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Autrefois Acquit And Autrefois Convict

December19,2014byadmin LeaveaComment

byRahulDeo,CNLUPatna

Editors Note: The doctrine in a way is the rule again double jeopardy. Rule
against double jeopardy means that a person cannot be tried for the same
offenceonceagainifhehasbeeneitherconvictedoracquittedinthetrialrelating
tosameoffence.Thispapercriticallyevaluatesthisdoctrineinthelightofvarious
leadingcaselaws.

INTRODUCTION

Autrefois Acquit and Autrefois Convict are the French terms literally meaning previously
acquitted and previously convicted respectively. These two terms have their origin in the
commonlawwheretheyareacceptedasthepleasofautrefoisacquitandautrefoisconvict
and these pleas have the effect that the trial cannot go ahead due to the special
circumstances that these two pleas depict. Actually a plea ofautrefoisacquit means that a
person cannot be tried again for an offence for the reason that he has previously been
acquitted in the same offence and such a plea can be taken or combined with plea of not
guilty.Similarlyapleaofautrefoisconvictmeansthatapersoncannotbetriedforanoffence
forthereasonthathehasbeenpreviouslybeenconvictedinanoffenceandthesamecan
be combined with the plea of not guilty. However these two terms are jointly known as
DoctrineofAutrefoisAcquitandAutrefoisConvict.Actuallythisdoctrineinawayistherule

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againdoublejeopardy.Ruleagainstdoublejeopardymeansthatapersoncannotbetriedfor
thesameoffenceonceagainifhehasbeeneitherconvictedoracquittedinthetrialrelating
tosameoffence.

Protectionagainstdoublejeopardyhasbeenprovidedbymanycountriesasaconstitutional
rightIndiabeingoneofthem.TheothercountriesincludeCanada,Israel,MexicoandU.S.
HoweverinthisprojectwewillanalyzethisDoctrineofAutrefoisAcquitandAutrefoisConvict
in special reference to Indian context in the light of the provisions of Code of Criminal
Procedure, 1973, Constitution of India and Indian Evidence Act, 1872. The Constitution of
India has provided this protection as a fundamental right under the Article 20(2) which
provides No person shall be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than
once.Thesameprinciplehasbeenenactedinthesection26oftheGeneralClausesAct,
1897andsection300oftheCriminalProcedureCode,1973.Howeverthesetwoprovisions
mentionedlaterhaveformedthebasisoftheincorporationoftheprotectionagainstdouble
jeopardyasafundamentalrightguaranteedbytheConstitutionofourcountry.Howeverthis
istobeemphasizedandthesamewillbeanalyzedinthelaterpartofthisprojectthatthis
doctrine has not been a replicate of the forms that exist in the Common Law and the U.S
constitution. In a nutshell at this point it can be just said that the ambit of this doctrine in
Indiancontextquitenarrowerascomparedtoothersystems.

Thisprojectanalysesthedoctrineinthelightoftheconstitutionalprovisions,theprovisionsof
theCr.PC,1973,IndianEvidenceAct,1872andatthesametimethedifferenceinitsambit,
theapplicabilityinthecriminaljusticesystemofIndia.

DOCTRINE OF AUTREFOIS ACQUIT AND AUTREFOIS CONVICT IN RELATION TO

CRIMINALPROCEDURECODE,1973

TheCodeofCriminalProcedure,1973whichisthemajorprocedurallawwithregardtothe
criminalcaseshasincorporatedthisdoctrinewhichhasbeenprovidedinsection300ofthis
[i]
code.

Section300.(1):Apersonwhohasoncebeentriedbyacourtofcompetentjurisdictionfor
anoffenceandconvictedoracquittedofsuchoffenceshall,whilesuchconvictionoracquittal
remainsinforce,notbeliabletobetriedagainforthesameoffence,noronthesamefacts
foranyotheroffenceforwhichadifferentchargefromtheonemadeagainsthimmighthave
beenmadeundersubsection(1)ofsection221,orforwhichhemighthavebeenconvicted
undersubsection(2)thereof.

