EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS

People v. Vera
In 1934, Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal
case filed against him by the Hongkong and Shanghai
Banking Corporation (HSBC). In 1936, he filed for probation.
The matter was referred to the Insular Probation Office
which recommended the denial of Cu Unjiengs petition for
probation. A hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning
the petition for probation. The Prosecution opposed the
petition. Eventually, due to delays in the hearing, the
Prosecution filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme
Court alleging that courts like the Court of First Instance of
Manila (which is presided over by Judge Vera) have no
jurisdiction to place accused like Cu Unjieng under probation
because under the law (Act No. 4221 or The Probation Law),
probation is only meant to be applied in provinces with
probation officers; that the City of Manila is not a province,
and that Manila, even if construed as a province, has no
designated probation officer hence, a Manila court cannot
grant probation.

Further still, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an

encroachment of the executives power to grant pardon.
They say that the legislature, by providing for a probation
law, had in effect encroached upon the executives power to
grant pardon. (Ironically, the Prosecution agreed with the
issues raised by HSBC ironic because their main stance
was the non-applicability of the probation law only in Manila
while recognizing its application in provinces).
For his part, one of the issues raised by Cu Unjieng is that,
the Prosecution, representing the State as well as the People
of the Philippines, cannot question the validity of a law, like
Act 4221, which the State itself created. Further, Cu Unjieng
also castigated the fiscal of Manila who himself had used the
Probation Law in the past without question but is now
questioning the validity of the said law (estoppel).
ISSUE:
1. May the State question its own laws?
2. Is Act 4221 constitutional?

Meanwhile, HSBC also filed its own comment on the matter

alleging that Act 4221 is unconstitutional for it violates the
constitutional guarantee on equal protection of the laws.
HSBC averred that the said law makes it the prerogative of
provinces whether or nor to apply the probation law if a
province chooses to apply the probation law, then it will
appoint a probation officer, but if it will not, then no
probation officer will be appointed hence, that makes it
violative of the equal protection clause.

HELD:

Further, HSBC averred that the Probation Law is an undue

delegation of power because it gave the option to the
provincial board to whether or not to apply the probation
law however, the legislature did not provide guidelines to
be followed by the provincial board.

Violation of the Equal Protection Clause

1. Yes. There is no law which prohibits the State, or its duly

authorized representative, from questioning the validity of a
law. Estoppel will also not lie against the State even if it had
been using an invalid law.
2. No, Act 4221
unconstitutional.

or

the

[old]

Probation

Law

is

The contention of HSBC and the Prosecution is well taken on

this note. There is violation of the equal protection clause.
Under Act 4221, provinces were given the option to apply
the law by simply providing for a probation officer. So if a
province decides not to install a probation officer, then the

accused within said province will be unduly deprived of the

provisions of the Probation Law.
Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
There is undue delegation of legislative power. Act 4221
provides that it shall only apply to provinces where the
respective provincial boards have provided for a probation
officer. But nowhere in the law did it state as to what
standard (sufficient standard test) should provincial boards
follow in determining whether or not to apply the probation
law in their province. This only creates a roving commission
which will act arbitrarily according to its whims.
Encroachment of Executive Power
Though Act 4221 is unconstitutional, the Supreme Court
recognized the power of Congress to provide for probation.
Probation does not encroach upon the Presidents power to
grant pardon. Probation is not pardon. Probation is within
the power of Congress to fix penalties while pardon is a
power of the president to commute penalties.
People v. Cayat
In 1937, there exists a law (Act 1639) which bars native nonChristians from drinking gin or any other liquor outside of
their customary alcoholic drinks. Cayat, a native of the
Cordillera, was caught with an A-1-1 gin in violation of this
Act. He was then charged and sentenced to pay P5.00 and
to be imprisoned in case of insolvency. Cayat admitted his
guilt but he challenged the constitutionality of the said Act.
He averred, among others, that it violated his right to equal
protection afforded by the constitution. He said this an
attempt to treat them with discrimination or mark them as
inferior or less capable race and less entitled will meet with
their instant challenge. The law sought to distinguish and
classify native non-Christians from Christians.

