REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking to review the Decision of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals
[1]

dated July 12, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the
decisions of both the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated
[2]

February 26, 1999, and the 7 thMunicipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) of Ibajay-Nabas,
[3]

Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted the application for registration of a parcel
of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent herein.

The facts are as follows:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito
S. Naguit, filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title
of a parcel of land situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is
designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad. 758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and
contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The application seeks judicial confirmation of
respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.

On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public
prosecutor, appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of
Rustico Angeles, opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico
Angeles filed a formal opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court
issued an order of general default against the whole world except as to the heirs of
Rustico Angeles and the government.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally
declared for taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under
Tax Declaration No. 3888 until 1991. On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of
[4]

Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all
his rights to the subject property and confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming
sometime in 1955 or 1956. Subsequently, the heirs of Maming executed a deed of
[5]

absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon started occupying the same.
She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and administrator. The
administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany, coconut and
gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years old,
and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels
of land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial
decrees. Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in
the concept of owner without any objection from any private person or even the
government until she filed her application for registration.

After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that
the government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite
notice. On September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the
subject parcel be brought under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529 and that the title thereto registered and confirmed
in the name of Naguit.[6]

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for
was declared alienable and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification
from Regional Executive Director Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Region VI. However, the court denied the motion for
[7]

reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998. [8]

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the
RTC, Kalibo, Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision,
dismissing the appeal.[9]

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a
decision dismissing the petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed
decision of the RTC.

Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the
Republic on September 4, 2000. [10]

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate
court gravely erred in holding that there is no need for the governments prior release of
the subject lot from the public domain before it can be considered alienable or
disposable within the meaning of P.D. No. 1529, and that Naguit had been in
possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the required period. [11]
 Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as
alienable and disposable before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership could even start.

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate

Court in arguing that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive
[12]

possession must first be alienable. Since the subject land was declared alienable only
on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have maintained a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree,
since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the OSG argues.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration

proceedings, bears close examination. It expressly provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of
First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription
under the provisions of existing laws.

....

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of
title under Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-
interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation, and; that such possession is under a bona fide claim of ownership since
June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of

the land should have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is
not borne out by the plain meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in
the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership.
Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to
which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely located. Ad [13]

proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view,
that all lands of the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable
before June 12, 1945 would not be susceptible to original registration, no matter the
length of unchallenged possession by the occupant. Such interpretation renders
paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the government
from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated
considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely

requires the property sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the
time the application for registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application
is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the property for alienation or
disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right to utilize
the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the
length of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already
been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an
intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.

This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals.
Therein, the Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an application for
[14]

registration is alienable, an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of

the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a
legislative act or a statute. In that case, the subject land had been certified by the
[15]

DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded that the alienable
status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents had
occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of
the said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property
was released and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the
DENR. [16]

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals, wherein the Court
[17]

noted that while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972
that the lands in question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at
registration therein did not succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application
in 1963, or nine (9) years before the property was declared alienable and disposable.
Thus, in this case, where the application was made years after the property had been
certified as alienable and disposable, theBracewell ruling does not apply.

A different rule obtains for forest lands, such as those which form part of a
[18]

reservation for provincial park purposes the possession of which cannot ripen into
[19]

ownership. It is elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land
[20]

cannot be owned by private persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals, forest [21]

land is not registrable and possession thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it
into private property, unless such lands are reclassified and considered disposable and
alienable. In the case at bar, the property in question was undisputedly classified as
[22]

disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is inapplicable, as correctly held
by the Court of Appeals. [23]

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis
of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original
registration through ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for
registration derives from a bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or
earlier, by reason of the claimants open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the
public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles
have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the
province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of
a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation
of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
 When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A.
No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at
least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again
amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12,
1945. This new starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree.

Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the
Public Land Act does refer to agricultural lands of the public domain, while the Property
Registration Decree uses the term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.
It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that alienable lands of the public
domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Clearly, the subject lands under Section
[24]

48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree are
of the same type.

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No.
1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.
There is a consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public
[25]

land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and
exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such property
[26]

may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section 14(2), and thus
susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription.
Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than
June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then
the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with
coconut trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
[27]

certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the

application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.
 The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in
possession in the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the
question. It is again hinged on the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there
could have been no bona fide claim of ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land
was declared alienable or disposable.

We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of
Appeals that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous
possession by her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of
such conclusion is primarily factual, and the Court generally respects the factual
findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession since 1945 was established through
proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time Naguit purchased the
property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although tax
declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder
has a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such
an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. [28]

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can
be traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or
for almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired
title thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system.
That she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open,
continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the
government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of
protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court

of Appeals dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 156117 May 26, 2005

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
JEREMIAS AND DAVID HERBIETO, respondents.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625,
dated 22 November 2002,1 which affirmed the Judgment of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of
Consolacion, Cebu, dated 21 December 1999,2 granting the application for land registration of the
respondents.

Respondents in the present Petition are the Herbieto brothers, Jeremias and David, who filed with
the MTC, on 23 September 1998, a single application for registration of two parcels of land, Lots No.
8422 and 8423, located in Cabangahan, Consolacion, Cebu (Subject Lots). They claimed to be
owners in fee simple of the Subject Lots, which they purchased from their parents, spouses Gregorio
Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976.3Together with their application for registration,
respondents submitted the following set of documents:

(a) Advance Survey Plan of Lot No. 8422, in the name of respondent Jeremias; and Advance
Survey Plan of Lot No. 8423, in the name of respondent David; 4

(b) The technical descriptions of the Subject Lots;5

(c) Certifications by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)

dispensing with the need for Surveyor's Certificates for the Subject Lots; 6

(d) Certifications by the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on the absence of certificates of title
covering the Subject Lots;7

(e) Certifications by the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) of
the DENR on its finding that the Subject Lots are alienable and disposable, by virtue of
Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated 25 June 1963;8
 (f) Certified True Copies of Assessment of Real Property (ARP) No. 941800301831, in the
name of Jeremias, covering Lot No. 8422, issued in 1994; and ARP No. 941800301833, in
the name of David, covering Lot No. 8423, also issued in 1994;9 and

(g) Deed of Definite Sale executed on 25 June 1976 by spouses Gregorio Herbieto and
Isabel Owatan selling the Subject Lots and the improvements thereon to their sons and
respondents herein, Jeremias and David, for P1,000. Lot No. 8422 was sold to Jeremias,
while Lot No. 8423 was sold to David.10

On 11 December 1998, the petitioner Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed an Opposition to
the respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots arguing that: (1) Respondents failed
to comply with the period of adverse possession of the Subject Lots required by law; (2)
Respondents' muniments of title were not genuine and did not constitute competent and sufficient
evidence of bona fide acquisition of the Subject Lots; and (3) The Subject Lots were part of the
public domain belonging to the Republic and were not subject to private appropriation. 11

The MTC set the initial hearing on 03 September 1999 at 8:30 a.m.12 All owners of the land adjoining
the Subject Lots were sent copies of the Notice of Initial Hearing. 13 A copy of the Notice was also
posted on 27 July 1999 in a conspicuous place on the Subject Lots, as well as on the bulletin board
of the municipal building of Consolacion, Cebu, where the Subject Lots were located. 14 Finally, the
Notice was also published in the Official Gazette on 02 August 1999 15 and The Freeman Banat
News on 19 December 1999.16

During the initial hearing on 03 September 1999, the MTC issued an Order of Special Default, 17 with
only petitioner Republic opposing the application for registration of the Subject Lots. The
respondents, through their counsel, proceeded to offer and mark documentary evidence to prove
jurisdictional facts. The MTC commissioned the Clerk of Court to receive further evidence from the
respondents and to submit a Report to the MTC after 30 days.

On 21 December 1999, the MTC promulgated its Judgment ordering the registration and
confirmation of the title of respondent Jeremias over Lot No. 8422 and of respondent David over Lot
No. 8423. It subsequently issued an Order on 02 February 2000 declaring its Judgment, dated 21
December 1999, final and executory, and directing the Administrator of the Land Registration
Authority (LRA) to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots. 18

Petitioner Republic appealed the MTC Judgment, dated 21 December 1999, to the Court of
Appeals.19 The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 22 November 2002, affirmed the appealed
MTC Judgment reasoning thus:

In the case at bar, there can be no question that the land sought to be registered has been
classified as within the alienable and disposable zone since June 25, 1963. Article 1113 in
relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code, respectively provides that "All things which are
within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise provided.
Property of the State or any of its subdivisions of patrimonial character shall not be the object
of prescription" and that "Ownership and other real rights over immovables also prescribe
 through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without need of title or of
good faith."

As testified to by the appellees in the case at bench, their parents already acquired the
subject parcels of lands, subject matter of this application, since 1950 and that they
cultivated the same and planted it with jackfruits, bamboos, coconuts, and other trees
(Judgment dated December 21, 1999, p. 6). In short, it is undisputed that herein appellees or
their predecessors-in-interest had occupied and possessed the subject land openly,
continuously, exclusively, and adversely since 1950. Consequently, even assuming arguendo
that appellees' possession can be reckoned only from June 25, 1963 or from the time the
subject lots had been classified as within the alienable and disposable zone, still the
argument of the appellant does not hold water.

As earlier stressed, the subject property, being alienable since 1963 as shown by CENRO
Report dated June 23, 1963, may now be the object of prescription, thus susceptible of
private ownership. By express provision of Article 1137, appellees are, with much greater
right, entitled to apply for its registration, as provided by Section 14(4) of P.D. 1529 which
allows individuals to own land in any manner provided by law. Again, even considering that
possession of appelless should only be reckoned from 1963, the year when CENRO
declared the subject lands alienable, herein appellees have been possessing the subject
parcels of land in open, continuous, and in the concept of an owner, for 35 years already
when they filed the instant application for registration of title to the land in 1998. As such, this
court finds no reason to disturb the finding of the court a quo.20

The Republic filed the present Petition for the review and reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, on the basis of the following arguments:

First, respondents failed to establish that they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open,
continuous, and adverse possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of owners since 12 June
1945 or earlier. According to the petitioner Republic, possession of the Subject Lots prior to 25 June
1963 cannot be considered in determining compliance with the periods of possession required by
law. The Subject Lots were classified as alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963, per
CENRO's certification. It also alleges that the Court of Appeals, in applying the 30-year acquisitive
prescription period, had overlooked the ruling in Republic v. Doldol,21 where this Court declared that
Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, as amended and as it is
presently phrased, requires that possession of land of the public domain must be from 12 June 1945
or earlier, for the same to be acquired through judicial confirmation of imperfect title.

Second, the application for registration suffers from fatal infirmity as the subject of the application
consisted of two parcels of land individually and separately owned by two applicants. Petitioner
Republic contends that it is implicit in the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, as amended, that the application for registration of title
to land shall be filed by a single applicant; multiple applicants may file a single application only in
case they are co-owners. While an application may cover two parcels of land, it is allowed only when
the subject parcels of land belong to the same applicant or applicants (in case the subject parcels of
land are co-owned) and are situated within the same province. Where the authority of the courts to
proceed is conferred by a statute and when the manner of obtaining jurisdiction is mandatory, it must
be strictly complied with or the proceedings will be utterly void. Since the respondents failed to
comply with the procedure for land registration under the Property Registration Decree, the
proceedings held before the MTC is void, as the latter did not acquire jurisdiction over it.

Jurisdiction

Addressing first the issue of jurisdiction, this Court finds that the MTC had no jurisdiction to proceed
with and hear the application for registration filed by the respondents but for reasons different from
those presented by petitioner Republic.

A. The misjoinder of causes of action and parties does not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to hear
and proceed with respondents' application for registration.

Respondents filed a single application for registration of the Subject Lots even though they were not
co-owners. Respondents Jeremias and David were actually seeking the individual and separate
registration of Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively.

Petitioner Republic believes that the procedural irregularity committed by the respondents was fatal
to their case, depriving the MTC of jurisdiction to proceed with and hear their application for
registration of the Subject Lots, based on this Court's pronouncement in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals,22 to wit:

. . . In view of these multiple omissions which constitute non-compliance with the above-cited
sections of the Act, We rule that said defects have not invested the Court with the authority
or jurisdiction to proceed with the case because the manner or mode of obtaining jurisdiction
as prescribed by the statute which is mandatory has not been strictly followed, thereby
rendering all proceedings utterly null and void.

This Court, however, disagrees with petitioner Republic in this regard. This procedural lapse
committed by the respondents should not affect the jurisdiction of the MTC to proceed with and hear
their application for registration of the Subject Lots.

The Property Registration Decree23 recognizes and expressly allows the following situations: (1) the
filing of a single application by several applicants for as long as they are co-owners of the parcel of
land sought to be registered;24 and (2) the filing of a single application for registration of several
parcels of land provided that the same are located within the same province. 25 The Property
Registration Decree is silent, however, as to the present situation wherein two applicants filed a
single application for two parcels of land, but are seeking the separate and individual registration of
the parcels of land in their respective names.

Since the Property Registration Decree failed to provide for such a situation, then this Court refers to
the Rules of Court to determine the proper course of action. Section 34 of the Property Registration
Decree itself provides that, "[t]he Rules of Court shall, insofar as not inconsistent with the provisions
of this Decree, be applicable to land registration and cadastral cases by analogy or in a suppletory
character and whenever practicable and convenient."

Considering every application for land registration filed in strict accordance with the Property
Registration Decree as a single cause of action, then the defect in the joint application for
registration filed by the respondents with the MTC constitutes a misjoinder of causes of action and
parties. Instead of a single or joint application for registration, respondents Jeremias and David,
more appropriately, should have filed separate applications for registration of Lots No. 8422 and
8423, respectively.

Misjoinder of causes of action and parties do not involve a question of jurisdiction of the court to hear
and proceed with the case.26 They are not even accepted grounds for dismissal thereof. 27 Instead,
under the Rules of Court, the misjoinder of causes of action and parties involve an implied admission
of the court's jurisdiction. It acknowledges the power of the court, acting upon the motion of a party
to the case or on its own initiative, to order the severance of the misjoined cause of action, to be
proceeded with separately (in case of misjoinder of causes of action); and/or the dropping of a party
and the severance of any claim against said misjoined party, also to be proceeded with separately
(in case of misjoinder of parties).

The misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition may have been corrected by
the MTC motu propio or on motion of the petitioner Republic. It is regrettable, however, that the MTC
failed to detect the misjoinder when the application for registration was still pending before it; and
more regrettable that the petitioner Republic did not call the attention of the MTC to the fact by filing
a motion for severance of the causes of action and parties, raising the issue of misjoinder only
before this Court.

B. Respondents, however, failed to comply with the publication requirements mandated by the
Property Registration Decree, thus, the MTC was not invested with jurisdiction as a land registration
court.

Although the misjoinder of causes of action and parties in the present Petition did not affect the
jurisdiction of the MTC over the land registration proceeding, this Court, nonetheless, has discovered
a defect in the publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing, which bars the MTC from assuming
jurisdiction to hear and proceed with respondents' application for registration.

A land registration case is a proceeding in rem,28 and jurisdiction in rem cannot be acquired unless
there be constructive seizure of the land through publication and service of notice. 29

Section 23 of the Property Registration Decree requires that the public be given Notice of the Initial
Hearing of the application for land registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3)
posting. Publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing shall be made in the following manner:

1. By publication.

Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of
Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official
 Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient
to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing
to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and
"to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear
in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application shall not
be granted.

Even as this Court concedes that the aforequoted Section 23(1) of the Property Registration Decree
expressly provides that publication in the Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the land registration court, it still affirms its declaration in Director of Lands v. Court of
Appeals30 that publication in a newspaper of general circulation is mandatory for the land registration
court to validly confirm and register the title of the applicant or applicants. That Section 23 of the
Property Registration Decree enumerated and described in detail the requirements of publication,
mailing, and posting of the Notice of Initial Hearing, then all such requirements, including publication
of the Notice in a newspaper of general circulation, is essential and imperative, and must be strictly
complied with. In the same case, this Court expounded on the reason behind the compulsory
publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in a newspaper of general circulation, thus

It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed

mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as well
as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case at hand.
The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as widely read and
circulated as newspaper and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation, such that the notices
published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at all. Additionally, such
parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in fact not own any other real
estate. In sum, the all encompassing in rem nature of land registration cases, the
consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and the objective of
disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a mandatory construction
of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting. 31

In the instant Petition, the initial hearing was set by the MTC, and was in fact held, on 03 September
1999 at 8:30 a.m. While the Notice thereof was printed in the issue of the Official Gazette, dated 02
August 1999, and officially released on 10 August 1999, it was published in The Freeman Banat
News, a daily newspaper printed in Cebu City and circulated in the province and cities of Cebu and
in the rest of Visayas and Mindanao, only on 19 December 1999, more than three months after the
initial hearing.

Indubitably, such publication of the Notice, way after the date of the initial hearing, would already be
worthless and ineffective. Whoever read the Notice as it was published in The Freeman Banat
News and had a claim to the Subject Lots was deprived of due process for it was already too late for
him to appear before the MTC on the day of the initial hearing to oppose respondents' application for
registration, and to present his claim and evidence in support of such claim. Worse, as the Notice
itself states, should the claimant-oppositor fail to appear before the MTC on the date of initial
hearing, he would be in default and would forever be barred from contesting respondents' application
for registration and even the registration decree that may be issued pursuant thereto. In fact, the
MTC did issue an Order of Special Default on 03 September 1999.

The late publication of the Notice of Initial Hearing in the newspaper of general circulation is
tantamount to no publication at all, having the same ultimate result. Owing to such defect in the
publication of the Notice, the MTC failed to constructively seize the Subject Lots and to acquire
jurisdiction over respondents' application for registration thereof. Therefore, the MTC Judgment,
dated 21 December 1999, ordering the registration and confirmation of the title of respondents
Jeremias and David over Lots No. 8422 and 8423, respectively; as well as the MTC Order, dated 02
February 2000, declaring its Judgment of 21 December 1999 final and executory, and directing the
LRA Administrator to issue a decree of registration for the Subject Lots, are both null and void for
having been issued by the MTC without jurisdiction.

II

Period of Possession

Respondents failed to comply with the required period of possession of the Subject Lots for the
judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title.

While this Court has already found that the MTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and proceed with
respondents' application for registration, this Court nevertheless deems it necessary to resolve the
legal issue on the required period of possession for acquiring title to public land.

Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their title to the
Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject Lots by purchase from
their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25 June 1976. Respondent
Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in possession of the Subject Lots in
the concept of an owner since 1950.32

Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, submitted by respondents themselves, the

Subject Lots are "within Alienable and Disposable, Block I, Project No. 28 per LC Map No. 2545 of
Consolacion, Cebu certified under Forestry Administrative Order No. 4-1063, dated June 25, 1963.
Likewise, it is outside Kotkot-Lusaran Mananga Watershed Forest Reservation per Presidential
Proclamation No. 932 dated June 29, 1992."33 The Subject Lots are thus clearly part of the public
domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.

As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private persons without
any grant, express or implied, from the government; 34 and it is indispensable that the person claiming
title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of
acquisition recognized by law.35

The Public Land Act, as amended, governs lands of the public domain, except timber and mineral
lands, friar lands, and privately-owned lands which reverted to the State. 36 It explicitly enumerates
the means by which public lands may be disposed, as follows:
 (1) For homestead settlement;

(2) By sale;

(3) By lease;

(4) By confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles;

(a) By judicial legalization; or

(b) By administrative legalization (free patent).37

Each mode of disposition is appropriately covered by separate chapters of the Public Land Act
because there are specific requirements and application procedure for every mode. 38 Since
respondents herein filed their application before the MTC,39 then it can be reasonably inferred that
they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title over the
Subject Lots.

Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not exceeding 144
hectares,40 may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the Public Land Act, as
amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073, which reads

Section 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) [Repealed by Presidential Decree No. 1073].

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since
June 12, 1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of the applications for
confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of
this chapter.

(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture
whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945
shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled to judicial
confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now requires adverse possession of the land
since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and
disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots
were classified as alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the
computation of the period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and
unless the land had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of
imperfect title shall not apply thereto.41 It is very apparent then that respondents could not have
complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as
amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be judicially confirmed
or legalized.

The confirmation of respondents' title by the Court of Appeals was based on the erroneous
supposition that respondents were claiming title to the Subject Lots under the Property Registration
Decree. According to the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 22 November 2002, Section 14(4)
of the Property Registration Decree allows individuals to own land in any other manner provided by
law. It then ruled that the respondents, having possessed the Subject Lots, by themselves and
through their predecessors-in-interest, since 25 June 1963 to 23 September 1998, when they filed
their application, have acquired title to the Subject Lots by extraordinary prescription under Article
1113, in relation to Article 1137, both of the Civil Code.42

The Court of Appeals overlooked the difference between the Property Registration Decree and the
Public Land Act. Under the Property Registration Decree, there already exists a title which is
confirmed by the court; while under the Public Land Act, the presumption always is that the land
applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and possessors only claim an interest in the
same by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open, and notorious possession. 43 As
established by this Court in the preceding paragraphs, the Subject Lots respondents wish to register
are undoubtedly alienable and disposable lands of the public domain and respondents may have
acquired title thereto only under the provisions of the Public Land Act.

However, it must be clarified herein that even though respondents may acquire imperfect or
incomplete title to the Subject Lots under the Public Land Act, their application for judicial
confirmation or legalization thereof must be in accordance with the Property Registration Decree, for
Section 50 of the Public Land Act reads

SEC. 50. Any person or persons, or their legal representatives or successors in right,
claiming any lands or interest in lands under the provisions of this chapter, must in every
case present an application to the proper Court of First Instance, praying that the validity of
the alleged title or claim be inquired into and that a certificate of title be issued to them under
the provisions of the Land Registration Act.44

Hence, respondents' application for registration of the Subject Lots must have complied with the
substantial requirements under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and the procedural
requirements under the Property Registration Decree.
Moreover, provisions of the Civil Code on prescription of ownership and other real rights apply in
general to all types of land, while the Public Land Act specifically governs lands of the public domain.
Relative to one another, the Public Land Act may be considered a special law 45 that must take
precedence over the Civil Code, a general law. It is an established rule of statutory construction that
between a general law and a special law, the special law prevails Generalia specialibus non
derogant.46

WHEREFORE, based on the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 67625, dated 22 November 2002, is REVERSED. The Judgment of
the MTC of Consolacion, Cebu in LRC Case No. N-75, dated 21 December 1999, and its Order,
dated 02 February 2000 are declared NULL AND VOID. Respondents' application for registration is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Acting C.J., (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, G.R. No. 181502

Petitioner,
Present:
CORONA, J., Chairperson,
- v e r s u s - CARPIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA and
PERALTA, JJ.
REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.
Promulgated:
February 2, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

R E S O LUTIO N
CORONA, J.:
This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the June
16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by petitioner
Florencia G. Diaz.

Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for registration
of a vast tract of land[1] located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan City in the then
Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12, 1976. [2] She
alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed and harvested
the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously, publicly and
adversely for more or less 26 years.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within the Fort
Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of Proclamation
No. 237 (Proclamation 237)[3] in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as it formed part of
the public domain.

Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of

Lands v. Reyes[4] that the property subject of Garcias application was inalienable as
it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory
Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio
Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and
Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven.
Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was declared null and
void.

Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision [5] dated
July 1, 1981.
The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of Appeals
(CA). In its decision[6] dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza (Mendoza decision),[7] the appellate court reversed and set aside the
decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was applicable to petitioners case as
it involved the same property.

The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in
question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcias right to the property
was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information
title the probative value of which had already been passed upon by this Court
in Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the
CA concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.
During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was
substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.[8]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While

the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the
records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the
appellate court, with Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution[9] upholding
petitioners right to recall the records of the case.

Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable

settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and
finalize the same.

The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the

Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly
outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the
portion of the property inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for
approval of the amicable settlement in the CA.[10]

On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise agreement.
[11]
On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration Administration to issue
the corresponding decree of registration in petitioners favor.[12]

However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the

OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance
of the decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of
land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.

On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended

resolution)[13] annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the
parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) xxxxxx
(2) xxxxxx
(3) xxxxxx
(4) xxxxxx
(5) xxxxxx
(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the
Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the
Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed
between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz; the said
Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000
which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the
name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject
property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999
Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending
the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-
appellee Diaz registration herein.
 SO ORDERED.

(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the
validity of the Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the
CAs amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant
solicitor general during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the
trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the
CA. His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional
right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void.
The motion was denied.[14]

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari [15] in this Court.
It was denied for raising factual issues. [16] She moved for reconsideration.[17] This
motion was denied with finality on the ground that there was no substantial
argument warranting a modification of the Courts resolution. The Court then
ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained. Accordingly, we ordered
entry of judgment to be made in due course.[18]
Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and
motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to
the Supreme Court en banc.[19] The Court denied[20] it considering that a second
motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.[21] Furthermore, the motion to
refer the case to the banc was likewise denied as the banc is not an appellate court
to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be appealed.[22] We reiterated
our directive that no further pleadings would be entertained and that entry of
judgment be made in due course.
 Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first
addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then
to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.[23] The body of the letter, undoubtedly in
the nature of a third motion for reconsideration, is hereby reproduced in its
entirety:

This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect the
destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence, that to your
mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and
my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation
of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice
so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the
Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready
reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex A.

The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves
the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in
a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render impartial
justice, because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals
Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he,
as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the
Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which
he lost.

In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the

very same case.

In the case of the Alabang Boys[,] the public was outraged by the actions
of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by
the Secretary of Justice.

In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my

constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the
 prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in which
he had lost.

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite
from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was
tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action
will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice
Mendoza.

I fully support your call for moral force that will slowly and eventually
lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in
which we all find ourselves.

I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight
the dark forces that surround us everyday.

I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as
mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not
experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.

Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).

The language of petitioners letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly

veiled threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in
to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the
risk of being vilified in the media and by the public.

This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioners

letter/third motion for reconsideration.

APPLICABILITY
OF REYES

The Court agrees with the Republics position that Reyes is applicable to this case.

To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;
 (2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. [24]

The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However,
petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of
identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that
since the applicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two cases
should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.[25]
This contention is erroneous.

The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director
of Lands.[26] In that case, Quintin Taedo endeavored to secure title to a considerable
tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141. When the case
eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial courts decision to dismiss the
proceedings as the property in question was part of the public domain. Quintins
successor-in-interest, Florencia Taedo, who despite knowledge of the proceedings
did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to Benigno S. Aquino.
The latter sought to have it registered in his name. The question in that case, as
well as in this one, was whether our decision in the case in which another person
was the applicant constituted res judicata as against his successors-in-interest.

We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the
provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete
and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and
declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only
against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.[27]
 We also declared in Aquino that:

From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the
law of the case or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication
should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be taken
as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is
indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last
resort that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be
considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x[28]

Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its
decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made
an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as
it formed part of a military reservation. Thus, petitioners argument that the findings
of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle
that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this
Court is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this
Courts ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.

However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings

in Reyes (which should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the
trial court still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision
in Reyes, declaring the subject land as forming part of a military reservation, and
thus outside the commerce of man.

By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the
decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.
[29]
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does
not exist in legal contemplation.[30]
 All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be
reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A
conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the
position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As
eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court
from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings."[31]

ACQUISITION OF
PRIVATE RIGHTS

Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its
effectivity is subject to private rights, if any there be.

By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the

military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is

inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land
involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of
the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land
consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)[32]

Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest

lands are not registrable under CA 141.

[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies

exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are
excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its
inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the
title. (Emphasis supplied).[33]
 However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been
reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon
the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to
classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and
mineral lands)[34]coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her
predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce
such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-
in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is
because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or
possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year
possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public
Land Act.[35] This was our ruling in Almeda v. CA.[36] The rules on the confirmation
of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is
released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and only then will it
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.[37]

Coming now to petitioners contention that her private rights to the property,
meaning her and her predecessors possession thereof prior to the establishment of
the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had
already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was
established. To reiterate:

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is

inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land
involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of
the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land
consist of public forest. x x x
Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to
ownership.
But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was
established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of
evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-
interest for more than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted:

Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five

(5) years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have
converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such
inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

xxx

During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was cleared
and cultivated under the kaingin system, while some portions were used as
grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting of
vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the Japanese
occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x
xxx

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising
thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that
sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a presumptive
grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course to be
considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere occupancy
of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or other
permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the
statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim
of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the State.
[38]

xxx

Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which

petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in Reyes,
[39]
thus rendering its probative value suspect, further militates against granting her
application for registration.

NULLITY OF COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT

On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA

that the same was null and void.

An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a

contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the
New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic,
through the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority,
and the Office of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the
agreement with her.[40] The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered the
compromise agreement between the parties null and void because although it is the
duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases involving land registration
proceedings, it must do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its
principal, the Republic of the Philippines.[41]

In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for
respondent, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a
compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of
Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires special authority for
attorneys to bind their clients.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority

to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their
clients litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a clients claim but the full
amount in cash. (Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of
a contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil
Code provides:

Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are
not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.
All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary
to law and against public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration of
petitioners withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that portion
of the property located within the military reservation, respondent was
withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated outside said reservation. The
Republic could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter of the
agreement was outside the commerce of man.

PETITIONERS CONTEMPT
OF COURT

This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot
reasonably be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack.

That petitioners letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of this

Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by stating:

This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect the
destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence, that to your
mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what
she perceived as this Courts failure to exercise utmost prudence in rendering
impartial justice in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:

I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and
my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the
implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our
Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice
so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the
Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready reference,
a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex A.

The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves
the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza in
a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render impartial
justice, because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals
Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he,
as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the
Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which
he lost. (Emphasis supplied).
 Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no
choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the
media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite
from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.

But she hastens to add in the same breath that:

I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I
however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even
destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.

Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:

. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the
next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I
suffered under our judicial system.

When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her
baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered:

xxx

The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a veiled threat[.] It was written in response to the
call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed against the factual backdrop
of the Alabang Boys case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L. Sabio
which also enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts of the
said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case where the lawyer of her opponent
eventually became justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing the very decision
in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to fundamental fair play
for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without transgression of the
due process clause. This is basic.

Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her piece,
because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in the course of that
emotional delivery, she has offended your honors sensibilities, she is ready for the
punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion as her letter
to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of threatening the Court.
 xxx

Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the inequity
bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.

The Court now puts an end to petitioners irresponsible insinuations and

threats of going public with this case. We are not blind to petitioners clever and
foxy interplay of threats alternating with false concern for the reputation of this
Court.

It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice
with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a
careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters
pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues
raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate
court and this Court in their respective resolutions.

As to petitioners complaint regarding this Courts denial of her petition through a

mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process as the Court
did not issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and applicable jurisprudence),
suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions or resolutions
signed by the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate ponencias,
extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or upon its authority,
depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis exists. When a
minute resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the Court) denies or
dismisses a petition or motion for reconsideration for lack of merit, it is understood
that the assailed decision or order, together with all its findings of fact and legal
conclusions, are deemed sustained.[42]
Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing three
successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of this
resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that no further pleadings shall be
entertained in this case. Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance of
this Courts orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her thinly
veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy although the
tone of petitioners compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly
subdued compared to her earlier letters constitutes contempt of court.

In Republic v. Unimex,[43] we held:

A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is

a declaration that the Court has already considered all issues presented by the
parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to the
parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of
this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be
circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.

A FEW OBSERVATIONS

If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional

right to due process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza
decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in
the CA (for its subsequent annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied?
It is obvious that it was only when her case became hopeless that her present
counsel frantically searched for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his clients
lost cause, subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a statement in her
petition to this Court that:

It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of

the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the entire
 proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the February
26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of applicant for
registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante
Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood
as counsel for Flora L. Garcias successor-in-interest, herein petitioner,
Florencia G. Garcia.[44] (Emphasis supplied).

The above cited statement does not help petitioners cause at all. If anything,
it only proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.

WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner

is NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The motion
is DENIEDconsidering that a third motion for reconsideration is a prohibited
pleading and the plea utterly lacks merit.

Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of

Five Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from
receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall
be dealt with more severely.

Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

AT T E S T AT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I FI C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division
Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Per Special Order No. 818 dated January 18, 2010.

[1]
The subject property has an area of around 16,800 hectares.
[2]
It was docketed as Land Registration Case No. 853 (LRC No. 853).
[3]
Proclamation Reserving for Military Purposes A Portion of the Public Domain Situated in the Municipalities of
Papaya, Sta. Rosa, and Laur, Province of Nueva Ecija and Portion of Quezon Province.
[4]
G.R. Nos. L-27594 and 28144, 28 November 1975, 68 SCRA 177.
[5]
Penned by Judge Virgilio D. Pobre Yigo. Dated July 1, 1981, rollo, pp. 218-241.
[6]
Concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera (retired) and Alicia V. Sempio-Diy (retired) of the Former
Fourth Division of the CA. Id., pp. 167-186.
[7]
He later on became an Associate Justice of this Court.
[8]
When the CA handed down its decision, petitioners co-heirs filed a petition for review on certiorari in this Court,
entitled Flora L. Garcia v. CA, et. al., docketed as G.R. No. 104561. It was denied for their failure to show
that the CA committed reversible error in the assailed decision warranting the exercise of this Courts
discretionary appellate jurisdiction. The motion for reconsideration they filed suffered the same fate.
[9]
Concurred in by Associate Justices Oscar M. Herrera (retired) and Alfredo M. Marigomen (retired) of the Former
Fourth Division of the CA. Rollo, pp. 313-319.
[10]
Id., pp. 351-355.
[11]
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Artemon D.
Luna (retired) and Conchita Carpio Morales (now Supreme Court Justice) of the Former Second Division
of the CA. Id., pp. 361-368.
[12]
Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Conchita
Carpio Morales (now Supreme Court Justice) and Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. (now Supreme Court Justice) of
the Former Second Division of the CA. Id., pp. 373-374.
[13]
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia A.
Hormachuelos, Marina L. Buzon (retired), Renato C. Dacudao (retired) and Enrico A. Lanzanas (retired),
forming a Special Division of Five of the CA. Id., pp. 104-118.
[14]
Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico (retired) and concurred in by Associate Justices Portia A.
Hormachuelos, Marina L. Buzon (retired), Enrico A. Lanzanas (retired) and Ramon A. Garcia forming a
Division of Five of the CA.Rollo, pp. 10-24.
[15]
Id., pp. 27-79.
[16]
Resolution dated 16 June 2008, id., p. 411.
[17]
Id., pp. 412-426.
[18]
Resolution dated 27 August 2008, id., p. 427. Eventually, in a resolution dated 19 August 2009, the Court
certified that its 16 June 2008 resolution, which denied the petition for review, had become final and
executory and, as such, was recorded in the book of entries of judgment.
[19]
Id., pp. 428-433.
[20]
Resolution dated 2 February 2009, id., p. 434.
[21]
Under Section 2, Rule 52 in relation to Section 4, Rule 56 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, as amended.
[22]
Per SC Circular 2-89, dated 7 February 1989, as amended by the Resolution dated 18 November 1993.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 435-439 and 450-451, respectively.
[24]
PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 124772, 14 August 2007, 530 SCRA 13, 21.
[25]
Rollo, p. 65.
[26]
39 Phil 851 (1919).
[27]
Id., See also Lopez v. Director of Lands, 48 Phil. 589 (1926).
[28]
Id., p. 861.
[29]
Republic v. COCOFED, G.R. Nos. 147062-64, 14 December 2001, 372 SCRA 462, 493, citing Cuison v. CA,
G.R. No. 128540, 15 April 1998, 289 SCRA 161, 171, which, in turn, cited People v. CA, No. L-54641, 28
November 1980, 101 SCRA 450, 465.
In Republic, we held that grave abuse of discretion may arise when a lower court or tribunal
violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. (Emphasis supplied).
[30]
People v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164185, 23 July 2008, 559 SCRA 449, 460.
[31]
CHED v. Dasig, G.R. No. 172776, 17 December 2008, 574 SCRA 227.
[32]
Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra note 4, p. 192.
[33]
Id., pp. 194-195.
[34]
Gordula v. CA, G.R. No. 127296, 22 January 1998, 284 SCRA 617, 633.
[35] C. A. No. 141, as amended, prescribes the substantive as well as the procedural requirements for acquisition of
public lands. This law requires at least thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition, immediately preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year
period lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the occupants and/or
possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title or continuous, open and notorious
possession. (Gordula v. CA, supra at 631. Although this case deals with an application for free patent, it is
applicable to this case as it also involves forest land.)
[36]
G.R. No. 85322, 30 April 1991, 196 SCRA 476, 480.
[37]
Republic v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 137887, 28 February 2000, 326 SCRA 574, 580 and Ituralde v. Falcasantos,
G.R. No. 128017, 20 January 1999, 301 SCRA 293, 296 which cited Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc. v.
CA, G.R. No. 50464, 29 January 1990, 181 SCRA 443, 448.
[38]
Director of Lands v. Reyes, supra note 4, pp. 192-193.
[39]
We stated therein:
The applicant relies on a purported titulo de informacion posesoria issued in the name of
Melecio Padilla (Exh. T, pp.62-68, Exhibits of Applicant). However, neither the original of the
said titulo de informacion posesoria, nor a duly authenticated copy thereof, was submitted in
evidence, and there are serious flaws on the faces of the alleged copies of the document, as in the
circumstances surrounding their execution. Thus, the two (2) purported photostat copies of the
said informacion posesoria title materially differ on the date when said informacion posesoria was
issued. One copy showed that the said document was issued on March 5, 1895 (Exhibit T), while
the other indicated that it was issued twelve (12) years earlier, or on March 5, 1883 (Exhibit 2).

In this case, we likewise noted that petitioners possessory information title is also a mere photocopy as per
the trial courts decision enumerating petitioners evidence. (Rollo, p. 229.) In the Opposition filed
by the OSG, it averred that petitioner moved to reopen the case and asked that she be allowed to
present the original of the document as her counsel was not able to establish the existence thereof
at the trial due to oversight. The OSG, however, pointed out that said failure to present this
pertinent piece of evidence was not due to oversight. Rather, the original of the said title could
not be presented. This can be gleaned from the transcript relevant to the matter:

ATTY. BRINGAS:
In any case, Your Honor, we have a typewritten copy which is legible which we will
request also to be marked in evidence.

COURT:

If that appears to be a faithful reproduction of the original upon comparison, then why not
make the proper manifestation for the record[?]

FISCAL VILORIA:

But, Your Honor, according to the counsel for the applicant, he has only in his possession
the xerox copy or photostat copy and the typewritten copy of the said document.
We have to see the original, Your Honor.

COURT:

Yes.

ATTY. BRINGAS.

We respectfully request, Your Honor, that the photostat copy of the said document be
marked in evidence as Exh. Q.
 COURT:

Mark it.

ATTY. BRINGAS:

Your Honor, we have the typewritten original copies of this photostat copy which we
respectfully request to be marked in evidence as Exh. R, the second page of Exh.
R to be marked as Exh. R-1 and page 3 of said Exh. R to be marked as Exh. R-2.

COURT:

Mark them.

(Transcript of Stenographic Notes, 15 December 1978, pp.23-25)

A perusal of the enumerated evidence presented by petitioner to the CFI would readily reveal that the
aforementioned photocopies were marked as such. See rollo, pp. 229-230.
[40]
CA resolution, id., pp. 14-15.
[41]
Anacleto v. Twest, G.R. No. 131411, 29 August 2000, 339 SCRA 211, pp. 216-217.
[42]
Complaint of Mr. Aurelio Indencia Arrienda Against SC Justices Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Ynares-Santiago, et. al.,
A.M. No. 03-11-30-SC, 9 June 2005, 460 SCRA 1, 13-14.
[43]
G.R. Nos. 166309-10, 25 November 2008, 571 SCRA 537, 540.
[44]
Rollo, p. 30.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014

SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari filed by the petitioners, spouses Antonio and
1

Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision dated May 16, 2005 and the resolution dated June 27,
2

2006 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA reversed and set aside the
3

decision dated May 7, 2001 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union, Branch
4

66, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372.

 THE BACKGROUND FACTS

In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square meter
land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The application
was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.

The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon
whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit of
adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in favor of
Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975. Rodolfo sold the
same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4, 1984.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest, have
been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than 50
years, and submitted as evidence the lots survey plan, technical description, and certificate of
assessment.

Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the application, it did not
5

present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no private opposition to the registration was
filed, the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996 against the whole world,
except the Republic. 6

In its Decision dated May 7, 2001, the RTC granted the application for registration in favor of the
7

spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the spouses Fortuna] have established [their] possession,
including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered, has been open,
continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an owner since 1948, or
for a period of over fifty (50) years."8

The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not
present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has been classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortunas evidence Tax
Declaration No. 8366 showed that possession over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing to
meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD).

In its decision dated May 16, 2005, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Although it
9

found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and disposable nature of the
land, they failed to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law requires, i.e.,
10

since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republics argument that Tax Declaration No. 8366 only
showed that the spouses Fortunas predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that she had been in
possession of the land only since 1948.

The CA denied the spouses Fortunas motion for reconsideration of its decision in its resolution
dated June 27, 2006. 11

THE PARTIES ARGUMENTS

Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.

They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the Public
Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the PLA by
requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire imperfect title
over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was removed by PD
No. 1073 and instead required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945. The amendment
introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD. 12

The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and published on
May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979. On the
basis of the Courts ruling in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al., they allege that PD No. 1073
13

and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17, 1979, respectively.
By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement under the RA No. 1942
amendment because Pastoras possession dates back, at the latest, to 1947.

They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not contradict that
fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to present documentary evidence
proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records Officer of the
Provincial Assessors Office, who testified that the records were lost beyond recovery due to the
outbreak of World War II.

Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the spouses Fortuna
contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora possessed the lot even before 1948. First, Tax
Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new tax declaration. Second, the
annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366 states that "this declaration cancels Tax
Nos. 10543[.]" Since Tax Declaration No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax Declaration
14

No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in 1947, indicating that there was already an owner and
possessor of the lot before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria Flores in LRC No.
2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register Lot Nos. 4462,
27066, and 27098, which were also originally owned by Pastora and are adjacent to the subject Lot
15

No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a place a few meters from the
three lots. She stated that she regularly passed by these lots on her way to school since 1938. She
knew the property was owned by Pastora because the latters family had constructed a house and
planted fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the area. On the basis of Macarias testimony
and the other evidence presented in LRC No. 2373, the RTC granted the spouses Fortunas
application for registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098 in its decision of January 3,
2005. The RTCs decision has lapsed into finality unappealed.
16

The spouses Fortuna claim that Macarias testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be considered to prove
Pastoras possession prior to 1948. Although LRC No. 2373 is a separate registration proceeding, it
pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property, Lot No. 4457, and belonged to the same
predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure to present Macaria in the proceedings before the
RTC in LRC No. 2372, the spouses Fortuna said "it was only after the reception of evidence x x x
that [they] were able to trace and establish the identity and competency of Macaria[.]" 17
Commenting on the spouses Fortunas petition, the Republic relied mostly on the CAs ruling which
denied the registration of title and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

THE COURTS RULING

We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove their compliance with the
requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public domain.

The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and

disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established

The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State. Of the four
18

classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and national
parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated. Public land that has not been classified as alienable
19

agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is essential for any applicant
for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to establish foremost the alienable and
disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the grant and disposition of alienable public
lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find application only from the time that a public land
has been classified as agricultural and declared as alienable and disposable.

Under Section 6 of the PLA, the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the
20

prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or

executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public domain.
The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise empowered
by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and disposable. 21

Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired through a
public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the notation in
the survey plan, which states:
22

This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395
certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.
23

It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment and
Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public land application filed
nor title previously issued for the subject parcel[.]" However, we find that neither of the above
24

documents is evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying the lot as alienable and
disposable agricultural land of the public domain.
Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties alienable
and disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only establish that the land subject of
25

the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable area per verification
through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy
of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR
Secretary or as proclaimed by the President. In Republic v. Heirs of Juan Fabio, the Court ruled
26 27

that [t]he applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original
28

classification of the land into alienable and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as
proclaimed by the President.

The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the DENR
Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The offices that
prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the issuances of the
President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and disposable. 29

For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as alienable
and disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive Department, the
spouses Fortunas claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA should be denied.

In judicial confirmation of imperfect

or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947

Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the alienable and disposable
character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient ground to deny the petition and terminate the case, we
deem it proper to continue to address the other important legal issues raised in the petition.

As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable agricultural
lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain may be disposed of,
among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition of
title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the original version of which states:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the Government,
since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety- four, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
[emphasis supplied]

On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year period of possession
under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942, read:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force
majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]

On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by requiring
possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:

SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act are
hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and disposable
lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]

Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years from 1945 up to its
enactment in 1977 is required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of applicants who had
complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose
possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 was established by the PD No.
1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa that "Filipino citizens who
30

by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on
January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at
least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial confirmation of their
imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]." January 24, 1947 was considered as the
cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted backward from January 25, 1977 the effectivity
date of PD No. 1073.

It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted; based on the
certification from the National Printing Office, PD No. 1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the
31

Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted fact
materially affects the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the PLA.

Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its promulgation,"
the Court has declared in Taada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. that the publication of laws is an
32

indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature." Accordingly, Section 6 of PD
33

No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or on
May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words,
applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove

that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947

Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural land of the
public domain, the spouses Fortunas application for registration of title would still not prosper for
failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortunas allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax Declaration No. 8366
was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating that Tax Declaration No. 8366 cancels the
earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed the land prior to 1948 or, at
the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a sworn statement of
the owner that was subscribed on October 23, 1947. While these circumstances may indeed
34

indicate possession as of 1947, none proves that it commenced as of the cut-off date of May 8,
1947. Even if the tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it does not show the nature of
Pastoras possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of possession and occupation.
"Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to
make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes
constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the
all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for an applicant to
qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction." Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that
35

Pastora exercised acts of possession and occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land.
Indeed, the lot was described as "cogonal." 36

The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No. 8366 by relying on
Macarias testimony in a separate land registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged that
she passed by Pastoras lots on her way to school, and she saw Pastoras family construct a house,
plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area. However, the Court is not convinced that Macarias
testimony constituted as the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in cases of this nature.

The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of land, all of which are
claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora. These parcels of land were covered by three
separate applications for registration, to wit:

a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of 2,961 sq. m., commenced
by Emeteria;
 b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a total area of 4,006 sq.
m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and

c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total area of 2,597 sq. m.

As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the same predecessor-in-
interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding
37

Pastoras ownership, be taken into account in resolving the present case.

Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have previously belonged to
Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an area for the Court to consider that Pastoras claimed acts
of possession and occupation (as testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the lots.
Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently assess and
declare that its entirety belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of possession and occupation in
what must have been but a limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366 described Lot No.
4457 as "cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No. 4457 when she said
that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties.

The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding Pastora's possession, do not
tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the rulings in
LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not even show that the lots have been officially reclassified as
alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature and duration of Pastora's occupation met the
requirements of the PLA, thus, failing to convince us to either disregard the rules of evidence or
consider their merits. In this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v. De las Santos: 38

Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization of
the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the judiciary
does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be granted, they
must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no such proof
would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is a basic
assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless alienated in
accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as do minus.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and the resolution dated
June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar as these
dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of title on the basis
of the grounds discussed above. Costs against the spouses Fortuna.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160453 November 12, 2012

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS III, and ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

By law, accretion - the gradual and imperceptible deposit made through the effects of the current of
the water- belongs to the owner of the land adjacent to the banks of rivers where it forms. The drying
up of the river is not accretion. Hence, the dried-up river bed belongs to the State as property of
public dominion, not to the riparian owner, unless a law vests the ownership in some other person.

Antecedents

Alleging continuous and adverse possession of more than ten years, respondent Arcadio Ivan A.
Santos III (Arcadio Ivan) applied on March 7, 1997 for the registration of Lot 4998-B (the property) in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Parafiaque City. The property, which had an area of 1,045 square
meters, more or less, was located in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, and was bounded in
the Northeast by Lot 4079 belonging to respondent Arcadio C. Santos, Jr. (Arcadio, Jr.), in the
Southeast by the Paraaque River, in the Southwest by an abandoned road, and in the Northwest by
Lot 4998-A also owned by Arcadio Ivan.1

On May 21, 1998, Arcadio Ivan amended his application for land registration to include Arcadio, Jr.
as his co-applicant because of the latters co-ownership of the property. He alleged that the property
had been formed through accretion and had been in their joint open, notorious, public, continuous
and adverse possession for more than 30 years.2

The City of Paraaque (the City) opposed the application for land registration, stating that it needed
the property for its flood control program; that the property was within the legal easement of 20
meters from the river bank; and that assuming that the property was not covered by the legal
easement, title to the property could not be registered in favor of the applicants for the reason that
the property was an orchard that had dried up and had not resulted from accretion. 3

Ruling of the RTC

On May 10, 2000,4 the RTC granted the application for land registration, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the applicants, ARCADIO IVAN A. SANTOS, III and
ARCADIO C. SANTOS, JR., both Filipinos and of legal age, as the TRUE and ABSOLUTE
OWNERS of the land being applied for which is situated in the Barangay of San Dionisio, City of
Paraaque with an area of one thousand forty five (1045) square meters more or less and covered
by Subdivision Plan Csd-00-000343, being a portion of Lot 4998, Cad. 299, Case 4, Paraaque
Cadastre, LRC Rec. No. and orders the registration of Lot 4998-B in their names with the following
technical description, to wit:

xxxx

Once this Decision became (sic) final and executory, let the corresponding Order for the Issuance of
the Decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), appealed.

Ruling of the CA

In its appeal, the Republic ascribed the following errors to the RTC, 5 to wit:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE PROPERTY SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED IS
AN ACCRETION TO THE ADJOINING PROPERTY OWNED BY APPELLEES DESPITE THE
ADMISSION OF APPELLEE ARCADIO C. SANTOS JR. THAT THE SAID PROPERTY WAS NOT
FORMED AS A RESULT OF THE GRADUAL FILLING UP OF SOIL THROUGH THE CURRENT OF
THE RIVER.

II

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION
DESPITE APPELLEES FAILURE TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE.

III

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLEES HAD SUFFICIENTLY ESTABLISHED
THEIR CONTINUOUS, OPEN, PUBLIC AND ADVERSE OCCUPATION OF THE SUBJECT
PROPERTY FOR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS.

On May 27, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.6

The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on October 20, 2003. 7

Issues

Hence, this appeal, in which the Republic urges that:8

RESPONDENTS CLAIM THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN ACCRETION TO THEIR

ADJOINING LAND THAT WOULD ENTITLE THEM TO REGISTER IT UNDER ARTICLE 457 OF
THE NEW CIVIL CODE IS CONTRADICTED BY THEIR OWN EVIDENCE.

II

ASSUMING THAT THE LAND SOUGHT TO BE REGISTERED WAS "PREVIOUSLY A PART OF

THE PARAAQUE RIVER WHICH BECAME AN ORCHARD AFTER IT DRIED UP," THE
REGISTRATION OF SAID PROPERTY IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENTS CANNOT BE
ALTERNATIVELY JUSTIFIED UNDER ARTICLE 461 OF THE CIVIL CODE.

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN NOT RULING THAT THE
FAILURE OF RESPONDENTS TO FORMALLY OFFER IN EVIDENCE AN OFFICIAL
CERTIFICATION THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE IS FATAL
TO THEIR APPLICATION FOR LAND REGISTRATION.

IV

THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT RESPONDENTS HAVE CONTINUOUSLY,

OPENLY, PUBLICLY AND ADVERSELY OCCUPIED THE SUBJECT PROPERTY FOR MORE
THAN THIRTY (30) YEARS IS NOT SUPPORTED BY WELL-NIGH INCONTROVERTIBLE
EVIDENCE.

To be resolved are whether or not Article 457 of the Civil Code was applicable herein; and whether
or not respondents could claim the property by virtue of acquisitive prescription pursuant to Section
14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree).

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

I.

The CA grossly erred in applying Article 457 of the Civil Code to respondents benefit

Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the banks of rivers
belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the currents of the waters."

In ruling for respondents, the RTC pronounced as follows:

On the basis of the evidence presented by the applicants, the Court finds that Arcadio Ivan A. Santos
III and Arcadio C. Santos, Jr., are the owners of the land subject of this application which was
previously a part of the Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up and further
considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by applicant, Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.,
after it was obtained by him through inheritance from his mother, Concepcion Cruz, now deceased.
Conformably with Art. 457 of the New Civil Code, it is provided that:

"Article 457. To the owners of the lands adjoining the bank of rivers belong the accretion which they
gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters."9

The CA upheld the RTCs pronouncement, holding:

It could not be denied that "to the owners of the lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the current of the waters" (Article 457 New
Civil Code) as in this case, Arcadio Ivan Santos III and Arcadio Santos, Jr., are the owners of the
land which was previously part of the Paraaque River which became an orchard after it dried up
and considering that Lot 4 which adjoins the same property is owned by the applicant which was
obtained by the latter from his mother (Decision, p. 3; p. 38 Rollo).10

The Republic submits, however, that the application by both lower courts of Article 457 of the Civil
Code was erroneous in the face of the fact that respondents evidence did not establish accretion,
but instead the drying up of the Paraaque River.
The Republics submission is correct.

Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish the
merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such evidence that is
of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to it. 11 They would be held
entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its registration under the Torrens system only
if they established that, indeed, the property was an accretion to their land.

Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. 12 The deposit of soil,
to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of
the current of the water; and (c) taking place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. 13

Accordingly, respondents should establish the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant
the grant of their application for land registration.

However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the gradual
and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river had formed Lot
4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-up river bed of the
Paraaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold that Lot 4998-B was "the
land which was previously part of the Paraaque River xxx (and) became an orchard after it dried
up."

Still, respondents argue that considering that Lot 4998-B did not yet exist when the original title of
Lot 4 was issued in their mothers name in 1920, and that Lot 4998-B came about only thereafter as
the land formed between Lot 4 and the Paraaque River, the unavoidable conclusion should then be
that soil and sediments had meanwhile been deposited near Lot 4 by the current of the Paraaque
River, resulting in the formation of Lot 4998-B.

The argument is legally and factually groundless. For one, respondents thereby ignore that the
effects of the current of the river are not the only cause of the formation of land along a river bank.
There are several other causes, including the drying up of the river bed. The drying up of the river
bed was, in fact, the uniform conclusion of both lower courts herein. In other words, respondents did
not establish at all that the increment of land had formed from the gradual and imperceptible deposit
of soil by the effects of the current. Also, it seems to be highly improbable that the large volume of
soil that ultimately comprised the dry land with an area of 1,045 square meters had been deposited
in a gradual and imperceptible manner by the current of the river in the span of about 20 to 30 years
the span of time intervening between 1920, when Lot 4 was registered in the name of their
deceased parent (at which time Lot 4998-B was not yet in existence) and the early 1950s (which
respondents witness Rufino Allanigue alleged to be the time when he knew them to have occupied
Lot 4988-B). The only plausible explanation for the substantial increment was that Lot 4988-B was
the dried-up bed of the Paraaque River. Confirming this explanation was Arcadio, Jr.s own
testimony to the effect that the property was previously a part of the Paraaque River that had dried
up and become an orchard.

We observe in this connection that even Arcadio, Jr.s own Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687
confirmed the uniform conclusion of the RTC and the CA that Lot 4998-B had been formed by the
drying up of the Paraaque River. Transfer Certificate of Title No. 44687 recited that Lot 4 of the
consolidated subdivision plan Pcs-13-002563, the lot therein described, was bounded "on the SW
along line 5-1 by Dried River Bed."14
That boundary line of "SW along line 5-1" corresponded with the location of Lot 4998-B, which was
described as "bounded by Lot 4079 Cad. 299, (Lot 1, Psu-10676), in the name of respondent
Arcadio Santos, Jr. (Now Lot 4, Psd-13-002563) in the Northeast."15

The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that became
respondents property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was definitely not an
accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved the recession of the water
level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate to accretion, which was the gradual
and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river banks through the effects of the current. In
accretion, the water level did not recede and was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as
the riparian owners had no legal right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B. Considering that the clear
and categorical language of Article 457 of the Civil Code has confined the provision only to
accretion, we should apply the provision as its clear and categorical language tells us to. Axiomatic it
is, indeed, that where the language of the law is clear and categorical, there is no room for
interpretation; there is only room for application. 16 The first and fundamental duty of courts is then to
apply the law.17

The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of ownership. Article
502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural beds are public dominion of the
State.18 It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot 4998-B, continue to belong to the

State as its property of public dominion, unless there is an express law that provides that the dried-
up river beds should belong to some other person. 19

II

Acquisitive prescription was

not applicable in favor of respondents

The RTC favored respondents application for land registration covering Lot 4998-B also because
they had taken possession of the property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than
30 years based on their predecessor-in-interest being the adjoining owner of the parcel of land along
the river bank. It rendered the following ratiocination, viz:20

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicants became the owners thereof, they
took possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than
thirty (30) years because their predecessors-in-interest are the adjoining owners of the subject
parcel of land along the river bank. Furthermore, the fact that applicants paid its realty taxes, had it
surveyed per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land
Management Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OICChief, Surveys Division Land
Registration Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Paraaque
River and that it does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

Finally, in the light of the evidence adduced by the applicants in this case and in view of the
foregoing reports of the Department of Agrarian Reforms, Land Registration Authority and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, the Court finds and so holds that the applicants
have satisfied all the requirements of law which are essential to a government grant and is,
therefore, entitled to the issuance of a certificate of title in their favor. So also, oppositor failed to
prove that the applicants are not entitled thereto, not having presented any witness.
In fine, the application is GRANTED.

As already mentioned, the CA affirmed the RTC.

Both lower courts erred.

The relevant legal provision is Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration
Decree), which pertinently states:

Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper [Regional Trial Court] an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:

(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

xxxx

Under Section 14(1), then, applicants for confirmation of imperfect title must prove the following,
namely: (a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since
June 12, 1945.21

The Republic assails the findings by the lower courts that respondents "took possession of the same
property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty (30) years." 22

Although it is well settled that the findings of fact of the trial court, especially when affirmed by the
CA, are accorded the highest degree of respect, and generally will not be disturbed on appeal, with
such findings being binding and conclusive on the Court, 23 the Court has consistently recognized
exceptions to this rule, including the following, to wit: (a) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (b) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd,
or impossible; (c) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (d) when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (f) when in making its findings
the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (g) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (h) when the
findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (i) when the
facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by
respondent; and (j) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence
and contradicted by the evidence on record.24

Here, the findings of the RTC were obviously grounded on speculation, surmises, or conjectures;
and that the inference made by the RTC and the CA was manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible.
Hence, the Court should now review the findings.

In finding that respondents had been in continuous, open, public and adverse possession of the land
for more than 30 years, the RTC declared:

In this regard, the Court found that from the time the applicant became the owners thereof, they took
possession of the same property continuously, openly, publicly and adversely for more than thirty
years because their predecessor in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel of land
along the river banks. Furthermore, the fact that the applicant paid its realty taxes, had it surveyed
per subdivision plan Csd-00-000343 (Exh. "L") which was duly approved by the Land Management
Services and the fact that Engr. Chito B. Cainglet, OIC Chief, Surveys Division Land Registration
Authority, made a Report that the subject property is not a portion of the Paraaque River and that it
does not fall nor overlap with Lot 5000, thus, the Court opts to grant the application.

The RTC apparently reckoned respondents period of supposed possession to be "more than thirty
years" from the fact that "their predecessors in interest are the adjoining owners of the subject parcel
of land." Yet, its decision nowhere indicated what acts respondents had performed showing their
possession of the property "continuously, openly, publicly and adversely" in that length of time. The
decision mentioned only that they had paid realty taxes and had caused the survey of the property to
be made. That, to us, was not enough to justify the foregoing findings, because, firstly, the payment
of realty taxes did not conclusively prove the payors ownership of the land the taxes were paid
for,25 the tax declarations and payments being mere indicia of a claim of ownership; 26 and, secondly,
the causing of surveys of the property involved was not itself an of continuous, open, public and
adverse possession.

The principle that the riparian owner whose land receives the gradual deposits of soil does not need
to make an express act of possession, and that no acts of possession are necessary in that instance
because it is the law itself that pronounces the alluvium to belong to the riparian owner from the time
that the deposit created by the current of the water becomes manifest 27 has no applicability herein.
This is simply because Lot 4998-B was not formed through accretion. Hence, the ownership of the
land adjacent to the river bank by respondents predecessor-in-interest did not translate to
possession of Lot 4998-B that would ripen to acquisitive prescription in relation to Lot 4998-B.

On the other hand, the claim of thirty years of continuous, open, public and adverse possession of
Lot 4998-B was not even validated or preponderantly established. The admission of respondents
themselves that they declared the property for taxation purposes only in 1997 and paid realty taxes
only from 199928 signified that their alleged possession would at most be for only nine years as of the
filing of their application for land registration on March 7, 1997.

Yet, even conceding, for the sake of argument, that respondents possessed Lot 4998-B for more
than thirty years in the character they claimed, they did not thereby acquire the land by prescription
or by other means without any competent proof that the land was already declared as alienable and
disposable by the Government. Absent that declaration, the land still belonged to the State as part of
its public dominion.

Article 419 of the Civil Code distinguishes property as being either of public dominion or of private
ownership. Article 420 of the Civil Code lists the properties considered as part of public dominion,
namely: (a) those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character; and (b) those
which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth. As earlier mentioned, Article 502 of the Civil Code
declares that rivers and their natural beds are of public dominion.

Whether the dried-up river bed may be susceptible to acquisitive prescription or not was a question
that the Court resolved in favor of the State in Celestial v. Cachopero, 29 a case involving the
registration of land found to be part of a dried-up portion of the natural bed of a creek. There the
Court held:
As for petitioners claim of ownership over the subject land, admittedly a dried-up bed of the
Salunayan Creek, based on (1) her alleged long term adverse possession and that of her
predecessor-in-interest, Marcelina Basadre, even prior to October 22, 1966, when she purchased
the adjoining property from the latter, and (2) the right of accession under Art. 370 of the Spanish
Civil Code of 1889 and/or Article 461 of the Civil Code, the same must fail.

Since property of public dominion is outside the commerce of man and not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription, the adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant
of title in the confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the
public domain. It is only after the Government has declared the land to be alienable and disposable
agricultural land that the year of entry, cultivation and exclusive and adverse possession can be
counted for purposes of an imperfect title.

A creek, like the Salunayan Creek, is a recess or arm extending from a river and participating in the
ebb and flow of the sea. As such, under Articles 420(1) and 502(1) of the Civil Code, the Salunayan
Creek, including its natural bed, is property of the public domain which is not susceptible to private
appropriation and acquisitive prescription. And, absent any declaration by the government, that a
portion of the creek has dried-up does not, by itself, alter its inalienable character.

xxxx

Had the disputed portion of the Salunayan Creek dried up after the present Civil Code took effect,
the subject land would clearly not belong to petitioner or her predecessor-in-interest since under the
aforementioned provision of Article 461, "river beds which are abandoned through the natural
change in the course of the waters ipso facto belong to the owners of the land occupied by the new
course," and the owners of the adjoining lots have the right to acquire them only after paying their
value.

And both Article 370 of the Old Code and Article 461 of the present Civil Code are applicable only
when "river beds are abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters." It is
uncontroverted, however, that, as found by both the Bureau of Lands and the DENR Regional
Executive Director, the subject land became dry as a result of the construction an irrigation canal by
the National Irrigation Administration. Thus, in Ronquillo v. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

The law is clear and unambiguous. It leaves no room for interpretation. Article 370 applies only if
there is a natural change in the course of the waters. The rules on alluvion do not apply to man-
made or artificial accretions nor to accretions to lands that adjoin canals or esteros or artificial
drainage systems. Considering our earlier finding that the dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub was
actually caused by the active intervention of man, it follows that Article 370 does not apply to the
case at bar and, hence, the Del Rosarios cannot be entitled thereto supposedly as riparian owners.

The dried-up portion of Estero Calubcub should thus be considered as forming part of the land of the
public domain which cannot be subject to acquisition by private ownership. xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, both provisions pertain to situations where there has been a change in the course of a
river, not where the river simply dries up. In the instant Petition, it is not even alleged that the
Salunayan Creek changed its course. In such a situation, commentators are of the opinion that the
dry river bed remains property of public dominion. (Bold emphases supplied)

Indeed, under the Regalian doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private
ownership are presumed to belong to the State.30 No public land can be acquired by private persons
without any grant, express or implied, from the Government. It is indispensable, therefore, that there
is a showing of a title from the State.31Occupation of public land in the concept of owner, no matter
how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. 32

Subject to the exceptions defined in Article 461 of the Civil Code (which declares river beds that are
abandoned through the natural change in the course of the waters as ipso facto belonging to the
owners of the land occupied by the new course, and which gives to the owners of the adjoining lots
the right to acquire only the abandoned river beds not ipso facto belonging to the owners of the land
affected by the natural change of course of the waters only after paying their value), all river beds
remain property of public dominion and cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription unless
previously declared by the Government to be alienable and disposable. Considering that Lot 4998-B
was not shown to be already declared to be alienable and disposable, respondents could not be
deemed to have acquired the property through prescription.

Nonetheless, respondents insist that the property was already classified as alienable and disposable
by the Government. They cite as proof of the classification as alienable and disposable the following
notation found on the survey plan, to wit:33

NOTE

ALL CORNERS NOT OTHERWISE DESCRIBED ARE OLD BL CYL. CONC. MONS 15 X 60CM

All corners marked PS are cyl. conc. mons 15 x 60 cm

Surveyed in accordance with Survey Authority NO. 007604-48 of the Regional Executive Director
issued by the CENR-OFFICER dated Dec. 2, 1996.

This survey is inside L.C. Map No. 2623, Proj. No. 25 classified as alienable/disposable by the
Bureau of Forest Devt. on Jan. 3, 1968.

Lot 4998-A = Lot 5883} Cad 299

Lot 4998-B = Lot 5884} Paranaque Cadastre.

Was the notation on the survey plan to the effect that Lot 4998-B was "inside" the map "classified as
alienable/disposable by the Bureau of Forest Development on 03 Jan. 1968" sufficient proof of the
propertys nature as alienable and disposable public land?

To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must
conclusively establish the existence of a positive act of the Government, such as a presidential
proclamation, executive order, administrative action, investigation reports of the Bureau of Lands
investigator, or a legislative act or statute. Until then, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do
not apply.

As to the proofs that are admissible to establish the alienability and disposability of public land, we
said in Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources v. Yap 34 that:

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public
domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the
land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is
alienable or disposable.There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain as
alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may also secure a certification
from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years
is alienable and disposable.

In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action, report, statute, or
certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of evidence showing that, prior to
2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants were subject of a government
proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent such well-nigh incontrovertible
evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands occupied by private claimants were
already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land classification or reclassification cannot be
assumed. They call for proof." (Emphasis supplied)

In Menguito v. Republic,35 which we reiterated in Republic v. Sarmiento,36 we specifically resolved the

issue of whether the notation on the survey plan was sufficient evidence to establish the alienability
and disposability of public land, to wit:

To prove that the land in question formed part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain, petitioners relied on the printed words which read: "This survey plan is inside Alienable and
Disposable Land Area, Project No. 27-B as per L.C. Map No. 2623, certified by the Bureau of
Forestry on January 3, 1968," appearing on Exhibit "E" (Survey Plan No. Swo-13-000227).

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the
public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned
by the State. x x x."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land
is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of
the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how
long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To overcome such presumption,
incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence, the land sought to
be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor-geodetic engineers notation in Exhibit "E" indicating
that the survey was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a
positive government act validly changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere
surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands of the public domain. By relying solely on the said
surveyors assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently proven that the land in question has been
declared alienable. (Emphasis supplied)

In Republic v. T.A.N. Properties, Inc.,37 we dealt with the sufficiency of the certification by the
Provincial Environmental Officer (PENRO) or Community Environmental Officer (CENRO) to the
effect that a piece of public land was alienable and disposable in the following manner, viz:

x x x it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and disposable.
The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the land
classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable and disposable, and that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved area per verification through
survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the applicant for land registration must present a copy
of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the
legal custodian of the official records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is
alienable and disposable. Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by
respondent do not, by themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.

Only Torres, respondents Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by

respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented before the
1wphi1

trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted the contents of the
certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the certifications are presumed duly issued
and admissible in evidence, they have no probative value in establishing that the land is alienable
and disposable.

xxxx

The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove that Lot
10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the DENR Secretary. Such
government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove the facts stated therein. Such
government certifications may fall under the class of documents contemplated in the second
sentence of Section 23 of Rule 132. As such, the certifications are prima facie evidence of their due
execution and date of issuance but they do not constitute prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. (Emphasis supplied)

These rulings of the Court indicate that the notation on the survey plan of Lot 4998-B, Cad-00-
000343 to the effect that the "survey is inside a map classified as alienable/disposable by the Bureau
of Forest Devt" did not prove that Lot 4998-B was already classified as alienable and disposable.
Accordingly, respondents could not validly assert acquisitive prescription of Lot 4988-B.

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals
promulgated on May 27, 2003; DISMISSES the application for registration of Arcadio C. Santos, Jr.
and Arcadio Ivan S. Santos III respecting Lot 4998-B with a total area of 1,045 square meters, more
or less, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Paraaque City, Metro Manila; and DECLARES Lot
4998-B as exclusively belonging to the State for being part of the dried--up bed of the Parat1aque
River.

Respondents shall pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

C E R TI F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 192896 July 24, 2013

DREAM VILLAGE NEIGHBORHOOD ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Incumbent

President, GREG SERIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
BASES DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, Respondent.

DECISION

REYES, J.:

Before us on Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the Decision2 dated
September 10, 2009 and Resolution3 dated July 13, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 85228 nullifying and setting aside for lack of jurisdiction the Resolution 4 dated April 28, 2004
of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) in COS LAP Case No. 99-500.
The fallo of the assailed COS LAP Resolution reads, as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the subject property, covering an area of 78,466 square meters, now being
occupied by the members of the Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. to be outside
of Swo-00-0001302 BCDA property.

2. In accordance with the tenets of social justice, members of said association are advised to
apply for sales patent on their respective occupied lots with the Land Management Bureau,
DENR-NCR, pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730.

3. Directing the Land Management Bureau-DENR-NCR to process the sales patent

application of complainants pursuant to existing laws and regulation.

4. The peaceful possession of actual occupants be respected by the respondents.

SO ORDERED.5
 Antecedent Facts

Petitioner Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. (Dream Village) claims to represent more
than 2,000 families who have been occupying a 78,466-square meter lot in Western Bicutan, Taguig
City since 1985 "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously." 6 The lot used to
be part of the Hacienda de Maricaban (Maricaban), owned by Dolores Casal y Ochoa and registered
under a Torrens title,7 Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 291, issued on October 17, 1906 by the
Registry of Deeds of Rizal.8 Maricaban covered several parcels of land with a total area of over
2,544 hectares spread out over Makati, Pasig, Taguig, Pasay, and Paraaque. 9

Following the purchase of Maricaban by the government of the United States of America (USA) early
in the American colonial period, to be converted into the military reservation known as Fort William
Mckinley, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 192 was issued in the name of the USA to cancel
OCT No. 291.10 The US government later transferred 30 has. of Maricaban to the Manila Railroad
Company, for which TCT No. 192 was cancelled by TCT Nos. 1218 and 1219, the first in the name of
the Manila Railroad Company for 30 has., and the second in the name of the USA for the rest of the
Maricaban property.11

On January 29, 1914, TCT No. 1219 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 1688, and later that
year, on September 15, 1914, TCT No. 1688 was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 2288, both
times in the name of the USA.12 On December 6, 1956, the USA formally ceded Fort William
Mckinley to the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), and on September 11, 1958, TCT No. 2288
was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. 61524, this time in the name of the Republic. 13 On July 12,
1957, President Carlos P. Garcia issued Proclamation No. 423 withdrawing from sale or settlement
the tracts of land within Fort William Mckinley, now renamed Fort Bonifacio, and reserving them for
military purposes.14

On January 7, 1986, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476 declaring certain
portions of Fort Bonifacio alienable and disposable15 in the manner provided under Republic Act
(R.A.) Nos. 274 and 730, in relation to the Public Land Act, 16 thus allowing the sale to the settlers of
home lots in Upper Bicutan, Lower Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan. 17

On October 16, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 172 amending
Proclamation No. 2476 by limiting to Lots 1 and 2 of the survey Swo-13-000298 the areas in
Western Bicutan open for disposition.18

On March 13, 1992, R.A. No. 7227 was passed19 creating the Bases Conversion and Development
Authority (BCDA) to oversee and accelerate the conversion of Clark and Subic military reservations
and their extension camps (John Hay Station, Wallace Air Station, ODonnell Transmitter Station,
San Miguel Naval Communications Station and Capas Relay Station) to productive civilian uses.
Section 820 of the said law provides that the capital of the BCDA will be provided from sales proceeds
or transfers of lots in nine (9) military camps in Metro Manila, including 723 has. of Fort Bonifacio.
The law, thus, expressly authorized the President of the Philippines "to sell the above lands, in whole
or in part, which are hereby declared alienable and disposable pursuant to the provisions of existing
laws and regulations governing sales of government properties,"21 specifically to raise capital for the
BCDA. Titles to the camps were transferred to the BCDA for this purpose, 22 and TCT No. 61524 was
cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886, 22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891,
now in the name of the BCDA.23

Excepted from disposition by the BCDA are: a) approximately 148.80 has. reserved for the National
Capital Region (NCR) Security Brigade, Philippine Army officers housing area, and Philippine
National Police jails and support services (presently known as Camp Bagong Diwa); b)
approximately 99.91 has. in Villamor Air Base for the Presidential Airlift Wing, one squadron of
helicopters for the NCR and respective security units; c) twenty one (21) areas segregated by
various presidential proclamations; and d) a proposed 30.15 has. as relocation site for families to be
affected by the construction of Circumferential Road 5 and Radial Road 4, provided that the
boundaries and technical description of these exempt areas shall be determined by an actual ground
survey.24

Now charging the BCDA of wrongfully asserting title to Dream Village and unlawfully subjecting its
members to summary demolition, resulting in unrest and tensions among the residents, 25 on
November 22, 1999, the latter filed a letter-complaint with the COSLAP to seek its assistance in the
verification survey of the subject 78,466-sq m property, which they claimed is within Lot 1 of Swo-13-
000298 and thus is covered by Proclamation No. 172. They claim that they have been occupying the
area for thirty (30) years "in the concept of owners continuously, exclusively and notoriously for
several years," and have built their houses of sturdy materials thereon and introduced paved roads,
drainage and recreational and religious facilities. Dream Village, thus, asserts that the lot is not
among those transferred to the BCDA under R.A. No. 7227, and therefore patent applications by the
occupants should be processed by the Land Management Bureau (LMB).

On August 15, 2000, Dream Village formalized its complaint by filing an Amended Petition 26 in the
COSLAP. Among the reliefs it sought were:

d. DECLARING the subject property as alienable and disposable by virtue of applicable

laws;

e. Declaring the portion of Lot 1 of subdivision Plan SWO-13-000298, situated in the barrio of
Western Bicutan, Taguig, Metro Manila, which is presently being occupied by herein
petitioner as within the coverage of Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 and outside the claim
of AFP-RSBS INDUSTRIAL PARK COMPLEX and/or BASES CONVESION
DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY.

f. ORDERING the Land Management Bureau to process the application of the

ASSOCIATION members for the purchase of their respective lots under the provisions of
Acts Nos. 274 and 730. (Underscoring supplied)

Respondent BCDA in its Answer28 dated November 23, 2000 questioned the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP to hear Dream Villages complaint, while asserting its title to the subject property pursuant
to R.A. No. 7227. It argued that under Executive Order (E.O.) No. 561 which created the COSLAP,
its task is merely to coordinate the various government offices and agencies involved in the
settlement of land problems or disputes, adding that BCDA does not fall in the enumeration in
Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, it being neither a pastureland-lease holder, a timber concessionaire, or a
government reservation grantee, but the holder of patrimonial government property which cannot be
the subject of a petition for classification, release or subdivision by the occupants of Dream Village.

In its Resolution29 dated April 28, 2004, the COSLAP narrated that it called a mediation conference
on March 22, 2001, during which the parties agreed to have a relocation/verification survey
conducted of the subject lot. On April 4, 2001, the COSLAP wrote to the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources (DENR)-Community Environment and Natural Resources Office-NCR
requesting the survey, which would also include Swo-00-0001302, covering the adjacent AFP-RSBS
Industrial Park established by Proclamation No. 1218 on May 8, 1998 as well as the abandoned
Circumferential Road 5 (C-5 Road).30
On April 1, 2004, the COSLAP received the final report of the verification survey and a blueprint copy
of the survey plan from Atty. Rizaldy Barcelo, Regional Technical Director for Lands of DENR.
Specifically, Item No. 3 of the DENR report states:

3. Lot-1, Swo-000298 is inside Proclamation 172. Dream Village Neighborhood Association, Inc. is
outside Lot-1, Swo-13-000298 and inside Lot-10, 11 & Portion of Lot 13, Swo-00-0001302 with an
actual area of 78,466 square meters. Likewise, the area actually is outside Swo-00-0001302 of
BCDA.31 (Emphasis ours and underscoring supplied)

COSLAP Ruling

On the basis of the DENRs verification survey report, the COSLAP resolved that Dream Village lies
outside of BCDA, and particularly, outside of Swo-00-0001302, and thus directed the LMB of the
DENR to process the applications of Dream Villages members for sales patent, noting that in view of
the length of time that they "have been openly, continuously and notoriously occupying the subject
property in the concept of an owner, x x x they are qualified to apply for sales patent on their
respective occupied lots pursuant to R.A. Nos. 274 and 730 in relation to the provisions of the Public
Land Act."32

On the question of its jurisdiction over the complaint, the COSLAP cited the likelihood that the
summary eviction by the BCDA of more than 2,000 families in Dream Village could stir up serious
social unrest, and maintained that Section 3(2) of E.O. No. 561 authorizes it to "assume jurisdiction
and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for
instance, the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or
unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action," even as Section 3(2)(d) of E.O.
No. 561 also allows it to take cognizance of "petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of
lands of the public domain," exactly the ultimate relief sought by Dream Village. Rationalizing that it
was created precisely to provide a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land
problems "in general," the COSLAP invoked as its authority the 1990 case of Baaga v.
COSLAP,33 where this Court said:

It is true that Executive Order No. 561 provides that the COSLAP may take cognizance of cases
which are "critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of parties
involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations
requiring immediate action." However, the use of the word "may" does not mean that the COSLAPs
jurisdiction is merely confined to the above mentioned cases. The provisions of the said Executive
Order are clear that the COSLAP was created as a means of providing a more effective mechanism
for the expeditious settlement of land problems in general, which are frequently the source of
conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural minorities. Besides, the COSLAP merely took over
from the abolished PACLAP whose functions, including its jurisdiction, power and authority to act on,
decide and resolve land disputes (Sec. 2, P.D. No. 832) were all assumed by it. The said Executive
Order No. 561 containing said provision, being enacted only on September 21, 1979, cannot affect
the exercise of jurisdiction of the PACLAP Provincial Committee of Koronadal on September 20,
1978. Neither can it affect the decision of the COSLAP which merely affirmed said exercise of
jurisdiction.34

In its Motion for Reconsideration35 filed on May 20, 2004, the BCDA questioned the validity of the
survey results since it was conducted without its representatives present, at the same time denying
that it received a notification of the DENR verification survey.36 It maintained that there is no basis for
the COSLAPs finding that the members of Dream Village were in open, continuous, and adverse
possession in the concept of owner, because not only is the property not among those declared
alienable and disposable, but it is a titled patrimonial property of the State. 37
In the Order38 dated June 17, 2004, the COSLAP denied BCDAs Motion for Reconsideration,
insisting that it had due notice of the verification survey, while also noting that although the BCDA
wanted to postpone the verification survey due to its tight schedule, it actually stalled the survey
when it failed to suggest an alternative survey date to ensure its presence.

CA Ruling

On Petition for Review39 to the CA, the BCDA argued that the dispute is outside the jurisdiction of the
COSLAP because of the lands history of private ownership and because it is registered under an
indefeasible Torrens title40; that Proclamation No. 172 covers only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 in
Western Bicutan, whereas Dream Village occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302,
which also belongs to the BCDA 41; that the COSLAP resolution is based on an erroneous DENR
report stating that Dream Village is outside of BCDA, because Lots 10, 11, and portion of Lot 13 of
Swo-00-0001302 are within the DA42; that the COSLAP was not justified in ignoring BCDAs request
to postpone the survey to the succeeding year because the presence of its representatives in such
an important verification survey was indispensable for the impartiality of the survey aimed at
resolving a highly volatile situation43; that the COSLAP is a mere coordinating administrative agency
with limited jurisdiction44; and, that the present case is not among those enumerated in Section 3 of
E.O. No. 56145.

The COSLAP, on the other hand, maintained that Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 provides that it
may assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes in "other similar land problems of
grave urgency and magnitude,"46 and the present case is one such problem.

The CA in its Decision47 dated September 10, 2009 ruled that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over
the complaint because the question of whether Dream Village is within the areas declared as
available for disposition in Proclamation No. 172 is beyond its competence to determine, even as the
land in dispute has been under a private title since 1906, and presently its title is held by a
government agency, the BCDA, in contrast to the case of Baaga relied upon by Dream Village,
where the disputed land was part of the public domain and the disputants were applicants for sales
patent thereto.

Dream Villages motion for reconsideration was denied in the appellate courts Order 48 of July 13,
2010.

Petition for Review in the Supreme Court

On petition for review on certiorari to this Court, Dream Village interposes the following issues:

IN ANNULLING THE RESOLUTION OF COSLAP IN COSLAP CASE NO. 99-500, THE

HONORABLE CA DECIDED THE CASE IN A MANNER NOT CONSISTENT WITH LAW AND
APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT;

THE HONORABLE CA ERRED IN RULING THAT COSLAP HAD NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
CONTROVERSY BETWEEN THE PARTIES HEREIN.49

The Courts Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

The BCDA holds title to Fort Bonifacio.

That the BCDA has title to Fort Bonifacio has long been decided with finality. In Samahan ng Masang
Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. BCDA,50 it was categorically ruled as follows:

First, it is unequivocal that the Philippine Government, and now the BCDA, has title and ownership
over Fort Bonifacio. The case of Acting Registrars of Land Titles and Deeds of Pasay City, Pasig and
Makati is final and conclusive on the ownership of the then Hacienda de Maricaban estate by the
Republic of the Philippines. Clearly, the issue on the ownership of the subject lands in Fort Bonifacio
is laid to rest. Other than their view that the USA is still the owner of the subject lots, petitioner has
not put forward any claim of ownership or interest in them.51

The facts in Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati are essentially not much different from the
controversy below. There, 20,000 families were long-time residents occupying 98 has. of Fort
Bonifacio in Makati City, who vainly sought to avert their eviction and the demolition of their houses
by the BCDA upon a claim that the land was owned by the USA under TCT No. 2288. The Supreme
Court found that TCT No. 2288 had in fact been cancelled by TCT No. 61524 in the name of the
Republic, which title was in turn cancelled on January 3, 1995 by TCT Nos. 23888, 23887, 23886,
22460, 23889, 23890, and 23891, all in the name of the BCDA. The Court ruled that the BCDAs
aforesaid titles over Fort Bonifacio are valid, indefeasible and beyond question, since TCT No.
61524 was cancelled in favor of BCDA pursuant to an explicit authority under R.A. No. 7227, the
legal basis for BCDAs takeover and management of the subject lots. 52

Dream Village sits on the

abandoned C-5 Road, which lies
outside the area declared in
Proclamation Nos. 2476 and 172 as
alienable and disposable.

Pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476, the following surveys were conducted by the Bureau of Lands to
delimit the boundaries of the areas excluded from the coverage of Proclamation No. 423:

Barangay Survey Plan Date Approved

1. Lower Bicutan SWO-13-000253 October 21, 1986

2. Signal Village SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986

3. Upper Bicutan SWO-13-000258 May 13, 1986

4. Western Bicutan SWO-13-000298 January 15, 198753

However, the survey plan for Western Bicutan, Swo-13-000298, shows that Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6
thereof are inside the area segregated for the Libingan ng mga Bayani under Proclamation No. 208,
which then leaves only Lots 1 and 2 of Swo-13-000298 as available for disposition. For this reason,
it was necessary to amend Proclamation No. 2476. Thus, in Proclamation No. 172 only Lots 1 and 2
of Swo-13-000298 are declared alienable and disposable.54
The DENR verification survey report states that Dream Village is not situated in Lot 1 of Swo-13-
000298 but actually occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-0001302: "x x x Dream Village is
outside Lot1, SWO-13-000298 and inside Lot 10, 11 & portion of Lot 13, SWO-00-0001302 with an
actual area of 78466 square meters. The area is actually is [sic] outside SWO-00-0001302 of
BCDA."55 Inexplicably and gratuitously, the DENR also states that the area is outside of BCDA,
completely oblivious that the BCDA holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio, even as the BCDA
asserts that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of SWO-00-0001302 are part of the abandoned right-of-way of C-5
Road. This area is described as lying north of Lot 1 of Swo-13-000298 and of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of
Swo-13-000298 (Western Bicutan) inside the Libingan ng mga Bayani, and the boundary line of Lot
1 mentioned as C-5 Road is really the proposed alignment of C-5 Road, which was abandoned
when, as constructed, it was made to traverse northward into the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Dream
Village has not disputed this assertion.

The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was abandoned by
deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga Bayani does not signify
abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that these lots would then become
alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of the BCDA, even as it is significant that
under Section 8(d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families
affected by the construction of C-5 Road. It is nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-
0001302 are part of the said relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south, 56making them
commercially valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the government has
abandoned them to Dream Village.

While property of the State or any

of its subdivisions patrimonial in
character may be the object of
prescription, those "intended for
some public service or for the
development of the national
wealth" are considered property of
public dominion and therefore not
susceptible to acquisition by
prescription.

Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its subdivisions not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription." Articles 420 and 421 identify what is
property of public dominion and what is patrimonial property:

Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:

(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges
constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;

(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some
public service or for the development of the national wealth.

Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article,
is patrimonial property.

