Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
TITLE: Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC
CITATION: 248 SCRA 300
FACTS:
Imelda, a little over 8 years old, in or about 1938, established her domicile
in Tacloban, Leyte where she studied and graduated high school in the
Holy Infant Academy from 1938 to 1949. She then pursued her college
degree, education, in St. Pauls College now Divine Word University also
in Tacloban. Subsequently, she taught in Leyte Chinese School still in
Tacloban. She went to manila during 1952 to work with her cousin, the
late speaker Daniel Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married late President Ferdinand Marcos
when he was still a Congressman of Ilocos Norte and was registered
there as a voter. When Pres. Marcos was elected as Senator in 1959,
they lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In
1965, when Marcos won presidency, they lived in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel Manila. She served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila during 1978.
Imelda Romualdez-Marcos was running for the position of Representative
of the First District of Leyte for the 1995 Elections. Cirilo Roy Montejo,
the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and also a
candidate for the same position, filed a Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification" with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner
did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. The petitioner,
in an honest misrepresentation, wrote seven months under residency,
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 29, 1995 and
that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or
residence. She arrived at the seven months residency due to the fact that
she became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa in said months.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner has satisfied the 1year residency requirement
to be eligible in running as representative of the First District of Leyte.
HELD:
Residence is used synonymously with domicile for election purposes.
The court are in favor of a conclusion supporting petitoners claim of legal
residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte despite her own
declaration of 7 months residency in the district for the following reasons:
1. A minor follows domicile of her parents. Tacloban became Imeldas
domicile of origin by operation of law when her father brought them to
Leyte;
2. Domicile of origin is only lost when there is actual removal or change
of domicile, a bona fide intention of abandoning the former residence and
establishing a new one, and acts which correspond with the purpose. In
the absence and concurrence of all these, domicile of origin should be
deemed to continue.
3. A wife does not automatically gain the husbands domicile because the
term residence in Civil Law does not mean the same thing in Political
Law. When Imelda married late President Marcos in 1954, she kept her
domicile of origin and merely gained a new home and not domicilium
necessarium.
4. Assuming that Imelda gained a new domicile after her marriage and
acquired right to choose a new one only after the death of Pres. Marcos,
her actions upon returning to the country clearly indicated that she chose
Tacloban, her domicile of origin, as her domicile of choice. To add,
petitioner even obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban,
Leyte while living in her brothers house, an act, which supports the
domiciliary intention clearly manifested. She even kept close ties by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other
important milestones.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the
necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned
Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby
SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the
Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
Representative of the First District of Leyte.
Aquino vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 120265, September 18, 1995 In order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for Representative of
the Second District of Makati City, he must prove that he has established
Agapito A. Aquino, Petitioner not just residence but domicile of choice.

Commission on Elections, Move Makati, Mateo Bedon and JuanitoIcaro, Petitioner, in his certificate of candidacy for the 1992 elections, indicated
Respondents not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992
but that he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately
Ponente: KAPUNAN, J.: preceding that elections. At that time, his certificate indicated that he was
also a registered voter of the same district. His birth certificate places
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of his parents. What stands
nascent democracy is to be preserved. In any challenge having the effect consistently clear and unassailable is that his domicile of origin of record
of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through the ballot, this Court up to the time of filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the
should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
the will of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective
offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident
cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's in his leasing a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease
qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so contract maybe indicative of petitioners intention to reside in Makati City,
noxious to the Constitution that giving effect to the apparent will of the it does notengender the kind of permanency required to prove
people would ultimately do harm to our democratic institutions. abandonment of onesoriginal domicile.

FACTS:
Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his certificate of candidacy for the position
of Representative for the Second District of Makati City. Private
respondents Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and
Mateo Bedon,Chairman of LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Brgy.Cembo, Makati
City, filed a petition to disqualify petitioner on the ground that the latter
lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for congressman which,
under Sec. 6, Art. VI of the Constitution, should be for a period not less
than 1 year immediately preceding the elections.
Petitioners assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to
Makatiis a bare assertion which is hardly supported by the facts. To
successfully effecta change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual
removal or an actualchange of domicile; a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one
and definite acts which correspond withthe purpose. In the absence of
clear and positive proof, the domicile of originshould be deemed to
continue.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner lacked the residence qualification as a

candidate for congressman as mandated by Sec. 6, Art.VI of the
Constitution.

HELD:
Jimenez vs Cabangbang (G.R. No. L-15905)
Freedom of Speech & Debate
Facts: Cabangbang was a member of the House of Representatives and
Chairman of its Committee on National Defense. On 14 Nov 1958,
Cabangbang caused the publication of an open letter addressed to the
Philippines. Said letter alleged that there have been allegedly three
operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers,
with the aid of some civilian political strategists. That such strategists
have had collusions with communists and that the Secretary of Defense,
Jesus Vargas, was planning a coup dtat to place him as the president.
The planners allegedly have Nicanor Jimenez, among others, under
their guise and that Jimenez et al may or may not be aware that they are
being used as a tool to meet such an end. The letter was said to have
been published in newspapers of general circulation. Jimenez then filed a
case against Cabangbang to collect a sum of damages against
Cabangbang alleging that Cabangbangs statement is libelous.
Cabangbang petitioned for the case to be dismissed because he said that
as a member of the HOR he is immune from suit and that he is covered
by the privileged communication rule and that the said letter is not even
libelous.
ISSUE: Whether or not the open letter is covered by privilege such they are by law, under the control of the Secretary of National
communication endowed to members of Congress. Whether or not the Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in question seems to
said letter is libelous.
HELD: Article VI, Section 15 of the Constitution provides The Senators
and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all cases except
treason, felony, and breach of the peace. Be privileged from arrest during
their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein, they shall
not be questioned in any other place. The publication of the said letter is
not covered by said expression which refers to utterances made by
Congressmen in the performance of their official functions, such as
speeches delivered, statements made, or votes cast in the halls of
Congress, while the same is in session as well as bills introduced in
Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises
housing its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of
Congress and of Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform
its functions as such at the time of the performance of the acts in
question. Congress was not in session when the letter was published and
at the same time he, himself, caused the publication of the said letter. It is
obvious that, in thus causing the communication to be so published, he
was not performing his official duty, either as a member of Congress or as
officer of any Committee thereof. Hence, contrary to the finding made by
the lower court the said communication is not absolutely privileged.
The SC is satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support
Jimenez action for damages. Although the letter says that plaintiffs are
under the control of the persons unnamed therein alluded to as
planners, and that, having been handpicked by Vargas, it should be
noted that defendant, likewise, added that it is of course possible that
plaintiffs are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may have
absolutely no knowledge. In other words, the very document upon which
plaintiffs action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely
unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely
unwitting tools of the planners. The SC does not think that this statement
is derogatory to Jimenez to the point of entitling them to recover
damages, considering that they are officers of our Armed Forces, that as
suggest that the group therein described as planners include these two
(2) high ranking officers.Petition is dismissed.
People v. Jalosjos [G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000]
FACTS
The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of
Congress who is now confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on
six counts is pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion
asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a Congressman,
including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings
despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to
free a person validly in prison.
Facts: The accused-appellant, Romeo Jalosjos, is a full-fledged member
of Congress who is confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape and acts of lasciviousness is pending appeal.
The accused-appellant filed a motion asking that he be allowed to fully
discharge the duties of a Congressman, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having
been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable offense on the basis
of popular sovereignty and the need for his constituents to be
represented.

ISSUE Issue: Whether or not accused-appellant should be allowed to

dischargemandate as member of House of Representatives
Whether or not being a Congressman is a substantial differentiation which
removes the accused-appellant as a prisoner from the same class as all
persons validly confined under law by reason of the mandate of the Held: Election is the expression of the sovereign power of the people.
sovereign will. However, inspite of its importance, the privileges and rights arising from
having been elected may be enlarged or restricted by law.
RULING
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of
NO. While the Constitution guarantees: x x x nor shall any person be theHouse of Representatives arises from a provision of the Constitution.
denied the equal protection of laws., this simply means that all persons The privilege has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The
similarly situated shall be treated alike both in rights enjoyed and provision granting an exemption as a special privilege cannot be
responsibilities imposed. The duties imposed by the mandate of the extended beyond the ordinary meaning of its terms. It may not be
people are multifarious. The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. extended by intendment,implication or equitable considerations.
The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may The accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
plausibly assert that their interests are disregarded. Here, election to the exempted from the operation of Sec. 11, Art. VI of the Constitution. The
position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a
distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners interrupted in their Congressman charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more
than six years is not merely authorized by law, it
freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and
has constitutionalfoundations. To allow accused-appellant to attend
confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all
congressional sessions and committee meetings for 5 days or more in a
those belonging to the same class. Hence, the performance of legitimate
week will virtually make him a free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position. Such anaberrant situation not only elevates accused-
appellants status to that of a special class, it also would be a mockery of
the purposes of the correction system.
 G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008 involving moral turpitude, i.e., two counts of statutory rape and six counts
of acts of lasciviousness, whereas he is indicted for coup d'etat which is
regarded as a "political offense."
o Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement as the functions and duties of the office are not
Furthermore, petitioner justifies in his favor the presence of noble causes
substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. in expressing legitimate grievances against the rampant and
o Justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public institutionalized practice of graft and corruption in the AFP.
self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos. xxx

A plain reading of Jalosjos suggests otherwise, however.

