EMINENT DOMAIN a small portion of the community or
- Who Exercises The Power neighborhood uses the latter. Where a
CITY OF MANILA V. CHINESE COMMUNITY
OF MANILA
GR 14355, 31 October 1919
FACTS: On the 11th day of December, 1916,
the city of Manila presented a petition in the
Court of First Instance of said city, praying that
certain lands, therein particularly described, be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
public improvement, specifically for the purpose
of extending Rizal Avenue. The Chinese
Community opposed the said expropriation,
contending that there was no necessity of
taking that it already had public character and
that it would it would disturb the resting places
of the dead.
The trial court decided that there was no
necessity for the expropriation of the strip of
land and absolved each and all of the
defendants from all liability under the
complaint, without any finding as to costs. From
the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.
ISSUE: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be
validly expropriated by the City of Manila?
HELD: The exercise of the right of eminent
domain, whether directly by the State, or by its
authorized agents, is necessarily in derogation
of private rights, and the rule in that case is
that the authority must be strictly construed. No
species of property is held by individuals with
greater tenacity, and none is guarded by the
constitution and laws more sedulously, than the
right to the freehold of inhabitants. When the
legislature interferes with that right, and, for
greater public purposes, appropriates the land
of an individual without his consent, the plain
meaning of the law should not be enlarged by
doubtful interpretation.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent
power in a municipal corporation, and before it
can exercise the right some law must exist
conferring the power upon it. When the courts
come to determine the question, they must not
only find (a) that a law or authority exists for
the exercise of the right of eminent domain, but
(b) also that the right or authority is being
exercised in accordance with the law. In the
present case there are two conditions imposed
upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: First, the land must be private; and,
second, the purpose must be public.
If the court, upon trial, finds that neither of
these conditions exists or that either one of
them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that
the right is being exercised in accordance with
law. It is a well known fact that cemeteries may
be public or private. The former is a cemetery
used by the general community, or
neighborhood, or church, while only a family, or
cemetery is open to the public, it is a public
use and no part of the ground can be taken
for other public uses under a general
authority. And this immunity extends to the
unimproved and unoccupied parts, which are
held in good faith for future use. It is alleged,
and not denied, that the cemetery in
question may be used by the general
community of Chinese, which fact, in the
general acceptation of the definition of a
public cemetery, would make the cemetery
in question public property. If that is true,
then, of course, the petition of the plaintif
must be denied, for the reason that the city
of Manila has no authority or right under the
law to expropriate public property. But,
whether or not the cemetery is public or
private property, its appropriation for the
uses of a public street, especially during the
lifetime of those specially interested in its
maintenance as a cemetery, should be a
question of great concern, and its
appropriation should not be made for such
purposes until it is fully established that the
greatest necessity exists therefor. In this
case there is no necessity of taking since
there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue
may be expanded to ease the traffic
situation.
The Supreme Court held that there is no
proof of the necessity of opening the street
through the cemetery from the record. But
those adjoining and adjacent lands have
been ofered to the city free of charge, which
answers every purpose of the City. The
Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment
of the lower court, with costs against the
appellant.
LAGCAO vs. JUDGE LABRA G.R. No.
155746
FACTS: After acquiring ownership title of Lot
1029 of Capitol Hills, Cebu City, Cebu, petitioners
tried to take possession of the same only to
discover that it was occupied by squatters.
Petitioners then instituted an ejectment
proceeding against the squatters, which was
affirmed by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC) Branch 1, Cebu City ordering the
squatters to vacate the lot.
However, when the demolition order was about
to be implemented, Cebu City Mayor Alvin Garcia
wrote two letters4 to the MTCC, requesting the
deferment of the demolition on the ground that
the City was still looking for a relocation site for
the squatters. Acting on the mayors request, the
MTCC issued two orders suspending the
demolition for a period of 120 days from February
22, 1999. Unfortunately for petitioners, during
the suspension period, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod (SP) of Cebu City passed a resolution
which identified Lot 1029 as a socialized housing
site pursuant to RA 7279. On July, 19, 2000,
Ordinance No. 18437 was enacted by the SP of
Cebu City authorizing the mayor of Cebu City to
initiate expropriation proceedings for the acquisition
of Lot 1029 which was registered in the name of
petitioners. This ordinance was approved by Mayor
Garcia.
Petitioners filed with the RTC an action for
declaration of nullity of Ordinance No. 1843 for being
unconstitutional. The trial court rendered its decision
dismissing the complaint filed by petitioners whose
subsequent motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied.
In an appeal to the Supreme Court, petitioners argue
that Ordinance No. 1843 is unconstitutional as it
sanctions the expropriation of their property for the
purpose of selling it to the squatters, an endeavour
contrary to the concept of "public use" contemplated
in the Constitution.8 They allege that it will benefit
only a handful of people.
ISSUE: Whether or not the intended expropriation
by the City of Cebu of a 4,048-square-meter parcel
of land owned by petitioners contravenes the
Constitution and applicable laws?
RULING: Ordinance No. 1843 which authorized the
expropriation of petitioners lot was enacted by the
SP of Cebu City to provide socialized housing for the
homeless and low-income residents of the City.
However, while we recognize that housing is one of
the most serious social problems of the country,
local government units do not possess unbridled
authority to exercise their power of eminent domain
in seeking solutions to this problem. The exercise by
local government units of the power of eminent
domain is not absolute. In fact, Section 19 of RA
7160 itself explicitly states that such exercise must
comply with the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws.
RA 7279 is the law that governs the local
expropriation of property for purposes of urban land
reform and housing. Sections 9 and 10 thereof
provide:
SEC 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. Lands
for socialized housing shall be acquired in the
following order:
(a) Those owned by the Government or any of its
subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies,
including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries;
(b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
(d) Those within the declared Areas or Priority
Development, Zonal Improvement Program sites,
and Slum Improvement and Resettlement Program
sites which have not yet been acquired;
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and
Services or BLISS which have not yet been acquired;
and
(f) Privately-owned lands.
Where on-site development is found more
practicable and advantageous to the beneficiaries,
the priorities mentioned in this section shall not
apply. The local government units shall give
budgetary priority to on-site development of
government lands.
SEC. 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. The modes
of acquiring lands for purposes of this Act shall
include, among others, community mortgage,
land swapping, land assembly or consolidation,
land banking, donation to the Government, joint
venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
expropriation: Provided, however, That
expropriation shall be resorted to only when
other modes of acquisition have been exhausted:
Provided further, That where expropriation is
resorted to, parcels of land owned by small
property owners shall be exempted for purposes
of this Act:
In the recent case of Estate or Heirs of the Late
Ex-Justice Jose B.L. Reyes et al. vs. City of Manila,
we ruled that the above-quoted provisions are
strict limitations on the exercise of the power of
eminent domain by local government units,
especially with respect to (1) the order of priority
in acquiring land for socialized housing and (2)
the resort to expropriation proceedings as a
means to acquiring it. Private lands rank last in
the order of priority for purposes of socialized
housing. In the same vein, expropriation
proceedings may be resorted to only after the
other modes of acquisition are exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions is mandatory
because these are the only safeguards of
oftentimes helpless owners of private property
against what may be a tyrannical violation of due
process when their property is forcibly taken from
them allegedly for public use.
We have found nothing in the records indicating
that the City of Cebu complied strictly with
Sections 9 and 10 of RA 7279. Ordinance No.
1843 sought to expropriate petitioners property
without any attempt to first acquire the lands
listed in (a) to (e) of Section 9 of RA 7279.
Likewise, Cebu City failed to establish that the
other modes of acquisition in Section 10 of RA
7279 were first exhausted. Moreover, prior to the
passage of Ordinance No. 1843, there was no
evidence of a valid and definite ofer to buy
petitioners property as required by Section 19 of
RA 7160.20 We therefore find Ordinance No. 1843
to be constitutionally infirm for being violative of
the petitioners right to due process.
MODAY VS COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL
(FEBRUARY 20, 1997)
FACTS: Petition for review of a decision of the
CA. The Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of
Bunawan passed a resolution authorizing the
municipal mayor to initiate the petition for
expropriation of a parcel of land, belonging to the
petitioners. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan
disapproved said resolution and returned it with
the comment that expropriation is unnecessary
considering that there are still other lots
available.
ISSUE: Whether a municipality may expropriate
private property by virtue of a municipal
resolution which was disapproved by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan?
RULING: The Court finds no merit in the petition
and affirms the decision of the CA. Eminent
domain is a fundamental State power that is
inseparable from sovereignty. It is government's
right to appropriate in the nature of a compulsory
sale to the State, private property for public use or
purpose. Inherently possessed by the national
legislature, the power of eminent domain may be
validly delegated to local governments, other public
entities and public utilities. For the taking of private
property by the government to be valid, the taking
must be for public use and there must be just
compensation. The
Sangguniang Panlalawigan's disapproval does not
render said resolution null and void. Their power to
declare a municipal resolution invalid is on the sole
ground that it is beyond the power of the
Sangguniang Bayan or the mayor to issue. Said
resolution is valid and binding and could be used as
lawful authority to petition for the condemnation of
petitioner's property. The limitations on the power of
eminent domain are that the use must be public,
compensation must be made and due process of law
must be observed. The necessity of exercising
eminent domain must be genuine and of a public
character.
Government may not capriciously choose what
private property should be taken. Instant petition is
DENIED. The questioned decision and resolution of
the CA are affirmed. TRO is lifted.
- Objects Of Expropriation
CITY OF MANILA VS. CHINESE
COMMUNITY CEMETER
GR No 14355 Oct. 31, 1919
FACTS: The City of Manila, in exercising the
owner of Eminent Domain, presented a petition
in the Court of First Instance of said City raying
that certain lands described therein, be
expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
public improvement, namely, the extension of
Rizal Avenue, Manila. Herein respondents
contend that there are other parcels of land
ofered for such improvement proposed by the
City at a lesser cost and that the chosen parcel
of land by the City is a cemetery where the
dead loved ones of the Chinese community
were buried. Herien respondents also averred
that the City of Manila will have to spend a
great deal amount of money in the relocation
and rebuilding of sepulchres, tombstones and
monuments of those afected by the
expropriation should they pursue to use the
Chinese Cemetery. The trial judge, Hon. Del
Rosario decided that there was no necessity for
the expropriation of the particular strip of land
in question. The City of Manila appealed
contending that under the law, it has the
authority to expropriate any land it may desire
and neither the court not the land owners can
inquire into the advisable purpose of the
expropriation or ask concerning the necessities
therefore; and that the courts are mere
appraisers of the land involved.
ISSUE: May the courts inquire into, and hear
proof upon, the necessity of the expropriation?
HELD: Section 241 of Act no. 190 provides
that the govt. of the Phil islands, or of any
province or department thereof, or of any
municipality, and any person, or public or
private corporation having, by law, the right
to condemn private property for public use,
shall exercise that right in the manner
prescribed under Sec. 242( a complaint in
expropriation proceeding shall be presented;
that the complaint shall state with certainty
the right of condemnation, with a description
of the property sought to be condemned
together with the interest of each defendant
separately.). Section 243 provides that if the
court shall find upon trial that the right to
expropriate the land in question exists, it
shall then appoint commissioners. Thus, Sec.
243 means that when the legislature
conferred upon the courts the right to
ascertain upon trial whether the right exists
for the exercise of eminent domain, it
intended that the courts should inquire into,
and hear proof upon: 1. whether the purpose
for the exercise of the right of eminent
domain is public; and 2.whether the land is
public or private. Supreme Court also
averred that the exercise of the right of
eminent domain is necessary in derogation
of private rights, and the rule in that case is
that the authority must be strictly construed.
Therefore, if there is no greatest necessity
existing for an expropriation, it should not be
made for such purposes until it is fully
established that such necessity exist. In the
present case, even granting that a necessity
exist for the opening of Rizal St. through the
cemetery, record shows that adjoining and
adjacent lands have been ofered to the city
free of charge which will answer every
purpose of the City of Manila. The cemetery,
then, still being under care and maintenance
of the living should be spared from such
expropriation where there are other lands
ofered for expropriation at a much lesser
expense to serve the same purpose. The
judgment of the lower court is hereby
affirmed.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. PLDT
GR. NO. L-1881; JANUARY 27, 1969
FACTS: The defendant, PLDT, and the RCA
Communications, Inc., entered into an
agreement whereby telephone messages,
coming from the United States and received
by RCA's domestic station, could
automatically be transferred to the lines of
PLDT; and vice-versa, for calls collected by
the PLDT for transmission from the
Philippines to the United States. The
arrangement was later extended to radio-
telephone messages to and from European
and Asiatic countries. Their contract
contained a stipulation that either party
could terminate it on a 24-month notice to
the other. PLDT gave notice to RCA to terminate
their contract on 2 February 1958.
After its creation in 1947, the Bureau of
Telecommunications set up its own Government
Telephone System by utilizing its own
appropriation and equipment and by renting
trunk lines of the PLDT to enable government
offices to call private parties. In doing so, the
Bureau has agreed to abide by the rules and
regulations of PLDT, which includes the
prohibition for public use that which was
furnished for private use. The Bureau has
extended its services to the general public since
1948, using the same trunk lines owned by, and
rented from, the PLDT, and prescribing its own
schedule of rates.
The bureau entered into an agreement to RCA
communications for a joint overseas telephone
service. PLDT complained to the bureau that the
latter was violating the conditions for it had
used the trunk lines not only for the use of
government offices but even to serve private
persons or the general public, in competition
with the business of the PLDT; and gave notice
that if said violations were not stopped by
midnight of 12 April 1958, the PLDT would sever
the telephone connections. Subsequently, PLDT
disconnected the trunk lines of the bureau for
not having received a reply from the latter
causing the isolation of the Philippines from the
rest of the world, except the United States.
The bureau proposed an interconnecting
agreement however; the proposal was not
accepted of either party because neither of
them could come to a compromise agreement.
Republic filed a suit against PLDT, in the Court
of First Instance of Manila, praying in its
complaint for judgment commanding the PLDT
to execute a contract with plaintif, through the
Bureau, for the use of the facilities of
defendant's telephone system throughout the
Philippines under such terms and conditions as
the court might consider reasonable, and for a
writ of preliminary injunction against the
defendant company to restrain the severance of
the existing telephone connections and/or
restore those severed.
The court issued an order to the defendant to
reconnect and restore the 78 trunk lines that it
has disconnected between the facilities of the
Government Telephone System; to refrain from
carrying into efect its threat to sever the
existing telephone communication between the
Bureau of Telecommunications and defendant,
and not to make connection over its telephone
system of telephone calls coming to the
Philippines from foreign countries through the
said Bureau's telephone facilities and the radio
facilities of RCA Communications, Inc.; and to
accept and connect through its telephone
system all such telephone calls coming to the
Philippines from foreign countries.
PLDT in its answer, denied any obligation it
has to the Bureau, as well as assailing the
jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance.
PLDT also claimed that the Bureau was
engaging in commercial telephone
operations, which was in excess of its
authority.
The lower court rendered judgment that it
could not compel the PLDT to enter into an
agreement with the Bureau because the
parties were not in agreement; that under
Executive Order 94, establishing the Bureau
of Telecommunications, said Bureau was not
limited to servicing government offices
alone, nor was there any in the contract of
lease of the trunk lines, since the PLDT
knew, or ought to have known, at the time
that their use by the Bureau was to be public
throughout the Islands, hence the Bureau
was neither guilty of fraud, abuse, or misuse
of the poles of the PLDT; and, in view of
serious public prejudice that would result
from the disconnection of the trunk lines,
declared the preliminary injunction
permanent, although it dismissed both the
complaint and the counterclaims.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau can
compel PLDT to permit interconnection of
the government telephone system?
RULINGS: Yes. The Republic may, in the
exercise of the sovereign power of eminent
domain, require the telephone company to
permit interconnection of the government
telephone system and that of the PLDT, as
the needs of the government service may
require, subject to the payment of just
compensation to be determined by the court.
If under section 6, Article XIII, of the
Constitution, the State may, in the interest of
national welfare, transfer utilities to public
ownership upon payment of just
compensation, there is no reason why the
State may not require a public utility to
render services in the general interest,
provided just compensation is paid therefor.
Ultimately, the beneficiary of the
interconnecting service would be the users
of both telephone systems, so that the
condemnation would be for public use.
- Where Expropriation Suit is Filed
BRGY. SAN ROQUE vs. HEIRS OF PASTOR
G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000
FACTS: Petitioner filed before the MTC of
Talisay, Cebu a Complaint to expropriate a
property of the respondents. In an Order
dated April 8, 1997, the MTC dismissed the
Complaint on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. It reasoned that "[e]minent
domain is an exercise of the power to take
private property for public use after payment
of just compensation. In an action for eminent
domain, therefore, the principal cause of action
is the exercise of such power or right. The fact
that the action also involves real property is
merely incidental. An action for eminent domain
is therefore within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not
with this Court."
The RTC also dismissed the Complaint when
filed before it, holding that an action for
eminent domain afected title to real property;
hence, the value of the property to be
expropriated would determine whether the case
should be filed before the MTC or the RTC.
Concluding that the action should have been
filed before the MTC since the value of the
subject property was less than P20,000.
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed directly to this
Court, raising a pure question of law.
ISSUE: Which court, MTC or RTC, has
jurisdiction over cases for eminent domain or
expropriation where the assessed value of the
subject property is below Twenty Thousand
(P20,000.00) Pesos?
HELD: An expropriation suit is incapable of
pecuniary estimation thus RTCs shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over expropriation
case as provided for by Section 19 (1) of BP
129, which states that RTCs shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all civil
actions in which the subject of the litigation is
incapable of pecuniary estimation;.
If the issue is primarily for the recovery of a
sum of money, the claim is considered capable
of pecuniary estimation, and whether
jurisdiction is in the municipal courts or in the
courts of first instance would depend on the
amount of the claim. However, where the basic
issue is something other than the right to
recover a sum of money, or where the money
claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence
of, the principal relief sought, like in suits to
have the defendant perform his part of the
contract (specific performance) and in actions
for support, or for annulment of a judgment or
to foreclose a mortgage, this Court has
considered such actions as cases where the
subject of the litigation may not be estimated in
terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively
by courts of first instance.
In the present case, an expropriation suit does
not involve the recovery of a sum of money.
Rather, it deals with the exercise by the
government of its authority and right to take
private property for public useHence, the courts
determine the authority of the government
entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and
the observance of due process. The subject
matter of an expropriation suit is the
governments exercise of eminent domain, a
matter that is incapable of pecuniary
estimation.
- Requisites Of Taking
REPUBLIC VS CASTELIVI ET. AL [G.R No.
L-20620, August 15, 1974]
FACTS: The Republic filed a complaint for
eminent domain on June 26, 1959 over a parcel
of land situated in San Jose, Floridablanca,
Pampanga. The said parcel of land is owned and
managed by the respondents. In its complaint,
the Republic alleged that the fair market value of
the land in question, according to the Committed
on Appraisal of Pampanga, was not more than
P2000/hectare or a total market value fair of
P259,669.10. It further prayed that the court will
grant the immediate possession over the land in
favor to the Republic and the court will appoint
three Commissioners to ascertain the report to
the court the just compensation of the property
sought to be expropriated.
The court granted the petition on June 29, 1959
and issued an order fixing the provisional market
value of the lands at P 259,669.10.
The respondents, on the other hand, filed a
motion to dismiss on July 14, 1959. They
alleged that the land in question, being a
residential land, had a fair market value of
P15/square meter, hence it had a total market
value of P11,389,485. It added that the Armed
Forces had been illegally occupying their property
since July 1, 1956. They prayed that the Republic
be ordered to pay P11,389,485 plus an interest of
6% per annum and P5,000,000 as unrealized
profit and the cost of the suit.
Meanwhile, after the Republic deposited with the
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga the amout of P
259,669.10, the trial court ordered that the
Republic be placed in possession of the lands.
The Republic actually placed in possession of the
lands on August 10, 1959.
The trial court rendered decision and ordered the
Republic to pay P10/square meter upon the
recommendation of the Commissioners and to
pay an interest of 6% per annum from July 1,
1956 when the Republic commenced its illegal
possession of the property in favor to the
Castellvis.
The Republic filed a motion to re-open the case
on the ground of newly discovered evidence.
Their contention was that the decision was not
supported by evidence and was against the law.
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of the property
under expropriation will commenced with the
filling of this action?
RULING: The Supreme Court held that in the
exercise of eminent domain, the expropriator can
enter only after the expropriation proceedings are
actually commence and deposit required by law
is duly made.
In this case, the taking of the Castellvis property
for purpose of eminent domain cannot be
considered to have taken place in 1947 when the
Republic commenced to occupy the property as a
lessee. The Supreme Court finds merit on the
contention of the Castellvi that the two essential
elements in the taking of property under the
power of eminent domain are not present in this
case, to wit, (1) the entrance and occupation must
be permanent of indefinite period, (2) in devoting in
puclic use the owner is ousted and deprived of the
benefits of the property. This is because when the
Republic entered into the property it was merely
under a contract of lease and mere leasing is not a
valid exercise of power of eminent domain.
With regards to the fair market of the value of the
property, the Supreme Court considered that it
should be base on the year that the expropriation
proceeding had commence and the payment of just
compensation was ascertained, in which case was on
1959. The Court has arrived at the conclusion that
the price of P10/ square meter, as recommended by
the Commissioners, is quite high. Hence, it ordered
the Republic to just pay P5/square meter.
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY VS.
ERICTA [GR L-34915, 24 JUNE 1983]
FACTS: Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64, entitled
Ordinance Regulating the Establishment,
Maintenance and Operation of Private Memorial Type
Cemetery Or Burial Ground Within the Jurisdiction of
Quezon City and Providing Penalties for the Violation
thereof provides that at least 6% of the total area of
the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for
charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers
and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death, to be determined by
competent City Authorities, and where the area so
designated shall immediately be developed and
should be open for operation not later than 6 months
from the date of approval of the application.
For several years, section 9 of the Ordinance was not
enforced by city authorities but 7 years after the
enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council
passed a resolution requesting the City Engineer,
Quezon City, to stop any further selling and/or
transaction of memorial park lots in Quezon City
where the owners thereof have failed to donate the
required 6% space intended for paupers burial.
Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer
notified Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. in writing that
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 would be
enforced. Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with
the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal, a petition for
declaratory relief, prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary injunction (Special Proceeding Q-16002)
seeking to annul Section 9 of the Ordinance in
question for being contrary to the Constitution, the
Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and
the Revised Administrative Code. There being no
issue of fact and the questions raised being purely
legal, both the City Government and Himlayang
Pilipino agreed to the rendition of a judgment on the
pleadings. The CFI rendered the decision declaring
Section 9 of Ordinance 6118, S-64 null and void. A
motion for reconsideration having been denied, the
City Government and City Council filed the petition
or review with the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Whether the setting aside of 6% of the total
area of all private cemeteries for charity burial
grounds of deceased paupers is tantamount to
taking of private property without just
compensation?
HELD: There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least 6% of the total area of all
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health,
morals, good order, safety, or the general welfare
of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area from a
private cemetery to benefit paupers who are
charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of
building or maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a
portion of private cemeteries is not covered by
Section 12(t) of Republic Act 537, the Revised
Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city
council to prohibit the burial of the dead within
the center of population of the city and to provide
for their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa 337 provides
in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang
panlungsod may provide for the burial of the
dead in such place and in such manner as
prescribed by law or ordinance it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned
land or to buy or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been the
law and practice in the past and it continues to
the present.
Expropriation, however, requires payment of just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is
diferent from laws and regulations requiring
owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas
for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
facilities from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said
requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and
wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of
the regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the
subdivision developer when individual lots are
sold to homeowners.
- Deprivation of Use
NAPOCOR vs. GUTIERREZ [193 SCRA 1
(1991)]
FACTS: Plaintif National Power Corporation,
a government owned and controlled entity,
planned to construct 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines but the lines have to pass
the lands belonging to defendants Matias
Cruz, Heirs of Natalia Paule and spouses
Misericordia Gutierrez and Ricardo Malit and
filed an eminent domain proceedings against
the defendants.
The defendant spouses were authorized to
withdraw the fixed provisional value of their
land in the sum of P973.00 by the court after
NPC deposited the amount upon filing the
complaint. The only controversy existing
between the parties litigants is the
reasonableness and adequacy of the
disturbance or compensation fee of the
expropriated properties. the court appointed
three commissioners in determining the fair
and just compensation due the defendants.
With the reports submitted by the three
commissioners and on the evidence adduced by
the defendants as well as the plaintif for the
purpose of proving the fair market value of the
property sought to be expropriated, the lower
court rendered a decision that National Power
Corporation has to pay defendant spouses
Ricardo Malit and Misericordia Gutierrez the
sum P5.00 per square meter as the fair and
reasonable market value of the 760 square
meters belonging to the said spouses and that
decision was affirmed by the court of appeals.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner should be made to
pay simple easement fee or full compensation
for the land traversed by its transmission lines?
HELD: While it is true that plaintif are only
after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless
perpetually deprives defendants of their
proprietary rights as manifested by the
imposition by the plaintif upon defendants that
below said transmission lines no plant higher
than three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore,
because of the high-tension current conveyed
through said transmission lines, danger to life
and limbs that may be caused beneath said
wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to
cap it all plaintif only pays the fee to
defendants once, while the latter shall
continually pay the taxes due on said afected
portion of their property.
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way
is definitely a taking under the power of
eminent domain. Considering the nature and
efect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-
Limay transmission lines, the limitation imposed
by NPC against the use of the land for an
indefinite period deprives private respondents
of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property
expropriated is entitled to a just compensation,
which should be neither more nor less,
whenever it is possible to make the
assessment, than the money equivalent of said
property. Just compensation has always been
understood to be the just and complete
equivalent of the loss which the owner of the
thing expropriated has to sufer by reason of
the expropriation.
PEOPLE VS. FAJARDO [GR L-12172, 29
AUGUST 1958]
FACTS: During the incumbency of Juan F.
Fajardo as mayor of the municipality of Baao,
Camarines Sur, the municipal council passed
Ordinance 7, series of 1950, providing that any
person or persons who will construct or repair a
building should, before constructing or
repairing, obtain a written permit from the
Municipal Mayor, that a fee of not less than
P2.00 should be charged for each building
permit and P1.00 for each repair permit issued,
and that any violation of the provisions of the
ordinance shall make the violator liable to pay a
fine of not less than P25 nor more than P50
or imprisonment of not less than 12 days nor
more than 24 days or both, at the discretion
of the court; and that if said building
destroys the view of the Public Plaza or
occupies any public property, it shall be
removed at the expense of the owner of the
building or house.
4 years later, after the term of Fajardo as
mayor had expired, he and his son-in-law,
Pedro Babilonia, filed a written request with
the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit
to construct a building adjacent to their
gasoline station on a parcel of land
registered in Fajardos name, located along
the national highway and separated from the
public plaza by a creek. On 16 January 1954,
the request was denied, for the reason
among others that the proposed building
would destroy the view or beauty of the
public plaza. On 18 January 1954, Fajardo
and Babilonia reiterated their request for a
building permit, but again the request was
turned down by the mayor. Whereupon,
Fajardo and Babilonia proceeded with the
construction of the building without a permit,
because they needed a place of residence
very badly, their former house having been
destroyed by a typhoon and hitherto they
had been living on leased property.
Fajardo and Babilonia were charged before
and convicted by the justice of the peace
court of Baao, Camarines Sur, for violation of
Ordinance 7. Fajardo and Babilonia appealed
to the Court of First Instance (CDI), which
affirmed the conviction, and sentenced both
to pay a fine of P35 each and the costs, as
well as to demolish the building in question
because it destroys the view of the public
plaza of Baao. From this decision, Fajardo
and Babilonia appealed to the Court of
Appeals, but the latter forwarded the records
to the Supreme Court because the appeal
attacks the constitutionality of the ordinance
in question.
ISSUE: Whether the refusal of the Mayor of
Baao to issue a building permit on the
ground that the proposed building would
destroy the view of the public plaza is an
undue deprivation of the use of the property
in question, and thus a taking without due
compensation?
HELD: The refusal of the Mayor of Baao to
issue a building permit to Fajardo and
Babilonia was predicated on the ground that
the proposed building would destroy the
view of the public plaza by preventing its
being seen from the public highway. Even
thus interpreted, the ordinance is
unreasonable and oppressive, in that it
operates to permanently deprive the
latter of the right to use their own property;
hence, it oversteps the bounds of police
power, and amounts to a taking of the property
without just compensation. But while property
may be regulated in the interest of the general
welfare such as to regard the beautification of
neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort and
happiness of residents), and in its pursuit, the
State may prohibit structures ofensive to the
sight, the State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the
beneficial use of their property and practically
confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the
aesthetic appearance of the community.
