Aid Tradeoff Disadvantage Answers - Samford 2013

Aid Trade-off DA Answers
Daniel/Michael/Dr. G
1
Samford Debate Institute 2013
Aid Trade-off Answers

AFF Answers................................................................................................................................2
1ar: Egyptian Economy Weak Now........................................................................................5
1ar: Sequester Already Cut Money.........................................................................................6
1ar: Aid Doesnt Solve............................................................................................................7
1ar: No Middle East War Impact...........................................................................................11
AFF: Defense Cuts Answers.................................................................................................16

2
AFF Answers
1) No link: plan doesnt spend any money.
2) Non-Unique: Political legitimacy crisis in Egypt remains unresolved.
The Center for American Progress, 2013 (think tank), Feb. 1, 2013, US OFFICIAL NEWS,
Retrieved May 29, 2013, from Lexis/Nexis
The divisions exposed by this flawed political transition highlight the political-legitimacy crisis that
still looms and remains unresolved in Egypt. Adding to the growing discontent were a divisive June
court decision to dissolve the elected parliament and the constitutional drafting process itself, which
opened much deeper fissures in Egyptian politics. The first Constituent Assembly, elected by the
Islamist-dominated parliament, faced boycotts from liberals, leftists, and al-Azhar University for
being unrepresentativea charge that Cairos Administrative Court upheld when it suspended
the Assembly in April 2012.
3) No threshold for aidno proof a small decrease triggers the collapse they
cite.
4) Non-unique: Egypt is in the midst of an economic meltdownaid isnt
solving.
The Center for American Progress, 2013 (think tank), Feb. 1, 2013, US OFFICIAL NEWS,
Retrieved May 29, 2013, from Lexis/Nexis
Continued economic meltdown At the same time that Egypt faces crises of political legitimacy and
deteriorated security, it is coping with an ongoing economic crisis. Egypts economy has suffered
from a rapid decline in foreign reservesfrom $35 billion down to $15 billion since the revolution
and a subsequent loss of value of the Egyptian pound, which has led to a spike in inflation. The political and economic
uncertainty in Egypt has driven away 92 percent of foreign direct investment and led to a 30
percent drop in tourism, one of Egypts most important industries. These economic problems have ballooned Egypts budget deficit to
more than 10 percent of GDP. Worse still, Egypt faces 12 percent total unemployment and 41 percent youth unemployment.
5) No impact: past instability hasnt triggered a war.

3
6) Sequester already cut budgets.

But the
warning is competing with snowballing enthusiasm for budget-cutting that has seized Washington
since the recent cuts, known here as the "sequester", went into effect. Cutting roughly five percent
of all federal budgets, analysts say the sequester would slice around 433 million dollars from U.S. global health aid for the remainder of
Katelyn Fossett, 2013 (staff writer), IPS - INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 9, 2013, Retrieved Apr. 27, 2013, from Lexis/Nexis
this fiscal year alone.
7) Non-unique: Aid to Afghanistan should trade-off.

Jonathan Turley, 2013 (writer), JONATHANTURLEY.ORG (RES IPSA LOQUITUR), Apr. 23,
2013, Retrieved Apr. 27, 2013, from Lexis/Nexis President Hamid Karzai has spent years
denouncing the United States as we have continued to pour hundreds of billions into this country
(and his corrupt family and government). Now, Karzai has called on China to come in and
guarantee security in the country as he continues to call on the United States to get out. Despite
these consistent attacks on the U.S. and Americans as 'demons'[1], the Obama Administration
continues to put our soldiers in harms way and spend money that is badly needed at home in this
country. So, while the Administration is cutting back on FAA towers and slowing air travel, we
will continue to spend wildly in a country seeking to replace us with China.
8) Non-unique: Aid to the Phillipines

Jose Katigbak,2013 (staff writer), THE PHILIPPINE STAR, Apr. 28, 2013, Retrieved Apr. 27,
2013 from http://www.philstar.com:8080/headlines/2013/04/28/935744/us-hikes-foreign-aid-phl
The US State Department has allocated over $178 million in foreign assistance to the Philippines in
its budget for fiscal year 2014, some $32 million more than what was actually provided in FY 2012.
Secretary of State John Kerry, in the budget presented to Congress, said the departments total
request of $47.8 billion strikes the balance between fiscal discipline and sustaining and advancing
Americas global leadership and is six percent less than in FY 2012.
9) Aid to Egypt is a drop in the bucket that solves nothing.