FACTS:
The distinctions cited by petitioner were not elemental in the
Petitioner Trillanes IV is on trial for coup detat in relation to the Oakwood pronouncement in Jalosjos that election to Congress is not a reasonable
Incident. In the 2007 elections, he won a seat in the Senate with a six- classification in criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of
year term commencing at noon on June 30, 2007. Petitioner now asks the the office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the class of
Court that he be allowed to attend all official functions of the Senate, prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of
alleging mainly that his case is distinct from that of Jalosjos as his case is movement.
still pending resolution whereas that in the Jalosjos case, there was
already conviction.
It cannot be gainsaid that a person charged with a crime is taken into
ISSUE: custody for purposes of the administration of justice. No less than the
Constitution provides:
o Whether or not valid classification between petitioner and
Jalosjos exists All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be
RULING: bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be
provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the
The petition is bereft of merit. privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall
not be required. (Underscoring supplied)
In attempting to strike a distinction between his case and that of Jalosjos,
petitioner chiefly points out that former Rep. Romeo Jalosjos (Jalosjos) The Rules also state that no person charged with a capital offense, or an
was already convicted, albeit his conviction was pending appeal, when he offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be
filed a motion similar to petitioner's Omnibus Motion, whereas he admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage
(petitioner) is a mere detention prisoner. He asserts that he continues to of the criminal action.
enjoy civil and political rights since the presumption of innocence is still in
his favor. That the cited provisions apply equally to rape and coup d'etat cases,
both being punishable by reclusion perpetua, is beyond cavil. Within the
Further, petitioner illustrates that Jalosjos was charged with crimes
class of offenses covered by the stated range of imposable penalties,
there is clearly no distinction as to the political complexion of or moral
turpitude involved in the crime charged.

In the present case, it is uncontroverted that petitioner's application for

bail and for release on recognizance was denied. The determination that
the evidence of guilt is strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the right
to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage of the criminal action."
Such justification for confinement with its underlying rationale of public
self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or
convicted prisoners-appellants like Jalosjos.

xxx

Petitioner goes on to allege that unlike Jalosjos who attempted to evade

trial, he is not a flight risk since he voluntarily surrendered to the proper
authorities and such can be proven by the numerous times he was
allowed to travel outside his place of detention.

Subsequent events reveal the contrary, however. The assailed Orders

augured well when on November 29, 2007 petitioner went past security
detail for some reason and proceeded from the courtroom to a posh hotel
to issue certain statements. The account, dubbed this time as the "Manila
Pen Incident," proves that petitioner's argument bites the dust. The risk
that he would escape ceased to be neither remote nor nil as, in fact, the
cause for foreboding became real.

Moreover, circumstances indicating probability of flight find relevance as a

factor in ascertaining the reasonable amount of bail and in cancelling a
discretionary grant of bail. In cases involving non-bailable offenses, what
is controlling is the determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. Once it is established that it is so, bail shall be denied as it is
neither a matter of right nor of discretion.
LIBAN VS. GORDON Government to create a National Society to this effect. He also raises the
fact that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a private corporation
FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial recommendation on a organized for public needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the PNRC
Supreme Court decision which ruled that being chairman of the Philippine is neither private or governmental, hence it was within the power of
National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a Senator, Congress to create.
and that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a
private corporation and the Congress is precluded by the Constitution to R E S O L U T I O N
create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with
the SEC as a private corporation. Respondent takes exception to the
second part of the ruling, which addressed the constitutionality of the LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Respondent avers
that the issue of constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of I. THE FACTS
locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not be touched upon
if it is not the lis mota of the case. Petitioners Liban, et al., who were officers of the Board of
Directors of the Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed with the Supreme
ISSUE: Whether or not it was proper for the Court to have ruled on the Court what they styled as Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as
constitutionality of the PNRC statute. Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate against respondent Gordon, who
was elected Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC)
HELD: Petition has merit. Board of Governors during his incumbency as Senator.

Political Law: It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Petitioners alleged that by accepting the chairmanship of the
Court should exercise judicial restraint when it comes to issues of PNRC Board of Governors, respondent Gordon ceased to be a member
constitutionality where it is not the lis mota of the case. of the Senate pursuant to Sec. 13, Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that [n]o Senator . . . may hold any other office or employment
In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
the issue of standing. As such, the Court should not have declared certain including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
provisions of such as unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Petitioners cited
PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the the case of Camporedondo vs. NLRC, G.R. No. 129049,
Constitution wants to prevent Congress from creating. First, the PNRC is decided August 6, 1999, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC, in
not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of supporting their argument that respondent Gordon automatically forfeited
war and administer relief to those who have been devastated by his seat in the Senate when he accepted and held the position of
calamities, among others. It is entirely devoted to public service. It is not Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors.
covered by the prohibition since the Constitution aims to eliminate abuse
by the Congress, which tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court, voting 7-
was created in order to participate in the mitigation of the effects of war, 5,[1] held thatthe office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a government
as embodied in the Geneva Convention. The creation of the PNRC is office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in Sec. 13,
compliance with international treaty obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC Chairman is elected by the
National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not like government PNRC Board of Governors; he is not appointed by the President or by
instrumentalities and GOCC. The PNRC is regulated directly by any subordinate government official. Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a
international humanitarian law, as opposed to local law regulating the GOCC because it is a privately-owned, privately-funded, and privately-run
other mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court to have charitable organization and because it is controlled by a Board of
declared certain portions of the PNRC statute as unconstitutional. Governors four-fifths of which are private sector individuals. Therefore,
However, it is the stand of Justice Carpio that there is no mandate for the
respondent Gordon did not forfeit his legislative seat when he was elected [The Court GRANTED reconsideration and MODIFIED the
as PNRC Chairman during his incumbency as Senator. dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting the second sentence
thereof.]
The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter, R.A. 95,
as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void insofar as it creates the PNRC NO, it was not correct for the Court to have decided on the
as a private corporation since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 constitutional issue because it was not the very lis mota of the case.
Constitution states that [t]he Congress shall not, except by general law, The PNRC is sui generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor a
provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private private corporation.
corporations, unless such corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof. The Court thus The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was not raised by the
directed the PNRC to incorporate under the Corporation Code and parties, and was not among the issues defined in the body of the
register with the Securities and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a Decision; thus, it was not the very lis mota of the case. We have
private corporation. The fallo of the Decision read: reiterated the rule as to when the Court will consider the issue of
constitutionality in Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, Inc., thus:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a This Court will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality unless it is
government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the the very lis mota. It is a well-established rule that a court should not pass
prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also upon a constitutional question and decide a law to be unconstitutional or
declare that Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the invalid, unless such question is raised by the parties and that when it is
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic Act No. 95, as raised, if the record also presents some other ground upon which the
amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264 and 1643, are VOID because court may [rest] its judgment, that course will be adopted and the
they create the PNRC as a private corporation or grant it corporate constitutional question will be left for consideration until such question will
powers. be unavoidable.

Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification and/or for
Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC likewise moved to intervene
and filed its own Motion for Partial Reconsideration. They basically
questioned the second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the constitutionality of
some provisions of the PNRC Charter.
II. THE ISSUE
[T]his Court should not have declared void certain sections of . . .
the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court should have exercised judicial
restraint on this matter, especially since there was some other ground
upon which the Court could have based its judgment. Furthermore, the
PNRC, the entity most adversely affected by this declaration of
unconstitutionality, which was not even originally a party to this case, was
being compelled, as a consequence of the Decision, to suddenly
reorganize and incorporate under the Corporation Code, after more than
sixty (60) years of existence in this country.

