G.R. No. L-23096 April 27, 1972
It thus ignored the grave jurisdictional defects
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE
LEON, petitioners,
vs.
ROSARIO, ALFREDO, MARIANO, PACIFICO,
ONOFRE, TEOFILO, LOLOY and TRINIDAD, all
surnamed LORENZO, respondents.
G.R. No. L-23376 April 27, 1972
DIONISIO, PERFECTO, MARIA REBECCA,
ASUNCION, MAURO, and, LOURDES, all
surnamed LORENZO, petitioners,
vs.
MARTIN NERY and LEONCIA L. DE
LEON, respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
The point to be resolved in these two petitions for
the review of a decision of the respondent Court
of Appeals dated April 30, 1964 is the extent of
the rights acquired by the vendees, the spouses
Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon 1 arising from
a sale of a parcel of land, four (4) hectares more
or less, situated in Malaking Kahoy, Paraaque,
Rizal. The vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, was the
widow of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and
guardian of their children, Dionisio, Perfecto,
Maria Rebeeca, Asuncion, Mauro and
2
Lourdes, who thereafter challenged the validity
of such a transaction. It was their contention that
notwithstanding an order authorizing the sale
from the probate court on June 2, 1953, it could
be, impugned as they were not informed of such
a move. Moreover, the guardianship proceeding,
instituted on December 7, 1950, was heard
without the two elder children, Dionisio and
Perfecto Lorenzo being notified although they
were then more than 14 years of age. The heirs of
Silvestra Ferrer, who originally owned one-fourth
of the property in question, 3 intervened in such
action. In the lower court decision, they were
adjudged co-owners of the aforesaid one-fourth
portion of the property, the sale by the widow
being considered null and void insofar as they
were concerned. The rights of the Children of
Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la Isla to one-
half of the three-fourths appertaining to such
spouses were likewise accorded recognition.
The matter was then elevated to the respondent
Court of Appeals by the spouses Martin Nery and
Leoncia L. de Leon. Respondent Court in its
decision, now subject of this review, declared
valid the deed of sale executed by the mother
Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the spouses Nery
and de Leon as to the whole three-fourths,
without prejudice however to the children
demanding from their mother their participation
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
in the amount paid for the sale of such property.
that attended the challenged orders, starting with
the two elder children not being notified of the
petition for guardianship, even if they were
already above 14, as pointed out and stressed in
their petition for review. There is need then for
the exercise of the corrective power of this Court.
The original decision of the lower court has much
more to recommend it. Thereby, the rights of the
children are fully respected. With a restoration in
full of what was decided by the lower court, there
is a corresponding modification of the judgment
of the Court of Appeals. So we decide.
The antecedents of the case were set forth in the
appealed decision thus: "After hearing the
evidence, the lower court handed down decision
on June 24, 1961, finding that in the guardianship
proceedings, the court acquired no jurisdiction
over the persons of the minors who were not
notified of the petition, at least 2 of them being
over 14 years of age; that as the inventory
submitted by the guardian stated that the minors
had no real estate, the court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the real property of the minors
and could not have validly authorized its sale,
and the total absence of the requisite notice
necessarily rendered the order of sale, ... null and
void, and the defendant, Martin S. Nery, a lawyer,
could not be considered a purchaser in good faith
of the one-half portion of the land belonging to
the minors; ... that as Silvestra Ferrer, one of the
sisters of Florentino Ferrer, did not sign the deed
of sale ... upon her death in 1952, her 1/4 portion
of the land passed to her nearest relatives, the
third-party plaintiffs who are children of her
sister, Tomasa Ferrer, whose action had not
prescribed 'because from the death of Silvestra
Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party
complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six
yeaxs had elapsed'; and that the remaining 3/4 of
the land in question was the conjugal property of
Leoncio Lorenzo and his wife, Bienvenida de la
Isla, 1/2 of which, upon the demise of Leoncio,
corresponding to Bienvenida and the other half to
their children, the herein plaintiffs, in equal
shares." 4
Why respondent Court reached the decision it did
on appeal was explained this way: "It is
unquestioned that the property in question
formerly belonged to Florentino Ferrer and his
three sisters, Agueda, Tomasa and Silvestra, and
brother, Meliton. When, after the death of
Florentino, that is, on December 6, 1943, the
document denominated 'Bilihan Ganap Nang
Lupang-Bukid', ... was executed in favor of
Leoncio F. Lorenzo, one of the children of Agueda
and married to Bienvenida de la Isla, by said
Agueda, Tomasa and the children of Meliton,
Page 1
already deceased, said Leoncio merely acquired
the participation of said sellers, equivalent to 3/4
undivided part of said land, and became a co-
owner to that extent with Silvestra who did not
execute said document and, therefore,did not sell
her 1/4 undivided portion of the said land, which
1/4 undivided portion passed, upon her demise in
1952, to her nearest relatives who are the third-
party plaintiffs Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica,
Onofre, Teofilo, Loloy and Trinidad all surnamed
Lorenzo, the children of her deceased sister,
Tomasa. Bienvenida de la Isla, then the wife of
said Leoncio F. Lorenzo, knew of this purchase
made by her deceased husband, and she had no
right to mortgage the whole land which, for
taxation purposes was declared in her husband's
name, without the consent of aforenamed
successors-in-interest of Silvestra Ferrer, much
less sell the same afterwards to the defendant
spouses, Martin S. Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon,
even if authorized by the guardianship court, said
authority having been granted upon her
misrepresentation, contained in her petition of
May 26, 1953, that her minor children, the
plaintiff's herein, were the owners in common of
1/2 portion of the land in question, the other 1/2
pertaining to her. However, inasmuch as the said
minor plaintiffs were really the owners in common
of 1/2 of 3/4 undivided part of the said land, and
the other 1/2, to their mother and guardian, the
orders of the guardianship court authorizing the
guardian to sell the real property of the minors,
and approving the deed of sale executed in
accordance with said authority must be construed
as referring to the correct real property of the
said minors." 5
Hence its dispositive portion provided as follows:
"[Wherefore], the appealed judgment is hereby
modified by declaring that the deed of sale ...,
executed by Bienvenida de la Isla in favor of the
defendants valid only insofar as the undivided 3/4
portion of the land in question is concerned, as to
which portion, the defendants are declared
owners, and that the third-party plaintiffs,
Rosario, Alfredo, Mariano, Pacifica, Onofre, Teofilo,
Loloy and Trinidad, all surnamed Lorenzo, are
declared owners in common of the remaining
undivided 1/4 portion of the said land. In all other
respects, the appealed judgment is hereby
affirmed. No Costs." 6
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon
and the children of the deceased Leoncio Lorenzo
and the vendor, Bienvenida de la Isla, not being
satisfied with the above decision instituted the
petitions for review. As noted at the outset, the
failure of respondent Court of Appeals to give due
weight to the grave jurisdictional defect that
tainted the guardianship proceeding resulted in
its judgment suffering the corrosion of substantial
legal error. The rights of the children of Leoncio
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
Lorenzo as upheld by the lower court must, to
repeat, be maintained. In that sense, the decision
of the respondent Court of Appeals is subject to
modification. Insofar however as it affirmed the
lower court decision sustaining the claim of the
heirs of Silvestra Ferrer, 7 it is free from any
infirmity.
1. What is indisputable in the light of the
controlling legal doctrines is that it was the lower
court and not the respondent Court of Appeals
that yielded obeisance to the applicable
procedural rule. It is worded thus: "When a
petition for the appointment of a general
guardian is filed, the court shall fix a time and
place for hearing the same, and shall cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the
persons mentioned in the petition residing in the
province, including the minor if above 14 years of
age or the incompetent himself, and may direct
other general or special notice thereof to be
given." 8 The late Chief Justice Moran was quite
explicit as to its jurisdictional character. These are
his words: "Service of the notice upon the minor if
above 14 years of age or upon the incompetent,
is jurisdictional. Without such notice, the court
acquires no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian." 9
The case cited by him in support of such view
is Yangco v. Court of First Instance, 10 a 1915
decision. As was therein made clear: "There is no
need for interpretation or construction of the
word in the case before us. Its meaning is so clear
that interpretation and construction are
unnecessary. Our simple duty is to leave
untouched the meaning with which the English
language has endowed the word; and that is the
meaning which the ordinary reader would accord
to it on reading a sentence in which it was found.
Where language is plain, subtle refinements
which tinge words so as to give them the color of
a particular judicial theory are not only
unnecessary but decidedly harmful. That which
has caused so much confusion in the law, which
has made it so difficult for the public to
understand and know what the law is with
respect to a given matter, is in considerable
measure the unwarranted interference by judicial
tribunals with the English language as found in
statutes and contracts, cutting out words here
and inserting them there, making them fit
personal ideas of what the legislature ought to
have done or what parties should have agreed
upon, giving them meanings which they do not
ordinarily have, cutting, trimming, fitting,
changing and coloring until lawyers themselves
are unable to advise their clients as to the
meaning of a given statute or contract until it has
been submitted to some court for its
'interpretation and construction.' " 11
Page 2
Respondent Court of Appeals cannot therefore be
sustained in its assumption that the probate court
could have authorized the sale in question. The
jurisdictional infirmity was too patent to be
overcome. It was the lower court that acted
correctly. There is the more reason for deciding as
we do considering that the rights of minors are
involved. It is a distinctive feature of our law, one
that is quite commendable, that whenever their
welfare may be affected, its solicitude is made
manifest. The rights of young are not to be
ignored. Precisely their stage of immaturity calls
for every procedural principle being observed
before their interest in property to which they
have a claim could be adversely affected. It does
not matter that their guardian is their mother. As
far back as 1811, in Salunga v.
12
Evangelista, Chief Justice Arellano took note
that even a mother could have an "interest
opposed to that of her children." 13 That may not
have been the precise situation in this case, but
certainly from the facts as found by the Court of
Appeals, the Lorenzo children would have been
better protected if they were notified as is
required by law. If there is any occasion then why
there should be a strict insistence on rule having
the impress of a jurisdictional requirement, this is
it.
Moreover, where minors are involved, the State
acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual who
because of age or incapacity are in an
unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other parties.
Unable as they are to take due care of what
concerns them, they have the political
community to look after their welfare. This
obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be
recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an
opinion of the United States Supreme Court: "This
prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the
supreme power of every State, whether that
power is lodged in a royal person or in the
legislature, and has no affinity to those arbitrary
powers which are sometimes exerted by
irresponsible monarchs to the great detriment of
the people and the destruction of their liberties.
On the contrary, it is a most beneficent function,
and often necessary to be exercised in the
interest of humanity, and for the prevention of
injury to those who cannot protect
themselves." 14
2. Much less could the decision arrived at both by
the lower court and respondent Court of Appeals
as to the heirs of Silvestra Ferrer 15 being entitled
to
one-fourth of the property in question be set
aside. At no time had the deceased Leoncio
Lorenzo ever denied that he was holding such
property in the capacity of trustee for them. At
the time then that the settlement of his estate
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
was pending in the probate court, his widow,
Bienvenida de la Isla, the vendor, could not assert
any other right, except that traceable to her late
husband. Respondent Court of Appeals did note
that petitioner Martin S. Nery is a lawyer. As a
member of the bar, he could not have been
unaware that his vendor could not sell to him
more than she rightfully could dispose of. It is
much too late in the day to depart from the well-
settled principle as to a trustee being incapable
of acquiring interest opposed to that of his
principal. So it was announced in Severino v.
Severino. 16 That is in conformity with an
overmastering requirement of equity and
conscience. He should thus be held to the
strictest degree of acccountability. The law would
lay itself open to well-deserved criticism if a
principle other than the above were followed. The
Nery spouses ought to be aware that it would be
unthinkable to deny its authoritative force
whenever called for.
The spouses Martin Nery and Leoncia L. de Leon
would demonstrate its inapplicability by the two
principal errors assigned, namely, that Silvestra
Ferrer did sell her share of the property as far
back as 1943 and that even if it were not so, the
deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and thereafter his
widow, Bienvenida de la Isla did assert rights of
ownership therein. It is obvious that on the face
of such alleged errors that they are essentially
factual. We are thus precluded from inquiring into
their veracity as on such a matter what was
decided by respondent Court of Appeals is
binding on us. Moreover, as to the alleged
prescription, the issue was resolved satisfactorily
by the lower court in this fashion: "The action of
said children of Tomasa Ferrer has not as yet
prescribed because from the death of Silvestra
Ferrer in 1952 up to the filing of the third-party
complaint on September 3, 1958, barely six years
had elapsed. Moreover, there is no clear and
satisfactory evidence that Leoncio Lorenzo and
his successors-in-interest had been in continuous,
adverse, and open possession, and under claim of
ownership, of the one-fourth portion
corresponding to Silvestra Ferrer as to acquire
same by acquisitive
prescription." 17Consequently, it was appropriate
for the Court of Appeals to affirm the judgment of
the lower court insofar as it recognized the rights
of the heir of Silvestra Ferrer to one-fourth of the
land sold.
WHEREFORE, premises considered with the
modification as above set forth that Dionisio,
Perfecto, Maria Rebecca, Asuncion, Mauro and
Lourdes, all surnamed Lorenzo, children of the
deceased Leoncio Lorenzo and Bienvenida de la
Isla are adjudged co-owners to the extent of one-
half of the three-fourths of the property in
question, as was decreed by the lower court, the
Page 3
appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed. With costs against Martin Nery and
Leoncia L. de Leon.
G.R. No. 151243 April 30, 2008
LOLITA R. ALAMAYRI, petitioner,
vs.
ROMMEL, ELMER, ERWIN, ROILER and
AMANDA, all surnamed PABALE, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
filed by petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri (Alamayri)
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the
Decision,2 dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133; as well as the
Resolution,3 dated 19 December 2001 of the
same court denying reconsideration of its
aforementioned Decision. The Court of Appeals,
in its assailed Decision, upheld the validity of the
Deed of Absolute Sale, dated 20 February 1984,
executed by Nelly S. Nave (Nave) in favor of
siblings Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roiler and
Amanda, all surnamed Pabale (the Pabale
siblings) over a piece of land (subject property) in
Calamba, Laguna, covered by Transfer Certificate
of Title (TCT) No. T-3317 (27604); and, thus,
reversed and set aside the Decision,4 dated 2
December 1997, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Pasay City, Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-
84-C.5 The 2 December 1997 Decision of the RTC
declared null and void the two sales agreements
involving the subject property entered into by
Nave with different parties, namely, Sesinando M.
Fernando (Fernando) and the Pabale siblings; and
ordered the reconveyance of the subject property
to Alamayri, as Naves successor-in-interest.
There is no controversy as to the facts that gave
rise to the present Petition, determined by the
Court of Appeals to be as follows:
This is a Complaint for Specific Performance with
Damages filed by Sesinando M. Fernando,
representing S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation
[Fernando] on February 6, 1984 before the
Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna presided
over by Judge Salvador P. de Guzman, Jr.,
docketed as Civil Case No. 675-84-C against Nelly
S. Nave [Nave], owner of a parcel of land located
in Calamba, Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317
(27604). [Fernando] alleged that on January 3,
1984, a handwritten "Kasunduan Sa Pagbibilihan"
(Contract to Sell) was entered into by and
between him and [Nave] involving said parcel of
land. However, [Nave] reneged on their
agreement when the latter refused to accept the
partial down payment he tendered to her as
previously agreed because she did not want to
sell her property to him anymore. [Fernando]
prayed that after trial on the merits, [Nave] be
ordered to execute the corresponding Deed of
Sale in his favor, and to pay attorneys fees,
litigation expenses and damages.
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
[Nave] filed a Motion to Dismiss averring that she
could not be ordered to execute the
corresponding Deed of Sale in favor of [Fernando]
based on the following grounds: (1) she was not
fully apprised of the nature of the piece of paper
[Fernando] handed to her for her signature on
January 3, 1984. When she was informed that it
was for the sale of her property in Calamba,
Laguna covered by TCT No. T-3317 (27604), she
immediately returned to [Fernando] the said
piece of paper and at the same time repudiating
the same. Her repudiation was further bolstered
by the fact that when [Fernando] tendered the
partial down payment to her, she refused to
receive the same; and (2) she already sold the
property in good faith to Rommel, Elmer, Erwin,
Roller and Amanda, all surnamed Pabale [the
Pabale siblings] on February 20, 1984 after the
complaint was filed against her but before she
received a copy thereof. Moreover, she alleged
that [Fernando] has no cause of action against
her as he is suing for and in behalf of S.M.
Fernando Realty Corporation who is not a party to
the alleged Contract to Sell. Even assuming that
said entity is the real party in interest, still,
[Fernando] cannot sue in representation of the
corporation there being no evidence to show that
he was duly authorized to do so.
Subsequently, [the Pabale siblings] filed a Motion
to Intervene alleging that they are now the land
owners of the subject property. Thus, the
complaint was amended to include [the Pabale
siblings] as party defendants. In an Order dated
April 24, 1984, the trial court denied [Naves]
Motion to Dismiss prompting her to file a
Manifestation and Motion stating that she was
adopting the allegations in her Motion to Dismiss
in answer to [Fernandos] amended complaint.
Thereafter, [Nave] filed a Motion to Admit her
Amended Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-
claim praying that her husband, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo be impleaded as her co-defendant,
and including as her defense undue influence and
fraud by reason of the fact that she was made to
appear as widow when in fact she was very much
married at the time of the transaction in issue.
Despite the opposition of [Fernando] and [the
Pabale siblings], the trial court admitted the
aforesaid Amended Answer with Counterclaim
and Cross-claim.
Still unsatisfied with her defense, [Nave] and Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo filed a Motion to Admit
Second Amended Answer and Amended Reply
and Cross-claim against [the Pabale siblings], this
time including the fact of her incapacity to
contract for being mentally deficient based on the
psychological evaluation report conducted on
December 2, 1985 by Dra. Virginia P. Panlasigui,
M. A., a clinical psychologist. Finding the motion
unmeritorious, the same was denied by the
court a quo.
[Nave] filed a motion for reconsideration thereof
asseverating that in Criminal Case No. 1308-85-C
entitled "People vs. Nelly S. Nave" she raised
therein as a defense her mental deficiency. This
being a decisive factor to determine once and for
all whether the contract entered into by [Nave]
with respect to the subject property is null and
Page 4
void, the Second Amended Answer and Amended
Reply and Cross-claim against [the Pabale
siblings] should be admitted.
Before the motion for reconsideration could be
acted upon, the proceedings in this case was
suspended sometime in 1987 in view of the filing
of a Petition for Guardianship of [Nave] with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 36 of Calamba,
Laguna, docketed as SP No. 146-86-C with Atty.
Vedasto Gesmundo as the petitioner. On June 22,
1988, a Decision was rendered in the said
guardianship proceedings, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
"Under the circumstances, specially since Nelly S.
Nave who now resides with the Brosas spouses
has categorically refused to be examined again at
the National Mental Hospital, the Court is
constrained to accept the Neuro-Psychiatric
Evaluation report dated April 14, 1986 submitted
by Dra. Nona Jean Alviso-Ramos and the
supporting report dated April 20, 1987 submitted
by Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, both of the National
Mental Hospital and hereby finds Nelly S. Nave an
incompetent within the purview of Rule 92 of the
Revised Rules of Court, a person who, by reason
of age, disease, weak mind and deteriorating
mental processes cannot without outside aid take
care of herself and manage her properties,
becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and
exploitation, said condition having become
severe since the year 1980. She and her estate
are hereby placed under guardianship. Atty.
Leonardo C. Paner is hereby appointed as her
regular guardian without need of bond, until
further orders from this Court. Upon his taking his
oath of office as regular guardian, Atty. Paner is
ordered to participate actively in the pending
cases of Nelly S. Nave with the end in view of
protecting her interests from the prejudicial sales
of her real properties, from the overpayment in
the foreclosure made by Ms. Gilda Mendoza-Ong,
and in recovering her lost jewelries and monies
and other personal effects.
SO ORDERED."
Both [Fernando] and [the Pabale siblings] did not
appeal therefrom, while the appeal interposed by
spouses Juliano and Evangelina Brosas was
dismissed by this Court for failure to pay the
required docketing fees within the reglementary
period.
In the meantime, [Nave] died on December 9,
1992. On September 20, 1993, Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo, [Naves] sole heir, she being an
orphan and childless, executed an Affidavit of
Self-Adjudication pertaining to his inherited
properties from [Nave].
On account of such development, a motion for
the dismissal of the instant case and for the
issuance of a writ of execution of the Decision
dated June 22, 1988 in SP No. 146-86-C (petition
for guardianship) was filed by Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo on February 14, 1996 with the court a
quo. [The Pabale siblings] filed their Opposition to
the motion on grounds that (1) they were not
made a party to the guardianship proceedings
and thus cannot be bound by the Decision
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
therein; and (2) that the validity of the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by the late [Nave] in their
favor was never raised in the guardianship case.
The case was then set for an annual conference.
On January 9, 1997, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed
a motion seeking the courts permission for his
substitution for the late defendant Nelly in the
instant case. Not long after the parties submitted
their respective pre-trial briefs, a motion for
substitution was filed by Lolita R. Alamayre (sic)
[Alamayri] alleging that since the subject
property was sold to her by Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute
Sale, she should be substituted in his stead. In
refutation, Atty. Vedasto Gesmundo filed a
Manifestation stating that what he executed is a
Deed of Donation and not a Deed of Absolute
Sale in favor of [Alamayri] and that the same was
already revoked by him on March 5, 1997. Thus,
the motion for substitution should be denied.
On July 29, 1997, the court a quo issued an Order
declaring that it cannot make a ruling as to the
conflicting claims of [Alamayri] and Atty. Vedasto
Gesmundo. After the case was heard on the
merits, the trial court rendered its Decision on
December 2, 1997, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the handwritten Contract to Sell
dated January 3, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave
and Sesinando Fernando null and void and of no
force and effect;
2. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
February 20, 1984 executed by Nelly S. Nave in
favor of the [Pabale siblings] similarly null and
void and of no force and effect;
3. Recognizing Ms. Lolita P. [Alamayri] as the
owner of the property covered by TCT No. 111249
of the land records of Calamba, Laguna;
4. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to execute a
transfer of title over the property in favor of Ms.
Lolita P. [Alamayri] in the concept of
reconveyance because the sale in their favor has
been declared null and void;
5. Ordering the [Pabale siblings] to surrender
possession over the property to Ms. [Alamayri]
and to account for its income from the time they
took over possession to the time the same is
turned over to Ms. Lolita [Alamayri], and
thereafter pay the said income to the latter;
6. Ordering [Fernando] and the [Pabale siblings],
jointly and severally, to pay Ms. [Alamayri]:
a. attorneys fees in the sum of P30,000.00; and
b. the costs.6
S.M. Fernando Realty Corporation, still
represented by Fernando, filed an appeal with the
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
58133, solely to question the portion of the 2
December 1997 Decision of the RTC ordering him
and the Pabale siblings to jointly and severally
pay Alamayri the amount of P30,000.00 as
attorneys fees.
The Pabale siblings intervened as appellants in
CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 averring that the RTC erred
in declaring in its 2 December 1997 Decision that
Page 5
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 20 February
1984 executed by Nave in their favor was null
and void on the ground that Nave was found
incompetent since the year 1980.
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, dated 10
April 2001, granted the appeals of S.M. Fernando
Realty Corporation and the Pabale siblings. It
ruled thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal
filed by S. M. Fernando Realty Corporation,
represented by its President, Sesinando M.
Fernando as well as the appeal interposed by
Rommel, Elmer, Erwin, Roller and Amanda, all
surnamed Pabale, are hereby GRANTED. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City,
Branch 119 in Civil Case No. 675-84-C is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
rendered upholding the VALIDITY of the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated February 20, 1984.
No pronouncements as to costs.7
Alamayri sought reconsideration of the afore-
quoted Decision of the appellate court, invoking
the Decision,8 dated 22 June 1988, of the RTC in
the guardianship proceedings, docketed as SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C, which found Nave
incompetent, her condition becoming severe
since 1980; and thus appointed Atty. Leonardo C.
Paner as her guardian. Said Decision already
became final and executory when no one
appealed therefrom. Alamayri argued that since
Nave was already judicially determined to be an
incompetent since 1980, then all contracts she
subsequently entered into should be declared null
and void, including the Deed of Sale, dated 20
February 1984, which she executed over the
subject property in favor of the Pabale siblings.
According to Alamayri, the Pabale siblings should
be bound by the findings of the RTC in its 22 June
1988 Decision in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, having
participated in the said guardianship proceedings
through their father Jose Pabale. She pointed out
that the RTC explicitly named in its orders Jose
Pabale as among those present during the
hearings held on 30 October 1987 and 19
November 1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri thus filed on 21 November 2001 a
Motion to Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in
Evidence so she could mark and submit as
evidence certain documents to establish that the
Pabale siblings are indeed the children of Jose
Pabale.
Atty. Gesmundo, Naves surviving spouse,
likewise filed his own Motion for Reconsideration
of the 10 April 2001 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, asserting
Naves incompetence since 1980 as found by the
RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, and his right to
the subject property as owner upon Naves death
in accordance with the laws of succession. It must
be remembered that Atty. Gesmundo disputed
before the RTC the supposed transfer of his rights
to the subject property to Alamayri, but the
court a quo refrained from ruling thereon.
In a Resolution, dated 19 December 2001, the
Court of Appeals denied for lack of merit the
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
Motions for Reconsideration of Alamayri and Atty.
Gesmundo.
Hence, Alamayri comes before this Court via the
present Petition for Review on Certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, with the following
assignment of errors:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE FINDING THAT NELLY S. NAVE WAS
INCOMPETENT IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-
86-C ON JUNE 22, 1988 CANNOT RETROACT TO
AFFECT THE VALIDITY OF THE DEED OF SALE SHE
EXECUTED ON FEBRUARY 20, 1984 IN FAVOR OF
RESPONDENTS PABALES.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE DECISION IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 146-
86-C DATED JUNE 22, 1988 IS NOT BINDING ON
RESPONDENTS PABALES.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING
PETITIONERS MOTION TO SCHEDULE HEARING
TO MARK DOCUMENTARY EXHIBITS IN EVIDENCE
TO ESTABLISH THE IDENTITY OF JOSE PABALE AS
THE FATHER OF RESPONDENTS PABALES.9
It is Alamayris position that given the final and
executory Decision, dated 22 June 1988, of the
RTC in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C finding Nave
incompetent since 1980, then the same fact may
no longer be re-litigated in Civil Case No. 675-84-
C, based on the doctrine of res judicata, more
particularly, the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment.
This Court is not persuaded.
Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged;
a thing judicially acted upon or decided; a thing
or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays
the rule that an existing final judgment or decree
rendered on the merits, and without fraud or
collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction,
upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is
conclusive of the rights of the parties or their
privies, in all other actions or suits in the same or
any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in
the first suit.10
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under
paragraphs (b) and (c) of Section 47, Rule 39,
which read:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. The
effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to
pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as
follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is,
with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as
to any other matter that could have been raised
in relation thereto, conclusive between the
parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action
or special proceeding, litigating the same thing
and under the same title and in the same
capacity; and
Page 6
(c) In any other litigation between the same
parties or their successors in interest, that only is
deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its
face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata thus lays down two
main rules which may be stated as follows: (1)
The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the parties
and their privies to the litigation and constitutes a
bar to a new action or suit involving the same
cause of action either before the same or any
other tribunal; and (2) Any right, fact, or matter in
issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved
in the determination of an action before a
competent court in which a judgment or decree is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by
the judgment therein and cannot again be
litigated between the parties and their privies
whether or not the claims or demands, purposes,
or subject matters of the two suits are the same.
These two main rules mark the distinction
between the principles governing the two typical
cases in which a judgment may operate as
evidence.11 In speaking of these cases, the first
general rule above stated, and which corresponds
to the afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47,
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is referred to as
"bar by former judgment"; while the second
general rule, which is embodied in paragraph (c)
of the same section and rule, is known as
"conclusiveness of judgment."
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v.
Register of Deeds provides the following
enlightening discourse on conclusiveness of
judgment:
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two
different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment
and (b) conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept conclusiveness of
judgment states that a fact or question which
was in issue in a former suit and was there
judicially passed upon and determined by a court
of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein as far as the parties to
that action and persons in privity with them are
concerned and cannot be again litigated in any
future action between such parties or their
privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or
different cause of action, while the judgment
remains unreversed by proper authority. It has
been held that in order that a judgment in one
action can be conclusive as to a particular matter
in another action between the same parties or
their privies, it is essential that the issue be
identical. If a particular point or question is in
issue in the second action, and the judgment will
depend on the determination of that particular
point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and
conclusive in the second if that same point or
question was in issue and adjudicated in the first
suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732
[1991]). Identity of cause of action is not required
but merely identity of issues.
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company
(Phils.), Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201,
210 [1991]), reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA
179 [1977]) in regard to the distinction between
bar by former judgment which bars the
prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim, demand, or cause of action, and
conclusiveness of judgment which bars the
relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different
claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of
material facts or questions which were in issue
and adjudicated in former action are commonly
applied to all matters essentially connected with
the subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it
extends to questions necessarily implied in the
final judgment, although no specific finding may
have been made in reference thereto and
although such matters were directly referred to in
the pleadings and were not actually or formally
presented. Under this rule, if the record of the
former trial shows that the judgment could not
have been rendered without deciding the
particular matter, it will be considered as having
settled that matter as to all future actions
between the parties and if a judgment necessarily
presupposes certain premises, they are as
conclusive as the judgment itself.12
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v.
Allied Banking Corporation, further differentiated
between the two rules of res judicata, as follows:
There is "bar by prior judgment" when, as
between the first case where the judgment was
rendered and the second case that is sought to
be barred, there is identity of parties, subject
matter, and causes of action. In this instance,
the judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put,
the judgment or decree of the court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation
between the parties, as well as their privies, and
constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving
the same cause of action before the same or
other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the
first and second cases, but no identity of
causes of action, the first judgment is
conclusive only as to those matters actually and
directly controverted and determined and not as
to matters merely involved therein. This is the
concept of res judicata known
as "conclusiveness of judgment." Stated
differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue
directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in the
determination of an action before a competent
court in which judgment is rendered on the merits
is conclusively settled by the judgment therein
and cannot again be litigated between the parties
and their privies whether or not the claim,
demand, purpose, or subject matter of the two
actions is the same.13
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-
litigation in a second case of a fact or question
already settled in a previous case. The second
case, however, may still proceed provided that it
will no longer touch on the same fact or question
Page 7
adjudged in the first case. Conclusiveness of
judgment requires only the identity of issues and
parties, but not of causes of action.
Contrary to Alamayris assertion, conclusiveness
of judgment has no application to the instant
Petition since there is no identity of parties and
issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil
Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of parties
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was a petition filed with
the RTC by Atty. Gesmundo for the appointment
of a guardian over the person and estate of his
late wife Nave alleging her incompetence.
A guardian may be appointed by the RTC over the
person and estate of a minor or an incompetent,
the latter being described as a person "suffering
the penalty of civil interdiction or who are
hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb
who are unable to read and write, those who are
of unsound mind, even though they have lucid
intervals, and persons not being of unsound
mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind,
and other similar causes, cannot, without outside
aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for
deceit and exploitation."14
Rule 93 of the Rules of Court governs the
proceedings for the appointment of a guardian, to
wit:
Rule 93
APPOINTMENT OF GUARDIANS
SECTION 1. Who may petition for appointment
of guardian for resident. Any relative, friend, or
other person on behalf of a resident minor or
incompetent who has no parent or lawful
guardian, or the minor himself if fourteen years of
age or over, may petition the court having
jurisdiction for the appointment of a general
guardian for the person or estate, or both, of such
minor or incompetent. An officer of the Federal
Administration of the United States in the
Philippines may also file a petition in favor of a
ward thereof, and the Director of Health, in favor
of an insane person who should be hospitalized,
or in favor of an isolated leper.
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for the
appointment of a general guardian must show, so
far as known to the petitioner:
(a) The jurisdictional facts;
(b) The minority or incompetency rendering the
appointment necessary or convenient;
(c) The names, ages, and residences of the
relatives of the minor or incompetent, and of the
persons having him in their care;
(d) The probable value and character of his
estate;
(e) The name of the person for whom letters of
guardianship are prayed.
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
The petition shall be verified; but no defect in the
petition or verification shall render void the
issuance of letters of guardianship.
SEC. 3. Court to set time for hearing. Notice
thereof. When a petition for the appointment of
a general guardian is filed, the court shall fix a
time and place for hearing the same, and shall
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to
the persons mentioned in the petition residing in
the province, including the minor if above 14
years of age or the incompetent himself, and may
direct other general or special notice thereof to
be given.
SEC. 4. Opposition to petition. Any interested
person may, by filing a written opposition,
contest the petition on the ground of majority of
the alleged minor, competency of the alleged
incompetent, or the unsuitability of the person for
whom letters are prayed, and may pray that the
petition be dismissed, or that letters of
guardianship issue to himself, or to any suitable
person named in the opposition.
SEC. 5. Hearing and order for letters to issue.
At the hearing of the petition the alleged
incompetent must be present if able to attend,
and it must be shown that the required notice has
been given. Thereupon the court shall hear the
evidence of the parties in support of their
respective allegations, and, if the person in
question is a minor or incompetent it shall
appoint a suitable guardian of his person or
estate, or both, with the powers and duties
hereinafter specified.
xxxx
SEC. 8. Service of judgment. Final orders or
judgments under this rule shall be served upon
the civil registrar of the municipality or city where
the minor or incompetent person resides or
where his property or part thereof is situated.
A petition for appointment of a guardian is a
special proceeding, without the usual parties, i.e.,
petitioner versus respondent, in an ordinary civil
case. Accordingly, SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C bears
the title: In re: Guardianship of Nelly S. Nave for
Incompetency, Verdasto Gesmundo y Banayo,
petitioner, with no named respondent/s.
Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 93 of the Rules of Court,
though, require that the petition contain the
names, ages, and residences of relatives of the
supposed minor or incompetent and those having
him in their care, so that those residing within the
same province as the minor or incompetent can
be notified of the time and place of the hearing
on the petition.
The objectives of an RTC hearing a petition for
appointment of a guardian under Rule 93 of the
Rules of Court is to determine, first, whether a
person is indeed a minor or an incompetent who
has no capacity to care for himself and/or his
properties; and, second, who is most qualified to
be appointed as his guardian. The rules
reasonably assume that the people who best
could help the trial court settle such issues would
be those who are closest to and most familiar
Page 8
with the supposed minor or incompetent, namely,
his relatives living within the same province
and/or the persons caring for him.
It is significant to note that the rules do not
necessitate that creditors of the minor or
incompetent be likewise identified and notified.
The reason is simple: because their presence is
not essential to the proceedings for appointment
of a guardian. It is almost a given, and
understandably so, that they will only insist that
the supposed minor or incompetent is actually
capacitated to enter into contracts, so as to
preserve the validity of said contracts and keep
the supposed minor or incompetent obligated to
comply therewith.
