11/8/2016 G.R.No.

133882

FIRSTDIVISION


ANGELADELAROSAandG.R.No.133882
CORAZONMEDINA,
Petitioners,
Present:

versusPANGANIBAN,C.J.,Chairperson,
YNARESSANTIAGO,
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ,*
CALLEJO,SR.,and
ORFELINAD.ROLDAN,CHICONAZARIO,JJ.
LORNASANDIEGO,
FLORDELIZAD.
CATACUTAN,NORMAY.
LACUESTA,andARSENIOPromulgated:
DULAY,
Respondents.September5,2006

xx


DECISION


CALLEJO,SR.,J.:


[1]
ThisisaPetitionforReviewonCertiorarioftheDecision oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)in
CAG.R. SP No. 45560 affirming, on a petition for review, the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court(RTC)ofTarlacinCivilCaseNo.8396,whichinturnreversedonappealthedecisionof
theMunicipalTrialCourt(MTC)ofTarlac,TarlacinCivilCaseNo.6089forunlawfuldetainer.

TheAntecedents

The spouses Adriano Rivera and Aurora Mercado were the owners of two (2) parcels of
land located in Tarlac, Tarlac, both covered by respective titles the 261squaremeter lot was
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7225, while the 772 sq. m. was covered by
TCTNo.7226.

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[2]
Sometime in 1957, the spouses Rivera executed a deed of sale over the properties in
favorofthespousesArsenioDulayandAsunciondelaRosa.GideondelaRosa,oneofAsuncions
brothers,wasoneoftheinstrumentalwitnessesinthedeed.Topayfortheproperty,thespouses
Dulay, who were members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), secured a
P9,500.00 loan and executed a real estate mortgage over the two lots as security therefor. On
September16,1957,theRegisterofDeedsissuedTCTNos.29040and29041inthenamesofthe
spousesDulay.

ThespousesDulayforthwithtookpossessionofthelots,excepta500squaremeterportion
which was then occupied by Gideon dela Rosa and his wife Angela and the portion where the
houseofCorazonMedinastood.ThespousesDulaydeclaredthepropertyfortaxationpurposes
intheirnamesandpaidtherealtytaxestherefor.

Sometimein1982,thespousesDulaymadedemandsonGideon,AngelaandCorazonto
vacate the premises, as their three daughters would be constructing their respective houses
thereon.Gideon,AngelaandCorazonrefusedtodoso,promptingthespousestofileacomplaint
forrecoveryofpossession(accionpubliciana)againstthemwiththethenCourtofFirstInstance
(CFI)ofTarlac.ThespousesDulayalleged,interalia,thattheyboughtthelotsfromthespouses
Rivera in 1957 defendants occupied a 370squaremeter portion on the western side, and were
claimingownershipoveronehalfoftheproperty,asshownbytheirlettertoplaintiffsappended
to their complaint and they needed the property so that their daughters, who already had their
respective families, could build houses thereon. The spouses Dulay prayed that defendants be
evicted from the property and be required to pay reasonable compensation for their use of the
[3]
premises. ThecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.6261.

In their answer to the complaint, defendants alleged the following by way of special and
affirmativedefenses:GideonandhissisterAsuncioncontributedequallytothepurchasepriceof
thepropertyplaintiffssecuredaGSISloanofP9,500.00,outofwhichP6,500.00waspaidtothe
vendors Gideon and Asuncion verbally agreed that plaintiffs would be indicated as the sole
vendees in the deed of sale as they were the GSIS members defendants had already paid their
share of the purchase price of the property as of 1978, except for the amount of P332.00 and,
insofarastheonehalfportiononthewesternsideofthepropertywasconcerned,plaintiffswere

trusteesfordefendants,wholikewiseownedthesame.Defendantsinterposedcounterclaimsfor
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[4]
damagesandprayedthatthesaidonehalfportionbereconveyedtothem.

Duringthetrial,thespousesDulayadducedinevidencethefollowing:theDeedofAbsoluteSale
[5]
datedJanuary16,1957,withGideonasaninstrumentalwitness thetaxdeclarationsintheir
[6]
namescoveringthepropertyandreceiptsofrealtytaxpaymentsmadeovertheproperty.

Defendants spouses Dela Rosa adduced in evidence a small notebook containing therein an
allegedlistofpaymentstothespousesDulayoftheirshareinthepurchasepriceoftheproperty.
[7]
They presented an NBI Questioned Documents Expert to prove the authenticity of the
[8]
signature of Asuncion Dulay on one of the receipts. However, Asuncion denied that she
boughtthepropertywithherbrotherGideon,andthatshereceivedanyamountfromhimandhis
wifeaspartofthepurchasepriceoftheproperty.Shelikewisedeniedthatitwashersignature
thatappearedonthepurportedreceipt.

On July 17, 1987, the trial court rendered judgment in Civil Case No. 6261 in favor of the
spouses Dulay and ordered the spouses Dela Rosa and Corazon Medina to vacate the property
[9]
andturnoverpossessiontoplaintiffs. Thetrialcourtdeclared:

ANALYZING THE EVIDENCE, there is no doubt that the registered owners of the lots in
question are the plaintiffsspouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa (Exhibits A and B).
TheyboughttheselotsfromthespousesAdrianoRiveraandAuroraMercado(ExhibitsDandD
1).