Was it correct for the Court to have passed upon and decided on Since its enactment, the PNRC Charter was amended several
the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter? Corollarily: What is times, particularly on June 11, 1953, August 16, 1971, December 15,
the nature of the PNRC? 1977, and October 1, 1979, by virtue of R.A. No. 855, R.A. No. 6373, P.D.
No. 1264, and P.D. No. 1643, respectively. The passage of several laws
relating to the PNRCs corporate existence notwithstanding the effectivity
III. THE RULING of the constitutional proscription on the creation of private corporations by
law is a recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the nature of a private
corporation contemplated by the aforesaid constitutional ban.
 A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would show that there is In sum, the PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and
none like it[,] not just in terms of structure, but also in terms of history, auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in accordance with
public service and official status accorded to it by the State and its commitments under international law. This Court cannot all of a
the international community. There is merit in PNRCs contention that its sudden refuse to recognize its existence, especially since the issue of the
structure is sui generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis character of
constitutionality of the PNRC Charter was never raised by the parties. It
the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has remained valid and effective from the time bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded to almost all national
of its enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 Constitution and disasters since 1947, and is widely known to provide a substantial portion
during the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and the 1987 of the countrys blood requirements. Its humanitarian work is
Constitution. The PNRC Charter and its amendatory laws have not been unparalleled. The Court should not shake its existence to the core in an
questioned or challenged on constitutional grounds, not even in this case untimely and drastic manner that would not only have negative
before the Court now. consequences to those who depend on it in times of disaster and armed
hostilities but also have adverse effects on the image of the Philippines in
[T]his Court [must] recognize the countrys adherence to the the international community. The sections of the PNRC Charter that were
Geneva Convention and respect the unique status of the PNRC in declared void must therefore stay.
consonance with its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has the
force and effect of law. Under the Constitution, the Philippines adopts the [Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in its entirety.
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the The Court MODIFIED the dispositive portion of the Decision by deleting
land. This constitutional provision must be reconciled and harmonized the second sentence, to now read as follows:
with Article XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of using the latter
to negate the former. By requiring the PNRC to organize under the WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of the
Corporation Code just like any other private corporation, the Decision of Philippine National Red Cross is not a government office or an office in a
July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRCs special status under international government-owned or controlled corporation for purposes of the
humanitarian law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to assist it prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.]
in discharging its obligations under the Geneva Conventions.

The PNRC, as a National Society of the International Red Cross

and Red Crescent Movement, can neither be classified as an
instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its character of neutrality as
well as its independence, nor strictly as a private corporation since it is
regulated by international humanitarian law and is treated as
an auxiliary of the State.

Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision, agency, or

instrumentality of the government, nor a GOCC or a subsidiary
thereof . . . so much so that respondent, under the Decision, was correctly
allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof concurrently while he
served as a Senator, such a conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the
PNRC is a private corporation within the contemplation of the provision
of the Constitution, that must be organized under the Corporation
Code. [T]he sui generis character of PNRC requires us to approach
controversies involving the PNRC on a case-to-case basis.
ADAZA VS PACANA
Singularity of Office/Position
FACTS: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental
in the January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started
discharging his duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana
was elected vice-governor for same province in the same elections.
Under the law, their respective terms of office would expire on March 3,
1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed his certificate of candidacy for the
May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza followed suit on April 27,
1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing first among the
candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as
Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has
discharged the functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his
oath of office as governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos,
and started to perform the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming
to be the lawful occupant of the governors office, Adaza has brought this
petition to exclude Pacana therefrom. He argues that he was elected to
said office for a term of six years, that he remains to be the governor of
the province until his term expires on March 3, 1986 as provided by law,
and that within the context of the parliamentary system, as in France,
Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the
position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected
member of Parliament.
including government-owned or controlled corporations, during his tenure,
except that of prime minister or member of the cabinet . . .
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza
cannot invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any
restrictions which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than
one office. Adaza further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy
for the Batasan he became a private citizen because he vacated his
office. Pacana, as a mere private citizen, had no right to assume the
governorship left vacant by petitioners election to the BP. This is not
tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law governing the election
of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of which
specifically provides that governors, mayors, members of the various
sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of
candidacy, be considered on forced leave of absence from office.
Indubitably, respondent falls within the coverage of this provision,
considering that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for the
1984 BP election he was a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan as
provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337, 5
otherwise known as the Local Government Code.

ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and
as a governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice
governor who ran for Congress and lost can assume his original position
and as such can, by virtue of succession, taeke the vacated seat of the
governor.

HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as

follows:

Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan

Pambansa] shall not hold any other office or employment in the
government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof,
PUYAT, ET. AL. vs. DE GUZMAN JR., ET. AL. G.R. No. L-51122, 25 RULING:
March 1982 Case Digest
The suit is for Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction poised The Court en banc ruled that ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for
against the Order of respondent Associate Commissioner of the Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be appearing as
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Hon. Sixto T. J. De counsel. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
Guzman, Jr., granting Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to ownership of ten (10) IPI shares.
intervene in a SEC Case.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of
FACTS: Assemblyman Fernandez. He had acquired a mere Php200.00 worth of
stock in IPI. He acquired them "after the fact", that is, on 30 May 1979,
On 14 May 1979, an election for the eleven Directors of the International after the contested election of Directors, after the quo warranto suit had
Pipe Industries (IPI), a private corporation, was held six of the elected been filed, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before
directors were herein petitioners that may be called the Puyat Group, the SEC. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had
while the other five were herein respondents, the Acero Group. Thus, the signified his intention to appear as counsel for the Acero group, but which
Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of was objected to by petitioners Puyat group. Realizing, perhaps, the
IPI. validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground
of legal interest in the matter under litigation.
On 25 May 1979, the Acero Group instituted at the SEC quo warranto
proceedings questioning the election. Under those facts and circumstances, there has been an indirect
appearance as counsel before an administrative body, which is a
Conferences were held on 25-31 May 1979 and the Puyat Group circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an
objected on Constitutional grounds the appearance of Justice Estanislao afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the proceedings in some
Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang Pambansa, as other capacity.
counsel for the Acero group. Section 11, Article VIII, 1973 Constitution,
then in force, provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional
before xxx any administrative body" and SEC was an administrative body. provision ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to
The prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not continue his influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in
appearance. the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That
which the Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by
When SEC Case was called on 31 May 1979, it turned out that indirection or by a general legislative act which is intended to
Assemblyman Fernandez had purchased on 15 May 1979 ten shares of accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
IPI stock for Php200.00, but the deed of sale was notarized only on 30
May 1979. He then filed on 31 May 1979 an Urgent Motion for Thus, the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case falls
Intervention in the SEC Case as the owner of 10 IPI shares alleging legal within the ambit of the prohibition contained in the 1973 Constitution.
interest in the matter in litigation, which motion was granted by the SEC Respondent Commissioner's Order granting Assemblyman Fernandez
Commissioner. leave to intervene in the SEC Case was reversed and set aside.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, in intervening in the SEC Case,

is in effect appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative
body in contravention of the Constitutional provision.
AVELINO VS CUENCO
FACTS: The petitioners, Senator Jose Avelino, in a quo warranto
proceeding, asked the court to declare him the rightful Senate President
and oust the respondent, Mariano Cuenco. In a session of the Senate,
Tanadas request to deliver a speech in order to formulate charges
against then Senate President Avelino was approved. With the leadership
of the Senate President followed by his supporters, they deliberately tried
to delay and prevent Tanada from delivering his speech. The SP with his
supporters employed delaying tactics, the tried to adjourn the session
then walked out. Only 12 Senators were left in the hall. The members of
the senate left continued the session and Senator Cuenco was appointed
as the Acting President of the Senate and was recognized the next day by
the President of the Philippines.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the court has jurisdiction of the case.
2. Whether or not Resolutions 67 & 68 was validly approved.
2. It was held that there is a quorum that 12 being the majority of 23. In
fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the
practical situation that of the twenty three senators who may participate in
the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after this decision,
twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will
side with Senator Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter
as the rightful President of the Senate, that office being essentially one
that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the
rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being
amenable at any time by that majority. And at any session hereafter held
with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all controversy arising
from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of
all concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions
herein involved could ratify all their acts and thereby place them beyond
the shadow of a doubt.

HELD:
1. The Court has no jurisdiction of the case because the subject matter is
political in nature and in doing so, the court will be against the doctrine of
separation of powers. To the first question, the answer is in the negative,
in view of the separation of powers, the political nature of the controversy
(Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil. 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1) and the constitutional grant to the
Senate of the power to elect its own president, which power should not be
interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We refused to take
cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the
suspended senators were alleged affected without any immediate
remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this case because the selection of
the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at liberty
at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if,
as the petition must imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators
want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the Senate Session Hall
not in the Supreme Court.
SANTIAGO VS SANDIGANBYAN

Facts: "That on or about October 17, 1988, or sometime prior or Held: WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is DISMISSED.
subsequent thereto, in Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of No costs.
this Honorable Court, accused MIRIAM DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, a public
officer, being then the Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration
and Deportation, with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the Ratio: The authority of the Sandiganbayan to order the preventive
exercise of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully suspension of an incumbent public official charged with violation of the
and criminally approve the application for legalization for the stay of provisions of Republic Act No. 3019 has both legal and jurisprudential
the aliens in violation of Executive Order No. 324 dated April 13, 1988 support. Section 13 of the statute provides:
which prohibits the legalization of said disqualified aliens knowing fully
well that said aliens are disqualified thereby giving unwarranted "SECTION 13. Suspension and loss of benefits. Any incumbent public
benefits to said aliens whose stay in the Philippines was unlawfully officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
legalized by said accused."
under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised Penal Code or for
any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or
Two other criminal cases, one for violation of the provisions of property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in
Presidential Decree No. 46 and the other for libel, were filed with the whatever stage of execution and mode of participation, is pending in
Regional Trial Court of Manila, docketed, respectively, No. 91-94555 and court, shall be suspended from office.
No. 91-94897.