One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible of
acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic,57 it was pointed out that from the
moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military lands in Metro Manila
became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said lands did not thereby
become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express reservation that they are to be sold in
order to raise funds for the conversion of the former American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court
noted that the purpose of the law can be tied to either "public service" or "the development of
national wealth" under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the
public dominion, albeit their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that it
is only upon their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become
private property and cease to be property of the public dominion: 58

For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or
disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service
or for the development of the national wealth."59

Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code, public domain lands become patrimonial property only if
there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the
development of national wealth. Only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run. Also under Section 14(2) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529, it is provided that before acquisitive prescription can
commence, the property sought to be registered must not only be classified as alienable and
disposable, it must also be expressly declared by the State that it is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth, or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Absent such an express declaration by the State, the land remains to be property of
public dominion.60

Since the issuance of Proclamation No. 423 in 1957, vast portions of the former Maricaban have
been legally disposed to settlers, besides those segregated for public or government use.
Proclamation No. 1217 (1973) established the Maharlika Village in Bicutan, Taguig to serve the
needs of resident Muslims of Metro Manila; Proclamation No. 2476 (1986), as amended by
Proclamation No. 172 (1987), declared more than 400 has. of Maricaban in Upper and Lower
Bicutan, Signal Village, and Western Bicutan as alienable and disposable; Proclamation No. 518
(1990) formally exempted from Proclamation No. 423 the Barangays of Cembo, South Cembo, West
Rembo, East Rembo, Comembo, Pembo and Pitogo, comprising 314 has., and declared them open
for disposition.

The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public dominion of the
State, because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved for some public service or
for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the conversion of military reservations in
the country to productive civilian uses.61 Needless to say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by
Dream Village has not even begun to run.

Ownership of a land registered

under a Torrens title cannot be lost
by prescription or adverse
possession.

Dream Village has been unable to dispute BCDAs claim that Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-
0001302 are the abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road, which is within the vast titled territory of Fort
Bonifacio. We have already established that these lots have not been declared alienable and
disposable under Proclamation Nos. 2476 or 172.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by prescription or
adverse possession.62 Section 47 of P.D. No. 1529, the Property Registration Decree, expressly
provides that no title to registered land in derogation of the title of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession. And, although the registered landowner may still
lose his right to recover the possession of his registered property by reason of laches, 63 nowhere has
Dream Village alleged or proved laches, which has been defined as such neglect or omission to
assert a right, taken in conjunction with lapse of time and other circumstances causing prejudice to
an adverse party, as will operate as a bar in equity. Put any way, it is a delay in the assertion of a
right which works disadvantage to another because of the inequity founded on some change in the
condition or relations of the property or parties. It is based on public policy which, for the peace of
society, ordains that relief will be denied to a stale demand which otherwise could be a valid claim. 64

The subject property having been

expressly reserved for a specific
public purpose, the COSLAP
cannot exercise jurisdiction over the
complaint of the Dream Village
settlers.

BCDA has repeatedly asserted that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction to hear Dream Villages
complaint. Concurring, the CA has ruled that questions as to the physical identity of Dream Village
and whether it lies in Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302, or whether Proclamation No. 172 has
released the disputed area for disposition are issues which are "manifestly beyond the scope of the
COSLAPs jurisdiction vis--vis Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O. No. 561," 65 rendering its Resolution a
patent nullity and its pronouncements void. Thus, the CA said, under Section 3 of E.O. No. 561, the
COSLAPs duty would have been to refer the conflict to another tribunal or agency of government in
view of the serious ramifications of the disputed claims:

In fine, it is apparent that the COSLAP acted outside its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the case.
It would have been more prudent if the COSLAP has [sic] just referred the controversy to the proper
forum in order to fully thresh out the ramifications of the dispute at bar. As it is, the impugned
Resolution is a patent nullity since the tribunal which rendered it lacks jurisdiction. Thus, the
pronouncements contained therein are void. "We have consistently ruled that a judgment for want of
jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation.
All acts performed pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect." 66 (Citation
omitted)

We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared specific public purpose under R.A. No.
7227, which unfortunately for Dream Village does not encompass the present demands of its
members. Indeed, this purpose was the very reason why title to Fort Bonifacio has been transferred
to the BCDA, and it is this very purpose which takes the dispute out of the direct jurisdiction of the
COSLAP. A review of the history of the COSLAP will readily clarify that its jurisdiction is limited to
disputes over public lands not reserved or declared for a public use or purpose.

On July 31, 1970, President Marcos issued E.O. No. 251 creating the Presidential Action Committee
on Land Problems (PACLAP) to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of all kinds
of land disputes between settlers, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and
decisive measures to solve land problems, or recommend other solutions. 67 E.O. No. 305, issued on
March 19, 1971, reconstituted the PACLAP and gave it exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving
public lands and other lands of the public domain, 68 as well as adjudicatory powers phrased in broad
terms: "To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative
proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving
public lands and lands of the public domain."69

On November 27, 1975, P.D. No. 832 reorganized the PACLAP and enlarged its functions and
duties. Section 2 thereof even granted it quasi judicial functions, to wit:

Sec. 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. The PACLAP shall have the following functions and
duties:

1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various
government agencies and agencies involved in land problems or disputes, and streamline
administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural
minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such
problems or disputes;

2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the
PACLAP, to any member agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That when the
Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon shall
have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall
be binding upon the parties therein involved and upon the member agency having
jurisdiction thereof;

xxxx

4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation and resolution of land
disputes or problems at provincial level, if possible. (Underscoring supplied)

On September 21, 1979, E.O. No. 561 abolished the PACLAP and created the COSLAP to be a
more effective administrative body to provide a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land
problems among small settlers, landowners and members of the cultural minorities to avoid social
unrest.70 Paragraph 2, Section 3 of E.O No. 561 now specifically enumerates the instances when the
COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:

Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

1. Coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government
offices and agencies involved in the settlement of land problems or disputes, and streamline
administrative procedures to relieve small settlers and landholders and members of cultural
minorities of the expense and time consuming delay attendant to the solution of such
problems or disputes;

2. Refer and follow-up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any
land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in
the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are
critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties
involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical
situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber

concessionaires;
 (b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;

(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;

(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public
domain; and

(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

xxxx

Citing the constant threat of summary eviction and demolition by the BCDA and the seriousness and
urgency of the reliefs sought in its Amended Petition, Dream Village insists that the COSLAP was
justified in assuming jurisdiction of COSLAP Case No. 99-500. But in Longino v. Atty. General, 71 it
was held that as an administrative agency, COSLAPs jurisdiction is limited to cases specifically
mentioned in its enabling statute, E.O. No. 561. The Supreme Court said:

Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such, could
wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. x x x.

xxxx

Under the law, E.O. No. 561, the COSLAP has two options in acting on a land dispute or problem
lodged before it, namely, (a) refer the matter to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for
settlement/resolution; or (b) assume jurisdiction if the matter is one of those enumerated in
paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law, if such case is critical and explosive in nature, taking into account
the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or
other similar critical situations requiring immediate action. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction
over a case or to refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider
the nature or classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions
raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and
damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any land
dispute or problem.72(Citation omitted)

The Longino ruling has been consistently cited in subsequent COSLAP cases, among them Davao
New Town Development Corp. v. COSLAP,73 Barranco v. COSLAP,74 NHA v. COSLAP,75 Cayabyab v.
de Aquino,76 Ga, Jr. v. Tubungan,77 Machado v. Gatdula,78 and Vda. de Herrera v. Bernardo.79

Thus, in Machado, it was held that the COSLAP cannot invoke Section 3(2)(e) of E.O. No. 561 to
assume jurisdiction over "other similar land problems of grave urgency," since the statutory
construction principle of ejusdem generis prescribes that where general words follow an
enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things
of the same kind as those specifically mentioned.80 Following this rule, COSLAPs jurisdiction is
limited to disputes involving lands in which the government has a proprietary or regulatory
interest,81 or public lands covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture
lease agreements, a timber concessions, or a reservation grants, 82 and where moreover, the dispute
is between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;
between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees; and between
occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants.
In Longino, the parties competed to lease a property of the Philippine National Railways. The high
court rejected COSLAPs jurisdiction, noting that the disputed lot is not public land, and neither party
was a squatter, patent lease agreement holder, government reservation grantee, public land
claimant or occupant, or a member of any cultural minority, nor was the dispute critical and explosive
in nature so as to generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation which required immediate
action.83

In Davao New Town Development Corp., it was held that the COSLAP has no concurrent jurisdiction
with the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in respect of disputes concerning the implementation
of agrarian reform laws, since "the grant of exclusive and primary jurisdiction over agrarian reform
matters on the DAR implies that no other court, tribunal, or agency is authorized to resolve disputes
properly cognizable by the DAR."84 Thus, instead of hearing and resolving the case, COSLAP should
have simply referred private respondents complaint to the DAR or DARAB. According to the Court:

The abovementioned proviso Section (3)(2) of E.O. No. 561, which vests COSLAP the power to
resolve land disputes, does not confer upon COSLAP blanket authority to assume every matter
referred to it. Its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the government has
proprietary or regulatory interest. Moreover, the land dispute in Baaga involved parties with
conflicting free patent applications which was within the authority of PACLAP to resolve, unlike that
of the instant case which is exclusively cognizable by the DAR.85

In Barranco, COSLAP issued a writ to demolish structures encroaching into private property. The 1wphi1

Supreme court ruled that COSLAP may resolve only land disputes "involving public lands or lands of
the public domain or those covered with a specific license from the government such as a pasture
lease agreement, a timber concession, or a reservation grant."86

In NHA, it was held that COSLAP has no jurisdiction over a boundary dispute between two local
government units, that its decision is an utter nullity correctible by certiorari, that it can never become
final and any writ of execution based on it is void, and all acts performed pursuant to it and all claims
emanating from it have no legal effect.87

In Cayabyab, it was held that "the jurisdiction of COSLAP does not extend to disputes involving the
ownership of private lands, or those already covered by a certificate of title, as these fall exactly
within the jurisdiction of the courts and other administrative agencies." 88

In Ga, Jr., it was reiterated that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over controversies relating to
ownership and possession of private lands, and thus, the failure of respondents to properly appeal
from the COSLAP decision before the appropriate court was held not fatal to the petition for certiorari
that they eventually filed with the CA. The latter remedy remained available despite the lapse of the
period to appeal from the void COSLAP decision.89

In Machado, the high court ruled that COSLAP has no jurisdiction in disputes over private lands
between private parties, reiterating the essential rules contained in Section 3 of E.O. No. 561
governing the exercise by COSLAP of its jurisdiction, to wit:

Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem
lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated
in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having
appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over
a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or
classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions raised;
and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage
or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general
power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem. Thus, under EO 561, the instances
when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or
those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber
concessions, or reservation grants.90 (Citations omitted)

In Vda. de Herrera, the COSLAP assumed jurisdiction over a complaint for "interference,
disturbance, unlawful claim, harassment and trespassing" over a private parcel of land. The CA ruled
that the parties were estopped to question COSLAPs jurisdiction since they participated actively in
the proceedings. The Supreme Court, noting from the complaint that the case actually involved a
claim of title and possession of private land, ruled that the RTC or the MTC has jurisdiction since the
dispute did not fall under Section 3, paragraph 2 (a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, was not critical and
explosive in nature, did not involve a large number of parties, nor was there social tension or unrest
present or emergent.91

In the case at bar, COSLAP has invoked Baaga to assert its jurisdiction. There, Guillermo Baaga
had filed a free patent application with the Bureau of Lands over a public land with an area of 30
has. Gregorio Daproza (Daproza) also filed a patent application for the same property. The opposing
claims and protests of the claimants remained unresolved by the Bureau of Lands, and neither did it
conduct an investigation. Daproza wrote to the COSLAP, which then opted to exercise jurisdiction
over the controversy. The high court sustained COSLAP, declaring that its jurisdiction is not confined
to the cases mentioned in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of E.O. No. 561, but includes land problems in
general, which are frequently the source of conflicts among settlers, landowners and cultural
minorities.

But as the Court has since clarified in Longino and in the other cases aforecited, the land dispute in
Baaga was between private individuals who were free patent applicants over unregistered public
lands. In contrast, the present petition involves land titled to and managed by a government agency
which has been expressly reserved by law for a specific public purpose other than for settlement.
Thus, as we have advised in Longino, the law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any
land dispute or problem, but it has to consider the nature or classification of the land involved, the
parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised, and the need for immediate and urgent action
thereon to prevent injuries to persons and damage or destruction to property.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

C E R TI F I C ATI O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion
of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1
Rollo. pp. 24-46.

2
Penned by Associate Justice Priscilla J. Baltazar-Padilla. with Associate Justices Josefina
GuevaraSalonga and Celia C. Librea-Leagogo. concurring; id. at 55-67.

3
ld.at71-72.

4
Id. at 112-116.

5
Id. at 115-116.

6
Id. at 29.

7
Pursuant to Act No. 496 (1902) or the Land Registration Act.

8
Rollo, p. 56.

9
Samahan ng Masang Pilipino sa Makati, Inc. v. BCDA, 542 Phil. 86 (2007).

10
Rollo, p. 56.