(2)Apersonacquittedorconvictedofanyoffencemaybeafterwardstried,withtheconsent
ofStateGovernment,foranydistinctoffenceforwhichaseparatechargemighthavebeen
againsthimataformertrialundersubsection(1)ofsection220.

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(3) A person convicted of any offence constituted by any act causing consequences which
together with such act, constituted a different offence from that of which he was convicted,
may be afterwards tried for such last mentioned offence, if the consequences had not
happened, or were not known to the court to have happened, at the time when he was
convicted.

(4) A person acquitted or convicted of any offence constituted by any acts may,
notwithstandingsuchacquittalorconviction,besubsequentlychargedwith,andtriedfor,any
other offence constituted by the same acts which he may have committed if the court by
whichhewasfirsttriedwasnotcompetenttotrytheoffencewithwhichheissubsequently
charged.

(5) A person discharged under section 258 shall not be tried again for the same offence
except with the consent of the Court by which he was discharged or of any other Court to
whichthefirstmentionedcourtissubordinate.

(6)Nothinginthissectionshallaffecttheprovisionsofsection26oftheGeneralClausesAct,
1897orofsection188ofthiscode.

ANALYSISOFTHESTATUTORYPROVISION

Theprovisionwaspreviouslymentionedinthesection403oftheoldcode.Thesectionlays
down the principle that a person who has been previously acquitted or convicted in any
offencecannotbetriedforthesameoffenceagaini.e.ruleagainstdoublejeopardyhowever
this protection is not absolute in nature and this thing becomes clear from the detailed
analysisofthesection300.Thisruleisactuallybasedoncommonlawmaximnemodebet
bisvexarithatmeansapersonshallnotbebroughtintodangerforoneandthesameoffence
more than once. The application of this doctrine in Indian context is different from that in
Common Law and U.S legal system. A detailed study of this section will bring out that the
conditionsnecessaryfortheapplicationofthisprovision.

Section300(1)laysdownthepropositionmentionedhereunder:

1.Theaccusedhasbeentriedbyacourtofcompetentjurisdiction.
2.He should be acquitted of the offence alleged to have been committed by him or an
offence which he might have been under Section 221(1) or for which he might have
beenconvictedundersection221(2).

Atthesametimeapersoncannotbetriedforanoffenceforwhichhehasbeenconvicted
previously.Withregardtosubsection(1)ofsection300thesecondtrialofapersonisbarred
evenifitisnotforthesameoffence,butthenifitisbasedonthesamefactsforanyother

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offenceforwhichachargemighthavebeenagainsthimundersection221(1)orforwhichhe
might have been convicted under section 221(2). Section 221(1) provides that where it is
doubtful on the basis of the facts of the case that what offence has been committed, the
accused can be charged with all such offences or any of such offences or he may be in
alternative charged of having committed any one of the said offences. Section 221(2)
provides that if the accused has been charged with one offence and it appears from the
evidencethathecommittedadifferentoffenceforwhichhemighthavebeenchargedunder
theprovisionsofsubsection(1),hemaybeconvictedwiththeoffencewhichheisshownto
havecommitted,althoughhewasnotchargedwithit.

