ARTICLE 39 AND 40: ACTION OR
DEFENSE FOR DECLARATION OF
ABSOLUTE NULLITY; JUDICIAL
DECLARATION
ATIENZA VS. BRILLANTES
FACTS:
This a complaint by Lupo Atienza for
gross immorality and appearance of impropriety
against Judge Brillantes.
Lupo Alleges that he has 2 children
with Yolanda de Castro, who are living together
in a home purchased by him in 1987 in Manila.
On 1991, Lupo saw Brillantes sleeping on his
bed. Upon inquiry, the houseboy told that
Brillantes had been cohabiting with de Castro.
Lupo left the home without confronting
Brillantes. Thereafter, respondent prevented him
from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children from him. Lupo claims
that Brillantes is married to Ongkiko with whom
he has 5 children. Brillantes on his part, alleged
that Lupo was not married to de Castro and that
he is not married to Ongkiko although he admits
having 5 children with her. Brillantes claims that
when he married de Castro in 1991 at California,
he believed in all good faith and with all legal
intents and purposes, that he was single because
her first marriage was solemnized without a
marriage license.
Brillantes argues that the provision of
Art. 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him considering that his first marriage took
place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil
Code of the Philippines while the second
marriage which took place in 1991 was
governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Art. 40 of the Family Code does
not apply to Brillantes.
HELD:
Art. 40 is applicable to remarriages
entered into after the effectivity of the Family
Code in 1988 regardless of date of the first
marriage. Besides, Art. 256 of the Family Code
said Art. 15 is given retroactive effect insofar
as it does prejudice or impair vested or acquired
rights in accordance with Civil Code or other
laws. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who
may feel that he is adversely affected.
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke
good faith. He made a mockery of the institution
of marriage and employed deceit to be able to
cohabit with a woman.
DOMINGO VS. CA
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a
marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense.
FACTS:
Private respondent Delia Soledad Domingo and
petitioner Roberto Domingo got married while
the marriage of Roberto with one Emerlina dela
Paz was still subsisting. Hence, Emerlina sued
Roberto for bigamy. Thereafter, Delia filed a
petition for the declaration of nullity of her
marriage with Roberto and separation of
property. Roberto filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the ground that the marriage being void ab
initio, the petition for the declaration of its
nullity is unnecessary. The trial court denied the
motion. Roberto then filed a special civil action
of certiorari and mandamus, which was
dismissed by the CA. Roberto contended that
the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of
marriage can be maintained only if it is for the
purpose of remarriage.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration
of a void marriage is necessary for the recovery
and the separation of properties.

RULING:
Yes. The Family Code has settled once and for
all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. In fact, the
requirement for a declaration of absolute nullity
of a marriage is also for the protection of the
spouse who, believing that his or her marriage is
illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of the nullity of his or her first
marriage, the person who marries again cannot
be charged with bigamy.
Article 40 of the Family Code denotes that such
final judgment declaring the previous marriage
void need not be obtained only for purposes of
remarriage. Undoubtedly, one can conceive of
other instances where a party might well invoke
the absolute nullity of a previous marriage for
purposes other than remarriage, such as in case
of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between
the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for
the custody and support of their common
children and the delivery of the latters'
presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence
needs must be adduced, testimonial or
documentary, to prove the existence of grounds
rendering such a previous marriage an absolute
nullity. These need not be limited solely to an
earlier final ju dgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void. Hence, in the instance
where a party who has previously contracted a
marriage which remains subsisting desires to
enter into another marriage which is legally
unassailable, he is required by law to prove that
the previous one was an absolute nullity. But this
he may do on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
MERCADO VS. TAN
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous
marriage is necessary before a subsequent one
can be legally contracted. One who enters into a
subsequent marriage without first obtaining such
judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy.
FACTS:
Vincent Mercado married Consuelo Tan while
his marriage with Ma. Thelma Oliva was still
subsisting. Hence, Tan filed a complaint for
bigamy against Mercado. Subsequently,
Mercado filed a petition for Declaration of
Nullity of Marriage against Oliva. The petition
was granted and the marriage between Mercado
and Oliva was declared null and void.
Nevertheless, the RTC convicted Mercado of the
crime of bigamy.
Mercado contended that since his previous
marriage had been declared null and void, he
cannot be convicted of the crime of bigamy as
there was no first marriage to speak of.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the element of previous legal
marriage is present in order to convict petitioner.
RULING:
Yes. Article 40 of the Family Code expressly
requires a judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage before that person can marry
again; otherwise, the second marriage will also
be void. It is now settled that the fact that the
first marriage is void from the beginning is not a
defense in a bigamy charge. One who enters
into a subsequent marriage without first
obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier
union is characterized by statute as void.
In the instant case, petitioner contracted a
second marriage although there was yet no
judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage. In fact, he instituted the Petition to
have the first marriage declared void only after
complainant had filed a letter-complaint
charging him with bigamy. By contracting a
second marriage while the first was still
subsisting, he committed the acts punishable
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.
That he subsequently obtained a judicial
declaration of the nullity of the first marriage
was immaterial. To repeat, the crime had
already been consummated by then.
CARINO VS. CARINO
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
FACTS:
The late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario contracted
two marriages during his lifetime. The first was
with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario, and the
second was with respondent Susan Yee Cario.
SPO4 Cario passed away under the care of
respondent, who spent for his medical and burial
expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed
claims for monetary benefits and financial
assistance pertaining to the deceased from
various government agencies. Respondent filed
a case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner praying that petitioner be ordered to
return to her at least one-half of the P146,000.00
death benefits which petitioner received from
various government agencies. Respondent
admitted that her marriage to the deceased took
place during the subsistence of, and without first
obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of the
marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
She, however, claimed to be in good faith since
she had no knowledge of the previous marriage.
To bolster her action for collection of sum of
money, respondent contended that the marriage
of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized without the
required marriage license. The trial court ruled
in favor of respondent, which the CA affirmed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between SPO4
Santiago Cario and petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cario is valid, thereby entitling her to the entire
subject death benefits.
RULING:
No. Under the Civil Code, which was the law in
force when the marriage of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased was solemnized in
1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of
marriage, and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions, renders the marriage void ab
initio. The records reveal that the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no
marriage license number and, as certified by the
Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, their office has no record of such
marriage license. It is beyond cavil, therefore,
that the marriage between petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage
license, and not being one of the marriages
exempt from the marriage license requirement,
is undoubtedly void ab initio.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, for
purposes of remarriage, there must first be a
prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a
previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage, otherwise, the
second marriage would also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case
of nullity of the previous marriage of the
deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not
validate the second marriage of the deceased
with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first
obtaining a judicial decree declaring the
marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the
deceased void. Hence, the marriage of
respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likewise, void ab initio.
Considering that the marriage of respondent
Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous
marriage, having been solemnized during the
subsistence of a previous marriage then
presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 of the
Family Code is therefore in order. The disputed
P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit
Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation,
Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations,
incentives and benefits from governmental
agencies earned by the deceased as a police
officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents
proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she
contributed money, property or industry in the
acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence,
they are not owned in common by respondent
and the deceased, but belong to the deceased
alone and respondent has no right whatsoever to
claim the same.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan
Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the
Family Code governs. Even if the disputed
death benefits were earned by the deceased
alone as a government employee, Article 147
creates a co-ownership in respect thereto,
entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof.
As there is no allegation of bad faith in the
present case, both parties of the first marriage
are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half
of the subject death benefits under scrutiny
shall go to the petitioner as her share in the
property regime, and the other half pertaining to
the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession,
to his legal heirs, namely, his children with
Susan Nicdao.
JARILLO VS. PEOPLE
(601 SCRA 236)- FULL CASE
ABLAZA VS. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in RTC
Cataingan, Masbate a petition for the declaration
of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted
on December 26, 1949 between his late brother
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated
without a marriage license, due to such license
being issued only on January 9, 1950. He
insisted that his being the surviving brother of
Cresenciano who had died without any issue
entitled him to one-half of the real properties
acquired by Cresenciano before his death,
thereby making him a real party in interest; and
that any person, himself included, could impugn
the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after
the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage
being void ab initio.
The RTC dismissed the petition for the
following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time
(action had long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is
not a party to the marriage.
The CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC,
thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a
marriage considered void from the beginning
does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires
that the same action must be filed by the proper
party, which in this case should be filed by any
of the parties to the marriage. xxxx
Certainly, a surviving brother of the
deceased spouse is not the proper party to file
the subject petition. More so that the surviving
wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even
impleaded as a party to said case.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner is a real party-in-interest
in the action to seek the declaration of nullity of
the marriage of his deceased brother solemnized
under the regime of the old Civil Code
HELD: YES
A valid marriage is essential in order to create
the relation of husband and wife and to give rise
to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising
out of such relation. The law prescribes the
requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the
validity of a marriage is tested according to the
law in force at the time the marriage is
contracted. As a general rule, the nature of the
marriage already celebrated cannot be changed
by a subsequent amendment of the governing
law. Thus, a Civil Code marriage remains void,
considering that the validity of a marriage is
governed by the law in force at the time of the
marriage ceremony.
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify
the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC
(Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages), which took effect on March 15,
2003.
Section 2 (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
explicitly provides the limitation that a petition
for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to
distinguish between marriages covered by the
Family Code and those solemnized under the
regime of the Civil Code. Specifically, A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered
by the Family Code, which took effect on
August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that
is prospective in application, is confined only to
proceedings commenced after March 15, 2003.
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval the following
actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to
wit:
1) Those commenced before March 15, 2003,
the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;
and
2) Those filed in relation to marriages celebrated
during the effectivity of the Civil Code and,
those celebrated under the regime of the Family
Code prior to March 15, 2003.
Considering that the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the
old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of
the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule
on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage
as having the right to initiate the action for
declaration of nullity of the marriage under AM
02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to
the petitioner.
The old and new Civil Codes contain no
provision on who can file a petition to declare
the nullity of a marriage, and when.
Accordingly, in Nial v. Bayadog, the children
were allowed to file after the death of their
father a petition for the declaration of the nullity
of their fathers marriage to their stepmother
contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of
a marriage license. There, the Court
distinguished between a void marriage and a
voidable one, and explained how and when each
might be impugned, thus wise:
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no
judicial decree is necessary in order to establish
the nullity of a marriage. Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void
marriage.......is as though no marriage had
ever taken place. And therefore, being good
for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the
fact of marriage may be material, either
direct or collateral. xxx
It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot
be collaterally attacked except in direct
proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the
parties so that on the death of either, the
marriage cannot be impeached, and is made
good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family
Code expressly provides that there must be a
judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage, though void, before a party can enter
into a second marriage and such absolute nullity
can be based only on a final judgment to that
effect. For the same reason, the law makes either
the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.
Corollarily, if the death of either party would
extinguish the cause of action or the ground for
defense, then the same cannot be considered
imprescriptible.
However, other than for purposes of remarriage,
no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other
purposes......the court may pass upon the validity
of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted
to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case.
However, that the absence of a provision in the
old and new Civil Codes cannot be construed as
giving a license to just any person to bring an
action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval, the
plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law
that every action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real party in
interest. Thus, only the party who can
demonstrate a proper interest can file the
action. Interest within the meaning of the rule
means material interest, or an interest in issue to
be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about
the question involved or a mere incidental
interest.
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late
Cresencianos brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed
himself to be, then he has a material interest in
the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely
affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a
brother like the petitioner, albeit not a
compulsory heir under the laws of succession,
has the right to succeed to the estate of a
deceased brother under the conditions stated in
Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code,
as follows:
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their
children survive with the widow or widower, the
latter shall be entitled to one half of the
inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their
children to the other half.
Article 1003. If there are no descendants,
ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to
the entire estate of the deceased in accordance
with the following articles.
Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner
to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any
descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate
or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner
was the late Cresencianos surviving heir. Such
prior determination must be made by the trial
court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions
of fact.
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not
implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresencianos
surviving wife, stood to be benefited or
prejudiced by the nullification of her own
marriage. She was truly an indispensable party
who must be joined herein. We take note, too,
that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in
Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila
G. Ablaza, and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses
Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to
determine who between the parties were the
legal owners of the property involved therein. As
a defendant in that action, the petitioner is
reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the
therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the
wife and daughter, respectively, of the late
Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another
indispensable party whose substantial right any
judgment in this action will definitely affect. The
petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
WHEREFORE, the case is reinstated, and its
records are returned to RTC Masbate, for further
proceedings, with instructions to first require the
petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in
order to implead Leonila Honato and her
daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-
defendants.
JARILLO VS PEOPLE
(622 SCRA 24)- FULL CASE
CHAN-TAN VS. TAN- FULL CASE
LASANAS VS. PEOPLE
THE FACTS:
Noel Lasanas (petitioner), and Socorro were
married by Judge Carlos Salazar in 1968,
without the benefit of a marriage license or an
affidavit of cohabitation. They renewed their
marriage vows in a religious ceremony before
Fr. Rodolfo Tamayo in Iloilo City, again without
attaching a marriage license or an affidavit of
cohabitation. They separated in 1982, however,
due to irreconcilable differences. Noel then
married Josefa Esteban in a religious ceremony
solemnized by Fr. Ramon Sequito in Iloilo City.
