Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 156364 September 3, 2007
JACOBUS BERNHARD HULST, petitioner,
vs.
PR BUILDERS, INC., respondent.
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60981.
The facts:
Jacobus Bernhard Hulst (petitioner) and his spouse Ida Johanna Hulst-Van Ijzeren (Ida), Dutch nationals, entered
into a Contract to Sell with PR Builders, Inc. (respondent), for the purchase of a 210-sq m residential unit in
respondent's townhouse project in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.
When respondent failed to comply with its verbal promise to complete the project by June 1995, the spouses Hulst
filed before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) a complaint for rescission of contract with
interest, damages and attorney's fees, docketed as HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618.
On April 22, 1997, HLURB Arbiter Ma. Perpetua Y. Aquino (HLURB Arbiter) rendered a Decision2 in favor of
spouses Hulst, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the complainant, rescinding the
Contract to Sell and ordering respondent to:
1) Reimburse complainant the sum of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid by the complainants to
P.R. Builders, plus interest thereon at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum from the time complaint was
filed;
2) Pay complainant the sum of P297,000.00 as actual damages;
3) Pay complainant the sum of P100,000.00 by way of moral damages;
4) Pay complainant the sum of P150,000.00 as exemplary damages;
5) P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and for other litigation expenses; and
6) Cost of suit.
SO ORDERED.3
Meanwhile, spouses Hulst divorced. Ida assigned her rights over the purchased property to petitioner.4 From then
on, petitioner alone pursued the case.
On August 21, 1997, the HLURB Arbiter issued a Writ of Execution addressed to the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the
Regional Trial Court of Tanauan, Batangas directing the latter to execute its judgment.5
On April 13, 1998, the Ex-Officio Sheriff proceeded to implement the Writ of Execution. However, upon complaint
of respondent with the CA on a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, the levy made by the Sheriff was set aside,
requiring the Sheriff to levy first on respondent's personal properties.6 Sheriff Jaime B. Ozaeta (Sheriff) tried to
implement the writ as directed but the writ was returned unsatisfied.7
On January 26, 1999, upon petitioner's motion, the HLURB Arbiter issued an Alias Writ of Execution.8
On March 23, 1999, the Sheriff levied on respondent's 15 parcels of land covered by 13 Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT)9 in Barangay Niyugan, Laurel, Batangas.10
In a Notice of Sale dated March 27, 2000, the Sheriff set the public auction of the levied properties on April 28,
2000 at 10:00 a.m..11
Two days before the scheduled public auction or on April 26, 2000, respondent filed an Urgent Motion to Quash
Writ of Levy with the HLURB on the ground that the Sheriff made an overlevy since the aggregate appraised value
of the levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m is P83,616,000.00, based on the Appraisal Report12 of Henry Hunter
Bayne Co., Inc. dated December 11, 1996, which is over and above the judgment award.13
At 10:15 a.m. of the scheduled auction date of April 28, 2000, respondent's counsel objected to the conduct of the
public auction on the ground that respondent's Urgent Motion to Quash Writ of Levy was pending resolution.
Absent any restraining order from the HLURB, the Sheriff proceeded to sell the 15 parcels of land. Holly Properties
Realty Corporation was the winning bidder for all 15 parcels of land for the total amount ofP5,450,653.33. The sum
of P5,313,040.00 was turned over to the petitioner in satisfaction of the judgment award after deducting the legal
fees.14
At 4:15 p.m. of the same day, while the Sheriff was at the HLURB office to remit the legal fees relative to the
auction sale and to submit the Certificates of Sale15 for the signature of HLURB Director Belen G. Ceniza
(HLURB Director), he received the Order dated April 28, 2000 issued by the HLURB Arbiter to suspend the
proceedings on the matter.16
Four months later, or on August 28, 2000, the HLURB Arbiter and HLURB Director issued an Order setting aside
the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties,17 reasoning as follows:
While we are not making a ruling that the fair market value of the levied properties is PhP6,500.00 per square meter
(or an aggregate value of PhP83,616,000.00) as indicated in the Hunter Baynes Appraisal Report, we definitely
cannot agree with the position of the Complainants and the Sheriff that the aggregate value of the 12,864.00-square
meter levied properties is only around PhP6,000,000.00. The disparity between the two valuations are [sic] so
egregious that the Sheriff should have looked into the matter first before proceeding with the execution sale of the
said properties, especially when the auction sale proceedings was seasonably objected by Respondent's counsel,
Atty. Noel Mingoa. However, instead of resolving first the objection timely posed by Atty. Mingoa, Sheriff Ozaete
totally disregarded the objection raised and, posthaste, issued the corresponding Certificate of Sale even prior to the
payment of the legal fees (pars. 7 & 8, Sheriff's Return).
While we agree with the Complainants that what is material in an execution sale proceeding is the amount for
which the properties were bidded and sold during the public auction and that, mere inadequacy of the price is not a
sufficient ground to annul the sale, the court is justified to intervene where the inadequacy of the price shocks the
conscience (Barrozo vs. Macaraeg, 83 Phil. 378). The difference between PhP83,616,000.00 and Php6,000,000.00
is PhP77,616,000.00 and it definitely invites our attention to look into the proceedings had especially so when there
was only one bidder, the HOLLY PROPERTIES REALTY CORPORATION represented by Ma, Chandra Cacho
(par. 7, Sheriff's Return) and the auction sale proceedings was timely objected by Respondent's counsel (par. 6,
Sheriff's Return) due to the pendency of the Urgent Motion to Quash the Writ of Levy which was filed prior to the
execution sale.
Besides, what is at issue is not the value of the subject properties as determined during the auction sale, but the
determination of the value of the properties levied upon by the Sheriff taking into consideration Section 9(b) of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure x x x.
xxxx
It is very clear from the foregoing that, even during levy, the Sheriff has to consider the fair market value of the
properties levied upon to determine whether they are sufficient to satisfy the judgment, and any levy in excess of
the judgment award is void (Buan v. Court of Appeals, 235 SCRA 424).
x x x x18 (Emphasis supplied).
The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, the levy on the subject properties made by the Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of Tanauan, Batangas,
is hereby SET ASIDE and the said Sheriff is hereby directed to levy instead Respondent's real properties that are
reasonably sufficient to enforce its final and executory judgment, this time, taking into consideration not only the
value of the properties as indicated in their respective tax declarations, but also all the other determinants at arriving
at a fair market value, namely: the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties, its actual or potential
uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape or location, and the tax declarations thereon.
SO ORDERED.19
A motion for reconsideration being a prohibited pleading under Section 1(h), Rule IV of the 1996 HLURB Rules
and Procedure, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA on September 27, 2000.
On October 30, 2002, the CA rendered herein assailed Decision20 dismissing the petition. The CA held that
petitioner's insistence that Barrozo v. Macaraeg21 does not apply since said case stated that "when there is a right to
redeem inadequacy of price should not be material" holds no water as what is obtaining in this case is not "mere
inadequacy," but an inadequacy that shocks the senses; that Buan v. Court of Appeals22 properly applies since the
questioned levy covered 15 parcels of land posited to have an aggregate value of P83,616,000.00 which shockingly
exceeded the judgment debt of only around P6,000,000.00.
Without filing a motion for reconsideration,23 petitioner took the present recourse on the sole ground that:
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ARBITER'S ORDER
SETTING ASIDE THE LEVY MADE BY THE SHERIFF ON THE SUBJECT PROPERTIES.24
Before resolving the question whether the CA erred in affirming the Order of the HLURB setting aside the levy
made by the sheriff, it behooves this Court to address a matter of public and national importance which completely
escaped the attention of the HLURB Arbiter and the CA: petitioner and his wife are foreign nationals who are
disqualified under the Constitution from owning real property in their names.
Section 7 of Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain. (Emphasis
supplied).
The capacity to acquire private land is made dependent upon the capacity to acquire or hold lands of the public
domain. Private land may be transferred or conveyed only to individuals or entities "qualified to acquire lands of
the public domain." The 1987 Constitution reserved the right to participate in the disposition, exploitation,
development and utilization of lands of the public domain for Filipino citizens25 or corporations at least 60 percent
of the capital of which is owned by Filipinos.26 Aliens, whether individuals or corporations, have been disqualified
from acquiring public lands; hence, they have also been disqualified from acquiring private lands.27
Since petitioner and his wife, being Dutch nationals, are proscribed under the Constitution from acquiring and
owning real property, it is unequivocal that the Contract to Sell entered into by petitioner together with his wife and
respondent is void. Under Article 1409 (1) and (7) of the Civil Code, all contracts whose cause, object or purpose is
contrary to law or public policy and those expressly prohibited or declared void by law are inexistent and void from
the beginning. Article 1410 of the same Code provides that the action or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract does not prescribe. A void contract is equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect.28It
does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical relation.29
Generally, parties to a void agreement cannot expect the aid of the law; the courts leave them as they are, because
they are deemed in pari delicto or "in equal fault."30 In pari delicto is "a universal doctrine which holds that no
action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or
to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation;
and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief of any kind will be given to one against the other."31
This rule, however, is subject to exceptions32 that permit the return of that which may have been given under a void
contract to: (a) the innocent party (Arts. 1411-1412, Civil Code);33 (b) the debtor who pays usurious interest (Art.
1413, Civil Code);34 (c) the party repudiating the void contract before the illegal purpose is accomplished or before
damage is caused to a third person and if public interest is subserved by allowing recovery (Art. 1414, Civil
Code);35 (d) the incapacitated party if the interest of justice so demands (Art. 1415, Civil Code);36 (e) the party for
whose protection the prohibition by law is intended if the agreement is not illegal per se but merely prohibited and
if public policy would be enhanced by permitting recovery (Art. 1416, Civil Code);37 and (f) the party for whose
benefit the law has been intended such as in price ceiling laws (Art. 1417, Civil Code)38 and labor laws (Arts.
1418-1419, Civil Code).39
It is significant to note that the agreement executed by the parties in this case is a Contract to Sell and not a contract
of sale. A distinction between the two is material in the determination of when ownership is deemed to have been
transferred to the buyer or vendee and, ultimately, the resolution of the question on whether the constitutional
proscription has been breached.
In a contract of sale, the title passes to the buyer upon the delivery of the thing sold. The vendor has lost and cannot
recover the ownership of the property until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside.40 On the
other hand, a contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive
condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed.41 In other
words, in a contract to sell, the prospective seller agrees to transfer ownership of the property to the buyer upon the
happening of an event, which normally is the full payment of the purchase price. But even upon the fulfillment of
the suspensive condition, ownership does not automatically transfer to the buyer. The prospective seller still has to
convey title to the prospective buyer by executing a contract of absolute sale.42
Since the contract involved here is a Contract to Sell, ownership has not yet transferred to the petitioner when he
filed the suit for rescission. While the intent to circumvent the constitutional proscription on aliens owning real
property was evident by virtue of the execution of the Contract to Sell, such violation of the law did not materialize
because petitioner caused the rescission of the contract before the execution of the final deed transferring
ownership.
Thus, exception (c) finds application in this case. Under Article 1414, one who repudiates the agreement and
demands his money before the illegal act has taken place is entitled to recover. Petitioner is therefore entitled to
recover what he has paid, although the basis of his claim for rescission, which was granted by the HLURB, was not
the fact that he is not allowed to acquire private land under the Philippine Constitution. But petitioner is entitled to
the recovery only of the amount of P3,187,500.00, representing the purchase price paid to respondent. No damages
may be recovered on the basis of a void contract; being nonexistent, the agreement produces no juridical tie
between the parties involved.43 Further, petitioner is not entitled to actual as well as interests thereon,44 moral and
exemplary damages and attorney's fees.
The Court takes into consideration the fact that the HLURB Decision dated April 22, 1997 has long been final and
executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
conclusions of fact or law and whether it was made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the
land.45 The only recognized exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc
pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after
the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.46 None of the exceptions is present in
this case. The HLURB decision cannot be considered a void judgment, as it was rendered by a tribunal with
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint.47
Ineluctably, the HLURB Decision resulted in the unjust enrichment of petitioner at the expense of respondent.
Petitioner received more than what he is entitled to recover under the circumstances.
Article 22 of the Civil Code which embodies the maxim, nemo ex alterius incommode debet lecupletari (no man
ought to be made rich out of another's injury), states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
The above-quoted article is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, the provisions of which were
formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the
stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that spring from the fountain of good conscience;
guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through society to the end that law may approach its
supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice.48 There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly
retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the
fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience.49
A sense of justice and fairness demands that petitioner should not be allowed to benefit from his act of entering into
a contract to sell that violates the constitutional proscription.
This is not a case of equity overruling or supplanting a positive provision of law or judicial rule. Rather, equity is
exercised in this case "as the complement of legal jurisdiction [that] seeks to reach and to complete justice where
courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of power to adapt their judgments to the special
circumstances of cases, are incompetent to do so."50
The purpose of the exercise of equity jurisdiction in this case is to prevent unjust enrichment and to ensure
restitution. Equity jurisdiction aims to do complete justice in cases where a court of law is unable to adapt its
judgments to the special circumstances of a case because of the inflexibility of its statutory or legal jurisdiction.51
The sheriff delivered to petitioner the amount of P5,313,040.00 representing the net proceeds (bidded amount
isP5,450,653.33) of the auction sale after deducting the legal fees in the amount of P137,613.33.52 Petitioner is
only entitled to P3,187,500.00, the amount of the purchase price of the real property paid by petitioner to
respondent under the Contract to Sell. Thus, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may validly order
petitioner to return the excess amount of P2,125,540.00.
The Court shall now proceed to resolve the single issue raised in the present petition: whether the CA seriously
erred in affirming the HLURB Order setting aside the levy made by the Sheriff on the subject properties.
Petitioner avers that the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no factual basis for pegging the fair market value of the
levied properties at P6,500.00 per sq m or P83,616,000.00; that reliance on the appraisal report was misplaced since
the appraisal was based on the value of land in neighboring developed subdivisions and on the assumption that the
residential unit appraised had already been built; that the Sheriff need not determine the fair market value of the
subject properties before levying on the same since what is material is the amount for which the properties were
bidded and sold during the public auction; that the pendency of any motion is not a valid ground for the Sheriff to
suspend the execution proceedings and, by itself, does not have the effect of restraining the Sheriff from proceeding
with the execution.
Respondent, on the other hand, contends that while it is true that the HLURB Arbiter and Director did not
categorically state the exact value of the levied properties, said properties cannot just amount to P6,000,000.00; that
the HLURB Arbiter and Director correctly held that the value indicated in the tax declaration is not the sole
determinant of the value of the property.
The petition is impressed with merit.
If the judgment is for money, the sheriff or other authorized officer must execute the same pursuant to the
provisions of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, viz:
Sec. 9. Execution of judgments for money, how enforced.
(a) Immediate payment on demand. - The officer shall enforce an execution of a judgment for money by demanding
from the judgment obligor the immediate payment of the full amount stated in the writ of execution and all lawful
fees. x x x
(b) Satisfaction by levy. - If the judgment obligor cannot pay all or part of the obligation in cash, certified bank
check or other mode of payment acceptable to the judgment obligee, the officer shall levy upon the properties of the
judgment obligor of every kind and nature whatsoever which may be disposed of for value and not otherwise
exempt from execution, giving the latter the option to immediately choose which property or part thereof may be
levied upon, sufficient to satisfy the judgment. If the judgment obligor does not exercise the option, the officer shall
first levy on the personal properties, if any, and then on the real properties if the personal properties are insufficient
to answer for the judgment.
The sheriff shall sell only a sufficient portion of the personal or real property of the judgment obligor which has
been levied upon.
When there is more property of the judgment obligor than is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees, he
must sell only so much of the personal or real property as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and lawful fees.
Real property, stocks, shares, debts, credits, and other personal property, or any interest in either real or personal
property, may be levied upon in like manner and with like effect as under a writ of attachment (Emphasis
supplied).53
Thus, under Rule 39, in executing a money judgment against the property of the judgment debtor, the sheriff shall
levy on all property belonging to the judgment debtor as is amply sufficient to satisfy the judgment and costs, and
sell the same paying to the judgment creditor so much of the proceeds as will satisfy the amount of the judgment
debt and costs. Any excess in the proceeds shall be delivered to the judgment debtor unless otherwise directed by
the judgment or order of the court.54
Clearly, there are two stages in the execution of money judgments. First, the levy and then the execution sale.
Levy has been defined as the act or acts by which an officer sets apart or appropriates a part or the whole of a
judgment debtor's property for the purpose of satisfying the command of the writ of execution.55 The object of a
levy is to take property into the custody of the law, and thereby render it liable to the lien of the execution, and put
it out of the power of the judgment debtor to divert it to any other use or purpose.56
On the other hand, an execution sale is a sale by a sheriff or other ministerial officer under the authority of a writ of
execution of the levied property of the debtor.57
In the present case, the HLURB Arbiter and Director gravely abused their discretion in setting aside the levy
conducted by the Sheriff for the reason that the auction sale conducted by the sheriff rendered moot and academic
the motion to quash the levy. The HLURB Arbiter lost jurisdiction to act on the motion to quash the levy by virtue
of the consummation of the auction sale. Absent any order from the HLURB suspending the auction sale, the sheriff
rightfully proceeded with the auction sale. The winning bidder had already paid the winning bid. The legal fees had
already been remitted to the HLURB. The judgment award had already been turned over to the judgment creditor.
What was left to be done was only the issuance of the corresponding certificates of sale to the winning bidder. In
fact, only the signature of the HLURB Director for that purpose was needed58 a purely ministerial act.
A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed
manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, without regard for or the exercise of his own judgment
upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the
right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion nor
judgment.59In the present case, all the requirements of auction sale under the Rules have been fully complied with
to warrant the issuance of the corresponding certificates of sale.
And even if the Court should go into the merits of the assailed Order, the petition is meritorious on the following
grounds:
Firstly, the reliance of the HLURB Arbiter and Director, as well as the CA, on Barrozo v. Macaraeg60 and Buan v.
Court of Appeals61 is misplaced.
The HLURB and the CA misconstrued the Court's pronouncements in Barrozo. Barrozo involved a judgment debtor
who wanted to repurchase properties sold at execution beyond the one-year redemption period. The statement of the
Court in Barrozo, that "only where such inadequacy shocks the conscience the courts will intervene," is at best a
mere obiter dictum. This declaration should be taken in the context of the other declarations of the Court in
Barrozo, to wit:
Another point raised by appellant is that the price paid at the auction sale was so inadequate as to shock the
conscience of the court. Supposing that this issue is open even after the one-year period has expired and after the
properties have passed into the hands of third persons who may have paid a price higher than the auction sale
money, the first thing to consider is that the stipulation contains no statement of the reasonable value of the
properties; and although defendant' answer avers that the assessed value wasP3,960 it also avers that their real
market value was P2,000 only. Anyway, mere inadequacy of price which was the complaint' allegation is not
sufficient ground to annul the sale. It is only where such inadequacy shocks the conscience that the courts will
intervene. x x x Another consideration is that the assessed value being P3,960 and the purchase price being in effect
P1,864 (P464 sale price plusP1,400 mortgage lien which had to be discharged) the conscience is not shocked upon
examining the prices paid in the sales in National Bank v. Gonzales, 45 Phil., 693 and Guerrero v. Guerrero, 57
Phil., 445, sales which were left undisturbed by this Court.
Furthermore, where there is the right to redeem as in this case inadequacy of price should not be material
because the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss
he claims to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale.
x x x x (Emphasis supplied).62
In other words, gross inadequacy of price does not nullify an execution sale. In an ordinary sale, for reason of
equity, a transaction may be invalidated on the ground of inadequacy of price, or when such inadequacy shocks
one's conscience as to justify the courts to interfere; such does not follow when the law gives the owner the right to
redeem as when a sale is made at public auction,63 upon the theory that the lesser the price, the easier it is for the
owner to effect redemption.64 When there is a right to redeem, inadequacy of price should not be material because
the judgment debtor may re-acquire the property or else sell his right to redeem and thus recover any loss he claims
to have suffered by reason of the price obtained at the execution sale.65 Thus, respondent stood to gain rather than
be harmed by the low sale value of the auctioned properties because it possesses the right of redemption. More
importantly, the subject matter in Barrozo is the auction sale, not the levy made by the Sheriff.
The Court does not sanction the piecemeal interpretation of a decision. To get the true intent and meaning of a
decision, no specific portion thereof should be isolated and resorted to, but the decision must be considered in its
entirety.66
As regards Buan, it is cast under an entirely different factual milieu. It involved the levy on two parcels of land
owned by the judgment debtor; and the sale at public auction of one was sufficient to fully satisfy the judgment,
such that the levy and attempted execution of the second parcel of land was declared void for being in excess of and
beyond the original judgment award granted in favor of the judgment creditor.
In the present case, the Sheriff complied with the mandate of Section 9, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, to
"sell only a sufficient portion" of the levied properties "as is sufficient to satisfy the judgment and the lawful fees."
Each of the 15 levied properties was successively bidded upon and sold, one after the other until the judgment debt
and the lawful fees were fully satisfied. Holly Properties Realty Corporation successively bidded upon and bought
each of the levied properties for the total amount of P5,450,653.33 in full satisfaction of the judgment award and
legal fees.67
Secondly, the Rules of Court do not require that the value of the property levied be exactly the same as the
judgment debt; it can be less or more than the amount of debt. This is the contingency addressed by Section 9, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court. In the levy of property, the Sheriff does not determine the exact valuation of the levied
property. Under Section 9, Rule 39, in conjunction with Section 7, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court, the sheriff is
required to do only two specific things to effect a levy upon a realty: (a) file with the register of deeds a copy of the
order of execution, together with the description of the levied property and notice of execution; and (b) leave with
the occupant of the property copy of the same order, description and notice.68 Records do not show that respondent
alleged non-compliance by the Sheriff of said requisites.
Thirdly, in determining what amount of property is sufficient out of which to secure satisfaction of the execution,
the Sheriff is left to his own judgment. He may exercise a reasonable discretion, and must exercise the care which a
reasonably prudent person would exercise under like conditions and circumstances, endeavoring on the one hand to
obtain sufficient property to satisfy the purposes of the writ, and on the other hand not to make an unreasonable and
unnecessary levy.69 Because it is impossible to know the precise quantity of land or other property necessary to
satisfy an execution, the Sheriff should be allowed a reasonable margin between the value of the property levied
upon and the amount of the execution; the fact that the Sheriff levies upon a little more than is necessary to satisfy
the execution does not render his actions improper.70 Section 9, Rule 39, provides adequate safeguards against
excessive levying. The Sheriff is mandated to sell so much only of such real property as is sufficient to satisfy the
judgment and lawful fees.
In the absence of a restraining order, no error, much less abuse of discretion, can be imputed to the Sheriff in
proceeding with the auction sale despite the pending motion to quash the levy filed by the respondents with the
HLURB. It is elementary that sheriffs, as officers charged with the delicate task of the enforcement and/or
implementation of judgments, must, in the absence of a restraining order, act with considerable dispatch so as not to
unduly delay the administration of justice; otherwise, the decisions, orders, or other processes of the courts of
justice and the like would be futile.71 It is not within the jurisdiction of the Sheriff to consider, much less resolve,
respondent's objection to the continuation of the conduct of the auction sale. The Sheriff has no authority, on his
own, to suspend the auction sale. His duty being ministerial, he has no discretion to postpone the conduct of the
auction sale.
Finally, one who attacks a levy on the ground of excessiveness carries the burden of sustaining that contention.72In
the determination of whether a levy of execution is excessive, it is proper to take into consideration encumbrances
upon the property, as well as the fact that a forced sale usually results in a sacrifice; that is, the price demanded for
the property upon a private sale is not the standard for determining the excessiveness of the levy.73
Here, the HLURB Arbiter and Director had no sufficient factual basis to determine the value of the levied property.
Respondent only submitted an Appraisal Report, based merely on surmises. The Report was based on the projected
value of the townhouse project after it shall have been fully developed, that is, on the assumption that the residential
units appraised had already been built. The Appraiser in fact made this qualification in its Appraisal Report: "[t]he
property subject of this appraisal has not been constructed. The basis of the appraiser is on the existing model
units."74 Since it is undisputed that the townhouse project did not push through, the projected value did not become
a reality. Thus, the appraisal value cannot be equated with the fair market value. The Appraisal Report is not the
best proof to accurately show the value of the levied properties as it is clearly self-serving.
Therefore, the Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza in HLRB Case No.
IV6-071196-0618 which set aside the sheriff's levy on respondent's real properties, was clearly issued with grave
abuse of discretion. The CA erred in affirming said Order.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated October 30, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 60981 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated August 28, 2000 of HLURB Arbiter Ma.
Perpetua Y. Aquino and Director Belen G. Ceniza in HLRB Case No. IV6-071196-0618 is declared NULL
andVOID. HLURB Arbiter Aquino and Director Ceniza are directed to issue the corresponding certificates of sale
in favor of the winning bidder, Holly Properties Realty Corporation. Petitioner is ordered to return to respondent the
amount of P2,125,540.00, without interest, in excess of the proceeds of the auction sale delivered to petitioner.
After the finality of herein judgment, the amount of P2,125,540.00 shall earn 6% interest until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
Ynares-Santiago, Chairperson, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, JJ., concur.

