted the existence of the sale of the one-third
portion thereof by Eusebio in favor of the spouses Isidro and Genoveva. Thus, the case as to Ceasaria
and the spouses Emilio and Zenaida was dismissed.
Ruling of the RTC
On March 26, 2007, the RTC rendered a Decision6 the decretal portion of which
reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1)
2)

Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 x x x and Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 21, 1995 x x x as null and void;
Declaring Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-47829 issued in the names of PRIMO ALAP married to
[Ceasaria] Alap, JOSE DILLA married to Pacita Dilla, DOMINADOR MARCOS married to Gloria
Marcos, and EMILIO SUMAJIT married to Zenaida Sumajit x x x and Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-48446 in the name of Spouses DOMINADOR MARCOS and GLORIA BANGI x x x as null and
void.

Consequently, the Registrar of Deeds of Tayug, Pangasinan is hereby directed to cancel the same and
all the other copies thereof and that Original Certificate of Title No. 22361 in the name of Alipio Bangi
married to Romana Diccion be revived and/or reinstated in the registration book.
3)
4)

Declaring the sale by Eusebio Bangi of his share to the land in question in favor of x x x Isidro
Bangi and Genoveva Diccion as valid and effective.
For the defendant to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.7
The RTC opined that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 is a nullity; that the same was
falsified considering that Alipio could not have executed the same in the said date since he died in
1918. Consequently, all the documents and certificates of title issued as a consequence of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 are void. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In fact, defendant Gloria Marcos admitted in Court that the Deed of Absolute Sale was falsified, only it
was allegedly falsified by a certain Dominador Quero. This notwithstanding, the fact still remains, that
the Deed of Absolute Sale, which was the basis for the cancellation of the Original Certificate of Title
No. 22361, was falsified.
xxxx
The Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995, being a forged document, is without question, null
and void. This being the case, the land titles issued by reason thereof are also void because a forged
deed conveys no right.8chanrobleslaw
The RTC upheld the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1943 over the one-third portion of the
subject property executed by Eusebio in favor of the spouses Isidro and Genoveva. The RTC pointed
out that the petitioners merely claimed that the signature of Eusebio appearing on the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1943 was falsified without presenting any other evidence to prove
such claim.

As regards the claim that Eusebio could not have validly sold the one-third portion of the subject
property since his acquisition of the same in 1928 through a donation propter nuptias by Alipio was
fictitious since the latter died in 1918, the RTC found that the petitioners likewise failed to present any
evidence to prove such allegation. Considering that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 5,
1943 is a notarized document, the RTC ruled that the same must be sustained in full force and effect
since the petitioners failed to present strong, complete and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity.
Unperturbed, the petitioners appealed from the RTC Decision dated March 26, 2007 to the CA,
maintaining that the sale between Eusebio and the spouses Isidro and Genoveva was invalid. 9 They
explained that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 5, 1943 stated that Eusebio acquired the
subject property from his parents Alipio and Ramona through a donation propter nuptias; that Eusebio
got married to Ildefonsa in 1928 and Alipio Bangi could not have executed a donation then because he
died in 1918.
Ruling of the CA
On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered the herein assailed Decision, 10 which affirmed the Decision
dated March 26, 2007 of the RTC. The CA upheld the petitioners claim that the supposed
donationpropter nuptias of the subject property in favor of Eusebio from his parents was not
sufficiently established. The CA pointed out that the purported Deed of Donation was not recorded in
the Register of Deeds; that there is no showing that the said donation was made in a public
instrument as required by the Spanish Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the supposed
donation in favor of Eusebio.
Nevertheless, the CA found that Eusebio, at the time he executed the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
the spouses Isidro and Genoveva, already owned the subject property, having inherited the same from
his father Alipio who died in 1918. Further, the CA did not give credence to the Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Quitclaim purportedly executed by Espedita and Jose Bangi since it appears to have
been caused to be executed by the petitioners as a mere afterthought and only for the purpose of
thwarting the respondents valid claim.11cralawlawlibrary
The petitioners sought a reconsideration12 of the Decision dated September 30, 2008, but it was
denied by the CA in its Resolution13 dated December 4, 2008.
Hence, the instant petition.
Issue
The issue set forth by the petitioners for this Courts resolution is whether the CA committed reversible
error in affirming the RTC Decision dated March 26, 2007, which upheld the Deed of Absolute Sale
dated November 5, 1943 over the one-third portion of the subject property executed by Eusebio in
favor of the spouses Isidro and Genoveva.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is denied.
The appellate court upheld the validity of the sale of the one-third portion of the subject property to
the spouses Isidro and Genoveva mainly on the finding that, after the death of Alipio in 1918, an oral
partition was had between Eusebio and his siblings Espedita and Jose Bangi; that at the time of the
said sale on November 5, 1943 to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva, Eusebio was already the owner of
the subject property.
On the other hand, the petitioners maintain that the said sale of the one-third portion of the subject
property was not valid. They insinuate that the subject property, at the time of the sale, was still
owned in common by the heirs of Alipio; that Eusebio could not validly sell the one-third portion of the
subject property as there was no partition yet among the heirs of Alipio.