Noels marriage status was indicated in the
marriage certificate as single. On July 26,
1996, Noel filed a complaint for annulment of
marriages and damages against Socorro, alleging
that the latter employed deceit,
misrepresentation and fraud in securing his
consent to their marriage. Soccoro then filed a
criminal case for bigamy against Noel, and the
corresponding information filed against him.
His complaint for declaration of nullity was
dismissed on November 24, 1998. Meanwhile,
in the criminal case for bigamy, Noel was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court as
charged. He appealed to the CA, but the latter
affirmed the RTC judgment. Thus, Noel filed
the instant petition for review on certiorari with
the Supreme Court. He argues that the first
element of bigamy was not duly proved, as his
marriage to Socorro was null and void for lack
of marriage license or affidavit of cohabitation;
he acted in good faith; and had the honest belief
that there was no need for a judicial declaration
of nullity of the first marriage before he could
contract a subsequent marriage. He argues that
the RTC and the CA incorrectly applied the
provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code, asserting that the civil law rule embodied
in Article 40 of the Family Code requiring a
judicial declaration of nullity before one could
contract a subsequent marriage should not apply
in this purely criminal prosecution; that even if
Article 40 of the Family Code was applicable,
he should still be acquitted because his
subsequent marriage was null and void for being
without a recorded judgment of nullity of
marriage, as provided in Article 53 in relation to
Article 52 of the Family Code; that,
consequently, an essential element of the crime
of bigamy, i.e. that the subsequent marriage be
valid, was lacking; and that his good faith and
lack of criminal intent were sufficient to relieve
him of criminal liability.
THE ISSUE:
Whether or not Noel should be held liable for
bigamy.
THE RULING:
The appeal lacks merit.
The law on bigamy is found in Article 349 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:
Article 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person who
shall contract a second or subsequent marriage
before the former marriage has been legally
dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a
judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.
The elements of the crime of bigamy are as
follows: (1) that the offender has been legally
married; (2) that the marriage has not been
legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be
presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3)
that he or she contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent
marriage has all the essential requisites for
validity.1
The CA specifically observed:
This Court concedes that the marriage between
accused-appellant Lasanas and private
complainant Patingo was void because of the
absence of a marriage license or of an affidavit
of cohabitation. The ratificatory religious
wedding ceremony could not have validated the
void marriage. Neither can the church wedding
be treated as a marriage in itself for to do so, all
the essential and formal requisites of a valid
marriage should be present. One of these
requisites is a valid marriage license except in
those instances when this requirement may be
excused. There having been no marriage license
nor affidavit of cohabitation presented to the
priest who presided over the religious rites, the
religious wedding cannot be treated as a valid
marriage in itself.
But then, as the law and jurisprudence say,
petitioner should have first secured a judicial
declaration of the nullity of his void marriage to
private complainant Patingo before marrying
Josefa Eslaban. Actually, he did just that but
after his marriage to Josefa Eslaban.
Consequently, he violated the law on bigamy.
Accuseds reliance on the cases of People v.
Mendoza, 95 Phil. 845 and People v. Aragon,
100 Phil. 1033 is misplaced because the ruling
in these cases have already been abandoned per
Relova v. Landico, supra, and Wiegel v. Sempio-
Diy, 143 SCRA 499. The petitioner also cited
Yap v. Court of Appeals, 145 SCRA 229 which
resurrected the Aragon and Mendoza doctrine
but Yaps ruling too had been overtaken by Art.
40 of the Family Code and by Domingo v. Court
of Appeals and Te v. Court of Appeals, supra.
Regarding accused-appellants defense of good
faith, the same is unavailing pursuant to
Maozca v. Domagas, 248 SCRA 625.
This Court, therefore concludes that the
appealed Decision is correct in all respect.2
Based on the findings of the CA, this case has
all the foregoing elements attendant.
The first and second elements of bigamy were
present in view of the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage between the
accused and Socorro. The requirement of
securing a judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage prior to contracting a subsequent
marriage is found in Article 40 of the Family
Code, to wit:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous
marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
(n)
The reason for the provision was aptly discussed
in Teves v. People:3
x x x The Family Code has settled once and for
all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage
is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. Where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought
to be invoked for purposes of contracting a
second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void.
