CAYETANO VS.

MONSOD

Facts: Atty. Christian Monsod was nominated by the late President Corazon C. Aquino as the
Chairman of the COMELEC on April 25, 1991. The Commission on Appointments confirmed Monsods
nomination on June 5, 1991 and took his oath of office 3 days following the confirmation. Atty.
Christian Monsod passed the bar examinations on 1960 and is a member of the Philippine Bar and
has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Petitioner Renato Cayetano
argued that Monsod does not possess the required qualification prescribed by the law and hoped
that Monsods appointment be declared null and void. The 1987 Philippine Constitution provides in
Section 1 (1), Article IX-C that the Chairman of the COMELEC shall be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, at least thirty0five years of age, holder of a college degree, must not have been a
candidate for any elective position in the immediately preceding-elections, and be a member of the
Philippine Bar who has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Christian Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years.
Held: Yes, Atty. Christian Monsod has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years.
It is stated in the case that the practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires
the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or services requires the use
in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

ALAWI VS. ALAUYA

Facts: Sophia Alawi is a sales representative of Villarosa & Co. in Davao City. Ashari M. Alauya is the
incumbent executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City. A contract was
executed by Alawis Agency for Alauya for the purchase on installments on a housing unit. A loan was
granted to Alauya by the NHMFC. On December 15 1995, Alauya wrote a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. noting that he is withdrawing from the contract between him and the company on
the grounds that his consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence by the sales agent. A copy of the letter with no stamp bearing the words Free
Postage PD 26 was sent to the Vice President of Villarosa & Co. Alauya also wrote to the Vice
President of NHMFC. Upon knowing that Alauya sent a letter to Villarosa & Co., Sophia Alawi filed a
complaint wherein she accused Alauya of malicious and libelous charges, unauthorized enjoyment of
free postage, and usurpation of the title of attoryney which is only granted to the member of the
Philippine Bar. He denied all of the accusations and Alauya further justified his use of the title
attorney since it is synonymous to the term Counsellors-at-law, a title which Sharia lawyers have
a rightful claim. Furthermore, he prefers the title attorney since counselor is often mistaken for
konsehal. Alauya pleaded for the courts compassion, alleging that what he did is expected of any
man unduly prejudiced and injured.
Issue: Whether or not Alauya may use the title attorney.
Held: No, Alauya may not use the title attorney. It has been established that persons who pass the
Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar and may only practice law before
Sharia courts. Those who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar and those admitted to the Philippine
Bar may both be considered counselors in the sense that they give counsel or advice to their clients.
However, only the latter may use the title attorney since it is reserved to those who passed the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and is a member in good
standing.
AREOLA VS. MENDOZA

Facts: On November 13, 2006, Areola wrote a letter-complaint in behalf of his co-detainees to the
Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. He alleged that Atty. Mendoza
visited the detainees of Antipolo City Jail with pending cases and stated that:

O kayong may mga kasong drugs na may pangpiyansa o pang-areglo ay maging praktikal sana kayo kung
gusto ninyong makalaya agad. Upang makatiyak kayo na hindi masasayang ang pera ninyo ay sa akin ninyo
ibigay o ng kamag-anak ninyo ang pera at ako na ang bahalang maglagay kay Judge Martin at Fiscal banqui;
at kayong mga detenidong mga babae na no bail ang kaso sa drugs, iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin
at palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon.

Atty. Mendoza allegedly said that as she is handling more than 100 cases, all detainees should prepare
and furnish her with their Sinumpaang Salaysay so that she may know the facts of their cases and their
defenses and also to give her the necessary payment for their transcript of stenographic notes.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Mendoza is guilty for violation of the attorneys oath, deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct, and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes, Atty. Mendoza admitted that she advised her clients to approach the judge and plead for
compassion so that their motions would be granted. This admission corresponds to one of Areolas
charges against Atty. Mendozathat she told her clients Iyak-iyakan lang ninyo si Judge Martin at
palalayain na kayo. Malambot ang puso noon. Atty. Mendoza made it appear that the judge is easily
moved if a party resorts to dramatic antics such as begging and crying in order for their cases to be
dismissed.

