Académique Documents
Professionnel Documents
Culture Documents
NARVASA
G.R. No. 140835, August 14 2000
FACTS:
Petitioner Ramon A. Gonzales, in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer, filed a
petition for prohibition and mandamus filed on December 9, 1999, assailing the
constitutionality of the creation of the Preparatory Commission
on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) and of the positions of presidential
consultants, advisers and assistants. The Preparatory Commission
on Constitutional Reform (PCCR) was created by President Estrada on
November 26, 1998 by virtue of Executive Order No. 43 (E.O. No. 43) in order
to study and recommend proposed amendments and/or revisions to the
1987 Constitution, and the manner of implementing the same.
Petitioner disputes the constitutionality of the PCCR based on the grounds that
it is a public office which only the legislature can create by way of a law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has a legal standing to assail the constitutionality
of Executive Order No. 43
HELD:
The Court dismissed the petition. A citizen acquires standing only if he can
establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable
action. Petitioner has not shown that he has sustained or is in danger of
sustaining any personal injury attributable to the creation of the PCCR. If at all,
it is only Congress, not petitioner, which can claim any injury in this case
since, according to petitioner, the President has encroached upon the
legislatures powers to create a public office and to propose amendments to
the Charter by forming the PCCR. Petitioner has sustained no direct, or even
any indirect, injury. Neither does he claim that his rights or privileges have
been or are in danger of being violated, nor that he shall be subjected to any
penalties or burdens as a result of the PCCRs activities. Clearly, petitioner has
failed to establish his locus standi so as to enable him to seek judicial redress
as a citizen.
Issues:
1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus
in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of
the Congress
2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take
cognizance of the instant petition.
3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA
exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure
such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto.
Rulings:
The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the
case of Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al (G.R.
No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and
prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry
(DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of
the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of
the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process
and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.
In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made
accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be
furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic.
Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives
issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the
Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.
It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in
treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from
frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal
recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo,
where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser
importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater
national interest.
In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno. It said: We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief
Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against
any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court,
however, in its endeavor to guard against the abuse of executive privilege,
should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it
would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.
ISSUE: Are the JPEPA negotiations within the scope of the constitutional
guarantee of access to information?
HELD: No. Secrecy of negotiations with foreign countries is not violative of the
constitutional provisions of freedom of speech or of the press nor of the
freedom of access to information.
The Court holds that, in determining whether an information is covered by the
right to information, a specific showing of need for such information is not a
relevant consideration, but only whether the same is a matter of public
concern. When, however, the government has claimed executive privilege, and
it has established that the information is indeed covered by the same, then the
party demanding it, if it is to overcome the privilege, must show that that the
information is vital, not simply for the satisfaction of its curiosity, but for its
ability to effectively and reasonably participate in social, political, and
economic decision-making. The constitutional right to information includes
official information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The
information, however, must constitute definite propositions by the government
and should not cover recognized exceptions like privileged information, military
and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national security and
public order.
FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for certiorari and
mandamus to nullify and set aside certain issuances of the Commission on
Elections (Comelec) respecting party-list groups which have manifested their
intention to participate in the party-list elections on May 14, 2007.
In the second petition (G.R. No. 177314), petitioners Loreta Ann P. Rosales,
Kilosbayan Foundation and Bantay Katarungan Foundation impugn Comelec
Resolution dated April 3, 2007.
1. Can the Court cancel the accreditation accorded by the Comelec to the
respondent party-list groups named in their petition on the ground that these
groups and their respective nominees do not appear to be qualified.
2. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the
nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information
and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; and
3. Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to
the public the names of said nominees.
HELD: The 1st petition is partly DENIED insofar as it seeks to nullify the
accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to
compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-
list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14,
2007 elections, the 2 petitions are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is
hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups,
1. The Court is unable to grant the desired plea of petitioners BA-RA 7941 and
UP-LR for cancellation of accreditation on the grounds thus advanced in their
petition. The exercise would require the Court to make a factual determination,
a matter which is outside the office of judicial review by way of special civil
action for certiorari. In certiorari proceedings, the Court is not called upon to
decide factual issues and the case must be decided on the undisputed facts on
record. The sole function of a writ of certiorari is to address issues of want of
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion and does not include a review of the
tribunals evaluation of the evidence. (note that nowhere in R.A. No. 7941 is
there a requirement that the qualification of a party-list nominee be
determined simultaneously with the accreditation of an organization. )
COMELECs basis of its refusal to disclose the names of the nominees of subject
party-list groups, Section 7 of R.A. 7941,which last sentence reads: "[T]he
names of the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list" is
certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the requested disclosure.
There is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec from
disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the "Certified List" of
the names.
It has been repeatedly said in various contexts that the people have the right
to elect their representatives on the basis of an informed judgment. While the
vote cast in a party-list elections is a vote for a party, such vote, in the end,
would be a vote for its nominees, who, in appropriate cases, would eventually
sit in the House of Representatives. The Court frowns upon any interpretation
of the law or rules that would hinder in any way the free and intelligent casting
of the votes in an election
3. COMELEC has a constitutional duty to disclose and release the names of the
nominees of the party-list groups named in the herein petitions. The right to
information is a public right where the real parties in interest are the public, or
the citizens to be precise, but like all constitutional guarantees, however, the
right to information and its companion right of access to official records are not
absolute. The peoples right to know is limited to "matters of public concern"
and is further subject to such limitation as may be provided by law. But no
national security or like concerns is involved in the disclosure of the names of
the nominees of the party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec
committed grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject of their
respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies.