88 Henry Munar Chan applied for the registration of a parcel of land located intrusion on the ground that the
e registration of a parcel of land located intrusion on the ground that the same properties were covered by its own
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66741 June 16, 1988
ANTHONY SY., WAYNE T. SY, LORY T. NGAN ANTHONY SY, JR., JESUS
SAMIO SON, and V & M COMMERCIAL COMPANY, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (4th Special
Cases Division), JUDGE MANUEL E. VALENZUELA Presiding Judge of
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch CXII,
Pasay City (formerly CFI, Branch XXIX, Pasay City, and TEOVILLE
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,respondents.
G.R. No. L-75011 June 16, 1988
TEOVILLE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONO0RABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and THE
PHILIPPINE MACHINERY PART MANUFACTURING CO.,
INC., respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The main issue in these consolidated petitions is whether or not formal
notice of a counsel's change of address was indispensable in the trial
court's telling the right of the losing parties to appeal its decision.
In G.R. No. 66741, the petitioners alleged that eight (8) hectares of land
along the South Superhighway in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, valued at
more than P 50 milIon is involved in these cases. They question the
decision which, through a technicality, would nullify their titles, deprive
them of their properties, and validate titles allegedly defective on their
faces alone.
in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila. The case was docketed as LRC Case No. Q- transfer certificates of title.
335 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch. On
February 21, 1974, a decision was rendered approving Chan's application. The two cases were tried jointly by the court's Branch XXIX presided by
Since Chan, even before the approval of his application had already the same judge.
disposed of several parcels of the subject lot, corresponding decrees of
registration and original certificates of title were issued in 1974 in favor of
After trial on the merits, the trial judge promulgated two separate
Chan and his various assignees. After the issuance of the decree, Chan
decisions in the two cases. The dispositive portion of the decision dated
continued to make several assignments and transfer of portions of the
November 25,1982 in Civil Case No. 6966-P states:
subject parcel of land. Corresponding certificates of title were issued to his
assignees.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered upholding
the plaintiffs better right to the properties in question,
On February 2, 1979, Teoville Development Corporation Teoville for short)
declaring as null and void Decrees of Registration Nos.
filed a complaint for quieting of title and damages with preliminary
N-150479 to N-150484, inclusive, Original Certificates
injunction against Henry Munar Chan and his assignees. It alleged among
of Title Nos. 10161 to 10166, inclusive, and all
others that: (1) Teoville Development Corporation is the owner of parcels
transfer certificates of title emanating therefrom, and
of land in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificates of
sentencing the defendants Henry Munar Chan and the
Title Nos. 268165, S-27367, S-27368, 188445, 188447 and 188347, all of
Sy Family, Anthony D. Sy, Sr., Anthony Sy, Jr., Lory T.
the Registry of Deeds of Rizal; (2) said parcels of land are part of a large
Ngan and Wayne T. Sy, jointly and severally, to pay
parcel of land acquired from its predecessor-in-interest, the Villonco Realty
the plaintiff the sum of P100,000.00 for attorney's
Company; (3) said parcels of land were originally registered as Original
fees, plus costs of suit.
Certificate of Title No. 2553 of the Registry of Deeds for Rizal issued in
G.L.R.O. Rec. No. 10766, Case No. 34 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal
The counterclaim of the defendants is hereby
on May 7, 1919 in favor of El Colegio de San Jose; and (4) that the
dismissed.
boundaries of the registered parcels of land of Henry Munar Chan overlap
those covered by the corporation's transfer certificates of title. The
The Third Party Complaint filed by the defendants
corporation prayed that the decrees of registration, original certificates of
Nussalt Industries Corporation and Sheridan
title, and transfer certificates of title issued to Chan and his assignees be
Manufacturing Industries Corporation against See Eng
declared as null and void. The case was filed with the Court of First
amio Son and Rodolfo Sy which was admitted
Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch and was docketed as Civil Case No.
pursuant to the Order of this Court on June 25, 1979 is
6966-P.
hereby dismissed for lack of evidence.
On April 30, 1981, Philippine Machinery Parts Manufacturing Company,
The preliminary injunction issued is made permanent
Inc., (hereinafter referred as Phil. Machinery) one of the assignees of
and the surety bond posted by the plaintiff is ordered
Henry Munar Chan filed a complaint for quieting of title with preliminary
cancelled.
injunction and damages against Teoville with the same court where Civil
Case No. 6966-P was pending. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
9055-P. Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Register of
Deeds for Rizal, Pasig, Metro Manila.
In 1981, Phil. Machinery entered into the parcels of land covered by its
The dispositive portion of the decision dated November 29, 1982 in Civil
transfer certificates of title, started digging them up, and removing soils
Case No. 9055-P states:
therefrom. Upon learning of such activities, Teoville protested against the
1
 WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing
the complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and
conformably with the judgment of this Court in Civil
Case No. 6966-P, Decree of Registration No. N-
150482, OCT No. 10162 and TCT Nos. 29684,103210
and 103219, and all succeeding transfer certificates
of title covering former Lot F, are hereby declared null
and void. The plaintiff is hereby ordered to pay the
defendant corporation the sum of P162,800.00, as
actual damages, and P100,000.00 for attorney's fees.
Copies of the decisions were sent to Nemesio Diaz, counsel for the
defendants in C.C. No. 6966-P and for the plaintiff in C.C. No. 9055-P, at
his address of record at No. 202 Medalla Building, Cubao, Quezon City. The
copies were returned to the court on December 11, 1982 unserved with
annotations from the post office on their respective envelopes that the
addressee had moved out of the stated address. On February 1, 1983,
Teoville, as plaintiff in C.C. No. P and defendant in C.C. No. 9055-P, filed in
both cases an exparte motion for a writ of execution stating that the
decisions in both cases had become final and executory. It alleged that
although there was a failure to deliver the copies of the decision, this did
not suspend the running of the period for the losing parties to either move
for a new trial or to appeal from the decisions for the reason that their
counsel, Nemesio Diaz did not file a formal notice of a change of address.
Teoville cited the case of Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v.
Court of appeals, et al. (100 SCRA 109) and states that had not Atty. Diaz
moved out of his address of record, he could have received the copies of
the decision on December 11, 1982. Therefore, the parties represented by
Diaz had 30 days or until January 10, 1983 to either file a motion for a new
trial or a motion for reconsideration or to perfect an appeal. Teoville stated
that such an omission resulted in the judgment becoming final.
On February 3, 1983, the lower court granted both motions.
Atty. Nemesio Diaz, in motions filed February 16 and March 1, 1983,
questioned the propriety of the Order considering that he had not received
copies of the subject decisions.
On March 21, 1983, Diaz, in behalf of the losing parties in the two cases
filed a joint motion for reconsideration of the two subject decisions.
The lower court denied all the motions in both cases on the ground that
the decision had long become final and executory and, hence, it had no
more jurisdiction to entertain the motions except to deny them.
The defendants in Civil Case No. 6966-P and plaintiff in C.C. No. 9055-P
then filed separate petitions for certiorari, prohibition, and/or mandamus
with the Intermediate Appellate Court challeging the lower court's orders.
The petition of the defendants in Civil Case No. 6966-P was docketed as
AC G.R. No. SP-00813 while that of the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 9055-P
was docketed as AC-G.R. No. SP-00803.
In separate decisions of two Divisions, the appellate court advanced the
view that service of copies of the decisions on counsel Atty. Nemesio Diaz
at his address on record was valid and effective and his failure to receive
them did not stop the running of the period to appeal. The court ruled that
formal notice of a change of address of counsel is indispensable for the
court to take cognizance of such change. It upheld Teoville's citation of the
dictum in Philippine Suburban Development Corporation v. Court of
Appeals (supra). Both petitions were denied for lack of merit.
A motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners in CA G.R. No. 00813
was denied. On the other hand, the petitioner's motion for reconsideration
in CA-G.R. No. 00803 was granted. The dispositive portion of the resolution
in AC-G.R. No. 00803 reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision of July 31,1984 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside. The writs of certiorari and
mandamus are granted. The orders of February 3,
1984 and April 19, 1984 as well as all proceedings
pursuant to the order of execution complained of are
declared null and void. Respondent court is hereby
directed to allow petitioner to file its contemplated
appeal from the decision dated November 29, 1982
within TEN (10) DAYS from petitioner's receipt of copy
of this resolution.
The motion for reconsideration of the above resolution filed by respondent
Teoville was denied.
The crucial issue in these two petitions is whether or not a formal notice of
a change of address is indispensable for the court to take cognizance of
such change of address.
Nemesio Diaz, counsel of the petitioners in G.R. No. 66741 and private
respondent in G.R. No. 75011 reiterates his earlier stand in the lower
courts that there was no need for him to file a formal change of address
because the lower court already had actual knowledge of his change of
address.
In the Philippine Suburban Development Corporation case, the petitioner,
after losing in the then Court of First Instance of Manila, filed a timely
appeal to the then Court of Appeals. The appellate court sent thru
registered mail a notice to the petitioner at its counsel's address on record
requiring it to file the appellant's brief within 45 days from receipt of said
notice. The notice was not claimed. The 45-day period lapsed. The
appellate court dismissed the appeal and final judgment was entered in
accordance with Section 9, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which provides
that service of said notices is deemed completed upon the expiration of
five days from the date of the first notice of the postmaster. Notices of the
dismissal of the appeal and the entry of judgment which were sent to the
counsel's address on record were not also claimed. The court of origin
issued the corresponding writ of execution which was served at the
counsel's new office in Makati where he was traced. It turned out that the
petitioner's counsel had changed his address without informng the court.
The counsel filed a motion to lift the order of dismissal, set aside entry of
judgment, and reinstate appeal. The motion was denied. A petition
challenging the denial of the motion before the Court of Appeals was also
denied. Hence the petitioner came to this Court. In dismissing the petition,
we stated:
Counsel claims that when he vacated his old office
and transferred to the 8th Floor, PLDT Building,
Makati, he filed several pleadings (an extension of
time to file comment on March 14, 1969 and the
comment filed on April 15, 1969) wherein he indicated
his address to be at the 8th Floor, PLDT Building,
Makati and contends that this should have put
respondent court and adverse counsel on notice. This
is untenable. We have held time and again that
notices to counsel should properly be sent to his
address of record in the absence of due notice to the
2
court of a change of address. As held in Lopez v. de
los Reyes, (31 SCRA 214 [1970], per former Chief
Justice Querube C. Makalintal; Marquez and Noza v.
Panganiban, 109 Phil. 1121 [1960]: and People v.
Manangan, 56 SCRA 817 [1974], per now Chief Justice
Fernando) the fact that counsel used a different
address in later pleadings' should not be taken as
notice to the court of either a change of address or of
another address in addition to that which was already
of record.
xxx xxx xxx
Counsel cannot presume that respondent court will
take cognizance of any other addresses that he may
use in his pleadings, or assume that a given address
is his residence, for unless he files a notice of change
of address, his official address remains to be that of
his address of record. It may well be a temporary
address or just one of the many offices maintained by
counsel. At most, it merely indicates (as was held in
Lopez, supra) that the pleading was prepared in and
mailed from said place and therefore does not
supersede his address of record. Moreover, notices of
court processes are ordinarily taken care of by clerks,
who are naturally guided by addresses of record. To
require the court and its personnel before sending out
the notices, to be continuously checking the record
and the various addresses from which a counsel may
have filed his pleadings and sending them to such
address(es) instead of his address of record which is
duly recorded on the cover of the Rollo is to show
confusion and add an intolerable burden which is not
permitted by the Rules of Court. Juane v. Garcia, 25
SCRA 801 [1968], per Sanchez, J. [retired]; see Rule 7,
Sec. 5; Rule 13, Sec. 5.)
Counsel pleads for a liberal interpretation of the Rules
of Court to allow the reinstatement of his appeal. The
failure of counsel to file brief within the reglementary
period and the dismissal of his appeal was of his own
doing. ...
There are circumstances which differentiate these petitions from
the Philippine Suburban Development Corporation case. In the instant
petitions, it is not a mere failure of the trial court to take notice of changes
of address indicated in subsequent pleadings. The trial judge was informed
in open court and had already taken cognizance of the change. He had, in
fact, acted in accordance with the change of address.
As stated by Diaz:
a) Atty. Nemesio P. Diaz, as counsel for defendants
(herein petitioners) in Civil Case No. 6966-P had been
placing his new address in all the pleadings, motions
and papers he has filed in Court as of November 27,
1981 (Annex E-1 hereof) and prior thereto;
b) Counsel for respondent Corporation actually knew
of Atty. Diaz' change of address. It was he who invited
the attention of respondent Judge to such change of
address and respondent Judge directed an attending
Clerk of Court to indicate such change in the
expediente of Civil Case No. 6966-P;
c) After November 27, 1981 and before November 25,
1982, notices and orders of respondent judge have
always been sent to the new address of Atty. Nemesio
P. Diaz at Suite 202-210 Isabel Building, Espana
Street, Manila (Annex qqqE2 hereof);
d) Likewise, after November 27, 1981, all the
pleadings, motions and papers filed by counsel of
respondent Corporation was addressed and furnished
to Atty. Nemesio P. Diaz at his new address at Suite
202-210 Isabel building, Espana Street, Manila
(Annexes J and K hereof); 11
e) It is only the Decision of respondent Judge dated
November 25, 1982 that was sent to the old address
of Atty. Diaz (Annex M hereof). There must be a
thousand reasons for sending that decision to said old
address despite circumstances indicated in pars. (a),
(b), (c) and (d) above;
f) As a matter of fact, the order granting the writ of
execution issued by respondent Judge was sent to the
new Address of Atty. Diaz at Suite 202-210 Isabel
Building, Espana Street, Manila (Annex O hereof;
annexes A, B and C of Annex S hereof).
Teoville denies the allegation in paragraph (b) above, even as Philippine
Machinery and the petitioners in G.R. No. 66741 insist on its truth. The
others are not in dispute and are sustained by the records. We quote with
approval the appellate court's resolution in CA-G.R. No. 00803, now G.R.
No. 75011, to wit:
In the case at bar, there are circumstances worthy of
serious consideration and which compel a 'second
look.' For instance, Our attention is called to the fact
that respondent court furnished counsel for petitioner
a copy of the order dated December 21, 1981 at his
new address at 202-210 Isabel Building, Espana
Street, Manila. Again after the decision of November
29, 1982 was rendered, respondent court sent a copy
of its order of February 3, 1983 granting an ex-parte
motion for execution to petitioner's counsel at his
same new address. These circumstances lend
credence to petitioner's assertion that the attention of
respondent court had been previously called upon in
open court that petitioner's counsel has been using
his new address in his pleadings, to which
manifestation respondent court responded with an
order to have the new address of said counsel noted
on the cover of the rollo. We said in Our decision of
July 31, 1984 that such notation is not sufficient
compliance of notice to the court of counsel's new
address as the cover of the expediente shows that the
new address of petitioner's counsel is written under
the column for plaintiff, private respondent in this
case. However, closer examination of said cover of
the expediente reveals that the column for
defendants on said cover is filled up, down to the
bottom part thereof, and there is no available space
on which to write the new address of petitioner's
counsel in said column and this explains why the new
address of counsel is found on the column for plaintiff.
3
 The important thing is that respondent court was fully
apprised and had actually taken cognizance of such
change of address of petitioner's counsel when its
orders issued before and after promulgation of the
decision of November 29, 1982 were sent to the new
address of petitioner's counsel. It is evident that when
notices of said orders were sent to the new address of
counsel for petitioner, respondent court's personnel
were apprised of his new address and had relied on
the new address of said counsel recorded on the
cover of the rollo. We truly find it strange that of all
things, the decision of November 29, 1982 was sent
to the old address of counsel for petitioner, when the
orders before and after said decision were sent to
counsel's new address.
From all the foregoing, We find that in this particular
case there was proper and adequate notice to
respondent court of the change of address of
petitioner's counsel; accordingly, the sending of
notice of the decision of November 29, 1982 to his old
and abandoned address was improper and invalid
service thereof. (Emphasis supplied; Rollo of G.R.
75011, pp. 083-085).
Accordingly, the trial court's sending of copies of its decisions in a P50
million controversy to an old address, knowing fully well that the
addressee having already moved would no longer receive them, does not
serve to start the running of the period to appeal. And since the records
are not clear as to when the losing parties may be considered to have
received copies of the trial court's decision, we rule for purposes of these
petitions, that the period to appeal shall commence upon our decision
becoming final and executory.
Our decision in these petitions does not, in the least bit, imply that we are
encouraging forgetfulness or lapses in the behavior of counsel. No matter
how aware a court may be about a change of address, attorneys should
never overlook the importance of filing a written notice of the change of
address with copies furnished all adverse parties. It is not in all petitions
that this Court will permit compelling equitable grounds to overcome the
effects of a less than strict observance of the Rules.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 75011 maintains as another issue that a petition
for certiorari in the appellate court was not the proper remedy for the
private respondent. The petitioner contends that upon denial of the
respondent's motion or reconsideration by the lower court, the latter
should have attempted to perfect an appeal or it should have filed a
motion for relief of judgment under Section 2, Rule 38 of the Revised Rules
of Court.
The trial court's April 19, 1983 Order shows that the motions to set aside
the order for the issuance of the writ of execution as well as the motions
for reconsideration of the adverse decisions were denied on the ground
that the lower court no longer had jurisdiction to entertain the subject
motions for having become final and executory. In effect, the order
foreclosed any other possible relief from the trial court's order of execution
which, according to private respondent, had already been partially
executed. Under these circumstances, a petition for certiorari is the proper
remedy.
On the other hand, the petitioners in G.R. No. 66741 also contend that the
complaint of Teoville for quieting of title in Civil Case No. 6966-P is barred
by Section 38 of the Land Registration Act (Act No. 496) since it seeks to
nullify and void the decrees of registration and the titles issued thereunder
pursuant to a valid and final decision of Land Registration Case No. Q-335.
In the case of Gitgano v. Borromeo (133 SCRA 437), we interpreted the law
as follows:
The basic rule, therefore, is after the lapse of one (1)
year, a decree of registration is no longer open to
review or attack, even though the issuance thereof
may have been attended by fraud. (Section 55, Act
496; Arnamento v. Guerrero, 96 SCRA 178; Republic v.
Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648). After one year from
its entry, a decree of registration becomes
indefeasible and conclusive. (Philippine National Bank
v. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207). This does not
mean, however, that the aggrieved party is without
remedy at law. If the property has not yet passed to
an innocent purchaser for value, an action for
reconveyance is still available."
The sole remedy of the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's
name is, after one year from the date of the decree, is
not to set aside the decree, butrespecting the decree
as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of
justice for reconveyance or if the property has passed
unto the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for
damages. Such a doctrine goes back to the 1919
landmark decision of Cabanos v. Register of Deeds of
Laguna, 40 Phil. 620' (Quiano v. Court of Appeals, 39
SCRA 221).
Teoville, plaintiff in Civil Case No. 6966-P alleged that the subject parcel of
land covered by petitioners' (defendants in Civil Case No. 6966-P)
certificates of title are also covered by certificates of titles in its name.
With the admission that both parties have certificates of title over the
properties, the issue in this case is, as between the parties, who has a
better right over the same parcels of land.
The private respondent was correct in filing a complaint for quieting of title
pursuant to Article 476 of the Civil Code. This is an ordinary Civil remedy
sanctioned by Section 38 of the Land Registration Act, The one year
prescriptive clause of Section 38 is not applicable in cases of double
registration. (See Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 95 SCRA 380).
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 66741 is GRANTED. The questioned
decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition
in G.R. No. 75011 is DENIED for lack of merit. The orders dated February 3,
1984 and April 19, 1984 of the trial court and all proceedings pursuant to
its orders of execution are declared null and void. The period for the
petitioners in G.R. No. 66741 and for the private respondent in G.R. No.
75011 to perfect their respective appeals school ommence from the date
this decision becomes final and executory .
SO ORDERED.
4
 ELIAS GALLAR, plaintiff-appellee, aforementioned amount, this document shall be considered absolute and
vs. irrevocably consummated and in the meantime the vendee shall be the
HERMENEGILDA HUSAIN, ET AL., defendants. one to make use of the aforementioned land in accordance with the Ley
BONIFACIO HUSAIN, defendant-appellant. Hipotecaria.

D. E. Esmeralda for defendant-appellant. In truth whereof, I have signed this document at Cabatuan, 9th of January,
E. B. Treas for plaintiff-appellee. 1919.

REGALA, J.: (Sgd.) TEODORO HUSAIN

This is an appeal directly from the Court of First Instance. Signed in the presence of:

A hectare of rice land in Cabatuan, Iloilo, is the subject of this controversy. (sgd.) TOMAS JILOCA (sgd.) EUSEBIO JOCANO
On January 9, 1919, Teodoro Husain, the owner, sold this land to Serapio
Chichirita for P30, reserving for himself the right to repurchase it within six Teodoro Husain did not redeem the land, although shortly after the
years. The deed of sale, written in Ilongo dialect, is contained in a private execution of the deed of sale, that is, on January 28, 1919, the vendee
instrument, the English translation of which reads: a retro, Chichirita, transferred his right to Graciana Husain, sister of the
vendor aretro, in what purports to be a resale of the land. The following
I, Teodoro Husain, single, of legal age, native and resident of the annotation appears on the reverse side of the deed of pacto de retro sale:
Municipality of Cabatuan, Province of Iloilo, Philippine islands,
because of the amount of Thirty Pesos (P30.00), Philippine NOTA: The amount stated above, was received by me from
currency, that was paid to me by Serapio Chichirita, married to Graciana Husain and on my own voluntary will as redemption
Florentina Muyuela of legal age, native and resident of this (gawad) of the same land, and because of this, I am transferring
Municipality of Cabatuan, Province of Iloilo, Philippine Islands, my rights as stated above to Graciana Husain in the presence of
hereby declare that I am selling to the aforementioned vendee her husband Manuel Catalan, and in truth whereof I have signed
Serapio Chichirita, his heirs, and the heirs of the latter, my one at Cabatuan, 28 January 1919.
parcel of rice land at Barrio Salacay of this Municipality of
Cabatuan, and its descriptions are as follows:
Thumb marked
Serapio Chichirita
One parcel of rice land that has a seedling of one
89 cavan of palay, legal measure, bounded on the North,
(English translation)
land of Juan Alcayaga, on the East, land of Agapito
Republic of the Philippines Suero, on the South, land of Elias Gallar and on the
Graciana Husain subsequently transferred her rights to the land to
SUPREME COURT West, land of Juan Mina. The said land was inherited
appellee Elias Gallar in exchange for one cow. The transaction is recorded
Manila by me from my father who is now dead, Clemente
in a second note added on the reverse side of the deed of sale. The note
Husain.
reads.
EN BANC
I also declare that we have agreed that if the vendor shall have repaid to
OTRA NOTA:
G.R. No. L-20954 May 24, 1967 the vendee the aforementioned amount of P30.00 within six years from
this date, the vendee or his heirs shall execute a document of repurchase
in my favor, but if after the said term that he cannot return the

5
 The undersigned Graciana Husain, with the consent and
knowledge of her husband Manuel Catalan, has agreed with
Elias Gallar that all the rights that belongs to her, or she,
Graciana Husain, is transferring to the said Elias Gallar in
accordance with that stated in the original with the difference
that this transfer is definite because it is their agreement in
exchange of one head of cow described in the Certificate of
Large Cattle existing in the Office of the Municipal treasurer of
this town. And in truth whereof, Graciana Husain signed
hereunder together with her husband Manuel Catalan.
Cabatuan, April 2, 1919.
(sgd.) MANUEL CATALAN (sgd.) GRACIANA HUSAIN
(English translation)
Possession of the land, together with the owner's duplicate of the
certificate of title of Teodoro Husain, was delivered on the same occasion
to appellee who since then has been in possession of the land.
In an affidavit dated March 6, 1928, Chichirita confirmed the "redemption"
of the land by Graciana Husain. In another affidavit of the same date,
Graciana Husain for her part confirmed having subsequently sold the land
to the appellee.1wph1.t
In 1960, appellee asked the Cadastral Court for the issuance to him of a
transfer certificate of title but the court dismissed his petition for lack of
jurisdiction. (The court, however, granted appellee's request for the
amendment of the certificate of title by changing the surname of "Osaen"
to "Husain.") He, therefore, filed this suit in the Court of Instance of Iloilo
on October 10, 1960 to compel Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain, as
heirs of Teodoro Husain, to execute a deed of conveyance in his favor so
that he could get a transfer certificate of title. He also asked for damages.
In their answer, Hermenegilda and Bonifacio Husain denied the sale and
contended that the agreement between their father and Serapio Chichirita
was that of a mortgage to secure a loan of P30. They claimed that the
mortgage had been discharged on January 28, 1919 when Graciana
Husain paid Teodoro Husain's debt to Chichirita. Hermenegilda and
Bonifacio Husain likewise invoked prescription to bar appellee's action and
asked for damages for the value of palay which they claimed they failed to
receive on account of appellee's refusal to return possession of the land to
them.
The trial court found that after acquiring the land from Teodoro Husain,
Serapio Chichirita sold it to Graciana Husain who in turn sold it to the
appellee. Accordingly, it ordered the appellants to execute a deed of
conveyance of the land in favor of the appellee on the authority of our
ruling in Sapto v. Fabiana, G.R. No. L-11285, May 16, 1958.
From this judgment, Bonifacio Husain brought this appeal to this Court. He
contends that the land in question, which is identified as Lot No. 766 of the
Cadastral Survey of Cabatuan, Iloilo and covered by Original Certificate of
Title No. 4521 of the Register of Deeds of Iloilo, is not the same land which
Teodoro Husain sold to Serapio Chichirita on January 9,1919. According to
appellant he raised this question at the trial but the lower court passed it
up in its decision. The records on appeal do not disclose that appellant
made such a claim. About the only hint that he was questioning the
identity of the land sold by means of the deed of sale of January 9, 1919
was an objection to a question during the direct examination of the
appellee. Thus the following appears on pages 20-21 of the transcript of
notes taken on July 5, 1961;
Q According to this Exhibit C, you bought the lot to in Exhibit
A which is Lot 766 in question, was bought, by you for one cow.
Do you know how much the worth of your cow during that time?
ATTY. ESMERALDA [for defendants]
Objection, Your Honor. The question is premised on Lot 766 but
the document does not mention Lot 766.
xxx xxx xxx
COURT
So your objection is that it lacks basis.
ATTY. ESMERALDA
It lacks basis, your Honor.
Otherwise, the records do not show any allegation made much less
evidence presented, by appellant of the supposed difference in the
identity of the land sold in the deed of pacto de retro sale and the land
now in question. Indeed, the only defense put up by appellant was that
the pacto de retro sale was in reality a mortgage and that, at any rate,
appellee's action was barred by the statute of limitations. In so doing,
appellant joined issues with the appellee and he will not now be permitted
to bring up new matters on appeal as this would constitute changing of
theory so utterly unfair to the adverse party1 that the lower court
deliberately, perhaps, ignored the point. It may be added that an
admission that the land described in the deed of sale and Lot No. 766 are
one and the same is implicit in appellant's defense that the deed of sale
did not express the true intention of the parties.
Still it is argued that no action can be brought on the basis of the deed of
sale with a right of repurchase because the land in question was
redeemed a few days after it had been sold. While it is indeed true that
the first note written on the reverse side of the deed of sale speaks of the
"redemption" of the land, there is no evidence to show that the vendee,
Graciana Husain, was acting in behalf of her brother Teodoro Husain, in the
exercise the latter's right of redemption. Now, unlike a debt which a third
party may satisfy even against the debtor's will2 the right of repurchase
may be exercised only by the vendor in whom the right is recognized by
contract3 or by any person to whom the right may have been
transferred.4 Graciana Husain must, therefore, be deemed to have
acquired the land in her own right, subject only to Teodoro Husain's right
of redemption. As the new owner she had a perfect right to dispose of the
land as she in fact did when she exchanged it for a cattle with the
appellee.
6
Now, when Teodoro Husain failed to redeem the land within the stipulated
period, i.e., January 9, 1925, its ownership became consolidated in the
appellee. True the successive sales are in a private instrument, but they
are valid just the same.5 By the delivery of possession of the land on April
2, 1919 the sale was consummated and title was transferred to the
appellee. Indeed, this action is not for specific performance; all it seeks is
to quiet title,6 to remove the cloud cast on appellee's ownership as a result
of appellant's refusal to recognize the sale made by their predecessor.
And, as plaintiff-appellee is in possession of the land, the action is
imprescriptible.7Appellant's argument that the action has prescribed would
be correct if they were in possession as the action to quiet title would then
be an action for recovery of real property which must be brought within
the statutory period of limitation governing such actions. 8

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs against

appellant.

