IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF MARYLAND No. Term STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Petitioner v JUDITH C. CHAMBERLAIN Respondent On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To The Court of Special Appeals PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI STEPHEN D. CHAMBERLAIN Pro Se Litigant schamberlaindocs(@ gmail.comPetitioner respectfully asks this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals to review that court’s unpublished opinion in an appeal from a contempt action initiated by Respondent Judith Chamberlain, Stephen D. Chamberlain v. Judith C. Chamberlain, No. 2594, September Term 2014. There are four reasons review is necessary and in the public’s interest. First, the Court of Special Appeals has no authority to reinvest the Circuit Court with jurisdiction of a matter that is exclusively under its own jurisdiction. Jurisdictional limits must be sacrosanct. This Court has a duty to correct lower courts when they act outside of their jurisdiction. Second, affirmation of the Circuit Court’s use of contempt powers to enforce this type of contract between two parties directly contravenes seitled law. Anytime the Court of Special Appeals rules in direct contravention to well settled law this Court must correct that ruling or publish an opinion reversing the existing case law. Third, substantial harm can occur when lower courts fail to ensure a citizen has the ability to comply with the sanction they impose. In this case, failure to ensure Mr. Chamberlain had the ability to comply with the purge amount set by the court was leading toward his incarceration had he not declared bankruptcy. Fourth, nothing is more destructive to the credibility of a judicial system than for the court itself to deny a citizen's most basic constitutional right to stand before a fair and impartial tribunal. By affirming the trial judge’s decision not to recuse himself under the circumstances of this case, the Court of Special Appeals denied Mr. Chamberlain this most basic constitutional right. While this Court has statutory authority to select which cases it reviews, it has both a statutory and a moral obligation to correct egregious errors by lower courts that are wrongly affirmed by the state’s intermediate appellate court in order to protect the integrity and credibility of the judicial system. The facts of this case are not in dispute and the law is unquestionably settled. Neither facts, law, nor legal reasoning support the opinion of the Court of Special Appeals. Failure to review and correct such an appellatedecision would severely damage the credibility of the judicial system and the public's trust in this critical institution. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Did affirmation of the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction and authority to use its contempt powers to enforce this agreement contravene settled law? 2. Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it affirmed the Circuit Court’s setting of the purge amount? 3. Did the Court of Special Appeals err when it found the trial judge was not required to recuse himself in this case? REQUIRED STATEMENTS ‘The underlying action was heard in the Anne Arundel County Circuit Court, Case number 02-C-09-139690. The Judgment issued by that court on May 7, 2015 adjudicated all claims in their entirety and the rights and liabili es of all parties to the action. An appeal was taken and the Court of Special Appeals rendered an opinion on August 24, 2016. A Motion for Reconsideration was filed. The Court of Special Appeals denied this motion and issued its mandate on December 1, 2016. BACKGROUND ‘The underlying declaratory judgment action concerned a single sentence in a college education provision contained within a Marital Settlement Agreement. Four months prior to trial, the issue became moot. After sustaining the legal action for 4 additional months, and just 4 days before trial, Ms. Chamberlain filed a motion declaringthe only issue she had brought before the court had become moot, issues regarding payment for college were not yet ripe, and sought a voluntary dismissal of her own action.! Mr. Chamberlain replied, concurred the only issue had become moot, and also sought dismissal? When the Circuit Court began to proceed with the case, Mr. Chamberlain provided evidence proving the only issue before the court had become moot. After the trial judge proceeded and made numerous other inexplicable legal decisions which contravened clear and unambiguous legal statutes and court procedures, Mr, Chamberlain was coerced into making an oral agreement in court to settle the litigation. An appeal was taken immediately thereafter questioning the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to have proceeded without a live controversy and the legality of the consent order which had been formulated during the proceedings. Prior to. consent order, Ms. Chamberlain sought to enforce the agreement by asking the Cireuit ity of the Court to use its contempt powers. Mr. Chamberlain first sought the recusal of the trial judge. This was denied. Mr. Chamberlain then argued that the Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with enforcement action while the specific issue of its jurisdiction and the validity of the consent order was under appeal. Third, Mr, Chamberlain showed precedential case law prevented the court from using its contempt powers to enforce this type of agreement between two parties. These arguments were rejected and the Circuit Court found Mr. Chamberlain in contempt. The trial judge subsequently set a purge amount of $14,000.00 and awarded $3,600.00 in attorney’s fees to be paid within 30 days. Over the course of two hearings, ‘Docket Entry #115 of April 14, 2014 2 Docket Entry #115 Sequence 1 of April 17, 2014 5 See Appellant's Brief and Reply Brief to the Court of Special Appeals, No. 719 September Term 2014, and Petition of Writ of Certiorari to this Court dated May 13, 2015 4significant testimony was heard regarding Mr. Chamberlain’s financial situation, his mandatory expenses, debt payments for marital debt assumed in the Marital Settlement Agreement, debt payments for debt assumed to terminate previous litigation, and his inability to comply with the consent order. After the purge was set, Mr. Chamberlain attempted to provide the court financial records to prove his inability to comply with the purge amount. This effort was rejected. Mr. Chamberlain appealed. Being unable to comply with the purge, the sanctions were reduced to a judgment. ‘Two months later, the Court of Special Appeals rendered its opinion and affirmed the initial jurisdiction of the Circuit Court to conduct the declaratory judgment action and the validity of the consent order formed during that proceeding, Because it was irrefutable the Circuit Court had acted in the clear absence of jurisdiction by presiding over a facially moot case, and the Court of Special Appeals inexplicably affirmed that action, Mr. Chamberlain filed a writ of certiorari with this Court seeking review. After this Court elected not to intervene, a writ of certiorari was filed with the United States Supreme Court The inability to obtain a review of the Court of Special Appeals affirmation of the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction (after both parties to the action had declared the only issue to be moot and it was proven to be moot) does not change the undisputed facts which prove the opinion was incorrect. Despite the jurisdiction and authority of the Circuit Court to use its contempt powers being raised on appeal, the Circuit Court moved forward with enforcement action of its self-affirmed order. After enduring multiple garnishment actions, including the garnishment of wages, and this Court’s decision not to prohibit the enforcement actions of the Circuit Court during the pendency of the appeal, Mr. Chamberlain was forced to file bankruptcy. * Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, #2594 September Term 2014 5 United States Supreme Court Petition for Writ of Certiorari No. 15-536 5STATEMENT OF FACTS The following facts are pertinent to the issue of jurisdiction, Between June 20, 2014 and April 21, 2015 the Court of Special Appeals held exclusive jurisdiction over the issue of whether the June 5, 2014 Consent Order was a valid agreement or void. During this time, on January 16, 2015, and February 5, 2015, the Circuit Court proceeded with a contempt action brought forth by Ms. Chamberlain for the purpose of coercing Mr. Chamberlain to comply with the terms of that challenged consent order. The following facts are pertinent to the issue of the Circuit Court's authority to use its contempt powers to enforce this type of agreement. This consent order involved payment of an adult son’s college education. It involved no judicial determination or court order, The consent order was endorsed by the court to give conclusiveness to ongoing litigation. It did not involve any matter the court could have imposed on the parties without their agreement. The following facts are pertinent to the issue of setting the purge amount. The record is replete with innumerable statements regarding Mr. Chamberlain’s inability to comply with the terms of the consent order. Financial records were available and offered to the Circuit Court but rejected. Mr. Chamberlain testified his expenses exceeded the income the trial judge attributed to him. The court denied Mr. Chamberlain an opportunity to provide evidence he was unable to comply with the purge amount that had just been set. The following facts are pertinent to the issue of recusal. The record shows Judge Harris had multiple opportunities to determine the court lacked jurisdiction to proceed with the declaratory judgment action on April 18, 2014. Multiple times, Judge Harris. affirmed his own conclusion he acted within his jurisdiction, Mr. Chamberlain informed Judge Harris his defense to the contempt charges would, among other things, focus on the ® Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, No. 719 September Term 2014 6court's initial lack of jurisdiction and subsequent void order. He clearly articulated how many times Judge Harris had already determined his ruling on the jurisdictional issue prior to the contempt hearing and therefore could not be fair and impartial to rule on this, defense. Additionally, Mr. Chamberlain had filed two complaints with the Commission on Judicial Disabilities for numerous violations of the judicial code of conduct and had filed a complaint with the Baltimore Field Office of the FBI alleging Judge Harris's actions circumstantially proved the presence of public corruption. Additionally, Mr. Chamberlain made the court aware he would be pursuing 42 U.S.C. § 1983 charges against Judge Harris in the United States Federal Court, District of Baltimore at the time of the recusal hearing. Judge Harris denied the recusal motion. ARGUMENT Appellate rulings from the Court of Special Appeals that directly contravene settled law must be reviewed, overtumed, or affirmed with new case law published. Appellate rulings that are based on fabricated presumptions and a disregard for undisputed evidence must be reviewed and corrected to protect the credibility of the judicial system, The Petitioner offers four arguments to highlight the need for review in this case. First, while the Court of Special Appeals held exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of the underlying consent order, the Circuit Court proceeded to enforce the challenged agreement. The Circuit Court lacked jurisdiction to enforce a facially void agreement during the pendency of the appeal. Second, it is settled law that certain types of consent orders are not “court orders” and cannot be enforced using the court’s contempt powers. This consent order falls within that category. The Circuit Court did not have authority to use contempt powers to enforce this agreement. Third, the Circuit Court set a purge amount without ensuring the purge amount could be met. A “contemnor” has the right toprove a present inability to comply with a purge amount. The evidence shows this right was denied. And fourth, a judge who has confirmed his own jurisdi ion to preside over a hearing, not once, not twice, but at least half a dozen times cannot then be said to have an open mind when considering the exact same question raised within a different legal action before him. The constitution guarantees the right of due process, which includes the fundamental right to stand before a fair and impartial tribunal. Affirmation of the trial judge’s decision not to recuse himself contravenes settled law and is not supported by the facts or the evidence in this case. 1. Affirmation Of The Case Law ircuit Court’s Jurisdiction Contravenes Precedential Questions of a court’s jurisdiction can be raised at any time.” After the Circuit Court proceeded to hear a facially moot case on April 18, 2014, an appeal was immediately taken with the Court of Special Appeals.’ The specific issue raised on appeal was whether the Circuit Court had jurisdiction to proceed on April 18, 2014 after both parties declared in writing the only issue before the court had become moot, and was proven to be moot, thereby making the verbal consent agreement which emanated from that proceeding void by law. It is well settled that once an appeal is taken, the appellate court is invested with exclusive jurisdiction over the specific issues raised on appeal and the lower court is ” Maryland Rule 8-131; Jones v. State, 843 A.2d 778, 379 Md. 704 (2004). ® Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, No. 719 September Term 2014 8divested of jurisdiction to act with regard to those issues.” The Court of Special Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction over the June 5, 2014 Consent Order from June 20, 2014 until April 21, 2015. The lower court held contempt hearings attempting to enforce the consent order on January 16, 2015, and February 5, 2015. The Court of Special Appeals” affirmation of the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction to proceed with a contempt action while the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court in the underlying action, and therefore the validity of the consent order, was under appeal is in direct contravention to settled law. IL. Affirmation of the Circuit Court’s Authority to Use Contempt Powers To Enforce This Type Of Consent Order Contravenes Settled Law In general, itis true, courts have authority to use contempt powers to enforce their orders. This general rule, however, is not applicable here. The legal question here is whether the consent order in this case is a contract between two parties, enforceable by breach of contract suit, or whether the consent order is an order of the court, enforceable through contempt. Affirmation this consent order was an order of a court which could be enforced through contempt directly contravenes settled law. In Jones v. Hubbard,!° the Court of Special Appeals provided a clear and distinguishable difference between a settlement agreement and a final judgment / court order. A settlement order may resemble a final judgment, but it is not necessarily the same. A settlement agreement is a contract which the parties enter into "for the settlement of a previously existing claim by a substituted performance." When this agreement is * Raimondi v. State, 261 A.2d 40, 8 Md. App. 468 (Ct. Spee. App. 1970). ‘The Court of Appeals has held that the perfecting of an appeal brings the subject matter thereof within the exclusive jurisdiction of the appellate court and suspends the authority of the lower court over it during the pendency of the appeal; that the lower court lacks jurisdiction to take any further action in the case with respect to the subject matter of the appeal until the receipt of the mandate of the appellate court, after the appeal has been heard and decided.” © Jones v. Hubbard, 740 A.2d 1004, 356 Md. 513 at 1011 (1999). 9entered with the court, it is termed a settlement order; however, it is not a court order. Rather, it is a compromise between the parties, which they submit to the court to stay the proceedings in the case. It should be noted that Jones does goes on to list a plethora of cases which point to the fact a consent agreement between parties, generally, becomes an order of the court and a consent judgment becomes a judgment of the court. But that general rule does not apply here. When the settlement involves an agreement that could not be judicially imposed without an agreement between the parties, the memorialized agreement in the form of a consent order cannot be considered a “judgment” but rather only an endorsement of the court concluding the judicial matter before it. ‘The Court of Special Appeals itself drew a sharp line of demarcation between consent orders a court could have imposed on their own accord (for example, consent orders concerning alimony, child support, or child custody), and consent orders a court could not impose absent an agreement between the parties, such as this one." The judge’s signature on this consent order is merely an endorsement of the court indi ting “judicial conelusiveness” to litigation.!2 Nothing more. [tis demonstrably not an order of the court. The opinion incorrectly relies upon Gertz and Bahena. The consent orders in both those cases involved consent orders whose terms could have been imposed by the court making them. Both are distinguishable from and inapplicable to the issue here.'3 Affirmation of the Circuit Court's use of its contempt powers to enforce this type of consent order is in direct conflict with controlling authority found in Mendelson and Johnston and reiterated by Jones.4 * Mendelson v. Mendelson, 541 A.2d 1331, 75 Md. App. 486 (Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md, at 681, 141 A. at 390 (1928) +2 Jones v. Hubbard, 740 A.2d 1004, 356 Md. 513 at 1011 (1999). 18 Opinion at p. 14. ' Mendelson v. Mendelson, 541 A.2d 1331, 75 Md. App. 486 (Ct. Spec. App. 1988); Johnston v. Johnston, 297 Md, 48, 465 A.2d 436 (1983); Jones v. Hubbard, 740 A.2d 1004, 356 Md. 513 at 1011 (1999) 10II. Neither Evidence Nor Law Supports The Court Of Special Appeals’ Affirmation The Circuit Court Set A Purge Amount The Contemnor Could Comply With ‘The Court of Special Appeals determined the lower court did not err when it set a purge amount at the conclusion of the February 5, 2015 contempt hearing. This ruling does not comport with clear and established law or the substantial evidence in the record. ‘A long and unwavering string of decisions in the intermediate appellate court, and this, Court,!5 compels the conclusion that Mr. Chamberlain has the right to demonstrate a present inability to comply with a purge amount set by a court, and that right was denied. The opinion relies upon generalities that have no relevance to the circumstances of the instant case in order to justify its determinations. There is no doubt pro se litigants are “expected to know and follow the rules and procedures.”!® And a court’s authority to either “believe or disbelieve” the testimony it hears is not contested.!” Neither statement, however, supports a conclusion the lower court correctly provided Mr. Chamberlain an opportunity to show he did not have the present ability to comply with the purge amount set on February 5, 2015. The law could not be more clear that evidence of a pi ability to comply with a consent order (which was disproven here) and evidence of a present ability to purge oneself of contempt are two fundamentally different things. The Court of Special Appeals found Mr. Chamberlain did not follow “rules and procedures” when he attempted to introduce financial evidence proving his inability to comply with the terms of the consent order during the contempt hearing, This fact is completely irrelevant to the court’s denial 6 Rawlings v. Rawlings, 766 A.2d 98, 362 Md. 535 (2001); Lynch v. Lynch, 677 A.2d 584, 342 Md. 509 (1996); Elzey v. Elzey, 435 A.2d 445, 291 Md. 369 (1981); State v. Roll and Scholl, 298 A.2d 867, 267 Md. 714 (1973); Johnson v. Johnson, 216 A.2d 914, 241 Md. 416 (1966). ' Footnote 6 on page 19 of August 24, 2016 opinion. Page 27 August 24, 2016 opinion. "of Mr. Chamberlain’s request to introduce financial documents to prove an inability to meet the purge amount set after having been found in contempt. Once the trial judge set a purge amount of $14,000.00 to be paid in 30 days, Mr. Chamberlain had the right to prove a present inability to meet that purge.'® This right was denied and directly contravenes substantial authoritative case law. Furthermore, the Court of Special Appeals relied upon the fact a trial judge has the authority to “believe or disbelieve” testimony. Possessing authority to judge the credibility of testimony is fundamentally different than determining testimony is not credible. Here, the record is devoid of evidence the trial judge found Mr. Chamberlain’s testimony regarding his financial situation less than credible. HAD the trial judge questioned the credibility of the testimony, which he did not, including the 15 direct statements Mr. Chamberlain made on the record testifying to his inability to comply with the terms of the consent order, it was incumbent upon him to review the financial documents Mr. Chamberlain attempted to provide to prove his inability to meet the purge amount. No case law supports the contention a court can “guess” or “assume” an ability to meet a purge, nor can a court refuse to review financial documents offered to prove an inability to meet a purge. In Rawlings, cited in the opinion for its relevance to the standard of evidence required to demonstrate an inability to pay, this Court noted the minimal testimony presented to the lower court in that case and pointed to the trial judge’s declaration that *® Rawlings v. Rawlings, 766 A.2d 98, 362 Md. 535 at 118 (2001). “Any person judged to be a civil contemnor must be afforded the opportunity to show a present inability to purge the contempt, that is, to show that he or she has neither the estate nor the ability to pay his or her obligation.” State v. Roll and Scholl, 298 A.2d 867, 267 Md. 714 (1973); Herd v. State, 377 A.2d 574, 37 Md. App. 362 (Ct. Spec. App. 1977); Jones v. State, 718 A.2d 222, 351 Md. 264 (1998); Lynch v. Lynch, 677 A.2d 584, 342 Md. 509 (1996); Ott v. FREDERICK COUNTY DEPT. OF SOC. SERV., 694 A.2d 101, 345 Md. 682 (1997); Elzey v. Elzey, 435 A.2d 445, 291 Md. 369 (1981); Johnson v. Johnson, 216 A.2d 914, 241 Md. 416 (1966). 12petitioner’s “credibility is at least zero, perhaps minus. So that you have a tendency to believe the opposite of what he says."2? There is no statement whatsoever, not even an inference, that the testimony given in this case was not credible. The opinion relies on its own speculation the lower court “disbelieved” the testimony. There is no evidence to support such speculation. The trial judge determined Mr. Chamberlain's income was over $100.000.00 and acknowledged he was aware of annual expenses totaling more than $184,000.00. He then denied Mr. Chamberlain an opportunity to prove a present inability to purge himself! This clear error ultimately forced Mr. Chamberlain to declare bankruptey or risk incarceration IV. The Court Of Special Appeals Erred When It Affirmed The Trial Judge’s Decision Not To Recuse Himself The Court of Special Appeals supported its conclusion the trial judge in this case was not required to recuse himself by supplanting the United States Constitution, the Maryland Constitution, and at least 6 United States Supreme Court cases providing controlling authority recusal was required with two sentences from Elrich, one of which is derived from a D.C. Circuit case from 1976, ‘The Due Process Clause provides a fundamental right to stand before a fair and impartial tribunal. Mr. Chamberlain proved, ad nauseam, Judge Harris had predetermined how he would rule on the question of his jurisdiction to proceed with the declaratory judgment action on April 18, 2014 which culminated in the challenged consent order. Mr Chamberlain explained one of his defenses to contempt would be that he could not be » Rawlings v. Rawlings, 766 A.2d 98, 362 Md. 535 at 114 (2001) ® Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 86 S. Ct. 1531, 16 L. Ed. 2d 622 at 368 (1966). Contemnor must have the “keys of their prison in their own pockets . . . a civil remedy . . . [that] has quite properly been exercised for centuries to secure the compliance with judicial deere ® United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31, 133 n. 301 (D.C.Cir.1976) 13held in contempt for disobedience to a facially void order. It is simply absurd to suggest Judge Harris could be fair and