The Family Law Revision Committee and the
Civil Code Revision Committee which drafted
what is now the Family Code of the Philippines
took the position that parties to a marriage
should not be allowed to assume that their
marriage is void even if such be the fact but
must first secure a judicial declaration of the
nullity of their marriage before they can be
allowed to marry again.
In fact, the requirement for a declaration of
absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his
or her marriage is illegal and void, marries
again. With the judicial declaration of the nullity
of his or her marriage, the person who marries
again cannot be charged with bigamy.
In numerous cases, this Court has consistently
held that a judicial declaration of nullity is
required before a valid subsequent marriage can
be contracted; or else, what transpires is a
bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral.
If petitioners contention would be allowed, a
person who commits bigamy can simply evade
prosecution by immediately filing a petition for
the declaration of nullity of his earlier marriage
and hope that a favorable decision is rendered
therein before anyone institutes a complaint
against him. We note that in petitioners case the
complaint was filed before the first marriage
was declared a nullity. It was only the filing of
the Information that was overtaken by the
declaration of nullity of his first marriage.
Following petitioners argument, even assuming
that a complaint has been instituted, such as in
this case, the offender can still escape liability
provided that a decision nullifying his earlier
marriage precedes the filing of the Information
in court. Such cannot be allowed. To do so
would make the crime of bigamy dependent
upon the ability or inability of the Office of the
Public Prosecutor to immediately act on
complaints and eventually file Informations in
court. Plainly, petitioners strained reading of the
law is against its simple letter.
Pursuant to Teves, the accuseds conviction for
bigamy is affirmed. The crime of bigamy was
consummated from the moment he contracted
the second marriage without his marriage to
Socorro being first judicially declared null and
void, because at the time of the celebration of
the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro
was still deemed valid and subsisting due to
such marriage not being yet declared null and
void by a court of competent jurisdiction.4
What makes a person criminally liable for
bigamy, according to People v. Odtuhan:5
x x x is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a
valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
The accuseds defense of acting in good faith
deserves scant consideration especially because
the records show that he had filed a complaint
for the annulment of his marriage with Socorro
prior to the institution of the criminal complaint
against him but after he had already contracted
his second marriage with Josefa. But even such
defense would abandon him because the RTC
(Branch 39) dismissed his complaint for
annulment of marriage after the information for
bigamy had already been filed against him, thus
confirming the validity of his marriage to
Socorro.
Considering that the accuseds subsequent
marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the
third element of bigamy was established.
Nonetheless, he submits that his marriage to
Josefa was invalid because of lack of a recorded
judgment of nullity of marriage. Such argument
had no worth, however, because it was he
himself who failed to secure a judicial
declaration of nullity of his previous marriage
prior to contracting his subsequent marriage. In
Tenebro v. Court of Appeals6, the Court has
explained that [s]ince a marriage contracted
during the subsistence of a valid marriage is
automatically void, the nullity of this second
marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy. x x x
A plain reading of [Article 349 of the Revised
Penal Code], therefore, would indicate that the
provision penalizes the mere act of contracting a
second or subsequent marriage during the
subsistence of a valid marriage.7 The Court has
further observed in Nollora, Jr. v. People:8
x x x Nollora may not impugn his [subsequent]
marriage to Geraldino in order to extricate
himself from criminal liability; otherwise, we
would be opening the doors to allowing the
solemnization of multiple flawed marriage
ceremonies. As we stated in Tenebro v. Court of
Appeals:
There is therefore a recognition written into the
law itself that such a marriage, although void ab
initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring
criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise
would render the States penal laws on bigamy
completely nugatory, and allow individuals to
deliberately ensure that each marital contract be
flawed in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple marriages,
while beguiling throngs of hapless women with
the promise of futurity and commitment.
Under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
the penalty for bigamy is prision mayor. With
neither an aggravating nor a mitigating
circumstance attendant in the commission of the
crime, the imposable penalty is the medium
period of prision mayor,9 which ranges from
eight years and one day to 10 years. Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence should be within
the range of prision correccional, the penalty
next lower than that prescribed for the offense,
which is from six months and one day to six
years. Accordingly, the indeterminate sentence
of two years and four months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and
one day of prision mayor as maximum, as
imposed by the RTC, was proper.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the
decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on
August 29, 2002; and ORDERS the petitioner to
pay the costs of suit.