Petitioner, then filed with the Sandiganbayan a Motion to "Redetermine In view of suspension NOT as a penalty
Probable Cause" and to dismiss or quash said information. Pending the It would appear, indeed, to be a ministerial duty of the court to issue an
resolution of this incident, the prosecution filed on 31 July 1995 with the
order of suspension upon determination of the validity of the information
Sandiganbayan a motion to issue an order suspending petitioner. filed before it. Once the information is found to be sufficient in form and
substance, the court is bound to issue an order of suspension as a matter
On 22 August 1995, petitioner filed her opposition to the motion of the of course, and there seems to be "no ifs and buts about it."
prosecution to suspend her.
Thus, it has been held that the use of the word "office" would indicate
The petition assails the authority of the Sandiganbayan to decree a that it applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding,
ninety-day preventive suspension of Mme. Miriam Defensor-Santiago, a and not only the particular office under which he stands accused.
Senator of the Republic of the Philippines, from any government position,
and furnishing a copy thereof to the Senate of the Philippines for the The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be
implementation of the suspension order. established in a pre-suspension proceeding before trial on the merits
proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to determine (1) the
strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the
Issue: Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction issuing suspension to offense charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could
petitioner. influence the witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the
records and other evidence before the court could have a valid basis in
decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it In view of RA 3019 and Sec 16, Art VI of the Constitution
secures to the accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the The order of suspension prescribed by Republic Act No. 3019 is
validity or regularity of the proceedings against him, such as, that he distinct from the power of Congress to discipline its own ranks.
has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the
acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his
mandatory suspension from office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. Section 16, Article VI of the Constitution which deals with the power
3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on any of the grounds of each House of Congress inter alia to'punish its Members for
set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal disorderly behavior,' and 'suspend or expel a Member' by a vote of
Procedure. two-thirds of all its Members subject to the qualification that the
penalty of suspension, when imposed, should not exceed sixty
days is unavailing, as it appears to be quite distinct from the
In view of multiple petitions suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a
"Petitioner next claims that the Amended information did not charge any penalty but a preliminary, preventive measure, prescinding from the
offense punishable under Section 3 (e) of RA. No. 3019 because the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner for misbehavior as a
official acts complained therein were authorized under Executive Member of the House of Representatives."
Order No. 324 and that the Board of Commissioners of the Bureau of
Investigation adopted the policy of approving applications for legalization
of spouses and unmarried, minor children of "qualified aliens" even
though they had arrived in the Philippines after December 31, 1983. She In view of the power of the Court
concludes that the Sandiganbayan erred in not granting her motion to
quash the information (Rollo, pp. 25-31). Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members
of Congress and that, therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus
decreeing the assailed preventive suspension order.

"In a motion to quash, the accused the accused admits

hypothetically the allegations of fact in the information(People vs.
Supnad, 7 SCRA 603 [1963]). Therefore, petitioner admitted Attention might be called to the fact that Criminal Case No. 16698 has
hypothetically in her motion that: been decided by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan on 06 December
(1) She was a public officer, 1999, acquitting herein petitioner. The Court, nevertheless, deems it
(2) She approved the application for legalization of the stay of aliens, appropriate to render this decision for future guidance on the significant
who arrived in the Philippines after January 1, 1984; issue raised by petitioner.
(3) Those aliens were disqualified;
(4) She was cognizant of such fact; and
(5) She acted in 'evident bad faith and manifest partiality in the
execution of her official functions.'
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

211 SCRA 315

Facts: On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in GR No.

104704, disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from
running for the Office of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections. Petitioner
filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate
through the fastest available means this Courts Resolution dated May 5,
1992 to all regional election directors, provincial election supervisors, city
and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors, the six (6)
accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said
election officials to delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the
certified list of candidates tally sheets, election returns and to count all
votes cast for the disqualified Melchor, Chavez in favor of Francisco I.
Chavez. On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which
resolved to delete the name of Melchor Chavez from the list of qualified
candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all Chavez votes
in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez name
in the list of qualified candidates.

Issue: Whether or not the law allows pre-proclamation controversy

involving the election of the members of the Senate.

Held: A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner
has no cause of action, the controversy presented being one in the nature
of a pre-proclamation.

While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation

controversies involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election
Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not allowed in elections
for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives. Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides: For purposes of
the elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the
House of Representatives, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed on
matters relating to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and
appreciation of the election returns or the certificate of canvass, as the
case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu propio or upon written complaint of an
interested person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or
election returns before it.
ABBAS VS SENATE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen
166 SCRA 651 Political Law The Legislative Department Electoral on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
Tribunals Inhibition in the Senate Electoral Tribunal the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be
In October 1987, Firdausi Abbas et al filed before the SET an election its Chairman.
contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN coalition who were
proclaimed senators-elect in the May 11 (1987) congressional elections It is quite clear that in providing for a SET to be staffed by both Justices of
by the COMELEC. The SET was at the time composed of three (3) the SC and Members of the Senate, the Constitution intended that both
Justices of the Supreme Court and six (6) Senators. Abbas later on filed those judicial and legislative components commonly share the duty
for the disqualification of the 6 senator members from partaking in the and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
said election protest on the ground that all of them are interested parties qualifications of Senators. The legislative component herein cannot be
to said case. Abbas argue that considerations of public policy and the totally excluded from participation in the resolution of senatorial election
norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass contests, without doing violence to the spirit and intent of the
disqualification sought. To accommodate the proposed disqualification, Constitution. It is not to be misunderstood in saying that no Senator-
Abbas suggested the following amendment: Tribunals Rules (Section 24) Member of the SET may inhibit or disqualify himself from sitting in
- requiring the concurrence of five (5) members for the adoption of judgment on any case before said Tribunal. Every Member of the Tribunal
resolutions of whatever nature - is a proviso that where more than four may, as his conscience dictates, refrain from participating in the resolution
(4) members are disqualified, the remaining members shall constitute a of a case where he sincerely feels that his personal interests or biases
quorum, if not less than three (3) including one (1) Justice, and may adopt would stand in the way of an objective and impartial judgment. What SC
resolutions by majority vote with no abstentions. Obviously tailored to fit is saying is that in the light of the Constitution, the SET cannot legally
the situation created by the petition for disqualification, this would, in the function as such; absent its entire membership of Senators and that no
context of that situation, leave the resolution of the contest to the only amendment of its Rules can confer on the three Justices-Members alone
three Members who would remain, all Justices of this Court, whose the power of valid adjudication of a senatorial election contest.
disqualification is not sought.

ISSUE: Whether or not Abbas proposal could be given due weight.

HELD: The most fundamental objection to such proposal lies in the plain
terms and intent of the Constitution itself which, in its Article VI, Section
17, creates the Senate Electoral Tribunal, ordains its composition and
defines its jurisdiction and powers.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating
to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members.
Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the
OCAMPO VS HRET ruling is that in voting for a candidate who has not been disqualified by
final judgment during the election day, the people voted for him bona fide,
432 SCRA 144 Political Law Election Law Second Placer Cannot without any intention to misapply their franchise, and in the honest belief
Be Declared the Winner that the candidate was then qualified to be the person to whom they
would entrust the exercise of the powers of government.
In May 2001, Mario Crespo, also known as Mark Jimenez, was declared
as the elected Congressman of the 6th District of Manila. Pablo Ocampo
was the rival candidate who filed an electoral protest in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) alleging that Crespos win was
due to election fraud and vote buying. In March 2003, Crespo was
declared by the HRET as ineligible for office due to lack of residence in
the said district of Manila. Due to such declaration, Ocampo then
requested the HRET to declare him as the winner of the election done in
2001 pursuant to Republic Act No. 6646 which provides that Any
candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified
shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted
Ocampo argued that the votes for Crespo should then be considered as
stray votes. And that being the fact that Ocampo received the second
highest number of vote (next to Crespo, with just a margin of 768 votes),
he should be declared as the winner of the said election. The HRET
denied Ocampos petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ocampo should be declared as the winner.