Alfred S.
Regnery, 2012 ( former publisher of The American Spectator), BREITBART, Oct. 3, 2012, Retrieved Apr. 27, 2013, from
Obamas new Egyptian pledge is just a

drop in the bucket in a $19 billion boondoggle that is so laden with corruption and waste
that the entire enterprise should be a public outrage, and it ought to be abolished or completely restructured.
http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2012/10/03/The-Scandal-That-Is-Foreign-Aid
Former Reagan-era Ambassador Eugene Douglas, who has visited Africa dozens of times both as a diplomat and as a businessman, and who has
closely observed US foreign aid and its impact for years, told me, the system is rotten and has become just another
piggy bank for the one world progressive college graduates who find it so uplifting to act out fantasies with taxpayer
funds and virtually no practical accountability.
10)Regional cooperation solves Middle East war impact:

Leon Hadar, 7/1/2011
(foreign policy studies expert @ CATO Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=13259)
To some extent, the recognition that the United States has lost some of its ability to determine strategic outcomes in the Middle East has already
encouraged regional powers to reassess the wisdom of free riding on American power. Saudi Arabia, together with its partners in the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC), has deployed troops to Bahrain to provide support to the regime and is
heading the efforts to
stabilize Yemen. Meanwhile, France, a major Mediterranean power, and Britain have played a leading role in the military operation in
Libya to protect their interests in the region. Turkey has been asserting more forcefully its role as a regional
power in multiple ways. Indeed, contrary to the warning proponents of U.S. military intervention typically
express, the withdrawal of American troops from Iraq and Afghanistan would not necessarily lead to more chaos and bloodshed in those

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countries. Russia,
India and Iran which supported the Northern Alliance that helped Washintgon topple the Taliban and
Pakistan (which once backed the Taliban) all have close ties to various ethnic and tribal groups in that country
and now have a common interest in stabilizing Afghanistan and containing the rivalries. A similar arrangement
could be applied to Iraq where Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran share an interest in assisting their local allies and in
restraining potential rivals Shiites, Sunnis, Kurds and Turkmen by preventing the sectarian tensions in Iraq from spilling
into the rest of the region. Hence, Turkey has already been quite successful in stabilizing and developing
economic ties with the autonomous Kurdish area of Iraq while containing irredentist Kurdish pressures in northern Iraq and southern
Turkey and protecting the Turkmen minority. And Turkey, together with Saudi Arabia and Iran, has played a critical role toward forming a
government in Baghdad that recognizes the interests of Shiites, Sunnis, and Kurds. The United States should take part in any negotiations leading
to regional agreements on Afghanistan and Iraq, a process that could also become an opportunity to improve the relationship with Iran. Such an
approach has the potential to demonstrate that regionalism, as opposed to American hegemonism, could
to U.S. interests as well as to the governments and people of the Middle East and Central Asia.
be more beneficial

5
1ar: Egyptian Economy Weak Now

Morsi is facing a crisis because of the struggles of the Egyptian economy.
Zvi Mazellast, 2013 (a fellow of The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs and former
ambassador to Romania, Egypt and Sweden), Apr. 2, 2013, Retrieved May 30, 2013 from
http://www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Foundering-in-quicksand-Is-there-hope-for-Egypt-308374
The Muslim Brotherhood who had won a sweeping victory in the first free parliamentary
elections and got their candidate elected president have bitterly disappointed the people who had
put their faith in them. Nothing has been done to improve their lot. Upon taking office Morsi had
promised and failed to take care of five burning issues within a hundred days: growing
insecurity, monster traffic jams in the capital, lack of fuel and cooking gas, lack of subsidized bread,
and the mounting piles of refuse in the streets.

6
1ar: Sequester Already Cut Money

Sequester will cut money from aid now.
Katelyn Fossett, 2013 (staff writer), IPS - INTER PRESS SERVICE, Apr. 9, 2013, Retrieved Apr. 27, 2013, from Lexis/Nexis But
the warning is competing with snowballing enthusiasm for budget-cutting that has seized
Washington since the recent cuts, known here as the "sequester", went into effect. Cutting roughly
five percent of all federal budgets, analysts say the sequester would slice around 433 million dollars
from U.S. global health aid for the remainder of this fiscal year alone.

7
1ar: Aid Doesnt Solve

Foreign aid doesnt solve.
Alfred S. Regnery, 2012 ( former publisher of The American Spectator), BREITBART, Oct. 3,
2012, Retrieved Apr. 27, 2013, from http://www.breitbart.com/Big-Peace/2012/10/03/TheScandal-That-Is-Foreign-Aid US foreign aid is no stranger to criticism. It was originally intended
to promote US foreign policy but is increasingly used for political and humanitarian purposes
which often have little to do with American interests. It is questionable whether it has any positive
impact on US foreign policy; nobody knows how much of what we send abroad is stolen,
converted to another use, or actually reaches its intended destination.
U.S. foreign aid not effective