As such, the Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors that Atty. Mendoza made irresponsible advices
to her clients in violation of Rule 1.02 and Rule 15.07 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It is the
mandate of Rule 1.02 that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system. Rule 15.07 states that a lawyer shall impress upon his client
compliance with the laws and the principles of fairness.

ARIENDA VS. MONILLA

Facts: On January 13, 2002, complainant alleged that the respondent and his husband, Atty. Monilia, went
to the complainants house and offered their services in settling the estate of complainants deceased
mother. Atty. Monilla would prepare an extrajudicial settlement while the respondents brother, Engr.
Arquero, would conduct the survey of the estate. Partial payments were made everytime the respondents
would go to the complainants house. The approved survey plan would not be given to the complainant
unless she pays the 20,000 she still owes. Complainant later found out that the respondent is not a lawyer
but a court employee and her husband had no authority to settle the estate as he was an employee of
DAR. The respondent denied that it was her and her husband who offered their services to the
complainant. Instead, it was the complainant and her sister who came to the respondents for her services
and made a request if the respondents brother can the lot left by the complainants deceased mother. The
respondent alleged that she is not aware of any agreement between her brother and the complainant.

Issue: Whether or not the respondent is guilty of abuse of authority and conduct unbecoming a court
employee.

Held: Yes, the respondent is guilty of simple misconduct unbecoming of court personnel while she was a
court stenographer. Furthermore, the respondent admitted that she prepared and finalized the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the complainants deceased mother to which she had no authority
to. Such actions constituted practice of law. Worse, the respondent also admitted receiving money for
such services. The respondents actions fall short of the exacting standards of ethics and morality imposed
upon court employees.

BRUNET VS. GUAREN

Facts: On February 1997, the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Guaren for the titling of a
residential lot. Atty. Guaren asked for a fee of 10,000 which shall be made after the delivery of the title.
Atty. Guaren asked for an advance fee of 1,000. Atty. Guaren took all pertinents documents relative to
the titling and on March 10, 1997, Atty. Guaren asked for additional payment of 6,000. From 1997 to 2001,
the complainant reminded Atty. Guaren of the case and he would say that the titling was in progress.
Because of the slow progress, they demanded the return of the money they paid. Atty. Guaren agreed to
return the payment provided that 5,000 be deducted to answer for professional fees. Complainants
further alleged that Atty. Guaren made a special appearance against them in a case.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Guaren has violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility.

Held: Yes, Atty. Guaren violated the Canon of Professional Responsibility. He failed to perform his
obligation and allowed 5 long years to elapse without any progress on the titling of the lot. He should also
be reprimanded for appearing in a case against complainants without their consent.

CIOCON-REER VS. LUBAO

Facts: Complainants alleged that on 12 September 2008, Judge Lubao issued an Order directing the parties
to submit their respective memoranda within 30 days from receipt of the order. Complainants alleged
that the defendants failed to submit their memorandum and should be deemed to have waived their right
to adduce evidence and that Judge Lubao should have decided the case. 4 months passed and still, no
decision is made. On 10 December 2008, the branch clerk of court sent a letter-request to the Post Office
of General Santos City asking for certification as to when the Order of 12 September 2008, sent under
Registry Receipt No. 690, was received by the defendants. However, the court did not receive any reply
from the Post Office. On May 20 2009, the defendants were given their last chance to submit their
memorandum within 30 days. Judge Lubao alleged that the complainants, Remberto Karaan Sr. is
engaging in practice of law even though he is not a lawyer.

Issue: Whether or not Remberto Karaan Sr. is engaged in unauthorized practice of law and should be cited
in contept.
Held: Yes, Remberto Karaan Sr. is guilty of unauthorized practice of law. The pleadings showed that Karaan
was engaged in the practice of law. Furthermore, numerous frivolous and administrative complaints were
filed by the complainants against several judges for the sole purpose of mocking the judicial system.
Karaans modus operandi of offering free paralegal advice and then making the parties execute a special
power of attorney that would make him an agent of the litigants and would allow him to file suits,
pleadings and motions with himself as one of the plaintiffs acting on behalf of his clients. The OCA noted
that Karaans services, on behalf of the underprivileged he claimed to be helping, fall within the practice
of law.

MAGNO VS. VELASCO-JACOBA

Facts: Atty. Evelyn Magno had a disagreement with her uncle, Lorenzo Inos about a landscaping contract.
Magno then wrote a sumbong addressed to Bonifacio Alcantara, their barangay captain. During the
conciliation, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba appeared for Lorenzo Inos, on the strength of a Special Power of
Attorney. Magno objected to Attorney Olivias appearance but she said that she was there not as counsel,
but only as attorney-in-fact. However, Jacoba, according to Magnos evidence, acted as counsel during
the proceedings, asserting her procedural know-how into every stage thereof, which made the
proceedings drag on longer than normal. It was because of these numerous instances that Magno charged
Jacoba with willful violation of the Local Government Code and the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is guilty of violating the Local Government Code and
the Code of Professional Responsibility

HELD: Yes, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba violated the Local Government Code and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Section 415 of the LGC clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in
katarungan pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. This enables
the lupon to first gather direct information about the facts and issues, unless in cases where parties are
minors or incompetent parties. Laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and settle their disputes
between themselves. The defense of Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacobo does not apply to this case.

PAGUIA VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

Facts: Petitioner Alan Paguia filed an original action for writ of certiorari to invalidate President Gloria
Arroyos nomination of Hilario Davide Jr. as Permanent Representative to the United Nations for violation
of Section 23 of R.A. 7157. Paguia argued that Davides age at the time of nomination disqualifies him
from holding his post. Sec. 23 of R.A. 7157 states that the mandatory retirement age of officers and
employees of DFA be at 65.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner lacks of capacity to sue and mootness.

Held: Yes, the petitioner lacks of capacity to sue and mootness. First, the petitioners citizenship and
taxpayer status do not clothe him with standing to bring this suit. Second, the petitioners suspension
from the practice of law bars him from performing any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. Preparing a petition with
carefully crafted arguments falls within the practice of law. Third, Respondent David already resigned his
post at the UN on April 2010.

PHILIPPINE LAWYERS ASSOCIATION VS AGRAVA

Facts: On May 27, 1957, Director Celdio Agrava issued a circular announcing that there will be an
examination on June 27, 1957 which will determine who are qualified to practice as a patent attorney
before the Philippine Patent Office. The Philippine Lawyers Association contends that those who have
passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the SC to practice law in the Philippine and is in good
standing is already qualified to practice before the Philippine Patent Office. They argue that this action is
in excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

Issue: Whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and preparation and prosecution of patent
applications constitute practice of law.

Held: Yes. under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to practice
law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that
much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and
application of the Patent Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to
establish facts involved; that part of the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so
much so that appeals from his orders and decisions are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

SANTOS VS. LACUROM

Facts: The complainant alleged that the respondent judge shows bias and favor to Rogelio Santos who
had three pending cases before the respondent judge. First, respondent judge allowed Santos, a non-
lawyer, to appear in court and litigate personally the three cases. Complainant pointed out that Santos
was already represented by counsels who have not withdrawn their appearances. Second, the respondent
judge always granted the pleadings of Santos. Third, respondent judge delayed the execution of the Court
of Appeals decision against Santos. Fourth, the respondent judge denied complainants letter-request to
inhibit himself from the cases to avoid suspicion of bias, prejudice, and conflict of interest.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent Judge Lacurom is guilty of gross misconduct, grave abuse of judicial
authority, gross bias and partiality, and gross violation of the code of Judicial Ethics.

Held: On the first allegation, the court recognizes the right of an individual to represent himself in any
case in which he is a party. He may conduct his litigation personally or with the assistance of an attorney.
Therefore, Santos can conduct the litigation of cases personally. He is not practicing law since he is
exercising his right to represent himself.

On the second and third allegation, the Court dismissed this charge since the complainant failed to prove
the respondent judges dispatch of all of the pleadings of Santos and the respondent judges alleged
delayed execution of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

On the fourth allegation, the Court argues that the respondent judges inhibition from the cases was
discretionary.

RODICA VS. LAZARO

Facts: On May 5, 2011, William Strong was arrested and detained by the Bureau of Immigration for
allegedly being involved in an international gang and conspiracy in Brazil on fraud involving the creation
of hundreds of dollars in illegal securities. Strong requested his friend Philip Apostol to look for a lawyer.
Apostol recommended the Lazaro Law Office represented by Atty. Manuel Lazaro and his associates who
initially declined but later accepted to handle the deportation case.
Strong initiated giving the information that his deportation case may be due to the complaint filed by his
live-in partner Jasper Rodica before the RTC against the Hillview Marketing Corporation for recovery and
possession and damages involving a property they have in Boracay which is represented by Atty. Tan.
Rodica was represented by Atty. Ibutnande in this case. Apparently, Rodica claimed that Atty. Manuel met
with Atty. Tan to discuss the settlement package on the deportation case they filed against Strong on the
condition that Rodica withdraws her complaint from the RTC of Cebu.

On May 25, 2011 the Bureau of Immigration rendered a judgment deporting Strong to leave the country.
On June 6, 2011 Rodica filed before the RTC a motion to withdraw her complaint against Hillview. Rodica
now alleges that after Strong was deported and withdrawing the case before the RTC, she was deceived
by Atty Manuel et al for over settlement of 7 million which was allegedly extorted from her after
misrepresenting that the withdrawal of the case before the RTC is only a part of the settlement package.

It appears on the record that Atty. Espejo, an associate of the Lazaro Law office helped in drafting the
Manifestation with Motion to Withdraw Motion for Reconsideration after Rodica pleaded him to prepare
the motion and was requested further to indicate the name of the Lazaro Law Office including the name
of Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle to give more weight on the pleading. Rodica promised Atty. Espejo to
talk to Atty. Manuel about it. The case before the RTC was actually dismissed on March 29, 2011 for failure
to show cause of action but a motion for reconsideration was filed by Rodica.

Issue: Whether or not the allegations of Rodica merit the disbarment of the respondents.

Held: The court ruled that Rodica failed to overcome the presumption of innocence of the respondents.
As a general rule, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence and the burden of proof rests upon the
complainant to clearly prove the allegations made against them. The required quantum of proof is
preponderance of evidence which is an evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief
than that which is offered in opposition thereto.

On Rodica's claim with regards to the settlement package, the court find it without merit because she
withdrew her complaint only after the deportation of Strong. It was also evident on record that the said
case was already dismissed even before the deportation case was filed only she filed a motion for
reconsideration. Therefore, it cannot be said that her withdrawal of the complaint is a settlement
consideration regarding the deportation case of Strong. Moreover, Strong is not a party to the case she
filed before the RTC therefore there is no connection between these 2 cases.

There was sufficient preponderance of evidence that was presented that the cause of her withdrawal of
the complaint is to facilitate the sale of her property in Boracay. According to Atty. Espejo who helped
Rodica draft the motion for withdrawal of the complaint, the said withdrawal is for the purpose of selling
her property to Apostol. Apostol further corroborated that he told Rodica he is willing to purchase the
property once it is free from any pending case. Rodica promised him to work on the termination of the
pending case attached to the property to make the sale.

On her claim to have paid 7 million to Atty. Manuel et al, she failed to substantiate such claim despite
showing off withdrawals from her bank account certain amount of money after failing to prove that the
said amount was paid to the respondents. Moreover, the court held that Rodica is not a client of Lazaro
Law Office. They merely handled the deportation case of Strong.
As for Atty. Espejo, the court found him to have aided Rodica for misrepresenting before the court that
she was aided by the Lazaro Law Office when in fact she is not. Atty. Espejo explained that Rodica assured
him to talk to Atty. Manuel and Atty. Michelle about including their name on the pleading but she did not
do so. Atty. Espejo should have known better that Atty. Ibutnande was the counsel on record on the case
before the RTC and therefore it is not his duty to prepare said pleading. He also should have known that
all pleadings before the court are acted based on merit or the lack of it and not by the name of the law
firm. However, the court give due recognition on the fact that Atty. Espejo expressed remorse on his
conduct and made a sincere apology to the RTC for wrongly employing the name of the Lazaro Law Office
and that he was newly admitted to the Bar in 2010, the court find it proper to give him a warning to
become more prudent on his actuation in the practice of his profession.