HELD: No. Jurisprudence has long established the doctrine that a second
placer cannot be proclaimed the first among the remaining qualified
candidates in the event that the highest earner of votes is disqualified.
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he
was elected does not necessarily give the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes the right to be declared the winner of the
elective office. Further, Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and section 72 of the
Omnibus Election Code require a final judgment before the election for
the votes of a disqualified candidate to be considered stray. Hence,
when a candidate has not yet been disqualified by final judgment during
the Election Day and was voted for, the votes cast in his favor cannot be
declared stray. To do so would amount to disenfranchising the electorate
in whom sovereignty resides. The obvious rationale behind the foregoing
 LAYUG vs COMELEC Proclaimed Buhay Party-List as a winner entitled to two (2) seats in the
House of Representatives. Being the fifth nominee, however, Brother
Mike was not proclaimed as the representative of Buhay Party-List.
FACTS:
On March 31, 2010, petitioner Rolando D. Layug filed pro se a Petition to
Disqualify3 (SPA No. 10-016 [DCN]) Buhay Party-List from participating in ISSUE:
the May 10, 2010 elections, and Brother Mike from being its nominee. 1. Whether or not SC has jurisdiction to question the declaration of
Velarde(SON) AND Teing over questions of qualifications in which the
He argued that Buhay Party-List is a mere extension of the El House of Representatives Tribunal has sole jurisdiction?
Shaddai, which is a religious sect. Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and William Irwin C. Tieng
It is disqualified from being a party-list under Section 5, Paragraph 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution4, as well as Section 6, Paragraph 1 of RULING:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 79415, otherwise known as the Party-List
System Act. The Court not the HRET has jurisdiction over the present petition.
Neither does Brother Mike, who is allegedly a billionaire real estate Clearly, the members of the House of Representatives are of two kinds:
businessman and the spiritual leader of El Shaddai, qualify as one who (1) members who shall be elected from legislative districts; and
belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sector (2) those who shall be elected through a party-list system of registered
national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
xxx, as required of party-list nominees under Section 6 (7) of COMELEC In this case, Buhay Party-List was entitled to two seats in the House that
Resolution No. 88076, the Rules on Disqualification Cases Against went to its first two nominees, Mariano Michael DM. Velarde, Jr. and
Nominees of Party-List Groups/Organizations Participating in the May 10, William Irwin C. Tieng. On the other hand, Brother Mike, being the fifth
2010 Automated National and Local Elections. nominee, did not get a seat and thus had not become a member of the
House of Representatives.
In their Answer, thereto,
Buhay Party-List and Brother Mike claimed that Buhay Party-List Indubitably, the HRET has no jurisdiction over the issue of Brother
is not a religious sect but a political party possessing all the Mike's qualifications.
qualifications of a party-list. Neither does the HRET have jurisdiction over the qualifications of Buhay
Composed of groups for the elderly, the women, the youth, the Party-List.
handicapped, as well as the professionals, and Brother Mike belongs to It is vested by law, specifically, the Party-List System Act, upon the
the marginalized and underrepresented elderly group. COMELEC.
Nominees from a political party such as Buhay Party-List need not
even come from the marginalized and underrepresented sector. Section 6 of said Act states that the COMELEC may motu proprio or
upon verified complaint of any interested party, remove or cancel, after
COMELEC Second Division found Layug to be a phantom petitioner by due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or
seeing to it that pleadings, orders and judicial notices addressed to him sectoral party, organization or coalition xxx. Accordingly, in the case of
are not received by him because the address he gave and maintains is Abayon vs. HRET,1 We ruled that the HRET did not gravely abuse its
fictitious. Accordingly, Layug was deemed to have received on June 23, discretion when it dismissed the petitions for quo warranto against Aangat
2010 a copy of the Resolution dated June 15, 2010 and, there being no Tayo party-list and Bantay party-list insofar as they sought the
motion for reconsideration filed within the reglementary period, said disqualifications of said party-lists.
Resolution was declared final and executory. It was entered, in the Book
of Entries of Judgment on July 28, 2010. Thus, it is the Court, under its power to review decisions, orders, or
resolutions of the COMELEC provided under Section 7, Article IX-A of
the 1987 Constitution2 and Section 1, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, that has jurisdiction to hear the instant petition.
Jalosjos v. COMELEC Case Digest [G.R. No. 191970 April 24, 2012] residence is synonymous with domicile, meaning that a person must not
FACTS: only intend to reside in a particular place but must also have personal
presence in such place coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City. He Migrated to
Australia and acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at The question of residence is a question of intention. Jurisprudence has
age 35, he returned to the Philippines and lived with his brother in laid down the following guidelines: (a) every person has a domicile or
Barangay Veterans Village, Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. Upon his return, he residence somewhere; (b) where once established, that domicile remains
took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was until he acquires a new one; and (c) a person can have but one domicile
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship. He then at a time.
renounced his Australian citizenship in September 2009.
It is inevitable under these guidelines and the precedents applying them
He acquired residential property where he lived and applied for that Jalosjos has met the residency requirement for provincial governor of
registration as voter in the Municipality of Ipil. His application was Zamboanga Sibugay.
opposed by the Barangay Captain of Veterans Village, Dan Erasmo, sr.
but was eventually granted by the ERB. Quezon City was Jalosjos domicile of origin, the place of his birth. It may
be taken for granted that he effectively changed his domicile from Quezon
A petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos' name in the voter's list was then City to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired
filed by Erasmo before the MCTC. Said petition was denied. It was then Australian citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia
appealed to the RTC who also affirmed the lower court's decision. became his domicile by operation of law and by choice.

On November 8, 2009, Jalosjos filed a Certificate of Candidacy for
Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay Province. Erasmo filed a petition to
deny or cancel said COC on the ground of failure to comply with R.A.
9225 and the one year residency requirement of the local government
code.
COMELEC ruled that Jalosjos failed to comply with the residency
requirement of a gubernatorial candidate and failed to show ample proof
of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in Ipil. COMELEC en
banc affirmed the decision.
When he came to the Philippines in November 2008 to live with his
brother in Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with
intent to change his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his
Australian citizenship, and renounced his allegiance to that country. In
addition, he reacquired his old citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance
to the Republic of the Philippines, resulting in his being issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of
Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos forfeited his legal right to live in
Australia, clearly proving that he gave up his domicile there. And he has
since lived nowhere else except in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.

ISSUE: To hold that Jalosjos has not establish a new domicile in Zamboanga
Sibugay despite the loss of his domicile of origin (Quezon City) and his
Whether or not the COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion domicile of choice and by operation of law (Australia) would violate the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos failed to settled maxim that a man must have a domicile or residence somewhere.
present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish his domicile in
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. The COMELEC concluded that Jalosjos has not come to settle his
domicile in Ipil since he has merely been staying at his brothers house.
RULING: But this circumstance alone cannot support such conclusion. Indeed, the
Court has repeatedly held that a candidate is not required to have a
The Local Government Code requires a candidate seeking the position of house in a community to establish his residence or domicile in a particular
provincial governor to be a resident of the province for at least one year place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented
before the election. For purposes of the election laws, the requirement of house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate
own the house where he lives would make property a qualification for same party to the CoA. This is also pursuant to the proposition
public office. What matters is that Jalosjos has proved two things: actual compromise by Sen Tolentino who proposed that the elected members of
physical presence in Ipil and an intention of making it his domicile. the CoA should consist of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-LABAN, two NPC and
one LAKAS-NUCD. Guingona, a member of LAKAS-NUCD, opposed the
Further, it is not disputed that Jalosjos bought a residential lot in the same
village where he lived and a fish pond in San Isidro, Naga, Zamboanga said compromise. He alleged that the compromise is against proportional
Sibugay. He showed correspondences with political leaders, including representation.
local and national party-mates, from where he lived. Moreover, Jalosjos is
a registered voter of Ipil by final judgment of the Regional Trial Court of ISSUE: Whether or not rounding off is allowed in determining a partys
Zamboanga Sibugay. representation in the CoA.