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996

CESARIO URSUA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:p
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by
the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085,
otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1
Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan,
Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila
to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted
benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint
was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the
involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the
area. 2
On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao
City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client
Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had
to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar
Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents
before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised him not to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he
would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3
When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to
register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after
which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed
the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave him a
copy of the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." 4
Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in
the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced
himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline
station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly
charged.
On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without
leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his
supposedalias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner
argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which
according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction.
The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by
R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccionalminimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals.
On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing
an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not
violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his
alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is
also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one
occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement
for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the
prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births.
He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under
the wrong law. 5
Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the
evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the
statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider the spirit
and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat
the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7
For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner,
and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its
amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and
before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym for literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with
which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have
been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those
legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias,
and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias oraliases for the use of which judicial authority
has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial
authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register . . . .
The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No.
142 now reads:
Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in
athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different
from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was
baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon
entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose
births have not been registered in any local civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the
approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall
comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames.
Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally
provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name
and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he
has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The
judicial authority for the use ofalias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the
proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the
same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry.
The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use
in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of
Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes,
which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. 8 The
pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax
or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence
of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name,
or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in
a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or
such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any
other person having a joint or common interest with him in such contract, agreement, business transaction, or
business . . . .
For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice
among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the
field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons
could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a
thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly
authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 9
In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use
of analias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled
There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name "Yu
Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc.,
by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to
his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real
name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices
which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily
avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau."
The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for
naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because
if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be
contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions.
And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to
write his name following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of
the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau
Young."
All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and
reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to
warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and
habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized
the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds
by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is
known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a
different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends
to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition
contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.
It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was
the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead
of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which
petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is
no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real
name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even
legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the
Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the
Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and
examination by anyone under the proper circumstances.
While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the
concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business
transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as
amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative
measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all
objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142
is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this
principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by
conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest
easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by
him.
WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao
City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla, Vitug, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 24-37.
2 Id., p. 26.
3 Records, p. 7.
4 Rollo, p. 26.
5 Id., p. 12.
6 People v. Purisima, Nos. L-42050-66, 28 November 1978, 86 SCRA 542.
7 Gregorio, Antonio L., Fundamentals of Criminal Law Review, 1985 Ed., p. 9; People v. Manantan, No. L-14129,
31 July 1962, 5 SCRA 684.
8 Aquino, Ramon C., The Revised Penal Code, 1961 Ed., Vol. II, pp. 1008-1009.
9 Francisco, Vicente J., The Revised Penal Code Annotated, 1954 Ed., Vol. II, p. 331; Guevarra, Guillermo B.,
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 1946 Ed., p. 359.
10 106 Phil. 762 (1959).
11 Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. III, West Publishing Co., p. 139.
12 See Note 6.
13 People v. Uy Jui Pio, 102 Phil. 679 (1957).
14 See Note 6.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________
 Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24170 December 16, 1968
ILLUH ASAALI, HATIB ABDURASID, INGKOH BANTALA, BASOK INGKIN, and MOHAMMAD
BANTALLA,petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondent.
FERNANDO, J.:
The policy relentlessly adhered to and unhesitatingly pursued to minimize, if not to do away entirely, with the evil
and corruption that smuggling brings in its wake would be frustrated and set at naught if the action taken by
respondent Commissioner of Customs in this case, as affirmed by the Court of Tax Appeals, were to be set aside
and this appeal from the decision of the latter were to succeed. Fortunately, the controlling principles of law do not
call for a contrary conclusion. It cannot be otherwise if the legitimate authority vested in the government were not
to be reduced to futility and impotence in the face of an admittedly serious malady, that at times has assumed
epidemic proportions.
The principal question raised by petitioners, owners of five sailing vessels and the cargo loaded therein declared
forfeited by respondent Commissioner of Customs for smuggling, is the validity of their interception and seizure by
customs officials on the high seas, the contention being raised that importation had not yet begun and that the
seizure was effected outside our territorial waters..
Why such a plea could not be given the least credence without doing violence to common sense and placing the law
in disrepute would be apparent from a statement of the case and the findings of facts as set forth in the decision now
under review, of the Court of Tax Appeals, dated November 19, 1964, the opinion being penned by the late
Associate Judge Augusto M. Luciano.
His opinion starts thus: "This is an appeal from the decision of the Acting Commissioner of Customs in Customs
Case No. 113, dated September 26, 1961, (Jolo Seizure Identification Cases Nos. 38, 39, 40, 41 & 42) decreeing the
forfeiture of five (5) sailing vessels (kumpits) named 'Iroc-Iroc,' 'Lahat-lahat,' 'Liberal Wing III,' 'Sulu Area
Command,' and 'Business,' with their respective cargoes of blue seal cigarettes and rattan chairs for violation of
Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code and Section 20 of Republic Act No. 426 in relation with
Section 1363(f) of the Revised Administrative Code."1
The facts according to the above opinion "are not controverted." Thus: "It appears that on September 10, 1950, at
about noon time, a customs patrol team on board Patrol Boat ST-23 intercepted the five (5) sailing vessels in
question on the high seas, between British North Borneo and Sulu while they were heading towards Tawi-tawi,
Sulu. After ordering the vessels to stop, the customs officers boarded and found on board, 181 cases of 'Herald'
cigarettes, 9 cases of 'Camel' cigarettes, and some pieces of rattan chairs. The sailing vessels are all of Philippine
registry, owned and manned by Filipino residents of Sulu, and of less than thirty (30) tons burden. They came from
Sandakan, British North Borneo, but did not possess any permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage in
the importation of merchandise into any port of the Sulu sea, as required by Section 1363(a) of the Revised
Administrative Code. Their cargoes were not covered by the required import license under Republic Act No. 426,
otherwise known as the Import Control Law."2
Respondent Commissioner of Customs, as noted at the outset, affirmed the decision rendered by the Collector of
Customs of Jolo, who found cause for forfeiture under the law of the vessels and the cargo contained therein. He
was, as also already made known, sustained by the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence this petition for review.
The first two errors assigned by petitioners would impugn the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs to institute
seizure proceedings and thereafter to declare the forfeiture of the vessels in question and their cargo. They would
justify their stand thus: "In the light of the fact that the vessels involved with the articles laden therein were
apprehended and seized on the high seas, beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines, the said vessels could not
have touched any place or port in the Philippines, whether a port or place of entry or not, consequently, the said
vessels could not have been engaged in the importation of the articles laden therein into any Philippine port or
place, whether a port or place of entry or not, to have incurred the liability of forfeiture under Section 1363(a) of the
Revised Administrative Code."3
Such a contention was advanced by petitioners before the Court of Tax Appeals. It met the repudiation that it
deserved. Thus: "We perfectly see the point of the petitioners but considering the circumstances surrounding the
apprehension of the vessels in question, we believe that Section 1363(a) of the Revised Administrative Code should
be applied to the case at bar. It has been established that the five vessels came from Sandakan, British North
Borneo, a foreign port, and when intercepted, all of them were heading towards Tawi-tawi, a domestic port within
the Sulu sea. Laden with foreign manufactured cigarettes, they did not possess the import license required by
Republic Act No. 426, nor did they carry a permit from the Commissioner of Customs to engage in importation into
any port in the Sulu sea. Their course announced loudly their intention not merely to skirt along the territorial
boundary of the Philippines but to come within our limits and land somewhere in Tawi-tawi towards which their
prows were pointed. As a matter of fact, they were about to cross our aquatic boundary but for the intervention of a
customs patrol which, from all appearances, was more than eager to accomplish its mission."4
The sense of realism and the vigorous language employed by the late Judge Luciano in rejecting such a plea
deserve to be quoted. Thus: "To entertain even for a moment the thought that these vessels were probably not bound
for a Philippine port would be too much a concession even for a simpleton or a perennial optimist. It is quite
irrational for Filipino sailors manning five Philippine vessels to sneak out of the Philippines and go to British North
Borneo, and come a long way back laden with highly taxable goods only to turn about upon reaching the brink of
our territorial waters and head for another foreign port."5
1. We find no plausible reason not to accept in its entirety such a conclusion reached by the Court of Tax Appeals.
Nor, even if the persuasive element in the above view were not so overwhelming, could we alter the decisive facts
as found by it. For it is now beyond question that its finding, if supported by substantial evidence, binds us, only
questions of law being for us to resolve. Where the issue raised belongs to the former category, we lack the power
of review.6
Moreover, for understandable reasons, we feel extreme reluctance to substitute our own discretion for that of the
Court of Tax Appeals in its appreciation of the relevant facts and its appraisal of their significance. As we had
occasion to state in a relatively recent decision: "Nor as a matter of principle is it advisable for this Court to set
aside the conclusion reached by an agency such as the Court of Tax Appeals which is, by the very nature of its
function, dedicated exclusively to the study and consideration of tax problems and has necessarily developed an
expertise on the subject, ..., there has been an abuse or improvident exercise of its authority."7
2. We thus could rest our decision affirming that of the Court of Tax Appeals on the above consideration.
It might not be amiss however to devote some degree of attention to the legal points raised in the above two
assignment of errors, discussed jointly by petitioners-appellants, alleging the absence of jurisdiction, the deprivation
of property without due process of law and the abatement of liability consequent upon the repeal of Republic Act
No. 426. Not one of the principles of law relied upon suffices to call for reversal of the action taken by the
respondent Commissioner of Customs, even if the facts presented a situation less conclusive against the pretension
of petitioners-appellants.
From the apprehension and seizure of the vessels in question on the high seas beyond the territorial waters of the
Philippines, the absence of jurisdiction of Commissioner of Customs is predicated. Such contention of petitioners-
appellants is without merit.
It is unquestioned that all vessels seized are of Philippine registry. The Revised Penal Code leaves no doubt as to its
applicability and enforceability not only within the Philippines, its interior waters and maritime zone, but also
outside of its jurisdiction against those committing offense while on a Philippine ship ...8 The principle of law that
sustains the validity of such a provision equally supplies a firm foundation for the seizure of the five sailing vessels
found thereafter to have violated the applicable provisions of the Revised Administrative Code.9
Moreover, it is a well settled doctrine of International Law that goes back to Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in
Church v. Hubbart,10 an 1804 decision, that a state has the right to protect itself and its revenues, a right not limited
to its own territory but extending to the high seas. In the language of Chief Justice Marshall: "The authority of a
nation within its own territory is absolute and exclusive. The seizure of a vessel within the range of its cannon by a
foreign force is an invasion of that territory, and is a hostile act which it is its duty to repel. But its power to secure
itself from injury may certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory."
The question asked in the brief of petitioners-appellants as to whether the seizure of the vessels in question and the
cargoes on the high seas and thus beyond the territorial waters of the Philippines was legal must be answered in the
affirmative.
4. The next question raised is the alleged denial of due process arising from such forfeiture and seizure. The
argument on the alleged lack of validity of the action taken by the Commissioner of Customs is made to rest on the
fact that the alleged offense imputed to petitioners-appellants is a violation of Section 1363(a) and not Section
1363(f). The title of Section 1363 is clear, "Property subject to forfeiture under customs laws." The first subsection
thereof, (a) cover any vessel including cargo unlawfully engaged in the importation of merchandise except a port of
entry. Subsection (f) speaks of any merchandise of any prohibited importation, the importation of which is effected
or attempted contrary to law and all other merchandise which in the opinion of the Collector of Customs have been
used are or were intended to be used as instrument in the importation or exportation of the former.
From the above recital of the legal provisions relied upon, it would appear most clearly that the due process
question raised is insubstantial. Certainly, the facts on which the seizure was based were not unknown to
petitioners-appellants. On those facts the liability of the vessels and merchandise under the above terms of the
statute would appear to be undeniable. The action taken then by the Commissioner of Customs was in accordance
with law.
How could there be a denial of due process? There was nothing arbitrary about the manner in which such seizure
and forfeiture were effected. The right to a hearing of petitioners-appellants was respected. They could not have
been unaware of what they were doing. It would be an affront to reason if under the above circumstances they could
be allowed to raise in all seriousness a due process question. Such a constitutional guaranty, basic and fundamental,
certainly should not be allowed to lend itself as an instrument for escaping a liability arising from one's own
nefarious acts.
5. Petitioners-appellants would further assail the validity of the action taken by the respondent Commissioner of
Customs by the plea that the repeal of Republic Act No. 426 abated whatever liability could have been incurred
thereunder. This argument raised before the Court of Tax Appeals was correctly held devoid of any persuasive
force. The decision under review cited our opinion in Golay-Buchel & Cie v. Commissioner of Customs11 to the
effect that the expiration of the Import Control Law "did not produce the effect of declaring legal the importation of
goods which were illegally imported and the seizure and forfeiture thereof as ordered by the Collector of Customs
illegal or null and void."
Roxas v. Sayoc 12 announced that principle earlier. Thus: "Herein, we are concerned with the effect of the
expiration of a law, not with the abrogation of a law, and we hold the view that once the Commissioner of Customs
has acquired jurisdiction over the case, the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650 will not divest him of his
jurisdiction thereon duly acquired while said law was still in force. In other words, we believe that despite the
expiration of Republic Act No. 650 the Commissioner of Customs retained his jurisdiction over the case and could
continue to take cognizance thereof until its final determination, for the main question brought in by the appeal
from the decision of the Collector of Customs was the legality or illegality of the decision of the Collector of
Customs, and that question could not have been abated by the mere expiration of Republic Act No. 650. We firmly
believe that the expiration of Republic Act No. 650 could not have produced the effect (1) of declaring legal the
importation of the cotton counterpanes which were illegally imported, and (2) of declaring the seizure and forfeiture
ordered by the Collector of Customs illegal or null and void; in other words it could not have the effect of annulling
or setting aside the decision of the Collector of Customs which was rendered while the law was in force and which
should stand until it is revoked by the appellate tribunal."
As late as 1965, in Bombay Dept. Store v. Commissioner of Customs,13 we had occasion to reaffirm the doctrine in
the above two decisions, the present Chief Justice, speaking for the Court, stating that such expiration of the period
of effectivity of Republic Act No. 650 "did not have the effect of depriving the Commissioner of Customs of the
jurisdiction, acquired by him prior thereto, to act on cases of forfeiture pending before him, which are in the nature
of proceeding in rem...."
It is thus most evident that the Court of Tax Appeals had not in any wise refused to adhere faithfully to controlling
legal principles when it sustained the action taken by respondent Commissioner of Customs. It would be a reproach
and a reflection on the law if on the facts as they had been shown to exist, the seizure and forfeiture of the vessels
and cargo in question were to be characterized as outside the legal competence of our government and violative of
the constitutional rights of petitioners-appellants. Fortunately, as had been made clear above, that would be an
undeserved reflection and an unwarranted reproach. The vigor of the war against smuggling must not be hampered
by a misreading of international law concepts and a misplaced reliance on a constitutional guaranty that has not in
any wise been infringed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Tax Appeals of November 19, 1964, is affirmed. With costs
against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Capistrano, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, pp. I-II.
2 Ibid, p. II.
3 Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, pp. 9-10.
4 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals, Brief for Petitioners-Appellants, pp. VIII-IX.
5 Ibid, p. IX.
6 Cf. Sanchez v. Commissioner of Customs, 102 Phil. 37 (1957); Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, L-12174,
April 26, 1962; Yupangco & Sons. Inc. v. Commissioner of Customs, L-22259, Jan. 19, 1966; Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Priscilla Estate, L-18282, May 29, 1964; Phil. Guaranty Co. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, L-22074, Sept. 6, 1965; Republic v. Razon, L-17462, May 24, 1967; Balbas v. Domingo, L-19804, Oct.
23, 1967.
7 Alhambra Cigar v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-23226, Nov. 28, 1967.
8 Article 2, Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3815).
9 Section 1363 (a) and (f).
10 2 Cranch 187, 234.
11 106 Phil. 777, 783 (1959).
12 100 Phil. 448. 452-453 (1956).
13 L-20460, September 30.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.
DECISION
PARDO, J.:
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals[1] modifying that of the Regional Trial
Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as
Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as
Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy from March 10, 1927 to
September 30, 1957.[3]
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula) were married before
a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur.[4]
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayed in the conjugal
home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate of Naturalization No.
5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, Southern District of New York.[6]
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted an accrued leave by
the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines.[7] He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant
and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar of Nabua as Crisologo
Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and the line for the fathers name was left
blank.[9]
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drew a written
agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzos
salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement
regarding their conjugal property acquired during their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for
her adulterous act since she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The
agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. The
agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce with the Superior Court of the
State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively
participated in the proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the
County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila.[13] Apparently, Alicia had no knowledge of the
first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.[14]
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife.[15] Their twenty-five (25) year union
produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized by Notary Public
Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito
Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot, located at San
Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal properties and other movables or
belongings that may be found or existing therein;
(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F.
Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever and wheresoever located,
specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong,
Nabua, Camarines Sur;
(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children, Raul F. Llorente,
Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal,
Philippines;
(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal properties, shall not be
disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed
of by and among themselves;
(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will and Testament, and in
her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order of age, if of age;
(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic) without bond;
(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretofore executed, signed, or
published, by me;
(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the Llorentes Side should ever
bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real
or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament.[17]
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, a petition for the probate
and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special
Administratrix of his estate.[18]
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzo was still alive.[19]
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will to probate.[20]
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition[22] for letters of administration over Lorenzos
estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were
acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property.[23]
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition for the issuance of
letters testamentary.[24]
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave due course to Paulas petition
in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star.[26]
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the late Lorenzo Llorente is
void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16,
1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the estate even if the will especially
said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declares the intrinsic
disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal
partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is
also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and
Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free
portion in equal shares.
Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such
let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of
P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and complete inventory
of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at any time come to her possession or to the
possession of any other person for her, and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges
on the same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just
account of her administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court and
to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.
On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.
SO ORDERED.[27]
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modified its earlier decision,
stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise of Lorenzo since they were not legally
adopted by him.[29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only
illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of
the estate.[30]
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification the decision of the
trial court in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared
as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of
cohabitation.
SO ORDERED.[32]
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of the decision.[33]
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34] denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.[35]
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised,[36] the issue is simple. Who
are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trial court for ruling on the
intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at the time of: (1) his
divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and
undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found. (emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit the foreign law. The Court
of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where the case was referred back to the law of
the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, in the same breath it
made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American law follows the domiciliary theory hence,
Philippine law applies when determining the validity of Lorenzos will.[38]
First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code
cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary
provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in force only
within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State of which the decedent was a resident.[39]
Second, there is no showing that the application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State
law.
The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor of Alice, who in the
trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children,
Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) of whatever property she
and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probated as duly executed in
accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances
here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven that respondent was no
longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become
applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed.[43] We hold that the
divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a
matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best
left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of
the country in which they are executed.
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines
in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.
(underscoring ours)
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her is glaringly shown in
the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on
family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity.[44]
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best proved by foreign law
which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordance with the formalities required is
answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our
system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress
specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law.[45]
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No. 17446
promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES as VALID the
decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of
California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzo
N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with
instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within
the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
________________________________________
[1] In CA-G. R. SP. No. 17446, promulgated on July 31, 1995, Lipana-Reyes+, J., ponente, Torres, Jr. and Hofilena,
JJ., concurring.
[2] In Spec. Proc. No. IR-755 (In the Matter of the Probate and Allowance of the Last Will and Testament of
Lorenzo N. Llorente, Lorenzo N. Llorente, Petitioner) and Spec. Proc. No. IR-888 (Petition for the Grant of Letters
of Administration for the Estate of Lorenzo N. Llorente, Paula T. Llorente, Petitioner), dated May 18, 1987, Judge
Esteban B. Abonal, presiding.
[3] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51.
[4] Exh. B, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
[5] Ibid.
[6] This was issued pursuant to Lorenzos petition, Petition No. 4708849, filed with the U.S. Court. Exhs. H and H-3
Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 157, 159.
[7] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 51; Exh. B, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 61.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Exh. A, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 60.
[10] Exh. B-1 Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 62.
[11] Exh. D, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 63-64.
[12] Exh. E, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 69.
[13] Exh. F, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, p. 148.
[14] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[15] Comment, Rollo, p. 147.
[16] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[17] Exh. A, Trial Court Folder of Exhibits, pp. 3-4; Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[18] Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-755.
[19] Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 37.
[20] Ibid.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Docketed as Spec. Proc. No. IR-888.
[23] Decision, RTC, Rollo, p. 38.
[24] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 52.
[25] Ibid., pp. 52-53.
[26] Ibid., p. 53.
[27] RTC Decision, Rollo, p. 37.
[28] Order, Regional Trial Court in Spec. Proc. Nos. IR-755 and 888, Rollo, p. 46.
[29] Citing Article 335 of the Civil Code, which states, The following cannot adopt: xxx
(3) a married person, without the consent of the other spouse; xxx, the trial court reasoned that since the divorce
obtained by Lorenzo did not dissolve his first marriage with Paula, then the adoption of Raul and Luz was void, as
Paula did not give her consent to it.
[30] Order, Regional Trial Court, Rollo, p. 47.
[31] Docketed as CA-G. R. SP No. 17446.
[32] Decision, Court of Appeals, Rollo, p. 56.
[33] On August 31, 1995, petitioner also filed with this Court a verified complaint against the members of the
Special Thirteenth Division, Court of Appeals, Associate Justices Justo P. Torres, Jr., Celia Lipana-Reyes + and
Hector Hofilena for gross ignorance of the law, manifest incompetence and extreme bias (Rollo, p. 15).
[34] Again with Associate Justice Celia Lipana-Reyes+, ponente, concurred in by Associate Justices Justo P. Torres,
Jr. and Hector Hofilena (Former Special Thirteenth Division).
[35] Filed on May 10, 1996, Rollo, pp. 9-36.
[36] Petitioner alleges (1) That the Court of Appeals lost its jurisdiction over the case when it issued the resolution
denying the motion for reconsideration; (2) That Art. 144 of the Civil Case has been repealed by Arts. 253 and 147
of the Family Code and (3) That Alicia and her children not are entitled to any share in the estate of the deceased
(Rollo, p. 19).
[37] Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher, 110 Phil. 686 (1961).
[38] Joint Record on Appeal, p. 255; Rollo, p. 40.
[39] In Re: Estate of Edward Christensen, Aznar v. Helen Garcia, 117 Phil. 96 (1963).
[40] 139 SCRA 139 (1985).
[41] 300 SCRA 406 (1998).
[42] 174 SCRA 653 (1989).
[43] The ruling in the case of Tenchavez v. Escano (122 Phil. 752 [1965]) that provides that a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present civil code is not entitled to
recognition as valid in this jurisdiction is NOT applicable in the case at bar as Lorenzo was no longer a Filipino
citizen when he obtained the divorce.
[44] Article 15, Civil Code provides Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad. (Underscoring ours)
[45] Bellis v. Bellis, 126 Phil. 726 (1967).
Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National
Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside the Orders, dated
September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her
Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of
the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the marriage, they established their
residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married
also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short),
is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business,
and that private respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the
Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of
June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to appeal. certiorari
and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court.
However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and
whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to
correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in
this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property in the
Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the
representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court that they had no community of
property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred
by prior judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign Court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain
matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations between petitioner and
private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community property, upon complete
separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in
person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving
his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither
community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in
favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce
proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.
xxx xxx xxx 4
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The
decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue
petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not
valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the
marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are
to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The
marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not
marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is
bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose
decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to private
respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just.
Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private
respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She
should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the Complaint filed in
Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.
4 p. 98, Rollo.
5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga, Private
International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 133876 December 29, 1999

BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner,
vs.
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

BUENA, J.:
Does a mortgage-creditor waive its remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgage constituted over a third party
mortgagor's property situated in the Philippines by filing an action for the collection of the principal loan before
foreign courts?
Sought to be reversed in the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
decision 1 of public respondent Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV No. 51094, promulgated on 30 September 1997
and its resolution, 2 dated 22 May 1998, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner Bank of America NT & SA (BANTSA) is an international banking and financing institution duly licensed
to do business in the Philippines, organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State of California,
United States of America while private respondent American Realty Corporation (ARC) is a domestic corporation.
Bank of America International Limited (BAIL), on the other hand, is a limited liability company organized and
existing under the laws of England.
As borne by the records, BANTSA and BAIL on several occasions granted three major multi-million United States
(US) Dollar loans to the following corporate borrowers: (1) Liberian Transport Navigation, S.A.; (2) El Challenger
S.A. and (3) Eshley Compania Naviera S.A. (hereinafter collectively referred to as "borrowers"), all of which are
existing under and by virtue of the laws of the Republic of Panama and are foreign affiliates of private
respondent. 3
Due to the default in the payment of the loan amortizations, BANTSA and the corporate borrowers signed and
entered into restructuring agreements. As additional security for the restructured loans, private respondent ARC as
third party mortgagor executed two real estate mortgages, 4 dated 17 February 1983 and 20 July 1984, over its
parcels of land including improvements thereon, located at Barrio Sto. Cristo, San Jose Del Monte, Bulacan, and
which are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78760, T-78761, T-78762 and T-78763.
Eventually, the corporate borrowers defaulted in the payment of the restructured loans prompting petitioner
BANTSA to file civil actions 5 before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan, to wit:
a) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court (1992-Folio No 2098)
against Liberian Transport Navigation S.A., Eshley Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping
Company S.A., Eddie Navigation Corp., S.A., Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua and Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua on June
17, 1992.
b) In England, in its High Court of Justice, Queen's Bench Division, Commercial Court (1992-Folio No. 2245)
against El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A., Eduardo Katipuan Litonjua & Aurelio Katipunan
Litonjua on July 2, 1992;
c) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No. 4039 of 1992) against Eshley
Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company S.A. Pacific Navigators Corporation,
Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering (Edyship) Co., Inc., Aurelio Katipunan Litonjua, Jr. and
Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on November 19, 1992; and
d) In Hongkong, in the Supreme Court of Hongkong High Court (Action No. 4040 of 1992) against Eshley
Compania Naviera S.A., El Challenger S.A., Espriona Shipping Company, S.A., Pacific Navigators Corporation,
Eddie Navigation Corporation S.A., Litonjua Chartering (Edyship) Co., Jr. and Eduardo Katipunan Litonjua on
November 21, 1992.
In the civil suits instituted before the foreign courts, private respondent ARC, being a third party mortgagor, was
private not impleaded as party-defendant.
On 16 December 1992, petitioner BANTSA filed before the Office of the Provincial Sheriff of Bulacan, Philippines
an application for extrajudicial foreclosure 6 of real estate mortgage.
On 22 January 1993, after due publication and notice, the mortgaged real properties were sold at public auction in
an extrajudicial foreclosure sale, with Integrated Credit and Corporation Services Co (ICCS) as the highest bidder
for the sum of Twenty four Million Pesos (P24,000.000.00). 7
On 12 February 1993, private respondent filed before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, Branch 159, an action for
damages 8 against the petitioner, for the latter's act of foreclosing extrajudicially the real estate mortgages despite
the pendency of civil suits before foreign courts for the collection of the principal loan.
In its answer 9 petitioner alleged that the rule prohibiting the mortgagee from foreclosing the mortgage after an
ordinary suit for collection has been filed, is not applicable in the present case, claiming that:
a) The plaintiff, being a mere third party mortgagor and not a party to the principal restructuring agreements, was
never made a party defendant in the civil cases filed in Hongkong and England;
b) There is actually no civil suit for sum of money filed in the Philippines since the civil actions were filed in
Hongkong and England. As such, any decisions (sic) which may be rendered in the abovementioned courts are not
(sic) enforceable in the Philippines unless a separate action to enforce the foreign judgments is first filed in the
Philippines, pursuant to Rule 39, Section 50 of the Revised Rules of Court.
c) Under English Law, which is the governing law under the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its
security interest by filing civil actions for sums of money.
On 14 December 1993, private respondent filed a motion for
suspension 10 of the redemption period on the ground that "it cannot exercise said right of redemption without at
the same time waiving or contradicting its contentions in the case that the foreclosure of the mortgage on its
properties is legally improper and therefore invalid."
In an order 11 dated 28 January 1994, the trial court granted the private respondent's motion for suspension after
which a copy of said order was duly received by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
On 07 February 1994, ICCS, the purchaser of the mortgaged properties at the foreclosure sale, consolidated its
ownership over the real properties, resulting to the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. T-18627, T-186272,
T-186273, T-16471 and T-16472 in its name.
On 18 March 1994, after the consolidation of ownership in its favor, ICCS sold the real properties to Stateland
Investment Corporation for the amount of Thirty Nine Million Pesos (P39,000,000.00). 12 Accordingly, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-187781(m), T-187782(m), T-187783(m), T-16653P(m) and T-16652P(m) were issued in
the latter's name.
After trial, the lower court rendered a decision 13 in favor of private respondent ARC dated 12 May 1993, the
decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring that the filing in foreign courts by the defendant of
collection suits against the principal debtors operated as a waiver of the security of the mortgages. Consequently,
the plaintiff's rights as owner and possessor of the properties then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-
78759, T-78762, T-78763, T-78760 and T-78761, all of the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan, Philippines,
were violated when the defendant caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages constituted thereon.
Accordingly, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the following sums, all with legal interest thereon
from the date of the filing of the complaint up to the date of actual payment:
1) Actual or compensatory damages in the amount of Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00);
2) Exemplary damages in the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00); and
3) Costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the assailed decision of the lower court prompting petitioner to file a
motion for reconsideration which the appellate court denied.
Hence, the instant petition for review 14 on certiorari where herein petitioner BANTSA ascribes to the Court of
Appeals the following assignment of errors:
1. The Honorable Court of Appeals disregarded the doctrines laid down by this Hon. Supreme Court in the cases of

Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Courtdocketed as G.R. No. 74730 promulgated on August
25, 1989 and Philippine Commercial International Bank vs. IAC, 196 SCRA 29 (1991 case), although said cases
were duly cited, extensively discussed and specifically mentioned, as one of the issues in the assignment of errors
found on page 5 of the decision dated September 30, 1997.
2. The Hon. Court of Appeals acted with grave abuse of discretion when it awarded the private respondent actual
and exemplary damages totalling P171,600,000.00, as of July 12, 1998 although such huge amount was not asked
nor prayed for in private respondent's complaint, is contrary to law and is totally unsupported by evidence (sic).
In fine, this Court is called upon to resolve two main issues:
1. Whether or not the petitioner's act of filing a collection suit against the principal debtors for the recovery of the
loan before foreign courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
2. Whether or not the award by the lower court of actual and exemplary damages in favor of private respondent
ARC, as third-party mortgagor, is proper.
The petition is bereft of merit.
First, as to the issue of availability of remedies, petitioner submits that a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure
requires the concurrence of two requisites: an ordinary civil action for collection should be filed and subsequently a
final judgment be correspondingly rendered therein.
According to petitioner, the mere filing of a personal action to collect the principal loan does not suffice; a final
judgment must be secured and obtained in the personal action so that waiver of the remedy of foreclosure may be
appreciated. To put it differently, absent any of the two requisites, the mortgagee-creditor is deemed not to have
waived the remedy of foreclosure.
We do not agree.
Certainly, this Court finds petitioner's arguments untenable and upholds the jurisprudence laid down in Bachrach15
and similar cases adjudicated thereafter, thus:
In the absence of express statutory provisions, a mortgage creditor may institute against the mortgage debtor either
a personal action or debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. In other words, he may he may pursue either of
the two remedies, but not both. By such election, his cause of action can by no means be impaired, for each of the
two remedies is complete in itself. Thus, an election to bring a personal action will leave open to him all the
properties of the debtor for attachment and execution, even including the mortgaged property itself. And, if he
waives such personal action and pursues his remedy against the mortgaged property, an unsatisfied judgment
thereon would still give him the right to sue for a deficiency judgment, in which case, all the properties of the
defendant, other than the mortgaged property, are again open to him for the satisfaction of the deficiency. In either
case, his remedy is complete, his cause of action undiminished, and any advantages attendant to the pursuit of one
or the other remedy are purely accidental and are all under his right of election. On the other hand, a rule that would
authorize the plaintiff to bring a personal action against the debtor and simultaneously or successively another
action against the mortgaged property, would result not only in multiplicity of suits so offensive to justice (Soriano
vs. Enriques, 24 Phil. 584) and obnoxious to law and equity (Osorio vs. San Agustin, 25 Phil., 404), but also in
subjecting the defendant to the vexation of being sued in the place of his residence or of the residence of the
plaintiff, and then again in the place where the property lies.
In Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 16 this Court, reiterating jurisprudence enunciated in Manila Trading and Supply Co
vs. Co Kim 17 and Movido vs.
RFC, 18 invariably held:
. . . The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security and bring, instead, an ordinary
action to recover the indebtedness with the right to execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor,
including the subject matter of the mortgage . . . , subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy by him
elected, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived. (Emphasis Ours)
Anent real properties in particular, the Court has laid down the rule that a mortgage creditor may institute against
the mortgage debtor either a personal action for debt or a real action to foreclose the mortgage. 19
In our jurisdiction, the remedies available to the mortgage creditor are deemed alternative and not cumulative.
Notably, an election of one remedy operates as a waiver of the other. For this purpose, a remedy is deemed chosen
upon the filing of the suit for collection or upon the filing of the complaint in an action for foreclosure of mortgage,
pursuant to the provision of Rule 68 of the of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As to extrajudicial foreclosure,
such remedy is deemed elected by the mortgage creditor upon filing of the petition not with any court of justice but
with the Office of the Sheriff of the province where the sale is to be made, in accordance with the provisions of Act
No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118.
In the case at bench, private respondent ARC constituted real estate mortgages over its properties as security for the
debt of the principal debtors. By doing so, private respondent subjected itself to the liabilities of a third party
mortgagor. Under the law, third persons who are not parties to a loan may secure the latter by pledging or
mortgaging their own property. 20
Notwithstanding, there is no legal provision nor jurisprudence in our jurisdiction which makes a third person who
secures the fulfillment of another's obligation by mortgaging his own property, to be solidarily bound with the
principal obligor. The signatory to the principal contractloanremains to be primarily bound. It is only upon
default of the latter that the creditor may have recourse on the mortgagors by foreclosing the mortgaged properties
in lieu of an action for the recovery of the amount of the loan. 21
In the instant case, petitioner's contention that the requisites of filing the action for collection and rendition of final
judgment therein should concur, is untenable.
Thus, in Cerna vs. Court of Appeals, 22 we agreed with the petitioner in said case, that the filing of a collection suit
barred the foreclosure of the mortgage:
A mortgagee who files a suit for collection abandons the remedy of foreclosure of the chattel mortgage constituted
over the personal property as security for the debt or value of the promissory note when he seeks to recover in the
said collection suit.
. . . When the mortgagee elects to file a suit for collection, not foreclosure, thereby abandoning the chattel mortgage
as basis for relief, he clearly manifests his lack of desire and interest to go after the mortgaged property as security
for the promissory note . . . .
Contrary to petitioner's arguments, we therefore reiterate the rule, for clarity and emphasis, that the mere act of
filing of an ordinary action for collection operates as a waiver of the mortgage-creditor's remedy to foreclose the
mortgage. By the mere filing of the ordinary action for collection against the principal debtors, the petitioner in the
present case is deemed to have elected a remedy, as a result of which a waiver of the other necessarily must arise.
Corollarily, no final judgment in the collection suit is required for the rule on waiver to apply.
Hence, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate-Appellate Court, 23 a case relied upon by petitioner, supposedly
to buttress its contention, this Court had occasion to rule that the mere act of filing a collection suit for the recovery
of a debt secured by a mortgage constitutes waiver of the other remedy of foreclosure.
In the case at bar, petitioner BANTSA only has one cause of action which is non-payment of the debt. Nevertheless,
alternative remedies are available for its enjoyment and exercise. Petitioner then may opt to exercise only one of
two remedies so as not to violate the rule against splitting a cause of action.
As elucidated by this Court in the landmark case of Bachrach Motor Co., Inc, vs. Icarangal. 24
For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause of action against the debtor. This
single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit with execution of the security. In other words, the
creditor in his action may make two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But
both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single
cause of action. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the
former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only one cause of action for a
single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause
of action by filing a complaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the
mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor
to file two separate complaints simultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his
mortgage, we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much cost to the
courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor.
Petitioner further faults the Court of Appeals for allegedly disregarding the doctrine enunciated in Caltex wherein
this High Court relaxed the application of the general rules to wit:
In the present case, however, we shall not follow this rule to the letter but declare that it is the collection suit which
was waived and/or abandoned. This ruling is more in harmony with the principles underlying our judicial system. It
is of no moment that the collection suit was filed ahead, what is determinative is the fact that the foreclosure
proceedings ended even before the decision in the collection suit was rendered. . . .
Notably, though, petitioner took the Caltex ruling out of context. We must stress that the Caltex case was never
intended to overrule the well-entrenched doctrine enunciated Bachrach, which to our mind still finds applicability in
cases of this sort. To reiterate, Bachrach is still good law.
We then quote the decision 25 of the trial court, in the present case, thus:
The aforequoted ruling in Caltex is the exception rather than the rule, dictated by the peculiar circumstances
obtaining therein. In the said case, the Supreme Court chastised Caltex for making ". . . a mockery of our judicial
system when it initially filed a collection suit then, during the pendency thereof, foreclosed extrajudicially the
mortgaged property which secured the indebtedness, and still pursued the collection suit to the end." Thus, to
prevent a mockery of our judicial system", the collection suit had to be nullified because the foreclosure
proceedings have already been pursued to their end and can no longer be undone.
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, it has not been shown whether the defendant pursued to the end or are still pursuing the collection
suits filed in foreign courts. There is no occasion, therefore, for this court to apply the exception laid down by the
Supreme Court in Caltex by nullifying the collection suits. Quite obviously, too, the aforesaid collection suits are
beyond the reach of this Court. Thus the only way the court may prevent the spector of a creditor having "plural
redress for a single breach of contract" is by holding, as the Court hereby holds, that the defendant has waived the
right to foreclose the mortgages constituted by the plaintiff on its properties originally covered by Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-78759, T-78762, T-78760 and T-78761. (RTC Decision pp., 10-11)
In this light, the actuations of Caltex are deserving of severe criticism, to say the least. 26
Moreover, petitioner attempts to mislead this Court by citing the case of PCIB vs. IAC. 27 Again, petitioner tried to
fit a square peg in a round hole. It must be stressed that far from overturning the doctrine laid down in Bachrach,
this Court in PCIB buttressed its firm stand on this issue by declaring:
While the law allows a mortgage creditor to either institute a personal action for the debt or a real action to
foreclosure the mortgage, he cannot pursue both remedies simultaneously or successively as was done by PCIB in
this case.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, when the PCIB filed Civil Case No. 29392 to enforce payment of the 1.3 million promissory note secured by
real estate mortgages and subsequently filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure, it violates the rule against
splitting a cause of action.
Accordingly, applying the foregoing rules, we hold that petitioner, by the expediency of filing four civil suits before
foreign courts, necessarily abandoned the remedy to foreclose the real estate mortgages constituted over the
properties of third-party mortgagor and herein private respondent ARC. Moreover, by filing the four civil actions
and by eventually foreclosing extrajudicially the mortgages, petitioner in effect transgressed the rules against
splitting a cause of action well-enshrined in jurisprudence and our statute books.
In Bachrach, this Court resolved to deny the creditor the remedy of foreclosure after the collection suit was filed,
considering that the creditor should not be afforded "plural redress for a single breach of contract." For cause of
action should not be confused with the remedy created for its enforcement. 28
Notably, it is not the nature of the redress which is crucial but the efficacy of the remedy chosen in addressing the
creditor's cause. Hence, a suit brought before a foreign court having competence and jurisdiction to entertain the
action is deemed, for this purpose, to be within the contemplation of the remedy available to the mortgagee-creditor.
This pronouncement would best serve the interest of justice and fair play and further discourage the noxious
practice of splitting up a lone cause of action.
Incidentally, BANTSA alleges that under English Law, which according to petitioner is the governing law with
regard to the principal agreements, the mortgagee does not lose its security interest by simply filing civil actions for
sums of money. 29
We rule in the negative.
This argument shows desperation on the part of petitioner to rivet its crumbling cause. In the case at bench,
Philippine law shall apply notwithstanding the evidence presented by petitioner to prove the English law on the
matter.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be properly pleaded and proved as a fact. 30 Thus, if the
foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as
our local or domestic or internal
law. 31 This is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs.
Sy-Gonzales, 32 said foreign law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum,
the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. 33
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. 34
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment upon the
merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.
Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract
that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 35
Clearly then, English Law is not applicable.
As to the second pivotal issue, we hold that the private respondent is entitled to the award of actual or
compensatory damages inasmuch as the act of petitioner BANTSA in extrajudicially foreclosing the real estate
mortgages constituted a clear violation of the rights of herein private respondent ARC, as third-party mortgagor.
Actual or compensatory damages are those recoverable because of pecuniary loss in business, trade, property,
profession, job or occupation and the same must be proved, otherwise if the proof is flimsy and non-substantial, no
damages will be given. 36 Indeed, the question of the value of property is always a difficult one to settle as
valuation of real property is an imprecise process since real estate has no inherent value readily ascertainable by an
appraiser or by the court. 37 The opinions of men vary so much concerning the real value of property that the best
the courts can do is hear all of the witnesses which the respective parties desire to present, and then, by carefully
weighing that testimony, arrive at a conclusion which is just and equitable. 38

In the instant case, petitioner assails the Court of Appeals for relying heavily on the valuation made by Philippine
Appraisal Company. In effect, BANTSA questions the act of the appellate court in giving due weight to the
appraisal report composed of twenty three pages, signed by Mr. Lauro Marquez and submitted as evidence by
private respondent. The appraisal report, as the records would readily show, was corroborated by the testimony of
Mr. Reynaldo Flores, witness for private respondent.
On this matter, the trial court observed:
The record herein reveals that plaintiff-appellee formally offered as evidence the appraisal report dated March 29,
1993 (Exhibit J, Records, p. 409), consisting of twenty three (23) pages which set out in detail the valuation of the
property to determine its fair market value (TSN, April 22, 1994, p. 4), in the amount of P99,986,592.00 (TSN,
ibid., p. 5), together with the corroborative testimony of one Mr. Reynaldo F. Flores, an appraiser and director of
Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. (TSN,ibid., p. 3). The latter's testimony was subjected to extensive cross-
examination by counsel for defendant-appellant (TSN, April 22, 1994, pp. 6-22). 39
In the matter of credibility of witnesses, the Court reiterates the familiar and well-entrenched rule that the factual
findings of the trial court should be respected. 40 The time-tested jurisprudence is that the findings and conclusions
of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses enjoy a badge of respect for the reason that trial courts have the
advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 41
This Court will not alter the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, principally because they are in
a better position to assess the same than the appellate court. 42 Besides, trial courts are in a better position to
examine real evidence as well as observe the demeanor of witnesses. 43
Similarly, the appreciation of evidence and the assessment of the credibility of witnesses rest primarily with the trial
court. 44 In the case at bar, we see no reason that would justify this Court to disturb the factual findings of the trial
court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with regard to the award of actual damages.
In arriving at the amount of actual damages, the trial court justified the award by presenting the following
ratiocination in its assailed decision 45, to wit:
Indeed, the Court has its own mind in the matter of valuation. The size of the subject real properties are (sic) set
forth in their individuals titles, and the Court itself has seen the character and nature of said properties during the
ocular inspection it conducted. Based principally on the foregoing, the Court makes the following observations:
1. The properties consist of about 39 hectares in Bo. Sto. Cristo, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, which is (sic) not
distant from Metro Manila the biggest urban center in the Philippines and are easily accessible through well-
paved roads;
2. The properties are suitable for development into a subdivision for low cost housing, as admitted by defendant's
own appraiser (TSN, May 30, 1994, p. 31);
3. The pigpens which used to exist in the property have already been demolished. Houses of strong materials are
found in the vicinity of the property (Exhs. 2, 2-1 to 2-7), and the vicinity is a growing community. It has even been
shown that the house of the Barangay Chairman is located adjacent to the property in question (Exh. 27), and the
only remaining piggery (named Cherry Farm) in the vicinity is about 2 kilometers away from the western boundary
of the property in question (TSN, November 19, p. 3);
4. It will not be hard to find interested buyers of the property, as indubitably shown by the fact that on March 18,
1994, ICCS (the buyer during the foreclosure sale) sold the consolidated real estate properties to Stateland
Investment Corporation, in whose favor new titles were issued, i.e., TCT Nos. T-187781(m); T-187782(m), T-
187783(m); T-16653P(m) and T-166521(m) by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan (sic), Bulacan;
5. The fact that ICCS was able to sell the subject properties to Stateland Investment Corporation for Thirty Nine
Million (P39,000,000.00) Pesos, which is more than triple defendant's appraisal (Exh. 2) clearly shows that the
Court cannot rely on defendant's aforesaid estimate (Decision, Records, p. 603).
It is a fundamental legal aphorism that the conclusions of the trial judge on the credibility of witnesses command
great respect and consideration especially when the conclusions are supported by the evidence on record.
46Applying the foregoing principle, we therefore hold that the trial court committed no palpable error in giving
credence to the testimony of Reynaldo Flores, who according to the records, is a licensed real estate broker,
appraiser and director of Philippine Appraisal Company, Inc. since 1990. 47 As the records show, Flores had been
with the company for 26 years at the time of his testimony.
Of equal importance is the fact that the trial court did not confine itself to the appraisal report dated 29 March 1993,
and the testimony given by Mr. Reynaldo Flores, in determining the fair market value of the real property. Above all
these, the record would likewise show that the trial judge in order to appraise himself of the characteristics and
condition of the property, conducted an ocular inspection where the opposing parties appeared and were duly
represented.
Based on these considerations and the evidence submitted, we affirm the ruling of the trial court as regards the
valuation of the property
. . . a valuation of Ninety Nine Million Pesos (P99,000,000.00) for the 39-hectare properties (sic) translates to just
about Two Hundred Fifty Four Pesos (P254.00) per square meter. This appears to be, as the court so holds, a better
approximation of the fair market value of the subject properties. This is the amount which should be restituted by
the defendant to the plaintiff by way of actual or compensatory damages . . . . 48
Further, petitioner ascribes error to the lower court awarding an amount allegedly not asked nor prayed for in
private respondent's complaint.
Notwithstanding the fact that the award of actual and compensatory damages by the lower court exceeded that
prayed for in the complaint, the same is nonetheless valid, subject to certain qualifications.
On this issue, Rule 10, Section 5 of the Rules of Court is pertinent:
Sec. 5. Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence. When issues not raised by the pleadings
are tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be treated in all respects as if they had been
raised in the pleadings. Such amendment of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to the
evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party at any time, even after judgement; but
failure to amend does not affect the result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and
shall do so with liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice will be
subserved thereby. The court may grant a continuance to enable the amendment to be made.
The jurisprudence enunciated in Talisay-Silay Milling Co., Inc. vs. Asociacion de Agricultures de Talisay-Silay,
Inc.49 citing Northern Cement Corporation vs. Intermediate Appellate Court 50 is enlightening:
There have been instances where the Court has held that even without the necessary amendment, the amount proved
at the trial may be validly awarded, as in Tuazon v. Bolanos (95 Phil. 106), where we said that if the facts shown
entitled plaintiff to relief other than that asked for, no amendment to the complaint was necessary, especially where
defendant had himself raised the point on which recovery was based. The appellate court could treat the pleading as
amended to conform to the evidence although the pleadings were actually not amended. Amendment is also
unnecessary when only clerical error or non substantial matters are involved, as we held in Bank of the Philippine
Islands vs. Laguna (48 Phil. 5). In Co Tiamco vs. Diaz (75 Phil. 672), we stressed that the rule on amendment need
not be applied rigidly, particularly where no surprise or prejudice is caused the objecting party. And in the recent
case of National Power Corporation vs. Court of Appeals (113 SCRA 556), we held that where there is a variance in
the defendant's pleadings and the evidence adduced by it at the trial, the Court may treat the pleading as amended to
conform with the evidence.
It is the view of the Court that pursuant to the above-mentioned rule and in light of the decisions cited, the trial
court should not be precluded from awarding an amount higher than that claimed in the pleading notwithstanding
the absence of the required amendment. But it is upon the condition that the evidence of such higher amount has
been presented properly, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing parties to support their respective
contentions and to refute each other's evidence.
The failure of a party to amend a pleading to conform to the evidence adduced during trial does not preclude an
adjudication by the court on the basis of such evidence which may embody new issues not raised in the pleadings,
or serve as a basis for a higher award of damages. Although the pleading may not have been amended to conform to
the evidence submitted during trial, judgment may nonetheless be rendered, not simply on the basis of the issues
alleged but also the basis of issues discussed and the assertions of fact proved in the course of trial. The court may
treat the pleading as if it had been amended to conform to the evidence, although it had not been actually so
amended. Former Chief Justice Moran put the matter in this way:
When evidence is presented by one party, with the expressed or implied consent of the adverse party, as to issues
not alleged in the pleadings, judgment may be rendered validly as regards those issues, which shall be considered as
if they have been raised in the pleadings. There is implied consent to the evidence thus presented when the adverse
party fails to object thereto.
Clearly, a court may rule and render judgment on the basis of the evidence before it even though the relevant
pleading had not been previously amended, so long as no surprise or prejudice is thereby caused to the adverse
party. Put a little differently, so long as the basis requirements of fair play had been met, as where litigants were
given full opportunity to support their respective contentions and to object to or refute each other's evidence, the
court may validly treat the pleadings as if they had been amended to conform to the evidence and proceed to
adjudicate on the basis of all the evidence before it.
In the instant case, inasmuch as the petitioner was afforded the opportunity to refute and object to the evidence,
both documentary and testimonial, formally offered by private respondent, the rudiments of fair play are deemed
satisfied. In fact, the testimony of Reynaldo Flores was put under scrutiny during the course of the cross-
examination. Under these circumstances, the court acted within the bounds of its jurisdiction and committed no
reversible error in awarding actual damages the amount of which is higher than that prayed for. Verily, the lower
court's actuations are sanctioned by the Rules and supported by jurisprudence.
Similarly, we affirm the grant of exemplary damages although the amount of Five Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00)
awarded, being excessive, is subject to reduction. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of
example or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
51 Considering its purpose, it must be fair and reasonable in every case and should not be awarded to unjustly
enrich a prevailing party. 52 In our view, an award of P50,000.00 as exemplary damages in the present case
qualifies the test of reasonableness.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION of the amount awarded as exemplary damages. According,
petitioner is hereby ordered to pay private respondent the sum of P99,000,000.00 as actual or compensatory
damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damage and the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1 CA Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 51094, penned by Justice Ricardo P. Galvez and concurred in by Justice Fidel V.
Purisima and Justice B.A. Adefuin-De la Cruz; Rollo, pp. 38-58.
2 CA Resolution in CA G.R. CV No. 51094, dated 22 May 1998; Rollo, p. 60.
3 Rollo, p. 38.
4 Ibid., p. 39.
5 Ibid.
6 Ibid., p. 40.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid.
10 Rollo, p. 41.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Rollo, pp. 41-42.
14 Rollo, pp. 10-36.
15 Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., vs. Esteban Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287.
16 154 SCRA 446.
17 71 Phil. 448.
18 105 Phil. 886.
19 Danao vs. Court of Appeals 154 SCRA 446.
20 Article 2085, Civil Code; Lustan vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 663.
21 Cerna vs. Court of Appeals 220 SCRA 517.
22 Ibid.
23 176 SCRA 741.
24 68 Phil. 287.
25 Rollo, p. 94.
26 Caltex Philippines, Inc. vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 176 SCRA 741.
27 196 SCRA 29.
28 Bachrach Motor vs. Icarangal, 68 Phil. 287.
29 Rollo, p. 16.7.
30 Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43; Sy Joc Lieng vs. Syquia, 16 Phil. 137.
31 Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472.
32 167 SCRA 736.
33 Philippine Conflict of Laws, Eighth Edition, 1996, Paras, page 46.
34 Article 17, par. 3, Civil Code.
35 Philippine Conflict of Laws, Eight Edition, 1996, Paras, p. 60.
36 Perfecto vs. Gonzales, 128 SCRA 640, as cited in Danao vs. Court of Appeals, 154 SCRA 447.
37 22 Am. Jur. 2d 193.
38 City of Manila vs. Corrales, 32 Phil. 85, 96.
39 Rollo, p. 103.
40 People vs. Morales, 241 SCRA 267.
41 People vs. Gamiao, 240 SCRA 254.
42 People vs. Cascalla, 240 SCRA 482.
43 Lee Eng Hong vs. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 392.
44 Ibid.
45 Rollo, pp. 46-47.
46 People vs. Asoy, 251 SCRA 682.
47 TSN, April 22, 1994, p. 6.
48 Decision, Records, ibid.
49 247 SCRA 361, 377-378.
50 158 SCRA 408.
51 Article 2229, Civil Code.
52 Philtranco Service Exporters, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 273 SCRA 562.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22595 November 1, 1927
Testate Estate of Joseph G. Brimo, JUAN MICIANO, administrator, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
ANDRE BRIMO, opponent-appellant.
Ross, Lawrence and Selph for appellant.
Camus and Delgado for appellee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The partition of the estate left by the deceased Joseph G. Brimo is in question in this case.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The errors which the oppositor-appellant assigns are:
(1) The approval of said scheme of partition; (2) denial of his participation in the inheritance; (3) the denial of the
motion for reconsideration of the order approving the partition; (4) the approval of the purchase made by the Pietro
Lana of the deceased's business and the deed of transfer of said business; and (5) the declaration that the Turkish
laws are impertinent to this cause, and the failure not to postpone the approval of the scheme of partition and the
delivery of the deceased's business to Pietro Lanza until the receipt of the depositions requested in reference to the
Turkish laws.
The appellant's opposition is based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
G. Brimo's will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason they are void
as being in violation or article 10 of the Civil Code which, among other things, provides the following:
Nevertheless, legal and testamentary successions, in respect to the order of succession as well as to the amount of
the successional rights and the intrinsic validity of their provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the
person whose succession is in question, whatever may be the nature of the property or the country in which it may
be situated.
But the fact is that the oppositor did not prove that said testimentary dispositions are not in accordance with the
Turkish laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in
the absence of evidence on such laws, they are presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines. (Lim and Lim
vs. Collector of Customs, 36 Phil., 472.)
It has not been proved in these proceedings what the Turkish laws are. He, himself, acknowledges it when he
desires to be given an opportunity to present evidence on this point; so much so that he assigns as an error of the
court in not having deferred the approval of the scheme of partition until the receipt of certain testimony requested
regarding the Turkish laws on the matter.
The refusal to give the oppositor another opportunity to prove such laws does not constitute an error. It is
discretionary with the trial court, and, taking into consideration that the oppositor was granted ample opportunity to
introduce competent evidence, we find no abuse of discretion on the part of the court in this particular. There is,
therefore, no evidence in the record that the national law of the testator Joseph G. Brimo was violated in the
testamentary dispositions in question which, not being contrary to our laws in force, must be complied with and
executed. lawphil.net
Therefore, the approval of the scheme of partition in this respect was not erroneous.
In regard to the first assignment of error which deals with the exclusion of the herein appellant as a legatee,
inasmuch as he is one of the persons designated as such in will, it must be taken into consideration that such
exclusion is based on the last part of the second clause of the will, which says:
Second. I like desire to state that although by law, I am a Turkish citizen, this citizenship having been conferred
upon me by conquest and not by free choice, nor by nationality and, on the other hand, having resided for a
considerable length of time in the Philippine Islands where I succeeded in acquiring all of the property that I now
possess, it is my wish that the distribution of my property and everything in connection with this, my will, be made
and disposed of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine islands, requesting all of my relatives to
respect this wish, otherwise, I annul and cancel beforehand whatever disposition found in this will favorable to the
person or persons who fail to comply with this request.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and the condition is that the instituted legatees must respect the
testator's will to distribute his property, not in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in accordance with
the laws of the Philippines.
If this condition as it is expressed were legal and valid, any legatee who fails to comply with it, as the herein
oppositor who, by his attitude in these proceedings has not respected the will of the testator, as expressed, is
prevented from receiving his legacy.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void, being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code provides
the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide.
And said condition is contrary to law because it expressly ignores the testator's national law when, according to
article 10 of the civil Code above quoted, such national law of the testator is the one to govern his testamentary
dispositions.
Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered unwritten, and the institution of
legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and effective even as to the herein oppositor.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the condition
imposed upon the legatees, is null and void, being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and effective it
not appearing that said clauses are contrary to the testator's national law.
Therefore, the orders appealed from are modified and it is directed that the distribution of this estate be made in
such a manner as to include the herein appellant Andre Brimo as one of the legatees, and the scheme of partition
submitted by the judicial administrator is approved in all other respects, without any pronouncement as to costs.
So ordered.
Street, Malcolm, Avancea, Villamor and Ostrand, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16749 January 31, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE TESTATE ESTATE OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN, DECEASED.
ADOLFO C. AZNAR, Executor and LUCY CHRISTENSEN, Heir of the deceased, Executor and Heir-appellees,
vs.
HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.
M. R. Sotelo for executor and heir-appellees.
Leopoldo M. Abellera and Jovito Salonga for oppositor-appellant.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr., presiding, in
Special Proceeding No. 622 of said court, dated September 14, 1949, approving among things the final accounts of
the executor, directing the executor to reimburse Maria Lucy Christensen the amount of P3,600 paid by her to
Helen Christensen Garcia as her legacy, and declaring Maria Lucy Christensen entitled to the residue of the
property to be enjoyed during her lifetime, and in case of death without issue, one-half of said residue to be payable
to Mrs. Carrie Louise C. Borton, etc., in accordance with the provisions of the will of the testator Edward E.
Christensen. The will was executed in Manila on March 5, 1951 and contains the following provisions:
3. I declare ... that I have but ONE (1) child, named MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney),
who was born in the Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No. 665 Rodger Young
Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I now have no living ascendants, and no descendants except my above named daughter,
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN, now married to Eduardo Garcia, about
eighteen years of age and who, notwithstanding the fact that she was baptized Christensen, is not in any way related
to me, nor has she been at any time adopted by me, and who, from all information I have now resides in Egpit,
Digos, Davao, Philippines, the sum of THREE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED PESOS (P3,600.00), Philippine
Currency the same to be deposited in trust for the said Maria Helen Christensen with the Davao Branch of the
Philippine National Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100.00), Philippine Currency per
month until the principal thereof as well as any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted..
xxx xxx xxx
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN
DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of my property and estate, real, personal
and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind or character, and wheresoever situated, of which I may be possessed at my death
and which may have come to me from any source whatsoever, during her lifetime: ....
It is in accordance with the above-quoted provisions that the executor in his final account and project of partition
ratified the payment of only P3,600 to Helen Christensen Garcia and proposed that the residue of the estate be
transferred to his daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen.
Opposition to the approval of the project of partition was filed by Helen Christensen Garcia, insofar as it deprives
her (Helen) of her legitime as an acknowledged natural child, she having been declared by Us in G.R. Nos. L-
11483-84 an acknowledged natural child of the deceased Edward E. Christensen. The legal grounds of opposition
are (a) that the distribution should be governed by the laws of the Philippines, and (b) that said order of distribution
is contrary thereto insofar as it denies to Helen Christensen, one of two acknowledged natural children, one-half of
the estate in full ownership. In amplification of the above grounds it was alleged that the law that should govern the
estate of the deceased Christensen should not be the internal law of California alone, but the entire law thereof
because several foreign elements are involved, that the forum is the Philippines and even if the case were decided in
California, Section 946 of the California Civil Code, which requires that the domicile of the decedent should apply,
should be applicable. It was also alleged that Maria Helen Christensen having been declared an acknowledged
natural child of the decedent, she is deemed for all purposes legitimate from the time of her birth.
The court below ruled that as Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of
California at the time of his death, the successional rights and intrinsic validity of the provisions in his will are to be
governed by the law of California, in accordance with which a testator has the right to dispose of his property in the
way he desires, because the right of absolute dominion over his property is sacred and inviolable (In re McDaniel's
Estate, 77 Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952, and In re Kaufman, 117 Cal. 286, 49 Pac. 192, cited in page 179,
Record on Appeal). Oppositor Maria Helen Christensen, through counsel, filed various motions for reconsideration,
but these were denied. Hence, this appeal.
The most important assignments of error are as follows:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT
THAT HELEN IS THE ACKNOWLEDGED NATURAL CHILD OF EDWARD E. CHRISTENSEN AND,
CONSEQUENTLY, IN DEPRIVING HER OF HER JUST SHARE IN THE INHERITANCE.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ENTIRELY IGNORING AND/OR FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THE
EXISTENCE OF SEVERAL FACTORS, ELEMENTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES CALLING FOR THE
APPLICATION OF INTERNAL LAW.
III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE THAT UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW,
PARTICULARLY UNDER THE RENVOI DOCTRINE, THE INTRINSIC VALIDITY OF THE
TESTAMENTARY DISPOSITION OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED EDWARD
E. CHRISTENSEN SHOULD BE GOVERNED BY THE LAWS OF THE PHILIPPINES.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE SCHEDULE OF DISTRIBUTION
SUBMITTED BY THE EXECUTOR IS CONTRARY TO THE PHILIPPINE LAWS.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT UNDER THE PHILIPPINE LAWS HELEN
CHRISTENSEN GARCIA IS ENTITLED TO ONE-HALF (1/2) OF THE ESTATE IN FULL OWNERSHIP.
There is no question that Edward E. Christensen was a citizen of the United States and of the State of California at
the time of his death. But there is also no question that at the time of his death he was domiciled in the Philippines,
as witness the following facts admitted by the executor himself in appellee's brief:
In the proceedings for admission of the will to probate, the facts of record show that the deceased Edward E.
Christensen was born on November 29, 1875 in New York City, N.Y., U.S.A.; his first arrival in the Philippines, as
an appointed school teacher, was on July 1, 1901, on board the U.S. Army Transport "Sheridan" with Port of
Embarkation as the City of San Francisco, in the State of California, U.S.A. He stayed in the Philippines until 1904.
In December, 1904, Mr. Christensen returned to the United States and stayed there for the following nine years until
1913, during which time he resided in, and was teaching school in Sacramento, California.
Mr. Christensen's next arrival in the Philippines was in July of the year 1913. However, in 1928, he again departed
the Philippines for the United States and came back here the following year, 1929. Some nine years later, in 1938,
he again returned to his own country, and came back to the Philippines the following year, 1939.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Being an American citizen, Mr. Christensen was interned by the Japanese Military Forces in the Philippines during
World War II. Upon liberation, in April 1945, he left for the United States but returned to the Philippines in
December, 1945. Appellees Collective Exhibits "6", CFI Davao, Sp. Proc. 622, as Exhibits "AA", "BB" and "CC-
Daney"; Exhs. "MM", "MM-l", "MM-2-Daney" and p. 473, t.s.n., July 21, 1953.)
In April, 1951, Edward E. Christensen returned once more to California shortly after the making of his last will and
testament (now in question herein) which he executed at his lawyers' offices in Manila on March 5, 1951. He died
at the St. Luke's Hospital in the City of Manila on April 30, 1953. (pp. 2-3)
In arriving at the conclusion that the domicile of the deceased is the Philippines, we are persuaded by the fact that
he was born in New York, migrated to California and resided there for nine years, and since he came to the
Philippines in 1913 he returned to California very rarely and only for short visits (perhaps to relatives), and
considering that he appears never to have owned or acquired a home or properties in that state, which would
indicate that he would ultimately abandon the Philippines and make home in the State of California.
Sec. 16. Residence is a term used with many shades of meaning from mere temporary presence to the most
permanent abode. Generally, however, it is used to denote something more than mere physical presence. (Goodrich
on Conflict of Laws, p. 29)
As to his citizenship, however, We find that the citizenship that he acquired in California when he resided in
Sacramento, California from 1904 to 1913, was never lost by his stay in the Philippines, for the latter was a territory
of the United States (not a state) until 1946 and the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of
California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951 he declared that he was a citizen of that State; so that
he appears never to have intended to abandon his California citizenship by acquiring another. This conclusion is in
accordance with the following principle expounded by Goodrich in his Conflict of Laws.
The terms "'residence" and "domicile" might well be taken to mean the same thing, a place of permanent abode. But
domicile, as has been shown, has acquired a technical meaning. Thus one may be domiciled in a place where he has
never been. And he may reside in a place where he has no domicile. The man with two homes, between which he
divides his time, certainly resides in each one, while living in it. But if he went on business which would require his
presence for several weeks or months, he might properly be said to have sufficient connection with the place to be
called a resident. It is clear, however, that, if he treated his settlement as continuing only for the particular business
in hand, not giving up his former "home," he could not be a domiciled New Yorker. Acquisition of a domicile of
choice requires the exercise of intention as well as physical presence. "Residence simply requires bodily presence
of an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make
it one's domicile." Residence, however, is a term used with many shades of meaning, from the merest temporary
presence to the most permanent abode, and it is not safe to insist that any one use et the only proper one. (Goodrich,
p. 29)
The law that governs the validity of his testamentary dispositions is defined in Article 16 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, which is as follows:
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of
the country where said property may be found.
The application of this article in the case at bar requires the determination of the meaning of the term "national law"
is used therein.
There is no single American law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the United States, each state
of the Union having its own private law applicable to its citizens only and in force only within the state. The
"national law" indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code above quoted can not, therefore, possibly mean or apply to
any general American law. So it can refer to no other than the private law of the State of California.
The next question is: What is the law in California governing the disposition of personal property? The decision of
the court below, sustains the contention of the executor-appellee that under the California Probate Code, a testator
may dispose of his property by will in the form and manner he desires, citing the case of Estate of McDaniel, 77
Cal. Appl. 2d 877, 176 P. 2d 952. But appellant invokes the provisions of Article 946 of the Civil Code of
California, which is as follows:
If there is no law to the contrary, in the place where personal property is situated, it is deemed to follow the person
of its owner, and is governed by the law of his domicile.
The existence of this provision is alleged in appellant's opposition and is not denied. We have checked it in the
California Civil Code and it is there. Appellee, on the other hand, relies on the case cited in the decision and
testified to by a witness. (Only the case of Kaufman is correctly cited.) It is argued on executor's behalf that as the
deceased Christensen was a citizen of the State of California, the internal law thereof, which is that given in the
abovecited case, should govern the determination of the validity of the testamentary provisions of Christensen's
will, such law being in force in the State of California of which Christensen was a citizen. Appellant, on the other
hand, insists that Article 946 should be applicable, and in accordance therewith and following the doctrine of
therenvoi, the question of the validity of the testamentary provision in question should be referred back to the law
of the decedent's domicile, which is the Philippines.
The theory of doctrine of renvoi has been defined by various authors, thus:
The problem has been stated in this way: "When the Conflict of Laws rule of the forum refers a jural matter to a
foreign law for decision, is the reference to the purely internal rules of law of the foreign system; i.e., to the totality
of the foreign law minus its Conflict of Laws rules?"
On logic, the solution is not an easy one. The Michigan court chose to accept the renvoi, that is, applied the Conflict
of Laws rule of Illinois which referred the matter back to Michigan law. But once having determined the the
Conflict of Laws principle is the rule looked to, it is difficult to see why the reference back should not have been to
Michigan Conflict of Laws. This would have resulted in the "endless chain of references" which has so often been
criticized be legal writers. The opponents of the renvoi would have looked merely to the internal law of Illinois,
thus rejecting the renvoi or the reference back. Yet there seems no compelling logical reason why the original
reference should be the internal law rather than to the Conflict of Laws rule. It is true that such a solution avoids
going on a merry-go-round, but those who have accepted the renvoitheory avoid this inextricabilis circulas by
getting off at the second reference and at that point applying internal law. Perhaps the opponents of the renvoi are a
bit more consistent for they look always to internal law as the rule of reference.
Strangely enough, both the advocates for and the objectors to the renvoi plead that greater uniformity will result
from adoption of their respective views. And still more strange is the fact that the only way to achieve uniformity in
this choice-of-law problem is if in the dispute the two states whose laws form the legal basis of the litigation
disagree as to whether the renvoi should be accepted. If both reject, or both accept the doctrine, the result of the
litigation will vary with the choice of the forum. In the case stated above, had the Michigan court rejected the
renvoi, judgment would have been against the woman; if the suit had been brought in the Illinois courts, and they
too rejected the renvoi, judgment would be for the woman. The same result would happen, though the courts would
switch with respect to which would hold liability, if both courts accepted the renvoi.
The Restatement accepts the renvoi theory in two instances: where the title to land is in question, and where the
validity of a decree of divorce is challenged. In these cases the Conflict of Laws rule of the situs of the land, or the
domicile of the parties in the divorce case, is applied by the forum, but any further reference goes only to the
internal law. Thus, a person's title to land, recognized by the situs, will be recognized by every court; and every
divorce, valid by the domicile of the parties, will be valid everywhere. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 7, pp. 13-
14.)
X, a citizen of Massachusetts, dies intestate, domiciled in France, leaving movable property in Massachusetts,
England, and France. The question arises as to how this property is to be distributed among X's next of kin.
Assume (1) that this question arises in a Massachusetts court. There the rule of the conflict of laws as to intestate
succession to movables calls for an application of the law of the deceased's last domicile. Since by hypothesis X's
last domicile was France, the natural thing for the Massachusetts court to do would be to turn to French statute of
distributions, or whatever corresponds thereto in French law, and decree a distribution accordingly. An examination
of French law, however, would show that if a French court were called upon to determine how this property should
be distributed, it would refer the distribution to the national law of the deceased, thus applying the Massachusetts
statute of distributions. So on the surface of things the Massachusetts court has open to it alternative course of
action: (a) either to apply the French law is to intestate succession, or (b) to resolve itself into a French court and
apply the Massachusetts statute of distributions, on the assumption that this is what a French court would do. If it
accepts the so-called renvoidoctrine, it will follow the latter course, thus applying its own law.
This is one type of renvoi. A jural matter is presented which the conflict-of-laws rule of the forum refers to a foreign
law, the conflict-of-laws rule of which, in turn, refers the matter back again to the law of the forum. This is renvoi
in the narrower sense. The German term for this judicial process is 'Ruckverweisung.'" (Harvard Law Review, Vol.
31, pp. 523-571.)
After a decision has been arrived at that a foreign law is to be resorted to as governing a particular case, the further
question may arise: Are the rules as to the conflict of laws contained in such foreign law also to be resorted to? This
is a question which, while it has been considered by the courts in but a few instances, has been the subject of
frequent discussion by textwriters and essayists; and the doctrine involved has been descriptively designated by
them as the "Renvoyer" to send back, or the "Ruchversweisung", or the "Weiterverweisung", since an affirmative
answer to the question postulated and the operation of the adoption of the foreign law in toto would in many cases
result in returning the main controversy to be decided according to the law of the forum. ... (16 C.J.S. 872.)
Another theory, known as the "doctrine of renvoi", has been advanced. The theory of the doctrine of renvoiis that
the court of the forum, in determining the question before it, must take into account the whole law of the other
jurisdiction, but also its rules as to conflict of laws, and then apply the law to the actual question which the rules of
the other jurisdiction prescribe. This may be the law of the forum. The doctrine of therenvoi has generally been
repudiated by the American authorities. (2 Am. Jur. 296)
The scope of the theory of renvoi has also been defined and the reasons for its application in a country explained by
Prof. Lorenzen in an article in the Yale Law Journal, Vol. 27, 1917-1918, pp. 529-531. The pertinent parts of the
article are quoted herein below:
The recognition of the renvoi theory implies that the rules of the conflict of laws are to be understood as
incorporating not only the ordinary or internal law of the foreign state or country, but its rules of the conflict of laws
as well. According to this theory 'the law of a country' means the whole of its law.
xxx xxx xxx
Von Bar presented his views at the meeting of the Institute of International Law, at Neuchatel, in 1900, in the form
of the following theses:
(1) Every court shall observe the law of its country as regards the application of foreign laws.
(2) Provided that no express provision to the contrary exists, the court shall respect:
(a) The provisions of a foreign law which disclaims the right to bind its nationals abroad as regards their personal
statute, and desires that said personal statute shall be determined by the law of the domicile, or even by the law of
the place where the act in question occurred.
(b) The decision of two or more foreign systems of law, provided it be certain that one of them is necessarily
competent, which agree in attributing the determination of a question to the same system of law.
xxx xxx xxx
If, for example, the English law directs its judge to distribute the personal estate of an Englishman who has died
domiciled in Belgium in accordance with the law of his domicile, he must first inquire whether the law of Belgium
would distribute personal property upon death in accordance with the law of domicile, and if he finds that the
Belgian law would make the distribution in accordance with the law of nationality that is the English law he
must accept this reference back to his own law.
We note that Article 946 of the California Civil Code is its conflict of laws rule, while the rule applied in In re
Kaufman, Supra, its internal law. If the law on succession and the conflict of laws rules of California are to be
enforced jointly, each in its own intended and appropriate sphere, the principle cited In re Kaufman should apply to
citizens living in the State, but Article 946 should apply to such of its citizens as are not domiciled in California but
in other jurisdictions. The rule laid down of resorting to the law of the domicile in the determination of matters with
foreign element involved is in accord with the general principle of American law that the domiciliary law should
govern in most matters or rights which follow the person of the owner.
When a man dies leaving personal property in one or more states, and leaves a will directing the manner of
distribution of the property, the law of the state where he was domiciled at the time of his death will be looked to in
deciding legal questions about the will, almost as completely as the law of situs is consulted in questions about the
devise of land. It is logical that, since the domiciliary rules control devolution of the personal estate in case of
intestate succession, the same rules should determine the validity of an attempted testamentary dispostion of the
property. Here, also, it is not that the domiciliary has effect beyond the borders of the domiciliary state. The rules of
the domicile are recognized as controlling by the Conflict of Laws rules at the situs property, and the reason for the
recognition as in the case of intestate succession, is the general convenience of the doctrine. The New York court
has said on the point: 'The general principle that a dispostiton of a personal property, valid at the domicile of the
owner, is valid anywhere, is one of the universal application. It had its origin in that international comity which was
one of the first fruits of civilization, and it this age, when business intercourse and the process of accumulating
property take but little notice of boundary lines, the practical wisdom and justice of the rule is more apparent than
ever. (Goodrich, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 164, pp. 442-443.)
Appellees argue that what Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines pointed out as the national law is the
internal law of California. But as above explained the laws of California have prescribed two sets of laws for its
citizens, one for residents therein and another for those domiciled in other jurisdictions. Reason demands that We
should enforce the California internal law prescribed for its citizens residing therein, and enforce the conflict of
laws rules for the citizens domiciled abroad. If we must enforce the law of California as in comity we are bound to
go, as so declared in Article 16 of our Civil Code, then we must enforce the law of California in accordance with
the express mandate thereof and as above explained, i.e., apply the internal law for residents therein, and its
conflict-of-laws rule for those domiciled abroad.
It is argued on appellees' behalf that the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is
situated" in Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code refers to Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines and that
the law to the contrary in the Philippines is the provision in said Article 16 that the national law of the deceased
should govern. This contention can not be sustained. As explained in the various authorities cited above the national
law mentioned in Article 16 of our Civil Code is the law on conflict of laws in the California Civil Code, i.e.,
Article 946, which authorizes the reference or return of the question to the law of the testator's domicile. The
conflict of laws rule in California, Article 946, Civil Code, precisely refers back the case, when a decedent is not
domiciled in California, to the law of his domicile, the Philippines in the case at bar. The court of the domicile can
not and should not refer the case back to California; such action would leave the issue incapable of determination
because the case will then be like a football, tossed back and forth between the two states, between the country of
which the decedent was a citizen and the country of his domicile. The Philippine court must apply its own law as
directed in the conflict of laws rule of the state of the decedent, if the question has to be decided, especially as the
application of the internal law of California provides no legitime for children while the Philippine law, Arts. 887(4)
and 894, Civil Code of the Philippines, makes natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent
recognizing them.
The Philippine cases (In re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156; Riera vs. Palmaroli, 40 Phil. 105; Miciano vs. Brimo,
50 Phil. 867; Babcock Templeton vs. Rider Babcock, 52 Phil. 130; and Gibbs vs. Government, 59 Phil. 293.) cited
by appellees to support the decision can not possibly apply in the case at bar, for two important reasons, i.e., the
subject in each case does not appear to be a citizen of a state in the United States but with domicile in the
Philippines, and it does not appear in each case that there exists in the state of which the subject is a citizen, a law
similar to or identical with Art. 946 of the California Civil Code.
We therefore find that as the domicile of the deceased Christensen, a citizen of California, is the Philippines, the
validity of the provisions of his will depriving his acknowledged natural child, the appellant, should be governed by
the Philippine Law, the domicile, pursuant to Art. 946 of the Civil Code of California, not by the internal law of
California..
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case returned to the lower court with
instructions that the partition be made as the Philippine law on succession provides. Judgment reversed, with costs
against appellees.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., took no part.

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________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23678 June 6, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF AMOS G. BELLIS, deceased.
PEOPLE'S BANK and TRUST COMPANY, executor.
MARIA CRISTINA BELLIS and MIRIAM PALMA BELLIS, oppositors-appellants,
vs.
EDWARD A. BELLIS, ET AL., heirs-appellees.
Vicente R. Macasaet and Jose D. Villena for oppositors appellants.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno for heirs-appellees E. A. Bellis, et al.
Quijano and Arroyo for heirs-appellees W. S. Bellis, et al.
J. R. Balonkita for appellee People's Bank & Trust Company.
Ozaeta, Gibbs and Ozaeta for appellee A. B. Allsman.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
This is a direct appeal to Us, upon a question purely of law, from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila
dated April 30, 1964, approving the project of partition filed by the executor in Civil Case No. 37089
therein.1wph1.t
The facts of the case are as follows:
Amos G. Bellis, born in Texas, was "a citizen of the State of Texas and of the United States." By his first wife,
Mary E. Mallen, whom he divorced, he had five legitimate children: Edward A. Bellis, George Bellis (who pre-
deceased him in infancy), Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman; by his second wife, Violet
Kennedy, who survived him, he had three legitimate children: Edwin G. Bellis, Walter S. Bellis and Dorothy Bellis;
and finally, he had three illegitimate children: Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis.
On August 5, 1952, Amos G. Bellis executed a will in the Philippines, in which he directed that after all taxes,
obligations, and expenses of administration are paid for, his distributable estate should be divided, in trust, in the
following order and manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three
illegitimate children, Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis, Miriam Palma Bellis, or P40,000.00 each and (c) after
the foregoing two items have been satisfied, the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and
second wives, namely: Edward A. Bellis, Henry A. Bellis, Alexander Bellis and Anna Bellis Allsman, Edwin G.
Bellis, Walter S. Bellis, and Dorothy E. Bellis, in equal shares.1wph1.t
Subsequently, or on July 8, 1958, Amos G. Bellis died a resident of San Antonio, Texas, U.S.A. His will was
admitted to probate in the Court of First Instance of Manila on September 15, 1958.
The People's Bank and Trust Company, as executor of the will, paid all the bequests therein including the amount of
$240,000.00 in the form of shares of stock to Mary E. Mallen and to the three (3) illegitimate children, Amos Bellis,
Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, various amounts totalling P40,000.00 each in satisfaction of
their respective legacies, or a total of P120,000.00, which it released from time to time according as the lower court
approved and allowed the various motions or petitions filed by the latter three requesting partial advances on
account of their respective legacies.
On January 8, 1964, preparatory to closing its administration, the executor submitted and filed its "Executor's Final
Account, Report of Administration and Project of Partition" wherein it reported, inter alia, the satisfaction of the
legacy of Mary E. Mallen by the delivery to her of shares of stock amounting to $240,000.00, and the legacies of
Amos Bellis, Jr., Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis in the amount of P40,000.00 each or a total of
P120,000.00. In the project of partition, the executor pursuant to the "Twelfth" clause of the testator's Last Will
and Testament divided the residuary estate into seven equal portions for the benefit of the testator's seven
legitimate children by his first and second marriages.
On January 17, 1964, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project
of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and, therefore,
compulsory heirs of the deceased.
Amos Bellis, Jr. interposed no opposition despite notice to him, proof of service of which is evidenced by the
registry receipt submitted on April 27, 1964 by the executor.1
After the parties filed their respective memoranda and other pertinent pleadings, the lower court, on April 30, 1964,
issued an order overruling the oppositions and approving the executor's final account, report and administration and
project of partition. Relying upon Art. 16 of the Civil Code, it applied the national law of the decedent, which in
this case is Texas law, which did not provide for legitimes.
Their respective motions for reconsideration having been denied by the lower court on June 11, 1964, oppositors-
appellants appealed to this Court to raise the issue of which law must apply Texas law or Philippine law.
In this regard, the parties do not submit the case on, nor even discuss, the doctrine of renvoi, applied by this Court
in Aznar v. Christensen Garcia, L-16749, January 31, 1963. Said doctrine is usually pertinent where the decedent is
a national of one country, and a domicile of another. In the present case, it is not disputed that the decedent was
both a national of Texas and a domicile thereof at the time of his death.2 So that even assuming Texas has a conflict
of law rule providing that the domiciliary system (law of the domicile) should govern, the same would not result in
a reference back (renvoi) to Philippine law, but would still refer to Texas law. Nonetheless, if Texas has a conflicts
rule adopting the situs theory (lex rei sitae) calling for the application of the law of the place where the properties
are situated, renvoi would arise, since the properties here involved are found in the Philippines. In the absence,
however, of proof as to the conflict of law rule of Texas, it should not be presumed different from ours.3 Appellants'
position is therefore not rested on the doctrine of renvoi. As stated, they never invoked nor even mentioned it in
their arguments. Rather, they argue that their case falls under the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of
Article 17 in relation to Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Article 16, par. 2, and Art. 1039 of the Civil Code, render applicable the national law of the decedent, in intestate or
testamentary successions, with regard to four items: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional
rights; (e) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. They provide that
ART. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary successions, both with respect to the order of succession and to the amount of
successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of
the person whose succession is under consideration, whatever may he the nature of the property and regardless of
the country wherein said property may be found.
ART. 1039. Capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the nation of the decedent.
Appellants would however counter that Art. 17, paragraph three, of the Civil Code, stating that
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
prevails as the exception to Art. 16, par. 2 of the Civil Code afore-quoted. This is not correct. Precisely,
Congressdeleted the phrase, "notwithstanding the provisions of this and the next preceding article" when they
incorporated Art. 11 of the old Civil Code as Art. 17 of the new Civil Code, while reproducing without substantial
change the second paragraph of Art. 10 of the old Civil Code as Art. 16 in the new. It must have been their purpose
to make the second paragraph of Art. 16 a specific provision in itself which must be applied in testate and intestate
succession. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which
decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent.
It is therefore evident that whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our System of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has specifically chosen
to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's national law. Specific provisions must
prevail over general ones.
Appellants would also point out that the decedent executed two wills one to govern his Texas estate and the
other his Philippine estate arguing from this that he intended Philippine law to govern his Philippine estate.
Assuming that such was the decedent's intention in executing a separate Philippine will, it would not alter the law,
for as this Court ruled in Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867, 870, a provision in a foreigner's will to the effect that his
properties shall be distributed in accordance with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void,
for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 now Article 16 of the Civil
Code states said national law should govern.
The parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the intrinsic validity of the provision of the
will and the amount of successional rights are to be determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes
cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis.
Wherefore, the order of the probate court is hereby affirmed in toto, with costs against appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1He later filed a motion praying that as a legal heir he be included in this case as one of the oppositors-appellants;
to file or adopt the opposition of his sisters to the project of partition; to submit his brief after paying his
proportionate share in the expenses incurred in the printing of the record on appeal; or to allow him to adopt the
briefs filed by his sisters but this Court resolved to deny the motion.
2San Antonio, Texas was his legal residence.
3Lim vs. Collector, 36 Phil. 472; In re Testate Estate of Suntay, 95 Phil. 500.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81262 August 25, 1989
GLOBE MACKAY CABLE AND RADIO CORP., and HERBERT C. HENDRY, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and RESTITUTO M. TOBIAS, respondents.
Atencia & Arias Law Offices for petitioners.
Romulo C. Felizmena for private respondent.

CORTES, J.:
Private respondent Restituto M. Tobias was employed by petitioner Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation
(GLOBE MACKAY) in a dual capacity as a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the engineering
operations manager. In 1972, GLOBE MACKAY discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent transactions
for which it lost several thousands of pesos.
According to private respondent it was he who actually discovered the anomalies and reported them on November
10, 1972 to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and to petitioner Herbert C. Hendry who was then the
Executive Vice-President and General Manager of GLOBE MACKAY.
On November 11, 1972, one day after private respondent Tobias made the report, petitioner Hendry confronted him
by stating that he was the number one suspect, and ordered him to take a one week forced leave, not to
communicate with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave the office keys.
On November 20, 1972, when private respondent Tobias returned to work after the forced leave, petitioner Hendry
went up to him and called him a "crook" and a "swindler." Tobias was then ordered to take a lie detector test. He
was also instructed to submit specimen of his handwriting, signature, and initials for examination by the police
investigators to determine his complicity in the anomalies.
On December 6,1972, the Manila police investigators submitted a laboratory crime report (Exh. "A") clearing
private respondent of participation in the anomalies.
Not satisfied with the police report, petitioners hired a private investigator, retired Col. Jose G. Fernandez, who on
December 10, 1972, submitted a report (Exh. "2") finding Tobias guilty. This report however expressly stated that
further investigation was still to be conducted.
Nevertheless, on December 12, 1972, petitioner Hendry issued a memorandum suspending Tobias from work
preparatory to the filing of criminal charges against him.
On December 19,1972, Lt. Dioscoro V. Tagle, Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner, after investigating
other documents pertaining to the alleged anomalous transactions, submitted a second laboratory crime report (Exh.
"B") reiterating his previous finding that the handwritings, signatures, and initials appearing in the checks and other
documents involved in the fraudulent transactions were not those of Tobias. The lie detector tests conducted on
Tobias also yielded negative results.
Notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias from the anomalies and the fact that the report of the
private investigator, was, by its own terms, not yet complete, petitioners filed with the City Fiscal of Manila a
complaint for estafa through falsification of commercial documents, later amended to just estafa. Subsequently five
other criminal complaints were filed against Tobias, four of which were for estafa through Falsification of
commercial document while the fifth was for of Article 290 of' the Revised Penal Code (Discovering Secrets
Through Seizure of Correspondence).lwph1.t Two of these complaints were refiled with the Judge Advocate
General's Office, which however, remanded them to the fiscal's office. All of the six criminal complaints were
dismissed by the fiscal. Petitioners appealed four of the fiscal's resolutions dismissing the criminal complaints with
the Secretary of Justice, who, however, affirmed their dismissal.
In the meantime, on January 17, 1973, Tobias received a notice (Exh. "F") from petitioners that his employment has
been terminated effective December 13, 1972. Whereupon, Tobias filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The labor
arbiter dismissed the complaint. On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the labor
arbiter's decision. However, the Secretary of Labor, acting on petitioners' appeal from the NLRC ruling, reinstated
the labor arbiter's decision. Tobias appealed the Secretary of Labor's order with the Office of the President. During
the pendency of the appeal with said office, petitioners and private respondent Tobias entered into a compromise
agreement regarding the latter's complaint for illegal dismissal.
Unemployed, Tobias sought employment with the Republic Telephone Company (RETELCO). However, petitioner
Hendry, without being asked by RETELCO, wrote a letter to the latter stating that Tobias was dismissed by GLOBE
MACKAY due to dishonesty.
Private respondent Tobias filed a civil case for damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and
abusive acts of petitioners. Petitioner Hendry, claiming illness, did not testify during the hearings. The Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T. Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private
respondent by ordering petitioners to pay him eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages, thirty
thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees, and costs. Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the Court of
Appeals. On the other hand, Tobias appealed as to the amount of damages. However, the Court of Appeals, an a
decision dated August 31, 1987 affirmed the RTC decision in toto. Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having
been denied, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.
Petitioners contend that they could not be made liable for damages in the lawful exercise of their right to dismiss
private respondent.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that because of petitioners' abusive manner in dismissing him as
well as for the inhuman treatment he got from them, the Petitioners must indemnify him for the damage that he had
suffered.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to
be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT
ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers
of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to
draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which
provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.
Article 20, which pertains to damage arising from a violation of law, provides that:
Art. 20. Every person who contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
However, in the case at bar, petitioners claim that they did not violate any provision of law since they were merely
exercising their legal right to dismiss private respondent. This does not, however, leave private respondent with no
relief because Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
This article, adopted to remedy the "countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs
helpless, even though they have actually suffered material and moral injury" [Id.] should "vouchsafe adequate legal
remedy for that untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for

specifically in the statutes" [Id. it p. 40; See also PNB v. CA,G.R. No. L-27155, May 18,1978, 83 SCRA
237, 247].
In determining whether or not the principle of abuse of rights may be invoked, there is no rigid test which can be
applied. While the Court has not hesitated to apply Article 19 whether the legal and factual circumstances called for
its application [See for e.g., Velayo v. Shell Co. of the Phil., Ltd., 100 Phil. 186 (1956); PNB v. CA, supra; Grand

G.R. No. L-48250, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 953; PAL v. CA,
Union Supermarket, Inc. v. Espino, Jr.,

G.R. No. L-46558, July 31,1981,106 SCRA 391; United General Industries, Inc, v. Paler G.R. No. L-
30205, March 15,1982,112 SCRA 404; Rubio v. CA, G.R. No. 50911, August 21, 1987, 153 SCRA 183] the
question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20
or Article 21 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of each case. And in the instant
case, the Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant circumstances, finds that all
petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke, causing damage to private respondent and for which the
latter must now be indemnified.
The trial court made a finding that notwithstanding the fact that it was private respondent Tobias who reported the
possible existence of anomalous transactions, petitioner Hendry "showed belligerence and told plaintiff (private
respondent herein) that he was the number one suspect and to take a one week vacation leave, not to communicate
with the office, to leave his table drawers open, and to leave his keys to said defendant (petitioner Hendry)" [RTC
Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 232]. This, petitioners do not dispute. But regardless of whether or not it was private
respondent Tobias who reported the anomalies to petitioners, the latter's reaction towards the former upon
uncovering the anomalies was less than civil. An employer who harbors suspicions that an employee has committed
dishonesty might be justified in taking the appropriate action such as ordering an investigation and directing the
employee to go on a leave. Firmness and the resolve to uncover the truth would also be expected from such
employer. But the high-handed treatment accorded Tobias by petitioners was certainly uncalled for. And this
reprehensible attitude of petitioners was to continue when private respondent returned to work on November 20,
1972 after his one week forced leave. Upon reporting for work, Tobias was confronted by Hendry who said.
"Tobby, you are the crook and swindler in this company." Considering that the first report made by the police
investigators was submitted only on December 10, 1972 [See Exh. A] the statement made by petitioner Hendry was
baseless. The imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations of Tobias
transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil Code. The Court has already ruled that
the right of the employer to dismiss an employee should not be confused with the manner in which the right is
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for

G.R. No. L-38088, August

damages to the employee [Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer and Plywood Inc.,

30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771; See also Philippine Refining Co., Inc. v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-21871, September
27,1966, 18 SCRA 107] Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners clearly failed to exercise in a
legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in
relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code.
But petitioners were not content with just dismissing Tobias. Several other tortious acts were committed by
petitioners against Tobias after the latter's termination from work. Towards the latter part of January, 1973, after the
filing of the first of six criminal complaints against Tobias, the latter talked to Hendry to protest the actions taken
against him. In response, Hendry cut short Tobias' protestations by telling him to just confess or else the company
would file a hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail. Hendry added that, "You Filipinos cannot be
trusted." The threat unmasked petitioner's bad faith in the various actions taken against Tobias. On the other hand,
the scornful remark about Filipinos as well as Hendry's earlier statements about Tobias being a "crook" and
"swindler" are clear violations of 'Tobias' personal dignity [See Article 26, Civil Code].
The next tortious act committed by petitioners was the writing of a letter to RETELCO sometime in October 1974,
stating that Tobias had been dismissed by GLOBE MACKAY due to dishonesty. Because of the letter, Tobias failed
to gain employment with RETELCO and as a result of which, Tobias remained unemployed for a longer period of
time. For this further damage suffered by Tobias, petitioners must likewise be held liable for damages consistent
with Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Petitioners, however, contend that they have a "moral, if not legal, duty to
forewarn other employers of the kind of employee the plaintiff (private respondent herein) was." [Petition, p. 14;
Rollo, p. 15]. Petitioners further claim that "it is the accepted moral and societal obligation of every man to advise
or warn his fellowmen of any threat or danger to the latter's life, honor or property. And this includes warning one's
brethren of the possible dangers involved in dealing with, or accepting into confidence, a man whose honesty and
integrity is suspect" [Id.]. These arguments, rather than justify petitioners' act, reveal a seeming obsession to prevent
Tobias from getting a job, even after almost two years from the time Tobias was dismissed.
Finally, there is the matter of the filing by petitioners of six criminal complaints against Tobias. Petitioners contend
that there is no case against them for malicious prosecution and that they cannot be "penalized for exercising their
right and prerogative of seeking justice by filing criminal complaints against an employee who was their principal
suspect in the commission of forgeries and in the perpetration of anomalous transactions which defrauded them of
substantial sums of money" [Petition, p. 10, Rollo, p. 11].
While sound principles of justice and public policy dictate that persons shall have free resort to the courts for
redress of wrongs and vindication of their rights [Buenaventura v. Sto. Domingo, 103 Phil. 239 (1958)], the right to

institute criminal prosecutions can not be exercised maliciously and in bad faith [Ventura v. Bernabe, G.R.
No. L-26760, April 30, 1971, 38 SCRA 5871.] Hence, in Yutuk V. Manila Electric Co., G.R. No. L-13016,
May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 337, the Court held that the right to file criminal complaints should not be used as a weapon
to force an alleged debtor to pay an indebtedness. To do so would be a clear perversion of the function of the

criminal processes and of the courts of justice. And in Hawpia CA, G.R. No. L-20047, June 30, 1967. 20
SCRA 536 the Court upheld the judgment against the petitioner for actual and moral damages and attorney's fees
after making a finding that petitioner, with persistence, filed at least six criminal complaints against respondent, all
of which were dismissed.
To constitute malicious prosecution, there must be proof that the prosecution was prompted by a design to vex and
humiliate a person and that it was initiated deliberately by the defendant knowing that the charges were false and

groundless [Manila Gas Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. L-44190, October 30,1980, 100 SCRA 602].
Concededly, the filing of a suit by itself, does not render a person liable for malicious prosecution [Inhelder

Corporation v. CA, G.R. No. 52358, May 301983122 SCRA 576]. The mere dismissal by the fiscal of the
criminal complaint is not a ground for an award of damages for malicious prosecution if there is no competent

evidence to show that the complainant had acted in bad faith [Sison v. David, G.R. No. L-11268, January
28,1961, 1 SCRA 60].

In the instant case, however, the trial court made a finding that petitioners acted in bad faith in filing the criminal
complaints against Tobias, observing that:
xxx
Defendants (petitioners herein) filed with the Fiscal's Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases, five (5) of
which were for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one for violation of Art. 290 of the Revised
Penal Code "discovering secrets thru seizure of correspondence," and all were dismissed for insufficiency or lack of
evidence." The dismissal of four (4) of the cases was appealed to the Ministry of Justice, but said Ministry
invariably sustained the dismissal of the cases. As above adverted to, two of these cases were refiled with the Judge
Advocate General's Office of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to railroad plaintiffs arrest and detention in the
military stockade, but this was frustrated by a presidential decree transferring criminal cases involving civilians to
the civil courts.
xxx
To be sure, when despite the two (2) police reports embodying the findings of Lt. Dioscoro Tagle, Chief Document
Examiner of the Manila Police Department, clearing plaintiff of participation or involvement in the fraudulent
transactions complained of, despite the negative results of the lie detector tests which defendants compelled
plaintiff to undergo, and although the police investigation was "still under follow-up and a supplementary report
will be submitted after all the evidence has been gathered," defendants hastily filed six (6) criminal cases with the
city Fiscal's Office of Manila, five (5) for estafa thru falsification of commercial document and one (1) for violation
of Art. 290 of the Revised Penal Code, so much so that as was to be expected, all six (6) cases were dismissed, with
one of the investigating fiscals, Asst. Fiscal de Guia, commenting in one case that, "Indeed, the haphazard way this
case was investigated is evident. Evident likewise is the flurry and haste in the filing of this case against respondent
Tobias," there can be no mistaking that defendants would not but be motivated by malicious and unlawful intent to
harass, oppress, and cause damage to plaintiff.
xxx
[RTC Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 235-236].
In addition to the observations made by the trial court, the Court finds it significant that the criminal complaints
were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case filed by Tobias against petitioners. This explains the
haste in which the complaints were filed, which the trial court earlier noted. But petitioners, to prove their good
faith, point to the fact that only six complaints were filed against Tobias when they could have allegedly filed one
hundred cases, considering the number of anomalous transactions committed against GLOBE MACKAY. However,
petitioners' good faith is belied by the threat made by Hendry after the filing of the first complaint that one hundred
more cases would be filed against Tobias. In effect, the possible filing of one hundred more cases was made to hang
like the sword of Damocles over the head of Tobias. In fine, considering the haste in which the criminal complaints
were filed, the fact that they were filed during the pendency of the illegal dismissal case against petitioners, the
threat made by Hendry, the fact that the cases were filed notwithstanding the two police reports exculpating Tobias
from involvement in the anomalies committed against GLOBE MACKAY, coupled by the eventual dismissal of all
the cases, the Court is led into no other conclusion than that petitioners were motivated by malicious intent in filing
the six criminal complaints against Tobias.
Petitioners next contend that the award of damages was excessive. In the complaint filed against petitioners, Tobias
prayed for the following: one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) as actual damages; fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) as exemplary damages; eight hundred thousand pesos (P800,000.00) as moral damages; fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) as attorney's fees; and costs. The trial court, after making a computation of the damages
incurred by Tobias [See RTC Decision, pp. 7-8; Rollo, pp. 154-1551, awarded him the following: eighty thousand
pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages; two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) as moral damages; twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary damages; thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney's fees; and,
costs. It must be underscored that petitioners have been guilty of committing several actionable tortious acts, i.e.,
the abusive manner in which they dismissed Tobias from work including the baseless imputation of guilt and the
harassment during the investigations; the defamatory language heaped on Tobias as well as the scornful remark on
Filipinos; the poison letter sent to RETELCO which resulted in Tobias' loss of possible employment; and, the
malicious filing of the criminal complaints. Considering the extent of the damage wrought on Tobias, the Court
finds that, contrary to petitioners' contention, the amount of damages awarded to Tobias was reasonable under the
circumstances.
Yet, petitioners still insist that the award of damages was improper, invoking the principle of damnum
absqueinjuria. It is argued that "[t]he only probable actual damage that plaintiff (private respondent herein) could
have suffered was a direct result of his having been dismissed from his employment, which was a valid and legal
act of the defendants-appellants (petitioners herein).lwph1.t " [Petition, p. 17; Rollo, p. 18].
According to the principle of damnum absque injuria, damage or loss which does not constitute a violation of a

legal right or amount to a legal wrong is not actionable [Escano v. CA, G.R. No. L-47207, September 25,

1980, 100 SCRA 197; See also Gilchrist v. Cuddy 29 Phil, 542 (1915); The Board of Liquidators v. Kalaw, G.R.
No. L-18805, August 14, 1967, 20 SCRA 987]. This principle finds no application in this case. It bears repeating
that even granting that petitioners might have had the right to dismiss Tobias from work, the abusive manner in
which that right was exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which petitioners must now be held liable. Moreover,
the damage incurred by Tobias was not only in connection with the abusive manner in which he was dismissed but
was also the result of several other quasi-delictual acts committed by petitioners.
Petitioners next question the award of moral damages. However, the Court has already ruled in Wassmer v. Velez,

G.R. No. L-20089, December 26, 1964, 12 SCRA 648, 653, that [p]er express provision of Article 2219 (10)
of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases mentioned in Article 21 of said Code." Hence,
the Court of Appeals committed no error in awarding moral damages to Tobias.
Lastly, the award of exemplary damages is impugned by petitioners. Although Article 2231 of the Civil Code
provides that "[i]n quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence,"

the Court, in Zulueta v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., G.R. No. L- 28589, January 8, 1973, 49 SCRA 1,
ruled that if gross negligence warrants the award of exemplary damages, with more reason is its imposition justified
when the act performed is deliberate, malicious and tainted with bad faith. As in the Zuluetacase, the nature of the
wrongful acts shown to have been committed by petitioners against Tobias is sufficient basis for the award of
exemplary damages to the latter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 09055
is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr. and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., took no part.

Footnotes
** Penned by Justice Jorge R. Coquia and concurred in be Justice Josue N. Bellosillo and Justice Venancio D.
Aldecoa Jr.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132344 February 17, 2000
UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST, petitioner,
vs.
ROMEO A. JADER, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
May an educational institution be held liable for damages for misleading a student into believing that the latter had
satisfied all the requirements for graduation when such is not the case? This is the issue in the instant petition for
review premised on the following undisputed facts as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of
Appeals (CA),1 to wit:
Plaintiff was enrolled in the defendants' College of Law from 1984 up to 1988. In the first semester of his last year
(School year 1987-1988), he failed to take the regular final examination in Practice Court I for which he was given
an incomplete grade (Exhibits "2", also Exhibit "H"). He enrolled for the second semester as fourth year law student
(Exhibit "A") and on February 1, 1988 he filed an application for the removal of the incomplete grade given him by
Professor Carlos Ortega (Exhibits "H-2", also Exhibit "2") which was approved by Dean Celedonio Tiongson after
payment of the required fee. He took the examination on March 28, 1988. On May 30, 1988, Professor Carlos
Ortega submitted his grade. It was a grade of five (5). (Exhibits "H-4", also Exhibits "2-L", "2-N").1wphi1.nt
In the meantime, the Dean and the Faculty Members of the College of Law met to deliberate on who among the
fourth year students should be allowed to graduate. The plaintiff's name appeared in the Tentative List of
Candidates for graduation for the Degree of Bachelor of Laws (LL.B) as of Second Semester (1987-1988) with the
following annotation:
JADER ROMEO A.
Def. Conflict of Laws x-1-87-88, Practice Court I Inc., 1-87-88 C-1 to submit transcript with S.O. (Exhibits "3",
"3-C-1", "3-C-2").
The 35th Investitures & Commencement Ceremonies for the candidates of Bachelor of Laws was scheduled on the
16th of April 1988 at 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, and in the invitation for that occasion the name of the plaintiff
appeared as one of the candidates. (Exhibits "B", "B-6", "B-6-A"). At the foot of the list of the names of the
candidates there appeared however the following annotation:
This is a tentative list Degrees will be conferred upon these candidates who satisfactorily complete requirements as
stated in the University Bulletin and as approved of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (Exhibit "B-7-
A").
The plaintiff attended the investiture ceremonies at F. dela Cruz Quadrangle, U.E., Recto Campus, during the
program of which he went up the stage when his name was called, escorted by her (sic) mother and his eldest
brother who assisted in placing the Hood, and his Tassel was turned from left to right, and he was thereafter handed
by Dean Celedonio a rolled white sheet of paper symbolical of the Law Diploma. His relatives took pictures of the
occasion (Exhibits "C" to "C-6", "D-3" to "D-11").
He tendered a blow-out that evening which was attended by neighbors, friends and relatives who wished him good
luck in the forthcoming bar examination. There were pictures taken too during the blow-out (Exhibits "D" to "D-
1").
He thereafter prepared himself for the bar examination. He took a leave of absence without pay from his job from
April 20, 1988 to September 30, 1988 (Exhibit "G") and enrolled at the pre-bar review class in Far Eastern
University. (Exhibits "F" to "F-2"). Having learned of the deficiency he dropped his review class and was not able
to take the bar examination.2
Consequently, respondent sued petitioner for damages alleging that he suffered moral shock, mental anguish,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights when he was not able to take the
1988 bar examinations arising from the latter's negligence. He prayed for an award of moral and exemplary
damages, unrealized income, attorney's fees, and costs of suit.
In its answer with counterclaim, petitioner denied liability arguing mainly that it never led respondent to believe
that he completed the requirements for a Bachelor of Laws degree when his name was included in the tentative list
of graduating students. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant ordering the latter to pay plaintiff the sum of THIRTY FIVE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED
SEVENTY PESOS (P35,470.00) with legal rate of interest from the filing of the complaint until fully paid, the
amount of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees and the cost of suit.
Defendant's counterclaim is, for lack of merit, hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.3
which on appeal by both parties was affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) with modification. The dispositive
portion of the CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the lower Court's Decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that defendant-appellee, in addition to the sum adjudged by the lower court in favor of plaintiff-
appellant, is also ORDERED to pay plaintiff-appellant the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND (P50,000.00) PESOS
for moral damages. Costs against defendant-appellee.
SO ORDERED.4
Upon the denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner UE elevated the case to this Court on a petition for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, arguing that it has no liability to respondent Romeo A. Jader,
considering that the proximate and immediate cause of the alleged damages incurred by the latter arose out of his
own negligence in not verifying from the professor concerned the result of his removal exam.
The petition lacks merit.
When a student is enrolled in any educational or learning institution, a contract of education is entered into between
said institution and the student. The professors, teachers or instructors hired by the school are considered merely as
agents and administrators tasked to perform the school's commitment under the contract. Since the contracting
parties are the school and the student, the latter is not duty-bound to deal with the former's agents, such as the
professors with respect to the status or result of his grades, although nothing prevents either professors or students
from sharing with each other such information. The Court takes judicial notice of the traditional practice in
educational institutions wherein the professor directly furnishes his/her students their grades. It is the contractual
obligation of the school to timely inform and furnish sufficient notice and information to each and every student as
to whether he or she had already complied with all the requirements for the conferment of a degree or whether they
would be included among those who will graduate. Although commencement exercises are but a formal ceremony,
it nonetheless is not an ordinary occasion, since such ceremony is the educational institution's way of announcing to
the whole world that the students included in the list of those who will be conferred a degree during the
baccalaureate ceremony have satisfied all the requirements for such degree. Prior or subsequent to the ceremony,
the school has the obligation to promptly inform the student of any problem involving the latter's grades and
performance and also most importantly, of the procedures for remedying the same.
Petitioner, in belatedly informing respondent of the result of the removal examination, particularly at a time when
he had already commenced preparing for the bar exams, cannot be said to have acted in good faith. Absence of
good faith must be sufficiently established for a successful prosecution by the aggrieved party in a suit for abuse of
right under Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith connotes an honest intention to abstain from taking undue
advantage of another, even though the forms and technicalities of the law, together with the absence of all
information or belief of facts, would render the transaction unconscientious.5 It is the school that has access to
those information and it is only the school that can compel its professors to act and comply with its rules,
regulations and policies with respect to the computation and the prompt submission of grades. Students do not
exercise control, much less influence, over the way an educational institution should run its affairs, particularly in
disciplining its professors and teachers and ensuring their compliance with the school's rules and orders. Being the
party that hired them, it is the school that exercises general supervision and exclusive control over the professors
with respect to the submission of reports involving the students' standing. Exclusive control means that no other
person or entity had any control over the instrumentality which caused the damage or injury.6
The college dean is the senior officer responsible for the operation of an academic program, enforcement of rules
and regulations, and the supervision of faculty and student services.7 He must see to it that his own professors and
teachers, regardless of their status or position outside of the university, must comply with the rules set by the latter.
The negligent act of a professor who fails to observe the rules of the school, for instance by not promptly
submitting a student's grade, is not only imputable to the professor but is an act of the school, being his employer.
Considering further, that the institution of learning involved herein is a university which is engaged in legal
education, it should have practiced what it inculcates in its students, more specifically the principle of good
dealings enshrined in Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
Art. 19 was intended to expand the concept of torts by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of
moral wrongs which is impossible for human foresight to provide specifically in statutory law.8 In civilized society,
men must be able to assume that others will do them no intended injury that others will commit no internal
aggressions upon them; that their fellowmen, when they act affirmatively will do so with due care which the
ordinary understanding and moral sense of the community exacts and that those with whom they deal in the general
course of society will act in good faith. The ultimate thing in the theory of liability is justifiable reliance under
conditions of civilized society.9 Schools and professors cannot just take students for granted and be indifferent to
them, for without the latter, the former are useless.
Educational institutions are duty-bound to inform the students of their academic status and not wait for the latter to
inquire from the former. The conscious indifference of a person to the rights or welfare of the person/persons who
may be affected by his act or omission can support a claim for damages.10 Want of care to the conscious disregard
of civil obligations coupled with a conscious knowledge of the cause naturally calculated to produce them would
make the erring party liable.11 Petitioner ought to have known that time was of the essence in the performance of
its obligation to inform respondent of his grade. It cannot feign ignorance that respondent will not prepare himself
for the bar exams since that is precisely the immediate concern after graduation of an LL.B. graduate. It failed to act
seasonably. Petitioner cannot just give out its student's grades at any time because a student has to comply with
certain deadlines set by the Supreme Court on the submission of requirements for taking the bar. Petitioner's
liability arose from its failure to promptly inform respondent of the result of an examination and in misleading the
latter into believing that he had satisfied all requirements for the course. Worth quoting is the following disquisition
of the respondent court:
It is apparent from the testimony of Dean Tiongson that defendant-appellee University had been informed during
the deliberation that the professor in Practice Court I gave plaintiff-appellant a failing grade. Yet, defendant-
appellee still did not inform plaintiff-appellant of his failure to complete the requirements for the degree nor did
they remove his name from the tentative list of candidates for graduation. Worse, defendant-appellee university,
despite the knowledge that plaintiff-appellant failed in Practice Court I, againincluded plaintiff-appellant's name in
the "tentative list of candidates for graduation which was prepared after the deliberation and which became the
basis for the commencement rites program. Dean Tiongson reasons out that plaintiff-appellant's name was allowed
to remain in the tentative list of candidates for graduation in the hope that the latter would still be able to remedy
the situation in the remaining few days before graduation day. Dean Tiongson, however, did not explain how
plaintiff appellant Jader could have done something to complete his deficiency if defendant-appellee university did
not exert any effort to inform plaintiff-appellant of his failing grade in Practice Court I.12
Petitioner cannot pass on its blame to the professors to justify its own negligence that led to the delayed relay of
information to respondent. When one of two innocent parties must suffer, he through whose agency the loss
occurred must bear it.13 The modern tendency is to grant indemnity for damages in cases where there is abuse of
right, even when the act is not illicit.14 If mere fault or negligence in one's acts can make him liable for damages
for injury caused thereby, with more reason should abuse or bad faith make him liable. A person should be
protected only when he acts in the legitimate exercise of his right, that is, when he acts with prudence and in good
faith, but not when he acts with negligence or abuse.15
However, while petitioner was guilty of negligence and thus liable to respondent for the latter's actual damages, we
hold that respondent should not have been awarded moral damages. We do not agree with the Court of Appeals'
findings that respondent suffered shock, trauma and pain when he was informed that he could not graduate and will
not be allowed to take the bar examinations. At the very least, it behooved on respondent to verify for himself
whether he has completed all necessary requirements to be eligible for the bar examinations. As a senior law
student, respondent should have been responsible enough to ensure that all his affairs, specifically those pertaining
to his academic achievement, are in order. Given these considerations, we fail to see how respondent could have
suffered untold embarrassment in attending the graduation rites, enrolling in the bar review classes and not being
able to take the bar exams. If respondent was indeed humiliated by his failure to take the bar, he brought this upon
himself by not verifying if he has satisfied all the requirements including his school records, before preparing
himself for the bar examination. Certainly, taking the bar examinations does not only entail a mental preparation on
the subjects thereof; there are also prerequisites of documentation and submission of requirements which the
prospective examinee must meet.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Petitioner is
ORDERED to PAY respondent the sum of Thirty-five Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Pesos (P35,470.00), with
legal interest of 6% per annum computed from the date of filing of the complaint until fully paid; the amount of
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) as attorney's fees; and the costs of the suit. The award of moral damages is
DELEIED.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Court of Appeals (CA) Decision promulgated October 10, 1997 penned by Justice Barcelona, with Justices
Mabutas, Jr. and Aquino, concurring, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 12-13.
2 A check with the Attorney's List in the Court shows that private respondent is not a member of the Philippine Bar.
(http.//www.supremecourt.gov.ph).
3 Decision of Regional Trial Court (RTC-Manila Branch IX) dated September 4, 1990 penned by Judge Edilberto
Sandoval, pp. 8-9; RTC Records, pp. 192-193; Rollo, pp. 8-9.
4 CA Decision, p. 24; Rollo, p. 31.
5 Tolentino, New Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. I, (1960 ed.) citing Wood v. Conrad, 2, S.B. 83, 50 N.W. 95.
6 Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co. (Minn) 344 NW2d 856. See also Jackson v. H.H. Robertson Co., 118 Ariz 29,
574 P2d 82; Cummins v. West Linn, 21 Or. App 643, 536 P2d 455.
7 Hawes and Hawes, "The Concise Dictionary of Education," p. 62, 1982 ed. cited in Sarmiento, Manual, p. 164.
8 PNB v. CA, 83 SCRA 237 (1978) cited in Sea Commercial Company v. CA, G.R. No. 122823, November
25, 1999.
9 Dean Roscoe Pound, Introduction to the Philosophy of Law.
10 Texas Pacific & Oil Co. v. Robertson, 125 Tex 4, 79 SW2d 830, 98 ALR 262.
11 See Helms v. Universal Atlas Cement Co., (CA5 Tex) 202 F2d 421 cert de 346 US 858, 98 L ed 372, 74 S Ct 74;
Otto Kuehne Preserving Co. v. Allen (CA8 Mo) 148 F 166; See also Alabama G.S.R. Co. v. Hill, 93 Ala 514, 9 So
722; Richmond & P.R. Co. v. Vance, 93 Ala 144, 9 So 574.
12 CA Decision, pp. 222-23; Rollo, pp. 29-30.
13 Ohio Farmers, Ins. Co. v. Norman, (App) 122 Ariz 330, 594 P2d 1026.
14 Sea Commercial Company v. CA, G.R. No. 122823, November 25, 1999.
15 Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed., Vol, I, p. 61.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 156841. June 30, 2005]
GF EQUITY, INC., petitioner, vs. ARTURO VALENZONA, respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO-MORALES, J.:
On challenge via Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Court of Appeals October 14, 2002 Decision[1] reversing
that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila dated June 28, 1997[2] which dismissed the complaint of herein
respondent Arturo Valenzona (Valenzona) for breach of contract with damages against herein petitioner GF Equity,
Inc. (GF Equity).
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
GF Equity, represented by its Chief Financial Officer W. Steven Uytengsu (Uytengsu), hired Valenzona as Head
Coach of the Alaska basketball team in the Philippine Basketball Association (PBA) under a Contract of
Employment.[3]
As head coach, the duties of Valenzona were described in the contract to include the following:
xxx
1. . . . coaching at all practices and games scheduled for the CORPORATIONs TEAM during the scheduled season
of the ASSOCIATION . . ., coaching all exhibition games scheduled by the corporation as approved by the PBA
during and prior to the scheduled season, coaching (if invited to participate) in the ASSOCIATIONs All Star Game
and attending every event conducted in association with the All Star Game, and coaching the play-off games
subsequent to the scheduled season based on the athletic program of the PBA.
xxx
3. The COACH agrees to observe and comply with all requirements of the CORPORATION respecting conduct of
its TEAM and its players, at all times whether on or off the playing floor. The CORPORATION may, from time to
time during the continuance of this contract, establish reasonable rules for the government of its players at home
and on the road; and such rules shall be part of this contract as fully is (sic) if herein written and shall be the
responsibility of the COACH to implement; x x x
4. The COACH agrees (a) to report at the time and place fixed by the CORPORATION in good physical condition;
(b) to keep himself throughout the entire season in good physical condition; (c) to give his best services, as well as
his loyalty to the CORPORATION, and to serve as basketball coach for the CORPORATION and its assignees; (d)
to be neatly and fully attired in public and always to conduct himself on and off the court according to the highest
standards of honesty, morality, fair play and sportsmanship; (e) not to do anything which is detrimental to the best
interests of the CORPORATION.
xxx
7. The COACH agrees that if so requested by the CORPORATION, he will endorse the CORPORATIONs products
in commercial advertising, promotions and the like. The COACH further agrees to allow theCORPORATION or the
ASSOCIATION to take pictures of the COACH alone or together with others, for still photographs, motion pictures
or television, at such times as the CORPORATION or the ASSOCIATION may designate, and no matter by whom
taken may be used in any manner desired by either of them for publicity or promotional purposes. (Underscoring
supplied).
xxx
Even before the conclusion of the contract, Valenzona had already served GF Equity under a verbal contract by
coaching its team, Hills Brothers, in the 3rd PBA Conference of 1987 where the team was runner-up.
Under the contract, GF Equity would pay Valenzona the sum of Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) monthly,
net of taxes, and provide him with a service vehicle and gasoline allowance.
While the employment period agreed upon was for two years commencing on January 1, 1988 and ending on
December 31, 1989, the last sentence of paragraph 3 of the contract carried the following condition:
3. x x x If at any time during the contract, the COACH, in the sole opinion of the CORPORATION, fails to exhibit
sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the team, the CORPORATION may terminate this contract.
(Emphasis supplied)
Before affixing his signature on the contract, Valenzona consulted his lawyer who pointed out the one-sidedness of
the above-quoted last sentence of paragraph 3 thereof. The caveatnotwithstanding, Valenzona still acceded to the
terms of the contract because he had trust and confidence in Uytengsu who had recommended him to the
management of GF Equity.
During his stint as Alaskas head coach, the team placed third both in the Open and All-Filipino PBA Conferences in
1988.
Valenzona was later advised by the management of GF Equity by letter of September 26, 1988 of the termination of
his services in this wise:
We regret to inform you that under the contract of employment dated January 1, 1988 we are invoking our rights
specified in paragraph 3.
You will continue to be paid until your outstanding balance which, as of September 25, 1988, is P75,868.38 has
been fully paid.
Please return the service vehicle to my office no later than September 30, 1988.[4] (Emphasis supplied)
Close to six years after the termination of his services, Valenzonas counsel, by letter of July 30, 1994,[5] demanded
from GF Equity payment of compensation arising from the arbitrary and unilateral termination of his employment.
GF Equity, however, refused the claim.
Valenzona thus filed on September 26, 1994 before the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint[6] against GF
Equity for breach of contract with damages, ascribing bad faith, malice and disregard to fairness and to the rights of
the plaintiff by unilaterally and arbitrarily pre-terminating the contract without just cause and legal and factual
basis. He prayed for the award of actual damages in the amount of P560,000.00 representing his unpaid
compensation from September 26, 1988 up to December 31, 1989, at the rate of P35,000.00 a month; moral
damages in the amount of P100,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of P50,000.00; attorneys fees in the
amount of P100,000.00; and costs of suit.
Before the trial court, Valenzona challenged the condition in paragraph 3 of the contract as lacking the element of
mutuality of contract, a clear transgression of Article 1308 of the New Civil Code, and reliance thereon, he
contended, did not warrant his unjustified and arbitrary dismissal.
GF Equity maintained, on the other hand, that it merely exercised its right under the contract to pre-terminate
Valenzonas employment due to incompetence. And it posited that he was guilty of laches and, in any event, his
complaint should have been instituted before a labor arbiter.
The trial court, upholding the validity of the assailed provision of the contract, dismissed, by decision of June 28,
1997,[7] the complaint of Valenzona who, it held, was fully aware of entering into a bad bargain.
The Court of Appeals, before which Valenzona appealed, reversed the trial courts decision, by decision of October
14, 2002,[8] and accordingly ordered GF Equity to pay him damages.
In its decision, the appellate court held that the questioned provision in the contract merely confers upon GF Equity
the right to fire its coach upon a finding of inefficiency, a valid reason within the ambit of its management
prerogatives, subject to limitations imposed by law, although not expressly stated in the clause; and the right
granted in the contract can neither be said to be immoral,unlawful, or contrary to public policy. It concluded,
however, that while the mutuality of the clause is evident, GF Equity abused its right by arbitrarily terminating . . .
Valenzonas employment and opened itself to a charge of bad faith. Hence, finding that Valenzonas claim for
damages is obviously . . . based on Art. 19 of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.,
the appellate court awarded Valenzona the following damages, furnishing the justification therefor:
. . . a) Compensatory damages representing his unearned income for 15 months. Actual and compensatory damages
are those recoverable because of a pecuniary loss in business, trade, property, profession, job or occupation. As
testified, his employment contract provided a monthly income of PhP35,000, which he lost from September 26,
1988 up to December 31, 1989 as a consequence of his arbitrary dismissal; b) Moral damages of PhP20,000. The
act caused wounded feelings on the part of the plaintiff. Moral damages is recoverable under Article 2220 and the
chapter on Human Relations of the Civil Code (Articles 1936) when a contract is breached in bad faith; c)
Exemplary damages of PhP20,000, by way of example or correction for the public good; and d) When exemplary
damages are awarded, attorneys fees can also be given. We deem it just to grant 10% of the actual damages as
attorneys fees. (Underscoring supplied)
Hence, this petition at bar, GF Equity faulting the appellate court in
. . . CONCLUD[ING] WRONGLY FROM ESTABLISHED FACTS IN A MANNER VIOLATIVE OF
APPLICABLE LAWS AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE.[9]
GF Equity argues that the appellate court committed a non-sequitur when it agreed with the findings of fact of the
lower court but reached an opposite conclusion. It avers that the appellate court made itself a guardian of an
otherwise intelligent individual well-versed in tactical maneuvers; that the freedom to enter into contracts is
protected by law, and the courts will not interfere therewith unless the contract is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public policy or public order; that there was absolutely no reason for the appellate court to have found bad
faith on its part; and that, at all events, Valenzona is guilty of laches for his unexplained inaction for six years.
Central to the resolution of the instant controversy is the determination of whether the questioned last sentence of
paragraph 3 is violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts.
Mutuality is one of the characteristics of a contract, its validity or performance or compliance of which cannot be
left to the will of only one of the parties.[10] This is enshrined in Article 1308 of the New Civil Code, whose
underlying principle is explained in Garcia v. Rita Legarda, Inc.,[11] viz:
Article 1308 of the New Civil Code reads as follows:
The contract must bind both contracting parties; its validity or compliance cannot be left to the will of one of them.
The above legal provision is a virtual reproduction of Article 1256 of the old Civil Code but it was so phrased as to
emphasize the principle that the contract must bind both parties. This, of course is based firstly, on the principle that
obligations arising from contracts have the force of law between the contracting parties and secondly, that there
must be mutuality between the parties based on their essential equality to which is repugnant to have one party
bound by the contract leaving the other free therefrom (8 Manresa 556). Its ultimate purpose is to render void a
contract containing a condition which makes its fulfillment dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one
of the contracting parties.
x x x (Emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)
The ultimate purpose of the mutuality principle is thus to nullify a contract containing a condition which makes its
fulfillment or pre-termination dependent exclusively upon the uncontrolled will of one of the contracting parties.
Not all contracts though which vest to one party their determination of validity or compliance or the right to
terminate the same are void for being violative of the mutuality principle. Jurisprudence is replete with instances of
cases[12] where this Court upheld the legality of contracts which left their fulfillment or implementation to the will
of either of the parties. In these cases, however, there was a finding of the presence of essential equality of the
parties to the contracts, thus preventing the perpetration of injustice on the weaker party.
In the case at bar, the contract incorporates in paragraph 3 the right of GF Equity to pre-terminate the contract that if
the coach, in the sole opinion of the corporation, fails to exhibit sufficient skill or competitive ability to coach the
team, the corporation may terminate the contract. The assailed condition clearly transgresses the principle of
mutuality of contracts. It leaves the determination of whether Valenzona failed to exhibit sufficient skill or
competitive ability to coach Alaska team solely to the opinion of GF Equity. Whether Valenzona indeed failed to
exhibit the required skill or competitive ability depended exclusively on the judgment of GF Equity. In other words,
GF Equity was given an unbridled prerogative to pre-terminate the contract irrespective of the soundness, fairness
or reasonableness, or even lack of basis of its opinion.
To sustain the validity of the assailed paragraph would open the gate for arbitrary and illegal dismissals, for void
contractual stipulations would be used as justification therefor.
The assailed stipulation being violative of the mutuality principle underlying Article 1308 of the Civil Code, it is
null and void.
The nullity of the stipulation notwithstanding, GF Equity was not precluded from the right to pre-terminate the
contract. The pre-termination must have legal basis, however, if it is to be declared justified.
GF Equity failed, however, to advance any ground to justify the pre-termination. It simply invoked the assailed
provision which is null and void.
While GF Equitys act of pre-terminating Valenzonas services cannot be considered willful as it was based on a
stipulation, albeit declared void, it, in doing so, failed to consider the abuse of rights principle enshrined in Art. 19
of the Civil Code which provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This provision of law sets standards which must be observed in the exercise of ones rights as well as in the
performance of its duties, to wit: to act with justice; give every one his due; and observe honesty and good faith.
Since the pre-termination of the contract was anchored on an illegal ground, hence, contrary to law, and GF Equity
negligently failed to provide legal basis for such pre-termination, e.g. that Valenzona breached the contract by
failing to discharge his duties thereunder, GF Equity failed to exercise in a legitimate manner its right to pre-
terminate the contract, thereby abusing the right of Valenzona to thus entitle him to damages under Art. 19 in
relation to Article 20 of the Civil Code the latter of which provides:
Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the
latter for the same.
In De Guzman v. NLRC,[13] this Court quoted the following explanation of Tolentino why it is impermissible to
abuse our rights to prejudice others.
The exercise of a right ends when the right disappears, and it disappears when it is abused, especially to the
prejudice of others. The mask of a right without the spirit of justice which gives it life is repugnant to the modern
concept of social law. It cannot be said that a person exercises a right when he unnecessarily prejudices another or
offends morals or good customs. Over and above the specific precepts of positive law are the supreme norms of
justice which the law develops and which are expressed in three principles: honeste vivere,[14] alterum non
laedere[15] and jus suum quique tribuere;[16] and he who violates them violates the law. For this reason, it is not
permissible to abuse our rights to prejudice others.
The disquisition in Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals[17] is just as relevant as it is
illuminating on the present case. In that case, this Court declared that even granting that the therein petitioners
might have had the right to dismiss the therein respondent from work, the abusive manner in which that right was
exercised amounted to a legal wrong for which the petitioners must be held liable.
One of the more notable innovations of the New Civil Code is the codification of "some basic principles that are to
be observed for the rightful relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order." [REPORT
ON THE CODE COMMISSION ON THE PROPOSED CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, p. 39]. The framers
of the Code, seeking to remedy the defect of the old Code which merely stated the effects of the law, but failed to
draw out its spirit, incorporated certain fundamental precepts which were "designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience" and which were also meant to serve as "guides for human conduct
[that] should run as golden threads through society, to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal, which is the
sway and dominance of justice" (Id.) Foremost among these principles is that pronounced in Article 19 which
provides:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
This article, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.[18]
Emphasis and underscoring supplied).
As for GF Equitys defense of laches on account of Valenzonas invocation of his right under the contract only after
the lapse of six years, the same fails.
Laches has been defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time to do that
which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier, thus giving rise to a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It is not concerned with mere lapse of time;
the fact of delay, standing alone, is insufficient to constitute laches.[19]
Laches applies in equity, whereas prescription applies at law. Our courts are basically courts of law, not courts of
equity. Laches cannot thus be invoked to evade the enforcement of an existing legal right. Equity, which has been
aptly described as a justice outside legality, is applied only in the absence of, and never against, statutory law.
Aequetas nunquam contravenit legis. Thus, where the claim was filed within the statutory period of prescription,
recovery therefor cannot be barred by laches. The doctrine of laches should never be applied earlier than the
expiration of time limited for the commencement of actions at law,[20] unless, as a general rule, inexcusable delay
in asserting a right and acquiescense in existing conditions are proven.[21] GF Equity has not proven, nay alleged,
these.
Under Article 1144[22] of the New Civil Code, an action upon a written contract must be brought within 10 years
from the time the right of action accrues. Since the action filed by Valenzona is an action for breach upon a written
contract, his filing of the case 6 years from the date his cause of action arose was well within the prescriptive
period, hence, the defense of laches would not, under the circumstances, lie.
Consequently, Valenzona is entitled to recover actual damages his salary which he should have received from the
time his services were terminated up to the time the employment contract expired.[23]
As for moral damages which the appellate court awarded, Article 2220 of the New Civil Code allows such award to
breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious
and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. It contemplates a state of
mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill-will.[24] Bad faith means a breach of a known duty through
some motive of interest or ill will. It must, however, be substantiated by evidence. Bad faith under the law cannot
be presumed, it must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
As earlier stated, however, the pre-termination of the contract was not willful as GF Equity based it on a provision
therein which is void. Malice or bad faith cannot thus be ascribed to GF Equity.
The unbroken jurisprudence is that in breach of contract cases where a party is not shown to have acted fraudulently
or in bad faith, liability for damages is limited to the natural and probable consequences of the breach of the
obligation which the parties had foreseen or could reasonably have foreseen. The damages, however, do not include
moral damages.[25]
The award by the appellate court of moral damages must thus be set aside. And so must the award of exemplary
damages, absent a showing that GF Equity acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent
manner.[26]
The award to Valenzona of attorneys fees must remain, however, GF Equity having refused to pay the balance of
Valenzonas salaries to which he was, under the facts and circumstances of the case, entitled under the contract, thus
compelling him to litigate to protect his interest.[27]
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 14, 2002 is hereby SET ASIDE and another
rendered declaring the assailed provision of the contract NULL AND VOID and ORDERING petitioner, GF Equity,
to pay private respondent, Arturo Valenzona, actual damages in the amount of P525,000.00 and attorneys fees in the
amount of P60,000.00.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Garcia, JJ., concur.

________________________________________
[1] CA Rollo 84-92.
[2] Records at 211-213.
[3] Id. at 7-10.
[4] Id. at 86.
[5] Id. at 11-12.
[6] Id. at 1-6.
[7] Vide note 2.
[8] Vide note 1.
[9] Rollo at 6.
[10] TOLENTINO, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. IV, 1990 ed., p. 410.
[11] 21 SCRA 555, 558-560 (1967).
[12] E.g., Jespajo Realty v. Court of Appeals 390 SCRA 27, 39 (2002). This Court in this case enunciated the rule
that the express provision in the lease agreement of the parties that violation of any of the terms and conditions of
the contract shall be sufficient ground for termination thereof by the lessor, removes the contract from the
application of Article 1308.
In Taylor v. Uy Tieng Piao, 43 Phil. 873 (1922), this Court ruled that Article 1256 (now Art. 1308) creates no
impediment to the insertion in a contract for personal service of a resolutory condition permitting the cancellation
of the contract by one of the parties. Such a stipulation, as can be readily seen, does not make either the validity of
the fulfillment of the contract dependent upon the will of the party to whom is conceded the privilege of
cancellation; for where the contracting parties have agreed that such option shall exist, the exercise of the option is
as much in the fulfillment of the contract as any other act which may have been the subject of agreement. x x x.
In Allied Banking Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 357, 363-365 (1998), this Court held: The fact that
such option is binding only on the lessor and can be exercised only by the lessee does not render it void for lack of
mutuality. After all, the lessor is free to give or not to give the option to the lessee. And while the lessee has a right
to elect whether to continue with the lease or not, once he exercises his option to continue and the lessor accepts,
both parties are thereafter bound by the new lease agreement. Their rights and obligations become mutually fixed,
and the lessee is entitled to retain possession of the property for the duration of the new lease, and the lessor may
hold him liable for the rent therefore. The lessee cannot thereafter escape liability even if he should subsequently
decide to abandon the premises. Mutuality obtains in such a contract and equality exists between the lessor and the
lessee since they remain with the same faculties in respect to fulfillment. (Underscoring supplied)
[13] 211 SCRA 723, 730 (1992).
[14] To live honorably, creditably, or virtuously.
[15] Not to injure another.
[16] To render to everyone his own.
[17] 176 SCRA 778, 790-791 (1989).
[18] Id. at 783-784.
[19] Chavez v. Bonto-Perez, 242 SCRA 73, 80 (1995).
[20] Imperial Victory Shipping Agency v. NLRC 200 SCRA 178, 184 (1991).
[21] Z. E. Lotho, Inc. v. Ice & Cold Storage Industries of the Phils., Inc. 3 SCRA 744, 750 (1961); Buenaventura v.
David, 37 Phil. 435 (1918).
[22] Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within 10 years from the time the right of action accrues.
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
3) Upon a judgment.
[23] In Teknika Skills and Trade Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 212 SCRA 132, 139-140 (1992), this Court held:
The principal cause of action in private respondents complaint is breach of contract of employment for a definite
period. Having established her case, which public respondents correctly sustained, she is entitled to the salary
corresponding to the unexpired portion of her contract. This is not a simple case of illegal dismissal of an employee
whose employment is without a definite period.
[24] Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 671, 675 (1995).
[25] Philippine Air Lines v. Miano, 242 SCRA 235, 240 (1995) and Lufthansa German Airlines v. Court of Appeals,
243 SCRA 600, 614-615 (1995). See also China Airlines, Ltd. v. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 897, 905-906 (1992);
Saludo, Jr.v. Court of Appeals 207 SCRA 498, 535-536 (1992); China Airlines, Ltd. v. Intermediate Appellate

Court, G.R. No. 73835, January 17, 1989; and Philippine Airlines v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-
46558, July 31, 1981.
[26] Article 2232 of the New Civil Code; Salvador v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124899, March 30, 2004.
[27] Article 2208 of the New Civil Code provides:
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorneys fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded:
(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just
and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens compensation and employers liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorneys fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorneys fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. (Emphasis supplied)

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

Heirs of PURISIMA NALA, represented by their attorney-in-fact EFEGENIA DIGNA DUYAN,

Petitioners, G.R. No. 161188
Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
-versus- CHICO-NAZARIO,
REYES, and
BRION,* JJ.

ARTEMIO CABANSAG,
Respondent. Promulgated:

June 13, 2008

x -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- x
DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision[1]
dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution[2] dated October 28, 2003, dismissing petitioners' appeal and affirming
with modification the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated August 10, 1994 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-
91-10541.

The facts of the case are as follows:

Artemio Cabansag (respondent) filed Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 for damages in October 1991. According to
respondent, he bought a 50-square meter property from spouses EugenioGomez, Jr. and Felisa Duyan Gomez on
July 23, 1990. Said property is part of a 400-square meter lot registered in the name of the Gomez spouses. In
October 1991, he received a demand letter from Atty. Alexander del Prado (Atty. Del Prado), in behalf of Purisima
Nala (Nala), asking for the payment of rentals from 1987 to 1991 until he leaves the premises, as said property is
owned by Nala, failing which criminal and civil actions will be filed against him. Another demand letter was sent
on May 14, 1991. Because of such demands, respondent suffered damages and was constrained to file the case
against Nala and Atty. Del Prado.[3]

Atty. Del Prado claimed that he sent the demand letters in good faith and that he was merely acting in behalf of his
client, Nala, who disputed respondent's claim of ownership. Nala alleged that said property is part of an 800-square
meter property owned by her late husband, Eulogio Duyan, which was subsequently divided into two parts. The
400-square meter property was conveyed to spouses Gomez in a fictitious deed of sale, with the agreement that it
will be merely held by them in trust for the Duyan's children. Said property is covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 281115 in the name of spouses Gomez. Nala also claimed that respondent is only renting the
property which he occupies.[4]
After trial, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 93, rendered its Decision on August 10, 1994, in favor of respondent.
The dispositive portion of the Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, by preponderance of evidence, the Court finds in favor of the plaintiff and
hereby orders the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay plaintiff the following:

1. P150,000.00 by way of moral damages;

2. P30,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
3. P20,000.00 as and for reasonable attorney's fees and other litigation expenses; and
4. to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.[5]

Nala and Atty. Del Prado appealed to the CA. The herein assailed CA Decision dated December 19, 2002 affirmed
the RTC Decision with modification, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 93, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-91-10541 is heretofore AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. Defendants-appellants are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff-appellee the amount of
P30,000.00 by way of moral damages. It is further ordered to pay him exemplary damages in the amount of
P10,000.00 and P10,000.00, attorney's fees.

SO ORDERED.[6]

In affirming the RTC Decision, the CA took note of the Decision dated September 5, 1994 rendered by the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 80, dismissing Civil Case No. 91-8821, an action for reconveyance of real property and
cancellation of TCT No. 281115 with damages, filed by Nala against spouses Gomez.[7]

Hence, herein petition by the heirs of Nala (petitioners)[8] with the following assignment of errors:

a) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the right of Purisima Nala to assert her rights and interest
over the property.
b) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in not considering the Decision rendered by the Court of Appeals in the case
for reconveyance which upheld the rights and interest of Purisima Nala and her children over a certain parcel of
land, a portion of which is subject of the present case.
c) Respondent Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and attorney's fees without any basis.[9]

Atty. Del Prado filed a motion for extension of time to file his separate petition but it was denied by the Court per

its Resolution dated January 19, 2004 issued in G.R. No. 160829.
Petitioners argue that their predecessor-in-interest had every right to protect and assert her interests over the
property. Nala had no knowledge that the property was sold by spouses Gomez to respondent when the demand
letters were sent. What she was aware of was the fact that spouses Gomez were managing the rentals on the
property by virtue of the implied trust created between them and Eulogio Duyan. When spouses Gomez failed to
remit the rentals and claimed ownership of the property, it was then that Nala decided to procure the services of
legal counsel to protect their rights over the property.

Petitioners also contend that it was error for the CA to take note of the RTC Decision in Civil Case No. 91-8821
without further noting that the CA had already reversed and set aside said RTC Decision and ordered reconveyance
of the property to Nala and her children in a Decision dated March 8, 2000 rendered in CA-G.R. CV No. 49163.
Petitioners also argue that respondent did not substantiate his claim for damages.

Preliminarily, the Court notes that both the RTC and the CA failed to indicate the particular provision of law under
which it held petitioners liable for damages. Nevertheless, based on the allegations in respondent's complaint, it
may be gathered that the basis for his claim for damages is Article 19 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

The foregoing provision sets the standards which may be observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in
the performance of ones duties. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be held responsible. But a right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as
such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. A person should be protected only when he acts in the
legitimate exercise of his right; that is, when he acts with prudence and in good faith, but not when he acts with
negligence or abuse. There is an abuse of right when it is exercised only for the purpose of prejudicing or injuring
another. The exercise of a right must be in accordance with the purpose for which it was established, and must not
be excessive or unduly harsh; there must be no intention to injure another.[10]

In order to be liable for damages under the abuse of rights principle, the following requisites must concur: (a) the
existence of a legal right or duty; (b) which is exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or
injuring another.[11]

It should be stressed that malice or bad faith is at the core of Article 19 of the Civil Code. Good faith is presumed,
and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove the same.[12] Bad faith, on the other hand, does not simply
connote bad judgment to simple negligence, dishonest purpose or some moral obloquy and conscious doing of a
wrong, or a breach of known duty due to some motives or interest or ill will that partakes of the nature of fraud.
Malice connotes ill will or spite and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm.[13]
In the present case, there is nothing on record which will prove that Nala and her counsel, Atty. Del Prado, acted in
bad faith or malice in sending the demand letters to respondent. In the first place, there was ground for Nala's
actions since she believed that the property was owned by her husband Eulogio Duyan and that respondent was
illegally occupying the same. She had no knowledge that spouses Gomez violated the trust imposed on them by
Eulogio and surreptitiously sold a portion of the property to respondent. It was only after respondent filed the case
for damages against Nala that she learned of such sale. The bare fact that respondent claims ownership over the
property does not give rise to the conclusion that the sending of the demand letters by Nala was done in bad faith.
Absent any evidence presented by respondent, bad faith or malice could not be attributed to petitioner since Nala
was only trying to protect their interests over the property.

Moreover, respondent failed to show that Nala and Atty. Del Prado's acts were done with the sole intention of
prejudicing and injuring him. It may be true that respondent suffered mental anguish, serious anxiety and sleepless
nights when he received the demand letters; however, there is a material distinction between damages and injury.
Injury is the legal invasion of a legal right while damage is the hurt, loss or harm which results from the injury.[14]
Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a
violation of a legal duty. In such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone; the law affords
no remedy for damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are
often called damnum absque injuria.[15]

Nala was acting well within her rights when she instructed Atty. Del Prado to send the demand letters. She had to
take all the necessary legal steps to enforce her legal/equitable rights over the property occupied by respondent. One
who makes use of his own legal right does no injury.[16] Thus, whatever damages are suffered by respondent
should be borne solely by him.

Nala's acts in protecting her rights over the property find further solid ground in the fact that the property has
already been ordered reconveyed to her and her heirs. In its Decision datedMarch 8, 2000 in CA-G.R. CV No.
49163, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and ordered the reconveyance of the property to
petitioners, and TCT No. 281115 was declared canceled. Said CA Decision was affirmed by this Court in its

Decision dated March 18, 2005 in G.R. No. 144148, which became final and executory on July 27, 2005.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 19, 2002 and Resolution dated October
28, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 48580 are NULLIFIED. Civil Case No. Q-91-
10541 is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Costs against respondent.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

________________________________________
* In Lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per Special Order No. 507 dated May 28, 2008.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Rodrigo V. Cosico, with Associate Justices Rebecca de Guia-Salvador and
Regalado E. Maambong, concurring; rollo, pp. 23-30.
[2] Id. at 32-33.
[3] Rollo, pp. 35-37.
[4] Id. at 41-47.
[5] CA rollo, p. 55.
[6] Id. at 146-147.
[7] Id. at 144-145.
[8] Nala was substituted by petitioners after her death on January 28, 2002.
[9] Rollo, p. 10.
[10] Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Limited v. Catalan, G.R. No. 159590, October 18, 2004,
440 SCRA 498, 511.
[11] Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Pacilan, Jr., G.R. No. 157314, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 372, 382.
[12] Saber v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 132981, August 31, 2004, 437 SCRA 259, 278.
[13] Id. at 278-279.
[14] Lagon v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. 119107, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 616, 627-628.
[15] Diaz v. Davao Light and Power Co., Inc., G.R. No. 160959, April 4, 2007, 520 SCRA 481, 509-510.
[16] Pro Line Sports Center, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 143, 154 (1997).

FIRST DIVISION

ALLAN C. GO, doing business under the name and style ACG Express Liner,
Petitioner,

- versus -

MORTIMER F. CORDERO,
Respondent.
x-----------------------------------------x G.R. No. 164703
MORTIMER F. CORDERO,
Petitioner,

- versus -

ALLAN C. GO, doing business underthe name and style ACG Express Liner, FELIPE M. LANDICHO and
VINCENT D. TECSON,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 164747
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

May 4, 2010
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

For review is the Decision[1] dated March 16, 2004 as modified by the Resolution[2] dated July 22, 2004 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113, which affirmed with modifications the Decision[3] dated May
31, 2000 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 85 in Civil Case No. 98-35332.
The factual antecedents:
Sometime in 1996, Mortimer F. Cordero, Vice-President of Pamana Marketing Corporation (Pamana), ventured into
the business of marketing inter-island passenger vessels. After contacting various overseas fast ferry manufacturers
from all over the world, he came to meet Tony Robinson, an Australian national based in Brisbane, Australia, who
is the Managing Director of Aluminium Fast Ferries Australia (AFFA).
Between June and August 1997, Robinson signed documents appointing Cordero as the exclusive distributor of
AFFA catamaran and other fast ferry vessels in the Philippines. As such exclusive distributor, Cordero offered for
sale to prospective buyers the 25-meter Aluminium Passenger catamaran known as the SEACAT 25.[4]
After negotiations with Felipe Landicho and Vincent Tecson, lawyers of Allan C. Go who is the owner/operator of
ACG Express Liner of Cebu City, a single proprietorship, Cordero was able to close a deal for the purchase of two
(2) SEACAT 25 as evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement dated August 7, 1997.[5] Accordingly, the parties
executed Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 for one (1) high-speed catamaran (SEACAT 25) for the price of
US$1,465,512.00.[6] Per agreement between Robinson and Cordero, the latter shall receive commissions totalling
US$328,742.00, or 22.43% of the purchase price, from the sale of each vessel.[7]
Cordero made two (2) trips to the AFFA Shipyard in Brisbane, Australia, and on one (1) occasion even
accompanied Go and his family and Landicho, to monitor the progress of the building of the vessel. He shouldered
all the expenses for airfare, food, hotel accommodations, transportation and entertainment during these trips. He
also spent for long distance telephone calls to communicate regularly with Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landicho.
However, Cordero later discovered that Go was dealing directly with Robinson when he was informed by Dennis
Padua of Wartsila Philippines that Go was canvassing for a second catamaran engine from their company which
provided the ship engine for the first SEACAT 25. Padua told Cordero that Go instructed him to fax the requested
quotation of the second engine to the Park Royal Hotel in Brisbane where Go was then staying. Cordero tried to
contact Go and Landicho to confirm the matter but they were nowhere to be found, while Robinson refused to
answer his calls. Cordero immediately flew to Brisbane to clarify matters with Robinson, only to find out that Go
and Landicho were already there in Brisbane negotiating for the sale of the second SEACAT 25. Despite repeated
follow-up calls, no explanation was given by Robinson, Go, Landicho and Tecson who even made Cordero believe
there would be no further sale between AFFA and ACG Express Liner.
In a handwritten letter dated June 24, 1998, Cordero informed Go that such act of dealing directly with Robinson
violated his exclusive distributorship and demanded that they respect the same, without prejudice to legal action
against him and Robinson should they fail to heed the same.[8] Corderos lawyer, Atty. Ernesto A. Tabujara, Jr. of
ACCRA law firm, also wrote ACG Express Liner assailing the fraudulent actuations and misrepresentations
committed by Go in connivance with his lawyers (Landicho and Tecson) in breach of Corderos exclusive
distributorship appointment.[9]
Having been apprised of Corderos demand letter, Thyne & Macartney, the lawyer of AFFA and Robinson, faxed a
letter to ACCRA law firm asserting that the appointment of Cordero as AFFAs distributor was for the purpose of
one (1) transaction only, that is, the purchase of a high-speed catamaran vessel by ACG Express Liner in August
1997. The letter further stated that Cordero was offered the exclusive distributorship, the terms of which were
contained in a draft agreement which Cordero allegedly failed to return to AFFA within a reasonable time, and
which offer is already being revoked by AFFA.[10]
As to the response of Go, Landicho and Tecson to his demand letter, Cordero testified before the trial court that on
the same day, Landicho, acting on behalf of Go, talked to him over the telephone and offered to amicably settle
their dispute. Tecson and Landicho offered to convince Go to honor his exclusive distributorship with AFFA and to
purchase all vessels for ACG Express Liner through him for the next three (3) years. In an effort to amicably settle
the matter, Landicho, acting in behalf of Go, set up a meeting with Cordero on June 29, 1998 between 9:30 p.m. to
10:30 p.m. at the Mactan Island Resort Hotel lobby. On said date, however, only Landicho and Tecson came and no
reason was given for Gos absence. Tecson and Landicho proposed that they will convince Go to pay him
US$1,500,000.00 on the condition that they will get a cut of 20%. And so it was agreed between him, Landicho and
Tecson that the latter would give him a weekly status report and that the matter will be settled in three (3) to four (4)
weeks and neither party will file an action against each other until a final report on the proposed settlement. No
such report was made by either Tecson or Landicho who, it turned out, had no intention to do so and were just
buying time as the catamaran vessel was due to arrive from Australia. Cordero then filed a complaint with the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) to prohibit the entry of SEACAT 25 from Australia based on misdeclaration and
undervaluation.Consequently, an Alert Order was issued by Acting BOC Commissioner Nelson Tan for the vessel
which in fact arrived on July 17, 1998. Cordero claimed that Go and Robinson had conspired to undervalue the
vessel by around US$500,000.00.[11]
On August 21, 1998, Cordero instituted Civil Case No. 98-35332 seeking to hold Robinson, Go, Tecson and
Landicho liable jointly and solidarily for conniving and conspiring together in violating his exclusive
distributorship in bad faith and wanton disregard of his rights, thus depriving him of his due commissions (balance
of unpaid commission from the sale of the first vessel in the amount of US$31,522.01 and unpaid commission for
the sale of the second vessel in the amount of US$328,742.00) and causing him actual, moral and exemplary
damages, including P800,000.00 representing expenses for airplane travel to Australia, telecommunications bills
and entertainment, on account of AFFAs untimely cancellation of the exclusive distributorship agreement. Cordero
also prayed for the award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and litigation expenses.[12]
Robinson filed a motion to dismiss grounded on lack of jurisdiction over his person and failure to state a cause of
action, asserting that there was no act committed in violation of the distributorship agreement. Said motion was
denied by the trial court on December 20, 1999. Robinson was likewise declared in default for failure to file his
answer within the period granted by the trial court.[13] As for Go and Tecson, their motion to dismiss based on
failure to state a cause of action was likewise denied by the trial court on February 26, 1999.[14]Subsequently, they
filed their Answer denying that they have anything to do with the termination by AFFA of Corderos authority as
exclusive distributor in the Philippines. On the contrary, they averred it was Cordero who stopped communicating
with Go in connection with the purchase of the first vessel from AFFA and was not doing his part in making
progress status reports and airing the clients grievances to his principal, AFFA, such that Go engaged the services of
Landicho to fly to Australia and attend to the documents needed for shipment of the vessel to the Philippines. As to
the inquiry for the Philippine price for a Wartsila ship engine for AFFAs other on-going vessel construction, this
was merely requested by Robinson but which Cordero misinterpreted as indication that Go was buying a second
vessel. Moreover, Landicho and Tecson had no transaction whatsoever with Cordero who had no document to show
any such shipbuilding contract. As to the supposed meeting to settle their dispute, this was due to the malicious
demand of Cordero to be given US$3,000,000 as otherwise he will expose in the media the alleged undervaluation
of the vessel with the BOC. In any case, Cordero no longer had cause of action for his commission for the sale of
the second vessel under the memorandum of agreement dated August 7, 1997 considering the termination of his
authority by AFFAs lawyers on June 26, 1998.[15]
Pre-trial was reset twice to afford the parties opportunity to reach a settlement. However, on motion filed by
Cordero through counsel, the trial court reconsidered the resetting of the pre-trial to another date for the third time
as requested by Go, Tecson and Landicho, in view of the latters failure to appear at the pre-trial conference on
January 7, 2000 despite due notice. The trial court further confirmed that said defendants misled the trial court in
moving for continuance during the pre-trial conference held on December 10, 1999, purportedly to go abroad for
the holiday season when in truth a Hold-Departure Order had been issued against them.[16] Accordingly, plaintiff
Cordero was allowed to present his evidence ex parte.
Corderos testimony regarding his transaction with defendants Go, Landicho and Tecson, and the latters offer of
settlement, was corroborated by his counsel who also took the witness stand. Further, documentary evidence
including photographs taken of the June 29, 1998 meeting with Landicho, Tecson and Atty. Tabujara at Shangri-las
Mactan Island Resort, photographs taken in Brisbane showing Cordero, Go with his family, Robinson and
Landicho, and also various documents, communications, vouchers and bank transmittals were presented to prove
that: (1) Cordero was properly authorized and actually transacted in behalf of AFFA as exclusive distributor in the
Philippines; (2) Cordero spent considerable sums of money in pursuance of the contract with Go and ACG Express
Liner; and (3) AFFA through Robinson paid Cordero his commissions from each scheduled payment made by Go
for the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA pursuant to Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825.[17]
On May 31, 2000, the trial court rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of Plaintiff and against
defendants Allan C. Go, Tony Robinson, Felipe Landicho, and Vincent Tecson. As prayed for, defendants are
hereby ordered to pay Plaintiff jointly and solidarily, the following:

1. On the First Cause of Action, the sum total of SIXTEEN MILLION TWO HUNDRED NINETY ONE
THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED FIFTY TWO AND FORTY THREE CENTAVOS (P16,291,352.43) as actual
damages with legal interest from 25 June 1998 until fully paid;

2. On the Second Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as moral damages;

3. On the Third Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as exemplary damages; and

4. On the Fourth Cause of Action, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as attorneys fees;

Costs against the defendants.

