CONSTI 2 ART III SEC 6 - CASES

Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. no. 88211, September 15,

1989
Facts : In February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed
from presidency via people power and forced into exile in
Hawaii. Nearly three years after, in his deathbed seeks return
to the Philippines to die.
Thus, this petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the
Court to order the respondent to issue travel documents to Mr.
Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin
the the implementation of President Aquinos decision to bar
their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners contend that the right of the Marcoses to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed under the Bill of Rights. That the
President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only the court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. The President has enumerated powers and
what is not enumerated is impliedly denied to her.

Issues : Whether or not the President has the power under

the Constitution, to bar Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines
Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
upon determining that the Marcosess return poses a serious
threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their
return

Held : The executive power of the President under the

Constitution is more than the sum of specific powers
enumerated under the Constitution. In balancing the general
welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals, the power involved is the Presidents
residual power to protect the general welfare of the people.
Presidential power is a wide discretion, within the bounds of
laws and extraordinary in times of emergency.
The President did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion in determining that the return of former President
Marcos and his family poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare. There exist factual bases in the
Presidents decision in the pleadings, oral arguments and facts
filed by the parties during the briefing in chambers by the Chief
of Staff of the Armed of the Philppines and National Security
Adviser.
That the President has the power under the Constitution to bar
the Macroses from returning has been recognized by the
members of the Legislature. Through a Resolution proposed in
the House of Representative, signed by 103 members urging
the President to allow Mr. Marcos to return to the Philippines
an act of true national reconciliation. The Resolution does not
question the Presidents power but was an appeal to allow a
man to come home and to die in his country. Such request
submit to the exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
President to determine whether it must be granted or not.
The case is not a political question and for such, the court
exercised its judicial power involving the determination
whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the
part of any branch or instrumnetality of the government.

Petition is hereby DISMISSED.

Manotoc Vs Ca
FACTS : There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted
by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6
of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the
petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was
charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.
Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to
leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to his
business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed
by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed
petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders
and the SEC communication request denying his leave to
travel abroad. According to the petitioner, having been
admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that
granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his
liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional
right to travel

ISSUE : WON the Court Acted with grave abuse of discretion

HELD : A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to

bail from leaving the Philippines. This is a necessary
consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. Rule
114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security
required and given for the release of a person who is in the
custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in

which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail

bond or recognizance The condition imposed upon petitioner
to make himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his
right to travel If the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond
the reach of the courts As petitioner has failed to satisfy the
trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency of his travel,
the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the
proposed travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their
having denied petitioner's motion for permission to leave the
country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results,
that We found no reversible error to have been committed by
the appellate court in allowing Shepherd to leave the country
after it had satisfied itself that she would comply with the
conditions of her bail bond.

arraignments could not be held because there was a pending

Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right
to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even
on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public
safety or public health."
Silverio vs. Court of Appeals [G.R. No. 94284, April 8,
1991]
Facts:
Silverio was charged with violation of Revised Securities Act.
In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty. After more
than 2 years after filing the information, respondent filed an
urgent ex parte motion to cancel the passport of Silverio on the
ground that he had gone abroad several times without
necessary court approval resulting in postponements of the
arraignment and scheduled hearings.

RTC then issued an order directing the DFA to cancel the

passport or to deny his application and the Commission on
Immigration to prevent Silverio from leaving the country. This
RTC finding that Silverio has not been arraigned and never
appeared in court on the scheduled date of his arraignment,
and Silverio has been going out of the country without the
court's knowledge and permission.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in

not finding that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its
Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of
facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled

Held:
(1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has
been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was filed long
after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several
arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due
to Petitioner's non-appearance.

(2) Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for

violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken
into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman,
conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so
required by the Court or the Rules. The foregoing condition
imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all
times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a
valid restriction of his right to travel.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no

means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the
Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into
effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law
jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all

auxiliary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it

into effect may be employed by such Court or officer.