Hence, it cannot be presumed that the Pabale
siblings were given notice and actually took part
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C. They are not Naves
relatives, nor are they the ones caring for her.
Although the rules allow the RTC to direct the
giving of other general or special notices of the
hearings on the petition for appointment of a
guardian, it was not established that the RTC
actually did so in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayris allegation that the Pabale siblings
participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C rests on
two Orders, dated 30 October 198715 and 19
November 1987,16 issued by the RTC in SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C, expressly mentioning the presence
of a Jose Pabale, who was supposedly the father
of the Pabale siblings, during the hearings held on
the same dates. However, the said Orders by
themselves cannot confirm that Jose Pabale was
indeed the father of the Pabale siblings and that
he was authorized by his children to appear in the
said hearings on their behalf.
Alamayri decries that she was not allowed by the
Court of Appeals to submit and mark additional
evidence to prove that Jose Pabale was the father
of the Pabale siblings.
It is true that the Court of Appeals has the power
to try cases and conduct hearings, receive
evidence and perform any and all acts necessary
to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling
within its original and appellate jurisdiction,
including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings. In general, however,
the Court of Appeals conducts hearings and
receives evidence prior to the submission of the
case for judgment.17 It must be pointed out that,
in this case, Alamayri filed her Motion to Schedule
Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence on 21
November 2001. She thus sought to submit
additional evidence as to the identity of Jose
Pabale, not only after CA-G.R. CV No. 58133 had
been submitted for judgment, but after the Court
of Appeals had already promulgated its Decision
in said case on 10 April 2001.
The parties must diligently and conscientiously
present all arguments and available evidences in
support of their respective positions to the court
before the case is deemed submitted for
judgment. Only under exceptional circumstances
may the court receive new evidence after having
rendered judgment;18 otherwise, its judgment
may never attain finality since the parties may
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
continually refute the findings therein with further
evidence. Alamayri failed to provide any
explanation why she did not present her evidence
earlier. Merely invoking that the ends of justice
would have been best served if she was allowed
to present additional evidence is not sufficient to
justify deviation from the general rules of
procedure. Obedience to the requirements of
procedural rules is needed if the parties are to
expect fair results therefrom, and utter disregard
of the rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal
construction.19 Procedural rules are tools
designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to
abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in
some instances, allows a relaxation in the
application of the rules, this, we stress, was never
intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to
violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in
the interpretation and application of the rules
applies only to proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that
litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is
equally true that every case must be prosecuted
in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
insure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.20
Moreover, contrary to Alamayris assertion, the
Court of Appeals did not deny her Motion to
Schedule Hearing to Mark Exhibits in Evidence
merely for being late. In its Resolution, dated 19
December 2001, the Court of Appeals also denied
the said motion on the following grounds:
While it is now alleged, for the first time, that the
[herein respondents Pabale siblings] participated
in the guardianship proceedings considering that
the Jose Pabale mentioned therein is their late
father, [herein petitioner Alamayri] submitting
herein documentary evidence to prove their
filiation, even though admitted in evidence at this
late stage, cannot bind [the Pabale siblings] as
verily, notice to their father is not notice to them
there being no allegation to the effect that he
represented them before the Calamba Court. 21
As the appellate court reasoned, even if the
evidence Alamayri wanted to submit do prove
that the Jose Pabale who attended the RTC
hearings on 30 October 1987 and 19 November
1987 in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C was the father of
the Pabale siblings, they would still not confirm
his authority to represent his children in the said
proceedings. Worth stressing is the fact that Jose
Pabale was not at all a party to the Deed of Sale
dated 20 February 1984 over the subject
property, which was executed by Nave in favor of
the Pabale siblings. Without proper authority, Jose
Pabales presence at the hearings in SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C should not bind his children to the
outcome of said proceedings or affect their right
to the subject property.
Since it was not established that the Pabale
siblings participated in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C,
then any finding therein should not bind them in
Civil Case No. 675-84-C.
No identity of issues
Page 9
Neither is there identity of issues between SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil Case No. 675-84-C
that may bar the latter, by conclusiveness of
judgment, from ruling on Naves competency in
1984, when she executed the Deed of Sale over
the subject property in favor the Pabale siblings.
In SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, the main issue was
whether Nave was incompetent at the time of
filing of the petition with the RTC in 1986, thus,
requiring the appointment of a guardian over her
person and estate.
In the cross-claim of Nave and Atty. Gesmundo
against the Pabale siblings in Civil Case No. 675-
84-C, the issue was whether Nave was an
incompetent when she executed a Deed of Sale
of the subject property in favor of the Pabale
siblings on 20 February 1984, hence, rendering
the said sale void.
While both cases involve a determination of
Naves incompetency, it must be established at
two separate times, one in 1984 and the other in
1986. A finding that she was incompetent in 1986
does not automatically mean that she was so in
1984. In Carillo v. Jaojoco,22 the Court ruled that
despite the fact that the seller was declared
mentally incapacitated by the trial court only nine
days after the execution of the contract of sale, it
does not prove that she was so when she
executed the contract. Hence, the significance of
the two-year gap herein cannot be gainsaid since
Naves mental condition in 1986 may vastly differ
from that of 1984 given the intervening period.
Capacity to act is supposed to attach to a person
who has not previously been declared incapable,
and such capacity is presumed to continue so
long as the contrary be not proved; that is, that
at the moment of his acting he was incapable,
crazy, insane, or out of his mind.23 The burden of
proving incapacity to enter into contractual
relations rests upon the person who alleges it; if
no sufficient proof to this effect is presented,
capacity will be presumed.24
Nave was examined and diagnosed by doctors to
be mentally incapacitated only in 1986, when the
RTC started hearing SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C; and
she was not judicially declared an incompetent
until 22 June 1988 when a Decision in said case
was rendered by the RTC, resulting in the
appointment of Atty. Leonardo C. Paner as her
guardian. Thus, prior to 1986, Nave is still
presumed to be capacitated and competent to
enter into contracts such as the Deed of Sale over
the subject property, which she executed in favor
of the Pabale siblings on 20 February 1984. The
burden of proving otherwise falls upon Alamayri,
which she dismally failed to do, having relied
entirely on the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC
in SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C.
Alamayri capitalizes on the declaration of the RTC
in its Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP. PROC.
No. 146-86-C on Naves condition "having
become severe since the year 1980."25 But there
is no basis for such a declaration. The
medical reports extensively quoted in said
Decision, prepared by: (1) Dr. Nona Jean Alviso-
Ramos, dated 14 April 1986,26 and (2) by Dr.
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
Eduardo T. Maaba, dated 20 April 1987,27 both
stated that upon their examination, Nave was
suffering from "organic brain syndrome
secondary to cerebral arteriosclerosis with
psychotic episodes," which impaired her
judgment. There was nothing in the said medical
reports, however, which may shed light on when
Nave began to suffer from said mental condition.
All they said was that it existed at the time Nave
was examined in 1986, and again in 1987. Even
the RTC judge was only able to observe Nave,
which made him realize that her mind was very
impressionable and capable of being
manipulated, on the occasions when Nave visited
the court from 1987 to 1988. Hence, for this
Court, the RTC Decision dated 22 June 1988 in SP.
PROC. No. 146-86-C may be conclusive as to
Naves incompetency from 1986 onwards, but not
as to her incompetency in 1984. And other than
invoking the 22 June 1988 Decision of the RTC in
SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C, Alamayri did not bother
to establish with her own evidence that Nave was
mentally incapacitated when she executed the 20
February 1984 Deed of Sale over the subject
property in favor of the Pabale siblings, so as to
render the said deed void.
All told, there being no identity of parties and
issues between SP. PROC. No. 146-86-C and Civil
Case No. 675-84-C, the 22 June 1988 Decision in
the former on Naves incompetency by the year
1986 should not bar, by conclusiveness of
judgment, a finding in the latter case that Nave
still had capacity and was competent when she
executed on 20 February 1984 the Deed of Sale
over the subject property in favor of the Pabale
siblings. Therefore, the Court of Appeals did not
commit any error when it upheld the validity of
the 20 February 1984 Deed of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition for Review is hereby DENIED. The
Decision, dated 10 April 2001, of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58133, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the
petitioner Lolita R. Alamayri.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184528 April 25, 2012
NILO OROPESA, Petitioner,
vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure of the
Decision1 dated February 29, 2008, as well as the
Resolution2 dated September 16, 2008, both
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 88449, entitled "NILO OROPESA vs. CIRILO
OROPESA." The Court of Appeals issuances
affirmed the Order3 dated September 27, 2006
and the Order4 dated November 14, 2006 issued
by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque
City, Branch 260 in SP. Proc. Case No. 04-0016,
which dismissed petitioner Nilo Oropesas petition
for guardianship over the properties of his father,
Page 10
respondent Cirilo Oropesa (a widower), and
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration
thereof, respectively.
