Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
In the matter of
State of Rajasthan
Appellant
versus
Respondent No. 1
Mrs. ShaliniGoyal
Respondent No. 2
Respondent No. 3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Sr. No.
1.
Particulars
Page No.
Index of Authorities
02
A. Books
B. Websites
C. Judicial Decisions
D. Dictionaries & lexicons
2.
04
3.
07
4.
Statement of Jurisdiction
08
5.
Statement of Facts
09
6.
12
7.
Arguments
13
Issue 1
Issue 2
Issue 3
Issue 4
Issue 5
Issue 6
8.
Prayer
39
Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, The Code of Criminal Procedure, 21stEdition 2013, Lexus Nexis by
B. M. Prasad, Manish Mohan
Ratanlal&Dhirajlal, The Indian Penal Code, 34thEdition 2013, Lexis Nexisby Justice K. T.
Thomas, M. A. Rashid
Criminal Manual (Criminal Major Acts), 2004, Professional Book Publishers, New Delhi
by Justice M. R. Mallick
Texbook on Indian Penal Code, 5th Edition 2015, Universal Law Publishing by K. D. Gaur
STATUTES:
ONLINE RESOURCES:
www.legalpundits.com
www.judis.nic.in
www.indiankanoon.org
www.advocatekhoj.com
www.lawkhoj.com
www.legalserviceindia.com
www.lawnotes.in
thelawdictionary.org
www.webster-dictionary.org
www.dictionary.reference.com
F.N
No
Page
Citation
No.
13
13
13
Their Workmen
4
13
13
13
N. Suriyakal v. A. Mohandoss
13
13
13
(2008) 13 SCC 17
10
13
AIR 1955 SC 65
11
14
12
10
14
(1989) 3 SCC 24
13
11
14
14
12
14
15
12
14
(1994) 5 SCC 27
16
12
14
17
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18
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18
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AIR 1968 SC 33
31
24
15
32
27
17
28
17
34
29
17
35
Santosh
30
19
36
Bhola Bind
31
19
37
31
19
38
32
20
39
Arundhati
33
20
1968 Cr LJ 848
40
33
20
41
34
20
42
35
20
43
36
20
44
37
20
45
38
22
1992(1)Crimes287(A.P)
46
39
22
1994(3)Crimes608(SC)
47
40,46
23
48
41
23
(2010) 9 SCC 73
49
42
23
50
43
23
51
44
23
52
45
24
53
47
24
54
49
25
55
50
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56
51
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57
52
25
58
53
26
59
PrakashKaur v Harjideperal
54
26
60
54
26
61
55
26
62
Satpals Case
56
26
63
57
26
64
58
26
1992(2)Crimes926(P&H)
65
59
27
66
60
27
67
61
27
68
62
27
63
28
70
Y.K.Bansal v. Anju
64
28
(All LJ 914)
71
65
28
72
66
29
73
67
29
74
68
30
75
69
30
76
Raman v. State
70
30
77
71
30
78
72
30
79
73
31
80
74
31
81
75
31
82
76
31
(2003) 8 SCC 80
83
77
32
84
78
32
85
79
33
86
80
33
87
81
33
88
82
35
89
Rajesh v. State
83
35
90
84
36
91
85
37
MR 1992 SC 1817
Sr. No.
Abbreviation
Full Form
1.
v.
2.
AIR
3.
CrLJ
4.
CrPC
5.
Honble
6.
IPC
7.
Pg
PAGE
8.
SC
SUPREME COURT
9.
Supra
10.
Volume
VOLUME
11.
ETC
ETCETRA
12.
SCR
13.
No.
NUMBER
14.
SCC
15.
IEA
VERSUS
HONOURABLE
AS MENTIONED ABOVE
10
11
12
13
14
In the present case, there has been a grave injustice caused to the family of the deceased, the
accused have also ignored the law that was put in place to prevent the atrocity of Dowry
death. The High Court of Rajasthan while ignoring the true value of the facts of the case
acquitted the accused. Every fact in the case points out that the accused persons had
traumatized the deceased for the purpose of dowry to an extent that she was sent back to her
house. It is evident as per her personal diary as she used to write about every event in detail.