7
90
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 70191 October 29, 1987
RODOLFO L. CORONEL, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ELIAS
MERLAN, BRIGIDO MERLAN, JOSE MERLAN, TEODORICO
NOSTRATIS, SEVERO JECIEL SANTIAGO FERNAN and FORTUNATO
OCAMPO,respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate
Court, now the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision and order of
the then Court of First Instance of Cavite in Civil Case No. 651. The
dispositive portion of the trial court's decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of moral justice,
judgment is hereby rendered in favor of all the
defendants and intervenor; hereby DISMISSING the
complaint; however, the Court hereby orders instead
the immediate partition of the land, subject-matter on
this case, without prejudice to the plaintiff, and in
accordance with the express but undivided
apportionments corresponding to the original co-
ownership, and pursuant to Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-1444 (EXHIBIT 4-b) of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Cavite, as entered on May 19, 1960;
Hereby declaring null and void, Transfer Certificate of
Title No, T-75543 of the same registry.
Without pronouncements as to costs. (At p. 71, Record
on Appeal)
The dispositive portion of the questioned order of the trial court reads.
WHEREFORE, under our present alternatives, as
prayed for by defendants and Intervenor, through
Lawyer Eleuterio A. Beltran, in their present incident
recorded on January 10, 1980; the Decision subject
matter hereof is amended in the following
significance:
Plaintiff Rodolfo Coronel is further ordered to submit a
complete Inventory and Accounting of all the harvests
of palay produced from the parcel of land (Lot 1950-A)
subject matter of the present litigation, and to deliver
the corresponding shares to the defendants and
intervenors correlated with all the harvests of palay
done by the plaintiffs; considering the unrebutted
finality of the testimony of defendant Brigido Merian
in congruence with his supplication for the Inventory
and Accounting of all the palay gathered by plaintiff
Radolfo Coronel who is likewise ordered, finally, to pay
Iawyer Eleuterio Beltran as counsel for defendants
and intervenors, Four Thousand (P400000) Pesos for
his professional services.
Naic, Cavite, February 13, 1980. (pp. 88-89, Record on
Appeal).
Petitioner Rodolfo Coronel filed a complaint for recovery of possession of a
parcel of land registered under his name (Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
75543 in the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Cavite) and more
particularly described as follows:
A parcel of land (lot 1950-A of the subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-104544 being a portion of Lot 1950, Naic,
Estate, LRC Rec. No. 8340), situated in the
Municipality of Naic, Province of Cavite, Island of
Luzon. Bounded on the NE., pts. 12 to 14 by Irrigation
Ditch; on the SE and SW pts. 14 to 15 and 15 to 1 by
Lot 1950-D of the subdivision plan; on the SW pts. 1
to 2 by lot 2304, and pts. 2 to 11 by Lot 1951, both of
Naic, Estate; and on the NW pts. 11 to 12 by Road. ... ;
containing an area of TWELVE THOUSAND ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE (12,189) SQUARE METERS,
more or less. ... (p. 10, Record on Appeal)
The complaint docketed as Civil Case No. 651 was filed against the private
respondents Elias Merlan, Brigido Merlan, Jose Merlan, Teodorico
Nostrates, Severo Jeciel Santiago Fernan and Fortunato Ocampo before the
then Court of First Instance of Cavite.
Coronel alleged in his complaint that at the time he purchased the subject
parcel of land, the defendants (private respondents herein) were already
occupying a portion thereof as "tenants at will" and that despite demands
to vacate the premises, the defendants failed and refused to move out
from the land.
In their Answer with Counterclaim and With Third-Party Complaint, the
defendants denied that Coronel was the owner of the whole parcel of land
and alleged that the lots occupied by them form part of a 1/3 undivided
share of brothers Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan which they inherited from
their deceased father Gabriel Merlan, one of the three heirs of Bernabela
Lontoc, the original owner of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate; that the
Merlan brothers together with their two brothers and a sister never sold
their undivided 1/3 share of the lot to anybody; that it was actually their
other co-heirs who sold their undivided portions and that the plaintiff's
claim of ownership of the whole parcel of land, if ever it has basis, is
fraudulent, void, and without effect; that the Merlans have always been in
open and peaceful possession of their undivided share of the lot
throughout the years from the first sale by their co-heirs of Lot No. 1950-A
in 1950; and that the other defendants were legitimate tenants. They
prayed that the plaintiff respect their rights over 1/3 (4,063 square
meters) of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate,
In their Third-Party Complaint, the defendants charged that the third-party
defendants, owners of the remaining portion of Lot No. 1950-A, defrauded
them when they sold the entire parcel.
Third-Party Defendants Marcelo Novelo, Paz Anuat Daniel Anuat and
Rosario Cailao the defendants' co-owners of Lot No. 1950-A denied that
8
they had something to do with the fraudulent acts or illegal machinations
which deprived the defendants of their share in the subject parcel of land,
and that what they sold was only their 2/3 undivided shares in said parcel.
They also filed a cross-claim against their co-defendant Mariano Manalo
whom they charged might have connived with others Including the
plaintiff to deprive the defendants and their co-heirs of their share in the
subject parcel of land.
As stated earlier, the lower court ruled in favor of the defendants and on
appeal, the lower court's decision was affirmed with the following
modification by the then Intermediate Appellate Court, to wit:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, there being no
reversible error in the main decision appealed from
dated December 7, 1979, and the Order of the Court
dated February 13, 1980, the same are hereby
AFFIRMED with the modification that after the word
"intervenor" in the main decision, the following shall
be inserted:
l) Declaring them as the absolute owners of the
remaining 1 1/3 of the 2/8 portion pertaining to the
late Bernabela Lontoc, nameIy, Lot 1950-A of the Naic
Estate pursuant to Art. 845 of the New Civil Code. (At
p. 29.)
The petitioner states that the appellate court erred as follows:
I ng sumusunod:
THAT THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT HAS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THAT THE
CLAIM OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS TO THE LAND IN
QUESTION HAS BEEN BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATION OR BY ESTOPPEL BY LACHES.
II
THAT THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT HAS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING PETITIONER
AS A PURCHASER IN GOOD FAITH AND FOR VALUABLE
CONSIDERATION OF THE LAND IN QUESTION.
III
THAT THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT HAS ERRED IN DECLARING AS NULL AND VOID
TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO. T-75543 OF THE
REGISTRY OF DEEDS OF CAVITE WHICH IS ALREADY
PACEL IN THE NAME OF PETITIONER. (at pp.1-2 Brief
for the Petitioners)
The records show that the 12,189 square meter lot was part of a 48,755
square meter lot covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3116 (RT-
5010) of the Naic Estate located at Muzon, Naic, Cavite in the names of
the spouses Valentin Gutierrez and Eligia Mangahas with a calculated
portion of 2/8; spouses Jose Perea and Celestia Naces with a calculated
portion of 3/8; Josefa Nazareno with a calculated portion of 1/8 and
Bernabela Lontoc with a calculated portion of 2/8. In dispute in the instant
case is the 2/8 share of Bernabela Lontoc which is equivalent to 12,189
square meters.
When Lontoc died in 1945, she was survived by three sets of heirs: 1)
Bernardino Merlan, a grandson by her son Enrique Merlan who died in
1918; 2) Jose Merlan and Brigido Merlan, defendants in the case below and
private respondents herein, Graciano Merlan, Agapito Merlan and Corazon
Merlan, children of her son Gabriel who died in 1937; and 3) Daniel Anuat
and Paz Anuat children of her daughter Francisca Merlan.
In 1950, Bernardino Merlan, Daniel Anuat and Paz Anuat sold their 2/3
undivided portion of the lot to spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela
Nobelo.
In 1960, Transfer Certificate of Title No. (T-3116) RT-5010 was cancelled by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1444 but carried the same afore-specified
registered co-owners with an annotation carried from the former Transfer
Certificate of Title, to wit:
"Entry No. 4953-SALE in favor of IGNACIO MANALO,
married to Marcela Nobelo covering the rights,
interest and participation of Bernardino Merlan,
married to Rosario Cailao DANIEL ANUAT married to
Dionisia Loyola, and PAZ ANUAT widow, on the share
of BERNABELA LONTOC, consisting of twenty 20
gantas of seedling, on the land described in this
Certificate of for the sum of THREE THOUSAND PESOS
(P3,000.00) by virtue of the deed of sale, executed
before the Notary Public for the City of Cavite Mr.
Primo D. Anuat (Doc. No. 652; page No. 77; Book No.
VII Series of 1950) on file in this Registry.
Date of Instrument March 11, 1950.
Date of Inscription March 13, 1950 at 2:35 p.m. (At
pp. 23, Court of Appeals Decision; pp. 18-19, Rollo)
In 1968, Lot No. 1950 of the Naic Estate was subdivided according to a
Sketch Plan (Exh. A). The sketch plan was approved by the Commission on
Land Registration on August 15, 1969. Bernabela Lontoc's 2/8 portion of
Lot No. 1950 became Lot No. 1950-A with an area of 12,189 square
meters.
Sometime in 1970, Ignacio Manalo sold his interest in Lot 1950-A to
Mariano Manalo. The pertinent portions of the deed of sale executed by
spouses Ignacio Manalo and Marcela Nobelo in favor of spouses Mariano
Manalo and Jorga Manalo states:
Ang pagkamayari namin ng bahaging binabanggit sa
itaas nito ay natatalikod ng titulo big. T-3116 na gaya
(Entry No. 4953-SALE In favor of IGNACIO MANALO
married to MARCELA NOVELO covering the rights,
interests and participations of BERNADINO MERLAN
married to ROSARIO CAILAO DANIEL ANUAT 'married
to DIONISIA LOYOLA, and PAZ ANUAT widow, on the
share of BERNABELA LONTOC, consisting of twenty
(20) gantas of seedling, on the land described in this
certificate of title of the sum of THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (P3,000.00), by virtue of the deed of sale
executed before the Notary Public for the City and
Prov. of Cavite Mr. Primo D. Anuat (Doc. No. 652; Page
9
 No. 77; Book No. VII, Series of 1950) on file in this
Registry. Date of instrument-March 13, 1950-at 2:35
p.m. (sgd) ESCOLASTICO CUEVAS, Register of Deeds.
Na alang-alang sa halagang ISANG LIBONG P1.000.00
PISO salaping (blurred), na sa amin ay ibinayad ni G.
MARIANO MANALO kasal kay JORGA MANALO may
sapat na gulang, Filipino at ang tirahan at pahatirang
sulat ay (blurred) Cavite, ay aming ipinagbili ng
tuluyan (Venta Real y Absoluta) ang nabanggit na
DALAWANG PUNG (20) salop na binhi, bahagi ng Lote
blg. 1950 (blurred) tiyak sa lote na unahan nito sa
naturang G. Mariano Manalo, sa kanyang tagamana o
kahaliti sa matuwid magpakailan man. Dito'y
sinasaysay rin namin ang nasabing lupang tubigan ay
walang sinasagutang pagkakautang kanino mang tao.
(pp. 25-26, Rollo)
The deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Deeds in Cavite.
Thereafter, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1444 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41175 was issued for Lot No. 1950-A of
the Naic Estate in the name of Mariano Manalo married to Jorga Lagos of
Naic, Cavite. The certificate of title issued in the name of spouses Mariano
Manalo and Jorga Lagos covered the whole Lot No. 1950-A without any
mention of the 1/3 share of the private respondents in the parcel of land
which was not sold to them.
Relying on the transfer certificate of title of the spouses Mariano Manalo
and Jorga Lagos and the Sketch Plan (Exhibit "A"), petitioner Rodolfo
Coronel then bought Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate from the former for
the consideration of P27,000.00 as per Doc. No. 341; Page No. 70; Book
No. V Series of 1974 in the Notarial Register of Notary Public Nonilo A.
Quitangon of the City of Manila. The deed of sale was registered on
December 19, 1974 causing the cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-41175 and the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75543 in
the name of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel.
Considering these facts, it is evident that the private respondents never
sold their 1/3 share over Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate; that what their
co-owners sold to Ignacio Manalo was their 2/3 share of the same lot; and
that Ignacio Manalo sold only the 2/3 share to third-party defendant
Mariano Manalo, the predecessor-in-interest of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel.
Consequently, there was a mistake when Transfer Certificate of Title No.
41175 was issued to Mariano Manalo covering the whole area of Lot No.
1950-A. Unfortunately, Mariano Manalo who was included as third-party
defendant as well as the subject of a cross- claim filed by the other third-
party defendants, and who could have shed light on this controversy was
at the time residing abroad and was not served with the third-party
complaint.
Moreover, private respondents Brigido Merlan and Jose Merlan were in
open, peaceful and adverse possession of their 1/3 share over the lot even
after 1950 when the first sale of the lot took place. The first time they
knew about Coronel's claim over the whole lot was when they were served
a copy of his complaint in 1975.
Under these circumstances, the first assignment of error is not well taken.
The petitioner contends that the claim of the private respondents over
their 1/3 undivided portion of Lot No. 1950-A 25 years after the
registration of the deed of sale in favor of Ignacio Manalo in 1950 and
more than five (5) years after the registration of the deed of sale in favor
of Mariano Manalo is barred by prescription or laches. According to him,
there was undue delay on the part of the private respondents to claim
their 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic Estate and that the action
for annulment should have been brought within four (4) years (Art. 1391,
New Civil Code) counted from the date of the registration of the
instrument.
The counterclaim of the private respondents which was in effect a
reconveyance to them of their 1/3 undivided share over lot No. 1950-A has
not prescribed. As lawful possessors and owners of the lot in question their
cause of action falls within the settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet
title to property-in one's possession is imprescriptible, Their undisturbed
possession over a period of more than 25 years gave them a continuing
right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the
adverse claim of a third party and the effect of his own title. If at all, the
private respondents' right, to quiet title, to seek reconveyance and to
annul Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-75543 accrued only in 1975 when
they were made aware of a claim adverse to their own. It was only at that
time that, the statutory period of prescription may be said to have
commenced to run against them. (Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683,
Faja v. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441; Caragay-Layno v. Court of Appeals,
133 SCRA 718).
In the same manner, there is no bar based on laches to assert their right
over 1/3 of the disputed property. "Laches has been defined as the failure
or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been done earlier;
it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time,
warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it." (Tejido v. Zamacoma, 138 SCRA 78
citing Tijam et al. v. Sibong-hanoy et al., 23 SCRA 29, Sotto v Teves, S6
SCRA 154) The facts of the case show that the private respondents have
always been in peaceful possession of the 1/3 portion of the subject lot,
exercising ownership thereto for more than 25 years disrupted only in
1975 when the petitioner tried to remove them by virtue of his torrens title
covering the entire Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate. It was only at this point
that private respondents knew about the supposed sale of their 1/3
portion of Lot 1950-A of the Naic Estate and they immediately resisted.
The petitioner, however, insists that he is a purchaser in good faith. Thus,
he argues that Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-41175 in the name of his
successor-in-interest Mariano Manalo was very clear to the effect that
there is no lien or encumbrance stated therein which could have been
seen by his parents who represented him in the sale as he was then in the
United States and by the lawyer contracted by him to execute or prepare
the corresponding deed of sale.
This notwithstanding, we cannot close our eyes to the fact that neither the
private respondents nor their co-owners of the subject parcel of land sold
the former's share of the lot. Furthermore, even Ignacio Manalo to whom
the third-party defendants sold their share resold only the 2/3 shares to
Mariano Manalo, the successor-in-interest of the petitioner. Whether or not
there was fraud or just a mistake or oversight of an employee of the
Register of Deeds of Cavite is not clear from the records. The point is that
the 1/3 undivided portion of the private respondents over Lot No. 1950-A
was mistakenly included in the transfer certificate of title of Mariano
Manalo.
We apply equitable considerations:
10
 Nor does the mere fact that respondent-appellee 769, 773, citing Legarda and Prieto v. Saleeby, 31
Marcelo Coral could show a certificate of Torrens Title Phil., 590; see also Caragay-Layno v. Court of
in his favor conclude the matter, the question of fraud Appeals, supra).
having been seasonably raised and the remedy of
reconveyance sought. Only recently, in Philippine We find no reversible error on the part of the lower courts in recognizing
Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Villalva (L-28194, the ownership of the private respondents over 1/3 of Lot No. 1950-A of the
November 24, 1972, 48 SCRA 31) this Court had Naic Estate. The petitioner is bound to recognize the lien in favor of the
occasion to state: There is, however, a countervailing private respondents which was mistakenly excluded and therefore not
doctrine, certainly not of lesser weight, that mitigates inscribed in the torrens title of the land of his predecessors-in-interest.
the harshness of the iron-clad application of the
principle attaching full faith and credit to a Torrens
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The questioned
certificate. It is inspired by the highest concept of
decision is AFFIRMED but with a modification to the effect that the
what is fair and what is equitable. It would be a sad
statement "Hereby declaring null and void, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
day for the law if it were to be oblivious to the
T-75543 of the same registry" is deleted. Instead, the Registrar of Deeds of
demands justice The acceptance accorded the Torrens
Cavite is ordered to segregate the 1/3 portion of Lot No. 1950-A of the Naic
system of registration would certainly be impaired if it
Estate (4,063 square meters) from the entire portion embraced in Transfer
could be utilized to perpetrate fraud and chicanery. If
Certificate of Title No. T-75543 and issue a new certificate of title in favor
it were thus, then no stigma would attach to a claim
of the heirs of Gabriel Merlan over the disputed one-third portion and
based solely on a narrow and literal reading of a
another new certificate of title over the remaining two-thirds portion of the
statutory prescription, devoid of any shadow of moral
land in favor of petitioner Rodolfo Coronel after cancelling Transfer
right. That is not the juridical norm as recognized by
Certificate of Title No. T-75543. The questioned order is also AFFIRMED. No
this Court. Deceit is not to be countenanced; duplicity
costs.
is not to be rewarded. Witness the favor with which
jurisprudence has looked on the action for
reconveyance as well as the recognition of the
constructive trust. There is thus the stress of
rectitude. (Ibid, p. 39). (Monticenes v. Court of
Appeals, 53 SC RA 14, 21; Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, we ruled in an earlier case that:

xxx xxx xxx

... The simple possession of a certificate of title, under

the Torrens System, does not necessarily make the
possessor a true owner of all the property described
therein. If a person obtains a title, under the Torrens
system, which includes by mistake or oversight land
which cannot be registered under the Torrens
systems, he does not, by virtue of said certificate
alone, become the owner of the lands illegally
included. (Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo, 49 Phil.
11
91
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-52064 December 26, 1984
JULIANA CARAGAY-LAYNO, Assisted by Her Husband, BENITO
LAYNO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and SALVADOR ESTRADA as
Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased, MARIANO DE
VERA, respondents.
Pedro Peralta for petitioner.
Andres T. Gutierrez for private respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
Respondent Appellate Court, then the Court of Appeal, affirmed in toto the
judgment of the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, at
Dagupan adjudging private respondent entitled to recover possession of a
parcel of land and ordering petitioners, as defendants below, to vacate the
premises. Petitioners, as paupers, now seek a reversal of that judgment.
It was established by a relocation survey that the Disputed Portion is a
3,732 square-meter-area of a bigger parcel of sugar and coconut land (Lot
No. 1, Psu-24206 [Case No. 44, GLRO Rec. No. 117]), with a total area of
8,752 square meters, situated at Calasiao, Pangasinan. The entire parcel is
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 63, and includes the adjoining
Lots 2 and 3, issued on 11 September 1947 in the name of Mariano M. DE
VERA, who died in 1951 without issue. His intestate estate was
administered first by his widow and later by her nephew, respondent
Salvador Estrada.
Petitioner, JULIANA Caragay, and the decedent, Mariano DE VERA, were
first cousins, "both orphans, who lived together under one roof in the care
of a common aunt."
As Administratrix, DE VERA's widow filed in Special Proceedings No. 4058
of the former Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch III, an Inventory
of all properties of the deceased, which included "a parcel of land in the
poblacion of Calasiao, Pangasinan, containing an area of 5,417 square
meters, more or less, and covered by Tax Declaration No. 12664."
Because of the discrepancy in area mentioned in the Inventory as 5,147
square meters (as filed by the widow), and that in the title as 8,752 square
meters, ESTRADA repaired to the Disputed Property and found that the
northwestern portion, subsequently surveyed to be 3,732 square meters,
was occupied by petitioner-spouses Juliana Caragay Layno and Benito
Layno. ESTRADA demanded that they vacate the Disputed Portion since it
was titled in the name of the deceased DE VERA, but petitioners refused
claiming that the land belonged to them and, before them, to JULIANA's
father Juan Caragay.
ESTRADA then instituted suit against JULIANA for the recovery of the
Disputed Portion (Civil Case No. D-2007), which she resisted, mainly on the
ground that the Disputed Portion had been fraudulently or mistakenly
included in OCT No. 63, so that an implied or constructive trust existed in
her favor. She then counterclaimed for reconveyance of property in the
sense that title be issued in her favor.
After hearing, the Trial Court rendered judgment ordering JULIANA to
vacate the Disputed Portion.
On appeal respondent Appellate Court affirmed the Decision in toto.
Before us, JULIANA takes issue with the following finding of respondent
Court:
Although Section 102 of Act 496 allows a Petition to
compel a Trustee to reconvey a registered land to
the cestui que trust (Severino vs. Severino, 44 Phil
343; Escobar vs. Locsin, 74 PhiL 86) this remedy is no
longer available to Juliana Caragay. Mariano de Vera's
land, Lot 1, Psu-24206, was registered on September
11, 1947 (Exhibit"C") and it was only on March 28,
1967 when the defendants filed their original answer
that Caragay sought the reconveyance to her of the
3,732 square meters. Thus, her claim for
reconveyance based on implied or constructive trust
has prescribed after 10 years (Banaga vs. Soler, L-
15717, June 30,1961; J.M. Tuason & Co. vs.
Magdangal, L-15539, Jan. 30, 1962; Alzona vs.
Capunitan, 4 SCRA 450). In other words, Mariano de
Vera's Original Certificate of Title No. 63 (Exhibit "C")
has become indefeasible. 1
We are constrained to reverse.
The evidence discloses that the Disputed Portion was originally possessed
openly, continuously and uninterruptedly in the concept of an owner by
Juan Caragay, the deceased father of JULIANA, and had been declared in
his name under Tax Declaration No. 28694 beginning with the year 1921
(Exhibit "2-C"), later revised by Tax Declaration No. 2298 in 1951 (Exhibit
"2-B"). Upon the demise of her father in 1914, JULIANA adjudicated the
property to herself as his sole heir in 1958 (Exhibit "4"), and declared it in
her name under Tax Declaration No. 22522 beginning with the year 1959
(Exhibit "2-A"), later cancelled by TD No. 3539 in 1966 (Exhibit "2"). Realty
taxes were also religiously paid from 1938 to 1972 (Exhibits "3-A" to "3-
H"). Tacking the previous possession of her father to her own, they had
been in actual open, continuous and uninterrupted possession in the
concept of owner for about forty five (45) years, until said possession was
disturbed in 1966 when ESTRADA informed JULIANA that the Disputed
Portion was registered in Mariano DE VERA's name.
To substantiate her claim of fraud in the inclusion of the Disputed Portion
in OCT No. 63, JULIANA, an unlettered woman, declared that during his
lifetime, DE VERA, her first cousin, and whom she regarded as a father as
he was much older, borrowed from her the Tax Declaration of her land
purportedly to be used as collateral for his loan and sugar quota
application; that relying on her cousin's assurances, she acceded to his
request and was made to sign some documents the contents of which she
did not even know because of her ignorance; that she discovered the
fraudulent inclusion of the Disputed Portion in OCT No. 63 only in 1966
when ESTRADA so informed her and sought to eject them.
12
Of significance is the fact, as disclosed by the evidence, that for twenty
(20) years from the date of registration of title in 1947 up to 1967 when
this suit for recovery of possession was instituted, neither the deceased
DE VERA up to the time of his death in 1951, nor his successors-in-
interest, had taken steps to possess or lay adverse claim to the Disputed
Portion. They may, therefore be said to be guilty of laches as would
effectively derail their cause of action. Administrator ESTRADA took
interest in recovering the said portion only when he noticed the
discrepancy in areas in the Inventory of Property and in the title.
Inasmuch as DE VERA had failed to assert any rights over the Disputed
Portion during his lifetime, nor did he nor his successors-in-interest
possess it for a single moment: but that, JULIANA had been in actual,
continuous and open possession thereof to the exclusion of all and sundry,
the inescapable inference is, fraud having been unsubstantiated, that it
had been erroneously included in OCT No. 63. The mistake is confirmed by
the fact that deducting 3,732 sq. ms., the area of the Disputed Portion
from 8,752 sq. ms., the area of Lot 1 in OCT No. 63, the difference is 5,020
sq. ms., which closely approximates the area of 5,147 sq. ms., indicated in
the Inventory of Property of DE VERA. In fact, the widow by limiting the
area in said Inventory to only 5,147 sq. ms., in effect, recognized and
admitted that the Disputed Portion of 3,132 sq. ms., did not form part of
the decedent's estate.
The foregoing conclusion does not necessarily wreak havoc on the
indefeasibility of a Torrens title. For, mere possession of a certificate of
title under the Torrens System is not conclusive as to the holder's true
ownership of all the property described therein for he does not by virtue of
said certificate alone become the owner of the land illegally included. 2
A forming part of Lot No. 1, Psu-24206, Case No. 44, GLRO Rec. No. 117,
Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to persons who
have never asserted any right of ownership over it.
... Obviously then, the inclusion of said area in the
title of Lot No. 8151 is void and of no effect for a land
registration Court has no jurisdiction to decree a lot to
persons who have put no claim in it and who have
never asserted any right of ownership over it. The
Land Registration Act as well as the Cadastral Act
protects only the holders of a title in good faith and
does not permit its provisions to be used as a shield
for the commission of fraud, or that one should enrich
himself at the expense of another. 3
JULIANA, whose property had been wrongfully registered in the name of possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner
another, but which had not yet passed into the hands of third parties, can thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or
properly seek its reconveyance. his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate
his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
The remedy of the landowner whose property has undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's to seek the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and
name is, after one year from the date of the decree, determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
not to set aside the decree, but, respecting the decree party and its effect on his own title, which right can be
as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, to claimed only by one who is in possession. No better
bring an ordinary action in the ordinary court of situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to
justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed apply this rule on equity than that of herein
into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in
damages. 4 possession of the litigated property for no less than 30
years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that
the land she had been occupying and cultivating all
Prescription cannot be invoked against JULIANA for the reason that as
these years, was titled in the name of a third person.
lawful possessor and owner of the Disputed Portion, her cause of action for
We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title
reconveyance which, in effect, seeks to quiet title to the property, falls
to the property, to seek its reconveyance and annul
within settled jurisprudence that an action to quiet title to property in
any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from
one's possession is imprescriptible. 5
Her undisturbed possession over a
the time the one in possession was made aware of a
period of fifty two (52) years gave her a continuing right to seek the aid of
claim adverse to his own, and it is only then that the
a Court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third
statutory period of prescription commences to run
party and the effect on her own title. 6
against such possessor.
Besides, under the circumstances, JULIANA's right to quiet title, to seek
WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby REVERSED and SET
reconveyance, and to annul OCT. No. 63 accrued only in 1966 when she
ASIDE, and another one entered ordering private respondent Salvador
was made aware of a claim adverse to her own. It was only then that the
Estrada, as Administrator of the Estate of the Deceased, Mariano de Vera,
statutory period of prescription may be said to have commenced to run
to cause the segregation of the disputed portion of 3,732 square meters
against her, following the pronouncement in Faja vs. Court of Appeals,
supra, a case almost Identical to this one.
presently occupied by petitioner Juliana Caragay-Layno, and to reconvey
the same to said petitioner. After the segregation shall have been
... Inasmuch as it is alleged in paragraph 3 of Frial's
accomplished, the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan is hereby ordered to
complaint, that Felipa Faja has been in possession of
issue a new certificate of title covering said 3,732 sq. m. portion in favor of
the property since 1945 up to the present for a period
petitioner, and another crtificate of title in favor of the Estate of the
of 30 years, her cause of action for reconveyance,
deceased, Mariano de Vera covering the remaining portion of 5,0520
which in effect seeks to quiet her title to the property,
square meters. No costs.
falls within that rule. If at all, the period of prescription
began to run against Felipa Faja only from the time
SO ORDERED
she was served with copy of the complaint in 1975
giving her notice that the property she was occupying
was titled in the name of Indalecio Frial. There is
settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual
13
14
92 bounded on the N by Camilo Aviles; on the E by
Malawa River, on the S by Anastacio Aviles and on the
Republic of the Philippines W by Juana and Apolonio Joaquin, with an area of
SUPREME COURT 18,900 square meters and declared under Tax
Manila Declaration No. 31446. This property is the share of
their father, Eduardo Aviles and brother of the
THIRD DIVISION defendant, in the estate of their deceased parents,
Ireneo Aviles and Anastacia Salazar.
area(s) alloted to them was agreed and measured
before the execution of the agreement but he was not
present when the measurement was made. Defendant
agreed to have a smaller area because his brother
Eduardo asked him that he wanted a bigger share
because he has several children to support. The
portion in litigation however is part of the share given
to him in the agreement of partition. At present, he is
only occupying an area of 12,686 square meters

SINCE 1957, Eduardo Aviles was in actual possession which is smaller than his actual share of 14,470

G.R. No. 95748 November 21, 1996 of the afore-described property. In fact, the latter square meters. Tax Declarations Nos. 23575, 481 and

mortgaged the same with the Rural Bank and 379 covering his property from 1958 (Exhs. "7", "8"

Philippine National Bank branch in Lingayen. When and "9") show that the area of his property is 14,470
ANASTACIA VDA. DE AVILES, ET AL., petitioners,
the property was inspected by a bank representative, square meters. The riceland portion of his land is
vs.
Eduardo Aviles, in the presence of the boundary 13,290 square meters, the fishpond portion is 500
COURT OF APPEALS and CAMILO AVILES, respondents.
owners, namely, defendant Camilo Aviles, Anastacio square meters and the residential portion is 680

Aviles and Juana and Apolonio Joaquin(,) pointed to square meters, or a total of 14,470 square meters.

the inspector the existing earthen dikes as the That the topography of his land is not the same,

boundary limits of the property and nobody objected. hence, the height of his pilapils are likewise not the
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the real estate mortgage was foreclosed, the same.

property was sold at public auction but this was

Is the special civil action of Quieting of Title under Rule 64 the proper
redeemed by plaintiffs' mother and the land was In its decision dated December 29, 1987, the trial court disposed of the
remedy for settling a boundary dispute? Did the respondent
subsequently transferred and declared in her name. case thus: 5