The facts of this case, as summed in the assailed
Decision, follow:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, a
petition for him and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to
be appointed as guardians over the property of
his father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa. The
case was docketed as SP Proc. No. 04-0016 and
raffled off to Branch 260.
In the said petition, it is alleged among others
that the (respondent) has been afflicted with
several maladies and has been sickly for over ten
(10) years already having suffered a stroke on
April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment
and memory [were] impaired and such has been
evident after his hospitalization; that even before
his stroke, the (respondent) was observed to have
had lapses in memory and judgment, showing
signs of failure to manage his property properly;
that due to his age and medical condition, he
cannot, without outside aid, manage his property
wisely, and has become an easy prey for deceit
and exploitation by people around him,
particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his girlfriend.
In an Order dated January 29, 2004, the presiding
judge of the court a quo set the case for hearing,
and directed the court social worker to conduct a
social case study and submit a report thereon.
Pursuant to the abovementioned order, the Court
Social Worker conducted her social case study,
interviewing the (petitioner) and his witnesses.
The Court Social Worker subsequently submitted
her report but without any finding on the
(respondent) who refused to see and talk to the
social worker.
On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Opposition to the petition for guardianship. On
August 3, 2004, the (respondent) filed his
Supplemental Opposition.
Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his
evidence which consists of his testimony, and
that of his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and
the (respondents) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya.
After presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a
manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his
case. The (petitioner) failed to file his written
formal offer of evidence.
Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion
(1) to Declare the petitioner to have waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the
presentation of his Evidence Closed since they
were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the
Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and
(3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File
Demurrer to Evidence.
In an Order dated July 14, 2006, the court a quo
granted the (respondents) Omnibus Motion.
Thereafter, the (respondent) then filed his
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23,
2006.5 (Citations omitted.)
The trial court granted respondents demurrer to
evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006.
The dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has
failed to provide sufficient evidence to establish
that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run
his personal affairs and to administer his
properties, Oppositors Demurrer to Evidence is
GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.6
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but this was
denied by the trial court in an Order dated
November 14, 2006, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, considering that the Court record
shows that petitioner-movant has failed to
provide sufficient documentary and testimonial
evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo Oropesa is
incompetent to run his personal affairs and to
administer his properties, the Court hereby
affirms its earlier Order dated 27 September
2006.
Accordingly, petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit.7
Unperturbed, petitioner elevated the case to the
Court of Appeals but his appeal was dismissed
through the now assailed Decision dated February
29, 2008, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered the instant
appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the
court a quo dated September 27, 2006 and
November 14, 2006 are AFFIRMED.8
A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioner but this was denied by the Court of
Appeals in the similarly assailed Resolution dated
September 16, 2008. Hence, the instant petition
was filed.
Petitioner submits the following question for
consideration by this Court:
WHETHER RESPONDENT IS CONSIDERED AN
"INCOMPETENT" PERSON AS DEFINED UNDER
SECTION 2, RULE 92 OF THE RULES OF COURT
WHO SHOULD BE PLACED UNDER
GUARDIANSHIP9
After considering the evidence and pleadings on
record, we find the petition to be without merit.
Petitioner comes before the Court arguing that
the assailed rulings of the Court of Appeals
should be set aside as it allegedly committed
grave and reversible error when it affirmed the
erroneous decision of the trial court which
purportedly disregarded the overwhelming
evidence presented by him showing respondents
incompetence.
In Francisco v. Court of Appeals,10 we laid out the
nature and purpose of guardianship in the
following wise:
Page 11
A guardianship is a trust relation of the most
sacred character, in which one person, called a
"guardian" acts for another called the "ward"
whom the law regards as incapable of managing
his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to
further the wards well-being, not that of the
guardian. It is intended to preserve the wards
property, as well as to render any assistance that
the ward may personally require. It has been
stated that while custody involves immediate
care and control, guardianship indicates not only
those responsibilities, but those of one in loco
parentis as well.11
In a guardianship proceeding, a court may
appoint a qualified guardian if the prospective
ward is proven to be a minor or an incompetent.
A reading of Section 2, Rule 92 of the Rules of
Court tells us that persons who, though of sound
mind but by reason of age, disease, weak mind or
other similar causes, are incapable of taking care
of themselves and their property without outside
aid are considered as incompetents who may
properly be placed under guardianship. The full
text of the said provision reads:
Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent."
Under this rule, the word "incompetent" includes
persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction
or who are hospitalized lepers, prodigals, deaf
and dumb who are unable to read and write,
those who are of unsound mind, even though
they have lucid intervals, and persons not being
of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease,
weak mind, and other similar causes, cannot,
without outside aid, take care of themselves and
manage their property, becoming thereby an
easy prey for deceit and exploitation.
We have held in the past that a "finding that a
person is incompetent should be anchored on
clear, positive and definite evidence." 12 We
consider that evidentiary standard unchanged
and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.
In support of his contention that respondent is
incompetent and, therefore, should be placed in
guardianship, petitioner raises in his
Memorandum13 the following factual matters:
a. Respondent has been afflicted with several
maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10)
years already;
b. During the time that respondent was
hospitalized at the St. Lukes Medical Center after
his stroke, he purportedly requested one of his
former colleagues who was visiting him to file a
loan application with the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
(AFPSLAI) for payment of his hospital bills, when,
as far as his children knew, he had substantial
amounts of money in various banks sufficient to
cover his medical expenses;
c. Respondents residence allegedly has been left
dilapidated due to lack of care and management;
d. The realty taxes for respondents various
properties remain unpaid and therefore petitioner
and his sister were supposedly compelled to pay
the necessary taxes;
e. Respondent allegedly instructed petitioner to
sell his Nissan Exalta car for the reason that the
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
former would be purchasing another vehicle, but
when the car had been sold, respondent did not
procure another vehicle and refused to account
for the money earned from the sale of the old car;
f. Respondent withdrew at least $75,000.00 from
a joint account under his name and his
daughters without the latters knowledge or
consent;
g. There was purportedly one occasion where
respondent took a kitchen knife to stab himself
upon the "orders" of his girlfriend during one of
their fights;
h. Respondent continuously allows his girlfriend
to ransack his house of groceries and furniture,
despite protests from his children.14
Respondent denied the allegations made by
petitioner and cited petitioners lack of material
evidence to support his claims. According to
respondent, petitioner did not present any
relevant documentary or testimonial evidence
that would attest to the veracity of his assertion
that respondent is incompetent largely due to his
alleged deteriorating medical and mental
condition. In fact, respondent points out that the
only medical document presented by petitioner
proves that he is indeed competent to run his
personal affairs and administer his properties.
Portions of the said document, entitled "Report of
Neuropsychological Screening,"15 were quoted by
respondent in his Memorandum 16 to illustrate that
said report in fact favored respondents claim of
competence, to wit:
General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and
Filipino, he enjoyed and participated meaningfully
in conversations and could be quite elaborate in
his responses on many of the test items. He
spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was
generally comprehensible. x x x.
xxxx
General Oropesa performed in the average range
on most of the domains that were tested. He was
able to correctly perform mental calculations and
keep track of number sequences on a task of
attention. He did BEST in visuo-constructional
tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs
using tiles. Likewise, he was able to render and
read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x
x x.
xxxx
x x x Reasoning abilities were generally intact as
he was able to suggest effective solutions to
problem situations. x x x.17
With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his
documentary evidence, his proof of his fathers
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies
given by himself and his sister (who were
claiming interest in their fathers real and
personal properties) and their fathers former
caregiver (who admitted to be acting under their
direction). These testimonies, which did not
include any expert medical testimony, were
insufficient to convince the trial court of
petitioners cause of action and instead lead it to
Page 12
grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by
respondent.
Even if we were to overlook petitioners
procedural lapse in failing to make a formal offer
of evidence, his documentary proof were
comprised mainly of certificates of title over real
properties registered in his, his fathers and his
sisters names as co-owners, tax declarations,
and receipts showing payment of real estate
taxes on their co-owned properties, which do not
in any way relate to his fathers alleged
incapacity to make decisions for himself. The only
medical document on record is the
aforementioned "Report of Neuropsychological
Screening" which was attached to the petition for
guardianship but was never identified by any
witness nor offered as evidence. In any event, the
said report, as mentioned earlier, was ambivalent
at best, for although the report had negative
findings regarding memory lapses on the part of
respondent, it also contained findings that
supported the view that respondent on the
average was indeed competent.
In an analogous guardianship case wherein the
soundness of mind of the proposed ward was at
issue, we had the occasion to rule that "where
the sanity of a person is at issue, expert opinion
is not necessary [and that] the observations of
the trial judge coupled with evidence establishing
the persons state of mental sanity will suffice."18
Thus, it is significant that in its Order dated
November 14, 2006 which denied petitioners
motion for reconsideration on the trial courts
unfavorable September 27, 2006 ruling, the trial
court highlighted the fatal role that petitioners
own documentary evidence played in disproving
its case and, likewise, the trial court made known
its own observation of respondents physical and
mental state, to wit:
The Court noted the absence of any testimony of
a medical expert which states that Gen. Cirilo O.