Also the refusal of the family members to take the deceased to the hospital even after the
servants requested them to, shows that the High Court ignored all the essential facts of the
case and acted perversely and acquitted the accused persons.
In light of the judgment by the High Court and the substantial injustice it caused not just to
the family of the deceased but also to the public interest at large we humbly submit to the
Honble Supreme Court that it invokes its discretionary jurisdiction to hear and try the matter,
in the interest of Justice to the deceased, the family of the deceased and the public at large.
The Court under Art.136 is free to adjudicate matters on question of fact, in order to remove
the defects of the case and provide proper justice.15 As even on the question of fact, wrong
question leads to a wrong answer. In such cases, errors of fact can be the subject matter of
15
The Supreme Court is not precluded from going into the question of facts under Art.136, if it
considers it necessary to do so.18 Art.136 uses the wording in any cause or matter. This gives
widest power to this court to deal with any cause or matter.19 It is plain that when the Supreme
Court reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily or that a court or
tribunal has not given a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the
finality of finding of facts, or otherwise can stand in the way of the exercise of this power.20
Hence, the petition is maintainable under Art. 136.
It is submitted that when a person has been dealt arbitrarily, this court has to allow the appeal
under Art.136,21 which involves High Court acting perversely22while appreciating the facts or
evidence put forth23 Also, where the consideration of evidence by High Court is not proper
then the Supreme Court can interfere in fact finding in a criminal case.24 We can conclude that
the High Court has erred while deciding the present case.
a) The Honble Trial Court and the Honble High Court have not been able to evaluate
and consider the case in a proper way in light of all the facts thereby resulting in
erroneous judgments and a miscarriage of justice.
16
17
18
ISSUE 2
Whether the accused persons can be punished under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for
the murder of the deceased?
Murder.Except in the cases hereinafter excepted, culpable homicide is murder, if the act by
which the death is caused is done with the intention of causing death, or
19
Ramgopal v. State of Maharashtra34In a case of death by poisoning it is only when the motive
is there and it is proved that the deceased died of the poison in question that the accused had
Santosh,1975 Cr LJ 602 : AIR 1975 SC 654; See also Sheaj Ra, 1983 Cr LJ 993 (SC) : AIR 1983 SC 614 : (1983) 3
SCC 280.
Bhola Bind, (1943) 22 pat 607. State of Karnataka v. Mallu Kallappa Pa l, AIR 1994 SC 784.
(1995) 1 Cr LJ 55 (Ker)
Arundha , 1968 Cr LJ 848, Ra ni v. State of H.P., 1993 Cr LJ 1811 (SC)
20
Anant Chantman Lagu v. The State of Bombay35their Lordships held that in a cause of
poisoning, the prosecution must establish: (a) that the death took place by poisoning; (h) that
the accused had the poison in his possession; and (c) that the accused had an opportunity to
administer the poison to the deceased. All the three requirements are satisfied in this case.
In Shanmughan v. State of Kerala36, the Honble Supreme Court held that if circumstantial
evidence, in the absence of direct proof of the three elements, is so decisive that the court can
unhesitatingly hold that the death was a result of administration of Poison and that the Poison
must have been administered by the accused persons, then the conviction can be rested on it.
In Bhupinder Singh v. State of Punjab37, the Honble Supreme Court held that We do not
consider that there should be acquittal on the failure of the prosecution to prove the possession
of poison with the accused .Murder by poison is invariably committed under the cover and
cloak of secrecy. Nobody will administer poison to another in the presence of others. The
person who administers poison to another in secrecy will not keep the portion of it for the
investigating officer to come and collect it. The person who commits such murder would
naturally take care to eliminate and destroy the evidence against him. In such cases, it would
be impossible for the prosecution to prove possession of poison with the accused. The
prosecution may, however, establish other circumstances consistent only with the hypothesis
of the guilt of the accused. The court then would not be justified in acquitting theaccused on
the ground that the prosecution has failed to prove possession of poison with the
accused.(Emphasis supplied)
In the present case the deceased was subjected to humiliation and harassment by way of
demanding dowry and taunts on account of not being able to satisfy the husbands families
thirst for Dowry. Not to mention the need for a boy child which the deceased was unable to
deliver and instead delivered a girl child.
On that fateful day the entire Goyal family conspired to murder the deceased and as such Mr.