ISSUE: Whether or not the said Act violates the equal

protection clause.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that Act 1639 is valid for it met the
requisites of a reasonable classification. The SC emphasized
that it is not enough that the members of a group have the
characteristics that distinguish them from others. The
classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be
arbitrary. The requisites to be complied with are;
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification
rests on real or substantial, not merely imaginary or
whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon accident of
birth or parentage. The law, then, does not seek to mark
the non-Christian tribes as an inferior or less capable race.
On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the
promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a
recognition of their inherent right to equality in the
enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by their Christian
brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the
law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the
government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to
raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the
benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of
placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of
true equality.
Ichong v. Hernandez

FACTS:
Petitioner, also in behalf of other alien residents
corporations and partnerships, brought this action to obtain
a judicial declaration that RA 1180 is unconstitutional.
Petitioner contends, among others, that said act violate the
equal protection of laws and that it violates the treaty of the
Philippines with China. Solicitor General contends that the
act was a valid exercise of the police power and that not a
single treaty was infringed by said act.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 1180 violates the equal protection of
laws

to procure the requisite mayors permit so as to be

employed or engage in trade in the City of Manila. Thus, a
case was filed with CFI-Manila to stop enforcement of the
ordinance. CFI-Manila declared the ordinance void. Thus, the
present petition for certiorari.
ISSUES:
(1)
Is the ordinance violative of the cardinal rule of
uniformity of taxation?
(2) Does it violate the principle against undue designation
of legislative power?
(3) Does it violate the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Constitution?

HELD:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue
favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination on oppression of inequality. The real question
at hand is whether or not the exclusion in the future aliens
for the retail trade unreasonable. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by a specified class if it applies to all
persons within such class and reasonable grounds exist for
making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not. Aliens are under no special
constitutional protection which forbids a classification
otherwise justified simply because the limitation of the class
falls along the lines of nationality. The difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitute a basis for reasonable
classification in the exercise of police power.

RULING:
(1) Yes. The P50 fee is unreasonable not only because it is
excessive but because it fails to consider valid substantial
differences in situation among individual aliens who are
required to pay it. The same amount of P50 is being
collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or
permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly
employee or a highly paid executive.

(3) Yes. Requiring a person before he can be employed to

get a permit from the City Mayor of Manila who may
withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the
basic right of the people in the Philippines to engage in a
means of livelihood. The shelter of protection under the due
process and equal protection clause is given to all persons,
both aliens and citizens.
Thus, the ordinance is invalid.

Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho

FACTS:
The Municipal Board of Manila enacted Ordinance 6537
requiring aliens (except those employed in the diplomatic
and consular missions of foreign countries, in technical
assistance programs of the government and another
country, and members of religious orders or congregations)

(2) Yes. It does not lay down any criterion or standard to

guide the Mayor in the exercise of his discretion. It has been
held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state
any policy or to set up any standard to guide or limit the
action, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and
unrestricted power, such ordinance is invalid.

Dumlao v. COMELEC
Patricio Dumlao was the former governor of Nueva Vizcaya.
He has already retired from his office and he has been
receiving retirement benefits therefrom.
In 1980, he filed for reelection to the same office.
Meanwhile, Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 was enacted. This law
provides, among others, that retirees from public office like
Dumlao are disqualified to run for office. Dumlao assailed
the law averring that it is class legislation hence
unconstitutional. In general, Dumlao invoked equal
protection in the eye of the law.
His petition was joined by Atty. Romeo Igot and Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr. These two however have different issues. The
suits of Igot and Salapantan are more of a taxpayers suit
assailing the other provisions of BP 52 regarding the term of
office of the elected officials, the length of the campaign,
and the provision which bars persons charged for crimes
from running for public office as well as the provision that
provides that the mere filing of complaints against them
after preliminary investigation would already disqualify them
from office.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dumlao, Igot, and Salapantan have a
cause of action.
HELD: No. The SC pointed out the procedural lapses of this
case for this case should have never been merged.
Dumlaos issue is different from Igots. They have separate
issues. Further, this case does not meet all the requisites so
that itd be eligible for judicial review. There are standards
that have to be followed in the exercise of the function of
judicial review, namely: (1) the existence of an appropriate
case; (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party
raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the
function be exercised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the