Defendantsclaimthattheyboughtfromtheplaintiffsonehalf(1/2)portionofthelotsinquestion
isuntenable.Firstly,ifitistrueasclaimedbythemthattherewassuchanagreementtopurchase
fromtheplaintiffsaportionofthelotsinquestion,whydidtheynotreduce[the]sameinwriting?
In fact, its the defendants, particularly Gideon dela Rosa, who induced and accompanied the
plaintiffs to go to a Notary Public for the execution of Exhibit D. The amounts mentioned in
Exhibit5does(sic)notclearlyindicatewhethertheywerepaymentsmadeforthepurchaseprice
in installment or for monthly rentals for their occupation of Lot 3B2.The defendants were the
onlyoneswhomadeentriesandaperusalofsuchentrieswerenotrecordedinsequenceofalleged
monthlypaymentbutmerelyentriesdictatedand/orwrittenatwill.

RegardingExhibit6andtheallegedsignatureofplaintiffAsunciondelaRosa,thereport(Exhibit
7, 7A and 7B) and the testimony of the Chief NBI handwriting expert when presented by the
defendantsthemselvesisveryemphatic.Thus:

However,thequestionsignaturewassignedoveratypewrittencarbonorduplicate.

Whatwemeanbythat,Sir,isthatthereishereapurportedreceiptwiththebody
typewritten underlining below the supposed signature Asuncion R. Dulay, it is a
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typewritten underlining below the supposed signature Asuncion R. Dulay, it is a
little surprising because if a document is prepared in one occasion, then the body
should be in ribbon impression and the underlining should be in ribbon. The
supposedtypewrittenbodyabovethesignatureisanoriginalribbonimpression,that
is,itisdirectfromthetypewrittenwiththeribbonstrikingthesheetofpaper,the
underlining,however,onwhichthesignatureissignedisacarbonimpression,that
[10]
meansitisaduplicateimpression.(pp.89,tsn.,Oct.30/85).

ThespousesDelaRosaandCorazonMedinaappealedtotheCA.Thecasewasdocketedas
CAG.R. CV No. 15455. On June 29, 1990, the appellate court rendered judgment granting the
appeal and reversed the trial courts ruling. According to the appellate court, the complaint was
prematureonaccountofplaintiffsfailuretoallege,intheircomplaint,thattherehadbeenearnest
effortstohavethecaseamicablysettledasmandatedunderArticle222oftheNewCivilCode.
[11]

The spouses Dulay filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File a Petition for Review on
Certiorari with this Court which was granted. The motion was recorded as UDK10069.
However,thespousesDulayfailedtofiletheirpetition.Thus,onNovember19,1990,theCourt
resolved to declare final and executory the decision of the CA in CAG.R. CV No. 15455 for
[12]
failure of plaintiffsappellees to file their petition for review. The resolution of the Court
[13]
becamefinalandexecutory.

In the meantime, Gideon died. His wife Angela and Corazon Medina continued residing in the
property without paying any rentals therefor. Asuncion Dulay passed away on June 26, 1995,
survived by her husband Arsenio and their children: Orfelina Roldan, Lorna San Diego,
FlordelizaCatacutan,andNormaLacuesta.

InaletterdatedOctober2,1995,Arsenioandhischildren,throughcounsel,madedemands
on Corazon and Angela to vacate the property within 30 days from receipt thereof, with a
[14]
warning that failure to do so would impel them to file the necessary legal action.
Nevertheless,theysuggestedaconferencetodiscusstheamicablesettlementofthematter.
CorazonandAngelaignoredtheletter.ThispromptedArsenioandhischildrentofileacomplaint
forevictionagainstAngelaandCorazonintheOfficeoftheBarangayCaptain.The parties did

notarriveatasettlement,andonDecember1,1995,thePangkatSecretaryissuedacertification
[15]
tofileaction.
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tofileaction.

On January 29, 1996, Arsenio and his children, as plaintiffs, filed a complaint for unlawful
detainer against Corazon and Angela, as defendants, in the MTC of Tarlac, Tarlac. Plaintiffs
allegedthefollowing:

3.PlaintiffsarethecoownersoftwoadjoiningparcelsofresidentiallandlocatedatTarlac,Tarlac,
andmoreparticularlydescribedasfollows:

TransferCertificateofTitleNo.29040

A parcel of land (Lot B of the subdivision plan Psd2284, being a portion of the
landdescribedontheoriginalplanII5215,G.L.R.O.RecordNo.7962),situatedin
the Barrio of San Roque, Municipality of Tarlac, Province of Tarlac. Bounded on
the N.E., by Lot C of the subdivision plan on the S.E., by Lot No. 3B2 of the
subdivision plan and property of Concepcion Cider on the W., by property of
TimoteaMercadoandontheN.W.,byLotAofthesubdivisionplan,containingan
areaofTWOHUNDREDSIXTYONE(261)SQUAREMETERS,moreorless.

TransferCertificateofTitleNo.29041

Aparcelofland(LotNo.3B2ofthesubdivisionplanPsd2284,beingaportionof
LotNo.3B,planII2977Amd.,G.L.R.O.RecordNo.1955),situatedintheBarrio
ofSanRoque,MunicipalityofTarlac,ProvinceofTarlac.BoundedontheN.E.,by
Lot87CofthesubdivisionplanontheS.E.,byLotNo.3B1ofthesubdivision
planontheS.W.,bypropertyofConcepcionCiderandontheN.W.,byLotBof
thesubdivisionplan,containinganareaofSEVENHUNDREDSEVENTYTWO
(772)SQUAREMETERS,moreorless.

CopiesofthetransfercertificatesoftitleareattachedasAnnexesAandB,respectively.Thetotal
assessedvalueofsaidlandsdoesnotexceedTwentyThousandPesos(P20,000.00).

4. Said parcels of land were formerly owned by the spouses Asuncion dela Rosa and Arsenio
Dulay.PlaintiffsOrfelinaRoldan,LornaSanDiego,FlordelizaCatacutan,andNormaLacuestaare
the children of the spouses Asuncion dela Rosa and plaintiff Arsenio Dulay. Upon the death of
Asuncion dela Rosa on 26 June 1995, said parcels of land became jointly owned by herein
plaintiffs.AcopyofAsunciondelaRosascertificateofdeathisattachedasAnnexC.

5. The spouses Dulay bought said parcels of land sometime in 1957. Defendants and their
predecessorsininterest have occupied and are continuously occupying about five hundred (500)
squaremeters,moreorless,ofsaidparcelsofland.Defendantsandtheirpredecessorsininterest
haveoccupiedsaidparcelsoflandsince1957withoutpayinganyrent.

6.Theoccupationbydefendantsofsaidparcelsoflandwereatthemeretoleranceofthespouses
Dulay and, thereafter, of the plaintiffs. Defendants have promised to vacate the premises if and
whenneededbythespousesDulayandplaintiffs.

7. Demands were made on defendants to vacate the premises, which demands, however, were
ignoredandnotheeded.Defendantsrefusedandcontinuestorefusetovacatethepremises.Acopy
ofthefinaldemandletterssenttoAngeladelaRosaandCorazonMedinaareattachedasAnnexes
DandE,respectively.

8. In an attempt to arrive at an amicable settlement and in recognition of their being blood
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8. In an attempt to arrive at an amicable settlement and in recognition of their being blood
relatives,plaintiffsexertedearnesteffortstowardsacompromisewithdefendants.Defendantswere
invitedtodiscussandsettlethematteramicably.Defendants,however,refusedtomeetanddiscuss
anysettlementandignoredtheinvitationextendedbyplaintiffs.

9.IncompliancewithSection412oftheLocalGovernmentCode(R.A.No.7160)andasafurther
attempttosettlethedisputeamicably,plaintiffsbroughtthemattertothelupongtagapamayapaof
theirbarangay.Defendants,however,refusedtodiscussanamicablesettlement.The certification
tofileactionissuedbytheluponchairmanisattachedandmadeanintegralparthereofasAnnexF.

10.Defendantshavebeenoccupyingandusingthepremiseswithoutpayinganyrenttherefor.The
presentreasonablerentalvalueofthepremisesisFiftyPesos(P50.00)permonth,whichamount
defendantsshouldbemadetopayfromSeptember1957untilpossessionisrestoredtoplaintiffs.

11.Byreasonoftheunjustifiablerefusaltovacateandtheunlawfuldetainerofthesubjectproperty
by defendants and all persons claiming rights under them, plaintiffs were constrained to seek
redressincourttoprotecttheirownrightsandinterests,therebycausingthemtoincurlitigation
expensesintheamountofnotlessthanFiftyThousandPesos(P50,000.00),forwhichamountthe
[16]
defendantshouldbemadeliabletoplaintiffs.

Plaintiffs therein prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in their favor as
follows:
WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,plaintiffsmostrespectfullypraythat,aftertrial,judgmentbe
renderedbythisHonorableCourtinfavorofplaintiffsandorderingasfollows:

1.Defendantsandallpersonsclaimingrightsunderthemtoimmediatelyvacatethepremises

2.Defendants to pay all rental arrears at the monthly rate of P50.00 from September 1957 until
possessionisrestoredoratotalofP23,000.00

3.DefendantstopaylitigationexpensesintheamountofP50,000.00and

4.Defendantstopaythecostsofthissuit.

[17]
Plaintiffsprayforsuchotherandfurtherreliefsjustandequitableunderthepremises.

ThecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.6089.

Intheiranswer,defendantsreiteratedtheirallegationsintheiranswertothecomplaintin
CivilCaseNo.6261intheCFIofTarlac.

On April 30, 1996, Angela filed a complaint against Arsenio and his children in the MTC of
Tarlac,Tarlacforrecoveryofownership,reconveyance,cancellationoftitle,anddamages. The
casewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.6154.Angela,asplaintiff,reiteratedherallegationsinher
answerandcounterclaiminCivilCaseNo.6261asallegationscomprisinghercausesofaction.
Sheprayedthat,afterdueproceedings,judgmentberenderedintheirfavor,thus:

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WHEREFORE,itismostrespectfullyprayedofthisHon.Courtthatjudgmentshallissue:

1. Ordering that an immediate temporary restraining order restraining the defendants from
disturbing the possession of the Plaintiff over the property in question until the case is finally
dissolved

2.DeclaringthePlaintiffasowneroftheonehalf(1/2)propertyinquestion,therebyreconveying
theownershipthereofandcancellingthetitle

3. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorneysfee,plusP1,000.00perhearing

4. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as
acceptancefee,plusP20,000.00aslitigationexpenses

5. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P20,000.00 as
exemplarydamages

6. Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay Plaintiff the amount of P10,000.00 as
moraldamages

[18]
7.Andgrantingsuchotherreliefsandremediesjustandequitableinthepremises.

OnJuly 17, 1996, the MTC issued a pretrial order in Civil Case No. 6089 defining the issue,
thus:

Whether or not Unlawful Detainer is proper in the premises considering the claim of
ownershipbydefendantsfromthebeginningoftheselitigationssometimein1982followedbythis
case at bench. Otherwise stated, is the occupation of the land in dispute by the defendants by
[19]
toleranceofplaintiffs.

OnSeptember25,1996,theMTCrenderedjudgmentinCivilCaseNo.6089infavorofCorazon
[20]
andAngelaandorderedthedismissalofthecomplaintonthegroundoflackofjurisdiction.
Thecourtheldthattheissuebetweenthepartieswasoneofownershipandnotmerelypossession
defacto.Thus,thepossessionofthepropertybydefendantswasnotbymeretolerance,butby
virtue of a claim of ownership in fact, defendants never recognized the plaintiffs claim of
ownershipovertheproperty.InrulingagainstArsenioandhischildren,thetrialcourtreliedon
theirpleadings,thedecisionoftheCFIinCivilCaseNo.6261,therulingoftheCAinCAG.R.
[21]
CVNo.15455,andtheresolutionofthisCourtinUDK10069. Itdeclaredthat,althoughthe

CAreversedthedecisionoftheCFIinTarlac,thefactsshowthatthedisputebetweentheparties
constitutespossessiondejuretheactionofthespousesDulayinCivilCaseNo.6261whichwas
anaccionpublicianacannotbeconvertedintooneforunlawfuldetainerinCivilCaseNo.6089.

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ArsenioandhischildrenappealedtotheRTC.ThecasewasdocketedasCivilCaseNo.8396.On
June 25, 1997, it reversed the decision of the MTC and ordered the eviction of defendants,
holdingthattheissuewastheentitlementtothephysicalpossessiondefactooftheproperty,an
[22]
issuewithintheexclusivejurisdictionoftheMTC incontrast,theissuebetweentheparties
in Civil Case No. 6261 was possession de jure and not possession de facto. The RTC further
declaredthatthespousesDulayhadatorrenstitleoverthepropertywhichwasconclusiveagainst
thewholeworldassuch,theywereentitledtothepossessionofthepropertyasownersthereof.
[23]
CitingtherulingofthisCourtinPeranv.Espera, the RTC ruled that Corazon and Angela
possessedthepropertyforaconsiderablelengthoftimeonlythroughmeretoleranceofplaintiffs.

Corazon and Angela moved to reconsider the decision, which the RTC denied in an
[24]
Order datedSeptember22,1997.TheyfiledapetitionforreviewintheCA,prayingthatthe
RTC decision be reversed and the decision of the MTC be affirmed. Angela claimed that she
ownedonehalfofthepropertyascoownerofthespousesDulay.ThecasewasdocketedasCA
G.R.SPNo.45560.

On March 16, 1998, the CA rendered judgment in CAG.R. SP No. 45560 affirming the
decision of the RTC and dismissing the petition. The CA ruled that, contrary to the claim of
Angela,therewasnotrustcreatedoveronehalfofthepropertyinherfavor.Sincethecomplaint
againstAngelaandCorazonintheMTCwasoneforunlawfuldetainer,theMTChadexclusive
jurisdictionoverthecase.Moreover,theyhadbeenin
possessionofthepropertybytolerance.Inanycase,theiractionwasbarredbyprescriptionand
laches.

AngelaandCorazonfiledamotionforreconsideration,whichtheCAdenied.

AngelaandCorazon,nowpetitioners,filedtheinstantpetitionforreviewoncertiorari,claiming
thattheCAerredasfollows:

I
THEHON.COURTOFAPPEALS,WITHDUERESPECT,ERREDINCONSIDERINGTHAT
THECASEATBARISONEOFUNLAWFULDETAINER,WHENITISONEOFRECOVERY
OFOWNERSHIPANDPOSSESSION.

II
THEHON.COURTOFAPPEALS,WITHDUERESPECT,ERREDINCONSIDERINGTHAT
THEREWASNOTRUSTCREATEDBYAGREEMENTOFTHEPARTIES.
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THEREWASNOTRUSTCREATEDBYAGREEMENTOFTHEPARTIES.

III
THEHON.COURTOFAPPEALS,WITHDUERESPECT,ERREDINCONSIDERINGTHAT
THEPETITIONERSCLAIMHASBEENBARREDBYPRESCRIPTIONORLACHES.

IV
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, WITH DUE RESPECT, ERRED IN AWARDING
[25]
ATTORNEYSFEEFORRESPONDENTS.

Accordingtopetitioners,duringthepretrialintheMTC,thepartiesstipulatedonthefollowing
issuestoberesolvedbythecourt:whetherornottheactionforunlawfuldetainerofrespondents
wasproperconsideringthatpetitionersclaimedownershipoverthepropertyintheiranswertothe
complaint and whether petitioners possessed the property by mere tolerance of respondents.
Petitionersinsistthatduringthepretrialconference,respondentsadmittedthattheyhadfileda
complaintforrecoveryofpossessionofpropertyagainstpetitionersintheCFIofTarlac,docketed
asCivilCaseNo.6261.

Petitionersmaintainthattheprincipalissueisoneofownershipoverthepropertyandnot
merely whether or not respondents, as plaintiffs, were entitled to possession de facto as the
registeredownersthereofhence,theMTChadnojurisdictionovertheactionofrespondents.

PetitionersareoftheviewthatthetrialcourtandtheCAerredindeclaringthattherewas
no trust created over the property. They maintain that there was a verbal agreement between
GideonandhissisterAsuncionthatthepropertywouldbepurchasedbythemthatthepurchase
pricethereofwouldbeadvancedbyAsuncionthatAsuncionwouldbeindicatedasthevendeein
the deed of absolute sale to enable her to secure a GSIS loan to pay for the property, with the
concomitant agreement that Gideon would pay onehalf of the purchase price for the property
andthatthepropertywillbetitledintheirnameastrusteesforthespousesGideonandAngela
delaRosaoveronehalfportionofthelots.Theyinsistthattheyarenotbarredfromassailingthe
deed of absolute sale executed in favor of the spouses Dulay by the spouses Rivera. There is
likewisenofactualandlegalbasisfortheawardofattorneysfees.