Dinesh Goyal procured the organo-phosporus poison from the store and with the help of the
other two accused held the deceased and forced fed her the poison. The servants could hear
the deceased scream that she did not want to die.
There is no room for doubt of the Honble Court that the three accused had knowledge that
the natural and probable cause of forcefully administering organo-phosporus poison would
lead to the death of the deceased. Also the entire story from procurement of the poison to the
post mortem report which clearly states that the deceased died of the said poison infers
21
ISSUE 3
Whether the three accused are guilty under Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code for
causing dowry-death of the deceased?
A reading of Section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 clearly shows that if a married
woman dies otherwise than under normal circumstances within seven years of her marriage
and it is shown that soon before her death she was subjected to cruelty or harassmentby her
husband or any relative of her husband in connection with demand for dowry, such death shall
be called a dowry death and such a husband or relative shall be deemed to have caused the
death.
22
In Hemchand v. State of Haryana39, the Supreme Court held that when a question arises
whether a person has committed the offence of dowry death of a woman all that is necessary
is it should be shown that soon before her unnatural death which took place within seven years
of the marriage, the deceased had been subjected, by such person, to cruelty or harassment for
or in connection with demand for dowry. If that is shown then the court shall presume that
such a person has caused the dowry death.
It can therefore be seen that irrespective of the fact whether such person is directly
responsible for the death of the deceased or not, by virtue of the presumption, he is deemed to
have committed the dowry death if there was such cruelty or harassment and that if the
unnatural death has occurred within 7 years from the date of marriage.
The Honourable Supreme Court of India pronounced inHans Raj v. State of Punjab40that the
conditions precedent for establishing an offence under section 304-B of the Indian Penal Code
read with section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act are as follows:
a) That a married woman died otherwise other than under normal circumstances.
23
In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana42, it has been held that if the above conditions exist, it
would constitute a dowry death and the husband and his relatives shall be deemed to have
caused her death. Courts have held a similar view in Kans Raj v. State of Punjab43 and Satvir
Singh v. State of Punjab44.
[a] That the deceased died otherwise than under normal circumstances
In Shanti v. State of Haryana45, the Supreme Court held that where the death occurred under
unnatural circumstances, it is immaterial whether it was the result of a suicide or homicide.
Even assuming that it is a case of suicide, even then it would be death amounting to dowry
death under Section 304-B.
In Hans Raj v. State of Punjab46, the Apex Court held that the term normal circumstances
apparently means not the natural death.
(2010) 9 SCC 73
(1998) 3 SCC 309
AIR 2000 SC 2324
AIR 2001 SC 2828
AIR 1991 SC 1226
2000 (3) Supreme 554 (SC); AIR 2000 SC 2324; (2000) DMC 645 SC; JT 2000 (5) SC 223; 2000 Cr LJ 2993
24
1. Any willful conduct which is of such nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit
suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health of the woman.
2. Harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view of coercing her or any
person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or
in on account of failure by her or any other person related to her to meet such demand.
Cruelty is not confined to physical cruelty but also includes mental cruelty.
Mental cruelty varies from person to person depending on the intensity of sensitivity and the
V.K.Dewan, Law rela ng to oences against woman, orient law house( 2nd edi on) 102
25
26
AIR 1996 SC 189; Shobha Rani v. Madhukar Reddi, AIR 1988 SC 121
27
The term dowry means any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given either
directly or indirectlya) By one party to a marriage to the other party to marriage or
b) By the parents of either party to the marriage or any other person, to either party to the
marriage or to any person at or before or any time after the marriage in connection
28
with the marriage of the said parties but does not include dower or mehr in cases of
persons to persons to whom Muslim personal law applies.
Thus there are three occasions related to dowry. One is before the marriage, second is at the
time of marriage and the third is at any time after the marriage. The third occasion may
appear to be an unending period but the crucial words are in connection with the marriage of
the said parties. This means that giving or agreeing to give any property or valuable security
during any of the above three stages should be in connection with the marriage of the
parties.
In G.S.Barooa v. Kanwaljit Singh63, it was held that demand of dowry is equal to taking of
dowry.
In Y.K.Bansal v. Anju64, it was held that dowry means any property given or agreed to be
given by the parents of a party to the marriage at the time of the marriage or before marriage
or in any time after the marriage in connection with the marriage.