As the case now stands, every structure that
may be erected on Fajardos land, regardless of
its own beauty, stands condemned under the
ordinance in question, because it would
interfere with the view of the public plaza from
the highway. Fajardo would, in efect, be
constrained to let their land remain idle and
unused for the obvious purpose for which it is
best suited, being urban in character. To legally
achieve that result, the municipality must give
Fajardo just compensation and an opportunity
to be heard.
CITY OF MANDALUYONG VS. FRANCISCO
[G.R. No. 137152 January 29, 2001]
FACTS: On a portion of the 3 lots (with an
aggregate area of 1,847 square meters located
at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City
of Mandaluyong), respondents constructed
residential houses several decades ago which
they had since leased out to tenants until the
present; on the vacant portion of the lots, other
families constructed residential structures
which they likewise occupied.
In 1983, the lots were classified by Resolution
No. 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban
Development Coordinating Council as an Area
for Priority Development for urban land reform
under Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284 of then
President Marcos; as a result of this
classification, the tenants and occupants of the
lots ofered to purchase the land from
respondents, but the latter refused to sell; on
November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the
Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and
occupants of the subject land, adopted
Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing
Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of
Mandaluyong to initiate action for the
expropriation of the subject lots and
construction of a medium-rise condominium for
qualified occupants of the land; on January 10,
1996, Mayor Abalos sent a letter to respondents
ofering to purchase the said property at
P3,000.00 per square meter; respondents did
not answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for
the expropriation of the said lots and the fixing
of just compensation at the fair market value of
P3,000.00 per square meter.2
Respondents alleged that the expropriation
of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and
is not for a public purpose; the subject lots
are their only real property and are too small
for expropriation, while petitioner has
several properties inventoried for socialized
housing; the fair market value of P3,000.00
per square meter is arbitrary because the
zonal valuation set by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter
ISSUE: WoN the said Lots can be subjected
to expropriation proceedings?
RULING: The SC adheres to the expanded
notion of public use. However, the passage
of R.A. No. 7279, the "Urban Development
and Housing Act of 1992" introduced a
limitation on the size of the land sought to
be expropriated for socialized housing. The
law expressly exempted "small property
owners" from expropriation of their land for
urban land reform
"Small-property owners" are defined by two
elements: (1) those owners of real property
whose property consists of residential lands
with an area of not more than 300 square
meters in highly urbanized cities and 800
square meters in other urban areas; and (2)
that they do not own real property other
than the same
And the property involved was co-owned by
the siblings which they inherited from their
parents. Knowing that the respondents have
no other property, the 1,847 square meters
lot if divided among them can then be
considered as a small-property of each of
the siblings and thus exempted from
appropriation.
Therefore, The property involved cannot be
subjected to expropriation.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION vs.
MARIA MENDOZA SAN PEDRO [G.R. No.
170945, September 26, 2006]
FACTS: The National Power Corporation
(NPC) is a government-owned-and-controlled
corporation created to undertake the
development of hydro-electric generation of
power and the production of electricity from
any and all sources; and particularly the
construction, operation, and maintenance of
power plants, auxiliary plants, dams,
reservoirs, pipes, mains, transmission lines,
power stations and substations, and other
works for the purpose of developing
hydraulic power from any river, lake, creek,
spring and waterfalls in the Philippines and
supplying such power to the inhabitants
thereof. Under Republic Act No.6395, as
amended, the NPC is authorized to enter
private property provided that the owners
thereof shall be indemnified for any actual
damage caused thereby.
For the construction of its San Manuel-San Jose
500 KV Transmission Line and Tower No. SMJ-
389, NPC negotiated with Maria Mendoza San
Pedro, then represented by her son, Vicente, for
an easement of right of way over her property,
Lot No. 2076. The property, which was partly
agricultural and partly residential land, was
located in Barangay Partida, Norzagaray,
Bulacan and covered by Tax Declaration No.
00386.
Maria executed a Right of Way Grant in favor of
NPC over the lot for P1,277,886.90. The NPC
paid her P524,635.50 for the damaged
improvements thereon.
The payment voucher for the residential portion
of the lot valued at P6,000,000.00 (at P600.00
per square meter) was then processed.
However, the NPC Board of Directors approved
Board Resolution No. 97-246 stating that it
would pay only P230.00 per sq m for the
residential portion and P89.00 per sq m for the
agricultural portion.
Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz submitted their
report, recommending as payment for just
compensation P800.00 per sq m for the
residential lot and P700.00 per sq m for the
agricultural lot. On October 28, 1999, the RTC
rendered judgment, # declaring as well-
grounded, fair and reasonable the
compensation for the property as
recommended by Atty. Baltazar and Engr. Cruz.
ISSUE: Whether or not the just compensation
was achieved with regards to the fair market
value of the residential and agricultural
property?
HELD: The trial court fixed the just
compensation for the property as follows: (1)
P499.00 per sq m on the 17,195 sq m
agricultural portion of the subject land; and (2)
P800.00 per sq m on the 6,565 sq m residential
portion of the lot. Noticeably, the trial court did
not blindly accept the recommendation of
majority of the commissioners of P800.00 per
sq m for the residential lot and P700.00 per sq
m for the agricultural lot. Indeed, the trial court
took into account the evidence of the parties, in
tandem with the findings and recommendation
of the majority of the commissioners.
Considering that such valuation of the trial
court as affirmed by the CA is reasonable as it is
and supported by the evidence on record, we
find no compelling reason to disturb the same.
The constant loud buzzing and exploding
sounds emanating from the towers and
transmission lines, especially on rainy days; the
constant fear on the part of the landowners that
the large transmission lines looming not far
above their land and the huge tower in front of
their lot will afect their safety and health; and
the slim chance that no one would be interested
to buy the remaining portions on each side of
the residential lot afected by the project, to the
damage of the landowners, both as to future
actual use of the land and financial gains to
be derived therefrom, makes the instant
case fall within the ambit of expropriation.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS [GR
119694, 22 MAY 1995]
FACTS: Comelec promulgated Resolution
2772, which provided that (1) the
Commission shall procure free print space of
not less than 1/2 page in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every
province or city for use as Comelec Space
from 6 March until 12 May 1995; and that in
the absence of said newspaper, Comelec
Space shall be obtained from any magazine
or periodical of said province or city; (2) that
Comelec Space shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates within the area in which the
newspaper, magazine or periodical is
circulated to enable the candidates to make
known their qualifications, their stand on
public issues and their platforms and
programs of government; and that the
Comelec Space shall also be used by the
Commission for dissemination of vital
election information among others.
Apparently in implementation of the
Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner
Regalado E. Maambong sent identical letters
to various publishers of newspapers like the
Business World, the Philippine Star, the
Malaya and the Philippine Times Journal, all
members of Philippine Press Institute (PPI),
advising the latter that they are directed to
provide free print space of not less than 1/2
page for use as Comelec Space or similar
to the print support which the latter have
extended during the 11 May 1992
synchronized elections which was 2 full
pages for each political party fielding
senatorial candidates, from 6 March to 6 May
1995, to make known to their qualifications,
their stand on public issues and their
platforms and programs of government.
PPI filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a
Temporary restraining order before the
Supreme Court to assail the validity of
Resolution 2772 and the corresponding
directive dated 22 March 1995.
ISSUE: Whether there was necessity for the
taking, i.e. compelling print media
companies to donate Comelec space.?
HELD: To compel print media companies to
donate Comelec space of the dimensions
specified in Section 2 of Resolution 2772 (not
less than 1/2 Page), amounts to taking of
private personal property for public use or
purposes. Section 2 failed to specify the
intended frequency of such compulsory
donation. The extent of the taking or
deprivation is not insubstantial; this is not a
case of a de minimis temporary limitation or
restraint upon the use of private property. The
monetary value of the compulsory donation,
measured by the advertising rates ordinarily
charged by newspaper publishers whether in
cities or in non-urban areas, may be very
substantial indeed.
The taking of print space here sought to be
efected may first be appraised under the public
of expropriation of private personal property for
public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful
taking of private property for public use need to
be examined here: one is the necessity for the
taking; another is the legal authority to efect
the taking. The element of necessity for the
taking has not been shown by the Comelec. It
has not been suggested that the members of
PPI are unwilling to sell print space at their
normal rates to Comelec for election purposes.
Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted
the power of imminent domain either by the
Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
reasonable relationship between that power and
the enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed. That the taking is
designed to subserve public use is not
contested by PPI. Only that, under Section 3 of
Resolution 2772, the free Comelec space
sought by the Comelec would be used not only
for informing the public about the identities,
qualifications and programs of government of
candidates for elective office but also for
dissemination of vital election information
(including, presumably, circulars, regulations,
notices, directives, etc. issued by Comelec). It
seems to the Court a matter of judicial notice
that government offices and agencies (including
the Supreme Court) simply purchase print
space, in the ordinary course of events, when
their rules and regulations, circulars, notices
and so forth need officially to be brought to the
attention of the general public. The taking of
private property for public use it, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not without
payment of just compensation.
Thus, although there is nothing at all to prevent
newspaper and magazine publishers from
voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec
for the purposes contemplated in Resolution
2772; Section 2 of resolution 2772 does not
provide a constitutional basis for compelling
publishers, against their will to provide free
print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2
does not constitute a valid exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
UNITED STATES V. CAUSBY [328 U.S. 256
(1946)]
FACTS: Thomas Lee Causby owned a
chicken farm outside of Greensboro, North
Carolina. The farm was located near an
airport used regularly by the United States
military. Heavy bombers and fighter planes
began to fly over Causby's property with
increasing frequency at all hours. Often the
fighters would fly so low as to blow the
leaves of the tops of Causby's trees. This
created a roar so deafening that Causby's
chickens would panic, running into walls and
killing themselves. According to Causby,
noise from the airport regularly frightened
the animals on his farm, resulting in the
deaths of several chickens. The problem
became so severe that Causby was forced to
abandon his business.
Under an ancient doctrine of the common
law, land ownership extended to the space
above and below the earth. Using this
doctrine as a basis, Causby sued the United
States, arguing that he owned the airspace
above his farm. By flying planes in this
airspace, he argued, the government had
confiscated his property without
compensation, thus violating the Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment (Eminent
Domain, Just Compensation).
The United States Court of Claims accepted
Causby's argument, and ordered the
government to pay compensation.
ISSUE: Did the flying of planes by the United
States military over Causby's farm constitute
a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth
Amendment?
HELD: Yes, to an extent. In a 6-2 opinion
authored by Justice William O. Douglas, the
Court concluded that the ancient common
law doctrine "has no place in the modern
world." Justice Douglas noted that, were the
Court to accept the doctrine as valid, "every
transcontinental flight would subject the
operator to countless trespass suits.
Common sense revolts at the idea."
However, while the Court rejected the
unlimited reach above and below the earth
described in the common law doctrine, it
also ruled that, "if the landowner is to have
full enjoyment of the land, he must have
exclusive control of the immediate reaches
of the enveloping atmosphere." Without
defining a specific limit, the Court stated that
flights over the land could be considered a
violation of the Takings Clause if they led to
"a direct and immediate interference with
the enjoyment and use of the land." Given
the damage caused by the particularly low,
frequent flights over his farm, the Court
determined that the government had
violated Causby's rights, and he was entitled
to compensation.
Cujus est solum ejus est usque ad coelum et ad
inferos has no legal authority in the United
States when pertaining to the sky. A man does
not have control and ownership over the
airspace of their property except within
reasonable limits to utilize their property.
Airspace above a set minimum height is
property of the Masses and no one man can
accuse airplanes or other such craft within of
trespassing on what they own.
- Priority In Expropriation
FILMSTREAM INTERNATIONAL INC. VS. CA
FACTS: Filstream International, Inc., is the
registered owner of the properties consisting of
adjacent parcels of land situated in Antonio
Rivera Street, Tondo II, Manila, with a total area
of 3,571.10 square meters.
Filstream filed an ejectment suit before the MTC
of Manila against the occupants of the parcels
of land on the grounds of termination of the
lease contract and non-payment of rentals.
Judgment was rendered by the MTC ordering
private respondents to vacate the premises and
pay back rentals to Filstream. Not satisfied,
malit, et. al. (the occupants) appealed the
decision to the RTC of Manila which in turn
affirmed the decision of the MTC. Still not
content, Malit, et. al. proceeded to the CA via a
petition for review. The result however
remained the same as the appellate court
affirmed the decision of the RTC in its decision.
Thereafter, no further action was taken by Malit,
et. al., as a result of which the decision in the
ejectment suit became final and executory.
However, during the pendency of the ejectment
proceedings Malit, et. al. filed a complaint for
Annulment of Deed of Exchange against
Filstream before the RTC of Manila. It was at this
stage that City of Manila came into the picture
when the city government approved Ordinance
7813 authorizing Mayor Alfredo S. Lim to initiate
the acquisition by negotiation, expropriation,
purchase, or other legal means certain parcels
of land which formed part of Filstreams
properties then occupied by Malit, et. al.
Subsequently, the City of Manila approved
Ordinance 7855 declaring the expropriation of
certain parcels of land situated along Antonio
Rivera and Fernando Ma. Guerrero streets in
Tondo, Manila which were owned by Mr. Enrique
Quijano Gutierrez, Filstreams predecessor-in-
interest. The said properties were to be sold and
distributed to qualified tenants of the area
pursuant to the Land Use Development Program
of the City of Manila.
ISSUE: Whether there is violation of due
process against Filstream in the manner its
properties were expropriated and condemned in
favor of the City of Manila?
RULING: That only a few could actually
benefit from the expropriation of the
property does not diminish its public use
character. It is simply not possible to provide
all at once land and shelter for all who need
them. Corollary to the expanded notion of
public use, expropriation is not anymore
confined to vast tracts of land and landed
estates. It is therefore of no moment that the
land sought to be expropriated in this case is
less than half a hectare only. Through the
years, the public use requirement in eminent
domain has evolved into a flexible concept,
influenced by changing conditions. Public
use now includes the broader notion of
indirect public benefit or advantage,
including in particular, urban land reform and
housing.
The Court takes judicial notice of the fact
that urban land reform has become a
paramount task in view of the acute
shortage of decent housing in urban areas
particularly in Metro Manila. Nevertheless,
despite the existence of a serious dilemma,
local government units are not given an
unbridled authority when exercising their
power of eminent domain in pursuit of
solutions to these problems. The basic rules
still have to be followed, which are as
follows: no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty, or property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws; private property
shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation. Thus, the exercise by local
government units of the power of eminent
domain is not without limitations. Even
Section 19 of the 1991 Local Government
Code is very explicit that it must comply with
the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws. Very clear from Sections 9
and 10 of Republic Act 7279 (Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992) are
the limitations with respect to the order of
priority in acquiring private lands and in
resorting to expropriation proceedings as a
means to acquire the same. Private lands
rank last in the order of priority for purposes
of socialized housing. In the same vein,
expropriation proceedings are to be resorted
to only when the other modes of acquisition
have been exhausted.
Compliance with these conditions must be
deemed mandatory because these are the
only safeguards in securing the right of
owners of private property to due process
when their property is expropriated for public
use. There is nothing in the records that
would indicate that City of Manila complied
with Section 9 and Section 10 of RA 7279.
Filstreams properties were expropriated and
ordered condemned in favor of the City of
Manila sans any showing that resort to the
acquisition of other lands listed under
Section 9 of RA 7279 have proved futile.
Evidently, there was a violation of Filstreams
right to due process which must accordingly be
rectified.
- Public Use
ESTATE OF JIMENEZ VS. PEZA [GR No.
137285, January 15, 2001]
FACTS: Private respondent Philippines Export
Processing Zone (PEZA), then called as the
Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA),
initiated before the Regional Trial Court of
Cavite expropriation proceedings on 3 parcels
of irrigated riceland in Rosario, Cavite. One of
the lots, Lot 1406 (A and B) of the San Francisco
de Malabon Estate, with an approximate area of
29,008 square meters, is registered in the name
of Salud Jimenez in the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite.
More than 10 years later, the said trial court in
an Order upheld the right of private respondent
PEZA to expropriate, among others, Lot 1406 (A
and B). Reconsideration of the said order was
sought by petitioner contending that said lot
would only be transferred to a private
corporation, Philippines Vinyl Corp., and hence
would not be utilized for a public purpose.
In an Order the trial court reconsidered the
Order and released Lot 1406-A from
expropriation while the expropriation of Lot
1406-B was maintained. Finding the said order
unacceptable, private respondent PEZA
interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, petitioner wrote a letter to private
respondent ofering two (2) proposals, namely:
1. Withdrawal of private respondent's appeal
with respect to Lot 1406-A I consideration of the
waiver of claim for damages and lass of income
for the possession of said lot by private
respondent.
2. The swap of Lot 1406-B with Lot 434 covered
by TCT No. T-14772 since private respondent
has no money yet to pay for the lot.
Private respondent's Board approved the
"proposal" and the compromise agreement was
signed by private respondent through its then
administrator Tagumpay Jadiniano assisted by
Government Corporate Counsel Oscar I. Garcia.
Said compromise agreement is quoted
hereunder:
1. That plaintif agrees to withdraw its appeal
from the Order of the Honorable Court which
released lot 1406-A from the expropriation
proceedings. On the other hand, defendant
Estate of Salud Jimenez agrees to waive, quit
claim and forfeit its claim for damages and loss
of income which it sustained by person of the
possession of said lot by plaintif from 1981 up
to the present.
2. That the parties agree that defendant
Estate of Salud Jimenez shall transfer lot
1406-B with an area of 13,118 square meters
which forms part of the lot registered under
TCT No. 113498 of the Registry of Deeds of
Cavite to the name of the plaintif and the
same shall be swapped and exchanged with
lot 434 with an area of 14,167 square meters
and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 14772 of the Registry of Deeds of Cavite
which lot will be transferred to the name of
Estate of Salud Jimenez.
3. That the swap arrangement recognized
the fact that the lot 1406-B covered by TCT
No. T-113498 of the state of defendant Salud
Jimenez is considered expropriated in favor
of the government based on Order of the
Honorable Court. However, instead of being
paid the just compensation for said lot, the
estate of said defendant shall be paid with
lot 434 covered by TCT No. T-14772.
4. That the parties agree that they will abide
by the terms of the foregoing agreement in
good faith and the Decision to be rendered
based on this Compromise Agreement is
immediately final and executory.
The CA remanded the case to the trial court
for the approval of the said compromise
agreement entered into between the parties,
consequent with the withdrawal of the
appeal with the Court of Appeals. In the
Order, the trial court approved the
compromise agreement.
However, private respondent failed to
transfer the title of Lot 434 to petitioner
inasmuch as it was not the registered owner
of the covering TCT No. T-14772 but
Progressive Realty Estate, Inc. Thus, on
March 13, 1997, petitioner Estate filed a
"Motion to Partially Annul the Order dated
August 23, 1993."
In the Order dated aug 24, the trial court
annulled the said compromise agreement
entered into between the parties and
directed private respondent to peacefully
turn over Lot 1406-A to the petitioner.
Disagreeing with the said Order of the trial
court, respondent PEZA moved13 for its
reconsideration. The same proved futile
since the trial court denied reconsideration
in its Order dated November 3, 1997.
The trial court, at the instance of petitioner,
corrected the Orders dated August 4, 1997
and November 3, 1997 by declaring that it is
Lot 1406-B and Lot 1406-A that should be
surrendered and returned to petitioner.
Respondent interposed before the Court of
Appeals a petition for certiorari and
prohibition seeking to nullify the Orders
dated August 4, 1997 and November 3, 1997
of the court. Petitioner filed its Comment.
ISSUE: The petition anchored on the following
assignment of errors:
1. Whether or not, the Court of Appeals
committed grave and reversible error in giving
due course to the special Civil Action filed by
respondent PEZA in CA-G.R. SP. No. 46112 when
it was made substitute for lost appeal in clear
contravention of the Honorable Courts ruling in
Sempio v. Court of Appeals (263 SCRA 617) and
Ongsitco v. Court of Appeals (255 SCRA 703) .
2. Granting in Gratia Argumenti that the Special
Civil Action of Certiorari is proper, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless wrongly interpreted the
phrase Original Demand contained in Article
2041 of petitioner estate is the return of the
subject lot (Lot 1406-B) which sought to be
expropriated and not the determination of just
compensation for the lot. Furthermore, even if
the interpretation of the court of appeals or the
import of the phrase in question is correct, it is
Article 2039 of the Civil Code and not Article
2041 which is applicable to compromise
agreements approved by the courts.
HELD:This court therefore finds that the
Court of Appeals did not err in interpreting
"original demand" to mean the fixing of just
compensation. The authority of respondent and
the nature of the purpose thereof have been
put to rest when the Expropriation Order dated
July 11, 1991 became final and was duly
admitted by petitioner in the compromise
agreement. The only issue for consideration is
the manner and amount of payment due to
petitioner. In fact, aside from the withdrawal of
private respondent's appeal to the Court of
Appeals concerning Lot 1406-A, the matter of
payment of just compensation was the only
subject of the compromise agreement dated
January 4, 1993. Under the compromise
agreement, petitioner was supposed to receive
respondent's Lot No. 434 in exchange for Lot
1406-B. When respondent failed to fulfill its
obligation to deliver Lot 434, petitioner can
again demand for the payment but not the
return of the expropriated Lot 1406-B. This
interpretation by the Court of Appeals is in
according with Section 4 to 8, Rule 67 of the
Rules of Court.
This court holds that respondent has the legal
authority to expropriate the subject Lot 1406-B
and that the same was for a valid public
purpose. In Sumulong v. Guerrero41 , this Court
has ruled that, the "public use" requirement for
a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain
is a flexible and evolving concept influenced by
changing conditions.
We have rules that the concept of just
compensation embraces not only the correct
determination of the amount to be paid to the
owners of the land, but also the payment of the
land within a reasonable time from its taking.
Without prompt payment, compensation cannot
be considered "just" inasmuch as the
property owner is made to sufer the
consequences of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to
wait for a decade or more before actually
receiving the amount necessary to cope with
his loss. We find that respondent capriciously
evaded its duty of giving what is due to
petitioner. In the case at bar, the
expropriation order was issued by the trial
court in 1991. The compromise agreement
between the parties was approved by the
trial court in 1993. However, from 1993 up to
the present, respondent has failed in its
obligation to pay petitioner to the prejudice
of the latter. Respondent caused damage to
petitioner in making the latter to expect that
it had a good title to the property to be
swapped with Lot 1406-B; and meanwhile,
respondent has been reaping benefits from
the lease or rental income of the said
expropriated lot. However, it is high time
that the petitioner be paid what was due him
eleven years ago. It is high time that the
petitioner be paid what was due him eleven
years ago. It is arbitrary and capricious for a
government agency to initiate expropriation
proceedings, seize a person's property, allow
the judgment of the court to become final
and executory and then refuse to pay on the
ground that there are no appropriations for
the property earlier taken and profitably
used. Though the respondent has committed
a misdeed to petitioner, we cannot, however,
grant the petitioner's prayer for the return of
the expropriated Lot No. 1406-B. The Order
of expropriation dated July 11, 1991, has
long become final and executory.
In view of all the foregoing, justice and
equity dictate that this case be remanded to
the trial court for hearing of the
expropriation proceedings on the
determination of just compensation for Lot
1406-B and for its prompt payment to the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby
denied. The Regional Trial Court of Cavite
City is hereby ordered to proceed with the
hearing of the expropriation proceedings,
docketed as Civil Case No. N-4029, regarding
the determination of just compensation for
Lot 1406-B, covered and described in TCT
No. T-113498-Cavite, and to resolve the
same with dispatch.
MANOSCA VS. COURT OF APPEALS
[252 SCRA 412, 1996]
FACTS: A petition for review on certiorari,
from the decision of the Court of Appeals,
dated 15 January 1992, in CA-G.R. SP No.
24969 (entitled Alejandro Manosca, et al. v.
Hon. Benjamin V. Pelayo, et al.) Wherein,
Petitioners inherited a piece of land located
at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro
Manila, with an area of about four hundred
ninety-two (492) square meters. When the
parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been
the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of
Iglesia Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1,
Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of
Presidential Decree No. 260, declaring the land
to be a national historical landmark. The
resolution was, on 06 January 1986, approved
by the Minister of Education, Culture and
Sports. Later, the opinion of the Secretary of
Justice was asked on the legality of the
measure. Thus the assailment of this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the public use
requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the
attempted expropriation by the Republic of a
492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by
the National Historical Institute (NHI) as a
national historical landmark.
HELD: The term public use, not having been
otherwise defined by the constitution, must be
considered in its general concept of meeting a
public need or a public exigency. The validity of
the exercise of the power of eminent domain for
traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not
at all to be said, however, that public use
should thereby be restricted to such traditional
uses. The idea that public use is strictly
limited to clear cases of use by the public has
long been discarded.
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando states: The
taking to be valid must be for public use. There
was a time when it was felt that a literal
meaning should be attached to such a
requirement. Whatever project is undertaken
must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is not
allowable. It is not so any more. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then the power
of eminent domain comes into play. As just
noted, the constitution in at least two cases, to
remove any doubt, determines what is public
use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
individuals. The other is the transfer, through
the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. It is
accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use.
Chief Justice Fernando, writing the ponencia in
J.M. Tuason & Co. vs. Land Tenure
Administration, has viewed the Constitution a
dynamic instrument and one that is not to be
construed narrowly or pedantically so as to
enable it to meet adequately whatever
problems the future has in store. Fr. Joaquin
Bernas, a noted constitutionalist himself, has
aptly observed that what, in fact, has ultimately
emerged is a concept of public use which is just
as broad as public welfare. Petitioners, finally,
would fault respondent appellate court in
sustaining the trial courts order which
considered inapplicable the case of Noble v.
City of Manila. Both courts held correctly. The
Republic was not a party to the alleged
contract of exchange between the Iglesia ni
Cristo and petitioners which (the contracting
parties) alone, not the Republic, could
properly be bound.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed
decision to be in accord with law and
jurisprudence. WHEREFORE, the petition is
DENIED.
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR VS.
COURT OF APPEALS
[G.R. No. 103125, May 17, 1993]
FACTS: This is an appeal by certiorari from
the decision of the Court of Appeals.
The Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the
Province of Camarines Sur passed Resolution
No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the
Provincial Governor to purchase or
expropriate property contiguous to the
provincial capitol site, in order to establish a
pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional
agricultural crops and a housing project for
provincial government employees.
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of
Camarines Sur, through its Governor, Hon.
Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases
for expropriation against Ernesto N. San
Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin.
The Province of Camarines Sur then filed a
motion for the issuance of writ of possession,
but the San Joaquins failed to appear at the
hearing of the motion.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the
complaints on the ground of inadequacy of
the price ofered for their property. The trial
court denied the motion to dismiss and
authorized the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of the property upon the
deposit with the Clerk of Court of the amount
of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed
by the trial court to answer for damages that
private respondents may sufer in the event
that the expropriation cases do not prosper.
The trial court issued a writ of possession.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief
from the order, authorizing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of their
property and a motion to admit an amended
motion to dismiss. Both motions were
denied.
In their petition before the Court of Appeals,
the San Joaquins asked: (a) that Resolution
No. 129 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be
declared null and void; (b) that the
complaints for expropriation be dismissed;
and (c) that the order denying the motion to
dismiss and allowing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of the property subject
of the expropriation and the order denying the
motion to admit the amended motion to
dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an
order be issued to restrain the trial court from
enforcing the writ of possession, and thereafter
to issue a writ of injunction.
In its answer to the petition, the Province of
Camarines Sur claimed that it has the authority
to initiate the expropriation and that the
expropriations are for a public purpose.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his
Comment to the petition, the Solicitor General
stated that under Section 9 of the Local
Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337), there was no
need for the approval by the Office of the
President of the exercise by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain.
However, the Solicitor General expressed the
view that the Province of Camarines Sur must
first secure the approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the
lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the
trial court, allowing the Province of Camarines
Sur to take possession of private respondents'
lands and the order denying the admission of
the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered
the trial court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the
requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of
the property of the private respondents from
agricultural to non-agricultural land. Hence this
petition.
ISSUE: Whether the expropriation of property
intended for the establishment of a pilot
development center and housing project of the
Province of Camarines Sur is in consonance with
the public purpose requirement of the
Constitution.
HELD: YES. The expropriation of the property
authorized by the questioned resolution is for a
public purpose. The establishment of a pilot
development center would insure to the direct
benefit and advantage of the people of the
Province of Camarines Sur. Once operational,
the center would make available to the
community invaluable information and
technology on agriculture, fishery and the
cottage industry. Ultimately, the livelihood of
the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be
enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the
public purpose requirement of the Constitution.
As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461,
"Housing is a basic human need. Shortage in
housing is a matter of state concern since it
directly and significantly afects public health,
safety, the environment and in sum the general
welfare."
REYES VS. NHA [GR No. 147511,
January 20, 2003]
FACTS: In 1977, respondent National
Housing Authority (NHA) filed separate
complaints for the expropriation of
sugarcane lands, particularly Lot Nos. 6450,
6448-E, 6198-A and 6199 of the cadastral
survey of Dasmarinas, Cavite belonging to
the petitioners, before the then Court of First
Instance of Cavite The stated public purpose
of the expropriation was the expansion of
the Dasmarinas Resettlement Project to
accommodate the squatters who were
relocated from the Metropolitan Manila area.
The trial court rendered judgment ordering
the expropriation of these lots and the
payment of just compensation. This was
affirmed by the Supreme Court in a decision
rendered in the case of NHA vs. Zaballero
and which became final.
The expropriation court issued an Order the
dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, and resolving thus, let an
Alias Writ of Execution be immediately
issued and that:
(1) The Register of Deeds of the Province of
Cavite is hereby ordered to transfer, in the
name of the plaintif National Housing
Authority, the following:
(a) Transfer Certificate No. RT-638 containing
an area of 79,167 square meters situated in
Barrio Bangkal, Dasmarias, Cavite;
(b) Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-55702
containing an area of 20,872 square meters
situated in Barrio Bangkal, Dasmarias,
Cavite;
(c) Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-639
and RT-4641 covering Lot Nos. 6198-A and
6199 with an aggregate area of 159,985
square meters also situated in Barrio
Bangkal, Dasmarias, Cavite.
(2) Plaintif National Housing Authority is
likewise hereby ordered, under pain of
contempt, to immediately pay the
defendants, the amounts stated in the Writ
of Execution as the adjudicated
compensation of their expropriated
properties, which process was received by it
according to the records, on September 26,
1988, segregating therefrom, and in
separate check, the lawyer's fees in favor of
Atty. Bobby P. Yuseco, in the amount of
P322,123.05, as sustained by their contract
as gleaned from the records, with no other
deduction, paying on its own (NHA) account,
the necessary legal expenses incident to the
registration or issuance of new certificates of
title, pursuant to the provisions of the
Property Registration Law (PD 1529);
(3) Defendants, however, are directed to pay
the corresponding capital gains tax on the
subject properties, directing them additionally,
to coordinate with the plaintif NHA in this
regard, in order to facilitate the termination of
this case, put an end to this controversy and
consign the same to its final rest."
ISSUE: The petitioners raise the following
assignment of errors:
1.The Honorable Court of Appeals had decided
a question of substance not in accord with
justice and equity when it ruled that, as the
judgment of the expropriation court did not
contain a condition that should the expropriated
property be not used for the intended purpose it
would revert to the condemnee, the action to
declare the forfeiture of rights under the
expropriation judgment can not prosper;
2.The Honorable Court of Appeals decided a
question of substance not in accord with
jurisprudence, justice and equity when it ruled
that the non-payment is not a ground for
forfeiture;
3.The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not
declaring the judgment of expropriation
forfeited in light of the failure of respondent to
use the expropriated property for the intended
purpose but for a totally diferent purpose."
HELD: The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
for the exercise of the power of eminent domain
over private properties upon payment of just
compensation. More specifically, section 9,
Article III states that private property shall not
be taken for public use without just
compensation. The constitutional restraints are
public use and just compensation.
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of
the eminent domain provision of the
Constitution by contending that the contract for
low cost housing is a deviation from the stated
public use. It is now settled doctrine that the
concept of public use is no longer limited to
traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the
idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear
cases of "use by the public" has been
abandoned. The term "public use" has now
been held to be synonymous with "public
interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and
"public convenience."
The restrictive view of public use may be
appropriate for a nation which circumscribes
the scope of government activities and public
concerns and which possesses big and correctly
located public lands that obviate the need to
take private property for public purposes.
Neither circumstance applies to the Philippines.
We have never been a laissez faire State. And
the necessities which impel the exertion of
sovereign power are all too often found in areas
of scarce public land or limited government
resources.
The act of respondent NHA in entering into a
contract with a real estate developer for the
construction of low cost housing on the
expropriated lots to be sold to qualified low
income beneficiaries cannot be taken to
mean as a deviation from the stated public
purpose of their taking. Jurisprudence has it
that the expropriation of private land for
slum clearance and urban development is for
a public purpose even if the developed area
is later sold to private homeowners,
commercials firms, entertainment and
service companies, and other private
concerns.
Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the
State to undertake, for the common good
and in cooperation with the private sector, a
continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make at afordable cost
decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in
urban centers and resettlement areas.11 The
expropriation of private property for the
purpose of socialized housing for the
marginalized sector is in furtherance of the
social justice provision under Section 1,
Article XIII of the Constitution which provides
that:
"SECTION 1. The Congress shall give
highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right
of all the people to human dignity, reduce
social, economic, and political inequalities,
and remove cultural inequities by equitably
difusing wealth and political power for the
common good.
To this end, the State shall require the
acquisition, ownership, use and disposition
of property and its increments."
THEREFORE, The appealed judgment is
modified as follows:
1. Ordering respondent National Housing
Authority to pay petitioners the amount of
P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon at
12% per annum computed from the taking of
the expropriated properties in 1997 until the
amount due shall have been fully paid;
2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital
gains tax; and
3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to
respondent National Housing Authority the
owners' duplicate certificates of title of the
expropriated properties upon full payment of
just compensation.
SUMULONG VS. GUERRERO [G.R. No. L-
48685, September 30, 1987]
FACTS: The National Housing Authority
(NIIA) filed a complaint for expropriation of
parcels of land covering approximately
twenty five (25) hectares, (in Antipolo, Rizal)
including the lots of petitioners Lorenzo
Sumulong and Emilia Vidanes-Balaoing with an
area of 6,667 square meters and 3,333 square
meters respectively. The land sought to be
expropriated were valued by the NHA at one
peso (P1.00) per square meter adopting the
market value fixed by the provincial assessor in
accordance with presidential decrees
prescribing the valuation of property in
expropriation proceedings.
Together with the complaint was a motion for
immediate possession of the properties. The
NHA deposited the amount of P158,980.00 with
the Philippine National Bank, representing the
"total market value" of the subject twenty five
hectares of land, pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 1224 which defines "the policy on
the expropriation of private property for
socialized housing upon payment of just
compensation."
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on
the ground that they had been deprived of the
possession of their property without due
process of law. This was however, denied.
Hence, this petition challenging the orders of
respondent Judge and assailing the
constitutionality of Pres. Decree No. 1224, as
amended.
ISSUE: Whether socialized housing constitutes
public use for purposes of expropriation.
HELD: YES. This Court is satisfied that
"socialized housing" fans within the confines of
"public use". As long as the purpose of the
taking is public, then the power of eminent
domain comes into play. As just noted, the
constitution in at least two cases, to remove
any doubt, determines what is public use. One
is the expropriation of lands to be subdivided
into small lots for resale at cost to individuals.
The other is in the transfer, through the
exercise of this power, of utilities and other
private enterprise to the government. is
accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use
In the case at bar, the use to which it is
proposed to put the subject parcels of land
meets the requisites of "public use". The lands
in question are being expropriated by the NHA
for the expansion of Bagong Nayon Housing
Project to provide housing facilities to low-
salaried government employees.
ASIAS EMERGING DRAGON VS DOTC AND
MIAA, [GR 169914]
FACTS: The facts of the two cases are intertwined,
both involves the controversies surrounding the NAIA
Airport III (NAIA3) project.
The facts from a case named Agan v. PIATCO serves
as a background. In 1993, six business leaders John
Gokongwei, Henry Sy, Sr., Lucio Tan, George Ty, and
Alfonso Yuchengco met with then president FVR
for a possibility of investing the construction of a
new airport terminal. They formed the company
Asias Emerging Dragon Corp. (AEDC) to pursue
this goal.
AEDC then gave an unsolicited proposal to the
Govt through the DOTC/MIAA for the
development of NAIA3 under the Build-Operate-
Transfer Law (BOT). Afterwards, DOTC created its
Pre-qualification Bids and Awards Committee
(PBAC) to implement the NAIA3 project as the
overseer for biddings.
Afterwards, then DOTC Secretary Garcia endorsed
the proposal of AEDC to National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA), whose technical
committee eventually approved it. Afterwards,
AEDC and DOTC signed a Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU), which essentially awards
to AEDC the NAIA3 project, with provisions that
AEDC must have a soft opening in two years.
Then, DOTC published in newspapers invitation
for competitive comparative proposals on
AEDCs unsolicited proposal, in accordance with a
law that governs unsolicited proposals.
Essentially, it required interested bidders to
submit 3 separate sealed envelopes: first on pre-
qualification documents, second on technical
proposals, and lastly on the financial proposal.
Paircargo Consortium (which eventually changed
name to PIATCO, a consortium composed of
Peoples Air Cargo and Warehousing, Inc., Phil. Air
and Ground Services, and Security Bank Corp.)
submitted their competitive proposal to PBAC.
The envelopes will be opened over a period of
time, each one opened only if the previous
envelope would qualify. AEDC would then oppose
each instance the sealed envelopes would be
opened, citing primarily PIATCOs dubious
financial capabilities to undergo with the project.
Eventually, PBAC found PIATCOs proposal to be
more favorable to the government and required
AEDC to match its proposal. Instead, AEDC
protested the undue preference given to PIATCO.
Subsequently, after a series of passes before the
NEDA Investment Committee, DOTC issued a
notice of award to PIATCO, and had signed a
concession agreement.
AEDC then filed with the RTC a petition for
Declaration of nullity of the proceedings (the
DOTC/NEDA/PBAC approval proceedings) (This is
the Agan v. PIATCO case) against DOTC,
and PBAC. It was in this case that Cong. Baterina
in GR 174166 filed a motion for Intervention and
petition-in-intervention, along with other group
and MIAA employees who allege that they stand
the risk of unemployment upon the
implementation of the agreements.
a. RTC in this case granted the intervention
of Baterina and MIAA. For Baterina, they were
granted standing in view of serious legal
questions involved and their impact to public
interest
b. RTC in this case ruled that the concession
agreements were null and void. MRs of PIATCO
denied with finality.
 c. Other issues are not relevant to our topic.
Then, there is another case, Republic v. Gingoyon,
which dealt with the expropriation of NAIA3 because
it remained in the possession of PIATCO after the
decision in Agan. In this case, the Govt sought to
take control of the facilities and deposited 3B+
(through MIAA) in Land Bank representing NAIA3s
assessed value. Govt prayed for a writ of possession
over NAIA3
Afterwards in Gingoyon, RTC gave two orders, first
being the Order that it will implement the writ of
possession only after the payment of 3B+ as just
compensation (expropriation), second as the next
order partially granting Govt MR on the first Order.
But still unsatisfied, the Govt filed another MR for
partial reconsideration of the second order. It was
during this reconsideration of the second order that
Baterina and others also sought to intervene. (in
sum, Baterina intervened in two instances)
Baterina wanted to intervene in this expropriation
proceeding by asserting his legal interest by virtue
of being a legislator, taxpayer, and concerned
citizen. They were saying that the government need
not pay PIATCO because the agreements were
deemed null and void.
RTC in Gingoyon denied Baterina (and others)
Intervention with finality. Afterwards, it directed MIAA
to immediately release to PIATCO the proferred value
of 3B+. It was here that AEDC filed a motion for
leave to admit attached answer-in-intervention,
asserting that they should be given preference over
NAIA3 because of the MOU, and also its right as the
projects original proponent.
ISSUE : Is PIATCO entitled to just compensation ?
HELD: Yes. Contrary to Baterina's stance, PIATCO's
entitlement to just and equitable consideration for
its construction of NAIA IPT III and the propriety of
the Republic's resort to expropriation proceedings
were already recognized and upheld by this Court in
Agan and Gingoyon.
The pronouncement in the 2004 Resolution is
especially significant to this case in two aspects,
namely: (i) that PIATCO must receive payment of just
compensation determined in accordance with law
and equity; and (ii) that the government is barred
from taking over NAIA 3 until such just compensation
is paid. The parties cannot be allowed to evade the
directives laid down by this Court through any mode
of judicial action, such as the complaint for eminent
domain.
The Government has chosen to resort to
expropriation, a remedy available under the law,
which has the added benefit of an integrated
process for the determination of just compensation
and the payment thereof to PIATCO. We appreciate
that the case at bar is a highly unusual case,
whereby the Government seeks to expropriate a
building complex constructed on land which the
State already owns. There is an inherent illogic in the
resort to eminent domain on property already owned
by the State. At first blush, since the State already
owns the property on which NAIA 3 stands, the
proper remedy should be akin to an action for
ejectment.
The right of eminent domain extends to personal
and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures,
adhered as they are to the soil, are considered as
real property. The public purpose for the
expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should
also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 (on
Expropriation) recognizes the possibility that the
property sought to be expropriated may be titled
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines,
although occupied by private individuals, and in
such case an averment to that efect should be
made in the complaint. The instant expropriation
complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex
"stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases
Conversion Development Authority, another
agency of [the Republic of the Philippines]."
Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole
judicial recourse by which the Government may
have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while
satisfying the requisites in the 2004 Resolution.
Eminent domain though may be the most
efective, as well as the speediest means by
which such goals may be accomplished. Not only
does it enable immediate possession after
satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also
has a built- in procedure through which just
compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there
should be no question as to the propriety of
eminent domain proceedings in this case.
HEIRS OF JUANCHO ARDONA ET AL. VS.
HON. JUAN Y. REYES [G.R Nos. L- 60549,
60553 October 26, 1983]
FACTS: The Philippine Tourism Authority filed 4
Complaints with the CIF of Cebu City for the
expropriation of some 282 hectares of rolling land
situated in barangays Malubog and Babag, Cebu
City, under PTA's express authority "to acquire by
purchase, by negotiation or by condemnation
proceedings any private land within and without
the tourist zones" for the development into
integrated resort complexes of selected and well-
defined geographic areas with potential tourism
value. As alleged in the complaints, the purposes
of the expropriation are: to promote tourism and
development of tourism projects will construct in
Barangays Malubog, Busay and Babag, all of
Cebu City. The development plan, covering
approximately 1,000 hectares, includes the
establishment of an electric power grid, deep
wells, and a complex sewerage and drainage
system. Complimentary and support facilities for
the project will be constructed, including public
rest houses, lockers, dressing rooms, cofee
shops, shopping malls, etc. Said facilities will
create and ofer employment opportunities to
residents of the community and further generate
income for the whole of Cebu City. Plaintif needs
the property above described which is directly
covered by the proposed golf court. The
petitioners allegation in that the taking is
allegedly not impressed with public use under the
Constitution, that there is no specific
constitutional provision authorizing the taking of
private property for tourism purposes; that
assuming that PTA has such power, the intended
use cannot be paramount to the determination of
the land as a land reform area; that limiting the
amount of compensation by Legislative fiat is
constitutionally repugnant; and that since the
land is under the land reform program, it is the
Court of Agrarian Relations and not the Court of First
Instance that has jurisdiction over the expropriation
cases.
ISSUE: Whether or not the actions to expropriate
their properties for the promotion of tourism are
constitutional?
RULING: There are three provisions of the
Constitution which directly provide for the exercise
of the power of eminent domain. Section 2, Article IV
provides: private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. Section 6,
Article XIV allows the State, in the interest of
national welfare or defense and upon payment of
just compensation to transfer to public ownership,
utilities and other private enterprises to be operated
by the government. Section 13, Article XIV states
that the Batasang Pambansa may authorize upon
payment of just compensation the expropriation of
private lands to be subdivided into small lots and
conveyed at cost to deserving citizens.
The petitioners look for the word "tourism" in the
Constitution. Understandably the search would be in
vain. The policy objectives of the framers can be
expressed only in general terms such as social
justice, local autonomy, conservation and
development of the national patrimony, public
interest, and general welfare, among others.
The petitioners face two major obstacles. First, their
contention which is rather sweeping in its call for a
retreat from the public welfare orientation is unduly
restrictive and outmoded. Second, no less than the
lawmaker has made a policy determination that the
power of eminent domain may be exercised in the
promotion and development of Philippine tourism.
There can be no doubt that expropriation for such
traditions' purposes as the construction of roads,
bridges, ports, waterworks, schools, electric and
telecommunications systems, hydroelectric power
plants, markets and slaughterhouses, parks,
hospitals, government office buildings, and flood
control or irrigation systems is valid. However, the
concept of public use is not limited to traditional
purposes. Here as elsewhere the Idea that "public
use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the
public" has been discarded.
The petitioners' contention that the promotion of
tourism is not "public use" because private
concessioners would be allowed to maintain various
facilities such as restaurants, hotels, stores, etc.
inside the tourist complex is impressed with even
less merit. Private bus firms, taxicab fleets, roadside
restaurants, and other private businesses using
public streets end highways do not diminish in the
least bit the public character of expropriations for
roads and streets. The lease of store spaces in
underpasses of streets built on expropriated land
does not make the taking for a private purpose.
Airports and piers catering exclusively to private
airlines and shipping companies are still for public
use. The expropriation of private land for slum
clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to
private homeowners, commercial firms,
entertainment and service companies, and other
private concerns.
The petitioners rely on the Land Reform Program of
the government in raising their second argument.
According to them, assuming that PTA has the
right to expropriate, the properties subject of
expropriation may not be taken for the purposes
intended since they are within the coverage of
"operation land transfer" under the land reform
program. Petitioners claim that certificates of
land transfer (CLT'S) and emancipation patents
have already been issued to them thereby
making the lands expropriated within the
coverage of the land reform area under
Presidential Decree No. 2; that the agrarian
reform program occupies a higher level in the
order of priorities than other State policies like
those relating to the health and physical well-
being of the people; and that property already
taken for public use may not be taken for another
public use.
The Petitioners, however, have failed to show
that the area being developed is indeed a land
reform area and that the afected persons have
emancipation patents and certificates of land
transfer. The records show that the area being
developed into a tourism complex consists of
more than 808 hectares, almost all of which is
not afected by the land reform program.
The issue of prematurity is also raised by the
petitioners. They claim that since the necessity
for the taking has not been previously
established, the issuance of the orders
authorizing the PTA to take immediate possession
of the premises, as well as the corresponding
writs of possession was premature.
Whether the order of respondent Judge in an
expropriation case allowing the other respondent
to take immediate possession of the parcel of
land sought to be condemned for the
beautification of its public plaza, without a prior
hearing to determine the necessity for the
exercise of the power of eminent domain, is
vitiated by jurisdictional defect, the Supreme
Court held that: It is not disputed that in issuing
such order, respondent Judge relied on
Presidential Decree No. 42 issued on the 9th of
November, 1972. This petition for certiorari must
fail, there being no showing that compliance with
the Presidential Decree, which under the
Transitory Provisions is deemed a part of the law
of the land, would be characterized as either an
act in excess of jurisdiction or a grave abuse of
discretion. The Court held that condemnation or
expropriation proceedings is in the nature of one
that is quasi-in-rem wherein the fact that the
owner of the property is made a party is not
essentially indispensable insofar was least as it
concerns is the immediate taking of possession of
the property and the preliminary determination of
its value, including the amount to be deposited.
In their last argument, the petitioners claim that
a consequence of the expropriation proceedings
would be their forcible ejectment. They contend
that such forcible ejectment is a criminal act
under Presidential Decree No. 583. This
contention is not valid. Presidential Decree No.
583 prohibits the taking cognizance or
implementation of orders designed to obstruct
the land reform program. It refers to the
harassment of tenant- farmers who try to enforce
emancipation rights. It has nothing to do with the
expropriation by the State of lands needed for
public purposes. As a matter of fact, the
expropriated area does not appear in the master
lists of the Ministry of Agrarian Reforms as a
tenanted area. The petitioners' bare allegations have
not been supported with particulars pointing to
specific parcels which are subject of tenancy
contracts. The petitioners may be owner-tillers or
may have some form of possessory or ownership
rights but there has been no showing of their being
tenants on the disputed lands.
The public respondents have stressed that the
development of the 808 hectares includes plans that
would give the petitioners and other displaced
persons productive employment, higher incomes,
decent housing, water and electric facilities, and
better living standards. Our dismissing this petition
is, in part, predicated on those assurances. The right
of the PTA to proceed with the expropriation of the
282 hectares already Identified as fit for the
establishment of a resort complex to promote
tourism is, therefore, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
METROPOLITAN CEBU WATER DISTRICT
(MCWD) VS. J. KING AND SONS COMPANY, INC.
[G.R No. 175983, April 16, 2009]
FACTS: Petitioner, MCWD wanted to acquire a 5-
square meter lot occupied by its production well. The
lot is part of respondents property covered by TCT
No. 168605 and located in Banilad, Cebu City.
Petitioner initiated negotiations with respondent J.
King and Sons Company, Inc. for the voluntary sale
of the latters property. Respondent did not agree to
petitioners proposal. After the negotiations had
failed, petitioner pursuant to its charter initiated
expropriation proceedings through Board Resolution
No. 015- 2004 which was duly approved by the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA).
Petitioner filed a complaint to expropriate the 5-
square meter portion of respondents property.
Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of
possession. Petitioner wanted to tender the amount
to respondent during a rescheduled hearing which
petitioners counsel had failed to attend. Petitioner
deposited with the Clerk of Court the amount of
P17,500.00 equivalent to 100% of the current zonal
value of the property which the Bureau of Internal
Revenue had pegged at P3,500.00 per square meter.
Subsequently, the trial court granted the motion and
issued the writ of possession. Respondent moved for
reconsideration but the motion was denied.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
65 with the Court of Appeals. It sought the issuance
of a TRO which the Court of Appeals granted. Thus,
petitioner was not able to gain entry to the lot.
The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision
granting respondents petition. It ruled that the
board resolution which authorized the filing of the
expropriation complaint lacked exactitude and
particularity which made it invalid; that there was no
genuine necessity for the expropriation of the 5-
square meter lot and; that the reliance on RA No.
8974 in fixing the value of the property contravenes
the judicial determination of just compensation.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the motion
was rejected.
ISSUE: Whether there was sufficient authority
from the petitioners board of directors to
institute the expropriation complaint?
HELD: Petitioners charter provides that it has
the powers, rights and privileges given to private
corporations under existing laws, in addition to
the powers granted in it. All the powers,
privileges, and duties of the district shall be
exercised and performed by and through the
board and that any executive, administrative or
ministerial power may be delegated and
redelegated by the board to any of its officers or
agents for such purpose. Being a corporation,
petitioner can exercise its powers only through its
board of directors.
For MCWD to exercise its power of eminent
domain, two requirements should be met,
namely: first, its board of directors passed a
resolution authorizing the expropriation, and;
second, the exercise of the power of eminent
domain was subjected to review by the LWUA. In
this case, petitioners board of directors approved
Board Resolution No. 015-2004 authorizing its
general manager to file expropriation and other
cases. Moreover, the LWUA did review and gave
its stamp of approval to the filing of a complaint
for the expropriation of respondents lot.
Specifically, the LWUA through its Administrator,
Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioners manager,
Armando H. Paredes, a letter dated 28 February
2005 authorizing petitioner to file the
expropriation case against the owner of the five-
square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by
TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D.
No. 198, as amended.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the
efect that upon compliance with the
guidelines...the court shall immediately issue to
the implementing agency an order to take
possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project. Under this
statutory provision, when the government, its
agencies or government-owned and controlled
corporations, make the required provisional
payment, the trial court has a ministerial duty to
issue a writ of possession.
- Governmental Withdrawal
NHA vs. HEIRS OF ISIDRO GUIVELONDO
[GR No. 154411, June 19, 2003]
FACTS: Petitioner filed with the RTC of Cebu
City, an Amended Complaint for eminent
domain against respondents. It alleged that
defendant Associacion Benevola de Cebu
was the claimant of a Lot located in Banilad,
Cebu City; that defendant Engracia Urot was
the claimant of parcels of Lots, in the same
area; that defendant Heirs of Isidro
Guivelondo were claimants of lots in Carreta,
Mabolo, Cebu City; and that the lands are in
the urban center which petitioner intends to
develop as a socialized housing project.
The Heirs of Guivelondo filed a Manifestation
waiving their objections to petitioners power
to expropriate their properties. Thus the RTC
issued an order to that efect. Thereafter, the
RTC appointed three Commissioners to
ascertain the just compensation of the
properties of respondents. The Commissioners
submitted their report recommending the just
compensation be fixed at P11,200.00 per
square meter, which was favored by the RTC.
Petitioner, however, filed a Motion to Dismiss
alleging that the implementation of its
socialized housing project was rendered
impossible because the value of the land sought
to be expropriated was too high, and the
intended beneficiaries cannot aford. The
Motion was denied since the prior case was
decided on already.
After petitioners appeal was denied by the CA,
the Landbank executed garnishment
proceedings against the funds of NHA.
ISSUES: 1. WON the state can be compelled by
the courts to continue with the exercise of its
inherent Power of Eminent Domain?
2. WON judgment has become final and
executory and if estoppel applies to
government?
3. WON writs of execution and garnishment
may be issued against the state?
HELD:There are two (2) stages in every
action for expropriation. The first is concerned
with the determination of the authority of the
plaintif to exercise the power of eminent
domain. The second is concerned with the
determination by the Court of the just
compensation.
The outcome of the first phase is final since it
disposes of the case. On the other hand, the
second phase fixes the amount of just
compensation. Both orders, being final, are
however, appealable. Once the first order
becomes final and no appeal thereto is taken,
the authority to expropriate and its public use
can no longer be questioned.
In the case at bar, petitioner did not appeal the
Order of the RTC, which declared the lawful
right to expropriate the properties hence the
Order became final.
Socialized housing has been recognized as
public use for purposes of exercising the power
of eminent domain. The need to provide
housing to the urban poor was not lost by fact
that the land cost more than petitioner had
expected. The public purpose of is not
diminished by the amount of just compensation
the court has fixed.
On the issue of the garnishment against
petitioners funds, there is a need to determine
if it is a government entity. Generally, funds and
properties of the government cannot be the
object of garnishment proceedings.
However, if the funds belong to a public
corporation or a GOCC with a personality of
its own, then its funds are not exempt from
garnishment.
Hence, it is clear that NHA is not exempt
from garnishment.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the
instant petition for review is DENIED.
NPC & POBRE vs. CA [GR No. 106804,
August 12, 2004]
FACTS: Petitioner NPC is a public
corporation created to generate geothermal,
hydroelectric, nuclear and other power and
to transmit electric power nationwide. NPC
is authorized by law to exercise the right of
eminent domain. Private respondent Pobre is
the owner of property located in Tiwi, Albay.
In 1963, Pobre began developing the
Property as a resort-subdivision, which he
named as Tiwi Hot Springs Resort
Subdivision.
The Commission on Volcanology certified
that thermal mineral water and steam were
present beneath the Property. The
commission found it suitable for domestic
use and potentially for commercial or
industrial use. NPC then became involved
with Pobres Property in three instances.
First was on February 1972 when Pobre
leased to NPC for one year eleven lots frof
the subdivision. Second was sometime in
1977, the first time that NPC filed its
expropriation case against Pobre to acquire
an 8,311.60 sqm portion of the Property. On
1979, the trial court ordered the
expropriation of the lots upon NPCs
payment of P25/sqm. NPC began drilling
operations and construction of steam wells.
While the first case was pending, NPC
dumped waste materials beyond the site
agreed upon by NPC with Pobre. It altered
the topography o the Property. No action
was done on Pobres complaints, dumping
continued. Third was on September 1979,
when NPC filed its second expropriation
case. NPC needed more lots for the
construction and maintenance of a Well Site.
NPC immediately deposited P5,546.36 with
the Philippine National Bank. The deposit
represented 10% of the total market value of
the lots covered by the second expropriation.
NPC entered the 5,554 sqm lot upon the
trial courts issuance of a writ of possession
to NPC.
Pobre filed a motion to dismiss the second
complaint and claimed that NPC damaged
his Property. He prayed for just
compensation of all the lots afected.
The trial court decided in favor of Pobre,
ordered the whole property to be paid of by
NPC.
NPC filed its motion for reconsideration of the
decision, which was denied by the trial courts.
NPC appealed to CA. CA upheld the trial courts
decision and denied NPCs motion for
reconsideration.
ISSUES: WON, CA erred:
1.In holding that NPC had taken the entire
Property of Pobre?