Ultimately, the resolution of the instant controversy is hinged upon the question of whether the heirs
of Alipio had already effected a partition of his estate prior to the sale of the one-third portion of the
subject property to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva on November 5, 1943. However, the foregoing
question is a factual question, which this Court may not pass upon in a petition for review under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court.
Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court categorically states that the petition filed shall raise only
questions of law, which must be distinctly set forth. A question of law arises when there is doubt as to
what the law is on a certain state of facts, while there is a question of fact when the doubt arises as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. For a question to be one of law, the same must not involve an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or any of them. The
resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.
Once it is clear that the issue invites a review of the evidence presented, the question posed is one of
fact.14cralawlawlibrary
The determination of whether the heirs of Alipio had already partitioned his estate prior to the sale of
the one-third portion of the subject property on November 5, 1943 necessarily requires an
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties; the doubt arises on the
truth or falsity of the allegations of the parties.
Even granting arguendo that the petition falls under any of the exceptions justifying a factual review of
the findings of the appellate court, the petition cannot prosper. The Court is of the opinion, and so
holds, that the CA did not commit any reversible error in ruling that an oral partition of the estate of
Alipio had already been effected by his heirs prior to the sale by Eusebio of the one-third portion of the
subject property to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva on November 5, 1943.
The petitioners claim that the CA erred in ruling that there was already a partition of the estate of
Alipio prior to the sale of the one-third portion of the subject property by Eusebio to the spouses Isidro
and Genoveva. They insist that there was no deed of extrajudicial partition by and among Eusebio,
Jose and Espedita [Bangi], wherein Eusebio [was assigned the subject property].15Accordingly, the
petitioners aver, the sale in favor of the spouses Isidro and Genoveva on November 5, 1943 is a nullity
and, consequently, the respondents do not have any right over the subject property.
The Court does not agree.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it
may belong.16 Every act which is intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or
devisees is deemed to be a partition.17 Partition may be inferred from circumstances sufficiently strong
to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be
presumed.18 Thus, in Hernandez v. Andal,19 the Court emphasized that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced
oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,
equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of
possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off
to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it
has been held or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went
into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement,
that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
possession in severalty.
xxxx
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and
ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect
thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. 20

The evidence presented by the parties indubitably show that, after the death of Alipio, his heirs
Eusebio, Espedita and Jose Bangi had orally partitioned his estate, including the subject property,
which was assigned to Eusebio. On this score, the CAs disquisition is instructive,
viz:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Even so, We are of the considered view that in 1943, when Eusebio Bangi executed the deed of sale in
favor of Isidro Bangi, Eusebio already had acquired interest in the property covered by OCT No. 22361
through succession from his father, Alipio Bangi, who died in 1918. Further, it appears that such
interest extends to the entire property embraced by OCT No. 22361. This much can be
gleaned from the testimony of appellant Gloria Marcos herself, who said that her father
Eusebio owned the entire lot because his siblings Espedita and Jose already had their share
from other properties.
That there was no written memorandum of the partition among Alipio Bangis heirs cannot detract
from appellees cause. It has been ruled that oral partition is effective when the parties have
consummated it by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership of the
respective portions set off to each. Here, it is obvious that Eusebio took possession of his share
and exercised ownership over it. Thus, the preponderant evidence points to the validity of the sale
executed between Eusebio Bangi and Isidro Bangi on November 5, 1943 over the one-third portion of
the property covered by OCT No. 22361. x x x.21 (Emphasis ours)
Further, the CA did not err in not giving credence to the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim
supposedly executed by Espedita and Jose Bangi on May 8, 1995. The Court notes that Alipio died in
1918 while his wife Ramona died on June 13, 1957. It is quite suspect that Espedita and Jose Bangi
executed the said Deed of Extrajudicial Partition, wherein they waived their rights over the subject
property in favor of Eusebios children, only on May 8, 1995. That only several months thereafter, the
subject property was supposedly sold to the spouses of Eusebios children and, later, to herein
petitioners spouses Dominador and Gloria.
The foregoing circumstances cast doubt as to the petitioners insinuation that the estate of Alipio had
only been partitioned in 1995, when Espedita and Jose Bangi executed the said Deed of Extrajudicial
Partition with Quitclaim. As pointed out by the CA, the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
with Quitclaim is but a ruse to defeat the rights of the respondents over the one-third portion of the
subject property. If at all, the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim executed by Espedita and
Jose Bangi merely confirms the partition of Alipios estate that was earlier had, albeit orally, in which
the subject property was assigned to Eusebio.
Accordingly, considering that Eusebio already owned the subject property at the time he sold the onethird portion thereof to the spouses Isidro and Genoveva on November 5, 1943, having been assigned
the same pursuant to the oral partition of the estate of Alipio effected by his heirs, the lower courts
correctly nullified the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 and November 21, 1995, as well
as TCT No. T-47829 and T-48446.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision
dated September 30, 2008 and Resolution dated December 4, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 89508 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.cralawred