necessity that the constitutional question be passed upon in

order to decide the case.
In this case, only the 3rd requisite was met.
The SC ruled however that the provision barring persons
charged for crimes may not run for public office and that the
filing of complaints against them and after preliminary
investigation would already disqualify them from office as
null and void.
The assertion that BP 52 is contrary to the safeguard of
equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional
guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to
rational classification. If the groupings are based on
reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be
treated and regulated differently from another class. For
purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have
been validly classified differently from younger employees.
Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory
retirement, while those of younger ages are not so
compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal
positions, to require that candidates should not be more
than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if
applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable
classification although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law should be to promote the
emergence of younger blood in our political elective
echelons. On the other hand, it might be that persons more
than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Retirement from government service may or may not be a
reasonable disqualification for elective local officials. For one
thing, there can also be retirees from government service at
ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to
disqualify retirees, aged 65, for a 65-year old retiree could
be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a
retiree.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official

(Dumalo), who has retired from a provincial, city or
municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from
running for the same office from which he had retired, as
provided for in the challenged provision.
Philippine Association of Service Exporters Inc., v.
Drilon
Facts: Petitioner, Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc.,
is engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers,
male and female of overseas employment. It challenges the
constitutional validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled Guidelines Governing the Temporary Suspension of
Deployment of Filipino Domestic and Household Workers. It
claims that such order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino workers but
only to domestic helpers and females with similar skills, and
that it is in violation of the right to travel, it also being an
invalid exercise of the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI
invokes Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for
worker participation in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law. Thereafter the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged guidelines
involving the police power of the State and informed the
court that the respondent have lifted the deployment ban in
some states where there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for sufficient
safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of the
Filipino workers.
Issue: Whether or not there has been a valid classification in
the challenged Department Order No. 1.

Held: SC in dismissing the petition ruled that there has been

valid classification, the Filipino female domestics working
abroad were in a class by themselves, because of the
special risk to which their class was exposed. There is no
question that Order No.1 applies only to female contract
workers but it does not thereby make an undue
discrimination between sexes. It is well settled hat equality
before the law under the constitution does not import a
perfect identity of rights among all men and women. It
admits of classification, provided that:
1.
2.
3.
4.

Such classification rests on substantial distinctions

That they are germane to the purpose of the law
They are not confined to existing conditions
They apply equally to all members of the same class

In the case at bar, the classifications made, rest on

substantial distinctions.
Dept. Order No. 1 does not impair the right to travel. The
consequence of the deployment ban has on the right to
travel does not impair the right, as the right to travel is
subjects among other things, to the requirements of public
safety as may be provided by law. Deployment ban of
female domestic helper is a valid exercise of police power.
Police power as been defined as the state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote general welfare. Neither is
there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1
constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power as the
labor code vest the DOLE with rule making powers.
Himagan v. People
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City.
He was charged for the murder of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and
for the attempted murder of Benjamins younger brother,
Barnabe. Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975,

Himagan was placed into suspension pending the murder

case. The law provides that:
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in
form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave
felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years
and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately
suspend the accused from office until the case is
terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial
and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from
arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42
of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service Decree provides that his
suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He
claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over
90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of
laws .
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal
protection guaranteed by the Constitution.
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA
6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no
other meaning than that the suspension from office of the
member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the
penalty is six years and one day or more shall last until the
termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted
before the termination of the case. The second sentence of
the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or
limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of
each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The
second deals with the time from within which the trial
should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently
from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on

preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry

weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to
harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious
offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending,
his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously
exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence
by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed.
the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days
under Sec 47 of RA 6975 does not violate the suspended
policemans constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from
arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the
mandatory word shall before the phrase be terminated
within ninety (90) days, there is nothing in RA 6975 that
suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will
be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period.
Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within
the period without justifiable reason may be subject to
administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where
the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial
is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such
that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not
without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case.
Should the court refuse to dismiss the case, the accused can
compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus,
or secure his liberty by habeas corpus.
Quinto v. COMELEC
Facts:

Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and

administer election laws, COMELEC issued Resolution No.
8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of
Candidacy (CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of
Registered Political Parties in Connection with the May 10,
2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of
Resolution No. 8678 provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.a) Any
person holding a public appointive office or position
including active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, and other officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be
considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not
be considered resigned upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy for the same or any other elective office or
position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from
their offices the moment they file their CoCs, petitioners
Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold
appointive positions in the government and who intend to
run in the coming elections, filed the instant petition for
prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the
afore-quoted Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and
void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13 of R.A. No.
9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution,
contains two conflicting provisions. These must be
harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive
at a declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from
their positions upon the filing of their CoCs.
Issue: whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of
Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section 4(a) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection
clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso
facto resigned from their posts upon the filing of their CoCs,

but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,

specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates
against the first class. The fact alone that there is
substantial distinction between those who hold appointive
positions and those occupying elective posts, does not
justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a
discriminatory governmental act may pass the constitutional
norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and
substantial differences between the classes treated
differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and
substantial distinction exists between a motorcycle and
other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification
among those prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all
motorized vehicles are created equala two-wheeled
vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a
four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it
does not comply with the second requirementif it is not
germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be
enforced not only for the present but as long as the problem
sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under the
last requirement, the classification would be regarded as
invalid if all the members of the class are not treated
similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations
imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court
finds that the differential treatment of persons holding
appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones
is not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to
prevent the use of a governmental position to promote ones

candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive

influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at
promoting the efficiency, integrity, and discipline of the
public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge
of official duty would be motivated by political
considerations rather than the welfare of the public. The
restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry
of civil servants to the electoral arena, while still in office,
could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance of
duty because they would be attending to their campaign
rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law,
then the assailed provision cannot be constitutionally
rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly
absent is the requisite that the classification must be
germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether one
holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils
sought to be prevented by the measure remain. For
example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the
Cabinet for that matter, could wield the same influence as
the Vice-President who at the same time is appointed to a
Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents
were appointed to take charge of national housing, social
welfare development, interior and local government, and
foreign affairs). With the fact that they both head executive
offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently
when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the
present state of our law, the Vice-President, in the example,
running this time, let us say, for President, retains his
position during the entire election period and can still use
the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in
the discharge of the functions of his appointive office, the
inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public
officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven
by a greater impetus for excellent performance to show his
fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive
officials differently from the elective ones. The classification
simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to

the purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the

second proviso of the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A.
No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal
protection clause.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED.
The second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, Section 66 of the Omnibus Election
Code and Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are
declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
_____
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
Held: No
To start with, the equal protection clause does not require
the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction. What it simply requires is equality
among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and
yonder is that of reasonableness, which has four requisites:
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
Our assailed Decision readily acknowledged that these
deemed-resigned provisions satisfy the first, third and fourth
requisites of reasonableness. It, however, proffers the
dubious conclusion that the differential treatment of
appointive officials vis--vis elected officials is not germane
to the purpose of the law, because "whether one holds an
appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be
prevented by the measure remain."
In the instant case, is there a rational justification for
excluding elected officials from the operation of the deemed
resigned provisions? There is.
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps
the purest expression of the sovereign power of the people.
It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public
office by popular vote. Considering that elected officials are