impartial to hear the same argument on jurisdiction, which was under appeal but not yet decided, and rule contrary to his previous 6 rulings on the same matter. The opinion’s conclusion is flawed because it relies on a significant misapprehension of the law. Claiming Stump v. Sparkman provided Judge Harris with absolute judicial immunity in this case is a travesty. The general rule that a judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity provides no cloak to a judge acting in the clear absence of jurisdiction, a long standing exception to the general rule and an exception proven to be the case here. As the appeal was pending, Judge Harris was aware of his potential financial liability in the impending 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case. It cannot be argued there was not a pecuniary interest involved with Judge Harris’s additional rulings in the case. Lastly, this Court is required to correct lower courts when they consistently demonstrate a misapprehension of clear and unambiguous statutory law. The Court of Special Appeals consistently points to the specific itemized list of required reasons for recusal, claiming they are not present, while ignoring the first formal comment to the tule: “Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge’s imparti might reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific provisions of subsections (a)(1) through (5) apply.” (underline added) The allegations in this case against Judge Harris make the criteria laid out for mandatory recusal by the Supreme Court in Mayberry look like a school-yard dispute.25 Here, over 50+ pages of evidence had been submitted to the Commission on Judicial Disabilities highlighting Judge Harris’s dishonesty and systemic failure to follow clear ® Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91S. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532 at 465(1971). [A] judge. vilified as this Pennsylvania judge . . . necessarily becomes embroiled in a running, bitter controversy. No one so cruelly slandered is likely to maintain that calm detachment necessary for fair adjudication.” 4legal procedures and comply with clear statutory law. Judge Harris was aware of the impending 42 U.S.C. § 1983 lawsuit Mr. Chamberlain was filing in federal court for acting in the complete absence of jurisdiction by presiding over a facially moot case. And innumerable pages in the record show Mr. Chamberlain aggressively challenged Judge Harris's ethics, integrity and honor. Under these circumstances, the Petitioner relies upon the United States and Maryland constitutions, Murchison24 Liteky, 25 Caperton,® Tumey27 Mayberry28 and Hargrove,” ALL of which supersede the Court of Special Appeals’ obtuse citation to Elrich. The focus must be on whether a “reasonable observer” sees “an appearance” of partiality, not proof. Liteky, a Supreme Court case cited by appellant, is explicitly instructive to this matter.*° In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 75 S. Ct. 623, 99 L. Ed. 942 (1955). 2 Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 114 S. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994), % Caperton v. AT Massey Coal Co., Inc., 129 §. Ct. 2252, 556 U.S. 868, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208 (2009). # Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 47 8. Ct. 437, 71 L. Ed, 749 (1927). % Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 91 8. Ct. 499, 27 L. Ed. 2d 532 (1971). ® Hargrove v. Board of Trustees, 529 A.2d 1372, 310 Md. 406 (1987). © Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. $40, 114 8. Ct. 1147, 127 L. Ed. 2d 474 at 563 (1994). “There is no justification, however, for a strict rule dismissing allegations of intrajudicial partiality, or the appearance thereof, in every case. A judge may find it difficult to put aside views formed during some earlier proceeding. In that instance we would expect the judge to heed the judicial oath and step down, but that does not always oceur. If through obduracy, honest mistake, or simple inability to attain self-knowledge the judge fails to acknowledge a disqualifying predisposition or circumstance, an appellate court must order recusal no matter what the source. As [ noted above, the central inquiry under § 455(a) is the appearance of partiality, not its place of origin.” 15CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner asks this Court to issue a writ of certiorari to the Court of Special Appeals to consider the questions presented herein. Respectfully submitted, Seman Stephen D. Chamberlain Pro Se Litigant Font: Times New Roman, 13 Point Certificate Of Service Thereby certify that, on this 13th day of December, 2016, I caused a copy of the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be served upon counsel for the Respondent, Evelyn Spurgin, Esquire, 221 Duke of Gloucester Street, Annapolis, MD 21401, via FEDEX, overnight priority, postage pre-paid. SATO Stephen D. Chamberlain 16