Doug Bandow 3-7-2011 (Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, U.S. Foreign Aid Hinders More
than it Helps, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-foreign-aid-hinders-more-ithelps, accessed 6/26/2013 TMW)
Despite Clintons extravagant claims, there is little evidence that foreign assistance advances U.S. interests. The
U.S. provided some $30 billion to Egypt over the last three decades, but the country remains poor
and undemocratic. Indeed, aid to the corrupt Mubarak dictatorship helped turn Egypt into popular
volcano. Pakistan has been on the U.S. dole and performing disastrously for decades . The waste,
inefficiency and corruption surrounding humanitarian projects in Afghanistan and Iraq are legendary. What of the $27 billion in so-called
development assistance requested for next year? These outlays have had no discernible impact on Third World
economic growth. No doubt some projects in some countries have provided some benefits. But there is no correlation
between aid and growth. Indeed, generous financial transfers to corrupt dictators often have impeded
necessary reforms. Aid advocates now claim to do better. President George W. Bush created the Millennium Challenge
Corporation to reward governments with good policies. Yet, reported the Washington Times last August, the agency is giving billions
of dollars to nations upbraided by the State Department for corruption in government. The
international dole has created long-term dependency and discouraged reform. Even humanitarian aid has a disappointing record . Six months
after the earthquake in Haiti, reported the Wall Street Journal, the process of reconstruction appears to have come to a halt. U.S.
Food for Peace shipments, used to dump farmers domestic surpluses, are notorious for ruining
local farmers and thus undermining local production. This problem continues in Haiti. On returning from a private aid
mission, Don Slesnick, the mayor of Coral Gables, Florida, complained: We were saddened to see rice bags travel no
more than 20 (meters) from the gates of the distribution site before ending up in the back of a
pickup truck presumably headed for the black market. To our further dismay, we returned home to
read news stories that those very same donations were undercutting Haitian rice farmers who
needed income to support their own families. Worse is Somalia. Reported the New York Times last year: As much as
half the food aid sent to Somalia is diverted from needy people to a web of corrupt contractors,
radical Islamist militants and local United Nations staff members.
U.S. foreign aid misused

Jason Chaffetz 6-30-2011 ( United States Congressmen, Accountability lacking U.S. foreign
aid, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jun/30/accountability-lacking-in-us-foreignaid/, accessed 6-26-2013)
Despite questions of widespread waste, fraud and abuse of foreign-aid dollars, President Obama
last week called for hundreds of millions of dollars in increased aid. Meanwhile, recent audits by the
USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG) have revealed a pattern of poor management from Haiti
to Iraq to Pakistan. I see no reason to believe additional aid dollars called for by Mr. Obama to the
Middle East and North Africa will be spent any more judiciously . The hearing, combined with audit

8
reports from the OIG, demonstrated that vast amounts of U.S. aid money is being spent with little
documentation or verification of quantifiable results. Although we hear claims of schools that have been built, no one can
produce photographs of a finished school. Weve spent money on physical infrastructure, but we have been shown no evidence the infrastructure
was completed. There is simply no process to credibly verify whether aid efforts are resulting in real outcomes or just wild distortions In Haiti,
for example, an audit revealed that grantees have constructed far fewer shelters than required following the January 2010 earthquake. By June 30,
2010, just 6 percent of the target had been reached. The OIG found that completed shelters varied greatly in terms of quality and price, and some
shelters did not meet minimum standards. Because the grants did not include requirements for mechanized rubble removal, only about 5 percent
of the rubble had been removed 11 months after the quake. The United States spent $1.2 billion in Haiti in 2010 but
cannot produce documentation of what was accomplished with that money . In Pakistan, where the
U.S. has authorized $7.5 billion in assistance over five years, an audit revealed significant
vulnerabilities that could result in waste or misuse of U.S. Government resources. More than 250
weaknesses were identified in the potential recipients ability to properly manage funds. The audit
revealed that USAID/Pakistan did not correct those vulnerabilities before distributing hundreds of
millions of aid dollars. An audit report on aid to Iraq revealed similar questions. The audit found anomalies in signatures submitted as
evidence of payments to beneficiaries. In one case, 262,482 people reportedly had benefited from the purchase
of medical supplies meant to treat just 100 victims of a specific attack. Even as weaknesses were identified in
Iraq, USAID was slow to implement the changes recommended in the audit.

9
U.S. foreign aid not effective

Doug Bandow 3-7-2011 (Senior Fellow at the CATO Institute, U.S. Foreign Aid Hinders More
than it Helps, http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/us-foreign-aid-hinders-more-ithelps, accessed 6/26/2013 TMW)
Despite Clintons extravagant claims, there is little evidence that foreign assistance advances U.S.
interests. The U.S. provided some $30 billion to Egypt over the last three decades, but the country
remains poor and undemocratic. Indeed, aid to the corrupt Mubarak dictatorship helped turn
Egypt into popular volcano. Pakistan has been on the U.S. dole and performing disastrously for
decades. The waste, inefficiency and corruption surrounding humanitarian projects in
Afghanistan and Iraq are legendary. What of the $27 billion in so-called development assistance
requested for next year? These outlays have had no discernible impact on Third World economic
growth. No doubt some projects in some countries have provided some benefits. But there is no
correlation between aid and growth. Indeed, generous financial transfers to corrupt dictators often
have impeded necessary reforms. Aid advocates now claim to do better. President George W.
Bush created the Millennium Challenge Corporation to reward governments with good policies.
Yet, reported the Washington Times last August, the agency is giving billions of dollars to nations
upbraided by the State Department for corruption in government. The international dole has
created long-term dependency and discouraged reform. Even humanitarian aid has a
disappointing record. Six months after the earthquake in Haiti, reported the Wall Street Journal,
the process of reconstruction appears to have come to a halt. U.S. Food for Peace shipments,
used to dump farmers domestic surpluses, are notorious for ruining local farmers and thus
undermining local production. This problem continues in Haiti. On returning from a private aid
mission, Don Slesnick, the mayor of Coral Gables, Florida, complained: We were saddened to
see rice bags travel no more than 20 (meters) from the gates of the distribution site before ending
up in the back of a pickup truck presumably headed for the black market. To our further dismay,
we returned home to read news stories that those very same donations were undercutting Haitian
rice farmers who needed income to support their own families. Worse is Somalia. Reported the
New York Times last year: As much as half the food aid sent to Somalia is diverted from needy
people to a web of corrupt contractors, radical Islamist militants and local United Nations staff
members.