put in office by their constituents for a definite term, it may

justifiably be said that they were excluded from the ambit of
the deemed resigned provisions in utmost respect for the
mandate of the sovereign will. In other words, complete
deference is accorded to the will of the electorate that they
be served by such officials until the end of the term for
which they were elected. In contrast, there is no such
expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
The dichotomized treatment of appointive and elective
officials is therefore germane to the purposes of the law. For
the law was made not merely to preserve the integrity,
efficiency, and discipline of the public service; the
Legislature, whose wisdom is outside the rubric of judicial
scrutiny, also thought it wise to balance this with the
competing, yet equally compelling, interest of deferring to
the sovereign will.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court RESOLVES to GRANT the
respondents
and
the
intervenors
Motions
for
Reconsideration; REVERSE and SET ASIDE this Courts
December 1, 2009 Decision; DISMISS the Petition; and ISSUE
this Resolution declaring as not UNCONSTITUTIONAL (1)
Section 4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678, (2) the
second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 9369, and (3) Section 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code.
_____
The ruling basically paves the way for justices, judges,
election officials, military and police officers, members of
the cabinet and all appointed civil servants to continue
exercising the functions of, and holding on to, their
appointive office while campaigning to get elected for an
elective position.
The legal ramifications are of great significance. As Justice
Carpio pointed out in his dissenting opinion, imagine if the
Provincial Commander of the AFP files his COC for governor
on 1 December 2009 for the 10 May 2010 elections. If he is

not considered automatically resigned from office, he has

until the start of the campaign period on 26 March 2010 to
remain in his post, in command of hundreds, if not
thousands, of fully-armed personnel. The same is true for
judges, cabinet secretaries, and other heads of offices who
have some kind of influence and control over certain
personnel and government resources. There are even
reports that some Comelec officials themselves have filed
their COCs for certain elective positions.
Next elections, it would then be possible that the Chief
Justice, the Comelec Chairperson or the AFP Chief of Staff
become a candidate for President, Vice-President or Senator
while serving the office to which they were appointed.
The decision does not seem to prevent the evil that the
Constitution, in so many words, seeks to prevent. In fact,
Article IX(B), Section 2(4) of the Constitution expressly
provides that No officer or employee in the civil service
shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.
Furthermore, if they lose, they just continue occupying their
appointive posts. This is illogical because Section 6, Art.
IX(B) of the Constitution provides that No candidate who
has lost in any election shall, within one year after such
election, be appointed to any office in the Government of
any government-owned or controlled corporations or in any
of its subsidiaries.
Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission
FACTS:
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated July 30,
2010.

PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the

President with the primary task to investigate reports of
graft and corruption commi ed by third-level public officers
and employees, their co-principals, accomplices and
accessories during the previous administration, and to
submit its finding and recommendations to the President,
Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an
investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, se le, or render awards
in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is
gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers
but it has no power to cite people in contempt, much less
order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it
cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists as
to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and
to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. They argued
that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates
the power of the Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the
Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1
because the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the
power to create an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the Truth Commission.
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and
statutes when it vested the Truth Commission with quasijudicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the
Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it
selectively targets for investigation and prosecution officials
and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption
is their peculiar species even as it excludes those of the

other administrations, past and present, who may be

indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of
petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress
because the Presidents executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct
investigations to ensure that laws are faithfully executed
and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
Administrative Code of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended),
R.A. No. 9970 and se led jurisprudence, authorize the
President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to
appropriate funds because there is no appropriation but a
mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede
the functions of the Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is
a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its
functions do not duplicate, supplant or erode the la ers
jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal
protection clause because it was validly created for laudable
purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the
petitions and question E. O. No. 1;2. WON E. O. No. 1
violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping
the powers of Congress to create and to appropriate funds
for public offices, agencies and commissions;3. WON E. O.
No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit:
(1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for
the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the
act must have the standing to question the validity of the
subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a

personal and substantial interest in the case such that he

has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of
the Congress as a body to which they belong as members.
To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the
power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that
institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the
prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the
Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are
allowed to question the validity of any official action which,
to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained,
or is in danger of sustaining, any personal and direct injury a
ributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
Locus standi is a right of appearance in a court of justice on
a given question. In private suits, standing is governed by
the real-parties-in interest rule. It provides that every
action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the
real party in interest. Real-party-in interest is the party
who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in
the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits.
Here, the plaintiff who asserts a public right in assailing an
allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of
the general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek
judicial protection. He has to make out a sufficient interest
in the vindication of the public order and the securing of
relief as a citizen or taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have
a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he
has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result. The
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogos assertion that the
petition covers ma ers of transcendental importance to
justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the a