2.In not excluding from the Property portions of
which NPC had previously expropriated and
paid for?
3.In holding that the amount of just
compensation fixed by the trial court at
P3,448,450.00 with interest from September
1979 until fully paid, is just and fair?
4.In not holding that the just compensation
should be fixed at P25/sqm only as what had
been previously agreed upon?
HELD: Even before the first case, Pobre had
established his property as a resort-subdivision.
NPC had wrought so much damage to the
property that it made it uninhabitable as a
resort-subdivision. Questions of facts are
beyond the pale of the SC as a petition for
review may only raise questions of law. NPC
points out that it did not take Pobres 68,969
sqm property. NPC argues that assuming that it
is liable for damages, the 8,311.60 sqm portion
that it had successfully expropriated and fully
paid for should have been excluded from the
68,969 sqm property that Pobre claims NPC had
damaged.
It was clearly established that the property
originally had a total area of 141,300 sqm.
Pobre identified the lots forming the 68,969
sqm property that comprised the undeveloped
area. NPC had the opportunity to object to the
identification of the lots, but failed to do so.
Thus, the trial and appellate courts finding on
the total land area NPC had damaged cannot be
disturbed.
When possession of the land cannot be turned
over to the landowner because it is not
anymore convenient or feasible to do so, the
only remedy available to the aggrieved
landowner is to demand payment of just
compensation.
In this case, the property is no longer habitable
as a resort-subdivision. The Property is
worthless is now only useful to NPC. NPC moved
for the dismissal of the complaint for the second
expropriation on the ground that it had found
an alternative site and there was stif opposition
from Pobre. NPC abandoned the second
expropriation case five years after it had
already deprived the Property virtually of all its
value. NPC has demonstrated its utter
disregard for Pobres property rights.
Thus, it would now be futile to compel NPC to
institute expropriation proceedings to
determine the just compensation for Pobres
68,969 square-meter Property. Pobre must
be spared any further delay in his pursuit to
receive just compensation from NPC. Just
compensation is the fair and full equivalent
of the loss.
The lesson in this case must not be lost on
entities with eminent domain authority.
Such entities cannot trifle with a citizens
property rights. The power of eminent
domain is an extraordinary power they must
wield with circumspection and utmost regard
for procedural requirements.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied for lack
of merit.
- Recovery of Expropriated Land
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs.
VICENTE G. LIM
G.R. No. 161656. June 29, 2005
FACTS: The Republic of the Philippines
instituted a special civil action for
expropriation with the CFI of Cebu involving
Lots 932 and 939 of the Banilad Friar Land
Estate, Lahug, Cebu City, for the purpose of
establishing a military reservation for the
Philippine Army. Lot 932 was registered in
the name of Gervasia Denzon under TCT No.
14921 with an area of 25,137 square meters,
while Lot 939 was in the name of Eulalia
Denzon and covered by TCT No. 12560
consisting of 13,164 square meters.
After depositing P9,500.00 with the
Philippine National Bank, pursuant to the
Order of the CFI dated October 19, 1938, the
Republic took possession of the lots.
Thereafter, or on May 14, 1940, the CFI
rendered its Decision ordering the Republic
to pay the Denzons the sum of P4,062.10 as
just compensation.
The Denzons interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals but it was dismissed. For
failure of the Republic to pay for the lots, the
Denzons successors-in-interest, Francisca
Galeos-Valdehueza and Josefina Galeos-
Panerio, filed with the same CFI an action for
recovery of possession with damages against
the Republic and officers of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines in possession of the
property. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. R-7208.
In the interim, TCT Nos. 23934 and 23935
covering Lots 932 and 939 were issued in
the names of Francisca Valdehueza and
Josefina Panerio, respectively. Annotated
thereon was the phrase subject to the
priority of the National Airports Corporation
to acquire said parcels of land, Lots 932 and
939 upon previous payment of a reasonable
market value.
The CFI promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding that they are
the owners and have retained their right as
such over Lots 932 and 939 because of the
Republics failure to pay the amount of
P4,062.10, adjudged in the expropriation
proceedings. However, in view of the
annotation on their land titles, they were
ordered to execute a deed of sale in favor of the
Republic. In view of the diferences in money
value from 1940 up to the present, the court
adjusted the market value at P16,248.40, to be
paid with 6% interest per annum from April 5,
1948, date of entry in the expropriation
proceedings, until full payment.
After their motion for reconsideration was
denied, Valdehueza and Panerio appealed from
the CFI Decision, in view of the amount in
controversy, directly to this Court. The case was
docketed as No. L-21032. The Court rendered
its Decision affirming the CFI Decision. It held
that Valdehueza and Panerio are still the
registered owners of Lots 932 and 939, there
having been no payment of just compensation
by the Republic. Apparently, this Court found
nothing in the records to show that the Republic
paid the owners or their successors-in-interest
according to the CFI decision. While it deposited
the amount of P9,500,00, and said deposit was
allegedly disbursed, however, the payees could
not be ascertained.
Meanwhile, Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged
Lot 932 to Vicente Lim, herein respondent, as
security for their loans. For their failure to pay
Lim despite demand, he had the mortgage
foreclosed in 1976. Thus, TCT No. 23934 was
cancelled, and in lieu thereof, TCT No. 63894
was issued in his name.
Respondent Lim filed a complaint for quieting of
title with the RTC of Cebu City, against General
Romeo Zulueta, as Commander of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, Commodore Edgardo
Galeos, as Commander of Naval District V of the
Philippine Navy, Antonio Cabaluna, Doroteo
Mantos and Florencio Belotindos, herein
petitioners. Subsequently, he amended the
complaint to implead the Republic.
RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent,
thus declaring plaintif Vicente Lim the absolute
and exclusive owner of Lot No. 932 with all the
rights of an absolute owner including the right
to possession. The monetary claims in the
complaint and in the counter claims contained
in the answer of defendants are ordered
Dismissed.
Petitioners elevated the case to the CA. In its
Decision, the Appellate Court sustained the RTC
Decision, thus:
An action to quiet title is a common law
remedy for the removal of any cloud or
doubt or uncertainty on the title to real
property. It is essential for the plaintif or
complainant to have a legal or equitable title
or interest in the real property, which is the
subject matter of the action. Also the deed,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding that is
being alleged as cloud on plaintifs title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or
inoperative despite its prima facie
appearance of validity or legal efficacy
(Robles vs. Court of Appeals, 328 SCRA 97).
In view of the foregoing discussion, clearly,
the claim of defendant-appellant Republic
constitutes a cloud, doubt or uncertainty on
the title of plaintif-appellee Vicente Lim that
can be removed by an action to quiet title.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic has retained
ownership of Lot 932 despite its failure to
pay respondents predecessors-in-interest
the just compensation?
HELD: From the taking of private property
by the government under the power of
eminent domain, there arises an implied
promise to compensate the owner for his
loss
Significantly, the above-mentioned provision
of Section 9, Article III of the Constitution is
not a grant but a limitation of power. This
limiting function is in keeping with the
philosophy of the Bill of Rights against the
arbitrary exercise of governmental powers to
the detriment of the individuals rights.
Given this function, the provision should
therefore be strictly interpreted against the
expropriator, the government, and liberally
in favor of the property owner.
Title to property which is the subject of
condemnation proceedings does not vest the
condemnor until the judgment fixing just
compensation is entered and paid, but the
condemnors title relates back to the date on
which the petition under the Eminent
Domain Act, or the commissioners report
under the Local Improvement Act, is filed.
Clearly, without full payment of just
compensation, there can be no transfer of
title from the landowner to the expropriator.
Otherwise stated, the Republics acquisition
of ownership is conditioned upon the full
payment of just compensation within a
reasonable time
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the
Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO vs.
REPUBLIC
[G.R. No. 168770 February 9, 2011]
FACTS: At the center of these 2 Petitions for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 is the
issue of the right of the former owners of lots
acquired for the expansion of the Lahug Airport
in Cebu City to repurchase or secure
reconveyance of their respective properties.
At the outset, 3 fairly established factual
premises ought to be emphasized:
First, the MCIAA and/or its predecessor agency
had not actually used the lots subject of the
final decree of expropriation for the purpose
they were originally taken by the government,
i.e., for the expansion and development of
Lahug Airport.
Second, the Lahug Airport had been closed and
abandoned. A significant portion of it had, in
fact, been purchased by a private corporation
for development as a commercial complex.
Third, it has been preponderantly established
by evidence that the NAC, through its team of
negotiators, had given assurance to the
afected landowners that they would be entitled
to repurchase their respective lots in the event
they are no longer used for airport purposes.
"No less than Asterio Uy," the Court noted in
Heirs of Moreno, "one of the members of the
CAA Mactan Legal Team, which interceded for
the acquisition of the lots for the Lahug
Airports expansion, affirmed that persistent
assurances were given to the landowners to the
efect that as soon as the Lahug Airport is
abandoned or transferred to Mactan, the lot
owners would be able to reacquire their
properties." In Civil Case No. CEB-20743, Exhibit
"G," the transcript of the deposition of
Anunciacion vda. de Ouano covering the
assurance made had been formally ofered in
evidence and duly considered in the initial
decision of the RTC Cebu City. In Civil Case No.
CEB-18370, the trial court, on the basis of
testimonial evidence, and later the CA,
recognized the reversionary rights of the suing
former lot owners or their successors in interest
and resolved the case accordingly. In point with
respect to the representation and promise of
the government to return the lots taken should
the planned airport expansion do not
materialize is what the Court said in Heirs of
Moreno, thus:
This is a difficult case calling for a difficult but
just solution. To begin with there exists an
undeniable historical narrative that the
predecessors of respondent MCIAA had
suggested to the landowners of the properties
covered by the Lahug Airport expansion scheme
that they could repurchase their properties at
the termination of the airports venue. Some
acted on this assurance and sold their
properties; other landowners held out and
waited for the exercise of eminent domain to
take its course until finally coming to terms with
respondents predecessors that they would not
appeal nor block further judgment of
condemnation if the right of repurchase was
extended to them. A handful failed to prove
that they acted on such assurance when
they parted with ownership of their land.
ISSUES: Whether abandonment of the
public use for which the subject properties
were expropriated entitles petitioners
Ouanos, et al. and respondents Inocian, et al.
to reacquire them?
HELD: YES. Providing added support to the
Ouanos and the Inocians right to repurchase
is what in Heirs of Moreno was referred to as
constructive trust, one that is akin to the
implied trust expressed in Art. 1454 of the
Civil Code, the purpose of which is to prevent
unjust enrichment. In the case at bench, the
Ouanos and the Inocians parted with their
respective lots in favor of the MCIAA, the
latter obliging itself to use the realties for the
expansion of Lahug Airport; failing to keep its
end of the bargain, MCIAA can be compelled
by the former landowners to reconvey the
parcels of land to them, otherwise, they
would be denied the use of their properties
upon a state of afairs that was not
conceived nor contemplated when the
expropriation was authorized. In efect, the
government merely held the properties
condemned in trust until the proposed public
use or purpose for which the lots were
condemned was actually consummated by
the government. Since the government
failed to perform the obligation that is the
basis of the transfer of the property, then the
lot owners Ouanos and Inocians can demand
the reconveyance of their old properties
after the payment of the condemnation
price.
In esse, expropriation is forced private
property taking, the landowner being really
without a ghost of a chance to defeat the
case of the expropriating agency. In other
words, in expropriation, the private owner is
deprived of property against his will. Withal,
the mandatory requirement of due process
ought to be strictly followed, such that the
state must show, at the minimum, a genuine
need, an exacting public purpose to take
private property, the purpose to be
specifically alleged or least reasonably
deducible from the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept,
has now acquired an expansive meaning to
include any use that is of "usefulness, utility,
or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit [of the public]." If the
genuine public necessitythe very reason or
condition as it wereallowing, at the first
instance, the expropriation of a private land
ceases or disappears, then there is no more
cogent point for the governments retention
of the expropriated land. The same legal
situation should hold if the government
devotes the property to another public use
very much diferent from the original or
deviates from the declared purpose to benefit
another private person. It has been said that
the direct use by the state of its power to oblige
landowners to renounce their productive
possession to another citizen, who will use it
predominantly for that citizens own private
gain, is ofensive to our laws.
A condemnor should commit to use the
property pursuant to the purpose stated in the
petition for expropriation, failing which it should
file another petition for the new purpose. If not,
then it behooves the condemnor to return the
said property to its private owner, if the latter
so desires. The government cannot plausibly
keep the property it expropriated in any manner
it pleases and, in the process, dishonor the
judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping
with the idea of fair play,
The notion, therefore, that the government,
viaexpropriation proceedings, acquires
unrestricted ownership over or a fee simple title
to the covered land, is no longer tenable.
Expropriated lands should be diferentiated
from a piece of land, ownership of which was
absolutely transferred by way of an
unconditional purchase and sale contract freely
entered by two parties, one without obligation
to buy and the other without the duty to sell. In
that case, the fee simple concept really comes
into play. There is really no occasion to apply
the "fee simple concept" if the transfer is
conditional. The taking of a private land in
expropriation proceedings is always conditioned
on its continued devotion to its public purpose.
As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is
terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then
the former owner, if he so desires, may seek its
reversion, subject of course to the return, at the
very least, of the just compensation received.
To be compelled to renounce dominion over a
piece of land is, in itself, an already bitter pill to
swallow for the owner. But to be asked to
sacrifice for the common good and yield
ownership to the government which reneges on
its assurance that the private property shall be
for a public purpose may be too much. But it
would be worse if the power of eminent domain
were deliberately used as a subterfuge to
benefit another with influence and power in the
political process, including development firms.
The mischief thus depicted is not at all far-
fetched with the continued application of Fery.
Even as the Court deliberates on these
consolidated cases, there is an uncontroverted
allegation that the MCIAA is poised to sell, if it
has not yet sold, the areas in question to Cebu
Property Ventures, Inc. This provides an added
dimension to abandon Fery.
- Genuine Necessity
CRISTINA DE KNECHT, vs. HON. PEDRO JL.
BAUTISTA
[G.R. No. L-51078, October 30, 1980]
FACTS: A petition for certiorari and
prohibition was filed by Cristina de Knecht
against the Honorable Pedro JL. Bautista, as
Judge presiding over CFI of Rizal, and the
Republic of the Philippines pines seeking that
judgment be rendered annulling the order for
immediate possession issued by respondent
court in the expropriation proceedings and
commanding respondents to desist from
further proceedings in the expropriation
action or the order for immediate possession
issued in said action, with costs.
And that a restraint order or writ of
preliminary injunction be issued ex-parte
enjoining respondents, their representative
representative and agents from enforcing
the here questioned order for mediate
posession petitioner ofering to post a bond
executed to the parties enjoined in an
amount to be fixed by the Court to the efect
that she will pay to such parties all damages
which they may sustain by reason of the
injunction if the Court should finally decide
she is not entitled there.
10 years ago, the government through the
Department of Public Workmen's and
Communication prepared a to EDSA to Roxas
Boulevard; that the proposed extension, an
adjunct of building program, the project
would pass through Cuneta Avenue up to
Roxas Boulevard that this route would be a
straight one taking into account the direction
of EDSA. Then Secretary Baltazar Aquino of
the Department of Public Highways directed
the City Engineer of Pasay City not to issue
temporary or permanent permits for the
construction and/or improvement of
buildings and other structures located within
the proposed extension through Cuneta
Avenue.
DPWH decided to make the proposed
extension go through Fernando Rein and Del
Pan Streets which are lined with old
substantial houses; that upon learning of the
changed the owners of the residential
houses that would be afected, the herein
petitioner being one of them.
Petitioner filed a formal petition to President
Ferdinand E. Marcos asking him to order the
Ministry of Public Highways to adoption, the
original plan of making the extension of
EDSA through Araneta Avenue instead of the
new plan going through Fernando Rein and
Del Pan Streets; that President Marcos
directed then Minister Baltazar Aquino to
explain within 24 hours why the proposed
project should not be suspended.
Minister Aquino submitted his explanation
defending the new proposed route; that the
President then referred the matter to the
Human Settlements Commission for
investigation and recommendation; that after
formal hearings to which all the parties
proponents and oppositors were given full
opportunity to ventilate their views and to
present their evidence, the Settlements
Commission submitted a report recommending
the reversion of the extension of EDSA to the
original plan passing through Cuneta Avenue;
and that notwithstanding the said report and
recommendation, the Ministry of Public
Highways insisted on implementing the plan to
make the extension of EDSA go through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Streets.
The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for
the issuance of a writ of possession of the
property sought to be expropriated on the
ground that said Republic had made the
required deposit with the Philippine National
Bank.
The respondent judge issued a writ of
possession authorizing the Republic of the
Philippines to take and enter upon the
possession of the properties sought be
condemned.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the plan to make the
extension of EDSA to Roxas Boulevard through
Fernando Rein and Del Pan Street be made?
2. Whether the respondent judge committed a
grave abuse of discretion in allowing the
Republic of the Philippines to take immediate
possession of the properties sought to be
expropriated?
HELD: From all the foregoing, the facts of
record and recommendations of the Human
Settlements Commission, it is clear that the
choice of Fernando Rein Del Pan Streets as
the line through which the Epifanio de los
Santos Avenue should be extended to Roxas
Boulevard is arbitrary and should not receive
judicial approval. The respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the Republic of the Philippines to take
immediate possession of the properties sought
to be expropriated.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition is
hereby granted. The order authorizing the
Republic of the Philippines to take or enter upon
the possession of the properties sought to be
condemned is set aside and the respondent
Judge is permanently enjoined from taking any
further action except to dismiss said case.
DE LA PAZ MASIKIP vs. JUDGE LEGASPI
[G.R. No. 136349, January 23, 2006]
FACTS: Petitioner Dela Paz Masikip is the
registered owner of a parcel of land with an
area of 4,521 square meters located at Pag-Asa,
Caniogan, Pasig City , Metro Manila. In a letter,
the then Municipality of Pasig, now City of Pasig,
respondent, notified petitioner of its intention to
expropriate a 1,500 square meter portion of her
property to be used for the "sports
development and recreational activities" of
the residents of Barangay Caniogan. This
was pursuant to Ordinance No. 42, enacted
by the then Sangguniang Bayan of Pasig .
Again, respondent wrote another letter to
petitioner, but this time the purpose was
allegedly "in line with the program of the
Municipal Government to provide land
opportunities to deserving poor sectors of
our community." Petitioner sent a reply to
respondent stating that the intended
expropriation of her property is
unconstitutional, invalid, and oppressive, as
the area of her lot is neither sufficient nor
suitable to "provide land opportunities to
deserving poor sectors of our community." In
its letter, respondent reiterated that the
purpose of the expropriation of petitioners
property is "to provide sports and
recreational facilities to its poor residents."
Subsequently, respondent filed with the
trial court a complaint for expropriation.
Respondent prayed that the trial court, after
due notice and hearing, issue an order for
the condemnation of the property; that
commissioners be appointed for the purpose
of determining the just compensation; and
that judgment be rendered based on the
report of the commissioners.
The trial court issued an Order denying the
Motion to Dismiss, on the ground that there
is a genuine necessity to expropriate the
property for the sports and recreational
activities of the residents of Pasig . As to the
issue of just compensation, the trial court
held that the same is to be determined in
accordance with the Revised Rules of Court.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration
but it was denied by the trial court.
Forthwith, it appointed the City Assessor and
City Treasurer of Pasig City as commissioners
to ascertain the just compensation. This
prompted petitioner to file with the Court of
Appeals a special civil action for certiorari.
The Appellate Court dismissed the petition
for lack of merit. Petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration was denied in a Resolution.
ISSUES: The questioned decision dated 31
october 1997 and resolution dated 20
november 1998 are contrary to law, the
rules of court and jurisprudence considering
that:
I. A. There is no evidence to prove that there
is genuine necessity for the taking of the
petitioners property.
B. There is no evidence to prove that the
public use requirement for the exercise of
the power of Eminent domain has been
complied with.
C. There is no evidence to prove that
respondent City of Pasig has complied with all
conditions precedent for the exercise of the
power of eminent domain.
The court a quos order, which were affirmed by
the court of appeals, efectively amount to the
taking of petitioners property without due
process of law:
II. The CA gravely erred in applying of rule on
actionable documents to the documents
attached to respondent city of pasig s
complaint to justify the court a quos denial of
petitioners responsive pleading to the
complaint for expropriation (the motion to
dismiss dated 21 april 1995).
III. The court of appeals gravely erred in
applying the rule on hypothetical admission of
facts alleged in a complaint considering that the
motion to dismiss filed by petitioner in the
expropriation case below was the responsive
pleading required to be filed under the then rule
67 of the rules of court and not an oridnary
motion to dismiss under rule 16 of the rules of
court.
HELD: On the two main issues one
substantive and one procedural
Petitioner filed her Motion to Dismiss the
complaint for expropriation on April 25, 1995. It
was denied by the trial court on May 7, 1996. At
that time, the rule on expropriation was
governed by Section 3, Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court which provides:
"SEC. 3. Defenses and objections. Within the
time specified in the summons, each defendant,
in lieu of an answer, shall present in a single
motion to dismiss or for other appropriate relief,
all his objections and defenses to the right of
the plaintif to take his property for the use or
purpose specified in the complaint. All such
objections and defenses not so presented are
waived. A copy of the motion shall be served on
the plaintifs attorney of record and filed with
the court with proof of service."
The motion to dismiss contemplated in the
above Rule clearly constitutes the responsive
pleading which takes the place of an answer to
the complaint for expropriation. Such motion is
the pleading that puts in issue the right of the
plaintif to expropriate the defendants property
for the use specified in the complaint. All that
the law requires is that a copy of the said
motion be served on plaintifs attorney of
record. It is the court that at its convenience will
set the case for trial after the filing of the said
pleading.
The CA therefore erred in holding that the
motion to dismiss filed by petitioner
hypothetically admitted the truth of the facts
alleged in the complaint, "specifically that there
is a genuine necessity to expropriate
petitioners property for public use." What
the trial court should have done was to set
the case for the reception of evidence to
determine whether there is indeed a genuine
necessity for the taking of the property,
instead of summarily making a finding that
the taking is for public use and appointing
commissioners to fix just compensation.
Significantly, the above Rule allowing a
defendant in an expropriation case to file a
motion to dismiss in lieu of an answer was
amended by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which took efect on July 1, 1997.
Section 3, Rule 67 now expressly mandates
that any objection or defense to the taking of
the property of a defendant must be set
forth in an answer.
The fact that the CA rendered its Decision on
October 31, after the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure took efect, is of no moment. It is
only fair that the Rule at the time petitioner
filed her motion to dismiss should govern.
The new provision cannot be applied
retroactively to her prejudice.
We now proceed to address the substantive
issue. The power of eminent domain is
lodged in the legislative branch of the
government. It delegates the exercise
thereof to local government units, other
public entities and public utility corporations,
subject only to Constitutional limitations.
Local governments have no inherent power
of eminent domain and may exercise it only
when expressly authorized by statute.
Section 19 of the Local Government Code of
1991 (Republic Act No. 7160) prescribes the
delegation by Congress of the power of
eminent domain to local government units
and lays down the parameters for its
exercise, thus: Judicial review of the exercise
of eminent domain is limited to the following
areas of concern: (a) the adequacy of the
compensation, (b) the necessity of the
taking, and (c) the public use character of
the purpose of the taking.
In this case, petitioner contends that
respondent City of Pasig failed to establish a
genuine necessity which justifies the
condemnation of her property. While she
does not dispute the intended public
purpose, nonetheless, she insists that there
must be a genuine necessity for the
proposed use and purposes. Evidently, there
is no "genuine necessity" to justify the
expropriation.
The right to take private property for public
purposes necessarily originates from "the
necessity" and the taking must be limited to
such necessity. In City of Manila v. Chinese
Community of Manila, we held that the very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of a public character.
Moreover, the ascertainment of the necessity
must precede or accompany and not follow, the
taking of the land.
Applying this standard, we hold that respondent
City of Pasig has failed to establish that there is
a genuine necessity to expropriate petitioners
property. Our scrutiny of the records shows that
the Certification issued by the Caniogan
Barangay Council dated November 20, 1994,
the basis for the passage of Ordinance No. 42 s.
1993 authorizing the expropriation, indicates
that the intended beneficiary is the Melendres
Compound Homeowners Association, a private,
non-profit organization, not the residents of
Caniogan. It can be gleaned that the members
of the said Association are desirous of having
their own private playground and recreational
facility. Petitioners lot is the nearest vacant
space available. The purpose is, therefore, not
clearly and categorically public.
Unless the requisite of genuine necessity for the
expropriation of ones property is clearly
established, it shall be the duty of the courts to
protect the rights of individuals to their private
property. Important as the power of eminent
domain may be, the inviolable sanctity which
the Constitution attaches to the property of the
individual requires not only that the purpose for
the taking of private property be specified. The
genuine necessity for the taking, which must be
of a public character, must also be shown to
exist.
The petition for review is GRANTED. The
challenged Decision and Resolution of the Court
of Appeals are REVERSED. The complaint for
expropriation filed before the trial court by
respondent City of Pasig is ordered DISMISSED.
MUNICIPALITY OF MEYCAUAYAN vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT [G.R.
No. 72126, January 29, 1988]
FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari
of the resolution by the former Intermediate
Appellate Court, now CA, setting aside its
earlier decision and dismissing the special civil
action for expropriation filed by the petitioner.
Respondent Philippine Pipes and Merchandising
Corporation filed with the Office of the
Municipal Mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan, an
application for a permit to fence a parcel of land
with a width of 26.8 meters and a length of
184.37 meters covered by TCT Nos. 215165 and
37879. The fencing of said property was
allegedly to enable the storage of the
respondent's heavy equipment and various
finished products such as large diameter steel
pipes, pontoon pipes for ports, wharves, and
harbors, bridge components, pre-stressed
girders and piles, large diameter concrete
pipes, and parts for low cost housing.
The Municipal Council of Meycauayan,
headed by then Mayor Celso R. Legaspi,
passed Resolution No. 258, manifesting the
intention to expropriate the respondent's
parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title No. 37879.
An opposition to the resolution was filed by
the respondent with the Office of the
Provincial Governor, which, in turn, created a
special committee of four members to
investigate the matter.
The Special Committee recommended that
the Provincial Board of Bulacan disapprove or
annul the resolution in question because
there was no genuine necessity for the
Municipality of Meycauayan to expropriate
the respondent's property for use as a public
road.
On the basis of this report, the Provincial
Board of Bulacan passed Resolution No. 238,
disapproving and annulling Resolution No.
258, of the Municipal Council of Meycauayan.
The respondent, then, reiterated to the
Office of the Mayor its petition for the
approval of the permit to fence the aforesaid
parcels of land.
However, the Municipal Council of
Meycauayan, now headed by Mayor Adriano
D. Daez, passed Resolution No. 21, for the
purpose of expropriating anew the
respondent's land. The Provincial Board of
Bulacan approved the aforesaid resolution.
Thereafter, the petitioner, filed with the RTC
of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch VI, a special civil
action for expropriation.
Upon deposit of the amount of P24,025.00,
which is the market value of the land, with
the Philippine National Bank, the trial court
issued a writ of possession in favor of the
petitioner.
The trial court issued an order declaring the
taking of the property as lawful and
appointing the Provincial Assessor of Bulacan
as court commissioner who shall hold the
hearing to ascertain the just compensation
for the property.
The respondent went to the Intermediate
Appellate Court on petition for review. The
appellate court affirmed the trial court's
decision. However, upon motion for
reconsideration by the respondent, the
decision was re-examined and reversed. The
appellate court held that there is no genuine
necessity to expropriate the land for use as a
public road as there were several other roads
for the same purpose and another more
appropriate lot for the proposed public road.
The court, taking into consideration the
location and size of the land, also opined
that the land is more Ideal for use as storage
area for respondent's heavy equipment and
finished products.
ISSUE: Whether the Municipality of
Meycauayan was right to exercise its power of
eminent domain to expropriate the
respondent's property for use as a public road?
HELD: This Court held that the foundation of
the right to exercise the power of eminent
domain is genuine necessity and that necessity
must be of a public character. Condemnation of
private property is justified only if it is for the
public good and there is a genuine necessity of
a public character. Consequently, the courts
have the power to inquire into the legality of
the exercise of the right of eminent domain and
to determine whether there is a genuine
necessity thereof. There is absolutely no
showing in the petition why the more
appropriate lot for the proposed road which was
ofered for sale has not been the subject of the
petitioner's attempt to expropriate assuming
there is a real need for another connecting
road.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED
for lack of merit. The questioned resolution of
the respondent court is AFFIRMED.