While the Court ordinarily respects the factual findings of administrative HELD: It is a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is
bodies like the COMELEC, this does not prevent it from exercising its
entitled to a fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional
review powers to correct palpable misappreciation of evidence or wrong
or irrelevant considerations. The evidence Jalosjos presented is sufficient representation of each of the political parties. A literal interpretation of
to establish Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, as his domicile. The COMELEC Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution leads to no other manner of
gravely abused its discretion in holding otherwise. application. The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to
which each of the parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate
Jalosjos won and was proclaimed winner in the 2010 gubernatorial race converted a fractional half membership into a whole membership of one
for Zamboanga Sibugay. The Court will respect the decision of the people senator by adding one half or .5 to 7.5 to be able to elect Romulo. In so
of that province and resolve all doubts regarding his qualification in his
doing one other partys fractional membership was correspondingly
favor to breathe life to their manifest will.
reduced leaving the latters representation in the Commission on
Court GRANTED the petition and SET ASIDE the Resolution of the Appointments to less than their proportional representation in the Senate.
COMELEC. This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in
compliance with its mandate that membership in the Commission be
based on the proportional representation of the political parties. The
GUINGONA VS GONZALES
election of Senator Romulo gave more representation to the LDP and
reduced the representation of one political party either the LAKAS
HRETs Composition Rounding Off
NUCD or the NPC. A party should have at least 1 seat for every 2 duly
elected senators-members in the CoA. Where there are more than 2
After the May 11, 1992 elections, the senate was composed of 15 LDP
parties in Senate, a party which has only one member senator cannot
senators, 5 NPC senators, 3 LAKAS-NUCD senators, and 1 LP-PDP-
constitutionally claim a seat. In order to resolve such, the parties may
LABAN senator. To suffice the requirement that each house must have 12
coalesce with each other in order to come up with proportional
representatives in the CoA, the parties agreed to use the traditional
representation especially since one party may have affiliations with the
formula: (No. of Senators of a political party) x 12 seats) Total No. of
other party.
Senators elected. The results of such a formula would produce 7.5
members for LDP, 2.5 members for NPC, 1.5 members for LAKAS-
NUCD, and 0.5 member for LP-PDP-LABAN. Romulo, as the majority
floor leader, nominated 8 senators from their party because he rounded
off 7.5 to 8 and that Taada from LP-PDP-LABAN should represent the
NERI VS SENATE COMMITTEES The communications are covered by executive privilege

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to
Communication (DOTC) entered into a contract with Zhong Xing follow and abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence,
Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and including, among others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are
services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept
to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China. has Constitutional underpinnings.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the
September 18, 2007 hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the
high executive officials and power brokers were using their influence to subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the
push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA. Constitution to the President, such as the area of military and foreign
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
Ribbon. He appeared in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 commander-in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers.
hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos of COMELEC tried to bribe Consistent with the doctrine of separation of powers, the information
him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential
attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the bribe. communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-
However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN delegable presidential power.
Project, petitioner refused to answer, invoking executive privilege. In 2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a
particular, he refused to answer the questions on: close advisor of the President or the President himself. The judicial test is
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project, that an advisor must be in operational proximity with the President.
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve. 3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to that may be overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the
the senate averring that the communications between GMA and Neri are information sought likely contains important evidence and by the
privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down in Senate vs Ermita be unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an order authority.
for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give
his testimony. In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of
executive privilege on the ground that the communications elicited by the
ISSUE: three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence between
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy
covered by executive privilege? decision-making process and, that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with
HELD: the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential
communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to
diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the

communications elicited by the three (3) questions are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to
a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This
authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the
concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in
Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of
President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no adequate showing of a
compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of the
unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners

claim of executive privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the
right of the people to information on matters of public concern.50 We
might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before
them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the
September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours.
Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more
questions from the Senators, with the exception only of those covered by
his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation.
Section 7 of Article III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall
be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers
pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
GARCILLANO VS HR constitutes publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which
provides that [l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the
In 2005, tapes which allegedly contained a conversation between GMA completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a
and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano surfaced. The said newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
conversation contained a plan to rig the elections to favor GMA. The
recordings then became subject to legislative hearings conducted The Senate admits in their pleadings and even on oral argument that the
separately by each House. In his privilege speech, Sen. Escudero Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation had
motioned a congressional investigation jointly conducted by the been published in newspapers of general circulation only in 1995 and in
Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th Congress, however,
Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and of which the term of half of its members commenced on June 30, 2007,
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules when they first
the inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. opened their session.
Lacsons motion for a senate inquiry was referred to the Committee on
National Defense and Security headed by Biazon. Garci subsequently
filed to petitions. One to prevent the playing of the tapes in the each
house for they are alleged to be inadmi8ssible and the other to prohibit
and stop the conduct of the Senate inquiry on the wiretapped
conversation.

ISSUE: Whether or not to grant the petitions of Garci.

HELD: Garcis petition to strike the tapes off the record cannot be
granted. The tapes were already played in Congress and those tapes
were already highly publicized. The issue is already overtaken by these
incidents hence it has become moot and academic. The second petition
must be granted however. The Senate cannot be allowed to continue with
the conduct of the questioned legislative inquiry without duly published
rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the constitutional requirement.

Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that [t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure. The requisite of publication of the
rules is intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.
Publication is indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule
of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. What
SENATE VS ERMITA made to face court martial proceedings. EO 464s constitutionality was
assailed for it is alleged that it infringes on the rights and duties of
495 SCRA 170 Political Law Constitutional Law Legislative Branch Congress to conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct
Question Hour Constitutionality of E.O. 464 oversight functions in the implementation of laws.

In 2005, scandals involving anomalous transactions about the North Rail
Project as well as the Garci tapes surfaced. This prompted the Senate to
conduct a public hearing to investigate the said anomalies particularly the
alleged overpricing in the NRP. The investigating Senate committee
issued invitations to certain department heads and military officials to
speak before the committee as resource persons. Ermita submitted that
he and some of the department heads cannot attend the said hearing due
to pressing matters that need immediate attention. AFP Chief of Staff
Senga likewise sent a similar letter. Drilon, the senate president, excepted
the said requests for they were sent belatedly and arrangements were
already made and scheduled. Subsequently, GMA issued EO 464 which
took effect immediately.
EO 464 basically prohibited Department heads, Senior officials of
executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are
covered by the executive privilege; Generals and flag officers of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent
or higher and such other officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the
PNP are covered by the executive privilege; Senior national security
officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered
by the executive privilege; and Such other officers as may be determined
by the President, from appearing in such hearings conducted by
Congress without first securing the presidents approval.
The department heads and the military officers who were invited by the
Senate committee then invoked EO 464 to except themselves. Despite
EO 464, the scheduled hearing proceeded with only 2 military personnel
attending. For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel
from testifying before legislative inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen.
Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military posts and were
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 464 is constitutional.
HELD: The SC ruled that EO 464 is constitutional in part. To determine
the validity of the provisions of EO 464, the SC sought to distinguish
Section 21 from Section 22 of Art 6 of the 1987 Constitution. The
Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article
VI of the Constitution. Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where
the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it.
Section 22 on the other hand provides for the Question Hour. The
Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is
precisely as a complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry.
The appearance of the members of Cabinet would be very, very essential
not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid
of legislation. Section 22 refers only to Question Hour, whereas, Section
21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of legislation, under which
anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be
held in contempt of the House. A distinction was thus made between
inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While attendance
was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in
inquiries in aid of legislation. Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely
related and complementary to each other, should not be considered as
pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section
power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit 21, the appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.
information that may be used for legislation, while the other pertains to
the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function. Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under NOTES: The SC ruled that Section 1 and Section 2a are valid. The
Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the rest invalid.
principle of separation of powers.
On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No.
While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it 151, revoking Executive Order No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No.
cannot frustrate the power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide
with its demands for information. When Congress exercises its power of by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among
inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt themselves others, the case of Senate v. Ermita when they are invited to legislative
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the inquiries in aid of legislation.
mere fact that they are department heads. Only one executive official
may be exempted from this power the President on whom executive
power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through
the power of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-equal branch
of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom. The
requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited
as it is only to appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For
under Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department
heads in inquiries in aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such
instances to respect the refusal of the department head to appear in such
inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by
the President herself or by the Executive Secretary.