ention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and

weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our
laws are faithfully executed. The powers of the President are
not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the President granted
pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated duty is the power
to create ad hoc commi ees. This flows from the obvious
need to ascertain facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into ma
ers which the President is entitled to know so that he can be
properly advised and guided in the performance of his
duties relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws
of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or
allocations of existing funds already appropriated. There is
no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of
Congress to appropriate funds. There is no need to specify
the amount to be earmarked for the operation of the
commission because, whatever funds the Congress has
provided for the Office of the President will be the very
source of the funds for the commission. The amount that
would be allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing
auditing rules and regulations so there is no impropriety in
the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode
their respective powers. If at all, the investigative function of
the commission will complement those of the two offices.
The function of determining probable cause for the filing of
the appropriate complaints before the courts remains to be
with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTCs power to
investigate is limited to obtaining facts so that it can advise
and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the
land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of
Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression
of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article
III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.

Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly

situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner. The purpose of the equal protection clause is to
secure every person within a states jurisdiction against
intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned
by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the states duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Equal protection clause
permits classification. Such classification, however, to be
valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four
requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)
It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies
equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the
members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to
rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of
the equal protection clause. The clear mandate of truth
commission is to investigate and find out the truth
concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during
the previous administration only. The intent to single out the
previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that
is, a class of past administrations. It is not a class of its own.
Not to include past administrations similarly situated
constitutes arbitrariness which the equal protection clause
cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly
reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for
vindictiveness
and
selective
retribution.
Superficial
differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations.
The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all
past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of
the nation to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights determined and all

public authority administered. Laws that do not conform to

the Constitution should be stricken down for being
unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order
No. 1 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is
violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

Almonte v. Vasquez
Facts:
This is a case wherein respondent Ombudsman, requires
petitioners Nerio Rogado and Elisa Rivera, as chief
accountant and record custodian, respectively, of the
Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to
produce "all documents relating to Personal Services Funds
for the year 1988" and all evidence such as vouchers from
enforcing his orders.
Petitioner Almonte was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB,
while Perez is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal
Management Division. The subpoena duces tecum was
issued by the Ombudsman in connection with his
investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB had
been illegally disbursed. The letter, purporting to have been
written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned citizen,
was addressed to the Secretary of Finance, with copies
furnished several government offices, including the Office of
the Ombudsman.
May be erased: [The letter reads in pertinent parts: that the
EIIB has a syndicate headed by the Chief of Budget Division
who is manipulating funds and also the brain of the so called
"ghost agents" or the "Emergency Intelligence Agents" (EIA);
that when the agency had salary differential last Oct '88 all
money for the whole plantilla were released and from that
alone, Millions were saved and converted to ghost agents of

EIA; Almost all EIIB agents collects payroll from the big time
smuggler syndicate monthly and brokers every week for
them not to be apprehended.]
In his comment on the letter-complaint, petitioner Almonte
denied all the allegations written on the anonymous letter.
Petitioners move to quash the subpoena and the subpoena
duces tecum but was denied.
Disclosure of the documents in question is resisted with the
claim of privilege of an agency of the government on the
ground that "knowledge of EIIB's documents relative to its
Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will necessarily
[lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets,
strategies, and tactics and the whole of its being" and this
could "destroy the EIIB."
Issue:
Whether petitioners can be ordered to produce documents
relating to personal services and salary vouchers of EIIB
employees on the plea that such documents are classified
without violating their equal protection of laws.
Held:
YES. At common law a governmental privilege against
disclosure is recognized with respect to state secrets
bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters and in
addition, privilege to withhold the identity of persons who
furnish information of violation of laws. In the case at bar,
there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be
disclosed by the production of records pertaining to the
personnel of the EIIB. Indeed, EIIB's function is the gathering
and evaluation of intelligence reports and information
regarding "illegal activities affecting the national economy,
such as, but not limited to, economic sabotage, smuggling,
tax evasion, dollar salting." Consequently, while in cases
which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine
from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable
danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military