- Just Compensation (Defined)
CMSR. OF INTERNAL REVENUE VS CENTRAL
LUZON DRUG CORPORATION [GR No.
148512, June 26, 2006]
FACTS: From January 1995 to December 1995,
Central Luzon Drug Corporation has been
granting 20% discount on the sale of medicines
to qualified senior citizens amounting to
P219,778.00. Pursuant to Revenue Regulations
No. 2-94 implementing R.A. No. 7432, which
states that the discount given to senior citizens
shall be deducted by the establishment from its
gross sales for value-added tax and other
percentage tax purposes, respondent deducted
the total amount of P219, 778.00 from its gross
income for the taxable year 1995. Subsequently
on December 27, 1996, the Central Luzon Drug
Corporation claimed for a tax credit amounting
to P150, 193.00 (P219, 778.00 20% sales
discount given to senior citizen P69, 585.00
income tax).
Since the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
was not able to decide the claim for refund on
time, respondent filed a Petition for Review with
the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on March 18,
1998. However, this was dismissed by CTA
declaring that even if the 20% sales discount is
granted to senior citizens as a credit, this
cannot be applied when there is no tax liability
or the tax credit is greater than the tax due.
The respondent then filed with the CA a petition
for Review. The petition for the P 150, 193.00
tax credit was granted and the decision of the
CTA set aside, thus this instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether the 20% sales discount
granted by respondent to qualified senior
citizens pursuant to Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No.
7432 may be claimed as a tax credit or as a
deduction from gross sales in accordance
with Sec. 2(1) of Revenue Regulations No. 2-
94?
HELD: The 20% sales discount given to
senior citizens may be claimed as a tax
credit and not as a deduction from the gross
sales.
Wherefore the petition is DENIED and the
decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
Legal Basis:
Sec. 4(a) of R.A. No. 7432 provides:
Sec. 4. Privileges for the Senior citizens.
The senior citizens shall be entitled to the
following:
(a) The grant of twenty percent (20%)
discount from all establishments relative to
utilization of transportations services, hotels
and similar lodging establishments,
restaurants and recreation centers and
purchase of medicines anywhere in the
country: Provided, that private
establishments may claim the cost as tax
credit.
The above provision explicitly employed the
word tax credit. Nothing in the provision
suggests for it to mean a deduction from
gross sales. To construe it otherwise would
be a departure from the clear mandate of
the law.
It is a fundamental rule in statutory
construction that the legislative intent must
be determined from the language of the
statute itself especially when the words and
phrases therein are clear and unequivocal.
The statute in such a case must be taken to
mean exactly what it says. Its literal
meaning should be followed to depart from
the meaning expressed by the words is to
alter the statute.
The tax credit benefit granted to the
establishments can be deemed as their just
compensation for private property taken by
the State for public use. The privilege
enjoyed by the senior citizens does not come
directly from the State, but rather from the
private establishments concerned.
SANTIAGO ESLABAN, JR. vs. CLARITA
VDA. DE ONORIO
[G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001]
FACTS: This is a petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed the decision of the RTC, Surallah,
South Cotabato, ordering the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA for brevity) to
pay respondent the amount of P107,517.60 as
just compensation for the taking of the latters
property.
Respondent Clarita Vda. de Enorio is the owner
of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nio, South
Cotabato with an area of 39,512 square meters.
Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of the
NIA, approved the construction of the main
irrigation canal of the NIA on the said lot,
afecting a 24,660 square meter portion thereof.
Respondents husband agreed to the
construction of the NIA canal provided that they
be paid by the government for the area taken
after the processing of documents by the
Commission on Audit.
Sometime in 1983, a Right-of-Way agreement
was executed between respondent and the NIA
(Exh. 1). The NIA then paid respondent the
amount of P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages.
Respondent subsequently executed an Affidavit
of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she
waived any compensation for damages to crops
and improvements which she sufered as a
result of the construction of a right-of-way on
her property (Exh. 2). The same year, petitioner
ofered respondent the sum of P35,000.00 by
way of amicable settlement pursuant to
Executive Order No. 1035, 18, which provides
in part that
Financial assistance may also be given to
owners of lands acquired under C.A. 141, as
amended, for the area or portion subject to the
reservation under Section 12 thereof in such
amounts as may be determined by the
implementing agency/instrumentality
concerned in consultation with the Commission
on Audit and the assessors office concerned.
Respondent demanded payment for the taking
of her property, but petitioner refused to pay.
Accordingly, respondent filed a complaint
against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court, praying that petitioner be ordered to pay
the sum of P111,299.55 as compensation for
the portion of her property used in the
construction of the canal constructed by the
NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor-
General, filed an Answer, in which he admitted
that NIA constructed an irrigation canal over the
property of the plaintif and that NIA paid a
certain landowner whose property had been
taken for irrigation purposes, but petitioner
interposed the defense that: (1) the
government had not consented to be sued; (2)
the total area used by the NIA for its irrigation
canal was only 2.27 hectares, not 24,600
square meters; and (3) respondent was not
entitled to compensation for the taking of her
property considering that she secured title over
the property by virtue of a homestead patent
under C.A. No. 141.
At the pre-trial conference, the following
facts were stipulated upon: (1) that the area
taken was 24,660 square meters; (2) that it
was a portion of the land covered by TCT No.
T-22121 in the name of respondent and her
late husband (Exh. A); and (3) that this area
had been taken by the NIA for the
construction of an irrigation canal.
The trial court rendered a decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
TRIAL COURT RULING: In view of the
foregoing, decision is hereby rendered in
favor of plaintif and against the defendant
ordering the defendant, National Irrigation
Administration, to pay to plaintif the sum of
P107,517.60 as just compensation for the
questioned area of 24,660 square meters of
land owned by plaintif and taken by said
defendant NIA which used it for its main
canal plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence this petition.
ISSUES: 1. WON the petition is dismissible
for failure to comply with the provisions of
section 5, rule 7 of the revised rules of civil
procedure?
2. WON land granted by virtue of a
homestead patent and subsequently
registered under presidential decree 1529
ceases to be part of the public domain?
3. WON the value of just compensation shall
be determined from the time of the taking or
from the time of the finality of the decision?
4. WON the affidavit of waiver of rights and
fees executed by respondent exempts
petitioner from making payment to the
former?
HELD: First. Rule 7, 5 of the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure provides
Certification against forum shopping. The
plaintif or principal party shall certify under
oath in the complaint or other initiatory
pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and
simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he
has not theretofore commenced any action
or filed any claim involving the same issues
in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency
and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if
there is such other pending action or claim, a
complete statement of the present status
thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn
that the same or similar action or claim has
been filed or is pending, he shall report the
fact within five (5) days therefrom to the
court wherein his aforesaid complaint or
initiatory pleading has been filed.
Failure to comply with the foregoing
requirements shall not be curable by mere
amendment of the complaint or other initiatory
pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of
the case without prejudice, unless otherwise
provided, upon motion and after hearing . . . .
By reason of Rule 45, 4 of the 1997 Revised
Rules on Civil Procedure, in relation to Rule 42,
2 thereof, the requirement of a certificate of
non-forum shopping applies to the filing of
petitions for review on certiorari of the decisions
of the Court of Appeals, such as the one filed by
petitioner.
As provided in Rule 45, 5, "The failure of the
petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing
requirements regarding . . . the contents of the
document which should accompany the petition
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof."
The requirement in Rule 7, 5 that the
certification should be executed by the plaintif
or the principal means that counsel cannot sign
the certificate against forum-shopping. The
reason for this is that the plaintif or principal
knows better than anyone else whether a
petition has previously been filed involving the
same case or substantially the same issues.
Hence, a certification signed by counsel alone is
defective and constitutes a valid cause for
dismissal of the petition.
In this case, the petition for review was filed by
Santiago Eslaban, Jr., in his capacity as Project
Manager of the NIA. However, the verification
and certification against forum-shopping were
signed by Cesar E. Gonzales, the administrator
of the agency. The real party-in-interest is the
NIA, which is a body corporate. Without being
duly authorized by resolution of the board of the
corporation, neither Santiago Eslaban, Jr. nor
Cesar E. Gonzales could sign the certificate
against forum-shopping accompanying the
petition for review. Hence, on this ground alone,
the petition should be dismissed.
Second. Coming to the merits of the case, the
land under litigation, as already stated, is
covered by a transfer certificate of title
registered in the Registry Office of Koronadal,
South Cotabato on May 13, 1976. This land was
originally covered by Original Certificate of Title
No. (P-25592) P-9800 which was issued
pursuant to a homestead patent granted on
February 18, 1960. We have held:
Whenever public lands are alienated, granted or
conveyed to applicants thereof, and the deed
grant or instrument of conveyance [sales
patent] registered with the Register of Deeds
and the corresponding certificate and owners
duplicate of title issued, such lands are deemed
registered lands under the Torrens System and
the certificate of title thus issued is as
conclusive and indefeasible as any other
certificate of title issued to private lands in
ordinary or cadastral registration
proceedings.
The Solicitor-General contends, however,
that an encumbrance is imposed on the land
in question in view of 39 of the Land
Registration Act (now P.D. No. 1529, 44)
which provides:
Every person receiving a certificate of title in
pursuance of a decree of registration, and
every subsequent purchaser of registered
land who takes a certificate of title for value
in good faith shall hold the same free from
all encumbrances except those noted on said
certificate, and any of the following
encumbrances which may be subsisting,
namely:
Third. Any public highway, way, private way
established by law, or any government
irrigation canal or lateral thereof, where the
certificate of title does not state that the
boundaries of such highway, way, irrigation
canal or lateral thereof, have been
determined.
As this provision says, however, the only
servitude which a private property owner is
required to recognize in favor of the
government is the easement of a "public
highway, way, private way established by
law, or any government canal or lateral
thereof where the certificate of title does not
state that the boundaries thereof have been
pre-determined." This implies that the same
should have been pre-existing at the time of
the registration of the land in order that the
registered owner may be compelled to
respect it. Conversely, where the easement
is not pre-existing and is sought to be
imposed only after the land has been
registered under the Land Registration Act,
proper expropriation proceedings should be
had, and just compensation paid to the
registered owner thereof.6
In this case, the irrigation canal constructed
by the NIA on the contested property was
built only on October 6, 1981, several years
after the property had been registered on
May 13, 1976. Accordingly, prior
expropriation proceedings should have been
filed and just compensation paid to the
owner thereof before it could be taken for
public use.
Indeed, the rule is that where private
property is needed for conversion to some
public use, the first thing obviously that the
government should do is to ofer to buy it. If
the owner is willing to sell and the parties
can agree on the price and the other
conditions of the sale, a voluntary
transaction can then be concluded and the
transfer efected without the necessity of a
judicial action. Otherwise, the government
will use its power of eminent domain, subject
to the payment of just compensation, to acquire
private property in order to devote it to public
use.
Third. With respect to the compensation which
the owner of the condemned property is
entitled to receive, it is likewise settled that it is
the market value which should be paid or "that
sum of money which a person, desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing but not
compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to
be given and received therefore." Further, just
compensation means not only the correct
amount to be paid to the owner of the land but
also the payment of the land within a
reasonable time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be considered
"just" for then the property owner is made to
sufer the consequence of being immediately
deprived of his land while being made to wait
for a decade or more before actually receiving
the amount necessary to cope with his loss.
Nevertheless, as noted in Ansaldo v. Tantuico,
Jr., there are instances where the expropriating
agency takes over the property prior to the
expropriation suit, in which case just
compensation shall be determined as of the
time of taking, not as of the time of filing of the
action of eminent domain.
Before its amendment in 1997, Rule 67, 4
provided:
Order of condemnation. When such a motion
is overruled or when any party fails to defend as
required by this rule, the court may enter an
order of condemnation declaring that the
plaintif has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be condemned, for the public use or
purpose described in the complaint upon the
payment of just compensation to be determined
as of the date of the filing of the complaint. . . .
It is now provided that
SEC. 4. Order of expropriation. If the
objections to and the defense against the right
of the plaintif to expropriate the property are
overruled, or when no party appears to defend
as required by this Rule, the court may issue an
order of expropriation declaring that the plaintif
has a lawful right to take the property sought to
be expropriated, for the public use or purpose
described in the complaint, upon the payment
of just compensation to be determined as of the
date of the taking of the property or the filing of
the complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to expropriate
the property may be appealed by any party
aggrieved thereby. Such appeal, however, shall
not prevent the court from determining the just
compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the plaintif
shall not be permitted to dismiss or discontinue
the proceeding except on such terms as the
court deems just and equitable. (Emphasis
added)
Thus, the value of the property must be
determined either as of the date of the
taking of the property or the filing of the
complaint, "whichever came first." Even
before the new rule, however, it was already
held in Commissioner of Public Highways v.
Burgos that the price of the land at the time
of taking, not its value after the passage of
time, represents the true value to be paid as
just compensation. It was, therefore, error for
the Court of Appeals to rule that the just
compensation to be paid to respondent
should be determined as of the filing of the
complaint in 1990, and not the time of its
taking by the NIA in 1981, because petitioner
was allegedly remiss in its obligation to pay
respondent, and it was respondent who filed
the complaint. In the case of Burgos , it was
also the property owner who brought the
action for compensation against the
government after 25 years since the taking
of his property for the construction of a road.
Indeed, the value of the land may be
afected by many factors. It may be
enhanced on account of its taking for public
use, just as it may depreciate. As observed
in Republic v. Lara:
[W]here property is taken ahead of the
filing of the condemnation proceedings, the
value thereof may be enhanced by the public
purpose for which it is taken; the entry by
the plaintif upon the property may have
depreciated its value thereby; or there may
have been a natural increase in the value of
the property from the time it is taken to the
time the complaint is filed, due to general
economic conditions. The owner of private
property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses; it is not intended that
his compensation shall extend beyond his
loss or injury. And what he loses is only the
actual value of his property at the time it is
taken. This is the only way that
compensation to be paid can be truly just,
i.e., "just" not only to the individual whose
property is taken, "but to the public, which is
to pay for it" . . . .
In this case, the proper valuation for the
property in question is P16,047.61 per
hectare, the price level for 1982, based on
the appraisal report submitted by the
commission (composed of the provincial
treasurer, assessor, and auditor of South
Cotabato) constituted by the trial court to
make an assessment of the expropriated
land and fix the price thereof on a per
hectare basis.14
Fourth. Petitioner finally contends that it is
exempt from paying any amount to
respondent because the latter executed an
Affidavit of Waiver of Rights and Fees of any
compensation due in favor of the Municipal
Treasurer of Barangay Sto. Nio, South Cotabato
. However, as the Court of Appeals correctly
held:
If NIA intended to bind the appellee to said
affidavit, it would not even have bothered to
give her any amount for damages caused on
the improvements/crops within the appellees
property. This, apparently was not the case, as
can be gleaned from the disbursement voucher
in the amount of P4,180.00 (page 10 of the
Folder of Exhibits in Civil Case 396) issued on
September 17, 1983 in favor of the appellee,
and the letter from the Office of the Solicitor
General recommending the giving of "financial
assistance in the amount of P35,000.00" to the
appellee.
Thus, We are inclined to give more credence to
the appellees explanation that the waiver of
rights and fees "pertains only to improvements
and crops and not to the value of the land
utilized by NIA for its main canal."15
The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION to the
extent that the just compensation for the
contested property be paid to respondent in the
amount of P16,047.61 per hectare, with interest
at the legal rate of six percent (6%) per annum
from the time of taking until full payment is
made. Costs against petitioner.
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v.
HONEYCOMB FARMS CORPORATION [G.R.
No. 169903 : February 29, 2012]
FACTS: Honeycomb Farms Corporation
(Honeycomb Farms) was the registered owner
of two parcels of agricultural land in Cataingan,
Masbate. Honeycomb Farms voluntarily ofered
these parcels of land, with a total area of
495.1374 hectares, to the DAR for coverage
under the CARL. From the entire area ofered,
the government chose to acquire only 486.0907
hectares.
The LBP, as the agency vested with the
responsibility of determining the land valuation
and compensation for parcels of land acquired
pursuant to the CARL, and using the guidelines
set forth in DAR AO No. 17, series of 1989, as
amended by DAR AO No. 3, series of 1991, fixed
the value of these parcels of land.
When Honeycomb Farms rejected the LBPs and
the DARs valuation for being too low,
Honeycomb Farms filed a case with the RTC,
acting as a Special Agrarian Court (SAC),
against the DAR Secretary and the LBP, praying
that it be compensated for its landholdings in
the amount of P12,440,000.00, with damages
and attorneys fees.
The RTC constituted a Board of Commissioners
to aid the court in determining the just
compensation for the subject properties.
Since the Board of Commissioners could not
reach a common valuation for the properties,
the RTC made its own valuation. First, the
RTC took judicial notice of the fact that a
portion of the land, measuring approximately
10 hectares, is commercial land, since it is
located a few kilometers away from Sitio
Curvada, Pitago, Cataingan, Masbate, which
is a commercial district. The lower court thus
priced the 10 hectares at P100,000.00 per
hectare and the remaining 476 hectares at
P32,000.00 per hectare. Both parties
appealed to the CA.
The LBP argued that the RTC committed a
serious error when it disregarded the formula
for fixing just compensation embodied in
DAR AO No. 6, as amended by DAR AO No.
11. The LBP also argued that the RTC erred in
taking judicial notice that 10 hectares of the
land in question is commercial land.
In contrast, Honeycomb Farms maintains
that the DAR AOs were issued merely to
serve as guidelines for the DAR and the LBP
in administratively fixing the valuation to be
ofered by the DAR to the landowner for
acceptance or rejection. However, it is not
mandatory for courts to use the DAR AOs to
fix just compensation as this would amount
to an administrative imposition on an
otherwise purely judicial function and
prerogative of determination of just
compensation for expropriated lands
specifically reserved by the Constitution to
the courts.
The CA affirmed with modification the
assailed RTC judgment with respect to the
computation of the amount fixed by the trial
court and the award of attorneys fees is
deleted.
ISSUES: 1. WON the CA committed a serious
error of law when it failed to apply the
mandatory formula for determining just
compensation fixed in DAR AO No. 11, series
of 1994.?
2. WON the RTC correctly took judicial notice
of the nature of the subject land?
HELD: The case is remanded to the RTC for
the determination of just compensation
based on the applicable administrative
orders of the Department of Agrarian
Reform.
It is the RTC, sitting as a SAC, which has the
power to determine just compensation for
parcels of land acquired by the State,
pursuant to the agrarian reform program. In
Land Bank of the Philippines v. Sps. Banal,
the DAR, as the administrative agency
tasked with the implementation of the
agrarian reform program, already came up
with a formula to determine just
compensation which incorporated the factors
enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657.
In Landbank of the Philippines v. Celada, the
Court emphasized the duty of the RTC to apply
the formula provided in the applicable DAR AO
to determine just compensation, stating that:
While [the RTC] is required to consider the
acquisition cost of the land, the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and
income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the
tax declaration and the assessments made by
the government assessors to determine just
compensation, it is equally true that these
factors have been translated into a basic
formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making
power under Section 49 of R.A. No. 6657. As the
government agency principally tasked to
implement the agrarian reform program, it is
the DAR's duty to issue rules and regulations to
carry out the object of the law. [The] DAR
[Administrative Order] precisely "filled in the
details" of Section 17, R.A. No. 6657 by
providing a basic formula by which the factors
mentioned therein may be taken into account.
The [RTC] was at no liberty to disregard the
formula which was devised to implement the
said provision.
These rulings plainly impose on the RTC the
duty to apply the formula laid down in the
pertinent DAR administrative regulations to
determine just compensation. Clearly, the CA
and the RTC acted with grievous error when
they disregarded the formula laid down by the
DAR, and chose instead to come up with their
own basis for the valuation of the subject land.
THE OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
vs.
AYALA LAND INCORPORATED [G.R. No.
177056 Sept. 18, 2009]
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on
Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court, filed by petitioner seeking the reversal
and setting aside of the decision of CA which
affirmed the decision of RTC, which denied the
Motion for Reconsideration of OSG. The RTC
adjudged that respondents Ayala Land,
Robinsons, Shangri-la, and SM Prime could not
be obliged to provide free parking spaces in
their malls to their patrons and the general
public.
The Senate Committee on Trade and Commerce
found that the collection of parking fees by
shopping malls is contrary to National Building
Code and figuratively speaking, the Code has
expropriated the land for parking. Also,
Committee stated that the collection of parking
fees would be against Article II of RA 9734
(Consumer Act of the Philippines) as to the
States policy of protecting the interest of
consumers. Moreover, Section 201 of the
National Building Code gives the responsibility
for the administration and enforcement of the
provisions of the Code, including the
imposition of penalties for administrative
violations thereof to the Secretary of Public
Works. This is not being strictly followed as
the LGUs are tasked to discharge the
regulatory powers of DPWH instead of DPWH
instead.
As such, Senate Committee recommended
that: 1) Office of Solicitor General should
institute the action to enjoin the collction of
parking fees and enforce the sanctions for
violation of National Building Code; 2) DTI
pursuant to RA 7394 should enforce the
provisions of Code relative to parking; and 3)
Congress should amend and update the
National Building Code to prohibit the
collection of parking fees and its waiver of
liability.
Respondent SM Prime assailed the
recommendation of the Committee and filed
a Petition for Declaratory Relief under Rule
63 of the Revised Rules of Court against
DPWH and local building officials, contending
that: 1) Rule XIX of Implementing Rules and
Regulations of National Building Code is
unconstitutional and void; 2) respondent has
the legal right to lease parking spaces; and
3) National Building Code IRR is inefective
as it was not published for 3 consecutive
weeks in newspaper of general circulation as
mandated by Section 211 of PD 1096.
OSG then filed a Petition for Declaratory
Relief and Injunction (with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction) to the RTC against
respondents, prohibiting them from
collecting parking fees and contending that
their practice of charging parking fees is
violative of National Building Code.
The RTC held that: 1) OSG has the capacity
to institute the proceeding it being a
controversy of public welfare; 2) a petition
for declaratory relief is proper since all the
requisites are present; 3) the Building Code
with its IRR does not necessarily impose that
parking spaces shall be free of charge and
providing parking spaces for free can be
considered as unlawful taking of property
right without just compensation; and 4) there
was no sufficient evidence to justify any
award for damages. They deemed that the
respondents are not obligated to provide
parking spaces free of charge.
OSG appealed the decision to CA, saying
that RTC erred in holding that the National
Building Code did not intend the parking
spaces to be free of charge. On the
otherhand, respondent SM filed a separate
appeal to the CA, contending that: 1) RTC
erred in failing to declare Rule XIX of IRR as
unconstitutional; 2) RTC erred in failing to
declare IRR inefective for not having been
published as required by law; 3) RTC erred in
dismissing the OSGs petition for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies; and 4) RTC
erred in failing to declare that OSG has no legal
standing as it is not a real party-in-interest.
CA denied the appeals of both petitioners and
respondents on the following grounds: 1) OSG
did not fail to exhaust administrative remedies
and that an administrative review is not a
condition precedent to judicial relief where the
question in dispute is purely a legal one and
nothing of an administrative nature is to be or
can be done; 2) the validity of National Building
Code IRR cannot be proceeded as it was not
discussed in RTC and the controversy could be
settled on other grounds without touching the
issue of validity since the courts should refrain
from passing upon the constitutionality of a law;
and 3) Section 803 of National Building Code
and Rule XIX of IRR are clear that they are only
intended to control the occupancy of areas and
structures, and in the absence of provision of
law, respondents could not be obliged to
provide parking spaces free of charge.
As such, OSG presented itself to SC for the
instant Petition for Review.
ISSUES: 1. Whether the CA erred in affirming
the ruling of RTC that respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces to their
customers or the public.
2. Whether the petition of OSG for prohibiting
the collection of parking fees is a valid exercise
of the police power of State.
HELD: 1. No. The CA was correct in affirming
the ruling of RTC, and the respondents are not
obliged to provide free parking spaces. SC
found no merit in the OSGs petition:
Sec 803 of National Building Code.
Percentage of Site Occupancy states that
maximum site occupancy shall be governed by
the use, type of construction, and height of the
building and the use, area, nature, and location
of the site; and subject to the provisions of the
local zoning requirements and in accordance
with the rules and regulations promulgated by
the Secretary.
RULE XIX PARKING AND LOADING SPACE
REQUIREMENTS
Pursuant to Section 803 of the National Building
Code (PD 1096) providing for maximum site
occupancy, the following provisions on parking
and loading space requirements shall be
observed:
1. The parking space ratings listed below are
minimum of-street requirements for specific
uses/occupancies for buildings/structures:
1.1 The size of an average automobile parking
slot shall be computed as 2.4 meters by 5.00
meters for perpendicular or diagonal
parking, 2.00 meters by 6.00 meters for
parallel parking. A truck or bus
parking/loading slot shall be computed at a
minimum of 3.60 meters by 12.00 meters.
The parking slot shall be drawn to scale and
the total number of which shall be indicated
on the plans and specified whether or not
parking accommodations, are attendant-
managed. (See Section 2 for computation of
parking requirements).
1.7 Neighborhood shopping center 1
slot/100 sq. m. of shopping floor area
SECTION 102. Declaration of Policy
It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to safeguard life, health, property, and
public welfare, consistent with the principles
of sound environmental management and
control; and to this end, make it the purpose
of this Code to provide for all buildings and
structures, a framework of minimum
standards and requirements to regulate and
control their location, site, design, quality of
materials, construction, use, occupancy, and
maintenance.
The requirement of free-of-charge parking,
the OSG argues, greatly contributes to the
aim of safeguarding life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the
principles of sound environmental
management and control. Adequate parking
spaces would contribute greatly to
alleviating traffic congestion when
complemented by quick and easy access
thereto because of free-charge parking.
Moreover, the power to regulate and control
the use, occupancy, and maintenance of
buildings and structures carries with it the
power to impose fees and, conversely, to
control partially or, as in this case,
absolutely the imposition of such fees.
The explicit directive of the above is that
respondents, as operators/lessors of
neighborhood shopping centers, should
provide parking and loading spaces with the
minimum ratio of one slot per 100 square
meters of shopping floor area. There is
nothing therein pertaining to the collection
(or non-collection) of parking fees by
respondents. In fact, the term parking fees
cannot even be found at all in the entire
National Building Code and its IRR. One rule
of statutory construction is that if a statute is
clear and unequivocal, it must be given its
literal meaning and applied without any
attempt at interpretation. Since Section 803
of the National Building Code and Rule XIX of
its IRR do not mention parking fees, then
simply, said provisions do not regulate the
collection of the same
The OSG cannot rely on Section 102 of the
National Building Code to expand the
coverage of Section 803 of the same Code and
Rule XIX of the IRR, so as to include the
regulation of parking fees. The OSG limits its
citation to the first part of Section 102 of the
National Building Code declaring the policy of
the State to safeguard life, health, property,
and public welfare, consistent with the
principles of sound environmental management
and control; but totally ignores the second part
of said provision, which reads, and to this end,
make it the purpose of this Code to provide for
all buildings and structures, a framework of
minimum standards and requirements to
regulate and control their location, site, design,
quality of materials, construction, use,
occupancy, and maintenance. While the first
part of Section 102 of the National Building
Code lays down the State policy, it is the
second part thereof that explains how said
policy shall be carried out in the Code. Section
102 of the National Building Code is not an all-
encompassing grant of regulatory power to the
DPWH Secretary and local building officials in
the name of life, health, property, and public
welfare. On the contrary, it limits the regulatory
power of said officials to ensuring that the
minimum standards and requirements for all
buildings and structures, as set forth in the
National Building Code, are complied with.
Consequently, the OSG cannot claim that in
addition to fixing the minimum requirements for
parking spaces for buildings, Rule XIX of the IRR
also mandates that such parking spaces be
provided by building owners free of charge. If
Rule XIX is not covered by the enabling law,
then it cannot be added to or included in the
implementing rules. The rule-making power of
administrative agencies must be confined to
details for regulating the mode or proceedings
to carry into efect the law as it has been
enacted, and it cannot be extended to amend
or expand the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute.
Administrative regulations must always be in
harmony with the provisions of the law because
any resulting discrepancy between the two will
always be resolved in favor of the basic law.
2. No. The petition of OSG to prohibit collection
of parking fees is not a valid exercise of the
police power of State.
It is not sufficient for the OSG to claim that the
power to regulate and control the use,
occupancy, and maintenance of buildings and
structures carries with it the power to impose
fees and, conversely, to control, partially or, as
in this case, absolutely, the imposition of such
fees. Firstly, the fees within the power of
regulatory agencies to impose are regulatory
fees. It has been settled law in this jurisdiction
that this broad and all-compassing
governmental competence to restrict rights of
liberty and property carries with it the
undeniable power to collect a regulatory fee. It
looks to the enactment of specific measures
that govern the relations not only as
between individuals but also as between
private parties and the political society. True,
if the regulatory agencies have the power to
impose regulatory fees, then conversely,
they also have the power to remove the
same. Even so, it is worthy to note that the
present case does not involve the imposition
by the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials of regulatory fees upon respondents;
but the collection by respondents of parking
fees from persons who use the mall parking
facilities. Secondly, assuming arguendo that
the DPWH Secretary and local building
officials do have regulatory powers over the
collection of parking fees for the use of
privately owned parking facilities, they
cannot allow or prohibit such collection
arbitrarily or whimsically. Whether allowing
or prohibiting the collection of such parking
fees, the action of the DPWH Secretary and
local building officials must pass the test of
classic reasonableness and propriety of the
measures or means in the promotion of the
ends sought to be accomplished.
Without using the term outright, the OSG is
actually invoking police power to justify the
regulation by the State, through the DPWH
Secretary and local building officials, of
privately owned parking facilities, including
the collection by the owners/operators of
such facilities of parking fees from the public
for the use thereof. The Court finds,
however, that in totally prohibiting
respondents from collecting parking fees, the
State would be acting beyond the bounds of
police power.
Police power is the power of promoting the
public welfare by restraining and regulating
the use of liberty and property. It is usually
exerted in order to merely regulate the use
and enjoyment of the property of the owner.
The power to regulate, however, does not
include the power to prohibit. A fortiori, the
power to regulate does not include the
power to confiscate. Police power does not
involve the taking or confiscation of
property, with the exception of a few cases
where there is a necessity to confiscate
private property in order to destroy it for the
purpose of protecting peace and order and of
promoting the general welfare; for instance,
the confiscation of an illegally possessed
article, such as opium and firearms.
When there is a taking or confiscation of
private property for public use, the State is
no longer exercising police power, but
another of its inherent powers, namely,
eminent domain. Eminent domain enables
the State to forcibly acquire private lands
intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner.
Normally, of course, the power of eminent
domain results in the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the expropriated
property; but no cogent reason appears why the
said power may not be availed of only to
impose a burden upon the owner of condemned
property, without loss of title and possession. It
is a settled rule that neither acquisition of title
nor total destruction of value is essential to
taking. It is usually in cases where title remains
with the private owner that inquiry should be
made to determine whether the impairment of
a property is merely regulated or amounts to a
compensable taking. A regulation that deprives
any person of the profitable use of his property
constitutes a taking and entitles him to
compensation, unless the invasion of rights is
so slight as to permit the regulation to be
justified under the police power. Similarly, a
police regulation that unreasonably restricts the
right to use business property for business
purposes amounts to a taking of private
property, and the owner may recover therefor.
Although in the present case, title to and/or
possession of the parking facilities remain/s
with respondents, the prohibition against their
collection of parking fees from the public, for
the use of said facilities, is already tantamount
to a taking or confiscation of their properties.
The State is not only requiring that respondents
devote a portion of the latters properties for
use as parking spaces, but is also mandating
that they give the public access to said parking
spaces for free. Such is already an excessive
intrusion into the property rights of
respondents. Not only are they being deprived
of the right to use a portion of their properties
as they wish, they are further prohibited from
profiting from its use or even just recovering
therefrom the expenses for the maintenance
and operation of the required parking facilities.
In conclusion, the total prohibition against the
collection by respondents of parking fees from
persons who use the mall parking facilities has
no basis in the National Building Code or its IRR.
The State also cannot impose the same
prohibition by generally invoking police power,
since said prohibition amounts to a taking of
respondents property without payment of just
compensation.
RP VS GINGOYON [December 19, 2005]
FACTS: The construction of the NAIA 3 had
spawned controversies that had its roots with
the promulgation of the Courts decision in
Agan vs PIATCO (2003 decision), which nullified
the contract between the Government and the
contractor (PIATCO) for being contrary to law
and public policy. At the time of the
promulgation of the 2003 decision, the NAIA 3
facilities had already been built by PIATCO and
were nearing completion. and several
respondents filed their respective motions for
the reconsideration of the 2003 Decision but
were denied by the Court in its Resolution.
However, the Court this time squarely
addressed the issue of the rights of PIATCO
to refund, compensation or reimbursement
for its expenses in the construction of the
NAIA 3 facilities. After the promulgation of
the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have
remained in the possession of PIATCO.
The Government filed a Complaint for
expropriation with the Pasay City Regional
Trial Court (RTC).The Government sought for
the issuance of a writ of possession
authorizing it to take immediate possession
and control over the NAIA 3 facilities. The
Government also declared that it had
deposited 3 Billion in cash with the Land
Bank of the Philippines, representing the
assessed value for taxation purposes. This
was the case now presided by Honorable
Gingoyon. On the same day that the
complaint was filed, the RTC issued an
Order directing the issuance of a writ of
possession to the Government, authorizing it
to "take or enter upon the possession" of the
NAIA 3 facilities. This decision was based on
Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, which prescribes that the initial
deposit be equivalent to the assessed value
of the property for purposes of taxation,
however this was amended by Republic Act
No. 8974. RA 8974 provides that as the
relevant standard for initial compensation,
the market value of the property as stated in
the tax declaration or the current relevant
zonal valuation of the BIR, whichever is
higher, and the value of the improvements
and/or structures using the replacement cost
method.
On the basis of RA 8974, the RTC directed
first, that the Land Bank of the Philippines,
Baclaran Branch, immediately release the
amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO.
Second, the Government was directed to
submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability
of Funds signed by authorized officials to
cover the payment of just compensation.
Third, the Government was directed "to
maintain, preserve and safeguard" the NAIA
3 facilities or "perform such as acts or
activities in preparation for their direct
operation" of the airport terminal, pending
expropriation proceedings and full payment
of just compensation. The Government was
also not allowed to perform acts of
ownership like leasing any part of NAIA 3 to
other parties. The Government then filed an
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on the
assailed order.
The RTC issued another Order, the second
now assailed before this Court, which
appointed 3 Commissioners to ascertain the
amount of just compensation for the NAIA 3
Complex. And on the same day the
Government issued a Motion for Inhibition of
Hon. Gingoyon. These motions were heard by
the RTC but were denied in an Omnibus Order.
Thus the present petition for Certiorari for the
nullification of the RTC orders dated January 4, 7
and 10, 2005 and for the inhibition of Hon.
Gingoyon from taking further action on the
expropriation case.
ISSUE: Whether Rule 67 of the Rules of Court or
Rep. Act No. 8974 governs the expropriation
proceedings in this case
HELD: Rep. Act No. 8974 applies in this case,
particularly insofar as it requires the immediate
payment by the Government of at least the
profered value of the NAIA 3 facilities to PIATCO
and provides certain valuation standards or
methods for the determination of just
compensation.
Since funds have been spent by PIATCO in their
construction, for the to take over the said
facility, it has to compensate respondent
PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The
compensation must be just and in accordance
with law and equity for the government cannot
unjustly enrich itself at the expense of PIATCO
and its investors.
Sec 2 Rule 67, states that plaintif shall have
the right to take or enter upon the possession of
the real property involved if he deposits with
the authorized government depositary an
amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be held by
such bank subject to the orders of the court.
In contrast, Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 8974
relevantly states:
Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due
notice to the defendant, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the
property the amount equivalent to the sum of
one hundred percent of the value of the
property based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue;
and the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7.
If Sec2 Rule 67 applies then PIATCO would be
enjoined from receiving a single centavo as just
compensation before the Government takes
over the NAIA 3 facility by virtue of a writ of
possession.
Hence the Court ruled that just compensation
should be made before the Government may
take over the NAIA 3.
RP VS IAC [GR No. 146062, June 28,
2001]
FACTS: A property consisting of 4 parcels of
land with a total area of 9,650 square meters
was the subject of expropriation. Its previous
owner, Avegon Inc., ofered it for sale to the City
School Board of Manila at P2, 300,000. The
school board was willing to buy at P1,
800,000 but the then Mayor of Manila
intervened and volunteered to negotiate with
Avegon Inc. for a better price.
Avegon Inc. sold the property and its
improvements to Amerex Electronics Phils.
Corporation for P1, 800,000.00. The Solicitor
General filed for the Department of
Education and Culture (DEC) a complaint
against Amerex for the expropriation of said
property before the Court of First Instance of
Manila. The complaint stated that the
property was needed by the government as
a permanent site for the Manuel de la Fuente
High School. The fair market value of the
property had been declared by Amerex as
P2, 435,000, and the assessor determined
the market value as P2, 432,042. The
assessed amount for taxation purposes is P1,
303,470 and was deposited with the PNB on
September 30, 1975. The Government was
able to take actual possession of the
property. Amerex then filed a motion to
dismiss citing the issue on just compensation
to be fixed at P2, 432,042, the market value
of the property determined by the assessor
which was lower than Amerex's own
declaration.
The motion to dismiss was opposed by the
plaintif saying that they can present
evidence of a much lower market value.
Amerex then filed a motion to withdraw the
deposit of P1,303,470 with the PNB without
the plaintif opposing provided that an order
of condemnation be issued to allow plaintif
to present evidence on the matter of just
compensation.
The plaintif filed a motion for leave of court
to amend its complaint stating that after it
had filed the same, P.D. No. 464was
amended by P.D. No. 794 and that the
amended complaint would state that the fair
market value of the property could not be in
excess of P1,800,000, the amount for which
defendant's predecessor-in-interest had
ofered to sell said properties to the Division
of Public Schools of Manila and which
amount was also the purchase price paid by
Amerex to Avegon Inc. This was denied by
the lower court, but after the plaintif filed a
motion for reconsideration, the lower court
admitted the amended complaint. Audited
financial statements were submitted by
Amerex and the statements yielded the
amount of P2, 258,018.48 as the total value
of the property.
The plaintif filed a motion to disqualify
Engineer Aurelio B. Aquino as commissioner
on the ground that he could not be expected
to be unbiased inasmuch as in the three
appraisal reports submitted by Amerex.
Amerex opposed the motion to disqualify
Aquino as commissioner, and the court, in its
order denied it. The commissioner then filed his
appraisal for the fair market value of the
property which is P2, 258,018.57 for purposes
of determining just compensation payable to
defendant AMEREX. The plaintif objected the
report and reiterated that the value should be
only P1, 800, 00.00. Basing it on the evidence,
the court ruled to fix the market value at of
P2,258.018.57 for just compensation, hence the
plaintif elevated the case to the then
Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) for review.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not respondent Court
erred in not disqualifying Commissioner Aurelio
B. Aquino from membership in the Committee
of Appraisal?
2. Whether or not respondent Court erred in
totally disregarding petitioner's evidence
showing that the award of just compensation
should be only P1, 800,000.00?
HELD: 1.No, the court did not err in not
disqualifying Commissioner Aquino. The report
of the commissioners is merely advisory and
recommendatory in character as far as the
court is concerned. The court may choose to
take action or to set aside the report or appoint
new commissioners, hence it really does not
matter if the commissioner had a pre conceived
and biased valuation of the property. The
determination of just compensation for a
condemned property is basically a judicial
function and not bound by its Commissioners.
2. No, the Court did not err in disregarding 's
evidence showing that the award of just
compensation should be only P1, 800,000.00.
Petitioner failed to substantiate its claim that
the property is worth lower than P1, 800,000
basing it on the value when it was first ofered
for sale to the City School Board of Manila. The
appraisal made by Ampil Realty and Appraisal
Co., Inc. on June 5, 1975, which date is nearest
to that of the actual taking of the property,
should be the basis for the determination of just
compensation the record being bereft of any
indications of anomaly appertaining thereto.
Wenceslao Ampil, the president of said
appraisal firm, also had testified at the trial and
therefore petitioner had the opportunity to
confront him and to question his report.
WHEREFORE, the just compensation of the
property expropriated for the use of the Manuel
de la Fuente High School Don Mariano Marcos
Memorial High School) is hereby fixed at
P2,400,000.00. After deducting the amount of
P1, 303,470.00 therefrom, the petitioner shall
pay the balance with legal interest from
October 13, 1975.
- Just Compensation (Determination)
BELEN vs. CA [195 SCRA 59]
FACTS: A small portion of land measuring a
100 square meters, more or less, belonging
to the Manotoc Services, Inc. was leased to
Pedro M. Belen. That piece of land is known
as Lot No. 10, Block 18 and is situated at
Sunog Apog, Tondo, Manila. On it stood a
house built by Belen.
Part of the land came to be occupied by
Alfredo Juliano and his family in the early
part of 1978; Juliano bought a house
standing thereon, not belonging to Belen,
and move in without the latters knowledge.
On learning of this, Belen had a talk with
Juliano, and they came to an agreement that
Juliano could continue staying on the land
temporarily and would pay one half of the
rental to Manotoc Reality, inc. Later a fire
razed both Belens and Julianos houses to
the ground. Belen told Juliano not to build
anything on the land anymore. However, on
julianos pleas, Belen acceded to Julianos
continued stay on the land on the explicit
condition that his occupancy should not be
longer than two and a half years. When
Juliano failed to leave the premises after the
stipulated term despite demand, Belen
brought suit in the Metropolitan Trial Court
sometime in September, 1982, and
succeeded in obtaining judgment a order of
the MTC to the defendant to vacate the
subject lot and pay plaintif the amount of
P3,000.00 as a attorneys fees, plus cost of
suit.
Juliano appealed to the RTC of manila. That
court reversed the judgment of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, but the decision was
made to rest on the expropriation of the
Manotoc Estate efected by Presidential
Decree No. 1670, where the Manotoc Reality
Incorporated ceased to be the owner of the
land.
Belen has perfected an appeal by certiorari
to SC and prays for judgment on the
following essential propostions that Manotoc
Reality Services has been denied of its right
of just compensation, not having receive any
money as payment for the subject property,
and the NHA not having taken possession
thereof in an appropriate action of eminent
domain.
ISSUE: Is the passage of Presidential Decree
No. 1670 constitutional, whereas it
disregarded the right of compensation and
due process of law?
HELD: Presidential Decree No 1670,
together with the companion decree,
numbered 1669 was struck down by this
court as unconstitutional and therefore, null
and void. The Court found that both decrees,
being violative of the petitioners (owners)
right to due process of law.
The court said on the determination of just
compensation: The decrees do not by
themselves, provide for any form of hearing or
procedure by which the petitioners can question
the propriety of the expropriation of their
properties or the reasonableness of the just
compensation.
Having failed to provide for a hearing, the
government should have filed an expropriation
case under Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
WHEREFORE, PD 1670 being void ab initio, all
acts done in reliance thereon and in accordance
therewith must also be viod ab initio, including
particularly the taking of possession of property
by the National Housing Authority and its
attempts to convert the same into a housing
project and the selection of the beneficiaries
thereof.
EPZA vs. DULAY [149 SCRA 305 (1987)]
FACTS: The President of the Philippines, issued
Proclamation No. 1811, reserving a certain
parcel of land of the public domain situated in
the city of Lapu-Lapu, Island of Mactan, Cebu
and covering a total area of 1,193,669 square
meters, more or less, for the establishment of
an export processing zone by petitioner Export
Processing Zone Authority (EPZA).
Not all the reserved area, however, was public
land. it included four parcel of land registered in
the name of private individual. The petitioner,
therefore ofered to purchase the parcels of
land from the respondent in accordance with
the valuation set forth in section 92, P.D. No.
464, as amended. The parties failed to reach an
agreement regarding the sale of the property.
The petitioner filed with the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu, Branch Lapu-Lapu City, a
complaint for expropriation with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of possession against the
private respondent, to expropriate the parcel of
land in pursuant to P.D. 66, as amended, which
empowers the petitioner to acquire by
condemnation proceedings any property for the
establishment of export processing zones in
relation to Proclamation No. 1811.
The respondent judge issued a writ of
possession authorizing the petitioner to take
immediate possession of the premises. The
private respondent filed its answer.
At the pre-trial conference, the respondent
judge issued an order stating that the parties
have agreed that the only issue to be resolved
is the just compensation for the properties and
that the pre-trial is thereby terminated and the
hearing on the merits is set on April 2, 1981.
The respondent judge issued the order
appointing certain persons as commissioners to
ascertain and report to the court the just
compensation for the properties sought to be
expropriated.
Subsequently the three commissioners
submitted their consolidated report
recommending a certain amount of P15.00
per square meter as the fair and reasonable
value of just compensation of the properties.
The petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order and objection to
commissioners report on the grounds that
P.D. No 1533 has superseded Sections 5 to 8
Rule 67 of the rules of court on the
ascertainment of just compensation must
not exceed the maximum amount set by P.D.
No. 1533. In addition the petitioner filed a
petition for certiorari and mandamus with
temporary restraining order, enjoining the
trial court from enjoining the order.
ISSUE: Whether or not Sections 5 to 8, Rule
67 of the revised rules of court had been
repealed or deemed amended by P.D. NO.
1533 insofar as appointment of
commissioners are concerned. Stated in
another way, is the exclusive and mandatory
mode of determining just compensation in
P.D. NO. 1533 valid and constitutional?
HELD: The method of ascertaining just
compensation under the aforecited decrees
constitutes impermissible encroachment on
judicial prerogatives. It tends to render this
court inutile in a matter which under the
constitution is reserved to it for final
determination. The courts task would be
relegated to simply stating the lower value
of the property as declared either by the
owner or the assessor and its choice must be
limited to the lower of the two. However, the
strict application of the decrees during the
proceedings would be nothing short of a
mere formality or a charade.the court cannot
exercise its discretion or independence in
determining what is just or fair. The court is
empowered to appoint commissioners to
assess the just compensation of these
properties under eminent domain
proceedings in order for the owner of the
property is entitled to recover the fair and
full value of the lot. In fine, the decree only
establishes a uniform basis for determining
just compensation which the court may
consider as one of the factors in arriving at
just compensation, as envisage in the
constitution. The executive department or
the legislature may make the initial
determinations but when a party claims a
violation of the guarantee in the Bill of
Rights, no statute, decree or executive order
can mandate that its own determination
shall prevail over the courts findings. The
determination of just compensation in
eminent domain cases is a judicial function.
We, therefore, hold that P.D. No. 1533, which
eliminates the courts discretion to appoint
commissioners pursuant to Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court, is unconstitutional and void.
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY Vs.
HONORABLE GREGORIO G. PINEDA [G.R.
No. L-59791 February 13, 1992]
FACTS: Petitioner MERALCO is a domestic
corporation duly organized and existing under
the laws of Philippines. Respondent Honorable
Judge Gregorio G. Pineda is impleaded in his
official capacity as the presiding judge of the
CFI (now RTC) of Rizal. While private
respondents Teofilo Arayon, Sr., Gil de Guzman,
Lucito Santiago and Teresa Bautista are owners
in fee simple of the expropriated property
situated at Malaya, Pililla, Rizal.
A complaint for eminent domain was filed by
petitioner MERALCO against 42 defendants with
the CFI (now RTC) of Rizal. The complaint
alleges that for the purpose of constructing a
230 KV Transmission line from Barrio Malaya to
Tower No. 220 at Pililla, Rizal, petitioner needs
portions of the land of the private respondents
consisting of an aggregate area of 237,321
square meters. Despite petitioner's ofers to
pay compensation and attempts to negotiate
with the respondents', the parties failed to
reach an agreement.
The petitioner strongly maintains that the
respondent court's act of determining and
ordering the payment of just compensation to
private respondents without formal presentation
of evidence by the parties on the reasonable
value of the property constitutes a flagrant
violation of petitioner's constitutional right to
due process. It stressed that respondent court
ignored the procedure laid down by the law in
determining just compensation because it
formulated an opinion of its own as to the value
of the land in question without allowing the
Board of Commissioners to hold hearings for the
reception of evidence.
ISSUE: WON the respondent court can dispense
with the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners in an expropriation proceeding
and determine for itself the just compensation?
RULING: Respondent judge, in the case at bar,
arrived at the valuation of P40.00 per square
meter on a property declared for real estate tax
purposes at P2.50 per hectare on the basis of a
"Joint Venture Agreement on Subdivision and
Housing Projects" executed by A.B.A Homes and
private respondents on June 1, 1972. This
agreement was merely attached to the motion
to withdraw from petitioner's deposit.
Respondent judge arrived at the amount of just
compensation on its own, without the proper
reception of evidence before the Board of
Commissioners. Private respondents as
landowners have not proved by competent
evidence the value of their respective
properties at a proper hearing. Likewise,
petitioner has not been given the
opportunity to rebut any evidence that would
have been presented by private
respondents.
In an expropriation case such as this one
where the principal issue is the
determination of just compensation, a trial
before the Commissioners is indispensable to
allow the parties to present evidence on the
issue of just compensation.
Contrary to the submission of private
respondents, the appointment of at least
three (3) competent persons as
commissioners to ascertain just
compensation for the property sought to be
taken is a mandatory requirement in
expropriation cases. While it is true that the
findings of commissioners may be
disregarded and the court may substitute its
own estimate of the value, the latter may
only do so for valid reasons, i.e., where the
Commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them
or where they have disregarded a clear
preponderance of evidence, or where the
amount allowed is either grossly inadequate
or excessive (Manila Railroad Company v.
Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286).
Thus, trial with the aid of the commissioners
is a substantial right that may not be done
away with capriciously or for no reason at all.
Moreover, in such instances, where the
report of the commissioners may be
disregarded, the trial court may make its
own estimate of value from competent
evidence that may be gathered from the
record. The aforesaid joint venture
agreement relied upon by the respondent
judge, in the absence of any other proof of
valuation of said properties, is incompetent
to determine just compensation.
Prior to the determination of just
compensation, the property owners may
rightfully demand to withdraw from the
deposit made by the condemnor in eminent
domain proceedings. Upon an award of a
smaller amount by the court, the property
owners are subject to a judgment for the
excess or upon the award of a larger sum,
they are entitled to a judgment for the
amount awarded by the court. Thus, when
the respondent court granted in the Orders,
the motions of private respondents for
withdrawal of certain sums from the deposit
of petitioner, without prejudice to the just
compensation that may be proved in the
final adjudication of the case, it committed
no error.
Records, specifically Meralco's deed of sale
in favor of Napocor show that the latter
agreed to purchase the parcels of land
already acquired by Meralco, the rights,
interests and easements over those parcels of
land which are the subject of the expropriation
proceedings, as well as those parcels of land
occupied by Meralco by virtue of grant of
easements of right-of-way. Thus, Meralco had
already ceded and in fact lost all its rights and
interests over the aforesaid parcels of land in
favor of Napocor. In addition, the same contract
reveals that the Napocor was previously
advised and actually has knowledge of the
pending litigation and proceedings against
Meralco . Hence, We find the contention of the
petitioner tenable. It is therefore proper for the
lower court to either implead the Napocor in
substitution of the petitioner or at the very least
implead the former as party plaintif.
All premises considered, this Court is convinced
that the respondent judge's act of determining
and ordering the payment of just compensation
without the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners is a flagrant violation of
petitioner's constitutional right to due process
and is a gross violation of the mandated rule
established by the Revised Rules of Court.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED and the
order issued by the respondent judge insofar as
it finally determined the amount of just
compensation is nullified. This case is hereby
ordered remanded to the lower court for trial
with the assistance of a Board of
Commissioners. Further, the National Power
Corporation is impleaded as party plaintif
therein.
REPUBLIC VS. SANTOS [G. R. No. L-57524
January 8, 1986]
FACTS: The case is an expropriation case which
involved the 66,096 square meters of land
claimed by 44 persons, located in Paranaque
and Muntinlupa, Rizal. The expropriation was
necessary for the widening of, and construction
of interchanges in the Manila South Diversion
Road. The Appraisal Committee for the province
of Rizal fixed at P40 per square meter, or an
amount of P2, 641,190. The Government
deposited that amount with the provincial
treasurer who deposited it in the Philippine
National Bank but some of the respondents
withdrew including Maura Santos. The Court of
First Instance at Pasig, Rizal in its order of June
19, 1969 granted the fiscal's motion fixing the
provisional value at P2, 641,190. 14 claimants
did not object to the valuation of P40 a square
meter. As to those who did not settle at the
price of P40 a square meter, the trial court,
pursuant to section 5, Rule 67 of the Rules of
Court, appointed three commissioners to
determine the just compensation: Benjamin
Morales for the court as chairman; Pacifico
Javier, the provincial assessor, for the Republic,
and Pacifico I. Guzman for the claimants. The
commissioners in their report recommended
that the just compensation for the lands should
be P100 a square meter except the land of
Maura Santos with an area of 25,909 square
meters. The trial court in its decision
modified that recommendation. It fixed P100
a square meter as the uniform price to be
paid to the claimants. The Court of Appeals
in its decision in turn modified the trial
court's decision and adopted the
commissioners' report and it added 6% legal
rate of interest.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the just
compensation to be paid by the Government
is 40 or 100, as recommended by the
commissioners.
2.Whether or not the Appellate Court erred
in not holding that the commissioners should
not have relied on the price of P100 for the
land of Jose Alcaraz which was sold in
November, 1969 and on other irrelevant
evidence.
3.Whether or not Appellate Court erred in
disregarding the fact that 14 out of the 44
claimants already sold their lots to the
Republic at P40 a square meter.
HELD: We hold that the trial court and the
Appellate Court erred in relying on the
commissioners' report whose
recommendation was not substantiated by
trustworthy evidence. As pointed out by the
Assistant Solicitor General, the appraisal of
P100 a square meter for the land of Alcaraz
was made about eight months after the filing
of the instant expropriation case. In
Presidential Decree No. 1533 provides that
just compensation should be the value of the
land "prior to the recommendation or
decision of the appropriate Government
office to acquire the property." In the case, it
should be noted that the expropriation
undeniably increased the value of the
remainder of her land with an area of
121,700 square meters. She was already
paid P1, 036,360 for her expropriated land.
Furthermore, the commissioners should not
have glossed over the undisputed fact that
14 claimants out of 44 had winningly sold
their lands to the Government at P40 a
square meter as fixed by the provincial
Appraisal Committee of which the provincial
assessor was a member. Evidently, they
were satisfied that that was a reasonable
price. According to section 8 of Rule 67, the
court is not bound by the commissioners'
report. It may make such order or render
such judgment as shall secure to the plaintif
the property essential to the exercise of his
right of condemnation, and to the defendant
just compensation for the property
expropriated.
As noted in the Velasquez case, the moment
a parcel of land is sought to be condemned,
the price, for some occult reason,
immediately soars far beyond what the owner
would think of asking or receiving in the open
market. Owners ask fabulous prices for it and
neighbours look on with an indulgent smile or
even persuade themselves that the land is
worth the price for which the owner holds out in
view of the fact that it is wanted by an entity
whose financial resources are supposed to be
inexhaustible. Consequently, the petitioner
should pay only P40 per square meter for the
expropriated lands. CMC (CMS) Investments,
Inc. was paid P35 a square meter for its 530
square meters. It is entitled to a deficiency on
which 6% legal rate of interest per annum
should be paid from the time the petitioner took
possession of its land up to the date of
payment. The decisions of the trial court and
the Court of Appeals are reversed and set aside.
The just compensation for the lands described
in paragraph 2 of petitioner's complaint is P40
per square meter.
SPS. EDMOND LEE VS. LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES
[G.R. No. 170422]
FACTS: Petitioners received a notice of
coverage informing them that their landholding
is covered by the governments compulsory
acquisition scheme pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No.
6657). On 1 June 2001, they received from the
DAR a copy of the notice of land valuation and
acquisition which contains an ofer of
P315,307.87 as compensation for 3.195
hectares of the property. Petitioners rejected
the ofer.
Subsequently, a summary administrative
proceeding was conducted by the Department
of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB)
to determine the valuation and compensation of
the subject property. The DARAB issued a
decision declaring that the Land Bank of the
Philippines (LBP) fully complied with the criteria
set forth in R.A. No. 6657 in determining the
value of the land, and ordered the LBP to pay
petitioners the original amount ofered by DAR.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the
decision, but their motion was denied by the
Provincial Adjudicator.
The CA held that since the taking of private
lands under the agrarian reform program
partakes of the nature of an expropriation
proceeding, the SAC should have appointed
competent and disinterested commissioners to
assist it in valuating the property in question,
following Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure. It remanded the case to the
trial court for proper and judicious
determination of just compensation, appointing
for that purpose a set of commissioners.
ISSUE: Was the SAC correct ?
HELD: No, The SACs reliance on the valuation
made by the appraisal company is misplaced,
since the valuation was not arrived at using
the factors required by the law and
prescribed by the AO No. 5.