CONSTI 2 ART III SEC 7 CASES

Legaspi Vs. Civil Service CommissionG.R. No. L-72119,
May 29, 1987Cortes, J.
Facts: Valentin L. Legaspi invoked his fundamental right to
information against the Civil Service Commission for denying
his request for information on the civil service eligibilities of
Julian Sibong hanoy and Mariano Agas employed as
sanitarians in the Health Department of Cebu City. They
allegedly represented themselves as civil service eligibles for
sanitarians. Hence, petitioner prayed for the issuance of the
extraordinary writ of mandamus to compel the respondent
Commission to disclose said information.
However, the Solicitor General interposed. He challenged the
petitioner's standing to sue upon the ground that the latter
does not possess any clear legal right to be informed of the
civil service eligibilities of the government employees
concerned. He calls attention to the alleged failure of the
petitioner to show his actual interest in securing this particular
information. He further argues that there is no ministerial duty
on the part of the Commission to furnish the petitioner with the
information he seeks.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner should be furnished a copy of
the civil service eligibles.
Held: Yes. The right of the people to information on matters of
public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records,
and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research

data used as basis. for policy development, shall be afforded

the citizen, subject to such stations as may be provided by
law (III, Sec. 7 of the 1987Constitution). The court further ruled
that it becomes apparent that when a mandamus proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner
is a citizen, and therefore, part of the general "public" which
possesses the right.

Valmonte vs. Belmonte, Jr. [G.R. No. 74930, February 13

1989]
FACTS:
Petitioner Valmonte wrote a letter to the respondent Feliciano
Belmonte, then GSIS General Manager, requesting to be
furnished with the list of names of the defunct interim and
regular Batasang Pambansa including the ten (10) opposition
members who were able to secure a clean loan of P 2 million
each on guaranty of Mrs. Imelda Marcos. And if such is not
possible, an access to those said documents. Apart from
Valmontes letter, he is stressing the premise of the request
onthe present provision of the Freedom constitution at that
time which is Art. IV, Sec. 6, that emphasizes the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern. Mr.
Belmonte, aware that such request contains serious legal
implications seek the help of Mr. Meynardo A. Tiro, a deputy
General Counsel. In Mr. Tiros reply letter, a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and all those who borrow
from it, whoever they may be; that the GSIS has a duty to its
customers to preserve this confidentiality; and that it would not
be proper for the GSIS to breach this confidentiality unless so
ordered by the courts.

On June 26, 1986, apparently not having yet received the

reply of the GSIS Deputy General Counsel, Petitioner
Valmonte wrote another letter saying that for failure to receive
a reply, they are now considering themselves free to do
whatever action necessary within the premises to pursue their
desired objective in pursuance of public interest. Separate
comments were filed by respondent Belmonte and the Solicitor
General. After petitioners filed a consolidated reply, the petition
was given due course and the parties were required to file
their memoranda. The parties having complied, the case was
deemed submitted for decision. In his comment, respondent
raise procedural objection to the issuance of a writ of
mandamus, among which is that petitioners have failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. Respondent claims that
actions of the GSIS General Manager are reviewable by the
Board of Trustees of the GSIS petitioners. However, did not
seek relief from the GSIS Board of Trustees, It is therefore
asserted that since administrative remedies were not
exhausted, then petitioners have no cause of action.
ISSUE:
Whether or not that Mr. Valmonte, together with his copetitioners, are entitled to the documents sought, by virtue of
their constitutional right to information.
RULING:
The cornerstone of this republican system of government is
delegation of power by the people to the state. Governmental
agencies and institutions operate within the limits of the
authority conferred by the people. Yet, like all constitutional
guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. Peoples
right to information is limited to matters of public concern and
is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law. The GSIS is a trustee of contributions from the

government and its employees and the administrator of

various insurance programs for the benefit of the latter.
Undeniably, its funds assume a public character. More
particularly, Secs. 5(b) and46 of P.D 1146, as amended (the
Revised Government Service Insurance act of 1977 provide
for annual appropriations for to pay for contributions,
premiums , interest and other amounts payable to GSIS by the
government, as employer, as well as the obligations which the
Republic of the Philippines assumes or guarantees to pay.
Considering the nature of its funds, the GSIS is expected to
manage its resources with utmost prudence and in strict
compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. It is
therefore the legitimate concern of the public to ensure that
these funds are managed properly with end in view of
maximizing the benefits that accrue to the insured government
employees. Moreover, the supposed borrowers were members
of the defunct Batasang Pambansa who themselves
appropriated funds for the GSIS and were therefore expected
to be the first to see to it that the GSIS performed its tasks with
the greatest degree of fidelity and that its transactions were
above board. Respondent maintains that a confidential
relationship exists between the GSIS and its borrowers. It is
argued that a policy of confidentiality restricts the
indiscriminate dissemination of information. He further
contends that in view of the right to privacy, which is equally
protected by the Constitution and by existing laws, the
documents, evidencing loan transactions of the GSIS must be
deemed outside the ambit of the right to information. There
can be no doubt that the right to privacy is constitutionally
protected. In the landmark case of Morfe vs. Mutuc, speaking
through then Mr. Justice Fernando stated that ultimate and
pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is
the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of
limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs

to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector,

which the state can control. Apparent from the above-quoted
statement of the court in Morfe is that the right to privacy
belongs to the individual in his private capacity, and not to
public and the government agencies like the GSIS. Moreover,
the right cannot be invoked by juridical entities like the GSIS. A
corporation has no right of privacy in its name since the entire
basis of the right to privacy is an injury to the feelings and
sensibilities of the party and a corporation would have no such
ground for relief. Neither can the GSIS through its General
manager, the respondent, invoke the right to privacy of its
borrowers. The right is purely personal in nature, and hence,
may be invoked only by the person whose privacy is claimed
to be violated. Respondent next asserts that the documents
evidencing the loan transactions are private in nature and
hence, are not covered by the Constitutional right to
information on matters of public concern which guarantees
access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions or decisions only.
Further, they argued that GSIS, is a governmental corporation
performing proprietary functions, are outside the coverage of
the peoples right to access to official records. This Dichotomy
characterizing government function has long been repudiated
in ACCFA v. Confederation of Unions and Government
Corporations and Offices, the Court said that the government,
WHETHER carrying out its sovereign attributes or running
some business, discharges the SAME FUNCTION of service
to the people. Consequently, that the GSIS , in granting the
loans, was exercising proprietary function would NOT justify
the exclusion of transactions from the coverage and scope of
right to information. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
hereby granted, and the respondent General Manager of the
Government Service Insurance System is ORDERED to allow
petitioners access to documents and records evidencing loans

granted to members of the former Batasang Pambansa, as

petitioners may specify, subject to reasonable regulations as to
time and manner of inspection, not incompatible with the
decision, as the GSIS may deem necessary. SO ORDERED.

1. Whether or not the constitutionality and the legality of the

MOA is ripe for adjudication;
2. Whether or not there is a violation of the people's right to
information on matters of public concern (Art 3 Sec. 7) under a
state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving
public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including public consultation
under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991)
3. Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines would be binding itself

Province of North Cotabato vs Government of the

Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:
On August 5, 2008, the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the
Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF Tripoli Agreement
on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern,
the petitioners seek to compel respondents to disclose and
furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD
and to prohibit the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the
holding of public consultation thereon. They also pray that the
MOA-AD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a
TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

ISSUES:

a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity

(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;
b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to
conform to the MOA;
c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,
RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

RULINGS:
1. Yes, the petitions are ripe for adjudication. The failure of the
respondents to consult the local government units or
communities affected constitutes a departure by respondents
from their mandate under EO No. 3. Moreover, the
respondents exceeded their authority by the mere act of
guaranteeing amendments to the Constitution. Any alleged

violation of the Constitution by any branch of government is a

proper matter for judicial review.
As the petitions involve constitutional issues which are of
paramount public interest or of transcendental importance, the
Court grants the petitioners, petitioners-in-intervention and
intervening respondents the requisite locus standi in keeping
with the liberal stance adopted in David v. Macapagal- Arroyo.
In Pimentel, Jr. v. Aguirre, this Court held:
x x x [B]y the mere enactment of the questioned law or the
approval of the challenged action, the dispute is said to have
ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt
act . Indeed, even a singular violation of the Constitution
and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.x x x x
By the same token, when an act of the President, who in our
constitutional scheme is a coequal of Congress, is seriously
alleged to have infringed the Constitution and the laws x x x
settling the dispute becomes the duty and the responsibility of
the courts.
That the law or act in question is not yet effective does not
negate ripeness.

