RESIDENT MARINE MAMMALS VS

REYES
Gr. No. 180771 APRIL 2015
Facts: A novel case was recently
decided by the Supreme Court where
a suit was filed by resident marine
mammals, like whales, dolphins, etc.
in order to prevent the exploration,
development and exploitation of
petroleum resources within Tanon
Strait, a narrow passage of water
situated between the islands of Negros
and Cebu.
This case arose when DOE and Japan
Petroleum Exploration Co. Ltd. (JAPEX)
entered into an agreement for the
exploration,
development
and
production of petroleum resources at
the offshore of Tanon Strait. The
Resident Marine Mammals, through
the Stewards, claimed that they
have the legal standing to file this
action since they stand to be benefited
or injured by the judgment in this suit.
Citing Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., they also
asserted their right to sue for the
faithful performance of international
and municipal environmental laws
created in their favor and for their
benefit.
In
this
regard,
they
propounded that they have the right to
demand that they be accorded the
benefits
granted
to
them
in
multilateral international instruments
that the Philippine Government had
signed,
under
the
concept
of
stipulation pour autrui.
The Stewards contended that there
should be no question of their right to
represent
the
Resident
Marine
Mammals as they have stakes in the
case as forerunners of a campaign to
build awareness among the affected
residents of Taon Strait and as
stewards of the environment since the
primary steward, the Government, had
failed in its duty to protect the

environment pursuant to the public

trust doctrine. They also contended
that the Court may lower the
benchmark in locus standi as an
exercise of epistolary jurisdiction.
Public respondents argued that the
Resident Marine Mammals have no
standing because Section 1, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court requires parties to
an action to be either natural or
juridical persons. They also contested
the applicability of Oposa, pointing out
that the petitioners therein were all
natural persons, albeit some of them
were still unborn. As regards the
Stewards, the public respondents
likewise challenged their claim of legal
standing on the ground that they are
representing animals, which cannot be
parties to an action. Moreover, the
public respondents argued that the
Stewards are not the real parties-ininterest for their failure to show how
they stand to be benefited or injured
by the decision in this case. Since the
petition was not brought in the name
of a real party-in-interest, it should be
dismissed for failure to state a cause
of action.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioners
have the capacity to sue or locus
standii
Ruling: Yes. SC ruled in favour of the
petitioners. Inanimate objects are
sometimes parties in litigation. A ship
has a legal personality, a fiction found
useful for maritime purposes. The
corporation sole - a creature of
ecclesiastical law - is an acceptable
adversary and large fortunes ride on
its cases. The ordinary corporation is a
person
for
purposes
of
the
adjudicatory processes, whether it
represents
proprietary,
spiritual,
aesthetic, or charitable causes.
Remedial statutes or statutes relating
to remedies or modes of procedure,
which do not create new or take away

vested rights, but only operate in

furtherance
of
the
remedy
or
confirmation of rights already existing,
do not come within the legal
conception of a retroactive law, or the
general
rule
against
retroactive
operation
of
statutes.
Statutes
regulating the procedure of the courts
will be construed as applicable to
actions pending and undetermined at
the time of their passage. Procedural
laws are retroactive in that sense and
to that extent, x x x.
Moreover, even before the Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases
became effective, the Court had
already taken a permissive position on
the
issue
of
locus
standi
in
environmental cases. In Oposa, the
Court allowed the suit to be brought in
the name of generations yet unborn
based
on
the
concept
of
intergenerational responsibility insofar
as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.
Furthermore, the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology, a right that
does not even need to be stated in our
Constitution as it is assumed to exist
from the inception of humankind,
carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain
from
impairing
the
environment.
In light of the foregoing, the need to
give the Resident Marine Mammals
legal standing has been eliminated by
our Rules, which allow any Filipino
citizen, as a steward of nature, to
bring
a
suit
to
enforce
our
environmental laws. It is worth noting
here that the Stewards are joined as
real parties in the Petition and not just
in representation of the named
cetacean species.