Section 17 of R.A. No. 6657 which
enumerates the factors to be considered in
determining just compensation reads:
SECTION 17. Determination of Just
Compensation.In determining just
compensation, the cost of acquisition of the
land, the current value of like properties, its
nature, actual use and income, the sworn
valuation by the owner, tax declarations, and
the assessment made by government
assessors shall be considered. The social and
economic benefits contributed by the
farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property as well as the
non-payment of taxes or loans secured from
any government financing institutions on the
said land shall be considered as additional
factors to determine its valuation.
The court find that the factors required by
the law and enforced by the DAR
Administrative Order were not observed by
the SAC when it adopted wholeheartedly the
valuation arrived at in the appraisal report.
According to the appraisal company, it
personally inspected the property,
investigated local market conditions, and
have given consideration to the extent,
character and utility of the property; sales
and holding prices of similar land; and
highest and best use of the property. The
value of the land was arrived at using the
market data approach, which bases the
value of the land on sales and listings of
comparable property registered within the
vicinity. In fact, as noted by the Court of
Appeals, a representative of the company
admitted that it did not consider the CARP
valuation to be applicable.
- Just Compensation (When
Determined)
ANSALDO VS. TANTUICO [G. R. No. L-
50147 August 3, 1990]
FACTS: 2 lots of private ownership were
taken by the Government and used for the
widening of a road for more than 43 years,
without benefit of an action of eminent
domain or agreement with its owners. The
owners of the land are Jose Ma. Ansaldo and
Maria Angela Ansaldo, are covered by title in
their names and have an aggregate area of
1,041 square meters. These lots were taken
from the Ansaldos sometime in 1947 by the
Department of Public Work Transportation
and Communication and made part of what
used to be Sta. Mesa Street and is now
Ramon Magsaysay Avenue at San Juan,
Metro Manila. The said owners did not make
any action until 26 years later asking for the
compensation of their land.
The case was referred to the Secretary of
Justice who rendered an opinion that the just
compensation be made in accordance with PD
76 which provide that the basis for the payment
of just compensation of property taken for
public use should be the current and fair market
value thereof as declared by the owner or
administrator, or such market value as
determined by the assessor, whichever was
lower. Commissioner of Public Highways
requested the Provincial Assessor of Rizal to
make a redetermination of the market value of
the Ansaldos' property in accordance with PD
76. The new valuation was made, after which
the Auditor of the Bureau of Public Highways
forwarded the Ansaldos' claim to the Auditor
General with the recommendation that payment
be made on the basis of the current and fair
market value and not on the fair market value
at the time of taking. The Commission on Audit
declined the recommendation and decided that
the compensation be from the actual time of
the taking of the land.
ISSUE: (As to the precise time the just
compensation be based) Whether or not the
just compensation be based on the time of the
actual taking of the possession or PD 76?
HELD: In the context of the State's inherent
power of eminent domain, there is a taking
when the owner is actually deprived or
dispossessed of his property; when there is a
practical destruction or a material impairment
of the value of his property or when he is
deprived of the ordinary use thereof. There is a
taking in this sense when the expropriator
enters private property not only for a
momentary period but for a more permanent
duration, for the purpose of devoting the
property to a public use in such a manner as to
oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial
enjoyment thereof. For ownership, after all, "is
nothing without the inherent rights of
possession, control and enjoyment. Where the
owner is deprived of the ordinary and beneficial
use of his property or of its value by its being
diverted to public use, there is taking within the
Constitutional sense. Under these norms, there
was undoubtedly a taking of the Ansaldos'
property when the Government obtained
possession thereof and converted it into a part
of a thoroughfare for public use.
It is as of the time of such a taking, to repeat,
that the just compensation for the property is to
be established. As stated in Republic v.
Philippine National Bank;
When plaintif takes possession before the
institution of the condemnation proceedings,
the value should be fixed as of the time of the
taking of said possession, not of filing of the
complaint and the latter should be the basis for
the determination of the value, when the taking
of the property involved coincides with or is
subsequent to, the commencement of the
proceedings. Indeed, otherwise, the
provision of Rule 69, Section 3, directing that
compensation be determined as of the date
of the filing of the complaint' would never be
operative. As intimated in Republic v. Lara
(supra), said provision contemplates normal
circumstances, under which the complaint
coincides or even precedes the taking of the
property by the plaintif.
The reason for the rule, as pointed out in
Rpublic v. Larae, is that;
Where property is taken ahead of the filing of
the condemnation proceedings, the value
thereof may be enchanced by the public
purpose for which it is taken; the entry by
the plaintif upon the property may have
depreciated its value thereby; or, there may
have been a natural increase in the value of
the property from the time the complaint is
filed, due to general economic conditions.
The owner of private property should be
compensated only for what he actually loses;
it is not intended that his compensation shall
extend beyond his loss or injury. And what he
loses is only the actual value of his property
at the time it is taken. This is the only way
that compensation to be paid can be truly
just i.e.,"just; not only to the individual
whose property is taken but, to the public,
which is to pay for it.
Clearly, then, the value of the Ansaldos'
property must be ascertained as of the year
1947, when it was actually taken, and not at
the time of the filing of the expropriation
suit, which, by the way, still has to be done.
It is as of that time that the real measure of
their loss may fairly be adjudged. The value,
once fixed, shall earn interest at the legal
rate until full payment is efected,
conformably with other principles laid down
by case law. The petition is denied and the
challenged decision of the Commission on
Audit is affirmed, and the Department of
Public Works and Highways is directed to
forthwith institute the appropriate
expropriation action over the land in
question so that the just compensation due
its owners may be determined in accordance
with the Rules of Court, with interest at the
legal rate of 6% per annum from the time of
taking until full payment is made.
CITY OF CEBU VS SPOUSES DEDAMO
[G.R. No. 142971 May 07, 2002]
FACTS: Petitioner City of Cebu filed a
complaint for eminent domain against
respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa
Dedamo. For the construction of a public
road which shall serve as an access/relief
road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the
General Maxilum Avenue and the back of
Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu
City. The lots are the most suitable site for the
purpose.
Deposited with the PNB the amount of P51,156
representing 15% of the fair market value of the
property to enable the petitioner to take
immediate possession of the property pursuant
to Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that their purpose was not for public
purpose but for the benefit of a private single
entity, Cebu Holdings. Also the respondents
alleged that they dont have any other land in
Cebu City.
Petitioner filed a motion for the issuance of a
writ of possession pursuant to Section 19 of R.A.
No. 7160. The motion was granted by the trial
court on 21 September 1994.
The parties executed and submitted to the trial
court an Agreement4 wherein they declared
that they have partially settled the case and in
consideration thereof they agreed on some
certain stipulations. One of the stipulations was:
1. xxx 2.xxx 3.xxx 4.xxx
5.xxx 6.xxx
7. That the judgment sought to be rendered
under this agreement shall be followed by a
supplemental judgment fixing the just
compensation for the property of the SECOND
PARTY after the Commissioners appointed by
this Honorable Court to determine the same
shall have rendered their report and approved
by the court.
The RTC rendered its decision on the value of
the property according to the assessed value of
the commissioners. The petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration contending that the
assessment of the property was no accurate.
The court adjusted its decision on the value
based on the new assessed value.
Petitioner elevated the case to CA. But the
petitioner failed to convince the CA and the
latter affirmed the decision of the RTC. Still
unsatisfied, petitioner filed with us the petition
for review in the case at bar.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not just compensation
should be determined as of the date the filing of
the complaint.
2.Whether or not the basis of the just
compensation is the value on the actual date
the filing of the complaint considering the
agreement entered into by the parties.
HELD: 1.It asserts that it should be which in
this case should be 17 September 1993 and not
at the time the property was actually taken in
1994, pursuant to the decision in "National
Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals."
2.The petitioner has misread our ruling in
The National Power Corp. vs. Court of
Appeals.10 We did not categorically rule in
that case that just compensation should be
determined as of the filing of the complaint.
We explicitly stated therein that although the
general rule in determining just
compensation in eminent domain is the
value of the property as of the date of the
filing of the complaint, the rule "admits of an
exception: where this Court fixed the value
of the property as of the date it was taken
and not at the date of the commencement of
the expropriation proceedings."
More than anything else, the parties, by a
solemn document freely and voluntarily
agreed upon by them, agreed to be bound
by the report of the commission and
approved by the trial court. The agreement
is a contract between the parties. It has the
force of law between them and should be
complied with in good faith. Article 1159 and
1315 of the Civil Code
Furthermore, petitioner did not interpose a
serious objection.11 It is therefore too late
for petitioner to question the valuation now
without violating the principle of equitable
estoppel. Records show that petitioner
consented to conform with the valuation
recommended by the commissioners. It
cannot detract from its agreement now and
assail correctness of the commissioners'
assessment.
NAPOCOR, vs. TIANGCO [G.R. No.
170846 February 6, 2007]
FACTS: Respondents are owners of a parcel
of land with an area of 152,187 square
meters at Barangay Sampaloc, Tanay, Rizal.
NPC requires 19,423 square meters of the
respondents aforementioned property,
across which its 500Kv Kalayaan-San Jose
Transmission Line Project will traverse.
NPCs Segregation Plan# for the purpose
shows that the desired right-of-way will cut
through the respondents land. Within the
portion sought to be expropriated stand fruit-
bearing tress, such as mango, avocado,
jackfruit, casuy, santol, calamansi, sintones
and coconut trees.
After repeated unsuccessful negotiations,
NPC filed an expropriation complaint against
the land of the respondent in the RTC of
Tanay, Rizal. The RTC issued a writ of
possession in favor of NPC after paying the
deposit requirement.
The trial court rendered its decision on the
value of the property using the 1984 tax
declaration. (which is incorrect as stated in
the decision of the supreme court)
The respondents filed a motion for recon. but it
was denied by RTC. So They filed an appeal and
the CA gave merit to the contention of the
respondents and made its revised valuation
using the 1993 tax declaration (increasing the
value of the property). The case went up to the
SC.
ISSUE: 1.Whether or not the property should be
valued using the 1984 or the 1993 tax
declarations.
2.Whether or not Sec. 3-A of R.A. No. 6395, as
amended by P.D. 938 will apply.
HELD: 1.In eminent domain cases, the time of
taking is the filing of the complaint, if there was
no actual taking prior thereto. Hence, in this
case, the value of the property at the time of
the filing of the complaint on November 20,
1990 should be considered in determining the
just compensation due the respondents.
Normally, the time of taking coincides with the
filing of complaint for expropriation as ruled in
the case of Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals, et al.The expropriation proceedings in
this case having been initiated by NPC on
November 20, 1990, property values on such
month and year should lay the basis for the
proper determination of just compensation.
2. It should not apply in the case at bar, the
acquisition of such easement is not gratis. The
limitations on the use of the property taken for
an indefinite period would deprive its owner of
the normal use thereof. For this reason, the
latter is entitled to payment of a just
compensation, which must be neither more nor
less than the monetary equivalent of the land
taken.
- Just Compensation (Manner of Payment)
DAR vs. CA 249 [SCRA 149, 1995]
FACTS: Petitioner Pedro Yap alleges that "o)n 4
September 1992 the TCTs of petitioner Yap
were totally cancelled by the Registrar of Deeds
of Leyte and were transferred in the names of
farmer beneficiaries collectively, based on the
request of the DAR together with a certification
of the Landbank that the sum of P735,337.77
and P719,869.54 have been earmarked for
Landowner Pedro L. Yap for the parcels of lands
covered by TCT Nos. 6282 and 6283,
respectively, and issued in lieu thereof TC-563
and TC-562, respectively, in the names of listed
beneficiaries without notice to petitioner Yap
and without complying with the requirement of
Section 16 (e) of RA 6657 to deposit the
compensation in cash and Landbank bonds in
an accessible bank.
The above allegations are not disputed by any
of the respondents.
Petitioner Heirs of Emiliano Santiago allege that
the heirs of Emiliano F. Santiago are the owners
of a parcel of land located at Laur, NUEVA ECIJA
with an area of 18.5615 hectares covered by
TCT No. NT-60359 of the registry of Deeds of
Nueva Ecija, registered in the name of the
late Emiliano F. Santiago; that in November
and December 1990, without notice to the
petitioners, the Landbank required and the
beneficiaries executed Actual tillers Deed of
Undertaking to pay rentals to the LandBank
for the use of their farmlots equivalent to at
least 25% of the net harvest; that on 24
October 1991 the DAR Regional Director
issued an order directing the Landbank to
pay the landowner directly or through the
establishment of a trust fund in the amount
of P135,482.12, that on 24 February 1992,
the Landbank reserved in trust P135,482.12
in the name of Emiliano F. Santiago. That the
beneficiaries stopped paying rentals to the
landowners after they signed the Actual
Tiller's Deed of Undertaking committing
themselves to pay rentals to the LandBank.
The above allegations are not disputed by
the respondents except that respondent
Landbank claims 1) that it was respondent
DAR, not Landbank which required the
execution of Actual Tillers Deed of
Undertaking (ATDU, for brevity); and 2) that
respondent Landbank, although armed with
the ATDU, did not collect any amount as
rental from the substituting beneficiaries.
Petitioner Agricultural Management and
Development Corporation (AMADCOR, for
brevity) alleges with respect to its
properties located in San Francisco, Quezon
that the properties of AMADCOR in San
Francisco, Quezon consist of a parcel of land
covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area of
209.9215 hectares and another parcel
covered by TCT No. 10832 with an area of
163.6189 hectares; that a summary
administrative proceeding to determine
compensation of the property covered by
TCT No. 34314 was conducted by the DARAB
in Quezon City without notice to the
landowner; that a decision was rendered
fixing the compensation for the parcel of
land covered by TCT No. 34314 with an area
of 209.9215 hectares at P2,768,326.34 and
ordering the Landbank to pay or establish a
trust account for said amount in the name of
AMADCOR; and that the trust account in the
amount of P2,768,326.34 fixed in the
decision was established by adding
P1,986,489.73 to the first trust account
established. With respect to petitioner
AMADCOR's property in Tabaco, Albay, it is
alleged that the property of AMADCOR in
Tabaco, Albay is covered by TCT No. T-2466
of the Register of Deeds of Albay with an
area of 1,629.4578 hectares'; that
emancipation patents were issued covering
an area of 701.8999 hectares which were
registered on 15 February 1988 but no action
was taken thereafter by the DAR to fix the
compensation for said land; that on 21 April
1993, a trust account in the name of AMADCOR
was established in the amount of
P12,247,217.83', three notices of acquisition
having been previously rejected by AMADCOR.
The above allegations are not disputed by the
respondents except that respondent Landbank
claims that petitioner failed to participate in the
DARAB proceedings (land valuation case)
despite due notice to it.
ISSUE: Petitioners submit that respondent court
erred in
(1) declaring as null and void DAR
Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1990,
insofar as it provides for the opening of trust
accounts in lieu of deposit in cash or in bonds,
and
(2) in holding that private respondents are
entitled as a matter of right to the immediate
and provisional release of the amounts
deposited in trust pending the final resolution of
the cases it has filed for just compensation.
HELD: Anent the first assignment of error,
petitioners maintain that the word "deposit" as
used in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 referred
merely to the act of depositing and in no way
excluded the opening of a trust account as a
form of deposit. Thus, in opting for the opening
of a trust account as the acceptable form of
deposit through Administrative Circular No. 9,
petitioner DAR did not commit any grave abuse
of discretion since it merely exercised its power
to promulgate rules and regulations in
implementing the declared policies of RA 6657.
The contention is untenable. Section 16(e) of RA
6657 provides as follows:
Sec. 16. Procedure for Acquisition of Private
Lands
(e) Upon receipt by the landowner of the
corresponding payment or, in case of rejection
or no response from the landowner, upon the
deposit with an accessible bank designated by
the DAR of the compensation in cash or in LBP
bonds in accordance with this Act, the DAR shall
take immediate possession of the land and shall
request the proper Register of Deeds to issue a
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines. . . . (emphasis
supplied)
It is very explicit therefrom that the deposit
must be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds".
Nowhere does it appear nor can it be inferred
that the deposit can be made in any other form.
If it were the intention to include a "trust
account" among the valid modes of deposit,
that should have been made express, or at
least, qualifying words ought to have appeared
from which it can be fairly deduced that a "trust
account" is allowed. In sum, there is no
ambiguity in Section 16(e) of RA 6657 to
warrant an expanded construction of the
term "deposit".
The conclusive efect of administrative
construction is not absolute. Action of an
administrative agency may be disturbed or
set aside by the judicial department if there
is an error of law, a grave abuse of power or
lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of
discretion clearly conflicting with either the
letter or the spirit of a legislative enactment.
18 In this regard, it must be stressed that the
function of promulgating rules and
regulations may be legitimately exercised
only for the purpose of carrying the
provisions of the law into efect. The power
of administrative agencies is thus confined
to implementing the law or putting it into
efect. Corollary to this is that administrative
regulations cannot extend the law and
amend a legislative enactment, 19 for
settled is the rule that administrative
regulations must be in harmony with the
provisions of the law. And in case there is a
discrepancy between the basic law and an
implementing rule or regulation, it is the
former that prevails. 20
In the present suit, the DAR clearly
overstepped the limits of its power to enact
rules and regulations when it issued
Administrative Circular No. 9. There is no
basis in allowing the opening of a trust
account in behalf of the landowner as
compensation for his property because, as
heretofore discussed, Section 16(e) of RA
6657 is very specific that the deposit must
be made only in "cash" or in "LBP bonds". In
the same vein, petitioners cannot invoke LRA
Circular Nos. 29, 29-A and 54 because these
implementing regulations cannot outweigh
the clear provision of the law. Respondent
court therefore did not commit any error in
striking down Administrative Circular No. 9
for being null and void.
Proceeding to the crucial issue of whether or
not private respondents are entitled to
withdraw the amounts deposited in trust in
their behalf pending the final resolution of
the cases involving the final valuation of
their properties, petitioners assert the
negative.
The contention is premised on the alleged
distinction between the deposit of
compensation under Section 16(e) of RA
6657 and payment of final compensation as
provided under Section 18 21 of the same
law. According to petitioners, the right of the
landowner to withdraw the amount
deposited in his behalf pertains only to the
final valuation as agreed upon by the
landowner, the DAR and the LBP or that
adjudged by the court. It has no reference to
amount deposited in the trust account
pursuant to Section 16(e) in case of rejection
by the landowner because the latter amount is
only provisional and intended merely to secure
possession of the property pending final
valuation. To further bolster the contention
petitioners cite the following pronouncements in
the case of "Association of Small Landowners in
the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform".
The last major challenge to CARP is that the
landowner is divested of his property even
before actual payment to him in full of just
compensation, in contravention of a well-
accepted principle of eminent domain.
The CARP Law, for its part conditions the
transfer of possession and ownership of the
land to the government on receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment or the
deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash
or LBP bonds with an accessible bank. Until
then, title also remains with the landowner. No
outright change of ownership is contemplated
either.
Hence the argument that the assailed measures
violate due process by arbitrarily transferring
title before the land is fully paid for must also
be rejected.
Notably, however, the aforecited case was used
by respondent court in discarding petitioners'
assertion as it found that: despite the
"revolutionary" character of the expropriation
envisioned under RA 6657 which led the
Supreme Court, in the case of Association of
Small Landowners in the Phil. Inc. vs. Secretary
of Agrarian Reform (175 SCRA 343), to conclude
that "payments of the just compensation is not
always required to be made fully in money"
even as the Supreme Court admits in the same
case "that the traditional medium for the
payment of just compensation is money and no
other" the Supreme Court in said case did not
abandon the "recognized rule . . . that title to
the property expropriated shall pass from the
owner to the expropriator only upon full
payment of the just compensation."
We agree with the observations of respondent
court. The ruling in the "Association" case
merely recognized the extraordinary nature of
the expropriation to be undertaken under RA
6657 thereby allowing a deviation from the
traditional mode of payment of compensation
and recognized payment other than in cash. It
did not, however, dispense with the settled rule
that there must be full payment of just
compensation before the title to the
expropriated property is transferred.
The attempt to make a distinction between the
deposit of compensation under Section 16(e) of
RA 6657 and determination of just
compensation under Section 18 is
unacceptable. To withhold the right of the
landowners to appropriate the amounts already
deposited in their behalf as compensation for
their properties simply because they rejected
the DAR's valuation, and notwithstanding
that they have already been deprived of the
possession and use of such properties, is an
oppressive exercise of eminent domain. The
irresistible expropriation of private
respondents' properties was painful enough
for them. But petitioner DAR rubbed it in all
the more by withholding that which rightfully
belongs to private respondents in exchange
for the taking, under an authority (the
"Association" case) that is, however,
misplaced. This is misery twice bestowed on
private respondents, which the Court must
rectify.
Hence, we find it unnecessary to distinguish
between provisional compensation under
Section 16(e) and final compensation under
Section 18 for purposes of exercising the
landowners' right to appropriate the same.
The immediate efect in both situations is
the same, the landowner is deprived of the
use and possession of his property for which
he should be fairly and immediately
compensated. Fittingly, we reiterate the
cardinal rule that: within the context of the
State's inherent power of eminent domain,
just compensation means not only the
correct determination of the amount to be
paid to the owner of the land but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be
considered "just" for the property owner is
made to sufer the consequence of being
immediately deprived of his land while being
made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to
cope with his loss.
The promulgation of the "Association"
decision endeavored to remove all legal
obstacles in the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
and clear the way for the true freedom of the
farmer. 25 But despite this, cases involving
its implementation continue to multiply and
clog the courts' dockets. Nevertheless, we
are still optimistic that the goal of totally
emancipating the farmers from their
bondage will be attained in due time. It must
be stressed, however, that in the pursuit of
this objective, vigilance over the rights of the
landowners is equally important because
social justice cannot be invoked to trample
on the rights of property owners, who under
our Constitution and laws are also entitled to
protection.
ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS
vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM
FACTS: These are 4 consolidated cases
questioning the constitutionality of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Act (R.A.
No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land
Reform Code or R.A. No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution
on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a
call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian
reform program. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly
or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of
the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in 1963.
P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide
for the compulsory acquisition of private lands
for distribution among tenant-farmers and to
specify maximum retention limits for
landowners. In 1987, President Corazon
Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27
and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the
manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform
program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No.
229, providing the mechanics for its (PP131s)
implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is
the enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned
enactments, nevertheless gives them
suppletory efect insofar as they are not
inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed
below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small
Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the
Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657.
The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do
not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since
their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they
should not be forced to distribute their land to
their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they
themselves have shown willingness to till their
own land. In short, they want to be exempted
from agrarian reform program because they
claim to belong to a diferent class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the
agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229)
on the ground that these laws already valuated
their lands for the agrarian reform program and
that the specific amount must be determined by
the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).
Manaay averred that this violated the principle
in eminent domain which provides that only
courts can determine just compensation. This,
for Manaay, also violated due process for under
the constitution, no property shall be taken for
public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which
states that landowners may be paid for their
land in bonds and not necessarily in cash.
Manaay averred that just compensation has
always been in the form of money and not in
bonds.
ISSUE: 1. Whether or not there was a
violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due
process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under
the agrarian reform program, must be in
terms of cash.
HELD: 1. No. The Association had not shown
any proof that they belong to a diferent
class exempt from the agrarian reform
program. Under the law, classification has
been defined as the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain
particulars and diferent from each other in
these same particulars. To be valid, it must
conform to the following requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial
distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes
of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the
members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all
persons or things similarly situated must be
treated alike both as to the rights conferred
and the liabilities imposed. The
Association have not shown that they belong
to a diferent class and entitled to a diferent
treatment. The argument that not only
landowners but also owners of other
properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be
rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is
clearly visible except to those who will not
see. There is no need to elaborate on this
matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed
a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification. Its decision is accorded
recognition and respect by the courts of
justice except only where its discretion is
abused to the detriment of the Bill of Rights.
In the contrary, it appears that Congress is
right in classifying small landowners as part
of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just
compensation is a power lodged in the
courts. However, there is no law which
prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR
from determining just compensation. In fact,
just compensation can be that amount
agreed upon by the landowner and the
government even without judicial
intervention so long as both parties agree. The
DAR can determine just compensation through
appraisers and if the landowner agrees, then
judicial intervention is not needed. What is
contemplated by law however is that, the just
compensation determined by an administrative
body is merely preliminary. If the landowner
does not agree with the finding of just
compensation by an administrative body, then
it can go to court and the determination of the
latter shall be the final determination. This is
even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the
decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just
compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just
compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian
reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require
billions of pesos in funds if all compensation
have to be made in cash if everything is in
cash, then the government will not have
sufficient money hence, bonds, and other
securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used
for just compensation.
- Just Compensation
(Trial with Commissioners)
LECA REALTY CORPORATION VS. REPUBLIC
[G.R. No. 155605. September 27, 2006]
FACTS: Petitioner filed a complaint for eminent
domain for the taking of some portions of their
properties. Attached to the complaint was
Resolution No. 94-1 of the City Appraisal
Committee of Mandaluyong, which was created
to appraise the properties that would be
afected by the construction of the project in
question. Commissioners submitted their
report, and recommended the fair market value
of properties of Leca Realty Corporation and
Leeleng Realty Inc.: P50,000 per sq.m., the
Commissioners took into consideration the
following factors: property location,
identification[,] neighborhood data, community
facilities and utilities, highest and best use,
valuation and reasonable indication of land
values within the vicinity.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not the Republic is
bound and put in estoppel by the gross
negligence/mistake of its agent/former counsel?
2.Whether the Court of Appeals incurred an
error of law in affirming the amount fixed by the
trial court based on the report of the board of
commissioners?
HELD: There was no reason why the Republic
could not have moved to reconsider the
assailed CA Decision or appealed it within the
reglementary period. These procedural devices
(reconsideration and appeal) were not only
available; they would have also constituted
plain, speedy and adequate remedies for
questioning the alleged errors in the CA
Decision. Petitions must be filed within 60
days. In the present case, the Petition was
filed after over a year. The rule on non-
estoppel of the government is not designed
to perpetrate an injustice. The request was
predicated on the conclusion that the
"compensation costs as recommended by
the commissioners and fixed by the court in
the above-mentioned Decision are
reasonable and acceptable"; and that the
"move will hasten the legal process, thereby
shorten the time of the proceedings and stop
the running of interest.
The more critical issue is the determination
of the amount of just compensation for the
expropriated property of Leca in GR 155605.
The Republic avers that the values arrived at
in the Commissioners' Report were not
supported by sufficient evidence. Leca,
alleges that the fair market value ascribed to
its property was not sufficient. As both the
Republic and Leca correctly pointed out,
however, the Commissioners' Report relied
heavily on newspaper advertisements of
ofers of sale of properties in the vicinity. It
must be noted, though, that the interest of
Petitioner Leca is distinct and separate from
and will in no way afect the settled rights
and interests of the other parties that did not
appeal the judgment of the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition of Leca Realty
Corporation is REMANDED to the trial court
for the proper determination of the amount
of just compensation.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS.
DELA CRUZ
[G.R. No. 156093. February 2, 2007]
FACTS: NAPOCOR a government-owned and
controlled corporation filed a complaint for
eminent domain and expropriation of an
easement of right of way against Spouses
Norberto and Josefina Dela Cruz who are
registered owners of the parcels of land to
be expropriated by NAPOCOR. After
respondents filed their respective answers to
petitioners Complaint, petitioner deposited
PhP 5,788.50 to cover the provisional value
of the land, petitioner then filed an Urgent
Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of
Possession, which the trial court granted.
The pre-trial was terminated in so far as
respondent Ferrer was concerned,
considering that the sole issue was the
amount of just compensation. Based on the
analysis of data gathered and making the
proper adjustments with respect to location,
area, shape, accessibility, and the highest
and best use of the subject properties, it is
the opinion of herein commissioners that the
fair market value of the subject real
properties is P10,000.00 per square meter,
as of this date, October 05, 1999. Petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
abovementioned Order, but said motion was
denied in the trial courts. Significantly,
petitioner did not file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA Decision, but it
directly filed a petition for review.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not petitioner was
denied due process when it was not allowed to
present evidence on the reasonable value of the
expropriated property before the Board of
Commissioners.
2.Whether or not the valuation of just
compensation herein was not based from the
evidence on record and other authentic
documents.
HELD: It is beyond question that petitions for
review may only raise questions of law which
must be distinctly set forth. Court is mandated
to only consider purely legal questions in this
petition, unless called for by extraordinary
circumstances. petitioner raises the issue of
denial of due process because it was allegedly
deprived of the opportunity to present its
evidence on the just compensation of properties
it wanted to expropriate, and the sufficiency of
the legal basis or bases for the trial courts
Order on the matter of just compensation.
because this case involves the expenditure of
public funds for a clear public purpose, this
Court will overlook the fact that petitioner did
not file a Motion for Reconsideration and brush
aside this technicality in favor of resolving this
case. Petitioner was deprived of due process
when it was not given the opportunity to
present evidence before the commissioners.
It is undisputed that the commissioners failed to
aford the parties the opportunity to introduce
evidence in their favor and petitioner was not
notified of the completion or filing of the
commissioners report, and that petitioner was
also not given any opportunity to file its
objections to the said report. the fact that no
trial or hearing was conducted to aford the
parties the opportunity to present their own
evidence should have impelled the trial court to
disregard the commissioners findings. The legal
basis for the determination of just
compensation was insufficient. it is not disputed
that the commissioners recommended that the
just compensation be pegged at PhP 10,000.00
per square meter.
For compensation, to be just, must be fair not
only to the owner but also to the taker. it is
clear that in this case, the sole basis for the
determination of just compensation was the
commissioners ocular inspection of the
properties in question, as gleaned from the
commissioners report. Clearly, the legal basis
for the determination of just compensation in
this case is insufficient as earlier enunciated.
This being so, the trial courts ruling in this
respect should be set aside. Petition is
granted.
NPC vs. HENSON [GR No. 129998,
December 29, 1998]
FACTS: The National Power Corporation
(NPC) originally instituted with the RTC, a
complaint for eminent domain, later
amended, for the taking for public use of 5
parcels of land, owned or claimed by
respondents, with a total aggregate area of
58,311 square meters, for the expansion of
the NPC Mexico Sub-Station.
Respondents are the registered
owners/claimants of the 5 parcels of land
sought to be expropriated, situated in San
Jose Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga.
Petitioner needed the entire area of the 5
parcels of land, comprising an aggregate
area of 58,311 square meters, for the
expansion of its Mexico Subdivision.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to fix the
provisional value of the subject parcels of
land.3
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. They
did not challenge petitioners right to
condemn their property, but declared that
the fair market value of their property was
from P180.00 to P250.00 per square meter.
The trial court denied respondents motion to
dismiss. The court did not declare that
petitioner had a lawful right to take the
property sought to be expropriated.
However, the court fixed the provisional
value of the land at P100.00 per square
meter, for a total area of 63,220 square
meters of respondents property, to be
deposited with the Provincial Treasurer of
Pampanga. Petitioner deposited the amount
on August 29, 1990.
The trial court issued a writ of possession in
favor of petitioner, and the courts deputy
sherif placed petitioner in possession of the
subject land. The trial court granted the
motions of respondents to withdraw the
deposit made by petitioner of the provisional
value of their property amounting to
P5,831,100.00, with a balance of
P690,900.00, remaining with the Provincial
Treasurer of Pampanga.
The trial court issued an order appointing 3
commissioners to aid the court in the
reception of evidence to determine just
compensation for the taking of the subject
property. After receiving the evidence and
conducting an ocular inspection, the
commissioners submitted to the court their
individual reports. However, the trial court
did not conduct a hearing on any of the
reports.
The trial court rendered judgment fixing the
amount of just compensation to be paid by
petitioner for the taking of the entire area of
63,220 square meters at P400.00 per square
meter, with legal interest thereon computed
from September 11, 1990, when petitioner was
placed in possession of the land, plus attorneys
fees of P20,000.00, and costs of the
proceedings.
In due time, petitioner appealed to the CA who
rendered decision affirming that of the RTC,
except that the award of P20,000.00, as
attorneys fees was deleted.
ISSUE: The issue presented boils down to what
is the just compensation for the taking of
respondents property for the expansion of the
NPCs Mexico Sub-station, situated in San Jose
Matulid, Mexico, Pampanga.
HELD: The parcels of land sought to be
expropriated are undeniably idle, undeveloped,
raw agricultural land, bereft of any
improvement. Except for the Henson family, all
the other respondents were admittedly farmer
beneficiaries under operation land transfer of
the Department of Agrarian Reform. However,
the land has been re-classified as residential.
The nature and character of the land at the
time of its taking is the principal criterion to
determine just compensation to the landowner.
In this case, the trial court and the CA fixed the
value of the land at P400.00 per square meter,
which was the selling price of lots in the
adjacent fully developed subdivision, the Santo
Domingo Village Subdivision. The land in
question, however, was an undeveloped, idle
land, principally agricultural in character,
though re-classified as residential.
Unfortunately, the trial court, after creating a
board of commissioners to help it determine the
market value of the land did not conduct a
hearing on the report of the commissioners. The
trial court fixed the fair market value of subject
land in an amount equal to the value of lots in
the adjacent fully developed subdivision. This
finds no support in the evidence. The valuation
was even higher than the recommendation of
anyone of the commissioners.
On the other hand, Commissioner Atienza
recommended a fair market value at P375.00
per square meter. This appears to be the closest
valuation to the market value of lots in the
adjoining fully developed subdivision.
Considering that the subject parcels of land are
undeveloped raw land, the price of P375.00 per
square meter would appear to the Court as the
just compensation for the taking of such raw
land.
Consequently, we agree with Commissioner
Atienzas report that the fair market value of
subject parcels of land be fixed at P375.00 per
square meter.
We also agree with petitioner that the area
of the communal irrigation canal consisting
of 4,809 square meters must be excluded
from the land to be expropriated. To begin
with, it is excluded in the amended
complaint. Hence, the trial court and the
Court of Appeals erred in including the same
in the area to be taken.
The trial court erroneously ordered double
payment for 3,611 square meters of lot 5
(portion) in the dispositive part of its
decision, and, hence, this must be deleted.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals
correctly required petitioner to pay legal
interest on the compensation awarded from
September 11, 1990, the date petitioner was
placed in possession of the subject land, less
the amount respondents had withdrawn from
the deposit that petitioner made with the
Provincial Treasurers Office.
We, however, rule that petitioner is under its
charter exempt from payment of costs of the
proceedings.
- Just Compensation (Legal Interest for
Expropriation Cases)
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION VS.
ANGAS
[G.R. No. 60225-26. May 8, 1992]
FACTS: National Power Corporation, a
government-owned and controlled
corporation and the agency through which
the government undertakes the on-going
infrastructure and development projects
throughout the country, filed two complaints
for eminent domain against private
respondents with the RTC of Lanao del Sur.
The complaint which sought to expropriate
certain specified lots situated at Limogao,
Saguiaran, Lanao del Sur was for the
purpose of the development of hydro-electric
power and production of electricity as well as
the erection of such subsidiary works and
constructions as may be necessarily
connected therewith.
A consolidated decision was rendered by the
lower court, declaring and confirming that
the lots mentioned and described in the
complaints have entirely been lawfully
condemned and expropriated by the
petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the
private respondents certain sums of money
as just compensation. Petitioner moved for a
reconsideration of the lower court's alleging
that the main decision had already become
final and executory with its compliance of
depositing the sums of money as just
compensation for the lands condemned, with
legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said
main decision can no longer be modified or
changed by the lower court; and that PD No.
116 is not applicable to this case because it is
Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the computation of
the legal rate of interest on just compensation
for expropriated lands, the law applicable is
Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a
6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular
No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at
12% per annum.
HELD: The transaction involved is clearly not a
loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits
but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a
public purpose, the payment of which is without
stipulation regarding interest, and the interest
adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of
indemnity for damages. The legal interest
required to be paid on the amount of just
compensation for the properties expropriated is
manifestly in the form of indemnity for
damages for the delay in the payment thereof.
Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in
the joint judgment of the lower court sought to
be enforced in this case is interest by way of
damages, and not by way of earnings from
loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall
apply.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. It was
declared that the computation of legal interest
at 6% per annum is the correct and valid legal
interest allowed in payments of just
compensation for lands expropriated for public
use to herein private respondents by the
Government through the National Power
Corporation.
WYCOCO V. JUDGE CASPILLO
[G.R. No. 146733, January 13, 2004]
FACTS: Felciano Wycoco owned 94.1690
hectares unirrigated and untenanted rice land
and voluntarily ofered to sell the land to DAR in
line with the CARP for P14.9M
A notice of intention to acquire 84.5690
hectares for P1, 342, 667.46 by the DAR sent to
him. The amount raised to P2,594,045.39 and
later modified to P2,280,159.82 excluded the
idle areas.
He refused and prompted the DAR to indorse
the case to DARAB, fixing the just
compensation.
DARAB requested the LBP to open a trust
account for Wycoco and deposited the
compensation ofered by the DAR and the
properties were distributed to the beneficiaries.
He filed a manifestation in VOS case no. 232 NE
93. While Cabanatuan Court acting as the
Special Agrarian Court.
ISSUES: 1.WON the RTC of Cabanatuan has
jurisdiction over the case?
2.WON there was a just compensation
ofered to the plaintif?
HELD: Point out that theres no need for
Wycoco to present an evidence in support of
the land valuation in as much as it is in
public knowledge that the prevailing market
value of agricultural lands in Nueva Ecija is
from P135,000.00 to P150,000.00 per
hectare. So the curt fixed the compensation
of:
P142,500.00- per hectare
94.1690- hectares (land size)
P13,428,082- total compensation + actual
damages P29,663,235.00 for unrealized
profits and P8,475,210.00 legal interest
This must be paid by DAR .
DAR and LBP filed a separate petition before
the CA and dismissed on May 29,97=Final
execution June6,07 and Feb. 9,99
respectively. The dismissal prompted Wycoco
to file a petition for mandamus before SC
praying the execution of Cabanatuan courts
decision and compelled Judge Caspillon to
inhibit himself from the hearing of the case.
CA modified the decision, deducted the
compensation due to Wycoco the amount
corresponding to 3.372 hectares for it was
found to have been previously sold to
Republic.
Sec 50 and 57 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform law of 1988)
DAR as an administrative agency cannot be
granted jurisdiction over the cases of
eminent domain and over criminal cases.
The valuation of property in eminent domain
is essentially a judicial function which is
vested with the Special Agrarian Courts and
cannot lodge with administrative agencies.
Rule XIII Sec.II of New Rules of Procedures of
DARAB
Sec.II just compensation shall not be
appealable to the Board but shall be brought
directly to the RTC designated as Special
Agrarian Court
So RTC or Cabanatuan has jurisdiction over
the case at bar because it is the designated
as SAC.
RTC should have allowed the parties to
present evidences so a fair compensation
shall be determined. There are factors to be
considered such as the cost of acquisition,
size, shape, location and tax declaration, for
ignoring the said factors, remand of the case
for determination is necessary.
THIS CASE BE REMANDED TO RTC FOR THE
DETERMINATION OF JUST COPENSATION.
 - Just Compensation (Writ of Possession)
CITY OF MANILA V. OSCAR SERRANO
[G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001]
FACTS: Ordinance No. 7833, enacted by the
City Council of Manila authorizing the
expropriation of certain properties in Manilas
First District in Tondo: TCT Nos. 70869,105201,
105202, and 138273 of the Register of the
Deeds of Manila, which are to be sold to
qualified occupants pursuant to Land Use
Development Program of the City.
Lot 1-C, One of the lots to be expropriated.
Consists of 343.10 square meters / 7 =
produced 49 square meters for each person.
Covered by TCT No. 138272 from TCT No. 70869
This lot belongs to Feliza De Guia, upon her
death, said lot was transferred to Alberto De
Guia and then to Edgardo de Guia heir of
Alberto, after the formers death.
The said lot was again transferred to Lee Kuan
Hui-TCT No. 217018 and subsequently sold to
Demetria De Guia TCT No. 226048.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the
property is proper in relation to R.A. 7279?
HELD: The petitioner filed an amended
complaint for expropriation (RTC) to the
supposed owners of the lots with TCT Nos.
70869, 105201,105202 and 138273, the
Serranos, heirs of late Demetria De Guia.
RTC issued an order to the petitioner to
deposite P 1,825,241.00 equivalent to the
assessed value of the lot and the issuance of a
writ of possession in their favor.
CA reversed RTCs decision and rather favored
the respondents, in the reason that the
petitioner failed to do the other modes of
acquisition of property, that is to tried first in
the city government before it can resort to
expropriation, under R.A.7279
SC reinstated the decision of RTC, because in
this case it is very early to determine if the
petitioner has been granted the right to
expropriate the property, since what has been
issued by the RTC to them is just a writ of
possession, which is not a right of an ownership.
Under R.A. 7279 there are requirements that
the petitioners need to complied with before
expropriating a property. To determine whether
or not the petitioner complied it and the
expropriation of the property is proper in
relation to R.A. 7279, further proceeding must
be made in RTC.
Thus the case was remanded back to RTC.
REPUBLIC VS. GINGOYON
[G. R. No. 166429, December 19, 2005]
FACTS: A dispute occurred after the contract
between the government and PIATCO has been
nullified for its being contrary to law and
public policy. PIATCO and other investors who
funded the facilities for NAIA 3 cannot
operate it and the government as well
cannot took it over, for doing so the
government would enrich itself unjustly by
the PIATCO and other investors expense.
The government wanted to expropriate NAIA
3, but isnt it illogical that a government
would expropriate the property it already
owned? So, the expropriation would only be
limited to the facilities and improvement that
have been introduced to NAIA 3, with its
equivalent just compensation.
ISSUE: 1.Whether R.A. No.8974 or Rule 67 is
applicable in property expropriation in the
case at bar?
2.Whether Judge Gingoyon can be compelled
to inhibit himself in the case?
HELD: Prior to this case a decision to Agan v
PIATCO has been rendered by the court, the
2004 Resolution: the government should
fully paid first the owner of the properties
subject for expropriation before it took the
properties in its possession and ownership.
This decision is final and executor.
Rule 67 stated:
SEC. 2. Entry of plaintif upon depositing
value with authorized government
depository. - Upon the filing of the complaint
or at any time thereafter and after due
notice to the defendant, the plaintif shall
have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real property involved if he
deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purposes
of taxation to be held by such bank subject
to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall
be in money, unless in lieu thereof the court
authorizes the deposit of a certificate of
deposit of a government bank of the
Republic of the Philippines payable on
demand to the authorized government
depositary.
R.A. No. 8974
SEC. 4. Guidelines for Expropriation
Proceedings.- Whenever it is necessary to
acquire real property for the right-of-way,
site or location for any national government
infrastructure project through expropriation,
the appropriate proceedings before the
proper court under the following guidelines:
a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and
after due notice to the defendant, the
implementing agency shall immediately pay
the owner of the property the amount
equivalent to the sum of (1) one hundred
percent (100%) of the value of the property
based on the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements
and/or structures as determined under Section
7 hereof; . . .
c) In case the completion of a government
infrastructure project is of utmost urgency and
importance, and there is no existing valuation
of the area concerned, the implementing
agency shall immediately pay the owner of the
property its profered value taking into
consideration the standards prescribed in
Section 5 hereof.
Upon completion with the guidelines
abovementioned, the court shall immediately
issue to the implementing agency an order to
take possession of the property and start the
implementation of the project.
Before the court can issue a Writ of Possession,
the implementing agency shall present to the
court a certificate of availability of funds from
the proper official concerned. . . .
Clearly that, applying Rule 67 would be a direct
rebuke to 2004 Resolution in Agan and the
court cannot sanction deviation from its own
final and executor orders. It would violate 2004
Resolution. Thus, it would be R.A.No. 8974 the
applicable law for the expropriation- in which
the government must pay first the just
compensation to the property owner before it
can took and use it.
R.A. No. 8974 well complemented with 2004
Resolution. Judge Gingoyon cannot be
compelled to inhibit himself, for incompetency
may be ground for administrative sanction but
not for inhibition, which requires lack of
objectivity or impartiality to sit on a case.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HOLY
TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP [G.R.
No. 172410, April 14, 2008]
FACTS: Petitioner, represented by the Toll
Regulatory Board (TRB), filed with the RTC a
Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation
against landowners whose properties would be
afected by the construction, rehabilitation and
expansion of the North Luzon Expressway.
Respondent Holy Trinity Realty and
Development Corporation (HTRDC) was one of
the afected landowners.
TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the
issuance of a Writ of Possession, manifesting
that it deposited a sufficient amount to cover
the payment of 100% of the zonal value of the
afected properties, in the total amount of
P28,406,700.00, with the Land Bank of the
Philippines, South Harbor Branch, an authorized
government depository. The RTC then issued
the Writ of Possession. HTRDC filed with the RTC
a Motion to Withdraw Deposit, praying that the
respondent or its duly authorized representative
be allowed to withdraw the amount of
P22,968,000.00, out of TRB's advance
deposit of P28,406,700.00 with LBP-South
Harbor, including the interest which accrued
thereon. Thereafter, the RTC allowed the
release of the principal amount together with
the interest to the respondent but on Motion
for Reconsideration of the TRB, it disallowed
the withdrawal of interest reasoning out that
the said issue will be included in the second
stage of expropriation, that is, the
determination of just compensation. The
private respondent elevated the issue to the
Court of Appeals which ruled that the
respondent is entitled to the interest by way
of accession. Hence, this petition of the
government.
ISSUE: WON the CA was correct in holding
that the interest earned by the deposited
amount in the expropriation account would
accrue to HRTDC by virtue of accession?
Held: Yes. There are two stages in
expropriation proceedings, the determination
of the authority to exercise eminent domain
and the determination of just compensation.
Under RA 8974, the Government is required
to make immediate payment to the property
owner upon the filing of the complaint to be
entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in
Rule 67, the Government is required only to
make an initial deposit with an authorized
government depositary. Moreover, Rule 67
prescribes that the initial deposit be
equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation, unlike Rep.
Act No. 8974 which provides, as the relevant
standard for initial compensation, the market
value of the property as stated in the tax
declaration or the current relevant zonal
valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of
the improvements and/or structures using
the replacement cost method.
Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which
eminent domain may be exercised by the
Government. Rep. Act No. 8974, which
covers expropriation proceedings intended
for national government infrastructure
projects. Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides
for a procedure eminently more favorable to
the property owner than Rule 67,
inescapably applies in instances when the
national government expropriates property
"for national government infrastructure
projects." Thus, if expropriation is engaged in
by the national government for purposes
other than national infrastructure projects,
the assessed value standard and the deposit
mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to
apply. Therefore, the RTC correctly applied
the procedure laid out in Republic Act No.
8974, by requiring the deposit of the amount
equivalent to 100% of the zonal value of the
properties sought to be expropriated before
the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of
the Republic.
Bank interest partake the nature of civil fruits
under Art. 442 of the New Civil Code. And since
these are considered fruits, ownership thereof
should be due to the owner of the principal.
Undoubtedly, being an attribute of ownership,
the [HTRDC's] right over the fruits (jus fruendi),
that is the bank interests, must be respected.
Article 1187 of the Civil Code provides that the
"efects of a conditional obligation to give, once
the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to
the day of the constitution of the obligation."
Hence, when HTRDC complied with the given
conditions, as determined by the RTC in its
Order dated 21 April 2003, the efects of the
constructive delivery retroacted to the actual
date of the deposit of the amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH.
- Just Compensation (Expropriation of
Utilities, Landed Estates and Municipal
Property)
THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL
NORTE vs. CITY OF ZAMBOANGA [G.R. No.
L-24440, March 28, 1968]
FACTS: Prior to its incorporation as a chartered
city, the Municipality of Zamboanga used to be
the provincial capital of the then Zamboanga
Province. Commonwealth Act 39 was approved
converting the Municipality of Zamboanga into
Zamboanga City. Section 50 of the Act also
provided that "buildings and properties which
the province shall abandon upon the transfer of
the capital to another place will be acquired and
paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a price to
be fixed by the Auditor General." The properties
and buildings referred to consisted of 50 lots
and some buildings constructed thereon,
located in the City of Zamboanga and covered
individually by Torrens certificates of title in the
name of Zamboanga Province. The lots are
utilized as the Capitol Site (1 lot), School site (3
lots), Hospital site (3 lots), Leprosarium (3 lots),
Curuan school (1 lot), Trade school (1 lot),
Burleigh school (2 lots), burleigh (9 lots), high
school playground (2 lots), hydro-electric site (1
lot), san roque (1 lot), and another 23 vacant
lots. In 1945, the capital of Zamboanga
Province was transferred to Dipolog and on 16
June 1948, RA 286 created the municipality of
Molave and making it the capital of Zamboanga
Province.
The Appraisal Committee formed by the Auditor
General, pursuant to CA 39, fixed the value of
the properties and buildings in question left by
Zamboanga Province in Zamboanga City at
P1,294,244.00. However, a Cabinet Resolution
was passed, conveying all the said 50 lots and
buildings thereon to Zamboanga City for P1.00,
efective as of 1945, when the provincial capital
of the Zamboanga Province was transferred to
Dipolog.
RA 711 was approved dividing the province
of Zamboanga into Zamboanga del Norte
and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the
assets and obligations of the old province
were to be divided between the two new
ones, Section 6 of the law provided that
upon the approval of the Act, the funds,
assets and other properties and the
obligations of the province of Zamboanga
shall be divided equitably between the
Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the
President, upon the recommendation of the
Auditor General." The Auditor General
apportioned the assets and obligations of the
defunct Province of Zamboanga,
apportioning 54.39% for Zamboanga del
Norte and 45.61% for Zamboanga del Sur.
The Executive Secretary, by order of the
President, issued a ruling holding that
Zamboanga del Norte had a vested right as
owner (should be co-owner pro-indiviso) of
the properties mentioned in Section 50 of CA
39, and is entitled to the price thereof,
payable by Zamboanga City. This efectively
revoked the Cabinet Resolution. The
Secretary of Finance then authorized the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue to deduct
an amount equal to 25% of the regular
internal revenue allotment for the City of
Zamboanga for the quarter ending 31 March
1960, then for the quarter ending 30 June
1960, and again for the first quarter of the
fiscal year 1960-1961. The deductions, all
aggregating P57,373.46 was credited to the
province of Zamboanga del Norte, in partial
payment of the P704,220,05 due it.
However, RA 3039 was approved amending
Section 50 of CA 39 by providing that "all
buildings, properties and assets belonging to
the former province of Zamboanga and
located within the City of Zamboanga are
hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of
the said City of Zamboanga." The Secretary
of Finance ordered the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue to stop from efecting
further payments to Zamboanga del Norte
and to return to Zamboanga City the sum of
P57,373.46 taken from it out of the internal
revenue allotment of Zamboanga del Norte.
Zamboanga City admits that since the
enactment of RA 3039, P43,030.11 of the
P57,373.46 has already been returned to it.
ISSUES: 1.Whether or not Republic Act 3039
be declared unconstitutional for depriving
plaintif province of property without due
process and just compensation
2.Whether or not the City of Zamboanga be
ordered to continue paying the balance of
P704,220.05 in quarterly installments of 25%
of its internal revenue allotments to
Zamboanga del Norte.
HELD: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring Republic Act No. 3039
unconstitutional insofar as it deprives plaintif
Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties,
consisting of 50 parcels of land and the
improvements thereon under certificates of title
in the name of the defunct province of
Zamboanga; ordering defendant City of
Zamboanga to pay to the plaintif the sum of
P704,220.05 payment thereof to be deducted
from its regular quarterly internal revenue
allotment equivalent to 25% thereof every
quarter until said amount shall have been fully
paid; ordering defendant Secretary of Finance
to direct defendant Commissioner of Internal
Revenue to deduct 25% from the regular
quarterly internal revenue allotment for
defendant City of Zamboanga and to remit the
same to plaintif Zamboanga del Norte until said
sum of P704,220.05 shall have been fully paid;
ordering plaintif Zamboanga del Norte to
execute through its proper officials the
corresponding public instrument deeding to
defendant City of Zamboanga the 50 parcels of
land and the improvements thereon under the
certificates of title upon payment by the latter
of the aforesaid sum of P704,220.05 in full;
dismissing the counterclaim of defendant City
of Zamboanga; and declaring permanent the
preliminary mandatory injunction, pursuant to
the order of the Court. No costs are assessed
against the defendants.
CITY OF BAGUIO vs. THE NATIONAL
WATERWORKS AND SEWERAGE AUTHORITY
[G.R. No. L-12032, August 31, 1959]
FACTS: A municipal corporation filed a
complaint in the CFI of Baguio for declaratory
relief against defendant, a public corporation
created by RA No. 1383, which contends that
said Act does not include within its preview the
Baguio Workshop System. In which the said Act
is unconstitutional because it has the efect of
depriving plaintif of the ownership, control and
operation of said waterworks system without
compensation and without due process of law,
and that it is oppressive, unreasonable and
unjust to plaintif and other cities, municipalities
and municipal districts similarly situated.
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that RA No. 1383 is a proper exercise of
the police power of the State, that assuming
that said Act contemplates an act of
expropriation, it is still a constitutional exercise
of the power of eminent domain, that at any
rate the Baguio Waterworks System is not a
private property but a "public works of public
service" over which the Legislature has control
and that the provision of the said Act being
clear and unambiguous, there is no necessity
for construction.
The Court, acting on the motion to dismiss as
well as on the answer and rejoinder filed by
both parties, denied the motion and ordered
defendant to file its answer to the complaint.
Defendant filed its answer reiterating and
amplifying the ground already advanced in
this motion to dismiss, adding thereto that
the action for the declaratory relief is
improper for the reason that the Baguio
waterworks System has already been
transferred to defendant pursuant to
Republic Act No. 1383 or, if such has not
been done, there has already been a breach
of said Act.
ISSUES: 1.Plaintif's action for Declaratory
relief is improper because there has already
been a breach by plaintif of Republic Act No.
1383
2.Republic Act No. 1383 does not
contemplates the exercise of the power of
eliminate domain but the exertion of the
police power of the State; and
3.Assuming arguendo that Republic Act No.
1383 involves the exercise of the power of
eminent domain the same does not violate
our Constitution.
HELD: The decision maintain that the
property held by a municipal corporation
units private capacity is not subject to the
unrestricted control of the legislature, and
the municipality cannot be deprived of such
property against its will, except by the
exercise of eminent domain with payment of
full compensation.
In its private capacity a municipal
corporation is wholly diferent. The people of
a compact community usually require certain
conveniences which cannot be furnished
without a franchise from the State and which
are either unnecessary in the rural districts,
such as a system of sewers, or parks and
open spaces, or which on account of the
expenses it would be financially impossible
to supply except where the population is
reasonably dense, such as water or gas. But
in so far as the municipality is thus
authorized to exercise the functions of a
private corporation, it is clothed with the
capacities of a private corporation and may
claim its rights and immunities, even as
against the sovereign, and is subject to the
liabilities of such a corporation, even as
against third parties.
The attempt of appellant in having
waterworks considered as public property
subject to the control of Congress or one
which can be regulated by the exercise of
police power having failed, that question
that now arises is: Does Republic Act No.
1383 provide for the automatic expropriation
of the waterworks in question in the light of
our Constitution? In other words, does said
law comply with the requirements of section
6, Article XIII, in relation to section 1(2),
Article III, of our Constitution?
Section 6, Article XIII of our Constitution
provides:
SEC. 6. The State may, in the interest of
National Welfare and defense, establish and
operate industries and means of transportation
and communication, and, upon payment of just
compensation, transfer to public ownership
utilities and other private enterprises to be
operated by the Government.
Section 1 (2), Article III, of our Constitution
provides:
(2) Private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation.
It is clear that the State may, in the interest of
National welfare, transfer to public ownership
any private enterprise upon payment of just
compensation. At the same time, one has to
bear in mind that no person can be deprived of
his property except for public use and upon
payment of just compensation. There is an
attempt to observe this requirement in Republic
Act No. 1383 when in providing for the transfer
of appellee's waterworks system to a national
agency it was directed that the transfer be
made upon payment of an equivalent value of
the property. Has this been implemented? Has
appellant actually transferred to appellee any
asset of the NAWASA that may be considered
just compensation for the property
expropriated? There is nothing in the record to
show that such was done. Neither is there
anything to this efect in Office Memorandum
No. 7 issued by the NAWASA in implementation
of the provision of the Republic Act No. 1383.
The law speaks of assets of the NAWASA by
they are not specified. While the Act empowers
the NAWASA to contract indebtedness and issue
bonds subject to the approval of the Secretary
of Finance when necessary for the transaction
of its business (sec. 2, par. (L), sec. 5, Act No.
1383), no such action has been taken to comply
with appellant's commitment in so far as
payment of compensation of appellee is
concerned. As to when such action should be
taken no one knows. And unless this aspect of
the law is clarified and appellee is given its due
compensation, appellee cannot be deprived of
its property even if appellant desires to take
over its administration in line with the spirit of
the law. We are therefore persuaded to
conclude that the law, insofar as it expropriates
the waterworks in question without providing
for an efective payment of just compensation,
violates our Constitution. In this respect, the
decision of the trial court is correct.