2. Yes. The Court finds that there is a grave violation of the

Constitution involved in the matters of public concern (Sec 7
Art III) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its
transactions involving public interest (Art 2, Sec 28) including
public consultation under RA 7160 (Local Government Code of
1991).
(Sec 7 ArtIII) The right to information guarantees the right of
the people to demand information, while Sec 28 recognizes

the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody

demands. The complete and effective exercise of the right to
information necessitates that its complementary provision on
public disclosure derive the same self-executory nature,
subject only to reasonable safeguards or limitations as may be
provided by law.
The contents of the MOA-AD is a matter of paramount public
concern involving public interest in the highest order. In
declaring that the right to information contemplates steps and
negotiations leading to the consummation of the contract,
jurisprudence finds no distinction as to the executory nature or
commercial character of the agreement.
E.O. No. 3 itself is replete with mechanics for continuing
consultations on both national and local levels and for a
principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of
the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process to conduct
regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments,
advice, and recommendations from peace partners and
concerned sectors of society.

3.
a) to create and recognize the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity
(BJE) as a separate state, or a juridical, territorial or political
subdivision not recognized by law;

Yes. The provisions of the MOA indicate, among other things,

that the Parties aimed to vest in the BJE the status of an
associated state or, at any rate, a status closely approximating
it.

The concept of association is not recognized under the

present Constitution.

No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is

recognized under our laws as having an associative
relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept
implies powers that go beyond anything ever granted by the
Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The
Constitution, however, does not contemplate any state in this
jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it
provide for a transitory status that aims to prepare any part of
Philippine territory for independence.

The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous

region recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an
expanded version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship
with the national government being fundamentally different
from that of the ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name
as it meets the criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo
Convention, namely, a permanent population, a defined
territory, a government, and a capacity to enter into relations
with other states.

Even assuming arguendo that the MOA-AD would not

necessarily sever any portion of Philippine territory, the spirit
animating it which has betrayed itself by its use of the
concept of association runs counter to the national
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic.

The defining concept underlying the relationship between the

national government and the BJE being itself contrary to the
present Constitution, it is not surprising that many of the
specific provisions of the MOA-AD on the formation and
powers of the BJE are in conflict with the Constitution and the
laws. The BJE is more of a state than an autonomous region.
But even assuming that it is covered by the term autonomous
region in the constitutional provision just quoted, the MOA-AD
would still be in conflict with it.

b) to revise or amend the Constitution and existing laws to

conform to the MOA:

The MOA-AD provides that any provisions of the MOA-AD

requiring amendments to the existing legal framework shall
come into force upon the signing of a Comprehensive
Compact and upon effecting the necessary changes to the
legal framework, implying an amendment of the Constitution
to accommodate the MOA-AD. This stipulation, in effect,
guaranteed to the MILF the amendment of the Constitution .

It will be observed that the President has authority, as stated in

her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the
Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however,
extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to
recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she
limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to
the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and
revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as
an unconstitutional act.

The suspensive clause in the MOA-AD viewed in light of the

above-discussed standards.

Given the limited nature of the Presidents authority to propose

constitutional amendments, she cannot guarantee to any third
party that the required amendments will eventually be put in
place, nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. The most she
could do is submit these proposals as recommendations either
to Congress or the people, in whom constituent powers are
vested.

c) to concede to or recognize the claim of the Moro Islamic

Liberation Front for ancestral domain in violation of Republic
Act No. 8371 (THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT
OF 1997),
particularly Section 3(g) & Chapter VII (DELINEATION,

Thus, the concept of Bangsamoro, as defined in this strand

of the MOA-AD, includes not only Moros as traditionally
understood even by Muslims, but all indigenous peoples of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands. The MOA-AD adds that the
freedom of choice of indigenous peoples shall be respected.
What this freedom of choice consists in has not been
specifically defined. The MOA-AD proceeds to refer to the
Bangsamoro homeland, the ownership of which is vested
exclusively in the Bangsamoro people by virtue of their prior
rights of occupation. Both parties to the MOA-AD acknowledge
that ancestral domain does not form part of the public domain.
Republic Act No. 8371 or the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997 provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and
delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other
things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent
of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.
Notably, the statute does not grant the Executive Department
or any government agency the power to delineate and
recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or
compromise.

RECOGNITION OF ANCESTRAL DOMAINS)

This strand begins with the statement that it is the birthright of
all Moros and all Indigenous peoples of Mindanao to identify
themselves and be accepted as Bangsamoros. It defines
Bangsamoro people as the natives or original inhabitants of
Mindanao and its adjacent islands including Palawan and the
Sulu archipelago at the time of conquest or colonization, and
their descendants whether mixed or of full blood, including
their spouses.