10
U.S. foreign aid misused

Jason Chaffetz 6-30-2011 ( United States Congressmen, Accountability lacking U.S. foreign
aid, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/jun/30/accountability-lacking-in-us-foreignaid/, accessed 6-26-2013)
Despite questions of widespread waste, fraud and abuse of foreign-aid dollars, President Obama
last week called for hundreds of millions of dollars in increased aid. Meanwhile, recent audits by the
USAID Office of Inspector General (OIG) have revealed a pattern of poor management from Haiti
to Iraq to Pakistan. I see no reason to believe additional aid dollars called for by Mr. Obama to the
Middle East and North Africa will be spent any more judiciously . The hearing, combined with audit
reports from the OIG, demonstrated that vast amounts of U.S. aid money is being spent with little
documentation or verification of quantifiable results. Although we hear claims of schools that have been built, no one can
produce photographs of a finished school. Weve spent money on physical infrastructure, but we have been shown no evidence the infrastructure
was completed. There is simply no process to credibly verify whether aid efforts are resulting in real outcomes or just wild distortions In Haiti,
for example, an audit revealed that grantees have constructed far fewer shelters than required following the January 2010 earthquake. By June 30,
2010, just 6 percent of the target had been reached. The OIG found that completed shelters varied greatly in terms of quality and price, and some
shelters did not meet minimum standards. Because the grants did not include requirements for mechanized rubble removal, only about 5 percent
of the rubble had been removed 11 months after the quake. The United States spent $1.2 billion in Haiti in 2010 but
cannot produce documentation of what was accomplished with that money . In Pakistan, where the
U.S. has authorized $7.5 billion in assistance over five years, an audit revealed significant
vulnerabilities that could result in waste or misuse of U.S. Government resources. More than 250
weaknesses were identified in the potential recipients ability to properly manage funds. The audit
revealed that USAID/Pakistan did not correct those vulnerabilities before distributing hundreds of
millions of aid dollars. An audit report on aid to Iraq revealed similar questions. The audit found anomalies in signatures submitted as
evidence of payments to beneficiaries. In one case, 262,482 people reportedly had benefited from the purchase
of medical supplies meant to treat just 100 victims of a specific attack. Even as weaknesses were identified in
Iraq, USAID was slow to implement the changes recommended in the audit.

11
1ar: No Middle East War Impact

(--) No risk of Middle East war self preservation, ideology, and fear of blowback
Susan Maloney 2007 and Ray Takeyh, 6/28/2007. Senior fellow for Middle East Policy
at the Saban Center for Middle East Studies at the Brookings Institution and senior fellow
for Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations. Why the Iraq War Wont
Engulf the Mideast, International Herald Tribune,
http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2007/0628iraq_maloney.aspx.
Yet, the Saudis, Iranians, Jordanians, Syrians, and others are very unlikely to go to war either
to protect their own sect or ethnic group or to prevent one country from gaining the upper hand in Iraq. The reasons are fairly
Middle Eastern leaders, like politicians everywhere, are primarily interested in one
thing: self-preservation. Committing forces to Iraq is an inherently risky proposition , which, if the
conflict went badly, could threaten domestic political stability. Moreover, most Arab armies
are geared toward regime protection rather than projecting power and thus have little
capability for sending troops to Iraq. Second, there is cause for concern about the so-called blowback
scenario in which jihadis returning from Iraq destabilize their home countries, plunging the region into
conflict. Middle Eastern leaders are preparing for this possibility. Unlike in the 1990s, when Arab fighters in the Afghan
jihad against the Soviet Union returned to Algeria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia and became a source of instability, Arab security
services are being vigilant about who is coming in and going from their countries. In the last
straightforward. First,
month, the Saudi government has arrested approximately 200 people suspected of ties with militants. Riyadh is also building a 700
there is no precedent
for Arab leaders to commit forces to conflicts in which they are not directly involved. The
kilometer wall along part of its frontier with Iraq in order to keep militants out of the kingdom. Finally,
Iraqis and the Saudis did send small contingents to fight the Israelis in 1948 and 1967, but they were either ineffective or never made
it. In the 1970s and 1980s, Arab countries other than Syria, which had a compelling interest in establishing its hegemony over
Lebanon, never committed forces either to protect the Lebanese from the Israelis or from other Lebanese. The
civil war in
Lebanon was regarded as someone else's fight. Indeed, this is the way many leaders view the current situation
in Iraq. To Cairo, Amman and Riyadh, the situation in Iraq is worrisome, but in the end it is an Iraqi and American fight. As far as
Iranian mullahs are concerned, they have long preferred to press their interests through proxies as opposed to direct engagement. At
a time when Tehran has access and influence over powerful Shiite militias, a massive cross-border incursion is both unlikely and
unnecessary. So Iraqis will remain locked in a sectarian and ethnic struggle that outside powers may abet, but will remain within the
The Middle East is a region both prone and accustomed to civil wars. But given
its experience with ambiguous conflicts, the region has also developed an intuitive ability to
contain its civil strife and prevent local conflicts from enveloping the entire Middle East.
borders of Iraq.
Deterrence checks Middle East escalation