Court 1
commit a reversible error when it did not declare the respective
rights of the parties over the disputed property in said action?
These are the key issues raised in this petition to review on certiorari the
Decision 2
of the respondent Court promulgated on September 28, 1990 in
CA-G.R. CV No. 18155, which affirmed the decision dated December 29,
1987 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 38, 3
Lingayen, Pangasinan,
dismissing a complaint for quieting of title.
The Facts
In an action for quieting of title commenced before the aforementioned
trial court, the following facts, "stripped of unnecessary verbiage", were
established by the respondent Court: 4
PLAINTIFFS aver that they are the actual possessors of
a parcel of land situated in Malawa, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, more particularly described as fishpond,
cogonal, unirrigated rice and residential land,
ON March 23, 1983, defendant Camilo Aviles asserted
a color of title over the northern portion of the
property with an area of approximately 1,200 square
meters by constructing a bamboo fence (thereon) and
moving the earthen dikes, thereby molesting and
disturbing the peaceful possession of the plaintiffs
over said portion.
UPON the other hand, defendant Camilo Aviles
admitted the agreement of partition (Exh. "1")
executed by him and his brothers, Anastacio and
Eduardo. In accordance therewith, the total area of
the property of their parents which they divided is
46,795 square meters and the area alloted (sic) to
Eduardo Aviles is 16,111 square meters more or less,
to Anastacio Aviles is 16,214 square meters more or
less, while the area alloted to defendant Camilo Aviles
is 14,470 square meters more or less. The respective
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered as follows:
1. Ordering the parties to employ the services of a
Land Surveyor of the Bureau of Lands, Region I, San
Fernando, La Union, to relocate and determine the
extent and the boundary limit of the land of the
defendant on its southern side in order that the
fourteen thousand four hundred seventy (14,470)
square meters which is the actual area given to the
defendant be determined;
2. Ordering the complaint dismissed for lack of basis
and merits;
15
 3. Ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendant the
sum of two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos as attorney's
fees and to further pay the costs of the proceedings;
4. All other claims are denied for lack of basis.
Dissatisfied with the trial court's decision, petitioners appealed to the
respondent appellate Court. In its now-assailed Decision, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in part the decision of the trial court, reasoning that a
special civil action for quieting of title is not the proper remedy for settling
a boundary dispute, and that petitioners should have instituted an
ejectment suit instead. The dispositive portion of the impugned Decision
reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision
dated December 29, 1987 dismissing the complaint is
hereby AFFIRMED but without necessarily agreeing
with the ration d'etre (sic) proferred by the Court a
quo. The portion thereof ordering the parties to
employ the service of a land surveyor to relocate and
determine the extent and boundary limit of the land
of the defendant on its southern portion in order that
the fourteen thousand four hundred seventy (14,470)
square meters which is the actual area given to the
defendant be determined is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Costs against plaintiffs-appellants.
The Issues
Disagreeing with the respondent Court, petitioners now raise the following
issues: 6
a. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct
when it opined that the . . . complaint for quieting of
title instituted by the petitioners against private
respondent before the court a quo is not the proper
remedy but rather, it should be a case for eejectment
(sic).
b. Whether or not the Hon. Court of Appeals is correct
in rendering a decision, now subject of the instant
petition, without fully determining the respective
rights of the herein parties.
Petitioners deem to be "without basis" the respondent Court's holding that
quieting of title is not the proper remedy in the case a quo. They assert
that private respondent is occupying the disputed lot because he claimed
it to be part of his share in the partitioned property of his parents, whereas
petitioners are claiming the said lot as part and parcel of the land allotted
to Eduardo Aviles, petitioners' predecessor-in-interest. They contend that
they have been occupying the aforesaid land as heirs of Eduardo Aviles in
"open, actual, continuous, peaceful, public and adversed (sic) (possession)
against the whole world." Further, they argue that, if indeed the disputed
lot belonged to private respondent, why then did it take him "almost 26
long years from June 27, 1957 or until March 27, 1983" to assert his
ownership; why did he not "assert his ownership" over the property when
Eduardo Aviles was still alive; and why did he not take any "action" when
the mortgage over the disputed property was foreclosed? 7
Private respondent corrects the petitioners' claim in regard to the date
when he had the bamboo fence constructed. He alleges that the
petitioners maliciously concocted the story that private respondent had
purportedly encroached some 1,200 meters on their property when, in
fact, "he was merely repairing the old bamboo fence existing where it had
always been since 1957." 8
The Court's Ruling
First Issue: Quieting of Title Not Proper Remedy
For Settling Boundary Dispute
We agree with respondent Court. The facts presented unmistakably
constitute a clear case of boundary dispute, which is not cognizable in a
special civil action to quiet title.
Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud
upon or doubt or uncertainty with respect to title to real property. 9
The Civil Code authorizes the said remedy in the following language:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding
which is apparently valid or effective but is, in truth
and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud
from being cast upon a title to real property or any
interest therein.
In fine, to avail of the remedy of quieting of title, a plaintiff must show that
there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owner's
title to or interest in real property. Thus, petitioners have wholly
misapprehended the import of the foregoing rule by claiming that
respondent Court erred in holding that there was "no . . . evidence of any
muniment of title, proceeding, written contract, . . .", and that there were,
as a matter of fact, two such contracts, viz., (i) the Agreement of Partition
executed by private respondent and his brothers (including the petitioners'
father and predecessor-in-interest), in which their respective shares in the
inherited property were agreed upon, and (ii) the Deed of Sale evidencing
the redemption by petitioner Anastacia Vda. de Aviles of the subject
property in a foreclosure sale. However, these documents in no way
constitute a cloud or cast a doubt upon the title of petitioners. Rather, the
uncertainty arises from the parties' failure to situate and fix the boundary
between their respective properties.
As correctly held by the respondent Court, "(i)n fact, both plaintiffs and
defendant admitted the existence of the agreement of partition dated June
8, 1957 and in accordance therewith, a fixed area was allotted (sic) to
them and that the only controversy is whether these lands were properly
measured. There is no adverse claim by the defendant "which is
apparently valid, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable" and which constitutes a cloud thereon.
Corollarily, and equally as clear, the construction of the bamboo fence
enclosing the disputed property and the moving of earthen dikes are not
the "clouds" or "doubts" which can be removed in an action for quieting of
title.
16
An action to quiet title or to remove cloud may not be brought for the
purpose of settling a boundary dispute. The precedent on this matter cited
by the respondent Court in its Decision is herewith reproduced in full: 10
In Ashurst v. McKenzie (1890) 92 Ala. 484, 9 So. 262,
where the complainants' predecessor in title and the
defendant had, during their occupancy, destroyed and
obliterated the boundary line between their adjoining
tracts of land, and there was now a dispute as to its
location, it was held that a bill did not lie to remove a
cloud on the complainants' title. The court said:
"There is no allegation or evidence of any muniment
of title, proceeding, written contract, or paper
showing any color of title in the defendant, which
could cast a shadow on the title of complainants to
any part of the land; there is no overlapping of
description in the muniments held by either. The land
of complainants and defendant join. The line which
separates them is in dispute and is to be determined
by evidence aliunde. Each admits that the other has
title up to his line wherever it may be, and the title
papers of neither fix its precise location. So that there
is no paper the existence of which clouds the title of
either party, and nothing could be delivered up and
canceled under the decree of the court undertaking to
remove a cloud.
Another similarly instructive precedent reported in the same
reference is also quoted below:
In Kilgannon v. Jenkinson (1883) 51 Mich. 240, 16 N.W.
390, the court, dismissing a bill to quiet title, said:
"The fundamental dispute is about the correct position
of the line between lots 3 and 7. The case is not one
where a complainant in possession of a specific piece
of land, and a defendant out of possession, but
claiming some right or title, are contending as to
which one has the better right to that same parcel;
but it is a case where the titles are not opposed, and
the basis and existence of all right and claim depend
simply upon where the original line runs. When that is
once settled, there can remain no semblance of claim
or cloud to be passed on, and the issue on that contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance," but to a
particular question is one regularly triable at law. . . 11
boundary dispute, and therefore not warranting the grant of declaratory
relief.
Second Issue: Should Partie's Rights Have Been Declared?
From another perspective, we hold that the trial court (and likewise the
Petitioners also chide the respondent Court (and the trial court) for not respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title, order the
declaring the respective rights of the parties with respect to the land in determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be
question, arguing that "when one is disturbed in any form in his rights of tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed
property over an immovable by the unfounded claims of others, he has property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the
the right to ask from the competent courts: . . . that their respective rights instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved
be determined . . . ". As support for their thesis, petitioners cite the constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners' interest or title in and to said
ancient case ofBautista vs. property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate in adversarial
Exconde. 12 proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered
and where evidence aliunde, other than the "instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding" itself, may be introduced. An action for
Rule 64 of the Rules of Court, dealing with actions for declaratory relief,
forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or
specifies in Section 1 thereof the grounds, conditions precedent or
for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may
requisites for bringing such petitions. 13
This Court has previously held that
be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute
may be fully threshed out.
Under this rule, only a person who is interested
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the instant petition
"under a deed, will, contract or other written
is hereby DENIED and the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs
instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute
against petitioners.
or ordinance, may bring an action to determine any
question of construction or validity arising under the
instrument or statute and for a declaration of his SO ORDERED.
rights or duties thereunder." This means that the
subject matter must refer to a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance,
to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not
mentioned therein is deemed excluded. This is under
the principle of expressio unius est exclussio
alterius. 14
93
Inasmuch as the enumeration of the causes, grounds or conditions Republic of the Philippines
precedent in the first paragraph of said Sec. 1 is exclusive, by parity of SUPREME COURT
rea-soning, it follows that similar remedies provided for in the second Manila
paragraph of the same section would also be marked with the same
exclusivity as to bar any other cause possibly clouding one's title as a SECOND DIVISION
ground for such petitions. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the action
to quiet title had been brought under Rule 64, the same would still not
G.R. No. 144773 May 16, 2005
have prospered, the subject matter thereof not referring to "a deed, will,
17
AZNAR BROTHERS REALTY COMPANY, petitioner,
vs.
LAURENCIO AYING, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE
OTHER HEIRS OF EMILIANO AYING, PAULINO AYING, IN HIS OWN
BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF SIMEON AYING,
AND WENCESLAO SUMALINOG, IN HIS OWN BEHALF AND IN
BEHALF OF THE OTHER HEIRS OF ROBERTA AYING, respondents.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari seeking the modification
of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated March 7, 2000 which
1
affirmed with modification the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Lapu-Lapu City, Branch 27 in Civil Case No. 2930-L; and the Resolution
dated August 2, 2000 denying petitioners motion for reconsideration of
the aforementioned decision.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
The disputed property is Lot No. 4399 with an area of 34,325 square
meters located at Dapdap, Lapu-Lapu City. Crisanta Maloloy-on petitioned
for the issuance of a cadastral decree in her favor over said parcel of land.
After her death in 1930, the Cadastral Court issued a Decision directing
the issuance of a decree in the name of Crisanta Maloloy-ons eight
children, namely: Juan, Celedonio, Emiliano, Francisco, Simeon, Bernabe,
Roberta and Fausta, all surnamed Aying. The certificate of title was,
however, lost during the war.
Subsequently, all the heirs of the Aying siblings executed an Extra-Judicial
Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 3, 1964,
conveying the subject parcel of land to herein petitioner Aznar Brothers
Realty Company. Said deed was registered with the Register of Deeds of
Lapu-Lapu City on March 6, 1964 under Act No. 3344 (the law governing
registration for unregistered land), and since then, petitioner had been
religiously paying real property taxes on said property.
In 1988, herein petitioner filed a Petition for Reconstitution of the Original
Title as the original title over the subject property had been lost during the
war. On April 12, 1988, the court granted said petition, thereby directing
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to issue a reconstituted title in the
name of the abovementioned Aying siblings. Thus, Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) No. RO-2856 was issued.
In 1991, petitioner, claiming to be the rightful owner of the subject
property, sent out notices to vacate, addressed to persons occupying the
property. Unheeded, petitioner then filed a complaint for ejectment
against the occupants before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Lapu-
Lapu City.
On February 1, 1994, the MTC ordered the occupants to vacate the
property. The case eventually reached this Court, docketed as G.R. No.
128102, entitled Aznar Brothers Realty Company vs. Court of Appeals,
Luis Aying, Demetrio Sida, Felomino Augusto, Federico Abing, and Romeo
Augusto. On March 7, 2000, a Decision was promulgated in favor of
2 it had been paying taxes thereon religiously; that it tolerated about 6
herein petitioner, declaring it as the rightful possessor of the parcel of land
in question.
Meanwhile, herein respondents, along with other persons claiming to be
descendants of the eight Aying siblings, all in all numbering around 220
persons, had filed a complaint for cancellation of the Extra-Judicial
Partition with Absolute Sale, recovery of ownership, injunction and
damages with the RTC of Lapu-Lapu City. The complaint was dismissed
twice without prejudice. Said complaint was re-filed on August 19, 1993,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2930-L.
In their amended complaint, herein respondents (plaintiffs before the RTC)
alleged that: they are co-owners of subject property, being descendants of
the registered owners thereof under OCT No. RO-2856; they had been in
actual, peaceful, physical, open, adverse, continuous and uninterrupted
possession in concept of owner of subject parcel of land since time
immemorial; their possession was disturbed only in the last quarter of
1991 when some of them received notices to vacate from petitioner and
several weeks thereafter, earthmoving equipment entered the disputed
land, bulldozing the same and destroying plants, trees and concrete
monuments ("mohon"); respondents discovered that such activities were
being undertaken by petitioner together with Sta. Lucia Realty and
Development, Inc.; petitioner claimed to be the owner of subject property
by virtue of an extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of absolute
sale executed in petitioners favor by the alleged heirs of Crisanta Maloloy-
on; the aforementioned extra-judicial partition of real estate with deed of
absolute sale is a fraud and is null and voidab initio because not all the co-
owners of subject property affixed their signature on said document and
some of the co-owners who supposedly signed said document had been
dead at the time of the execution thereof; petitioner entered subject land
in bad faith, knowing fully well that it did not have any right to the land
and used force, threat and intimidation against respondents; and they
suffered moral damages.3
Petitioner (defendant before the RTC) filed its Answer, denying that
respondents are the lawful owners of subject parcel of land by virtue of
their being descendants or heirs of the registered owners of subject
property. Instead, petitioner alleged that it had been in actual possession
of subject land as owner thereof by virtue of the extra-judicial partition of
real property and deed of absolute sale executed in its favor; that in fact,
persons to live on said land but said persons were eventually ejected by
court order. Petitioner then raised the affirmative defenses of failure to
state cause of action and prescription, as it took respondents 27 years, 10