Two, Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of

1991 requires all national offices to conduct consultations
beforeany project or program critical to the environment and
human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of
a particular group of people residing in such locality, is
implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program
that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast
territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively
and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a
great number of inhabitants from their total environment.

CONCLUSION:
In sum, the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process
committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry
out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by E.O.
No. 3, Republic Act No. 7160, and Republic Act No. 8371. The
furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and
crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority,
and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary
and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of
positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

The MOA-AD cannot be reconciled with the present

Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions but the
very concept underlying them, namely, the associative
relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are
unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the
associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its
way to independence.

The motions are not meritorious.

Intervention Not Allowed
After Final Judgment

Chavez vs.
Presidential Commisslon on
Government [G.R. No. 130716, December 9, 1998]

Good

Before the Court are (1) a "Motion for Leave to Intervene with
Motion for Leave to File the Attached Partial Motion for
Reconsideration . . ." and (2) "Partial Motion for
Reconsideration," both filed on January 22, 1999, as well as
movants' Memorandum of Authorities filed on March 16, 1999.
Movants Ma. Imelda Marcos-Manotoc, Ferdinand R. Marcos II
and Irene Marcos-Araneta allege that they are parties and
signatories 1 to the General and Supplemental Agreements
dated December 28, 1993, which this Court, in its Decision
promulgated on December 9, 1998, declared "NULL AND
VOID for being contrary to law and the Constitution." As such,
they claim to "have a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties or an interest against
both as to warrant their intervention." They add that their
exclusion from the instant case resulted in a denial of their
constitutional rights to due process and to equal protection of
the laws. They also raise the "principle of hierarchical
administration of justice" to impugn the Court's cognizance of
petitioner's direct action before it.

First, we cannot allow the Motion for Leave to Intervene at this

late stage of the proceedings. Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules
of Court, provides that a motion to intervene should be filed
"before rendition of judgment . . ." Our Decision was
promulgated December 9, 1998, while movants came to us
only on January 22, 1999. Intervention can no longer be
allowed in a case already terminated by the final judgment. 2
Second, they do not even offer any valid plausible excuse for
such late quest to assert their alleged rights. Indeed, they may
have no cogent reason at all. As Petitioner Chavez asserts, 3
the original petition, which was filed on October 3, 1997, was
well-publicized. So were its proceedings, particularly the oral
arguments heard on March 16, 1998. Movants have long been
back in the mainstream of Philippine political and social life.
Indeed, they could not (and in fact did not) even feign
unawareness of the petition prior to its disposition.
Third, the assailed Decision has become final and executory;
the original parties have not filed any motion for
reconsideration, and the period for doing so has long lapsed.
Indeed, the movants are now legally barred from seeking
leave to participate in this proceeding. Nevertheless, we shall
tackle their substantive arguments, most of which have been
taken up in said Decision, so as to finally dispose any
allegation, even in the remote future, of lack of due process or
violation of the right to equal protection.
No Denial of Due Process

Movants claim that their exclusion from the proceeding

regarding the Agreements to which they were parties and
signatories was a denial of "their property right to contract
without due process of law."
We rule that the movants are merely incidental, not
indispensable, parties to the instant case. Being contractors to
the General and Supplemental Agreements involving their
supposed properties, they claim that their interests are
affected by the petition. However, as exhaustively discussed in
the assailed Decision, the Agreements undeniably contain
terms an condition that are clearly contrary to the Constitution
and the laws and are not subject to compromise. Such terms
and conditions cannot be granted by the PCGG to anyone, not
just to movants. Being so, no argument of the contractors will
make such illegal and unconstitutional stipulations pass the
test of validity. 4 The void agreement will not be rendered
operative by the parties' alleges performance (partial or full) of
their respective prestations. A contract that violates the
Constitution and the law is null and void ab intio and vests no
rights and creates no obligations. It produces no legal effect at
all. 5 In legal terms, the movants have really no interest to
protect or right to assert in this proceeding. Contrary to their
allegations, no infraction upon their rights has been committed.
The original petition of Francisco I. Chavez sought to enforce a
constitutional right against the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) and to determine whether the
latter has been acting within the bounds of its authority. In the
process of adjudication, there is no need to call on each and
every party whom said agency has contracted with.
In any event, we are now ruling on the merits of the arguments
raised by movants; hence, they can no longer complain of not
having been heard in this proceeding.