1.An analysis of this section makes it clear that there must be the trial of the accused,
[ii]
that is, hearing and determination on the merits and for the purpose of the ban to
subsequenttrialascontemplatedbythesection300(1)thereshouldhavebeenthetrial
oftheaccusedandonpreviousoccasion,hemusthavebeenconvictedoracquitted.If
[iii]
thereisnotrialthenthesubsequenttrialforthesameoffenceisnotbarred.
2.However the acquittal or the conviction, in order to be actual defence to the charge
mustbebyacourtofcompetentjurisdiction.Ifthecourtwhichheldthefirsttrialwasnot
competenttotrythechargeputforwardinthesecondtrial,thissectionwouldhaveno
application.Atrialbyacourthavingnojurisdictioninthecaseisvoidabinitioandthe
accusedifacquittedisliabletoberetriedforthesameoffence.
3.The person must have been either acquitted or been convicted. It is only then that a
person can take the plea of this section in order to bar the second trial for the same
offence.Meredischargeoftheaccuseddoesnotamounttoacquittal.Apersonissaid
tobedischargedwhenheisrelievedfromthelegalproceedingbyanorderwhichdoes
not amount to judgement. Judgement is the final order in a trial terminating either in
convictionoracquittaloftheaccused.Apersonwhoisinlawonlydischargedmaybe
chargedagainforthesameoffenceifsomeothertestimonyisdiscoveredagainsthim
however a person who is acquitted of a charge can never be put on the trial for the
sameoffence.Adischargeleavesthematteratlargeforallpurposesofjudicialinquiry
and there is nothing to prevent a Magistrate discharging the accused from inquiring
[iv]
againintothecase.
4.However in case where a judgement has been passed by a competent court either
acquittingorconvictingtheaccused,theresolongasthejudgementremainsinforce
the person so acquitted or convicted cannot be tried again for the same offence, but
wheresuchanorderorjudgementhasbeensetasidebyaCourteitheronappealor
revision then such person can again be tried for the same offence because the
previoustrialisannulledthereby.
5.Theconvictionortheacquittalinthepreviouscasecannotbeabarinthetrialofthe
samepersonforadifferentoffencebasedondifferentfactsbutonthesameevidence.
[v]
InthecaseofStateofTamilNaduv.Nalini therewascriminaltrialforcertainoffences
underTADA(nowPOTA),alongwiththeotheroffencesunderIPC.Thesubsequenttrial

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fortheoffencesunderTADAbasedonthesamefactswasheldtobebarredandthe
convictionoftheaccusedinthesubsequenttrialwassetaside.

Trialonseparatecharges:

Section300(2)contemplatesasituationwhereapersonmighthavebeenchargedwithand
triedinaccordancewiththesection220(1)ofCr.PC,1973.Inthiscasethepersonwhocan
besocharged,maybetriedonceagainevenaftertheorderoftheconvictionoracquittalin
the previous case, however with the prior consent of the state government. Section 220(1)
providesthatif,inoneseriesofactssoconnectedtogetherastoformthesametransaction,
more offences than one are committed by the same person, he may be charged with and
triedatonetrialfor,everysuchoffence.Whereapersonhasbeenconvictedofanyoffence
andaseparatechargeforanotheroffencecouldhavebeenmadebutwasnotmadeagainst
him in the formal trial, he should not be liable to be tried again for the other offence as a
[vi]
matter of course because this might lend itself to abuse. For this reason the later part of
thissectionenvisagestheprovisionthatsuchkindofsecondtrialcanbemadeonlywiththe
prior consent of the state Government. The State Government also is supposed to give its
consentafterthedueconsiderationofallthefactsandcircumstancesofthecaseandwith
[vii]
themainintendmentofthelawviz.promotionofjustice.

Section 300(3) envisages a situation where a person is convicted of any offence by an act
causing such consequences, that the act together with the consequences constituted a
different offence from the one for which he was convicted. In such a situation if the
consequences had not happened or were not known to the court at the time when such
personwasconvictedthenhemaybeafterwardstriedforsuchanoffence.Howeveritmust
be noted in the Section 300(3) that the words used are apersonconvicted and does not
includeacquittedasintheformersubsections.Thereforethisruledoesnotapplywherehe
has been acquitted. In order to have a better understanding on this point let us take an
examplewhereAistriedforcausinggrievoushurttoapersonandisconvicted.Lateritis
foundthatthepersontowhomgrievoushurtwasdonehedied.HereinthiscaseAmaybe
triedonceagainseparatelyfortheoffenceofculpablehomicide.Howeverletuspresumein
thesameexamplethatAwasacquittedofthechargeofgrievoushurt,andtheninthiscase
he cannot be tried once again if the person later dies, for the offence of culpable homicide
underthissection.Thereasonforkeepingtheacquittaloutofthepurviewofthissectioncan
belogicallyascertainedinthesensethatthesectionprovidesthatlateroffenceforwhichthe
personmaybetried,isanoffencebecauseoftheconsequencesoftheformeractandthe
offence constituted by the former act, being taken together. However when a person is
acquittedoftheformerchargethenitisquiteclearthatheisexoneratedfromtheliabilityof
committingthatoffence,thereforehowandwhyshouldapersonbetriedonceagainforthe
consequences that have ensued from the act from the liability of which he has been

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exonerated.Thisisthepossiblelogicalexplanationbehindthecontemplationofthissection
bythelegislature.

Section300(4)providesthatwhereapersonhasbeenacquittedorconvictedofanyoffence
constitutedbyanyacts,hemaybechargedwithandtriedagainforanyoffencebasedonthe
samefactsnotwithstandinghisacquittalorconviction,ifthecourtbywhichhewaspreviously
triedwasnotcompetenttotrytheoffencewithwhichheissubsequentlycharged.Toprovide
abetterexplanationtothesectionletustakeanexamplewhereAistriedforrobberybya
JudicialMagistrateoffirstclass.Howeverheislaterchargedfortheoffenceofdacoitybased
onthesamefacts.Inthiscasesincethesubsequentchargeoftheoffenceofdacoityisnot
triable by a Judicial Magistrate of first class and is triable only by the Court of Session,
thereforethesecondtrialofsuchapersonirrespectiveofthefactthatwhetherhehasbeen
acquittedorconvicted,willnotbebarred.

Section300(5)contemplatesasituationwhereapersonhasbeendischargedundersection
258oftheCr.PC,1973.Section258providesthatinanysummonscaseinstitutedotherwise
thanuponcomplaint,aMagistrateofthefirstclassor,withtheprevioussanctionoftheChief
JudicialMagistrate,anyotherJudicialMagistrate,may,forthereasontoberecordedbyhim,
stop the proceedings at any stage without pronouncing any judgement and where such
stoppageismadeaftertheevidenceoftheprincipalwitnesshasbeenrecorded,pronouncea
judgementofacquittal,andinanyothercase,releasetheaccused,andsuchreleaseshall
havetheeffectofdischarge.Thesection300(5)providesthatwhereapersonhasbeenso
dischargedunderthesection258hecannotbetriedonceagainforthesameoffencewithout
thepreviousconsentoftheCourtwhichgavesuchorderofdischargeorofanyotherCourt
towhichtheformercourtissubordinate.Thisprovisionisinordertoprovideacheckagainst
abuse of power of fresh prosecution especially in respect of discharge under the said
[viii]
provisions thus treating it differently from discharges under other provisions of law. It
should be noted that this section does not apply in case of discharge made in the cases
whichhavebeeninstitutedonacomplaint.MoresoanorderofdischargeunderSection258
[ix]
canneverberegardedasanacquittalforthepurposeofthesection300(5). Itcanbevery
wellbevisualisedintheexplanationappendedtothesection300whichspecificallyprovides
thatdismissalofacomplaintordischargeoftheaccusedinnotanacquittalforthepurpose
ofthissection.

Section 300(6) in clear terms provides that nothing in the section 300 shall affect the
provisionsofthesection26oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897orofsection188ofthiscode.
Section26oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897provides:Whereanactoromissionconstitutes
anoffenceundertwoormoreenactments,thentheoffendershallbeliabletobeprosecuted
andpunishedundereitheroranyofthoseenactments,butshallnotbeliabletobepunished
twice for the same offence. If the accused was acquitted during the first trial on a specific
charge such acquittal will not prohibit a second trial on a separate charge for an offence
[x]
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[x]
constitutedbythesamefactsunderadifferentenactment. ItwasheldinthecaseofState
[xi]
ofM.Pv.BireshwarRao thattherecannotbeanyprohibitiontoatrialandconvictionunder
section 409 of the IPC in a case where the accused had been tried and acquitted of an
offenceunderSection52ofthePreventionofCorruptionAct,1947constitutedonidentical
facts.