Russell 10 [James, senior lecturer Naval postgraduate school, 1/5/10
James A. Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear

Weapons: U.S. Strategic and Policy Conundrums in the Gulf, http://www.analyst-network.com/article.php?art_id=3297
This history suggests an overwhelming emphasis on the role of conventional force in

operationalizing American security guarantees and extended deterrent commitments. In the
Gulfunlike Northeast Asiathe role of nuclear weapons has never been explicitly spelled
out and has very much remained in the background. However, while reference to nuclear weapons might remain
unstated, the reality is that they are explicitly committed to defend American forces whenever the commander-in-chief might deem it necessary.
The entire (and substantial) American military regional footprint operates under a quite explicit nuclear umbrellaheadlines or no headlines. If a
nuclear umbrella is indeed draped over Americas forward deployed Gulf presence, its hard not to see how that umbrella is similarly draped over
the states that are hosting those forces. The only problem with Secretary Clintons recent statements is that she seems unaware of this fact, i.e.,
the United States already maintains a nuclear umbrella backed by nuclear weapons in the region. While the United States has pledged not to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear signatories of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (known as negative security assurances), it maintains a
policy of calculated ambiguity in honoring those commitments if its forces are attacked by chemical or biological weapons.[24] President Clinton
reinforced this position in Presidential Decision Memorandum 60 in December 1997, which stated: The United States reaffirms that it will not use

12
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an
invasion or any other attack on the United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state toward which it has a
As
previously noted, the United States last unsheathed this proverbial sword in 1996 with the
discovery of a potential chemical weapons plant in Libya. The sword, however, remains at
the ready in the Gulf where Irans development of chemical weapons, long-range missiles,
and its emphasis on terrorism and asymmetric warfare constitute prominent elements of the regional threat
environment. If anything Irans weakened conventional forces potentially drive Iranian military
responses during an armed conflict to those weapons that would lead the United States to
consider forswearing its negative security assurances.[26] [26. As argued in James A. Russell, Strategic
security commitment carried out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.[25]
Stability Reconsidered: Prospects for Escalation and Nuclear War in the Middle East, Institut Franais des Relations Internationales Proliferation
Papers 26 (Spring 2009).] In
this scenario, it seems clear that American nuclear weapons are a

component in the web of military capabilities designed to discourage Iranian use of its
unconventional weapons in war. Conclusion Nuclear weapons have historically helped
implicitly and explicitly support Americas far flung global commitments in the Gulf and
elsewhere. The system of Gulf security built by the United States reflects a time-honored
template of regional defense and security honed in decades of Cold War experience. In the
Gulf, the dual tools of extended deterrence and security assurances have proven a
cornerstone of a system of regional security efficiently administered by Americas military
organizations. Nuclear weapons today undeniably form part of this systemexplicitly protecting
U.S. forces and implicitly protecting regimes hosting those forces.
(--) No global escalationthe US and Russia have lost historical linkages to the
Middle East:
Gwynne Dyer, 2002 December 2002. Ph.D. in Military and Middle Eastern History from the
University of London and former professor at the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and
Oxford University. The Coming War, Queens Quarterly, Questia.
All of this indicates an extremely dangerous situation, with many variables that are impossible to assess fully. But there is one
this will not become World War III. Not long ago, wars in the Middle East
always went to the brink very quickly, with the Americans and Soviets deeply involved on
opposite sides, bristling their nuclear weapons at one another. And for quite some time we lived on the
brink of oblivion. But that is over. World War III has been cancelled, and I don't think we could pump it up again
no matter how hard we tried. The connections that once tied Middle Eastern confrontations to a global
confrontation involving tens of thousands of nuclear weapons have all been undon e. The Eastcomforting reality here:
West Cold War is finished. The truly dangerous powers in the world today are the industrialized countries in general. We are the
ones with the resources and the technology to churn out weapons of mass destruction like sausages. But the good news is: we are out
of the business.
(--) Middle East wars wont escalateregional players are invested in stability:
Kevin Drum, 2007
(http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012050.php)
Needless to say, no one can predict the future with any confidence, especially in a region as turbulent as the Middle East. And it's impossible to
I think most of the regional players are more invested in

stability than we give them credit for, especially if the United States takes a sane and
energetic diplomatic approach to things. Saudi Arabia and Iran both want to keep their oil
flowing, and both continue to keep bilateral talks plodding along. Syria will follow Iran's
lead. Jordan will hunker down.
prove that a worst case scenario won't happen. Still,