Oropesa does not have the mental, emotional,
and physical capacity to manage his own affairs.
On the contrary, Oppositors evidence includes a
Neuropsychological Screening Report which
states that Gen. Oropesa, (1) performs on the
average range in most of the domains that were
tested; (2) is capable of mental calculations; and
(3) can provide solutions to problem situations.
The Report concludes that Gen. Oropesa
possesses intact cognitive functioning, except for
mildly impaired abilities in memory, reasoning
and orientation. It is the observation of the
Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and
able.19 (Citation omitted; emphasis supplied.)
It is axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari because the Court is not a
trier of facts."20 We only take cognizance of
questions of fact in certain exceptional
circumstances;21 however, we find them to be
absent in the instant case. It is also long settled
that "factual findings of the trial court, when
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be
disturbed by this Court. As a rule, such findings
by the lower courts are entitled to great weight
and respect, and are deemed final and conclusive
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
on this Court when supported by the evidence on
record."22 We therefore adopt the factual findings
of the lower court and the Court of Appeals and
rule that the grant of respondents demurrer to
evidence was proper under the circumstances
obtaining in the case at bar.
Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Demurrer to evidence. After the
plaintiff has completed the presentation of his
evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal
on the ground that upon the facts and the law the
plaintiff has shown no right to relief. If his motion
is denied, he shall have the right to present
evidence. If the motion is granted but on appeal
the order of dismissal is reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present
evidence.
A demurrer to evidence is defined as "an
objection by one of the parties in an action, to the
effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether
true or not, to make out a case or sustain the
issue."23 We have also held that a demurrer to
evidence "authorizes a judgment on the merits of
the case without the defendant having to submit
evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have
to do, if plaintiffs evidence shows that he is not
entitled to the relief sought."241wphi1
There was no error on the part of the trial court
when it dismissed the petition for guardianship
without first requiring respondent to present his
evidence precisely because the effect of granting
a demurrer to evidence other than dismissing a
cause of action is, evidently, to preclude a
defendant from presenting his evidence since,
upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has
shown no right to relief.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated
February 29, 2008 as well as the Resolution dated
September 16, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 88449 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 194366 October 10, 2012
NAPOLEON D. NERI, ALICIA D. NERI-
MONDEJAR, VISMINDA D. NERI-CHAMBERS,
ROSA D. NERI-MILLAN, DOUGLAS D. NERI,
EUTROPIA D. ILLUT-COCKINOS AND
VICTORIA D. ILLUT-PIALA, Petitioners,
vs.
HEIRS OF HADJI YUSOP UY AND
JULPHA* IBRAHIM UY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioners
Napoleon D. Neri (Napoleon), Alicia D. Neri-
Mondejar (Alicia), Visminda D. Neri-Chambers
(Visminda), Rosa D. Neri-Millan (Rosa), Douglas D.
Neri (Douglas), Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos
(Eutropia), and Victoria D. Illut-Piala (Victoria)
seek to reverse and set aside the April 27, 2010
Page 13
Decision2 and October 18, 2010 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01031-
MIN which annulled the October 25, 2004
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Panabo City, Davao del Norte and instead,
entered a new one dismissing petitioners
complaint for annulment of sale, damages and
attorneys feesagainst herein respondents heirs
of spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy
(heirs of Uy).
The Facts
During her lifetime, Anunciacion Neri
(Anunciacion) had seven children, two (2) from
her first marriage with Gonzalo Illut (Gonzalo),
namely: Eutropia and Victoria, and five (5) from
her second marriage with Enrique Neri (Enrique),
namely: Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda, Douglas and
Rosa. Throughout the marriage of spouses
Enrique and Anunciacion, they acquired several
homestead properties with a total area of
296,555 square meters located in Samal, Davao
del Norte, embraced by Original Certificate of
Title (OCT) Nos. (P-7998) P-21285, (P-14608) P-
51536 and P-20551 (P-8348)7issued on February
15, 1957, August 27, 1962 and July 7, 1967,
respectively.
On September 21, 1977, Anunciacion died
intestate. Her husband, Enrique, in his personal
capacity and as natural guardian of his minor
children Rosa and Douglas, together with
Napoleon, Alicia, and Vismindaexecuted an Extra-
Judicial Settlement of the Estate with Absolute
Deed of Sale8 on July 7, 1979, adjudicating among
themselves the said homestead properties, and
thereafter, conveying themto the late spouses
Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha Ibrahim Uy (spouses
Uy)for a consideration of P 80,000.00.
On June 11, 1996, the children of Enrique filed a
complaint for annulment of saleof the said
homestead properties against spouses Uy (later
substituted by their heirs)before the RTC,
docketed as Civil Case No.96-28, assailing the
validity of the sale for having been sold within the
prohibited period. Thecomplaint was later
amended to include Eutropia and Victoriaas
additional plaintiffs for having been excluded and
deprived of their legitimes as childrenof
Anunciacion from her first marriage.
In their amended answer with counterclaim, the
heirs of Uy countered that the sale took place
beyond the 5-year prohibitory period from the
issuance of the homestead patents. They also
denied knowledge of Eutropia and Victorias
exclusionfrom the extrajudicial settlement and
sale of the subject properties, and interposed
further the defenses of prescription and laches.
The RTC Ruling
On October 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision
ordering, among others, the annulment of the
Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate with
Absolute Deed of Sale. It ruled that while the sale
occurred beyond the 5-year prohibitory period,
the sale is still void because Eutropia and Victoria
were deprived of their hereditary rights and that
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
Enrique had no judicial authority to sell the
shares of his minor children, Rosa and Douglas.
Consequently, it rejected the defenses of laches
and prescription raised by spouses Uy, who
claimed possession of the subject properties for
17 years, holding that co-ownership rights are
imprescriptible.
The CA Ruling
On appeal, the CAreversed and set aside the
ruling of the RTC in its April 27, 2010 Decision and
dismissed the complaint of the petitioners. It held
that, while Eutropia and Victoria had no
knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement and
sale of the subject properties and as such, were
not bound by it, the CA found it unconscionable
to permit the annulment of the sale considering
spouses Uys possession thereof for 17 years, and
thatEutropia and Victoriabelatedlyfiled their
actionin 1997, ormore than two years
fromknowledge of their exclusion as heirs in 1994
when their stepfather died. It, however, did not
preclude the excluded heirs from recovering their
legitimes from their co-heirs.
Similarly, the CA declared the extrajudicial
settlement and the subsequent saleas valid and
binding with respect to Enrique and hischildren,
holding that as co-owners, they have the right to
dispose of their respective shares as they
consider necessary or fit.While recognizing Rosa
and Douglas to be minors at that time, they were
deemed to have ratified the sale whenthey failed
to question it upon reaching the age of
majority.Italso found laches to have set in
because of their inaction for a long period of time.
The Issues
In this petition, petitioners imputeto the CA the
following errors:
I. WHEN IT UPHELDTHE VALIDITY OF THE "EXTRA
JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE WITH
ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" AS FAR AS THE
SHARES OF EUTROPIA AND VICTORIA WERE
CONCERNED, THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF
THEIR INHERITANCE;
II. WHEN IT DID NOT NULLIFY OR ANNUL THE
"EXTRA JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF THE ESTATE
WITH ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE" WITH RESPECT
TO THE SHARESOF ROSA AND DOUGLAS,
THEREBY DEPRIVING THEM OF THEIR
INHERITANCE; and
III. WHEN IT FOUND THAT LACHES OR
PRESCRIPTION HAS SET IN.
The Ruling of the Court
The petitionis meritorious.
It bears to stress that all the petitioners herein
are indisputably legitimate children of
Anunciacion from her first and second marriages
with Gonzalo and Enrique, respectively, and
consequently, are entitled to inherit from her in
equal shares, pursuant to Articles 979 and 980 of
the Civil Code which read:
ART. 979. Legitimate children and their
descendants succeed the parents and other
Page 14
ascendants, without distinction as to sex or age,
and even if they should come from different
marriages.
xxx
ART. 980. The children of the deceased shall
always inherit from him in their own right,
dividing the inheritance in equal shares.
As such, upon the death of Anunciacion on
September 21, 1977, her children and Enrique
acquired their respective inheritances,9 entitling
them to their pro indiviso shares in her whole
estate, as follows:
9/16 (1/2 of the conjugal assets +
Enrique
1/16)
Eutropia 1/16
Victoria 1/16
Napoleo
1/16
n clothed with powers of administration and bereft
Alicia 1/16
Visminda 1/16
Rosa 1/16
Douglas 1/16
Hence, in the execution of the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale in favor of spouses Uy, all the heirs of
Anunciacionshould have participated. Considering
that Eutropia and Victoria were admittedly
excluded and that then minors Rosa and Douglas
were not properly represented therein, the
settlement was not valid and binding uponthem
and consequently, a total nullity.
Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by
agreement between heirs. x x x
The fact of the extrajudicial settlement or
administration shall be published in a newspaper
of general circulation in the manner provided in
the next succeeding section; but no extrajudicial
settlement shall be binding upon any person who
has not participated therein or had no notice
thereof. (Underscoring added)
The effect of excluding the heirs in the settlement
of estate was further elucidated in Segura v.
Segura,10 thus:
It is clear that Section 1 of Rule 74 does not apply
to the partition in question which was null and
void as far as the plaintiffs were concerned. The
rule covers only valid partitions. The partition in
the present case was invalid because it excluded
six of the nine heirs who were entitled to equal
shares in the partitioned property. Under the rule
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
"no extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon
any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof." As the partition was a
total nullity and did not affect the excluded heirs,
it was not correct for the trial court to hold that
their right to challenge the partition had
prescribed after two years from its execution
However, while the settlement of the estate is
null and void, the subsequent sale of the subject
propertiesmade by Enrique and his children,
Napoleon, Alicia and Visminda, in favor of the
respondents isvalid but only with respect to their
proportionate shares therein.It cannot be denied
that these heirs have acquired their respective
shares in the properties of Anunciacion from the
moment of her death11and that, as owners
thereof, they can very well sell their undivided
share in the estate.12
With respect to Rosa and Douglas who were
minors at the time of the execution of the
settlement and sale, their natural guardian and
father, Enrique, represented them in the
transaction. However, on the basis of the laws
prevailing at that time, Enrique was merely
of any authority to dispose of their 2/16 shares in
the estate of their mother, Anunciacion.
Articles 320 and 326 of the Civil Code, the laws in
force at the time of the execution of the
settlement and sale, provide:
ART. 320. The father, or in his absence the
mother, is the legal administrator of the property
pertaining to the child under parental authority. If
the property is worth more than two thousand
pesos, the father or mother shall give a bond
subject to the approval of the Court of First
Instance.
ART. 326. When the property of the child is worth
more than two thousand pesos, the father or
mother shall be considered a guardian of the
childs property, subject to the duties and
obligations of guardians under the Rules of Court.
Corollarily, Section 7, Rule 93 of the Rules of
Court also provides:
SEC. 7. Parents as Guardians. When the
property of the child under parental authority is
worth two thousand pesos or less, the father or
the mother, without the necessity of court
appointment, shall be his legal guardian. When
the property of the child is worth more than two
thousand pesos, the father or the mother shall be
considered guardian of the childs property, with
the duties and obligations of guardians under
these Rules, and shall file the petition required by
Section 2 hereof. For good reasons, the court
may, however, appoint another suitable persons.
Administration includes all acts for the
preservation of the property and the receipt of
fruits according to the natural purpose of the
thing. Any act of disposition or alienation, or any
reduction in the substance of the patrimony of
child, exceeds the limits of administration. 13 Thus,
a father or mother, as the natural guardian of the
minor under parental authority, does not have
Page 15
the power to dispose or encumber the property of
the latter. Such power is granted by law only to a
judicial guardian of the wards property and even
then only with courts prior approval secured in
accordance with the proceedings set forth by the
Rules of Court.14
Consequently, the disputed sale entered into by
Enrique in behalf of his minor children without the
proper judicial authority, unless ratified by them
upon reaching the age of majority, 15 is
unenforceable in accordance with Articles 1317
and 1403(1) of the Civil Code which provide:
ART. 1317. No one may contract in the name of
another without being authorized by the latter or
unless he has by law a right to represent him.
A contract entered into in the name of another by
one who has no authority or legal representation,
or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be
unenforceable, unless it is ratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has
been executed, before it is revoked by the other
contracting party.
ART. 1403. The following contracts are
unenforceable, unless they are ratified:
(1) Those entered into the name of another
person by one who has been given no authority
or legal representation, or who has acted beyond
his powers;
xxx
Ratification means that one under no disability
voluntarily adopts and gives sanction to some
unauthorized act or defective proceeding, which
without his sanction would not be binding on him.
It is this voluntary choice, knowingly made, which
amounts to a ratification of what was theretofore
unauthorized, and becomes the authorized act of
the party so making the ratification.16 Once
ratified, expressly or impliedly such as when the
person knowingly received benefits from it, the
contract is cleansed from all its defects from the
moment it was constituted,17 as it has a
retroactive effect.
Records, however, show that Rosa had ratified
the extrajudicial settlement of the estate with
absolute deed of sale. In Napoleon and Rosas
Manifestation18 before the RTC dated July 11,
1997,they stated:
"Concerning the sale of our parcel of land
executed by our father, Enrique Neri concurred in
and conformed to by us and our other two sisters
and brother (the other plaintiffs), in favor of Hadji
Yusop Uy and his spouse Hadja Julpa Uy on July 7,
1979, we both confirmed that the same was
voluntary and freely made by all of us and
therefore the sale was absolutely valid and
enforceable as far as we all plaintiffs in this case
are concerned;" (Underscoring supplied)
In their June 30, 1997 Joint-Affidavit, 19 Napoleon
and Rosa also alleged:
"That we are surprised that our names are
included in this case since we do not have any
intention to file a case against Hadji Yusop Uy and
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
Julpha Ibrahim Uy and their family and we respect
and acknowledge the validity of the Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate with Absolute Deed of
Sale dated July 7, 1979;" (Underscoring supplied)
Clearly, the foregoing statements
constitutedratification of the settlement of the
estate and the subsequent sale, thus, purging all
the defects existing at the time of its execution
and legitimizing the conveyance of Rosas 1/16
share in the estate of Anunciacion to spouses Uy.
The same, however, is not true with respect to
Douglas for lack of evidence showing ratification.
Considering, thus, that the extrajudicial
settlement with sale is invalid and therefore, not
binding on Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, only
the shares ofEnrique, Napoleon, Alicia, Visminda
and Rosa in the homestead properties have
effectivelybeen disposed in favor of spouses Uy.
"A person can only sell what he owns, or is
authorized to sell and the buyer can as a
consequence acquire no more than what the
sellercan legally transfer."20 On this score, Article
493 of the Civil Codeis relevant, which provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person
in its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to
him in the division upon the termination of the
co-ownership.
Consequently, spouses Uy or their substituted
heirs became pro indiviso co-owners of the
homestead properties with Eutropia, Victoria and
Douglas, who retained title to their respective
1/16 shares. They were deemed to be holding the
3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas
under an implied constructive trust for the latters
benefit, conformably with Article 1456 of the Civil
Code which states:"if property is acquired
through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it
is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from
whom the property comes." As such, it is only
fair, just and equitable that the amount paid for
their shares equivalent to P 5,000.0021 each or a
total of P 15,000.00 be returned to spouses Uy
with legal interest.
On the issue of prescription, the Court agrees
with petitioners that the present action has not
prescribed in so far as it seeks to annul the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate. Contrary to
the ruling of the CA, the prescriptive period of 2
years provided in Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules
of
Court reckoned from the execution of the
extrajudicial settlement finds no application to
petitioners Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas, who
were deprived of their lawful participation in the
subject estate. Besides, an "action or defense for
the declaration of the inexistence of a contract
does not prescribe" in accordance with Article
1410 of the Civil Code.
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However, the action to recover property held in
trust prescribes after 10 years from the time the
cause of action accrues,22 which is from the time
of actual notice in case of unregistered deed. 23 In
this case, Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas claimed
to have knowledge of the extrajudicial settlement
with sale after the death of their father, Enrique,
in 1994 which spouses Uy failed to refute. Hence,
the complaint filed in 1997 was well within the
prescriptive period of 10 years.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED.
The April 27, 2010 Decision and October 18, 2010
Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
judgment is entered:
1. Declaring the Extra-Judicial Settlement of the
Estate of Anunciacion Neri NULL and VOID;
2. Declaring the Absolute Deed of Sale in favor of
the late spouses Hadji Yusop Uy and Julpha
Ibrahim Uy as regards the 13/16 total shares of
the late Enrique Neri, Napoleon Neri, Alicia D.
RULE ON GUARDIANSHIP OF MINORS (A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC)
Neri-Mondejar, Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and
Rosa D. Neri-Millan VALID;
3. Declaring Eutropia D. Illut-Cockinos, Victoria D.
Illut-Piala and Douglas D. Neri as the LAWFUL
OWNERS of the 3/16 portions of the subject
homestead properties, covered by Original
Certificate of Title Nos. (P-7998) P-2128, (P-
14608) P-5153 and P-20551 (P-8348); and
4. Ordering the estate of the late Enrique Neri, as
well as Napoleon Neri, Alicia D. Neri-Mondejar,
Visminda D. Neri-Chambers and Rosa D. Neri-
Millan to return to the respondents jointly and
solidarily the amount paid corresponding to the
3/16 shares of Eutropia, Victoria and Douglas in
the total amount of P 15,000.00, with legal
interest at 6% per annum computed from the
time of payment until finality of this decision and
12% per annum thereafter until fully paid.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
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