matters without compelling production, no similar excuse

can be made for a privilege resting on other considerations.
The Ombudsman is investigating a complaint that several
items in the EIIB were filled by fictitious persons and that
the allotments for these items in 1988 were used for illegal
purposes. The plantilla and other personnel records are
relevant to his investigation as the designated protectors of
the people of the Constitution.
Nor is there violation of petitioners' right to the equal
protection of the laws. Petitioners complain that "in all forum
and tribunals . . . the aggrieved parties . . . can only hale
respondents via their verified complaints or sworn
statements with their identities fully disclosed," while in
proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman
anonymous letters suffice to start an investigation. In the
first place, there can be no objection to this procedure
because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the
second place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of
complaints "in any form and in a manner," the framers of
the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence
of the people which keep them from complaining against
official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out,
the Office of the Ombudsman is different from the other
investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials
who, through official pressure and influence, can quash,
delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the
other hand complainants are more often than not poor and
simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.
Finally, it is contended that the issuance of the subpoena
duces tecum would violate petitioners' right against selfincrimination. It is enough to state that the documents
required to be produced in this case are public records and
those to whom the subpoena duces tecum is directed are
government officials in whose possession or custody the
documents are. Moreover, if, as petitioners claim the
disbursement by the EII of funds for personal service has

already been cleared by the COA, there is no reason why

they should object to the examination of the documents by
respondent Ombudsman.
Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City
Facts:
January 29, 1964, the municipal board of Ormoc City passed
Ordinance No. 4 Series of 1964 imposing a municipal tax for
all productions of centrifugal sugar milled equivalent to 1
% per export sale to USA and other foreign countries.
Payments were made under protest by Ormoc sugar
Company.
Sugar Company filed before CFI of Leyte a complaint against
the City of Ormoc alleging that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection
clause and the rule of uniformity of taxation. In response,
defendants asserted that the tax ordinance was within the
city's power to enact under Local Autonomy Act and the
same did not violate constitutional limitations.
After pre-trial and submission of case memoranda, CFI
declared the ordinance constitutional, that it is within the
charter of the city.
Appeal was then taken to SC by the Ormoc Sugar Company
alleging the same statutory and constitutional violations.
Appellant questions the authority of the Municipal Board to
levy such tax in view of the Revised dministrative Code
which denies municipal councils to impose export tax.
Issue: Whether constitutional limits on the power of
taxation, and equal protection clause and rule of uniform
taxation were infringed?
Held:

We ruled that the equal protection clause applies only to

persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a
classification is reasonable where (1) it is based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2)
these are germane to the purpose of the law; (3) the
classification applies not only to present conditions but also
to future conditions which are substantially identical to
those of the present; (4) the classification applies only to
those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the
questioned ordinance does not meet them, for it taxes only
centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. At the time of the
taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.,
it is true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms
applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance
should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any
subsequently established sugar central, of the same class as
plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if
later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the
tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc
City Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
The ordinance is unconstitutional.
Ysaruegi v. PAL
Facts: Petitioner was a former international flight steward of
PAL, herein respondent. Petitioner was dismissed because of
his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company. Petitioner claims that he was illegally dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner was discriminated against
when he was dismissed.

Held: Petition denied. To make his claim more believable,

petitioner invokes the equal protection clause guaranty of
the Constitution. However, in the absence of governmental
interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution
cannot be invoked. Put differently, the Bill of Rights is not
meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals.

Indeed, the US Supreme Court, in interpreting the 14th

Amendment, which is the source of our equal protection
guarantee, is consistent in saying that the equal protection
erects no shield against private conduct, however
discriminatory or wrongful. Private actions, no matter how
egregious, cannot violate the equal protection guarantee.