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads

are implementing the statutes which it has issued, its right to such
information is not as imperative as that of the President to whom, as Chief
Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in
keeping with the separation of powers, states that Congress may
only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which
TOLENTINO VS SEC. OF FINANCE enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code. There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716
235 SCRA 630 (1994) 249 SCRA 635 (1995) Political Law on various grounds.
Origination of Revenue Bills EVAT Amendment by Substitution
One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House
Arturo Tolentino et al are questioning the constitutionality of RA 7716 of Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution,
otherwise known as the Expanded Value Added Tax (EVAT) Law. because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No.
Tolentino averred that this revenue bill did not exclusively originate from 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S. No. 1630 did
the House of Representatives as required by Section 24, Article 6 of the not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.
Constitution. Even though RA 7716 originated as HB 11197 and that it
passed the 3 readings in the HoR, the same did not complete the 3 Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe
readings in Senate for after the 1st reading it was referred to the Senate
Constitution
Ways & Means Committee thereafter Senate passed its own version
known as Senate Bill 1630. Tolentino averred that what Senate could Held:
have done is amend HB 11197 by striking out its text and substituting it The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of
with the text of SB 1630 in that way the bill remains a House Bill and the Representatives as required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not
Senate version just becomes the text (only the text) of the HB. (Its bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the law but the revenue bill which is
ironic however to note that Tolentino and co-petitioner Raul Roco even required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill
signed the said Senate Bill.)
which initiated the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the
law must substantially be the same as the House bill would be to deny the
ISSUE: Whether or not the EVAT law is procedurally infirm. Senates power not only to concur with amendments but also to propose
amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the
HELD: No. By a 9-6 vote, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge, initiative for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of
holding that such consolidation was consistent with the power of the the public debt, private bills and bills of local application must come from
Senate to propose or concur with amendments to the version originated the House of Representatives on the theory that, elected as they are from
the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
in the HoR. What the Constitution simply means, according to the 9
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the
justices, is that the initiative must come from the HoR. Note also that Constitutionprohibit the filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in
there were several instances before where Senate passed its own version anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as action by
rather than having the HoR version as far as revenue and other such bills the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.
are concerned. This practice of amendment by substitution has always
been accepted. The proposition of Tolentino concerns a mere matter of The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3
form. There is no showing that it would make a significant difference if readings on separate days as required by the Constitution because the
second and third readings were done on the same day. But this was
Senate were to adopt his over what has been done.
because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of
Facts: printing but also that of reading the bill on separate days. That upon the
The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of certification of a billby the President the requirement of 3 readings on
goods and properties as well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed with is
7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system and supported by the weightof legislative practice.
PHIL. CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION VS ENRIQUEZ already taken cared of by other legislation and may be more properly
addressed by revising the debt policy. He, however did not delete the
235 SCRA 506 Political Law Veto Power Part of the Legislative P86,323,438,000.00 appropriation therefor. Taada et al averred that the
Process president cannot validly veto that provision w/o vetoing the amount
allotted therefor. The veto of the president herein is sustained for the
Constitutionality of the Pork Barrel Countrywide Development Fund vetoed provision is considered inappropriate; in fact the Sc found that
such provision if not vetoed would in effect repeal the Foreign Borrowing
This is a consolidation of cases which sought to question the veto Act making the legislation as a log-rolling legislation.
authority of the president involving the General Appropriations Bill of 1994
as well as the constitutionality of the pork barrel. The Philippine Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUCs
Constitution Association (PHILCONSA) questions the countrywide
development fund. PHILCONSA said that Congress can only allocate The appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs), the
funds but they cannot specify the items as to which those funds would be President vetoed special provisions which authorize the use of income
applied for since that is already the function of the executive. and the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds was
likewise vetoed. The reason for the veto is that there were already funds
In G.R. No. 113766, after the vetoing by the president of some provisions allotted for the same in the National expenditure Program. Taada et al
of the GAB of 1994, neither house of congress took steps to override the claimed this as unconstitutional. The SC ruled that the veto is valid for it is
veto. Instead, Senators Wigberto Taada and Alberto Romulo sought the in compliant to the One Fund Policy it avoided double funding and
issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against Executive redundancy.
Secretary Teofisto Guingona et al. Taada et al contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provisions added to items Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for
in the GAB of 1994 for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the road maintenance
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH); and (2) the
conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain The President vetoed this provision on the basis that it may result to a
appropriations for the CAFGUs, the DPWH, and the National Housing breach of contractual obligations. The funds if allotted may result to
Authority (NHA). abandonment of some existing contracts. The SC ruled that this Special
Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the
ISSUE: Whether or not the Presidents veto is valid. subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance,
and on the other hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended
HELD: In the PHILCONSA petition, the SC ruled that Congress acted 70% by administrative and 30% by contract. The 1987 Constitution
within its power and that the CDF is constitutional. In the Taada petitions allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items
the SC dismissed the other petitions and granted the others. in an expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items
to which they relate so long as they are appropriate in the budgetary
Veto on special provisions sense. The veto herein is then not valid.

The president did his veto with certain conditions and compliant to the Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of
ruling inGonzales vs Macaraig. The president particularly vetoed the debt military equipment
reduction scheme in the GAA of 1994 commenting that the scheme is
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and
prohibition violate the Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of
contractual obligations, and if allowed, shall effectively alter the original
intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment
deemed necessary to modernize the AFP. The SC affirmed the veto. Any
provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law or
requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a
separate and substantive bill. Therefore, being inappropriate provisions.
Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation
benefits should be covered by direct appropriations specifically approved
for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the
officials enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution. The
SC retained the veto per reasons provided by the president.
Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGUs
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGUs including the
payment of separation benefits. The President declared in his Veto
Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the item on
the CAFGUs shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to
P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758. The SC ruled to retain the veto per
reasons provided by the president. Further, if this provision is allowed the
it would only lead to the repeal of said existing laws.
Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc
In his veto message: The said condition is consistent with the
Constitutional injunction prescribed under Section 8, Article IX-B of the
Constitutional which states that no elective or appointive public officer or
employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation
unless specifically authorized by law. I am, therefore, confident that the
heads of the said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully
adhere to the well-established principle on compensation standardization.
Taada et al claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated
the independence and fiscal autonomy of the Supreme court, the
Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR. The SC sustained the veto: In the
first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the
GAB by Congress itself, not by the President. The Veto Message merely
highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional or indirect
compensation can only be given pursuant to law. In the second place,
such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of
appropriations must be made in accordance with law. Such statements
may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
Pork Barrel Constitutional
The pork barrel makes the unequal equal. The Congressmen, being
representatives of their local districts know more about the problems in
their constituents areas than the national government or the president for
that matter. Hence, with that knowledge, the Congressmen are in a better
position to recommend as to where funds should be allocated.
DIGEST 2
7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of
1994) entitled An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the
Government of the Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and
for other Purposes was approved by the President and vetoed some of
the provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to
realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense
category claiming that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues
of constitutionality were raised before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and
void a.) Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of
the President of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept
of Budget and Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.)
Constitutionality of the conditions imposed by the President in the items of Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. AFP modernization,
the GAA of 1994 and 2.) the constitutionality of the veto of the special prior approval of Congress required before release of modernization
provision in the appropriation for debt services. funds. It is the so-called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin.
action in implementing a law or requiring legislative approval must be
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.
prohibition and mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners
contest the constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions allows Chief of
to items in the GAA of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the Staff to augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to
conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain the Consttution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a
appropriations for the CAFGUs, DPWH, and Natl Highway Authority. specific law. Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.

Issue: Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGUs use of

special fund for the compensation of the said CAFGUs. Vetoed, Pres.
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is requires his prior approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD
constitutional and valid? No. 1597 & RA No. 6758). A provision in an appropriation act cannot be
used to repeal/amend existing laws. VETO VALID.
Held:

Special Provision on Debt Ceiling Congress provided for a debt-ceiling.

Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service.
The said provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service.
They are appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the
entire item/appropriation. VETO VOID. BELGICA VS OCHOA (PREVIOUS SESSIONS)

Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCUs said provision allows

for the use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCUs. Provision for
Western Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres.
Other SCUs enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely
acted in pursuance to existing law. VETO VALID.