ANG VS ANG
Gr. No. 186993 AUGUST 2012

Facts: On September 2, 1992,

spouses
Alan
and
EmAng
(respondents) obtained a loan in the
amount of (US$300,000.00) from
Theodore and Nancy Ang (petitioners).
On even date, the respondents
executed a promissory note
in favor of the petitioners wherein they
promised to pay the latter the said
amount, with interest at the rate of ten
percent (10%) per annum, upon
demand. However, despite
repeated demands, the respondents
failed to pay the petitioners.
Thus, on August 28, 2006, the
petitioners sent the respondents a
demand letter asking them to pay
their outstanding debt which, at that
time,
already
amounted
to
(US$719,671.23),
inclusive of the ten percent (10%)
annual interest that had accumulated
over the years. Notwithstanding the
receipt of the said demand letter, the
respondents still failed to settle their
loan obligation.
On August 6, 2006, the petitioners,
who were then residing in the United
States of America, executed their
respective
Special
Powers
of
Attorneyin favor of Attorney Eldrige
Marvin
Aceron for the purpose of filing an
action
in
court
against
the
respondents. On September 15, 2006,
Atty. Aceron, in behalf of the
petitioners,
filed
a
Complaintfor
collection of sum of money with the
RTC of Quezon City against the
respondents.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Aceron,
being merely a representative of the
petitioners, is not the real party in
interest in the case.
Ruling: Atty. Aceron, despite being
the attorney-in-fact of the petitioners,

is not a real party in interest in the

case.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
reads:
Section 2. Parties in interest. A real
party in interest is the party who
stands to be benefited or injured by
the judgment in the suit, or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit. Unless
otherwise authorized by law or these
Rules,
every
action
must
be
prosecuted or defended in the name of
the real party in interest.
Interest within the meaning of the
Rules of Court means material interest
or an interest in issue to be affected
by the decree or judgment of the case,
as distinguished from mere curiosity
about the question involved. A real
party in interest is the party who, by
the substantive law, has the right
sought to be enforced.
Applying the foregoing rule, it is clear
that Atty. Aceron is not a real party in
interest in the case below as he does
not stand to be benefited or
Injured by any judgment therein. He
was
merely
appointed
by
the
petitioners as their attorney-in-fact for
the limited purpose of filing and
prosecuting the complaint against the
respondents.
Such
appointment,
however, does not mean that he is
subrogated
into
the
rights
of
petitioners and ought to be considered
as a real party in interest.
Being merely a representative of the
petitioners, Atty. Aceron in his personal
capacity does not have the right to file
the complaint below against the
respondents. He may only do so, as
what he did, in behalf of the
petitioners the real parties in
interest. To stress, the right sought to
be enforced in the case below belongs
to the petitioners and not to Atty.

Aceron. Clearly, an attorney-in-fact is

not a real party in interest.
CRISOLOGO vs. JEWM AGROINDUSTRIAL CORP
G.R. No. 196894 March 3, 2014
Facts: On October 19, 1998, RTC-Br. 8,
Davao City rendered its decision in
favor of one Sy Sen Ben, the plaintiff
in
a
collection
case,
against
defendants Robert Limso, So Keng Koc,
et al. The defendants were directed to
transfer the subject properties in favor
of Sy Sen Ben. The latter subsequently
sold the subject properties to one
Nilda Lam who, in turn, sold the same
to JEWM on June 1, 2000. TCT Nos.
325675 and 325676 were then
eventually issued in the name of
JEWM, both of which still bearing the
same annotations as well as the notice
of lis pendens in connection with the
other pending cases filed against So
Keng Kok. A year thereafter, Spouses
Jesus G. Crisologo and Nannette B.
Crisologo prevailed in the separate
collection case filed before RTC-Br. 15,
Davao
City
against
the
same
defendants. Thus, on July 1, 1999, the
said defendants were ordered to
solidarily pay the Spouses Crisologo.
After the issuance of writ of execution,
the Branch Sheriff issued a notice of
sale scheduling an auction the
properties covered by TCT Nos.
325675 and 325676, now, in the name
of JEWM.
To protect its interest, JEWM filed a
separate action before RTC-Br. 14 for
cancellation of lien with prayer for the
issuance of a preliminary injunction,
cancellation of all the annotations on
the back of the pertinent TCTs; and the
issuance of a permanent injunction
order after trial on the merits. The
counsel then of spouses Crisologo
questioned the authority of the said