The complaint for disbarment was dismissed.

ULEP VS. LEGAL CLINIC INC.

Facts: In 1984, The Legal Clinic was formed by Atty. Rogelio Nogales. Its aim, according to Nogales was to
move toward specialization and to cater to clients who cannot afford the services of big law firms. Now,
Atty. Mauricio Ulep filed a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of the latters advertisements which
contain the following:

It is also alleged that The Legal Clinic published an article entitled Rx for Legal Problems in Star Week of
Philippine Star wherein Nogales stated that they The Legal Clinic is composed of specialists that can take
care of a clients problem no matter how complicated it is even if it is as complicated as the Sharon Cuneta-
Gabby Concepcion situation. He said that he and his staff of lawyers, who, like doctors, are specialists
in various fields, can take care of it. The Legal Clinic, Inc. has specialists in taxation and criminal law,
medico-legal problems, labor, litigation and family law. These specialists are backed up by a battery of
paralegals, counselors and attorneys.

As for its advertisement, Nogales said it should be allowed in view of the jurisprudence in the US which
now allows it (John Bates vs The State Bar of Arizona). And that besides, the advertisement is merely
making known to the public the services that The Legal Clinic offers.

Issue: Whether or not the services offered by The Legal Clinic Inc. constitute practice of law and if its
advertisement may be allowed.

Held: The Legal Clinic is composed mainly of paralegals, which is undoubtedly beyond the domain of the
paralegals. As stated in a previous jurisprudence, practice of law is only reserved for the members of the
Philippine bar, and not to paralegals. As with the Legal Clinics advertisements, the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that a lawyer in making known his legal services must use only honest, fair,
dignified and objective information or statement of facts.

A lawyer cannot advertise his talents in a manner that a merchant advertises his goods. The Legal Clinic
promotes divorce, secret marriages, bigamous marriages which are undoubtedly contrary to law.

The only allowed form of advertisements would be: (1.) Citing your involvement in a reputable law list,
(2.) An ordinary professional card (3.) Phone directory listing without designation to a lawyers
specialization.

VARGAS VS. IGNES

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

GSIS VS. COURT OF APPEALS

Facts:

Issue:

Held:

LINGAN VS. CALUBAQUIB

Facts: On June 15, 2006, Calubaquib and Baliga were found guilty of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility and the Lawyers Oath. The respondents were suspended from the practice of law for one
year. Baliga also serves as the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights. On January 16, 2007,
he was suspended from his position with the Commission on Human Rights en banc arguing that Baligas
suspensions from the practice of law prevented him from assuming his post as a Regional Director. Baliga
argued that suspension from the practice of law did not include his position from public office. On May 8,
2009, the court received a letter from Lingan alleging that Baliga continued practicing law and discharging
his functions as the regional director of CHR. Complainant Lingan claimed that the discharge of the
functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director necessarily required the practice of law. A
Commission on Human Rights Regional Director must be a member of the bar and is designated as
Attorney VI. Since this court suspended Atty. Baliga from the practice of law, Atty. Baliga was in effect a
non-lawyer . . . and [was] disqualified to hold the position of[Regional Director].

Issue: Whether or not suspension from the practice of law includes desisting from holding a position in
government requiring authority to practice law.

Held: The exercise of the powers and functions of a Commission on Human Rights Regional Director
constitutes practice of law. Thus, the Regional Director must be an attorney a member of the bar in
good standing and authorized to practice law. When the Regional Director loses this authority, such as
when he or she is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law, the Regional Director loses a necessary
qualification to the position he or she is holding. The disbarred or suspended lawyer must desist from
holding the position of Regional Director. From the time Atty. Baliga received the courts order of
suspension on July 5, 2006,[76] he has been without authority to practice law. He lacked a necessary
qualification to his position as Commission on Human Rights Regional Director/Attorney VI.