Intheircommentonthepetition,respondentsaverthatthestayofpetitionersinthepropertyafter
1982wasbymeretolerance.TheMTChadexclusivejurisdictionovertheiractionbecauseitwas
filedwithinoneyearfrompetitionerslastdemandtovacatetheproperty.TheCAcorrectlyruled
thatnotrustwascreatedovertheproperty,withpetitionersastrustorsandrespondentsastrustees
whetheratrustagreementwascreatedisaquestionoffactwhichcannotberaisedinthisCourtin 9/18
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whetheratrustagreementwascreatedisaquestionoffactwhichcannotberaisedinthisCourtin
apetitionforreviewoncertiorari.

Inanyevent,petitionersclaimofaconstructivetrustwasbarredbyprescriptionsincemore
than ten years had elapsed from the time the titles over the properties in favor of respondents
wereissuedonSeptember16,1957.

RespondentsfurtherpointoutthattheMTCofTarlacrenderedjudgmentinCivilCaseNo.
6154dismissingthecomplaintonthegroundofprescriptionorlachesonApril6,2000,theRTC
affirmed the decision on appeal the CA affirmed the decision in CAG.R. SP No. 58857 on
February14,2002andonJanuary22,2003,thisCourtdeniedpetitionerspetitionforreviewof
[26]
thedecisionoftheCAinG.R.No.155599. Thus,thefactthatnoconstructivetrustexistedin
favorofpetitionershasbeenlaidtorestbytheCourt.

TheRulingoftheCourt

The threshold issues are: (1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the action of respondents
(plaintiffs therein) (2) whether the CA erred in declaring that there was no trust relationship
betweenpetitionersastrustorsandrespondentsastrustees(3)whethertheappellatecourterred
inrulingthattheactionofpetitionerstoenforcethetrustagainstrespondentshadprescribedand
(4)whetherrespondentsareentitledtoattorneysfees.

On the first issue, we agree with the decision of the CA that the action of respondents against
petitioners was one for unlawful detainer, and that the MTC had jurisdiction over the same.
Indeed, petitioners claimed ownership over onehalf of the property in their answer to the
complaintandallegedthatrespondentsweremerelytrusteesthereoffortheirbenefitastrustors
and, during the pretrial, respondents admitted having filed their complaint for recovery of
possession of real property (accion publiciana) against petitioners before the CFI of Tarlac,
docketed as Civil Case No. 6261. However, these did not divest the MTC of its inceptial
jurisdictionoverthecomplaintforunlawfuldetainerofrespondents.

It is settled jurisprudence that what determines the nature of an action as well as which
courtorbodyhasjurisdictionoveritaretheallegationsof
thecomplaintandthecharacterofthereliefsought,whetherornotplaintiffisentitledtoanyand
[27]
all of the reliefs prayed for. The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the nature of the10/18
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all of the reliefs prayed for. The jurisdiction of the court or tribunal over the nature of the
action cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set up in the court or upon a motion to
dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would depend almost entirely on defendant.
[28]
Oncejurisdictionisvested,thesameisretaineduptotheendofthelitigation.

Jurisdictioncannotbeconferredbythevoluntaryactoragreementofthepartiesitcannot
be acquired through or waived, enlarged or diminished by their act or omission. Neither is it
conferredbytheacquiescenceofthecourt.Itisneitherforthecourtnorthepartiestoviolateor
disregardtherule,thismatterbeinglegislativeincharacter.Thus,thejurisdictionoverthenature
ofanactionandthesubjectmatterthereofisnotaffectedbythetheoriessetupbydefendantinan
[29]
answerormotiontodismiss.

Section3ofRepublicActNo.7691,amendingSection33(2)ofBatasPambansaBlg.129,
whichwasthelawineffectwhenrespondentsfiledtheircomplaintagainstpetitioners,provides
that Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
providedthat,when,insuchcases,defendantraisesthequestionsofownershipinhispleadings
andthequestionofpossessioncannotberesolvedwithoutdecidingtheissueofownership,the
issueofownershipshallberesolvedonlytodeterminetheissuesofpossession.

As gleaned from the averments of the complaint, respondents, as plaintiffs below, alleged that
theyweretheownersofparcelsoflandcoveredbyTCTNos.29040and29041,hence,entitledto
thepossessionofthepropertypetitioners(defendantstherein)andtheirpredecessorsininterest
hadoccupiedthesaidparcelsoflandsince1957withoutpayinganyrenttheirpossessionover
the property continued even after the spouses Dulay purchased the property and that their
occupationofthepropertywasbymeretoleranceofthespousesDulayand,afterAsunciondied
onJune26,1995,byrespondentspetitionerspromisedtovacatethepremiseswhenrespondents
needed the property demands were made by respondents on October 2, 1995 for petitioners to
vacate the property but the latter refused, prompting an action to be filed in the Office of the

Pangkatand,onDecember1,1995,thePangkatSecretaryissuedacertificationtofileaction.As
gleanedfromthepetitoryportionofthecomplaint,respondentslikewiseprayedfortheeviction
of petitioners from the property with a plea for judgment for reasonable compensation for
petitionersoccupationofthepremises.RespondentsfiledtheircomplaintonJanuary29,1996in
theMTC,withintheperiodofoneyearfromthefinaldemandmadeagainstpetitionerstovacate
theproperty.
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theproperty.

Itistruethatduringthepretrial,theMTCissuedanorderdefiningtheissuetobelitigatedbythe
partieswhetherornotunlawfuldetainerisproperinthepremisesconsideringdefendantsclaimof
ownershipfrom1982otherwisestated,whetherpetitionersoccupationofthelandindisputewas
bymeretoleranceofrespondents.AsframedbytheMTC,theissuebeforeitwasbasicallyoneof
physicalormaterialpossessionoftheproperty,althoughpetitionersraisedownershipasanissue.
Thus, the MTC erred when it declared that, since defendants claimed ownership over the
property,itwasdivestedofitsjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofanddecidethecaseonitsmerits.

Itbearsstressingthatinunlawfuldetainercases,theonlyissueforresolution,independentofany
claim of ownership by any party litigant, is: who is entitled to the physical and material
possessionofthepropertyinvolved?Themerefactthatdefendantraisesthedefenseofownership
ofthepropertyinthepleadingsdoesnotdeprivetheMTCofitsjurisdictiontotakecognizanceof
anddecidethecase.Incaseswheredefendantraisesthequestionofownershipinthepleadings
andthequestionofpossessioncannotberesolvedwithoutdecidingtheissueofownership,the
courtmayproceedandresolvetheissueofownershipbutonlyforthepurposeofdeterminingthe
issueofpossession.However,thedispositionoftheissueofownershipisnotfinal,asitmaybe
thesubjectofseparateproceedingspecificallybroughttosettletheissue.Hence,thebarefactthat
petitioners,intheiranswertothecomplaint,raisedtheissueofwhethertheyownedtheproperty
astrustorsofaconstructivetrust(withthespousesDulayasthetrustees),didnotdivesttheMTC
[30]
ofitsjurisdictiontotakecognizanceofthecaseanddecidethesameonitsmerits.

Petitionerswerewellawarethattheissueofownershipoverthepropertyhadtoberesolvedina
properactionforthepurpose,separatefromandindependentofCivilCaseNo.6089intheMTC
ofTarlac.ItisforthisreasonthatpetitionerAngelafiledacomplaintforrecoveryofownership,
reconveyance,cancellationoftitleanddamagesagainstrespondents,docketedasCivilCaseNo.
6154,whereinsheprayedthatrespondents,asdefendants,beorderedtoconveytoheronehalf
portion of the property. However, her claim was rejected by the trial court, which ordered the

complaintdismissedtheRTClikewisedismissedthecaseonappeal.Inaffirmingthisdismissal
inCAG.R.SPNo.58857promulgatedonFebruary14,2002,theCAratiocinatedasfollows:

Nevertheless,notwithstandingtheforegoing,thisCourtfindsthatpetitionerscomplaintshouldbe
dismissed.Thisissobecausepetitionermiserablyfailedtoestablishherclaimtotheproperty.It
mustbestressedthatwhileanimpliedtrustmaybeestablishedbyparolevidence,suchevidence
must be as fully convincing as if the acts giving rise to the trust obligation are proven by an
authenticdocument. (Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 603 [1999], at page
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authenticdocument. (Heirs of Lorenzo Yap v. Court of Appeals, 312 SCRA 603 [1999], at page
609).Animpliedtrustcannotbemadetorestonvagueandinconclusiveproof.(Ibid.)

Unfortunatelyforpetitioner,theevidenceshepresentedinherattempttoestablishtheirsocalled
trust agreement is not sufficient or convincing. The list of dates and amounts written by her
purportedlyshowingpaymentsmadetothelateAsunciondelaRosaDulaycannotevenbegiven
credenceasappreciationofsuchlistcanbeequivocal(seeExhibitH,page152,OriginalRecords).
ThelistwasmadeinpetitionershandwritingandtherewasnocountersignaturemadebyDulay
showingacknowledgmentofsuchlisting.Atbest,thelistcanmerelybeappreciatedasitis,alist,
but definitely, it does not prove payments made on the purchase price of the portion of the
property.

Also,theCourtnotestheNBIsQuestionedDocumentsReportNo.316884(datedNov.14,1984)
finding that the signature of Asuncion Dulay in the receipt allegedly acknowledging partial
paymentintheamountofP500.00wassignedoveratypewrittencarbonorduplicateimpression
which is not part of the main entries in the receipt (see Exhibit 7, page 154, Original Records).
Suchconclusionshowsthattheentriesmadeonthereceiptwerenotwrittenonasingleoccasion
butratherseparatelyexecuted.Thus,theCourtcannotgiveanyevidentiaryvalueonsaidreceipt
consideringthatitscredibilityissuspect.

Meanwhile,privaterespondentshaveintheirfavorTCTNos.29040and29041inthenameofthe
spouses Arsenio Dulay and Asuncion dela Rosa (see Exhibits 1 and 2, pages 181182, Original
Records)theDeedofAbsoluteSaleexecutedin1957bythespousesAdrianoRiveraandAurora
Mercado(petitionerspaternalgrandparents)conveyingtheentirepropertytothespousesDulayfor
the price of P7,000 (see Exhibit 3, page 148, Original Records) the tax declaration receipts
showingtaxpaymentsmadebyprivaterespondentsontheproperty(seeExhibits3to3b,pages
183185,OriginalRecords)andthetaxdeclarationofrealpropertyfortheyear1974inthename
ofthespousesDulay(seeExhibitCtoC1,pages150151,OriginalRecords).

Alltold,petitionerfailedtodischargethatonusincumbentuponhertoproveherclaimoverthe
[31]
property.

AngelaassailedthedecisionoftheCAinthisCourtinG.R.No.155599,andthisCourtresolved
todenythepetitionasfollows:

G.R.No.155599(AngeladelaRosav.OrfelinaRoldan,etal.).Consideringtheallegations,issues,
andargumentsadducedinthepetitionforreviewoncertiorariofthedecisionandresolutionofthe
CourtofAppealsdatedFebruary14,2002andOctober14,2002,respectively,theCourtResolves
to DENY the petition for failure of the petitioner to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals
committedanyreversibleerrorinthechallengeddecisionandresolutionastowarranttheexercise
[32]
bythisCourtofitsdiscretionaryappellatejurisdictioninthiscase.