Petition Treated as an Exception to the Principle of

Hierarchical Administration of Justice
Movants allege that despite petitioner's own statement that he
did not intended "to stop or delay . . . the proceedings involving
the subject agreements as an incident before the
Sandiganbayan," this Court ruled the validity of the said
Agreements. They submit that it thereby preempted the
Sandiganbayan and rendered moot the three-year
proceedings so far undertaken by the latter court regarding the
same. Movants pray that the proceedings before the anti-graft
court be allowed to take their due course, consistent with the
principle of the hierarchical administration of justice.

This matter has been discussed and ruled upon in the assailed
Decision. Movants have not raised any new argument that has
not been taken up. In any event, we wish to point out that the
principle of the hierarchy of the courts generally applies to
cases involving factual question. The oft-repeated justification
for invoking it is that such cases do not only impose upon the
precious time of the Court but, more important, inevitably
result in their delayed adjudication. Often, such cases have to
be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
or as better equipped t resolve to the issues, since the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. 6 Inasmuch as the
petition at bar involves only constitutional and legal questions
concerning public interest, the Court resolved to exercise
primary jurisdiction on the matter.
Moreover, in taking jurisdiction over the Chavez petition, the
Court actually avoided unnecessary delays and expenses in
the resolution of the ill-gotten wealth cases, which have been
pending for about twelve years now. With this Decision, the
Sandiganbayan may now more speedily resolves the merits of

Civil Case No. 141. Finally, it is an elementary rule that this

Court may at its sound discretion suspend procedural rules in
the interest of substantial justice. 7

they are not subject to ratification. 8 Neither will they acquire

validity through the passage of time. 9
Petition Presented Actual
Case and Judicial Question

Petition Sought to Define

Scope of Right to Information

Movants insist that there was "nothing "secret" or "furtive"

about the agreements as to warrant their compulsory
disclosure by the Honorable Court . . .." They submit that when
they filed their Motion for Approval of Compromise Agreements
before the Sandiganbayan, they practically "opened to public
scrutiny the agreements and everything else related thereto."
In our Decision, we have already discussed this point and,
hence, shall no longer belabor it. Suffice it to say that in our
Decision, we ruled that the Chavez petition was not confined
to the conclude terms contained in the Agreements, but
likewise concerned other ongoing and future negotiations and
agreement, perfected or not. It sought a precise interpretation
of the scope of the twin constitutional provisions on "public
transactions." It was therefore not endered moot and academic
simply by the public disclosure of the subject Agreements.
Alleged Partial Implementation of Agreements Immaterial
The movants also claim that PCGG's grant to their mother of
access rights to one of their sequestered properties may be
equivalent to an implied ratification of the Agreements. As we
have ruled, the subject Agreements are null and void for being
contrary to the Constitution and the laws. Being null and void,

We reiterate that mandamus, over which this Court has

original jurisdiction, is proper recourse for a citizen to enforce a
public right and to compel the performance of a public duty,
most especially when mandated by the Constitution. As aptly
pointed out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug, 10 "procedural rules .
. . [are] not cogent reasons to deny to the Court its taking
cognizance of the case."
There is no political question involved here. The power and the
authority of the PCGG to compromise is not the issue. In fact,
we have not prohibited or restrained it from doing so. But when
the compromise entered into palpably violated the Constitution
and the laws, this Court is duty-bound to strike it down as null
and void. Clearly, by violating the Constitution and the laws,
the PCGG gravely abused its discretion. 11
In sum, we hold that the motions are procedurally flawed and
that, at this late stage, intervention can no longer be allowed.
Moreover, movants are not indispensable parties to this suit
which principally assails the constitutionality and legality of
PCGG's exercise of its discretion. In any event, the Court has
ruled on the merits of movants' claims. Hence, they can no
longer complain, however remotely, of deprivation of due
process or of equal protection of the law.
WHEREFORE, the motions are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit. Let the Decision of this Court, dated December 9, 1998,
be now entered.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.