RES JUDICATA AND RELEVANCY WITH PROTECTION AGAINST DOUBLE

JEOPARDY

Theprincipleofresjudicataorinotherwordsprincipleofissueestoppeldoesnotbaratrial
ratheritisaruleofevidenceaccordingtowhich,whereanissueoffacthasbeentriedbya
competent Court on a former occasion and a finding has been reached in favour of the
accused, such finding would constitute an estoppel or res judicata against the prosecution,
notasabartotrialandconvictionoftheaccusedforadistinctoffence,butasprecludingthe
reception of an evidence to disturb the finding of the fact when the accused is tried
[xii]
subsequentlyevenforadifferentoffencewhichmightbepermittedbylaw. ThemaximRes
Judicata Pro Veritate Accipitur signifies that when a matter has been finally resolved by a
[xiii]
competentcourt,thesamemattercannotberelitigatedonceagain. Thisistobenotedthat
this principle has no statutory basis rather it is the creation of judicial interpretation and
decisions. The rule is different from the rule against double jeopardy in the sense that res
judicataonlyreferstotheadmissibilityofevidenceinasubsequenttrialaimedtoupsetthe
finding of a fact reached at, by a competent Court in a previous trial. While discussing the
principle of res judicata i.e. issueestoppel the Supreme Court has relied on the famous
observations of Lord Mac Dermott in the case of Sambasivam v Public Prosecutor,
[xiv]
FederationofMalaya inwhichhesaid:

Theeffectoftheverdictofacquittalpronouncedbyacompetentlawfulchargeanda
lawfultrialisnotcompletelystatedbysayingthatthepersonaccusedcannotbetriedagain
forthesameoffence.Tothatitmustbeaddedthattheverdictisbindingandconclusiveinall
[xv]
subsequentproceedingsbetweenthepartiesforadjudication.

TheimportanceofthisstatementbyLordMacDermottliesinthefactthatwhenanacquittal
isorderedbyacompetentCourtthenitnotonlyactsasbartothefurthertrialoftheperson
soacquittedforthesameoffence,atthesametimethefindingsoftheCourtduringthetrial
inwhichthepersonwasacquittedonthebasisoftheevidencesadduced,arebindingandno
evidencecanbegiventoupsetthefindingofsuchcourtinanysubsequenttrialofthesame
person, however for a different offence. The conditions for the applicability for the rule of
issueestoppelarementionedhereunder:

1.Thepartiesinthetwotrialsmustbethesame

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2.Thefactinissueprovedornotprovedmustbetheidenticalwiththeoneintheprevious
case

However it should be seen that the rule of issue estoppel has not got any direct statutory
recognition in connection with the section 300 of Cr.PC, 1973 but still it is quite significant
and relevant for the reason that this principle is related with the evidentiary aspect of the
aforesaid section. A blend of doctrine of res judicata and doctrine of autrefois acquit and
autrefoisconvicthasbeenprovidedintheSection40oftheIndianEvidenceAct,1872.

Theexistenceofanyjudgement,orderordecreewhichlawpreventsanycourtfromtaking
the cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant fact when the question is whether
[xvi]
such court ought to take cognizance of such suit, or to hold such trial. In view of the
relation of this section to the doctrine of autrefois acquit and autrefois convict it can be
emphasized that where a person is tried for an offence wherein he is either convicted or
acquitted,incaseofhisbeingtriedsubsequentlyforthesameoffence,theevidenceofthe
previoustrialwillbeadmissibleundersection40topreventsuchpersonfrombeingsotried.

Howeverregardingthebenefitofthedoctrineofresjudicataapointtobeponderedoveris
thatitisonlytheaccusedwhohasbeengiventhebenefitthathecanusethefindingsofthe
competentCourtasanestoppelinhisfurthertrial.Theprosecutionhasnotbeengivenany
suchfreedomwhereafactfoundbyacourtagainsttheaccusedintheformertrialmaybe
establishedbytheruleofresjudicataorissueestoppelinthesubsequenttrial.