Special Provision on Road Maintenance Congress specified 30% ratio

fo works for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines
set forth by DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation. It is not an inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj.
of road maintenance & cannot be veoted w/o vetoing the entire
appropriation. VETO VOID.
ARAULLO VS AQUINO III This apparently opened a can of worms as it turns out that the DAP does
not only realign funds within the Executive. It turns out that some non-
Political Law Constitutional Law Separation of Powers Fund Executive projects were also funded; to name a few: Php1.5B for the
Realignment Constitutionality of the Disbursement Acceleration CPLA (Cordillera Peoples Liberation Army), Php1.8B for the MNLF (Moro
Program National Liberation Front), P700M for the Quezon Province, P50-P100M
for certain Senators each, P10B for Relocation Projects, etc.
Power of the Purse Executive Impoundment
This prompted Maria Carolina Araullo, Chairperson of the Bagong
When President Benigno Aquino III took office, his administration noticed Alyansang Makabayan, and several other concerned citizens to file
the sluggish growth of the economy. The World Bank advised that the various petitions with the Supreme Court questioning the validity of the
economy needed a stimulus plan. Budget Secretary Florencio Butch DAP. Among their contentions was:
Abad then came up with a program called the Disbursement Acceleration
Program (DAP). DAP is unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional rule which
provides that no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in
The DAP was seen as a remedy to speed up the funding of government pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
projects. DAP enables the Executive to realign funds from slow moving
projects to priority projects instead of waiting for next years appropriation. Secretary Abad argued that the DAP is based on certain laws particularly
So what happens under the DAP was that if a certain government project the GAA (savings and augmentation provisions thereof), Sec. 25(5), Art.
is being undertaken slowly by a certain executive agency, the funds VI of the Constitution (power of the President to augment), Secs. 38 and
allotted therefor will be withdrawn by the Executive. Once withdrawn, 49 of Executive Order 292 (power of the President to suspend
these funds are declared as savings by the Executive and said funds expenditures and authority to use savings, respectively).
will then be reallotted to other priority projects. The DAP program did
work to stimulate the economy as economic growth was in fact reported Issues:
and portion of such growth was attributed to the DAP (as noted by the
Supreme Court). I. Whether or not the DAP violates the principle no money shall be paid
out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law
Other sources of the DAP include the unprogrammed funds from the (Sec. 29(1), Art. VI, Constitution).
General Appropriations Act (GAA). Unprogrammed funds are standby
appropriations made by Congress in the GAA. II. Whether or not the DAP realignments can be considered as
impoundments by the executive.
Meanwhile, in September 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada made an
expos claiming that he, and other Senators, received Php50M from the III. Whether or not the DAP realignments/transfers are constitutional.
President as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment of then
Chief Justice Renato Corona. Secretary Abad claimed that the money IV. Whether or not the sourcing of unprogrammed funds to the DAP is
was taken from the DAP but was disbursed upon the request of the constitutional.
Senators.
V. Whether or not the Doctrine of Operative Fact is applicable.
HELD: These DAP transfers are not savings contrary to what was being
declared by the Executive. Under the definition of savings in the GAA,
I. No, the DAP did not violate Section 29(1), Art. VI of the Constitution. savings only occur, among other instances, when there is an excess in
DAP was merely a program by the Executive and is not a fund nor is it an the funding of a certain project once it is completed, finally discontinued,
appropriation. It is a program for prioritizing government spending. As or finally abandoned. The GAA does not refer to savings as funds
such, it did not violate the Constitutional provision cited in Section 29(1), withdrawn from a slow moving project. Thus, since the statutory definition
Art. VI of the Constitution. In DAP no additional funds were withdrawn of savings was not complied with under the DAP, there is no basis at all
from the Treasury otherwise, an appropriation made by law would have for the transfers. Further, savings should only be declared at the end of
been required. Funds, which were already appropriated for by the GAA, the fiscal year. But under the DAP, funds are already being withdrawn
were merely being realigned via the DAP. from certain projects in the middle of the year and then being declared as
savings by the Executive particularly by the DBM.
II. No, there is no executive impoundment in the DAP. Impoundment of
funds refers to the Presidents power to refuse to spend appropriations or IV. No. Unprogrammed funds from the GAA cannot be used as money
to retain or deduct appropriations for whatever reason. Impoundment is source for the DAP because under the law, such funds may only be used
actually prohibited by the GAA unless there will be an unmanageable if there is a certification from the National Treasurer to the effect that the
national government budget deficit (which did not happen). Nevertheless, revenue collections have exceeded the revenue targets. In this case, no
theres no impoundment in the case at bar because whats involved in the such certification was secured before unprogrammed funds were used.
DAP was the transfer of funds.
V. Yes. The Doctrine of Operative Fact, which recognizes the legal effects
III. No, the transfers made through the DAP were unconstitutional. It isof an act prior to it being declared as unconstitutional by the Supreme
true that the President (and even the heads of the other branches of theCourt, is applicable. The DAP has definitely helped stimulate the
government) are allowed by the Constitution to make realignment of economy. It has funded numerous projects. If the Executive is ordered to
funds, however, such transfer or realignment should only be made withinreverse all actions under the DAP, then it may cause more harm than
their respective offices. Thus, no cross-border transfers/augmentationsgood. The DAP effects can no longer be undone. The beneficiaries of the
may be allowed. But under the DAP, this was violated because funds DAP cannot be asked to return what they received especially so that they
appropriated by the GAA for the Executive were being transferred to the relied on the validity of the DAP. However, the Doctrine of Operative Fact
Legislative and other non-Executive agencies. may not be applicable to the authors, implementers, and proponents of
the DAP if it is so found in the appropriate tribunals (civil, criminal, or
Further, transfers within their respective offices also contemplate administrative) that they have not acted in good faith.
realignment of funds to an existing project in the GAA. Under the DAP,
even though some projects were within the Executive, these projects are
non-existent insofar as the GAA is concerned because no funds were
appropriated to them in the GAA. Although some of these projects may be
legitimate, they are still non-existent under the GAA because they were
not provided for by the GAA. As such, transfer to such projects is
unconstitutional and is without legal basis.

On the issue of what are savings

PASCUAL VS SEC. OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMM.
110 Phil. 331 Political Law Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed
In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated
P85,000.00 for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement Pasig feeder road terminals. Wenceslao Pascual, then
governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the
appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the
terminals sought to be improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The
said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose Zulueta who was a member of
the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual
claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns
those terminals and that his property would be unlawfully enriched at the
expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would be upheld. Pascual then
prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be
restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other
hand, perhaps as an afterthought, donated the said property to the City of
Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.
HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a
private purpose. The subsequent donation of the property to the
government to make the property public does not cure the constitutional
defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still
a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the
taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by
taxation can be expanded only for public purposes and not for the
advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta,
the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence,
was null and void.
FARINAS VS EXEC. SECRETARY
FACTS:
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section
14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section 26(1),
Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject
which should be expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section
67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a
proscribed rider.
They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of Rep. Act No. 9006,
on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the
other. Rep. Act No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the
use of media for election propaganda and the elimination of unfair
election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other than
the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by considering them
as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy.
The repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not
embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject matter of Rep. Act No.
9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution because it repeals Section
67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66 thereof
which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person
holding a public appointive office or position, including active members of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against
appointive officials. By the repeal of Section 67, an elective official who
runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of
candidacy. Elective officials continue in public office even as they
campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the
other hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on
appointive officials remains - they are still considered ipso facto resigned
from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
HELD:
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its
entirety as irregularities attended its enactment into law. The law, not only To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional
Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section 16 of requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title, the
the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval Court laid down the rule that
is a violation of the due process clause of the Constitution, as well as Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of
jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it becomes statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the
effective. power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall be
expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election construction. It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough
Code is a good law; hence, should not have been repealed. The reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect,
petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that without expressing each and every end and means necessary or
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be
mandate on the Accountability of Public Officers: set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair
must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost Election Practices.
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives. The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No.
9006 are comprehensive enough to include the repeal of Section 67 of
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the
House of Representatives acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist
to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of the that the title be a complete index of its content.
House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections
as ipso facto resigned therefrom, upon the filing of their respective The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
certificates of candidacy. which imposes a limitation on elective officials who run for an office other
than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep. Act No.
9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for
ISSUES: election propaganda, does not violate the one subject-one title rule. This
Court has held that an act having a single general subject, indicated in
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is a Rider. the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the
W/N Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 Is Violative of the Equal Protection general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of such subject by
Clause of the Constitution. providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject.

W/N Section 16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect
upon its approval is a violation of the due process clause of the
Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law
before it becomes effective.
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a
form of harassment or discrimination that had to be done away with and
repealed. The executive department found cause with Congress when the
President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some
sectors of society and in government may believe that the repeal of
Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage political adventurism. But
policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is
within the exclusive dominion of the political branches of the
government. It is not for this Court to look into the wisdom or propriety of
legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or
unwise, whether it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the
best means to achieve the desired results, whether, in short, the
legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a
particular manner are matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the
serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring them within the range
of judicial cognizance. Congress is not precluded from repealing Section
67 by the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra upholding the validity of
the provision and by its pronouncement in the same case that the
provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it
imperative to repeal the law on its belief that the election process is
thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of election laws the fair,
honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is
achieved.
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code and the doctrine enunciated
in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006, notwithstanding its express statement, took
effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette or a
newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched
principles in constitutional law is that the courts do not involve themselves
with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the exclusive
concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of
a statute is challenged on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the
court is to determine whether it transcends constitutional limitations or the
limits of legislative power. No such transgression has been shown in this
case.

Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and

appointive officials. The former occupy their office by virtue of the
mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term
and may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions. On the
other hand, appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their
designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials
hold their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of
tenure while others serve at the pleasure of the appointing authority.

Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which
provides that it shall take effect immediately upon its approval, is
defective. However, the same does not render the entire law invalid.
In Taada v. Tuvera, this Court laid down the rule:

... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of

effectivity and not to the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in
any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date
without its previous publication.

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its

discretion provide that the usual fifteen-period shall be shortened or
extended.
Francisco I. Chavez vs. Presidential Commission on Good completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered.
Government et al
The Court said that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth
Categories: Information Disclosure is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, and there is
no question that petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill-
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements gotten wealth. The question that remains is whether the constitutional
pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth. provision likewise guarantee access to information regarding ongoing
Respondents' opposite view is that the constitutional provisions refer to negotiations or proposals prior to the final agreement. Reviewing the
completed and operative official acts, not to those still being considered. deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, the Court held that it is
The Court said that the recovery of the Marcoses' alleged ill-gotten wealth incumbent upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government
is a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest, and there is representatives, to disclose sufficient public information on any proposed
no question that petitioner has a right to respondents' disclosure of any settlement they have decided to take up with the ostensible owners and
agreement that may be arrived at concerning the Marcoses' purported ill- holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must pertain to
gotten wealth. definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or
inter-agency recommendations or communications during the stage when
common assertions are still in the process of being formulated or are in
Petitioner, invoking his constitutional right to information, demands that the "exploratory" stage.
respondents make public any and all negotiations and agreements
pertaining to PCGG's task of recovering the Marcoses' ill-gotten wealth.
Respondents' opposite view is that the constitutional provisions refer to