CONSTI 2 ART III SEC 8 CASES

Social Security System (SSS) Employees Association
vs.
Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 85279, July 28, 1989
Facts:
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon
the unions demands concerning the implementation of their
CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with
prayer for writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners for
staging an illegal strike. The court issued a temporary
restraining order pending the resolution of the application for
preliminary injunction while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss
alleging the courts lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in
taking cognizance on the subject matter since the jurisdiction
lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations Commission
as the case involves a labor dispute. The Social Security
System contends on one hand that the petitioners are covered
by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no
right to strike. They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE
therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from striking.
Issue:
Whether or not Social Security System employers have the
right to strike.
Ruling:
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and
Social Justice provides guarantee among workers with the

right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities

such as strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180
provides that the Civil Service law and rules governing
concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall
be observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by
Congress referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of
the Civil Service Commission which states that prior to the
enactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike
by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging
strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other
forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage
or disruption of public service. Therefore in the absence of
any legislation allowing government employees to strike they
are prohibited from doing so.

Victoriano vs. Elizalde Rope Workers Union [G.R. No. L25246, September 12, 1974]
FACTS: Benjamin victoriano a member of iglesia ni cristo had
been in the employ of the Elizalde Rope factory Inc since
1958. Her was a member of elizalde rope workers union which
had with the company a CBA containing a closed shop
provision which reads as follow Membership union shall be
required as a condition of employment for all permanent
employees worker covered by this agreement. RA 3350 was
enacted introducing an amendment to paragraph (4)
subsection (a) of section 4 of RA 875 as follows but such
agreement shall not cover members of any religious sect
which prohibit affiliation of their member in any such 0labor
organization Benjamin victoriano presents his resignation to
appellant union thereupon the union wrote a formal letter to
separate the appellee from the service in view of the fact that
he was resigning from the union as member of the company
notified the apellee and his counsel that unless the appellee
could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the union the
company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service
. this prompted appellee to file an action for injunction to enjoin
the company and the union from dismissing apallee.
ISSUE: WON RA 3350 is unconstitutional

HELD: the constitution provision only prohibits legislation for

the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of
any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the
acceptance of any creed or the chosen form of religion within
limits of utmost amplitude. RA 3350 does not require as a
qualification on condition in joining any lawful association
membership in any particular religion on in any religious sect
neither does the act requires affiliation with a religious sect that
prohibits its member from joining a labor union as a condition
on qualification for withdrawing from labor union RA 3350 only
exempts member with such religious affililiation from the
required to do a positive act to exercise the right to join or to
resign from the union. He is exempted from form the coverage
of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have
entered into. Therefore RA 3350 is never an illegal evasion of
constitutional provision or prohibition to accomplish a desired
result which is lawful in itself by vering or following a legal way
to do it.

provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void
and of no legal force and effect.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court may compel Atty. Edillion to
pay his membership fee to the IBP.

In re: IBP membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. Marcial

Edillon [A.C. No. 1928 August 3, 1978]
FACTS: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed
practicing Attorney in the Philippines. The IBP Board of
Governors recommended to the Court the removal of the
name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for stubborn
refusal to pay his membership dues assailing the provisions of
the Rule of Court 139-A and the provisions of par. 2, Section
24, Article III, of the IBP By-Laws pertaining to the organization
of IBP, payment of membership fee and suspension for failure
to pay the same.
Edillon contends that the stated provisions constitute an
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled as a pre-condition to maintain his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay
the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this
compelled financial support of the said organization to which
he is admitted personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of
the rights to liberty and properly guaranteed to him by the
Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes the above

HELD: The Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar which

every lawyer must be a member of as distinguished from bar
associations in which membership is merely optional and
voluntary. All lawyers are subject to comply with the rules
prescribed for the governance of the Bar including payment a
reasonable annual fees as one of the requirements. The Rules
of Court only compels him to pay his annual dues and it is not
in violation of his constitutional freedom to associate. Bar
integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with
anyone. He is free to attend or not the meeting of his
Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its election
as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected
is the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court in order to
further the States legitimate interest in elevating the quality of
professional legal services, may require thet the cost of the
regulatory program the lawyers.
Such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power
of the State. The right to practice law before the courts of this
country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory
measure is recognize then a penalty designed to enforce its
payment is not void as unreasonable as arbitrary. Furthermore,
the Court has jurisdiction over matters of admission,
suspension, disbarment, and reinstatement of lawyers and
their regulation as part of its inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities thus the court may compel all members of the
Integrated Bar to pay their annual dues.