13
(--) Middle East wars dont escalate empirically proven

Yglesias, 2007 [Matthew Yglesias is an Associate Editor of The Atlantic Monthly,
Containing Iraq, The Atlantic, 12 Sep 2007,
http://matthewyglesias.theatlantic.com/archives/2007/09/containing_iraq.php]
Kevin Drum tries to throw some water on the "Middle East in Flames" theory holding that American
withdrawal from Iraq will lead not only to a short-term intensification of fighting in Iraq, but also to some kind of broader regional conflagration.
Ivo Daalder and James Lindsay, as usual sensible but several clicks to my right, also make this point briefly in Democracy:
"Talk that
Iraqs troubles will trigger a regional war is overblown; none of the half-dozen civil wars the
Middle East has witnessed over the past half-century led to a regional conflagration." Also worth
mentioning in this context is the basic point that the Iranian and Syrian militaries just aren't
able to conduct meaningful offensive military operations. The Saudi, Kuwait, and
Jordanian militaries are even worse. The IDF has plenty of Arabs to fight closer to home. What you're looking at,
realistically, is that our allies in Kurdistan might provide safe harbor to PKK guerillas, thus prompting our allies in Turkey to mount some crossborder military strikes against the PKK or possibly retaliatory ones against other Kurdish targets. This is a real problem, but it's obviously not a
problem that's mitigated by having the US Army try to act as the Baghdad Police Department or sending US Marines to wander around the desert
hunting a possibly mythical terrorist organization.
(--) Middle East Wars wont spreadother nations have no incentive to get
involved:
Kevin Drum, 2007
(http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/archives/individual/2007_09/012050.php)
A PROVOCATION....In my ongoing effort to embarrass myself in public, I'm going to revisit the
subject of the feared Mideast meltdown that might follow in the wake of an American
withdrawal from Iraq. First, though, to make my position absolutely clear: I do believe that the
Iraq civil war itself would likely get worse if we leave, but I don't believe this would
necessarily lead to a broadening of the war to the entire region (the "Middle East In Flames"
theory). My skepticism of the MEIF theory is mostly grounded in two things. First, it's a theory
that gets an awful lot of uncritical acceptance without much in the way of actual detailed
argument. That's always a bad sign. Second, worst case scenarios have a long history of being
trotted out as a convenient way of forestalling unwanted action, and that's what seems to be
happening in this case. Beyond that, though, there are the specifics of the MEIF scenario itself
and this is the part where I go to work without a net. Here's the nickel version of why I suspect
an Iraqi civil war won't spread. The four neighbors that are most likely to get involved in a
wider war are Saudi Arabia, Iran, Jordan, and Syria. Basically, I consider Saudi Arabia a
paper tiger. They're militarily incompetent and will never get directly involved in Iraq, no
matter how much the local Wahhabi imams rant about the persecution of Iraq's Sunni minority.
Iran is more competent, but over the past 30 years they've never displayed any territorial
ambitions. They prefer working through proxies. Both Saudi Arabia and Iran may provide
some modest funding for their "side," but probably not much more. Jordan has no desire
to get involved in any kind of war, and in any case we have a moderate amount of influence
with King Abdullah. We can almost certainly keep Jordan from taking precipitate action as long
as they don't feel too threatened. Syria is harder to predict, but they've got plenty of
problems on their plate already. Besides, they've been making fairly consistently
conciliatory noises lately, and as Eric Umansky reminds us, they actively tried to cooperate with
us in the early days of the Iraq war until Donald Rumsfeld put the kibosh on them.

14
(--) Middle East wars dont escalate your evidence is media bias
Luttwak, 2007 [Edward Luttwak, CSIS senior associate and has served as a consultant to
the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, the U.S. Department of
State, the U.S. Army, Navy, and Air Force, and a number of allied governments as well as
international corporations and financial institutions, The middle of nowhere, Prospect, May
2007, www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=9302]
Why are middle east experts so unfailingly wrong? The lesson of history is that men never learn
from history, but middle east experts, like the rest of us, should at least learn from their past
mistakes. Instead, they just keep repeating them. The first mistake is "five minutes to
midnight" catastrophism. The late King Hussein of Jordan was the undisputed master of this
genre. Wearing his gravest aspect, he would warn us that with patience finally exhausted the Arab-Israeli
conflict was about to explode, that all past conflicts would be dwarfed by what was about to happen
unless, unless And then came the remedyusually something rather tame when compared with the immense catastrophe
predicted, such as resuming this or that stalled negotiation, or getting an American envoy to the scene to make the usual promises to
the Palestinians and apply the usual pressures on Israel. We
read versions of the standard King Hussein
speech in countless newspaper columns, hear identical invocations in the grindingly repetitive radio and television
appearances of the usual middle east experts, and are now faced with Hussein's son Abdullah periodically repeating his father's
speech almost verbatim. What
actually happens at each of these "moments of truth"and we may be

approaching another oneis nothing much; only the same old cyclical conflict which always restarts when peace is about to
break out, and always dampens down when the violence becomes intense enough . The ease of filming
and reporting out of safe and comfortable Israeli hotels inflates the media coverage of every minor affray. But humanitarians should
note that the dead from Jewish-Palestinian fighting since 1921 amount to fewer than 100,000about as many as are killed in a
season of conflict in Darfur.
(--) Risks of escalatory war or runaway proliferation are all hype