SO ORDERED.[18]
Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson filed a motion for new trial, claiming that they have been unduly prejudiced by
the negligence of their counsel who was allegedly unaware that the pre-trial conference on January 28, 2000 did not
push through for the reason that Cordero was then allowed to present his evidence ex-parte, as he had assumed that
the said ex-parte hearing was being conducted only against Robinson who was earlier declared in default.[19] In its
Order dated July 28, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for new trial.[20] In the same order, Corderos motion
for execution pending appeal was granted. Defendants moved to reconsider the said order insofar as it granted the
motion for execution pending appeal.[21] On August 8, 2000, they filed a notice of appeal.[22]
On August 18, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration and on August 21, 2000, the writ of
execution pending appeal was issued.[23] Meanwhile, the notice of appeal was denied for failure to pay the
appellate court docket fee within the prescribed period.[24] Defendants filed a motion for reconsideration and to
transmit the case records to the CA.[25]
On September 29, 2000, the CA issued a temporary restraining order at the instance of defendants in the certiorari
case they filed with said court docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 questioning the execution orders issued by the
trial court. Consequently, as requested by the defendants, the trial court recalled and set aside its November 6, 2000
Order granting the ex-parte motion for release of garnished funds, cancelled the scheduled public auction sale of
levied real properties, and denied the ex-parte Motion for Break-Open Order and Ex-ParteMotion for Encashment
of Check filed by Cordero.[26] On November 29, 2000, the trial court reconsidered its Order dated August 21, 2000
denying due course to the notice of appeal and forthwith directed the transmittal of the records to the CA.[27]
On January 29, 2001, the CA rendered judgment granting the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 60354 and
setting aside the trial courts orders of execution pending appeal. Cordero appealed the said judgment in a petition
for review filed with this Court which was eventually denied under our Decision dated September 17, 2002.[28]
On March 16, 2004, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 affirmed the trial court (1) in allowing Cordero to present
his evidence ex-parte after the unjustified failure of appellants (Go, Tecson and Landicho) to appear at the pre-trial
conference despite due notice; (2) in finding that it was Cordero and not Pamana who was appointed by AFFA as
the exclusive distributor in the Philippines of its SEACAT 25 and other fast ferry vessels, which is not limited to the
sale of one (1) such catamaran to Go on August 7, 1997; and (3) in finding that Cordero is entitled to a commission
per vessel sold for AFFA through his efforts in the amount equivalent to 22.43% of the price of each vessel or
US$328,742.00, and with payments of US$297,219.91 having been made to Cordero, there remained a balance of
US$31,522.09 still due to him. The CA sustained the trial court in ruling that Cordero is entitled to damages for the
breach of his exclusive distributorship agreement with AFFA. However, it held that Cordero is entitled only to
commission for the sale of the first catamaran obtained through his efforts with the remaining unpaid sum of
US$31,522.09 or P1,355,449.90 (on the basis of US$1.00=P43.00 rate) with interest at 6% per annum from the
time of the filing of the complaint until the same is fully paid. As to the P800,000.00 representing expenses incurred
by Cordero for transportation, phone bills, entertainment, food and lodging, the CA declared there was no basis for
such award, the same being the logical and necessary consequences of the exclusive distributorship agreement
which are normal in the field of sales and distribution, and the expenditures having redounded to the benefit of the
distributor (Cordero).
On the amounts awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees, the CA
reduced the same to P500,000.00, P300,000.00 and P50,000.00, respectively. Appellants were held solidarily liable
pursuant to the provisions of Article 1207 in relation to Articles 19, 20, 21 and 22 of the New Civil Code. The CA
further ruled that no error was committed by the trial court in denying their motion for new trial, which said court
found to be pro forma and did not raise any substantial matter as to warrant the conduct of another trial.
By Resolution dated July 22, 2004, the CA denied the motions for reconsideration respectively filed by the
appellants and appellee, and affirmed the Decision dated March 16, 2004 with the sole modification that the legal
interest of 6% per annum shall start to run from June 24, 1998 until the finality of the decision, and the rate of 12%
interest per annum shall apply once the decision becomes final and executory until the judgment has been satisfied.
The case before us is a consolidation of the petitions for review under Rule 45 separately filed by Go ( G.R.
No. 164703) and Cordero (G.R. No. 164747) in which petitioners raised the following arguments:

G.R. No. 164703

(Petitioner Go)

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS DISREGARDED THE RULES OF COURT AND PERTINENT
JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN NOT RULING THAT THE
RESPONDENT IS NOT THE REAL PARTY-IN-INTEREST AND IN NOT DISMISSING THE INSTANT CASE
ON THE GROUND OF LACK OF CAUSE OF ACTION;

II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN HOLDING HEREIN PETITIONER RESPONSIBLE FOR THE
BREACH IN THE ALLEGED EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTORSHIP AGREEMENT WITH ALUMINIUM FAST
FERRIES AUSTRALIA;

III. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT MISAPPLIED THE LAW AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE
OF DISCRETION IN FINDING PETITIONER LIABLE IN SOLIDUM WITH THE CO-DEFENDANTS WITH
RESPECT TO THE CLAIMS OF RESPONDENT;

IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS MISAPPLIED LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FOUND PETITIONER LIABLE FOR UNPAID COMMISSIONS,
DAMAGES, ATTORNEYS FEES, AND LITIGATION EXPENSES; and

V. THE HONORABLE APPELLATE COURT ACTED CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AND
GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY DEPRIVED HEREIN PETITIONER OF HIS
RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS BY AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURTS DENIAL OF PETITIONERS MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL.[29]

G.R. No. 164747

(Petitioner Cordero)

I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT
AWARDING PETITIONER ACTUAL DAMAGES FOR HIS COMMISSION FOR THESALE OF THE SECOND
VESSEL, SINCE THERE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON RECORD WHICH PROVES THAT THERE WAS A
SECOND SALE OF A VESSEL.

A. THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT DATED 7 AUGUST 1997 PROVIDES THAT RESPONDENT GO

WAS CONTRACTUALLY BOUND TO BUY TWO (2) VESSELS FROM AFFA.

B. RESPONDENT GOS POSITION PAPER AND COUNTER-AFFIDAVIT/POSITION PAPER THAT WERE

FILED BEFORE THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, ADMITS UNDER OATH THAT HE HAD INDEED
PURCHASED A SECOND VESSEL FROM AFFA.

C. RESPONDENTS ADMITTED IN THEIR PRE-TRIAL BRIEF THAT THEY HAD PURCHASED A SECOND
VESSEL.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT ENTITLED TO HIS
COMMISSIONS FOR THE PURCHASE OF A SECOND VESSEL, SINCE IT WAS PETITIONERS EFFORTS
WHICH ACTUALLY FACILITATED AND SET-UP THE TRANSACTION FOR RESPONDENTS.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT IMPOSING THE PROPER LEGAL INTEREST RATE ON
RESPONDENTS UNPAID OBLIGATION WHICH SHOULD BE TWELVE PERCENT (12%) FROM THE TIME
OF THE BREACH OF THE OBLIGATION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE ORIGINAL AMOUNT OF

CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES AWARDED TO PETITIONER BY THE TRIAL COURT CONSIDERING THE
BAD FAITH AND FRAUDULENT CONDUCT OF RESPONDENTS IN MISAPPROPRIATING THE MONEY
OF PETITIONER.[30]

The controversy boils down to two (2) main issues: (1) whether petitioner Cordero has the legal personality to sue
the respondents for breach of contract; and (2) whether the respondents may be held liable for damages to Cordero
for his unpaid commissions and termination of his exclusive distributorship appointment by the principal, AFFA.

I. Real Party-in-Interest
First, on the issue of whether the case had been filed by the real party-in-interest as required by Section 2, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court, which defines such party as the one (1) to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The purposes of this provision are: 1) to prevent the prosecution of actions
by persons without any right, title or interest in the case; 2) to require that the actual party entitled to legal relief be
the one to prosecute the action; 3) to avoid a multiplicity of suits; and 4) to discourage litigation and keep it within
certain bounds, pursuant to sound public policy.[31] A case is dismissible for lack of personality to sue upon proof
that the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, hence grounded on failure to state a cause of action.[32]
On this issue, we agree with the CA in ruling that it was Cordero and not Pamana who is the exclusive distributor of
AFFA in the Philippines as shown by the Certification dated June 1, 1997 issued by Tony Robinson.[33] Petitioner
Go mentions the following documents also signed by respondent Robinson which state that Pamana Marketing
Corporation represented by Mr. Mortimer F. Cordero was actually the exclusive distributor: (1) letter dated 1 June
1997[34]; (2) certification dated 5 August 1997[35]; and (3) letter dated 5 August 1997 addressed to petitioner
Cordero concerning commissions to be paid to Pamana Marketing Corporation.[36] Such apparent inconsistency in
naming AFFAs exclusive distributor in the Philippines is of no moment. For all intents and purposes, Robinson and
AFFA dealt only with Cordero who alone made decisions in the performance of the exclusive distributorship, as
with other clients to whom he had similarly offered AFFAs fast ferry vessels. Moreover, the stipulated commissions
from each progress payments made by Go were directly paid by Robinson to Cordero.[37] Respondents Landicho
and Tecson were only too aware of Corderos authority as the person who was appointed and acted as exclusive
distributor of AFFA, which can be gleaned from their act of immediately furnishing him with copies of bank
transmittals everytime Go remits payment to Robinson, who in turn transfers a portion of funds received to the bank
account of Cordero in the Philippines as his commission. Out of these partial payments of his commission, Cordero
would still give Landicho and Tecson their respective commission, or cuts from his own commission. Respondents
Landicho and Tecson failed to refute the evidence submitted by Cordero consisting of receipts signed by them. Said
amounts were apart from the earlier expenses shouldered by Cordero for Landichos airline tickets, transportation,
food and hotel accommodations for the trip to Australia.[38]
Moreover, petitioner Go, Landicho and Tecson never raised petitioner Corderos lack of personality to sue on behalf
of Pamana,[39] and did so only before the CA when they contended that it is Pamana and not Cordero, who was
appointed and acted as exclusive distributor for AFFA.[40] It was Robinson who argued in support of his motion to
dismiss that as far as said defendant is concerned, the real party plaintiff appears to be Pamana, against the real
party defendant which is AFFA.[41] As already mentioned, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss filed by
Robinson.
We find no error committed by the trial court in overruling Robinsons objection over the improper resort to
summons by publication upon a foreign national like him and in an action in personam, notwithstanding that he
raised it in a special appearance specifically raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his person. Courts acquire
jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, while jurisdiction over the defendants in a civil case
is acquired either through the service of summons upon them in the manner required by law or through their
voluntary appearance in court and their submission to its authority.[42] A party who makes a special appearance in
court challenging the jurisdiction of said court based on the ground of invalid service of summons is not deemed to
have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.[43]
In this case, however, although the Motion to Dismiss filed by Robinson specifically stated as one (1) of the
grounds the lack of personal jurisdiction, it must be noted that he had earlier filed a Motion for Time to file an
appropriate responsive pleading even beyond the time provided in the summons by publication.[44] Such motion
did not state that it was a conditional appearance entered to question the regularity of the service of summons, but
an appearance submitting to the jurisdiction of the court by acknowledging the summons by publication issued by
the court and praying for additional time to file a responsive pleading. Consequently, Robinson having
acknowledged the summons by publication and also having invoked the jurisdiction of the trial court to secure
affirmative relief in his motion for additional time, he effectively submitted voluntarily to the trial courts
jurisdiction. He is now estopped from asserting otherwise, even before this Court.[45]

II. Breach of Exclusive Distributorship,

Contractual Interference and
Respondents Liability for Damages

In Yu v. Court of Appeals,[46] this Court ruled that the right to perform an exclusive distributorship agreement and
to reap the profits resulting from such performance are proprietary rights which a party may protect. Thus,
injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent a wrongful interference with contracts by strangers to such contracts
where the legal remedy is insufficient and the resulting injury is irreparable. In that case, the former dealer of the
same goods purchased the merchandise from the manufacturer in England through a trading firm inWest Germany
and sold these in the Philippines. We held that the rights granted to the petitioner under the exclusive distributorship
agreement may not be diminished nor rendered illusory by the expedient act of utilizing or interposing a person or
firm to obtain goods for which the exclusive distributorship was conceptualized, at the expense of the sole
authorized distributor.[47]
In the case at bar, it was established that petitioner Cordero was not paid the balance of his commission by
respondent Robinson. From the time petitioner Go and respondent Landicho directly dealt with respondent
Robinson in Brisbane, and ceased communicating through petitioner Cordero as the exclusive distributor of AFFA
in the Philippines, Cordero was no longer informed of payments remitted to AFFA in Brisbane. In other words,
Cordero had clearly been cut off from the transaction until the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 which was sold
through his efforts. When Cordero complained to Go, Robinson, Landicho and Tecson about their acts prejudicial to
his rights and demanded that they respect his exclusive distributorship, Go simply let his lawyers led by Landicho
and Tecson handle the matter and tried to settle it by promising to pay a certain amount and to purchase high-speed
catamarans through Cordero. However, Cordero was not paid anything and worse, AFFA through its lawyer in
Australia even terminated his exclusive dealership insisting that his services were engaged for only one (1)
transaction, that is, the purchase of the first SEACAT 25 in August 1997.
Petitioner Go argues that unlike in Yu v. Court of Appeals[48] there is no conclusive proof adduced by petitioner
Cordero that they actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA and hence there was no violation of
the exclusive distributorship agreement. Further, he contends that the CA gravely abused its discretion in holding
them solidarily liable to Cordero, relying on Articles 1207, 19 and 21 of the Civil Code despite absence of evidence,
documentary or testimonial, showing that they conspired to defeat the very purpose of the exclusive distributorship
agreement.[49]
We find that contrary to the claims of petitioner Cordero, there was indeed no sufficient evidence that respondents
actually purchased a second SEACAT 25 directly from AFFA. But this circumstance will not absolve respondents
from liability for invading Corderos rights under the exclusive distributorship. Respondents clearly acted in bad
faith in bypassing Cordero as they completed the remaining payments to AFFA without advising him and furnishing
him with copies of the bank transmittals as they previously did, and directly dealt with AFFA through Robinson
regarding arrangements for the arrival of the first SEACAT 25 in Manila and negotiations for the purchase of the
second vessel pursuant to the Memorandum of Agreement which Cordero signed in behalf of AFFA. As a result of
respondents actuations, Cordero incurred losses as he was not paid the balance of his commission from the sale of
the first vessel and his exclusive distributorship revoked by AFFA.
Petitioner Go contends that the trial and appellate courts erred in holding them solidarily liable for Corderos unpaid
commission, which is the sole obligation of the principal AFFA.It was Robinson on behalf of AFFA who, in the
letter dated August 5, 1997 addressed to Cordero, undertook to pay commission payments to Pamana on a staggered
progress payment plan in the form of percentage of the commission per payment. AFFA explicitly committed that it
will, upon receipt of progress payments, pay to Pamana their full commission by telegraphic transfer to an account
nominated by Pamana within one to two days of [AFFA] receiving such payments.[50] Petitioner Go further
maintains that he had not in any way violated or caused the termination of the exclusive distributorship agreement
between Cordero and AFFA; he had also paid in full the first and only vessel he purchased from AFFA.[51]
While it is true that a third person cannot possibly be sued for breach of contract because only parties can breach
contractual provisions, a contracting party may sue a third person not for breach but for inducing another to commit
such breach.
Article 1314 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 1314. Any third person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party.

The elements of tort interference are: (1) existence of a valid contract; (2) knowledge on the part of the third person
of the existence of a contract; and (3) interference of the third person is without legal justification.[52]
The presence of the first and second elements is not disputed. Through the letters issued by Robinson attesting that
Cordero is the exclusive distributor of AFFA in the Philippines, respondents were clearly aware of the contract
between Cordero and AFFA represented by Robinson. In fact, evidence on record showed that respondents initially
dealt with and recognized Cordero as such exclusive dealer of AFFA high-speed catamaran vessels in the
Philippines. In that capacity as exclusive distributor, petitioner Go entered into the Memorandum of Agreement and
Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 with Cordero in behalf of AFFA.
As to the third element, our ruling in the case of So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals[53] is instructive, to wit:
A duty which the law of torts is concerned with is respect for the property of others, and a cause of action ex delicto
may be predicated upon an unlawful interference by one person of the enjoyment by the other of his private
property. This may pertain to a situation where a third person induces a party to renege on or violate his undertaking
under a contract. In the case before us, petitioners Trendsetter Marketing asked DCCSI to execute lease contracts in
its favor, and as a result petitioner deprived respondent corporation of the latters property right. Clearly, and as
correctly viewed by the appellate court, the three elements of tort interference above-mentioned are present in the
instant case.

Authorities debate on whether interference may be justified where the defendant acts for the sole purpose of
furthering his own financial or economic interest. One view is that, as a general rule, justification for interfering
with the business relations of another exists where the actors motive is to benefit himself. Such justification does
not exist where his sole motive is to cause harm to the other.Added to this, some authorities believe that it is not
necessary that the interferers interest outweigh that of the party whose rights are invaded, and that an individual acts
under an economic interest that is substantial, not merely de minimis, such that wrongful and malicious motives are
negatived, for he acts in self-protection. Moreover, justification for protecting ones financial position should not be
made to depend on a comparison of his economic interest in the subject matter with that of others. It is sufficient if
the impetus of his conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives.

As early as Gilchrist vs. Cuddy, we held that where there was no malice in the interference of a contract, and the
impulse behind ones conduct lies in a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives, a party cannot be a
malicious interferer. Where the alleged interferer is financially interested, and such interest motivates his conduct, it
cannot be said that he is an officious or malicious intermeddler.

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner So Ping Bun prevailed upon DCCSI to lease the warehouse to his
enterprise at the expense of respondent corporation. Though petitioner took interest in the property of respondent
corporation and benefited from it, nothing on record imputes deliberate wrongful motives or malice in him.

xxx

While we do not encourage tort interferers seeking their economic interest to intrude into existing contracts at the
expense of others, however, we find that the conduct herein complained of did not transcend the limits forbidding
an obligatory award for damages in the absence of any malice. The business desire is there to make some gain to
the detriment of the contracting parties. Lack of malice, however, precludes damages. But it does not relieve
petitioner of the legal liability for entering into contracts and causing breach of existing ones. The respondent
appellate court correctly confirmed the permanent injunction and nullification of the lease contracts between
DCCSI and Trendsetter Marketing, without awarding damages. The injunction saved the respondents from further
damage or injury caused by petitioners interference.[54] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

Malice connotes ill will or spite, and speaks not in response to duty. It implies an intention to do ulterior and
unjustifiable harm. Malice is bad faith or bad motive.[55] In the case ofLagon v. Court of Appeals,[56] we held that
to sustain a case for tortuous interference, the defendant must have acted with malice or must have been driven by
purely impure reasons to injure the plaintiff; in other words, his act of interference cannot be justified. We further
explained that the word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to choose one course of conduct
by persuasion or intimidation. As to the allegation of private respondent in said case that petitioner induced the
heirs of the late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property to petitioner despite an alleged renewal of the original lease
contract with the deceased landowner, we ruled as follows:
Assuming ex gratia argumenti that petitioner knew of the contract, such knowledge alone was not sufficient to
make him liable for tortuous interference. x x x

Furthermore, the records do not support the allegation of private respondent that petitioner induced the heirs of Bai
Tonina Sepi to sell the property to him. The word induce refers to situations where a person causes another to
choose one course of conduct by persuasion or intimidation. The records show that the decision of the heirs of the
late Bai Tonina Sepi to sell the property was completely of their own volition and that petitioner did absolutely
nothing to influence their judgment. Private respondent himself did not proffer any evidence to support his claim. In
short, even assuming that private respondent was able to prove the renewal of his lease contract with Bai Tonina
Sepi, the fact was that he was unable to prove malice or bad faith on the part of petitioner in purchasing the
property.Therefore, the claim of tortuous interference was never established.[57]
In their Answer, respondents denied having anything to do with the unpaid balance of the commission due to
Cordero and the eventual termination of his exclusive distributorship by AFFA. They gave a different version of the
events that transpired following the signing of Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825. According to them, several builder-
competitors still entered the picture after the said contract for the purchase of one (1) SEACAT 25 was sent to
Brisbane in July 1997 for authentication, adding that the contract was to be effective on August 7, 1997, the time
when their funds was to become available. Go admitted he called the attention of AFFA if it can compete with the
prices of other builders, and upon mutual agreement, AFFA agreed to give them a discounted price under the
following terms and conditions: (1) that the contract price be lowered; (2) that Go will obtain another vessel; (3)
that to secure compliance of such conditions, Go must make an advance payment for the building of the second
vessel; and (4) that the payment scheme formerly agreed upon as stipulated in the first contract shall still be the
basis and used as the guiding factor in remitting money for the building of the first vessel. This led to the signing of
another contract superseding the first one (1), still to be dated 07 August 1997. Attached to the answer were
photocopies of the second contract stating a lower purchase price (US$1,150,000.00) and facsimile transmission of
AFFA to Go confirming the transaction.[58]
As to the cessation of communication with Cordero, Go averred it was Cordero who was nowhere to be contacted at
the time the shipbuilding progress did not turn good as promised, and it was always Landicho and Tecson who, after
several attempts, were able to locate him only to obtain unsatisfactory reports such that it was Go who would still
call up Robinson regarding any progress status report, lacking documents for MARINA, etc., and go to Australia
for ocular inspection. Hence, in May 1998 on the scheduled launching of the ship in Australia, Go engaged the
services of Landicho who went to Australia to see to it that all documents needed for the shipment of the vessel to
the Philippines would be in order. It was also during this time that Robinsons request for inquiry on the Philippine
price of a Wartsila engine for AFFAs then on-going vessel construction, was misinterpreted by Cordero as
indicating that Go was buying a second vessel.[59]
We find these allegations unconvincing and a mere afterthought as these were the very same averments contained in
the Position Paper for the Importer dated October 9, 1998, which was submitted by Go on behalf of ACG Express
Liner in connection with the complaint-affidavit filed by Cordero before the BOC-SGS Appeals Committee relative
to the shipment valuation of the first SEACAT 25 purchased from AFFA.[60] It appears that the purported second
contract superseding the original Shipbuilding Contract No. 7825 and stating a lower price of US$1,150,000.00 (not
US$1,465,512.00) was only presented before the BOC to show that the vessel imported into the Philippines was not
undervalued by almost US$500,000.00.Cordero vehemently denied there was such modification of the contract and
accused respondents of resorting to falsified documents, including the facsimile transmission of AFFA supposedly
confirming the said sale for only US$1,150,000.00. Incidentally, another document filed in said BOC case, the
Counter-Affidavit/Position Paper for the Importer dated November 16, 1998,[61] states in paragraph 8 under the
Antecedent facts thereof, that --
8. As elsewhere stated, the total remittances made by herein Importer to AFFA does not alone represent the
purchase price for Seacat 25. It includes advance payment for the acquisition of another vessel as part of the deal
due to the discounted price.[62]

which even gives credence to the claim of Cordero that respondents negotiated for the sale of the second vessel and
that the nonpayment of the remaining two (2) instalments of his commission for the sale of the first SEACAT 25
was a result of Go and Landichos directly dealing with Robinson, obviously to obtain a lower price for the second
vessel at the expense of Cordero.
The act of Go, Landicho and Tecson in inducing Robinson and AFFA to enter into another contract directly with
ACG Express Liner to obtain a lower price for the second vessel resulted in AFFAs breach of its contractual
obligation to pay in full the commission due to Cordero and unceremonious termination of Corderos appointment as
exclusive distributor.Following our pronouncement in Gilchrist v. Cuddy (supra), such act may not be deemed
malicious if impelled by a proper business interest rather than in wrongful motives. The attendant circumstances,
however, demonstrated that respondents transgressed the bounds of permissible financial interest to benefit
themselves at the expense of Cordero. Respondents furtively went directly to Robinson after Cordero had worked
hard to close the deal for them to purchase from AFFA two (2) SEACAT 25, closely monitored the progress of
building the first vessel sold, attended to their concerns and spent no measly sum for the trip to Australia with Go,
Landicho and Gos family members. But what is appalling is the fact that even as Go, Landicho and Tecson secretly
negotiated with Robinson for the purchase of a second vessel, Landicho and Tecson continued to demand and
receive from Cordero their commission or cut fromCorderos earned commission from the sale of the first SEACAT
25.
Cordero was practically excluded from the transaction when Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho suddenly ceased
communicating with him, without giving him any explanation.While there was nothing objectionable in negotiating
for a lower price in the second purchase of SEACAT 25, which is not prohibited by the Memorandum of
Agreement, Go, Robinson, Tecson and Landicho clearly connived not only in ensuring that Cordero would have no
participation in the contract for sale of the second SEACAT 25, but also that Cordero would not be paid the balance
of his commission from the sale of the first SEACAT 25. This, despite their knowledge that it was commission
already earned by and due to Cordero. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly ruled that the actuations of Go,
Robinson, Tecson and Landicho were without legal justification and intended solely to prejudice Cordero.
The existence of malice, ill will or bad faith is a factual matter. As a rule, findings of fact of the trial court, when
affirmed by the appellate court, are conclusive on this Court.[63]We see no compelling reason to reverse the
findings of the RTC and the CA that respondents acted in bad faith and in utter disregard of the rights of Cordero
under the exclusive distributorship agreement.
The failure of Robinson, Go, Tecson and Landico to act with fairness, honesty and good faith in securing better
terms for the purchase of high-speed catamarans from AFFA, to the prejudice of Cordero as the duly appointed
exclusive distributor, is further proscribed by Article 19 of the Civil Code:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

As we have expounded in another case:

Elsewhere, we explained that when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible. The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. These standards are the
following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith. Its antithesis, necessarily, is
any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right or duty; (2)
which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another. When Article 19 is violated,
an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to damages arising
from a violation of law x x x. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 21 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to injure.
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21, and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.[64]

Petitioner Gos argument that he, Landicho and Tecson cannot be held liable solidarily with Robinson for actual,
moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees awarded to Cordero since no law or contract provided for
solidary obligation in these cases, is equally bereft of merit. Conformably with Article 2194 of the Civil Code, the
responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for the quasi-delict is solidary.[65] In Lafarge Cement
Philippines, Inc. v. Continental Cement Corporation,[66] we held:
[O]bligations arising from tort are, by their nature, always solidary. We have assiduously maintained this legal
principle as early as 1912 in Worcester v. Ocampo, in which we held:

x x x The difficulty in the contention of the appellants is that they fail to recognize that the basis of the present
action is tort. They fail to recognize the universal doctrine that each joint tort feasor is not only individually liable
for the tort in which he participates, but is also jointly liable with his tort feasors. x x x

It may be stated as a general rule that joint tort feasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is
done, if done for their benefit. They are each liable as principals, to the same extent and in the same manner as if
they had performed the wrongful act themselves. x x x

Joint tort feasors are jointly and severally liable for the tort which they commit. The persons injured may sue all of
them or any number less than all. Each is liable for the whole damages caused by all, and all together are jointly
liable for the whole damage. It is no defense for one sued alone, that the others who participated in the wrongful act
are not joined with him as defendants; nor is it any excuse for him that his participation in the tort was insignificant
as compared to that of the others. x x x

Joint tort feasors are not liable pro rata. The damages can not be apportioned among them, except among
themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each paying an aliquot part. They are
jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. x x x
A payment in full for the damage done, by one of the joint tort feasors, of course satisfies any claim which might
exist against the others. There can be but satisfaction. The release of one of the joint tort feasors by agreement
generally operates to discharge all. x x x

Of course, the court during trial may find that some of the alleged tort feasors are liable and that others are not
liable. The courts may release some for lack of evidence while condemning others of the alleged tort feasors. And
this is true even though they are charged jointly and severally.[67] [EMPHASIS SUPPLIED.]