court to restrain the execution

proceedings in RTC-Br. 15. But JEWM
opposed it on the ground that Spouses
Crisologo were not parties in the case.
No motion to intervene was, however,
filed as the Spouses Crisologo believed
that it was unnecessary since they
were already the John and Jane Does
named in the complaint of JEWM.
Issue: Whether or not Spouses
Crisologo
are
considered
as
indispensable parties in the case for
cancellation of lien.
Ruling: In an action for the
cancellation
of
memorandum
annotated at the back of a certificate
of title, the persons considered as
indispensable include those whose
liens appear as annotations pursuant
to Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529. In
Southwestern University v. Laurente,
the Court held that the cancellation of
the annotation of an encumbrance
cannot be ordered without giving
notice to the parties annotated in the
certificate of title itself. It would, thus,
be an error for a judge to contend that
no notice is required to be given to all
the
persons
whose
liens
were
annotated at the back of a certificate
of title. Here, undisputed is the fact
that Spouses Crisologos liens were
indeed annotated at the back of TCT
Nos. 325675 and 325676. Thus, as
persons with their liens annotated,
they stand to be benefited or injured
by any order relative
to the
cancellation of annotations in the
pertinent TCTs. In other words, they
are as indispensable as JEWM itself in
the final disposition of the case for
cancellation, being one of the many
lien holders.
As indispensable parties, Spouses
Crisologo should have been joined as
defendants in the case pursuant to
Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.
The reason behind this compulsory

joinder of indispensable parties is the

complete determination of all possible
issues, not only between the parties
themselves but also as regards other
persons who may be affected by the
judgment. In this case, RTC-Br. 14,
despite repeated pleas by Spouses
Crisologo
to
be
recognized
as
indispensable
parties,
failed
to
implement the mandatory import of
the aforecited rule.
ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST VS
CA
300 SCRA 579
Facts: The development, exploration
and utilization of the mineral deposits
in the Surigao Mineral Reservation
have been authorized by the Republic
Act No. 1528, as amended by Republic
Act No. 2077 and Republic Act No.
4167, by virtue of which laws, a
memorandum of agreement was
drawn on July 3, 1968, whereby the
Republic of the Philippines thru the
Surigao Mineral Reservation Board,
granted MMIC the exclusive right to
explore, develop and exploit nickel,
cobalt, and other minerals in the
Surigao Mineral Reservation. MMIC is a
domestic corporation engaged in
mining with respondent Jesus S.
Cabarrus Sr. as president and among
its original stockholders.
The Philippine government undertook
to support the financing of MMIC by
purchase of MMIC debenture bonds
and extension of guarantees. Further,
from the DBP and/or the government
financing institutions to subscribe in
MMIC and issue guarantee/s of foreign
loans
or
deferred
payment
arrangements secured from the US
Eximbank, Asian Development Bank
(ADB), Kobe steel of amount not
exceeding US$100 million. On July 13,
1981, MMIC, PNB, and DBP executed a
mortgage trust agreement whereby

MMIC as mortgagor, agreed to

constitute a mortgage in favour of PNB
and DBP as mortgages, over all MMIC
assets; subject of real estate and
chattel mortgage executed by the
mortgagor, and additional assets
described and identified, including
assets of whatever kind, nature or
description, which the mortgagor may
acquire whether in substitution of, in
replenishment or in addition thereto.
Due to the unsettled obligations, a
financial restructuring plan (FRP) was
suggested, however not finalized. The
obligations matured and the mortgage
was foreclosed. The foreclosed assets
were sold to PNB as the lone bidder
and were assigned to the newly
formed corporations namely Nonoc
Mining Corporation, Maricalum Mining
and Industrial Corporation and Island
Cement Corporation. In 1986, these
assets were transferred to the asset
privatization trust. On February 28,
1985, Jesus S. Cabarrus Sr. together
with the other stockholders of MMIC,
filed a derivative suit against DBP and
PNB before the RTC of Makati branch
62, for annulment of foreclosures,
specific performance and damages. A
compromise
and
arbitration
agreement was entered by the parties
to which committee awarded damages
in favor of Cabarrus.
Issue: Whether or not the award
granted to Cabarrus was proper.
Ruling: No. Civil case no. 9900 filed
before the RTC being a derivative suit,
MMIC should have been impleaded as
a party. It was not joined as a part
plaintiff or party defendant at any
stage before of the proceedings as it
is, the award for damages to MMIC,
which was not party before the
arbitration committee is a complete
nullity.