ARTICLE20(2)visvisSECTION300OFCr.PC,1973

The Constitution of India incorporates protection against double jeopardy by including as a

fundamentalrightundertheArticle20(2)whichprovides,Nopersonshallbeprosecutedand
punishedforthesameoffencemorethanonce.Thisarticleincleartermsincorporatesthe
rule against double jeopardy. It should be noted that the existence of this law in India was
priortotheenactmentofourConstitutioninformofanenactmentundertheSection26ofthe
GeneralClausesAct,1897.Howeverafterincorporationintheconstitutionthisprotectionhas
become a Constitutional guarantee in form of a fundamental right rather than just being a
statutory right. This is to be emphasized that the rule against double jeopardy is an import
from the common law system which recognizes a legal maxim Nemo debet bis vexari
meaningtherebyapersoncannotbeputinperiltwiceforthesameoffence.Moresothe5th
amendment of the American Constitution declares that no person shall be put twice in the
jeopardyoflifeorlimb.Thebackgroundfortherecognitionofthisruleasafundamentalright
was created by the already prevailing statues in India such as the Section 300 of Code of
CriminalProcedure,1973(section403oftheoldcode)andasalreadymentionedsection26
oftheGeneralClausesAct,1897.Howeveratthispointismustbeemphasizedatthispoint
of time that this provision in Indian context is in distinction with that provided in the other

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statutessuchassection300ofCr.PC,1973,andGeneralClausesAct,andatthesametime
withthatprevailinginthecommonlawcountriesandU.S.

As per the judicial interpretation in our country Article 20(2) incorporates only the rule of
autrefois convict and not autrefois acquit. It provides that if a person has been prosecuted
andpunishedthenhecannotbeprosecutedforthesameoffenceonceagain.Theruleisin
distinction with the American provision in the sense that there irrespective of the
consequenceofprosecutionwhetheritresultsintheconvictionoracquittal,apersoncannot
be tried again for the same offence. The common law principle is also the same. However
thearticle20(2)isdifferentinthesensethatinordertobringacaseunderthe20(2)tobara
secondtrialitmustbeshownthatthepersonhasbeenprosecutedbeforeacourtandhas
beenpunishedbyitforthesameoffence.Bothpunishmentandprosecutionshouldcoexist
for Art.20 (2) to be operative. A prosecution without punishment would not bring the case
withintheArt.20(2).Ifapersonhasbeenprosecutedforanoffencebutacquitted,thenhe
[xvii]
canbeprosecutedbythesameoffenceonceagainandpunished. TheSupremeCourtin
[xviii]
thecaseofStateofBombayv.S.LApte hasexplainedthelegalpositionoftheArt.20(2):

To operate as a bar the second prosecution and the consequential punishment

thereunder, must be for the same offence. The crucial requirement therefore for attracting
theArticleisthattheoffencesarethesame,i.e.theyshouldbeidentical.Ifhoweverthetwo
offences are distinct then notwithstanding that the allegation of facts in the two complaints
might be substantially similar, the benefit of the ban cannot be invoked. It is therefore,
necessary to analyze and compare not the allegations in the two complaints but the
ingredientsofthetwooffencesandseewhethertheidentityismadeout.

Another important ingredient of the Article 20 (2) is prosecution. Though not mentioned
specifically,ithasbeenreadthattheprosecutionmustbebeforeacourtoflaw,orajudicial
tribunalrequiredbylawtodecidemattersincontroversyjudiciallyonevidenceandonoath
which it must be authorised by the law to administer, and not before a tribunal which
entertainsadepartmentaloradministrativeenquiry,eventhoughsetupbyastatute,butnot
[xix]
requiredtoproceedonlegalevidencegivenonoath.