[33]
TheresolutionoftheCourtbecamefinalandexecutoryonMay20,2003. Thus,theissueof
whetherornotrespondentsweretrusteesofone
halfofthepropertyhadbeenfinallyresolvedbythisCourtinfavorofrespondentsinfine,the
validityofTCTNos.29040and29041inthenamesofthespousesDulayhadbeenaffirmedby
thetrialcourt,theMTC,theCAandthisCourt.TheclaimofcoownershipofpetitionerAngela
andpossessionoverthewesternportionofthepropertythushavenofactualandlegalbasis.
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WeagreewithpetitionersthatthecomplaintofthespousesDulayfiledin1982docketedasCivil
CaseNo.6261wasoneforrecoveryofpossessionoftheproperty(accionpubliciana) and that
theylikewiselaterfiledacomplaintwiththeMTC,onJanuary29,1996,forunlawfuldetainerin
CivilCaseNo.6089insteadofanaccionpubliciana.However,respondentswerenotproscribed
fromfilingacomplaintforunlawfuldetainerfive(5)orsix(6)yearsfromthedismissaloftheir
complaintforrecoveryofpossessionofrealproperty.Thedismissalofrespondentscomplaintin
CivilCaseNo.6261bytheCAwasnotbasedonthemeritsofthecase,butsolelybecauseitwas
premature on account of the failure to allege that earnest efforts were made for the amicable
settlementofthecasesasrequiredbyArticle222oftheNewCivilCode.The dismissal of the
[34]
complaintwasthuswithoutprejudice.

It bears stressing that, after the Court declared in UDK10069 on November 19, 1990 that the
decision of the CA in CAG.R. CV No. 15455 was final and executory, respondents did not
immediately file their complaint for unlawful detainer against petitioners for their eviction.
RespondentsfiledtheircomplaintonlyonJanuary29,1996,orafterthelapseofalmostsix(6)
years, but barely four (4) months after respondents final demand to vacate the property on
October2,1995 and the issuance of the certification of the Pangkat Secretary on December 1,
1995.

We agree with the contention of petitioners that for an action for unlawful detainer based on
possession by mere tolerance to prosper, the possession of the property by defendant must be
[35]
legal from the very beginning. In this case, petitioners possession of the property was
tolerated by the former owners, the spouses Rivera, and by the spouses Dulay after they
purchasedtheproperty.Afterall,AngelawasthegranddaughterofConsolacionRivera,thesister
ofAdrianoRivera,andGideonwasthebrotherofAsuncion.However,whenthespousesDulay

needed the property for their childrens use and requested petitioners to vacate the property, the
latterrefused.Fromthenon,petitionerspossessionofthepropertybecamedeforciant.Aperson
whooccupiesthelandofanotheronthelatterstolerance,withoutanycontractbetweenthem,is
[36]
necessarily barred by an implied provision that he will vacate the same upon demand.
Respondents thus had the option to file a complaint for unlawful detainer within one year
therefrom,oranaccionpublicianabeyondtheoneyearperiodfromthedemandofrespondents
asplaintiffsforpetitionerstovacatetheproperty.
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asplaintiffsforpetitionerstovacatetheproperty.

TheCourtnotesthatthepropertywassoldtorespondents,andthatitwastitledintheirnames
(TCT Nos. 29040 and 29041). The said deed and titles support the right of respondents to the
[37]
material possession of the property. Under all the circumstances and facts in this case,
petitionersclaim,thattheyhadtherighttothematerialpossessionoftheproperty,hasnofactual
andlegalbasis.WequotewithapprovalthedecisionoftheCAinCAG.R.SPNo.45560:

Private respondents are entitled to its possession from the time title was issued in their favor as
registeredowners.An action for unlawful detainer may be filed when possession by a landlord,
vendor,vendeeorotherpersonagainstwhomthepossessionofanylandorbuildingisunlawfully
withheldaftertheexpirationorterminationoftheirrighttoholdpossession,byvirtueofacontract,
expressorimplied.

Second.Theageoldruleisthatthepersonwhohasatorrenstitleoveralandisentitledto
possessionthereof.Exceptfortheclaimthatthetitleofprivaterespondentsisnotconclusiveproof
ofownership,petitionershaveshownnorighttojustifytheircontinuedpossessionofthesubject
[38]
premises.

On the issue of whether the RTC acted in excess of its appellate jurisdiction in awarding
P50,000.00 as attorneys fees in favor of respondents, petitioners aver that under the Rules on
SummaryProcedure,respondentsareentitledtoamaximumamountofonlyP20,000.00hence,
theRTCactedinexcessofitsjurisdictionwhenitawardedP50,000.00asattorneysfees,asitis
inexcessofthemaximumamountunderthesaidRules.Besides,petitionersaver,theamountof
P50,000.00isunjustandinequitable.Moreover,theRTCorderedpetitionerstopayattorneysfees
ofP50,000.00withoutevensupportingtheawardwithitsfindingandcitinglegalprovisionsor
caselaw.

For its part, the CA ruled that the award of P50,000.00 as attorneys fees under the Rules on
SummaryProceduredoesnotapplyinacasewherethedecisionoftheMTCisappealedtothe
RTC.ThelattercourtmayawardanamountbeyondthemaximumamountofP20,000.00under

theRulesonSummaryProcedureasattorneysfeesforthereasonthat,onappealintheRTC,the
regularrulesofcivilprocedureapply.AccordingtotheCA,therewasfactualandlegalbasisfor
theawardofP50,000.00asrespondentsattorneysfees:

Second.Decisionallawstates

Thereisnoquestionthatacourtmay,wheneveritdeemsjustandequitable,allow
the recovery by the prevailing party of attorneys fees. In determining the
reasonablenessofsuchfees,thisCourtinanumberofcaseshasprovidedvarious
criteriawhich,forconvenientguidance,wemightcollate,thusly:a)thequantityand
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criteriawhich,forconvenientguidance,wemightcollate,thusly:a)thequantityand
character of the services rendered b) the labor, time and trouble involved c) the
natureandimportanceofthelitigationd)theamountofmoneyorthevalueofthe
property affected by the controversy e) the novelty and difficulty of questions
involvedf)theresponsibilityimposedoncounselg)theskillandexperiencecalled
for in the performance of the service h) the professional character and social
standing of the lawyer i) the customary charges of the bar for similar services j)
the character of employment, whether casual or for established client k) whether
the fee is absolute or contingent (it being the rule that an attorney may properly
chargeahigherfeewhenitiscontingentthanwhenitisabsoluteandl)theresults
secured.