Settled is the doctrine that in a

derivative suit, the corporation is
the real party in interest while the
stockholder filing suit for the
corporations behalf is only a
nominal party. The corporation
should be included as a party in
the suit.
An individual stockholder is permitted
to institute a derivative suit on behalf
of the corporation wherein he holds
stock in order to protect or vindicate
corporate
rights,
whenever
the
officials of the corporation refuse to
sue, or are the ones to be sued or hold
the control of the corporation. In such
actions, the suing stockholder is
regarded as a nominal party, with the
corporation as the real part in interest.
It is a condition sine qua non that the
corporation be impleaded as a party
because not only is the corporation
an indispensable party, but it is also
the present rule that it must be served
with process. The reason given is that
the judgement must be made binding
upon the corporation in order that the
corporation may get the benefit of the
suit and may not bring a subsequent
suit against the same defendants for
the same cause of action. In other
words the corporation must be joined
as a party because it is its cause of
action that is being litigated and
because judgement must be a res
judicata against it.
PAMPLONA PLANTATION CO. VS
TINGHIL
450 SCRA 421
Facts: This stems from a case before
the Labor Arbiter for underpayment,
overtime pay, premium pay for rest
day and holiday, service incentive
leave pay, damages, attorneys fees,
and 13th month pay. The complainants
claimed that they were regular rank
and file employees of petitioner

Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc. with

different
hiring
periods,
work
designations, and salary rates.
Petitioner, however, denied this,
alleging that some of the complainants
are seasonal employees, some are
contractors, and others were hired
under the pakyaw system, while the
rest were hired by the Pamplona
Plantation Leisure Corporation, which
has a separate and distinct entity from
it.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) held petitioner
and Pamplona Plantations manager,
Jose
Luis
Bondoc,
liable
for
underpayment as complainants were
regular employees of petitioner. They
were also held guilty of illegal
dismissal with regard to complainants
Joselito Tinghil and Pedro Emperado.
The NLRC reversed the LAs decision,
dismissing all the complaints, finding
that the complaint should have been
directed
against
the
Pamplona
Plantation Leisure Corporation since
complainants
individual
affidavits
contained the allegations that their
tasks pertained to their work in the
golf course.
The Court of Appeals (CA) set aside
the NLRCs dismissal and reinstated
the LAs Decision with modification.
Issue: Whether or not Pamplona
Plantations manager is personally
liable for the money claims awarded to
the workers
Ruling: SC affirmed the decision.
Reiterating
Pamplona
Plantation
Company, Inc. v. Tinghil, the Court
holds that by piercing the veil of

corporate fiction, the two corporations

the Pamplona Plantation Corporation,
Inc. and the Pamplona Plantation
Leisure Corporation are one and the
same. An examination of the facts
reveals that, for both the coconut
plantation and the golf course, there is
only one management which the
laborers deal with regarding their
work. A portion of the plantation (also
called
Hacienda
Pamplona)
had
actually been converted into a golf
course and other recreational facilities.
The weekly payrolls issued by
petitioner-company bore the name
Pamplona Plantation Co., Inc.
Petitioner believes that its manager,
Jose Luis Bondoc, should not have
been held solidarily liable with the
company for the wage differentials
awarded to respondents. Petitioner
argues that Bondoc is merely an
employee of the company and not a
corporate director or officer who can
be held personally liable therefor.
The rule is that officers of a
corporation are not personally liable
for their official acts unless it is shown
that they have exceeded their
authority. However, the legal fiction
that a corporation has a personality
separate
and
distinct
from
stockholders and members may be
disregarded if it is used as a means to
perpetuate fraud or an illegal act or as
a vehicle for the evasion of an existing
obligation,
the
circumvention
of
statutes, or to confuse legitimate
issues. Moreover, assuming Bondoc is
a corporate officer, a corporate officer
is not personally liable for the money
claims
of
discharged
corporate
employees unless he acted with
evident malice and bad faith in
terminating their employment.