HoweverfromtheanalysisoftheconstitutionalprovisionsitisquiteclearthattheArticle20
(2) contemplates only the doctrine of autrefois convict. Now when the Section 300 of the
Cr.PCisreadinlightoftheConstitutionalprovisionunderArt.20(2)primafacieitappearsto
us that both the provisions stand, though not completely but partially in contradiction with
each other. Where on one hand Art.20 (2) provides bar to the second trial only in case of
previous conviction, Section 300 of Cr.PC prima facie contemplates a situation where the
second trial of a person will be barred for the same offence for the either reason i.e.
convictedoracquitted.AllthesubsectionsofSection300exceptsubsection3specifically
laydownthatbothconvictionandacquittalactasabartothesubsequenttrialofthesame

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person in various circumstances. In such a situation I find the statutory provision of Cr.PC
andtheConstitutionalmandateinconflictwitheachother.Howeverthisisknownthatinany
circumstanceanyConstitutionalprovisionwillprevailoverotherstatutes.Moresoapossible
reasonthatIamabletofigureoutisthetimegapbetweentheenactmentsofthestatutory
provision of Cr.PC and that of the Constitutional provision. No doubt the principles of
autrefoisacquitandautrefoisconvictwhichwerepreexistingintheoldCr.PCaswellasthe
GeneralClausesAct,1897formedthebasisforincorporationofthisasafundamentalright
when the Constitution was enacted in India, though with some reservations which limit the
ambitandscopeofthedoctrines.

CONCLUSION

The doctrine of Autrefois acquit and Autrefois convict has been included as a fundamental
rightinourConstitution,thoughthepurviewofthedoctrineisnarrowerthaninotherstatutes
likeCr.PC,GeneralClausesAct,andthatinothercountrieslikeU.K,U.S.Howeveritisclear
thatinsuchcircumstancestheConstitutionshallprevail.Toconcludeitcanbesaidthatthis
doctrineisasafeguardandactsasvalveagainsttheunlawfulprosecutionofapersonforthe
sameoffenceforthesecondtime.Thepleasofautrefoisacquitandautrefoisconvictareone
of the preliminary pleas to bar any trial. As we have already analysed in the whole project
thattheruleofissueestoppelisalsorelatedtothedoctrinebuteventhenthisrulehasnot
been incorporated in the code as it was thought to be not advisable to do so at present.
According to the law commission our Supreme Court and High Court have not had proper
opportunityyetofconsideringalltheimplicationsoftheruleandanyhastylegislationmayby
[xx]
itsrigiditycreatedifficulties.

EditedbySakshamDwivedi

[i]Section300,CodeofCriminalProcedure,1973

[ii]RatanlalandDhirajlal,TheCodeofCriminalProcedure,17thedn,p.568

[iii]LalBhanjiv.StateofMaharashtra,AIR1979SC94

[iv]RamSharmav.PinkiSharma,1989CrLJ2153(Pat)

[v]AIR1999SC2640

[vi]JointCommitteeReport,p.xxii

[vii]InguvaMallikarjunaSharmav.StateofA.P,1978CriLJ392

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[viii]Sarkar,CodeofCriminalProcedure,9thedn,p.1251

[ix] Ratanlal and Dhirajlal, Commentary on Criminal Procedure Code, 18th edn(enlarged),
p.993

[x]Rasulv.StateofMysore,AIR1959Mys136

[xi]AIR1957SC592

[xii]Kelkar,R.V,CriminalProcedure,5thedn,p.505

[xiii]Krishnamachari,V,LawofEvidence,6thedn,p.270

[xiv]1950AC458(PC)

[xv]Ibid.,p.479

[xvi]Section40,IndianEvidenceAct,1872

[xvii]Jain,M.P,IndianConstitutionalLaw,5thedn,p.1060

[xviii]AIR1961SC578

[xix]Jain,M.P,IndianConstitutionalLaw,5thedn,p.1062

[xx]41stReport,p.256,para30:6

FiledUnder:CriminalLaw,CriminologyandVictimology
TaggedWith:criminallaw

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