In view thereof, the award of attorneys fees is justified.That is, in addition to the provisions of
Article2208oftheNewCivilCodewhichreads

Intheabsenceofstipulation,attorneysfeesandexpensesoflitigation,other
thanjudicialcosts,cannotberecovered,except:

xxxx

(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to
litigatewiththirdpersonsortoincurexpensestoprotecthisinterest

xxxx

consideringthatpetitionersrefusedtovacatethesubjectpremisesdespitedemandsbytheprivate
respondents.

Finally,theSupremeCourthasexplained

TheRuleonSummaryProcedureappliesonlyincasesfiledbeforetheMetropolitan
TrialCourtandMunicipalTrialCourtspursuanttoSection36ofBatasPambansa
Blg.129.xxxHence,whentherespondentsappealedthedecisionoftheMunicipal
TrialCourttotheRegionalTrialCourt,theapplicablerulesarethoseofthelatter
court.

Thus,theawardoftheamountoffiftythousandpesos(P50,000.00)asattorneysfeesisjustified
consideringthatthejurisdictionalamountoftwentythousandpesos(P20,000.00)underSection1,
paragraph(A),subparagraph(1)oftheRevisedRuleonSummaryProcedureappliesonlytothe
MetropolitanTrialCourts,MunicipalTrialCourtsinCities,MunicipalTrialCourtsandMunicipal
[39]
CircuitTrialCourts.

WeagreewiththerulingoftheCA.TheceilingofP20,000.00appliesonlyintheMTCwherethe
RulesonSummaryProcedureareapplied.OnappealtotheRTC,theRTCmayaffirm,modifyor
evenreversethedecisionoftheMTCassuch,theRTCmayincreasetheawardforattorneysfees
inexcessofP20,000.00ifthereisfactualbasistherefor.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against the
petitioners.

SOORDERED.

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11/8/2016 G.R.No.133882



ROMEOJ.CALLEJO,SR.
AssociateJustice




WECONCUR:




ARTEMIOV.PANGANIBAN
ChiefJustice
Chairperson



Nopart
CONSUELOYNARESSANTIAGOMA.ALICIAAUSTRIAMARTINEZ
AssociateJusticeAssociateJustice



MINITAV.CHICONAZARIO
AssociateJustice



CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the
conclusionsintheaboveDecisionwerereachedinconsultationbeforethecasewasassignedto
thewriteroftheopinionoftheCourtsDivision.

ARTEMIOV.PANGANIBAN
ChiefJustice

*Nopart.
[1]
PennedbyAssociateJusticeDemetrioG.Demetria,withAssociateJusticesMinervaP.GonzagaReyes(laterappointedSupreme
CourtAssociateJustice,nowretired)andRamonA.Barcelona(retired),concurringrollo,pp.108118.
[2]
CArollo,p.26.
[3]
Rollo,pp.3438.
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11/8/2016 G.R.No.133882
[4]
Id.at3940.
[5]
ExhibitsD,D1toD2.
[6]
ExhibitsC,F,F1toF2.
[7]
Exhibits5to5a.
[8]
ExhibitF.
[9]
Rollo,pp.3449.
[10]
CArollo,pp.2931.
[11]
Rollo,pp.5055.
[12]
Id.at56.
[13]
CArollo,p.40.
[14]
Rollo,p.64.
[15]
Id.at65.
[16]
Id.at5862.
[17]
Id.at6061.
[18]
CArollo,pp.5556.
[19]
Id.at62.
[20]
Id.at6071.
[21]
Exhibits1,2and3.
[22]
CArollo,pp.7281.
[23]
G.R.No.L57259,October13,1983,125SCRA78.
[24]
CArollo,p.90.
[25]
Rollo,p.16.
[26]
Id.at294301.
[27]
UnionBankofthePhilippinesv.CourtofAppeals,352Phil.808,828829(1998).
[28]
HeirsofRaphaelMagpiliv.DeJesus,G.R.No.167748,November8,2005,474SCRA366.
[29]
Ramosv.StatelandInvestmentCorporation,G.R.No.161973,November11,2005,474SCRA726,737738,citingOcav.Court
ofAppeals,378SCRA642(2002).
[30]
Tumlos v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 137650, April 12, 2000, 330 SCRA 718 Tala Realty Services Coporation v. Banco Filipino
Savings and Mortgage Bank, G.R. No. 129887, February 17, 2000, 325 SCRA 768 Arcal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127850,
January26,1998,285SCRA34Refugiav.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.118284,July5,1996,258SCRA347.
[31]
Rollo,pp.298299.
[32]
Id.at301.
[33]
Id.
[34]
Section5,Rule16oftheRevisedRulesofCourt.
[35]
Valdez,Jr.v.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.132424,May4,2006.
[36]
Refugiav.CourtofAppeals,supranote30.
[37]
Boyv.CourtofAppeals,G.R.No.125088,April14,2004,427SCRA196,206.
[38]
Rollo,p.116.
[39]
Id.at117118.

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