In Pawan Kumar v. State of Haryana65, the Supreme Court held under section 2 of the Dowry
Prohibition Act 1961 that an agreement for dowry is not always necessary.
In State of Andhra Pradesh v. Raj Gopal Asawa66, the Supreme Court did not restrict dowry to
a mere agreement or demand at the time of marriage or before the marriage but also included
a demand made subsequent to the marriage.
In the present case Accused No.1 demanded a dowry of substantial value, commensurate with
his social status and to spend a minimum of Rs. 1 Crore on the wedding apart from dowry.
The agreed dowry was paid to the entire satisfaction of the Goyal family. Later on after the
marriage, Accused No.2 was continuously making dowry demands for Mercedes Benz Classic
Car and for a fixed deposit of Rs. 1 Crore. Hence we see that demands for dowry were made
before marriage, at the time of marriage as well as after the marriage.
29
30
31
32
Abetment of suicide:
If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be
punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
To combat the ever increasing menace of dowry deaths, Criminal Law (Second Amendment)
Act, 1983 has provided that where a married girl commits suicide within seven years of her
marriage, the Court may presume that her husband and his relatives had abetted her to commit
suicide by virtue of insertion of Section 113A in the Evidence Act, 1872.
A perusal of Section 113-A of IEA, 1872 would imply that to raise this presumption the
following ingredients must be show:
a) the deceased committed suicide
b) the accused instigated or abetted for committing suicide
c) direct involvement by the accused in such instigation or abetment.
In Ramesh Vithal Patil v. State of Karnataka77, the deceased committed suicide within a period
of seven years from her marriage. S. 113-A of the Indian Evidence Act is therefore clearly
attracted to this case. Presumption contemplated therein must spring into action.
In State of Punjab v. Iqbal Singh78, the Apex Court setting aside the order of acquittal of the
High Court and restoring the trial courts verdict held that the accused husband, mother-in-law
and sister-in-law are liable for abetment of suicide under Section 306, IPC for creating such
circumstances which provoked or forced the deceased to commit suicide.
In Gurbachan Singh v. Satpal Singh79, when the woman committed suicide because of
33
As is evident from the statement of facts, in the instant case, the deceased was driven to
commit suicide by constant harassment for dowry and cruelty through humiliation,
harassment, intimidation and interference by the three accused, the final straw being the act of
procuring and making available the poison to the deceased.
The three accused, through their constant harassment for dowry and acts of cruelty created
such circumstances as to drive the deceased to commit suicide by consuming the poison.
Further, there was no urgency displayed by the three accused in shifting the victim to the
hospital for treatment and even after repeated requests from PW-5 and, PW-6 and PW-7, the
accused failed to act and provide emergency medical treatment to the accused thereby
causing her death. The intention was clearly to drive the person to commit suicide and to
ensure that death would follow.
There is no room for any doubt of the Honble Court that the three accused are guilty of
abetment of suicide under Section 306 of the Indian Penal Code.
34
35
The intention was clearly to drive the person to meet their demand for dowry failing which to
drive the deceased to commit suicide and to ensure that death would follow as punishment for
failing to meet the demands.
The acts of the family are in consonance with their common objective and it may be hard to
specifically pin point to individual roles played by the three accused in driving the deceased to
commit suicide.
The Apex Court in Krishnan v. State of Karnataka82 has reiterated the principle that Section 34
has been framed to meet a case in which it may be difficult to distinguish between the acts of
individual members of a party or to prove exactly what part was taken by each of them.
In Rajesh v. State83, the Supreme Court held the existence of a common intention can be
inferred from the attending circumstances of the case and the conduct of the parties and no
direct evidence of common intention is necessary. Participation in the commission of the
offence need not be proved in all cases.
In Pradeep Kumar v. Union Admn84, the Supreme Court held that common intention can be
proved either from direct evidence or by inference from the acts or attending circumstances of
the case and conduct of the parties.
It is therefore appropriate to charge and prosecute the three accused under Section 34 of the
(2003) 7 SCC 56; AIR 2003 SC 2978; 2003 SCW 3688 (SC)
(1999) 8 SCC 928
(2006) 10 SCC 608
36
37
MR 1992 SC 1817
38
39