LAYNE, 2007 (Professor of Political Science @ Texas A&M) 2007
[Christopher, American Empire: A Debate , P. 79-80 //
The same architects of illusion who fulminated for war with Iraq now are agitating for war with Iran.
If Iran gets nuclear

weapons they say, three bad things could happen: it could trigger a nuclear arms race in
the Middle East; it might supply nuclear weapons to terrorists; and Tehran could use its
nuclear weapons to blackmail other states in the region or to engage in aggression. Each of
these scenarios, however, is improbable in the extreme. During the early 1960s, American
policy-makers had similar fears that China's acqui- sition of nuclear weapons would
trigger a proliferation stampede, But these fears did not materialize-and a nuclear Iran will
not touch off a proliferation snowball in the Middle East. Israel, of course, already is a nuclear power (as is
Pakistan, another regional power). The other three states that might be tempted to go for a nuclear weapons capability are Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. As MIT professor Barry Posen points out, however, each of these three states would be under strong
pressure not do to so.84 Egypt is particularly vulnerable to outside pressure to refrain from going nuclear because its shaky
economy depends on foreign-especially U.S-economic assistance. Saudi Arabia would find it hard to purchase nuclear weapons or
material on the black market-which is closely watched by the United States-and, Posen notes, it would take the Saudis years to
develop the industrial and engineering capabilities to develop nuclear weapons indigenously. Turkey is constrained by its
membership in NATO and its quest to be admitted to membership of the European Union.
No great power intervention in the Middle Eastoil interests will encourage

cooperation:
Frederic Wehrey, 2010
(Rand Corporation, THE IRAQ EFFECT The Middle East After the Iraq War, http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2010/RAND_MG892.pdf)

15
Continue the policy of encouraging responsible
stakeholder involvement from China and, to the extent possible,

Russia; harness these countries respective niche interests to promote regional economic growth and stability. In
the same vein, the U.S. should avoid alarmist reactions to Chinese or Russian influence in the region,
particularly their economic activities, because many of these activities are more likely to complement, rather than
supplant, U.S. regional interests. For example, China and the United States have a strong converging
interest in creating a stable regional security order conducive to the flow of the regions oil
and gas. U.S. policy should also distinguish among extraregional powers pursuit of their economic interests and more-aggressive attempts to
move the regional system toward multipolarity, which is a greater concern in the case of Russia than China.
Superpowers wont go to war over the Middle East

Gelb 10 [Leslie, President Emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations and former senior
official in the U.S. Defense Department from 1967 to 1969 and in the State Department from
1977 to 1979, November/December Foreign Affairs, Proquest]
Also reducing the likelihood of conflict today is that there is no arena in which the vital interests of great
powers seriously clash. Indeed, the most worrisome security threats today--rogue states with
nuclear weapons and terrorists with weapons of mass destruction--actually tend to unite
the great powers more than divide them. In the past, and specifically during the first era of globalization, major powers
would war over practically nothing. Back then, they fought over the Balkans, a region devoid of resources and geographic importance, a strategic
zero. Today,
they are unlikely to shoulder their arms over almost anything, even the highly
strategic Middle East. All have much more to lose than to gain from turmoil in that region.
To be sure, great powers such as China and Russia will tussle with one another for advantages, but they will stop
well short of direct confrontation. To an unprecedented degree, the major powers now need one another
to grow their economies, and they are loath to jeopardize this interdependence by allowing
traditional military and strategic competitions to escalate into wars. In the past, U.S. enemies--such as the
Soviet Union--would have rejoiced at the United States' losing a war in Afghanistan. Today, the United States and its enemies share an interest in
blocking the spread of both Taliban extremism and the Afghan-based drug trade. China also looks to U.S. arms to protect its investments in
Afghanistan, such as large natural-resource mines. More broadly, no
great nation is challenging the balance of

power in either Europe or Asia. Although nations may not help one another, they rarely oppose one another
in explosive situations.