months and 27 days to file the action to recover subject property, when an
action to recover property based on an implied trust should be instituted
within 4 years from discovery of the fraud.4
In the Pre-Trial Order dated January 30, 1995 of the RTC, the issues were
narrowed down to the following:
1. Whether or not the plaintiffs [herein respondents] are the
heirs of the registered owners of Lot No. 4399.
2. Whether or not plaintiffs are the owners of Lot No. 4399.
3. Whether or not the defendant Aznar [herein petitioner] is
estopped to make any claim on Lot No. 4399.
4. Whether or not the defendant Aznar is a builder in bad faith.
5. Whether or not the defendants are liable for damages and
attorneys fees in favor of the plaintiffs.
6. Whether or not the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with
Deed of Absolute Sale is valid and had, in effect, validly
conveyed to defendant Aznar Lot No. 4399.
18
 7. Whether or not the plaintiffs action has prescribed.5
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision dated July 4, 1997, ruling that
respondents evidence failed to prove that the extra-judicial partition with
deed of absolute sale was a totally simulated or fictitious contract and
concluded that said document is valid, thus, effectively conveying to
petitioner the property in question. It further held that respondents action
had prescribed in that the action is considered as one for reconveyance
based on implied or constructive trust, it prescribed in 10 years from the
registration of the deed on March 6, 1964; and if the action is considered
as one for annulment of contract on the ground of fraud, it should have
been filed within 4 years from discovery of the fraud. The trial court also
ruled that respondents failed to present any admissible proof of filiation,
hence, they were not able to prove that they are indeed heirs of the eight
Aying siblings who appear as the registered owners under OCT No. RO-
2856.
The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the
amended complaint on the ground of prescription, and declaring
the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale dated March 3, 1964 as valid and binding, adjudging that
Lot 4399 with an area of 34,325 square meters located at
Dapdap, Mactan, Lapu-Lapu City had been validly conveyed to
and in favor of Aznar Brothers Realty Company, and directing
the Register of Deeds of Lapu-Lapu City to register the above-
mentioned deed in accordance with law and to cancel Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-2856, and to issue a transfer
certificate of title in the name of Aznar Brothers Realty Company
upon payment of the necessary registration fees pursuant
thereto.
The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued in this case is hereby
ordered dissolved.
The Motion for Contempt filed by the plaintiffs against
defendants is dismissed for want of factual and legal basis.
Costs against the plaintiffs.
SO ORDERED.6
Herein respondents appealed the foregoing decision to the CA and on
March 7, 2000, said court promulgated its Decision, the dispositive portion
of which is reproduced hereunder:
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the contested Decision while
AFFIRMED is hereby MODIFIED. The heirs of Emiliano Aying,
Simeon Aying and Roberta Aying are hereby declared as the
lawful owners of the contested property but equivalent only to
3/8.
SO ORDERED.
In modifying the RTC judgment, the CA ratiocinated that "an action for
recovery of possession of registered land never prescribes in view of the
provision of Section 44, Act No. 496 (now Sec. 47, PD 1520), to the effect
that no title to registered land in derogation to that of a registered owner
shall be acquired by prescription." The CA further ruled that even if the
action is deemed to be based on implied trust, prescription did not begin
to run since there is no evidence that positive acts of repudiation were
made known to the heirs who did not participate in the execution of the
Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus,
striking down the RTCs ruling that the respondents complaint is
dismissible on the ground of prescription, the CA held instead that herein
respondents action had not prescribed but upheld the validity of the
Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale, except as
to the shares of the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta, who did not
participate in the execution of said document.
Herein petitioners motion for reconsideration of the CA decision was
denied per Resolution dated August 2, 2000.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari assailing the CA
decision on the following grounds:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT AN HEIR OF THE ORIGINAL REGISTERED OWNER MAY LOSE
HIS RIGHT TO RECOVER A TITLED PROPERTY BY REASON OF
LACHES;
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE
THAT THE ACT OF REGISTRATION OF THE DEED OF PARTITION
WITH SALE MAY BE CONSIDERED AN UNEQUIVOCAL
REPUDIATION OF THE TRUST GIVING RISE TO PRESCRIPTION;
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE
PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE 1104 OF THE CIVIL CODE TO THE
EFFECT THAT IN THE ABSENCE OF BAD FAITH OR FRAUD, THE
PARTITION WITH PRETERITION OF ANY COMPULSORY HEIR SHALL
NOT BE RESCINDED.7
In their Comment, respondents argue that this case is an action to declare
as null and void the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale, hence, under Article 1410 of the Civil Code, an action for
declaration of an inexistent contract does not prescribe. Respondents
further posit that the principle of laches should be applied against
petitioner and not against them, as they (respondents) had been in actual
possession of the subject property, while petitioner merely brought action
to eject them more than 29 years after the alleged execution of the Extra-
Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale. They also
refuted petitioners arguments regarding the application of the principles
of implied and constructive trusts in this case.
At the outset, it should be stressed that not all the plaintiffs who filed the
amended complaint before the trial court had been impleaded as
respondents in the present petition. The only parties impleaded are the
heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying, whom the CA adjudged as
owners of a 3/8 portion of the land in dispute for not having participated in
the execution of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale.
It is significant to note that herein petitioner does not question the CA
conclusion that respondents are heirs of the aforementioned three Aying
siblings. Hence, the trial court and appellate courts findings that the
19
Extra- Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was not
forged nor simulated and that the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta
Aying did not participate in the execution thereof, are now beyond cavil.
The issues raised by petitioner for the Courts resolution are (1) whether or
not respondents cause of action is imprescriptible; and (2) if their right to
bring action is indeed imprescriptible, may the principle of laches apply.
Respondents alleged in their amended complaint that not all the co-
owners of the land in question signed or executed the document
conveying ownership thereof to petitioner and made the conclusion that
said document is null and void. We agree with the ruling of the RTC and
the CA that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale is valid and binding only as to the heirs who participated in the
execution thereof, hence, the heirs of Emiliano, Simeon and Roberta Aying,
who undisputedly did not participate therein, cannot be bound by said
document.
However, the facts on record show that petitioner acquired the entire
parcel of land with the mistaken belief that all the heirs have executed the
subject document. Thus, the trial court is correct that the provision of law
applicable to this case is Article 1456 of the Civil Code which states:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the
property comes.
In Vda. De Esconde vs. Court of Appeals, the Court expounded thus:
8
Construing this provision of the Civil Code, in Philippine National
Bank v. Court of Appeals, the Court stated:
A deeper analysis of Article 1456 reveals that it is not
a trust in the technical sense for in a typical trust,
confidence is reposed in one person who is named a
trustee for the benefit of another who is called the
cestui que trust, respecting property which is held by
the trustee for the benefit of the cestui que trust. A
constructive trust, unlike an express trust, does not
emanate from, or generate a fiduciary relation. While
in an express trust, a beneficiary and a trustee are
linked by confidential or fiduciary relations, in a
constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any
fiduciary relation to speak of and the so-called trustee
neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the
property for the beneficiary.9
The concept of constructive trusts was further elucidated in the same
case, as follows:
. . . implied trusts are those which, without being expressed, are
deducible from the nature of the transaction as matters of intent
or which are superinduced on the transaction by operation of
law as matters of equity, independently of the particular
intention of the parties. In turn, implied trusts are either
resulting or constructive trusts. These two are differentiated
from each other as follows:
Resulting trusts are based on the equitable doctrine
that valuable consideration and not legal title
determines the equitable title or interest and are
presumed always to have been contemplated by the
parties. They arise from the nature of circumstances
of the consideration involved in a transaction whereby
one person thereby becomes invested with legal title
but is obligated in equity to hold his legal title for the
benefit of another. On the other hand, constructive
trusts are created by the construction of equity
in order to satisfy the demands of justice and
prevent unjust enrichment. They arise contrary
to intention against one who, by fraud, duress
or abuse of confidence, obtains or holds the
legal right to property which he ought not, in
equity and good conscience, to hold.10 (Emphasis
supplied)
Based on such concept of constructive trusts, the Court ruled in said case
that:
The rule that a trustee cannot acquire by prescription ownership
over property entrusted to him until and unless he repudiates
the trust, applies to express trusts and resulting implied trusts.
However, inconstructive implied trusts, prescription may
supervene even if the trustee does not repudiate the
relationship. Necessarily, repudiation of said trust is not a
condition precedent to the running of the prescriptive period.11
The next question is, what is the applicable prescriptive period?
In Amerol vs. Bagumbaran,12 the Court expounded on the prescriptive
period within which to bring an action for reconveyance of property based
on implied or constructive trust, to wit:
. . . under the present Civil Code, we find that just as an implied
or constructive trust is an offspring of the law (Art. 1456, Civil
Code), so is the corresponding obligation to reconvey the
property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In this
context, and vis--vis prescription, Article 1144 of the Civil Code
is applicable.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought
within ten years from the time the right of action
accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
xxx xxx xxx
An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust must perforce prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A
long line of decisions of this Court, and of very recent vintage at
that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that
an action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive
trust prescribes in ten years from the issuance of the Torrens
title over the property.13
It has also been ruled that the ten-year prescriptive period begins to run
from the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the
20
certificate of title over the property, but if the person claiming to be the
owner thereof is in actual possession of the property, the right to seek
reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does not
prescribe.14
In the present case, respondents Wenceslao Sumalinog, an heir of Roberta
Aying; Laurencio Aying, an heir of Emiliano Aying; and Paulino Aying, an
heir of Simeon Aying, all testified that they had never occupied or been in
possession of the land in dispute. 15
Hence, the prescriptive period of ten
years would apply to herein respondents.
The question then arises as to the date from which the ten-year period
should be reckoned, considering that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and
not under Act No. 496 (Land Registration Act), despite the fact the land in
dispute was already titled under Act No. 496 in the names of the Aying
siblings at the time the subject document was executed.
In Spouses Abrigo vs. De Vera,16 it was held that registration of
instruments must be done in the proper registry, in order to affect and
bind the land and, thus, operate as constructive notice to the
world. 17
Therein, the Court ruled:
x x x If the land is registered under the Land Registration Act
(and has therefore a Torrens Title), and it is sold but the
subsequent sale is registered not under the Land Registration
Act but under Act 3344, as amended, such sale is not
considered REGISTERED x x x .18
In this case, since the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of
Absolute Sale was registered under Act No. 3344 and not under Act No.
496, said document is deemed not registered. Accordingly, the ten-year
prescriptive period cannot be reckoned from March 6, 1964, the date of
registration of the subject document under Act No. 3344. The prescriptive
period only began to run from the time respondents had actual notice of
the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale.
The only evidence on record as to when such prescriptive period
commenced as to each of the respondents are Wenceslao Sumalinogs
(heir of Roberta Aying) testimony that about three years after 1964, they
already learned of the existence of the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real
Estate with Deed of Absolute Sale;19 and Laurencio Ayings (heir of
Emiliano Aying) admission that he found out about the sale of the land in
dispute a long time ago and can only estimate that it must be after martial
law.20 Paulino Aying (heir of Simeon Aying) gave no testimony whatsoever
as to when the children of Simeon Aying actually learned of the existence
of the document of sale. On the other hand, petitioner did not present any
other evidence to prove the date when respondents were notified of the
execution of the subject document.
In view of the lack of unambiguous evidence of when the heirs of Emiliano
Aying and Simeon Aying discovered the existence of the document of sale,
it must be determined which party had the burden of proof to establish
such fact.
The test for determining where the burden of proof lies is to ask which
party to an action or suit will fail if he offers no evidence competent to
show the facts averred as the basis for the relief he seeks to
obtain.21 Moreover, one alleging a fact that is denied has the burden of
proving it and unless the party asserting the affirmative of an issue
sustains the burden of proof of that issue by a preponderance of the
evidence, his cause will not succeed.22 Thus, the defendant bears the
burden of proof as to all affirmative defenses which he sets up in answer
to the plaintiffs claim or cause of action; he being the party who asserts
the truth of the matter he has alleged, the burden is upon him to establish
the facts on which that matter is predicated and if he fails to do so, the
plaintiff is entitled to a verdict or decision in his favor.23
In the case at bar, it was petitioner, as the defendant before the RTC,
which set up in its Answer the affirmative defense of prescription. It was,
therefore, incumbent upon petitioner to prove the date from which the
prescriptive period began to run. Evidence as to the date when the ten-
year prescriptive period began exists only as to the heirs of Roberta Aying,
as Wenceslao Sumalinog admitted that they learned of the existence of
the document of sale in the year 1967. As to the heirs of Emiliano Aying
and Simeon Aying, there is no clear evidence of the date when they
discovered the document conveying the subject land to petitioner.
Petitioner miserably failed to adduce proof of when the heirs of Emiliano
Aying and Simeon Aying were notified of the subject document. Hence,
with regard to said heirs, the Court may consider the admission in the
amended complaint that they learned of the conveyance of the disputed
land only in 1991 when petitioner sent notices to vacate to the occupants
of the subject land, as the date from which the ten-year prescriptive
period should be reckoned.
Respondents filed their Amended Complaint on December 6, 1993.24 Thus,
with regard to respondent heirs of Roberta Aying who had knowledge of
the conveyance as far back as 1967, their cause of action is already
barred by prescription when said amended complaint was filed as they
only had until 1977 within which to bring action. As to the respondent
heirs of Emiliano and Simeon Aying, they were able to initiate their action
for reconveyance of property based on implied or constructive trust well
within the ten-year prescriptive period reckoned from 1991 when they
were sent by petitioner a notice to vacate the subject property.
Evidently, laches cannot be applied against respondent heirs of Emiliano
and Simeon Aying, as they took action to protect their interest well within
the period accorded them by law.
With regard to petitioners argument that the provision of Article 1104 of
the Civil Code, stating that a partition made with preterition of any of the
compulsory heirs shall not be rescinded, should be applied, suffice it to
say that the Extra-Judicial Partition of Real Estate with Deed of Absolute
Sale is not being rescinded. In fact, its validity had been upheld but only
as to the parties who participated in the execution of the same. As
discussed above, what was conveyed to petitioner was ownership over the
shares of the heirs who executed the subject document. Thus, the law,
particularly, Article 1456 of the Civil Code, imposed the obligation upon
petitioner to act as a trustee for the benefit of respondent heirs of
Emiliano and Simeon Aying who, having brought their action within the
21
prescriptive period, are now entitled to the reconveyance of their share in follows: The amended complaint of the heirs of Roberta Aying is SO ORDERED.
the land in dispute. DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. However, the heirs of Emiliano
Aying and Simeon Aying, having instituted the action for reconveyance

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED and within the prescriptive period, are hereby DECLARED as the LAWFUL

the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 7, 2000 is MODIFIED, as OWNERS of a 2/8 portion of the parcel of land covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. RO-2856.

22