16
AFF: Defense Cuts Answers

U.S. defense spending is unnecessary
Peter G. Peterson Foundation 4-12-2013 (http://www.pgpf.org/Chart-Archive/0053_defensecomparison, Acessed 6-24-2013 TMW)
We currently spend more on defense than the next 10 countries combined. Defense spending accounts
for about 20 percent of all federal spending nearly as much as Social Security, or the combined spending for Medicare and Medicaid. The
sheer size of the defense budget suggests that it should be part of any serious effort to
address America's long-term fiscal challenges. National security threats have evolved over
the past 50 years, changing the nature of U.S. commitments around the world. We need a
defense budget that matches these new security challenges, not the threats of the last
century. We should also recognize that a strong economy is essential for providing the resources to meet future threats, and addressing our
long-term structural debts will keep our economy strong. Indeed, as Admiral Mike Mullen, the past Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has
said: "The single greatest threat to our national security is our debt." - See more at: http://www.pgpf.org/Chart-Archive/0053_defensecomparison#sthash.MwDMZD9Y.dpuf
Defense budget weakens U.S. economy

Joseph Lazzaro 11/20/2011 ( U.S. Editor, managing editor of WallStreetEurope.com and
Economics/Markets Editor for AOLs DailyFinance.com, Imperial Overstretch: Is a Bloated
Defense Budget Weakening the U.S.?, http://www.ibtimes.com/imperial-overstretch-bloateddefense-budget-weakening-us-213116, accessed 6/25/13 TMW)
It's hard to believe that a nation could spend more on defense and actually become weaker. But
that, in fact, is what's happening in the United States -- and what will continue to happen, if the
U.S. continues to divert too much of the nation's resources to defense programs. The Rise and
Fall of the Great Powers Yale University History Professor Paul Kennedy perhaps best
demonstrated the link between too much military spending and national decline in his seminal
work, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (Random House: 1987). In it, Kennedy argued,
among other tenets, that the relative strength between the major powers in the world never
remains constant, and that, repeatedly, a great power has thought it could engage in military
adventures -- extend itself beyond its ability to maintain those commitments, and neglect its
economy, but the result has been empire decline. Kennedy's term for the phenomenon is imperial
overstretch, also known as imperial overreach, and the two classic examples are: the British
Empire and the Soviet Union. Each spent too much of its resources on the military -- to the neglect
of its economy -- and we know what resulted: each empire ended. And the view from here argues
that the United States -- another great power -- in this case a superpower that overspent on defense,
has weakened its economy and is in danger of driving its empire to the fate of Britain's and the
Soviet Union's, if it doesn't change its course and reverse the policy . Kennedy's overstretch thesis,
in detail, is as follows: As defense spending increases, this reduces the investments in economic
growth, which eventually, leads to the downward spiral of slower growth, heavier taxes,
deepening domestic splits over spending priorities, and weakening capacity to bear the burdens
of defense.
Defense budget cuts beneficialbolster the economy

Benjamin Zycher 8-8-12 ( Ph.D., economics University of California, A.B., political science
University of California, Associate at the U.S. Department of Intelligence and Research, and
Senior Fellow at the Pacific Research institute, Economic Effects of Reductions in Defense

17
Outlays, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/economic-effects-reductions-defenseoutlays, accessed 6/26/13 TMW)

A reduction in defense consumption and investment shifts resources among economic sectors and
thus has economic effects analogous to those caused by changes in demand and supply in any
industry. The unemployment (or underemployment) of labor and other resources during the
adjustment process can be politically significant but has only temporary economic effects ; however
painful for some, this process of resource reallocation is economically beneficial in the aggregate
over time. Moreover, the data suggest strongly that the adverse effects of spending cuts would be
small in the aggregate because defense spending is a small component of GDP (less than 5 percent),
and because estimates of the multiplier effects of defense expenditures reported in the scholarly
literature are relatively low.

Aid Tradeoff Disadvantage Answers - Samford 2013

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Aid Trade-off DA Answers

Aid Trade-off Answers

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

5) No impact: past instability hasnt triggered a war.

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

6) Sequester already cut budgets.

this fiscal year alone.

7) Non-unique: Aid to Afghanistan should trade-off.

8) Non-unique: Aid to the Phillipines

9) Aid to Egypt is a drop in the bucket that solves nothing.

Obamas new Egyptian pledge is just a

10)Regional cooperation solves Middle East war impact:

heading the efforts to

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

1ar: Egyptian Economy Weak Now

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

1ar: Sequester Already Cut Money

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

1ar: Aid Doesnt Solve

U.S. foreign aid not effective

U.S. foreign aid misused

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

U.S. foreign aid not effective

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

U.S. foreign aid misused

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

1ar: No Middle East War Impact

Deterrence checks Middle East escalation

James A. Extended Deterrence, Security Guarantees and Nuclear

This history suggests an overwhelming emphasis on the role of conventional force in

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

this scenario, it seems clear that American nuclear weapons are a

I think most of the regional players are more invested in

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

(--) Middle East wars dont escalate empirically proven

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

read versions of the standard King Hussein

actually happens at each of these "moments of truth"and we may be

(--) Risks of escalatory war or runaway proliferation are all hype

If Iran gets nuclear

No great power intervention in the Middle Eastoil interests will encourage

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

Continue the policy of encouraging responsible

stakeholder involvement from China and, to the extent possible,

Superpowers wont go to war over the Middle East

great nation is challenging the balance of

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

AFF: Defense Cuts Answers

Defense budget weakens U.S. economy

Defense budget cuts beneficialbolster the economy

Aid Trade-off DA Answers

Outlays, http://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/economic-effects-reductions-defenseoutlays, accessed 6/26/13 TMW)

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