The rule is that the defendant found guilty of interference with contractual relations cannot be held liable for more
than the amount for which the party who was inducted to break the contract can be held liable.[68] Respondents
Go, Landicho and Tecson were therefore correctly held liable for the balance of petitioner Corderos commission
from the sale of the first SEACAT 25, in the amount of US$31,522.09 or its peso equivalent, which
AFFA/Robinson did not pay in violation of the exclusive distributorship agreement, with interest at the rate of 6%
per annum from June 24, 1998 until the same is fully paid.
Respondents having acted in bad faith, moral damages may be recovered under Article 2219 of the Civil Code.[69]
On the other hand, the requirements of an award of exemplary damages are: (1) they may be imposed by way of
example in addition to compensatory damages, and only after the claimants right to them has been established; (2)
that they cannot be recovered as a matter of right, their determination depending upon the amount of compensatory
damages that may be awarded to the claimant; and (3) the act must be accompanied by bad faith or done in a
wanton, fraudulent, oppressive or malevolent manner.[70] The award of exemplary damages is thus in order.
However, we find the sums awarded by the trial court as moral and exemplary damages as reduced by the CA, still
excessive under the circumstances.
Moral damages are meant to compensate and alleviate the physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injuries unjustly
caused. Although incapable of pecuniary estimation, the amount must somehow be proportional to and in
approximation of the suffering inflicted.Moral damages are not punitive in nature and were never intended to enrich
the claimant at the expense of the defendant. There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and
reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar facts. Trial courts are
given discretion in determining the amount, with the limitation that it should not be palpably and scandalously
excessive. Indeed, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered.[71]
We believe that the amounts of P300,000.00 and P200,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages, respectively,
would be sufficient and reasonable. Because exemplary damages are awarded, attorneys fees may also be awarded
in consonance with Article 2208 (1).[72] We affirm the appellate courts award of attorneys fees in the amount of
P50,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DENIED. The Decision dated March 16, 2004 as modified by the Resolution dated
July 22, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 69113 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in
that the awards of moral and exemplary damages are hereby reduced to P300,000.00 and P200,000.00, respectively.
With costs against the petitioner in G.R. No. 164703.
SO ORDERED.
 MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
________________________________________
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate
Justices B.A. Adefuin-Dela Cruz and Eliezer R. Delos Santos.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Jose Catral Mendoza (now a Member of this Court) and concurred in by Associate
Justices Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and Eliezer R. Delos Santos.
[3] Penned by Judge Pedro M. Areola.
[4] Folder of plaintiffs exhibits, pp. 1-34.
[5] Id., pp. 35-39.
[6] Id., pp. 43-51.
[7] Id., pp. 40-42.
[8] Id., pp. 52-53.
[9] Id., pp. 54-56.
[10] Id., pp. 56-57.
[11] TSN, April 5, 2000, pp. 27-35; folder of plaintiffs exhibits, p. 58.
[12] Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-16.
[13] Id., pp. 155-157, 167-171, 186-189, 249-251.
[14] Id., pp. 70-77, 178.
[15] Id., pp. 213-214.
[16] Id., pp. 298-299.
[17] TSN, April 14, 2000, pp. 2-44.
[18] Records, Vol. I, pp. 445-446.
[19] Id., pp. 460-465.
[20] Id., pp. 477-480.
[21] Id., pp. 481-485.
[22] Id., p. 486.
[23] Id., pp. 500-502.
[24] Id., p. 503.
[25] Id., pp. 512-514.
[26] Records, Vol. II, pp. 550-620.
[27] Id., pp. 621-622.
[28] Cordero v. Go,G.R. No. 149754, 389 SCRA 288.
[29] Rollo (G.R. No. 164703), pp. 23-24.

[30] Rollo (G.R. No. 164747), pp. 21-22.

[31] Oco v. Limbaring, G.R. No. 161298, January 31, 2006, 481 SCRA 348, 358.

[32] Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 158397, November 26, 2004, 444 SCRA 509.
[33] Folder of exhibits, Exhibit A-6, p. 7.
[34] Id., Exhibit A-9, p. 10
[35] Id., Exhibit A, p. 1.
[36] Id., Exhibit A-3, p. 4.
[37] Id., Exhibits J to J-2, K to K-4, M, Y to Y-4, pp. 59-66, 69-71, 314-318.
[38] Id., Exhibits R-6, P, R-7, V, W , X to X-7, Y to Y-4 and Z to Z-2, pp. 232, 236-238, 239, 301-321.
[39] Records, Vol. I, pp. 70-73, 203-213, 265-267, 460-464.
[40] CA rollo, pp. 78-84.
[41] Records, Vol. I, pp. 241-242.
[42] Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. v. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007, 530
SCRA 170, 186.
[43] United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, G.R. No. 146593, October 26, 2001, 368 SCRA 464, 470.
[44] Records, Vol. I, pp. 168-170.
[45] See Dole Philippines, Inc.(Tropifresh Division) v. Quilala, G.R. No. 168723, July 9, 2008, 557 SCRA
433, 437-438.
[46] G.R. No. 86683, January 21, 1993, 217 SCRA 328.
[47] Id., pp. 331, 332.
[48] Supra.
[49] Rollo ( G.R. No. 164703), pp. 33-34.
[50] Id., pp 36-37; Exhibit A-3, folder of exhibits, p. 4.
G.R. No. 164703), p. 39.
[51] Rollo (

[52] So Ping Bun v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 120554, September 21, 1999, 314 SCRA 751, 758, citing 30
Am Jur, Section 19, pp. 71-72 and Sampaguita Pictures, Inc. v. Vasquez, et al. (Court of Appeals, 68 O.G. 7666).
[53] Supra.
[54] Id., pp. 758-760.
[55] Borjal v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999, 301 SCRA 1, 28.
[56] G.R. No. 119107, March 18, 2005, 453 SCRA 616, 626.
[57] Id., p. 626.
[58] Records, Vol. I, pp. 204-206.
[59] Id., pp. 206-207.
[60] Folder of exhibits, Exhibit BB, pp. 324-342.
[61] Id., Exhibit CC, pp. 343-361.
[62] Id., p. 345.
[63] Ramas v. Quiamco, G.R. No. 146322, December 6, 2006, 510 SCRA 172, 178.
[64] Nikko Hotel Manila Garden v. Reyes, G.R. No. 154259, February 28, 2005, 452 SCRA 532, 546-547,

citing Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 25.

[65] Ngo Sin Sing v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., G.R. No. 170596, November 28, 2008, 572 SCRA 625, 638,

citing Chan, Jr. v. Iglesia ni Cristo, Inc., G.R. No. 160283, October 14, 2005, 473 SCRA 177, 186.

[66] G.R. No. 155173, November 23, 2004, 443 SCRA 522.
[67] As cited in Ngo Sin Sing v. Li Seng Giap & Sons, Inc., supra.
[68] Daywalt v. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587 (1919).
[69] Magat v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124221, August 4, 2000, 337 SCRA 298; Far East Bank & Trust
Company v. Court of Appeals, 311 Phil. 783 (1995); and Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R.

No. 130030, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 141, 145-146.

[70] National Steel Corporation v. Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Br. 2, Iligan City, G.R. No.
127004, March 11, 1999 304 SCRA 609.
[71] Samson, Jr. v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, G.R. No. 150487, July 10, 2003, 405 SCRA 607, 611-612,
citing Expertravel & Tours, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 368 Phil. 444 (1999); De la Serna v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 109161, June 21, 1994, 233 SCRA 325; Visayan Sawmill Company, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 83851, March 3, 1993, 219 SCRA 378; Flores v. Uy, G.R. Nos. 121492 & 124325, October 26,
2001, 368 SCRA 347; Pagsuyuin v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 72121, February 6, 1991, 193

SCRA 547; Northwest Airlines v. Laya, G.R. No. 145956, May 29, 2002, 382 SCRA 730; Cavite
Development Bank v. Sps. Lim, 381 Phil. 355 (2000); Coca-Cola Bottlers, Phils., Inc. v. Roque, 367 Phil. 493

(1999); Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 117228, June 19, 1997, 274 SCRA 282; Prudential Bank v.
Court of Appeals, 384 Phil. 942 (1999); Singson v. Court of Appeals, 346 Phil. 831 (1997); Del Rosario v. Court of
Appeals, 334 Phil. 812 (1997); Philippine National Bank v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 326 (1996); Mayo v.

People,G.R. No. 91201, December 5, 1991, 204 SCRA 642; Policarpio v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
94563, March 5, 1991, 194 SCRA 729; Radio Communications of the Phils., Inc. v. Rodriguez, G.R. No.
83768, February 28, 1990, 182 SCRA 899; and Prudenciado v. Alliance Transport System, Inc., No. L-33836,
March 16, 1987, 148 SCRA 440.
[72] B.F. Metal (Corporation) v. Lomotan, G.R. No. 170813, April 16, 2008, 551 SCRA 618.
SECOND DIVISION

TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, G.R. No. 180764

Petitioner,
Present:
Carpio, J., Chairperson,
- versus - Brion,
Del Castillo,
Abad, and
Perez, JJ.
EMMA M. ROSQUETA,
Respondent. Promulgated:

January 19, 2010

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x

DECISION

ABAD, J.:

This case is about the right to recover damages for alleged abuse of right committed by a superior public officer in
preventing a subordinate from doing her assigned task and being officially recognized for it.

The Facts and the Case

Respondent Emma M. Rosqueta (Rosqueta), formerly Deputy Commissioner of the Revenue Collection and
Monitoring Group of the Bureau of Customs (the Bureau), tendered her courtesy resignation from that post on
January 23, 2001, shortly after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo assumed office. But five months later on June 5,
2001, she withdrew her resignation, claiming that she enjoyed security of tenure and that she had resigned against
her will on orders of her superior.[1]
Meantime, on July 13, 2001 President Arroyo appointed Gil Valera (Valera) to respondent Rosquetas position.
Challenging such appointment, Rosqueta filed a petition for prohibition, quo warranto, and injunction against
petitioner Titus B. Villanueva (Villanueva), then Commissioner of Customs, the Secretary of Finance, and Valera
with the Regional Trial Court[2] (RTC) of Manila in Civil Case 01-101539. On August 27, 2001 the RTC issued a
temporary restraining order (TRO), enjoining Villanueva and the Finance Secretary[3] from implementing Valeras
appointment. On August 28, 2001 the trial court superseded the TRO with a writ of preliminary injunction.[4]

Petitioner Villanueva, Valera, and the Secretary of Finance challenged the injunction order before the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 66070. On September 14, 2001 the CA issued its own TRO, enjoining the
implementation of the RTCs injunction order. But the TRO lapsed after 60 days and the CA eventually dismissed
the petition before it.

On November 22, 2001 while the preliminary injunction in the quo warranto case was again in force, petitioner
Villanueva issued Customs Memorandum Order 40-2001, authorizing Valera to exercise the powers and functions
of the Deputy Commissioner.

During the Bureaus celebration of its centennial anniversary in February 2002, its special Panorama magazine
edition featured all the customs deputy commissioners, except respondent Rosqueta. The souvenir program,
authorized by the Bureaus Steering Committee headed by petitioner Villanueva to be issued on the occasion, had a
space where Rosquetas picture was supposed to be but it instead stated that her position was under litigation.
Meanwhile, the commemorative billboard displayed at the Bureaus main gate included Valeras picture but not
Rosquetas.

On February 28, 2002 respondent Rosqueta filed a complaint[5] for damages before the RTC of Quezon City
against petitioner Villanueva in Civil Case Q-02-46256, alleging that the latter maliciously excluded her from the
centennial anniversary memorabilia. Further, she claimed that he prevented her from performing her duties as
Deputy Commissioner, withheld her salaries, and refused to act on her leave applications. Thus, she asked the RTC
to award her P1,000,000.00 in moral damages, P500,000.00 in exemplary damages, and P300,000.00 in attorneys
fees and costs of suit.

But the RTC dismissed[6] respondent Rosquetas complaint, stating that petitioner Villanueva committed no wrong
and incurred no omission that entitled her to damages. The RTC found that Villanueva had validly and legally
replaced her as Deputy Commissioner seven months before the Bureaus centennial anniversary.

But the CA reversed the RTCs decision,[7] holding instead that petitioner Villanuevas refusal to comply with the
preliminary injunction order issued in the quo warranto case earned for Rosqueta the right to recover moral
damages from him.[8] Citing the abuse of right principle, the RTC said that Villanueva acted maliciously when he
prevented Rosqueta from performing her duties, deprived her of salaries and leaves, and denied her official
recognition as Deputy Commissioner by excluding her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia.Thus, the
appellate court ordered Villanueva to pay P500,000.00 in moral damages, P200,000.00 in exemplary damages and
P100,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses. With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, Villanueva
filed this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.

The Issue Presented

The key issue presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in holding petitioner Villanueva liable in
damages to respondent Rosqueta for ignoring the preliminary injunction order that the RTC issued in the quo
warranto case (Civil Case 01-101539), thus denying her of the right to do her job as Deputy Commissioner of the
Bureau and to be officially recognized as such public officer.

The Courts Ruling

Under the abuse of right principle found in Article 19 of the Civil Code,[9] a person must, in the exercise of his
legal right or duty, act in good faith. He would be liable if he instead acts in bad faith, with intent to prejudice
another. Complementing this principle are Articles 20[10] and 21[11] of the Civil Code which grant the latter
indemnity for the injury he suffers because of such abuse of right or duty.[12]

Petitioner Villanueva claims that he merely acted on advice of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) when he
allowed Valera to assume the office as Deputy Commissioner since respondent Rosqueta held the position merely in
a temporary capacity and since she lacked the Career Executive Service eligibility required for the job.

But petitioner Villanueva cannot seek shelter in the alleged advice that the OSG gave him. Surely, a government
official of his rank must know that a preliminary injunction order issued by a court of law had to be obeyed,
especially since the question of Valeras right to replace respondent Rosqueta had not yet been properly resolved.

That petitioner Villanueva ignored the injunction shows bad faith and intent to spite Rosqueta who remained in the
eyes of the law the Deputy Commissioner. His exclusion of her from the centennial anniversary memorabilia was
not an honest mistake by any reckoning. Indeed, he withheld her salary and prevented her from assuming the duties
of the position. As the Court said in Amonoy v. Spouses Gutierrez,[13] a partys refusal to abide by a court order
enjoining him from doing an act, otherwise lawful, constitutes an abuse and an unlawful exercise of right.

That respondent Rosqueta was later appointed Deputy Commissioner for another division of the Bureau is
immaterial. While such appointment, when accepted, rendered the quo warranto case moot and academic, it did not
have the effect of wiping out the injuries she suffered on account of petitioner Villanuevas treatment of her. The
damage suit is an independent action.

The CA correctly awarded moral damages to respondent Rosqueta. Such damages may be awarded when the
defendants transgression is the immediate cause of the plaintiffs anguish[14] in the cases specified in Article
2219[15] of the Civil Code.[16]
Here, respondent Rosquetas colleagues and friends testified that she suffered severe anxiety on account of the
speculation over her employment status.[17] She had to endure being referred to as a squatter in her workplace. She
had to face inquiries from family and friends about her exclusion from the Bureaus centennial anniversary
memorabilia. She did not have to endure all these affronts and the angst and depression they produced had
Villanueva abided in good faith by the courts order in her favor. Clearly, she is entitled to moral damages.

The Court, however, finds the award of P500,000.00 excessive. As it held in Philippine Commercial International
Bank v. Alejandro,[18] moral damages are not a bonanza. They are given to ease the defendants grief and suffering.
Moral damages should reasonably approximate the extent of hurt caused and the gravity of the wrong done. Here,
that would beP200,000.00.

The Court affirms the grant of exemplary damages by way of example or correction for the public good but, in line
with the same reasoning, reduces it to P50,000.00. Finally, the Court affirms the award of attorneys fees and
litigation expenses but reduces it to P50,000.00.

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 30,
2007 in CA-G.R. CV 85931 with MODIFICATION in that petitioner Titus B. Villanueva is ORDERED to pay
respondent Emma M. Rosqueta the sum of P200,000.00 in moral damages, P50,000.00 in exemplary damages, and
P50,000.00 in attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE P. PEREZ
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

________________________________________
[1] Former Commissioner of Customs, Renato A. Ampil.
[2] Branch 51.
[3] Hon. Jose Isidro Camacho.
[4] Records, p. 12. It is hereby ordered by the undersigned Judge of the Regional Trial Court that until further
orders, you, the said respondents and all your attorneys, representatives, agents and any other persons assisting are
hereby enjoined from implementing or enforcing the appointment of respondent GIL A. VALERA to the position of
Customs Deputy Commissioner for Revenue Collection and Monitoring and respondent Valera from assuming the
said office or exercising its functions until further orders from this Court.
[5] Id. at 1-8.
[6] Rollo, pp. 80-109. Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
[7] Id. at 48-65. Penned by Associate Justice Enrico A. Lanzanas and concurred in by Associate Justices Remedios
Salazar-Fernando and Rosalinda Asuncion-Vicente.
[8] Id. at 63.
[9] Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice,
give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
[10] Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.
[11] Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals or
good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
[12] Carpio v. Valmonte, 481 Phil. 352, 362 (2004).
[13] 404 Phil. 586, 594 (2001).
[14] Art. 2217, Civil Code. Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of
pecuniary computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants
wrongful act for omission.
[15] Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
4) Adultery or concubinage;
5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
6) Illegal search;
7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
8) Malicious prosecution;
9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this Article, may also recover
moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this
Article, in the order named.
[16] Carpio v. Valmonte, supra note 12, at 364.
[17] Testimony of Wilnora Cawile, TSN, March 5, 2003, pp. 16-18; testimony of Wilhelmina Faustino, TSN, May
15, 2003, pp. 10-13, 19-25; testimony of John Aclaro, June 6, 2003, pp. 20-26.
[18] G.R. No. 175587, September 21, 2007, 533 SCRA 738, 757-758.
G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015 - PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW
BDO UNIBANK, INC., Petitioner, v. JOSEPHINE D. GOMEZ, Respondent.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 199601, November 23, 2015
PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL INTERNATIONAL BANK (NOW BDO UNIBANK, INC., Petitioner,
v.JOSEPHINE D. GOMEZ, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court1 filed by Philippine
Commercial International Bank (PCIB) assailing the May 23, 2011 decision2 and the December 7, 2011 resolution3
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 68288. The CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 145 (RTC) in toto.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

Josephine D. Gomez (Josephine) was a teller at the Domestic Airport Branch of the PCIB when a certain Colin R.
Harrington opened Savings Account No. 373-28010-6 with said branch in January 1985.

The following day, Harrington presented two (2) genuine bank drafts dated January 3, 1985, issued by the Bank of
New Zealand. The first draft was in the sum of US$724.57 payable to "C.R. Harrington," while the second draft
was in the sum of US$2,004.76 payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington."

The PCIB, on the other hand, alleged that it was a certain Sophia La'O, as a representative of Harrington, who
presented the bank drafts for deposit.

Upon receipt of the bank drafts, Josephine asked her immediate supervisor, Eleanor Flores, whether the drafts
payable to "Servants C/C.R. Harrington" were acceptable for deposit to the savings account of Harrington. When
Flores answered in the affirmative, and after receiving from the bank's foreign exchange supervision a Philippine
Currency conversion of the amounts reflected in the drafts, Josephine received the deposit slip. Thereafter, the
deposits were duly entered in Harrington's savings account.

On two (2) separate dates, a certain individual representing himself as Harrington withdrew the sums of P45,000.00
and P5,600.00. Subsequently, the bank discovered that the person who made the withdrawals was an impostor.
Thus, the bank had to pay Harrington P50,600.00 representing the amounts of the bank drafts in his name.

The PCIB issued a memorandum asking Josephine to explain why no disciplinary action should be taken against
her for having accepted the bank drafts for deposits. Josephine reasoned that being a new teller she was not yet fully
oriented with the various aspects of the job. She further alleged that she had asked the approval of her immediate
supervisor prior to receiving the deposits.

On November 14, 1985, the PCIB deducted the amount of P-423.38 from Josephine's salary. Josephine wrote the
PCIB to ask why the deduction was made.

After due investigation on the matter, the PCIB issued another memorandum finding Josephine grossly negligent
and liable for performing acts in violation of established operating procedures. The memorandum required
Josephine to pay the amount of P-50,600.00 through deductions in her salary, allowance, bonuses, and profit
sharing until the amount is fully paid.

Josephine wrote the PCIB to ask for the basis of its findings that she was grossly negligent and liable to pay the
amount of P50,600.00. During trial, the RTC found that the PCIB did not even respond to this letter. PCIB,
however, alleged that it had replied to Josephine's letter, and explained that she was afforded due process and the
deductions made prior to January 15, 1986, were merely a withholding pending the investigation.

The PCIB also admitted that as early as January 15, 1986, it had started to deduct the amount of P 200.00 from
Josephine's salary as well as 50% of her bonuses and profit sharing.

On February 10, 1986, Josephine filed a complaint for damages with prayer for preliminary injunction before the
RTC of Makati City. She claimed that the PCIB had abused its right by gradually deducting from her salary the
amount the bank had to pay Harrington.

The PCIB filed its answer with counterclaims and a separate complaint with the RTC of Makati City, which was
raffled to Branch 149.

In its May 25, 1999 decision, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Josephine and ordered the PCIB to pay her
actual damages in the amount of P5,006.00 plus 12% interest from filing of the complaint; moral damages in the
amount of PI 50,000.00; and attorney's fees in the amount of P-50,000.00.

The RTC considered the PCIB's manner of deducting from the salary and allowance of Josephine as having been
rendered in bad faith and contrary to morals, good custom, and public policy. This was borne out by the fact that the
PCIB had already deducted from her salary before Josephine received the memorandum finding her liable for the
P50,600.00. In addition, while there were other individuals involved in this incident, it appeared that it was only
Josephine who was made solely responsible.

On appeal, the PCIB argued that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case because it was a labor dispute, which the
labor tribunals are more competent to resolve. It also maintained that there was no factual or legal basis for the RTC
to make it liable for damages and to pay Josephine.
In its May 23, 2011 decision, the CA affirmed the May 25, 1999 RTC decision. It held that the PCIB was estopped
from questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC because it had filed an answer with counterclaims and even initiated a
separate case before a different branch of the RTC. It upheld the RTC's findings and conclusion in awarding
damages and attorney's fees to Josephine because there was no reason to disturb them.

The CA, subsequently, denied the PCIB's motion for reconsideration on December 7, 2011; hence, the PCIB filed
the present petition.

First, the PCIB contends that the CA gravely erred in ruling that its actions were in total and wanton disregard of
Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code because the courts a quo summarily imputed bad faith on how it had treated
Josephine.

Second, the PCIB maintains that the CA gravely erred in awarding moral damages and attorney's fees to Josephine
absent any basis for it while averring that bad faith cannot be presumed and that Josephine had failed to prove it
with clear and convincing evidence.
OUR RULING

We DENY the present petition for lack of merit.

The civil courts have jurisdiction

over a case when the cause of action
does not have a reasonable causal
connection from the employer-employee
relationship.

Although the PCIB opted not to raise the issue before this Court, we find it prudent and imperative to justify why
the RTC had jurisdiction to take cognizance of Josephine's complaint despite the fact that her cause of action arose
because her employer arbitrarily deducted from her salary - an act expressly prohibited by our labor laws.4

Article 224 [217] of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide claims for actual, moral, exemplary, and other forms of damages arising from employer-employee
relations. The legislative intent appears clear to allow Labor Arbiters to award to an employee not only the reliefs
provided by our labor laws, but also moral and other forms of damages governed by the Civil Code. Specifically,
we have mentioned, in fact, that a complaint for damages under Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code would not
suffice to keep the case without the jurisdictional boundaries of our labor courts -especially when the claim for
damages is interwoven with a labor dispute.5

Nevertheless, when the cause of action has no reasonable connection with any of the claims provided for in Article
224 of the Labor Code, jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts. 6 Here, since Josephine's cause of
action is based on a quasi-delict or tort under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil Code, the civil courts
(not the labor tribunals) have jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case.
To be sure, the case of Singapore Airlines Ltd. v. Ernani Cruz Pao is enlightening:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Upon the facts and issues involved, jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil
courts. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-employee relations, and the latest
amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. 1691 and BP Big. 130 provides that all other claims
arising from employer-employee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters, in essence, petitioner's claim for
damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for
duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without
pay. This, coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and
conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy
from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law.

Clearly, the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz of his job as the
latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work but on the manner and consequent effects of such
abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had to suffer.7[emphasis and
underscoring supplied]cralawlawlibrary

In the present case, Josephine filed a civil complaint for damages against the PCIB based on how her employer
quickly concluded that she was negligent and hence arbitrarily started to deduct from her salary. Clearly, without
having to dwell on the merits of the case, Josephine opted to invoke the jurisdiction of our civil courts because her
right to fair treatment was violated.

The discussion in Quisaba v. Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood, Inc. is just as relevant as it is illuminating on the
present case, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Although the acts complained of seemingly appear to constitute "matters involving employee-employer relations"
as Quisaba's dismissal was the severance of a preexisting employee-employer relation, his complaint is grounded
not on his dismissalper se as in fact he does not ask for reinstatement or backwages, but on the manner of his
dismissal and the consequent effects of such dismissal.
xxx

The "right" of the respondents to dismiss Quisaba should not be confused with themanner in which the right was
exercised and the effects flowing therefrom. If the dismissal was done anti-socially or oppressively, as the
complaint alleges, then the respondents violated article 1701 of the Civil Code which prohibits acts of oppression
by either capital or labor against the other, and article 21, which makes a person liable for damages if he willfully
causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, the sanction
for which, by way of moral damages, is provided in article 2219, no. 10. (Cf. Phil. Refining Co. v. Garcia, L-21962,
Sept. 27, 1966, 18 SCRA 107).8cralawlawlibrary

From the foregoing, the case at bar is intrinsically concerned with a civil dispute because it has something to do
with Josephine's right under Article 19 of the Civil Code, and does not involve an existing employer-employee
relation within the meaning of Article 224 of the Labor Code. Josephine's complaint was, therefore, properly filed
with and exclusively cognizable by the RTC.

Questions on whether there was a

preponderance of evidence to justify the
award of damages or whether there was
a causal connection between the given
set of facts and the damage suffered by
the private complainant are questions of fact.

The Court's jurisdiction under a Rule 45 review is limited to reviewing perceived errors of law, which the lower
courts may have committed. The resolution of factual issues is the function of the lower courts whose findings,
when aptly supported by evidence, bind this Court. This is especially true when the CA affirms the RTC's findings.
While this Court, under established exceptional circumstances, had deviated from the above rule, we do not find
this case to be under any of the exceptions.

Essentially, what the PCIB seeks is a relief from the Court on the issue of the propriety of the award of damages.
On this point alone, the petition must fail, as a Rule 45 petition bars us from the consideration of factual issues,
especially when both the RTC and the CA were consistent with their rulings.

Nevertheless, we still affirm the assailed CA rulings even if we were to disregard these established doctrinal rules.

Article 19 of the Civil Code provides that every person in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his
duties must act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. The principle embodied in
this provision is more commonly known as the "abuse of right principle." The legal sanctions for violations of this
fundamental principle are found in Articles 209 and 2110 of the Civil Code. We explained how these two provisions
correlate with each other in GF Equity, Inc. v. Valenzona:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
[Article 19], known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, sets certain
standards which must be observed not only in the exercise of one's rights but also in the performance of one's
duties. These standards are the following: to act with justice; to give everyone his due; and to observe honesty and
good faith. The law, therefore, recognizes a primordial limitation on all rights; that in their exercise, the norms of
human conduct set forth in Article 19 must be observed. A right, though by itself legal because recognized or
granted by law as such, may nevertheless become the source of some illegality. When a right is exercised in a
manner which does not conform with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible. But while Article 19 lays down a
rule of conduct for the government of human' relations and for the maintenance of social order, it does not provide a
remedy for its violation. Generally, an action for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 would be proper.11
[Emphasis supplied]cralawlawlibrary

Both the RTC and the CA found the acts of the PCIB were in clear violation of Article 19 of the Civil Code and
held the PCIB liable for damages. While the PCIB has a right to penalize employees for acts of negligence, the right
must not be exercised unjustly and illegally. In the instant case, the PCIB made deductions on Josephine's salary
even if the investigation was still pending. Belatedly, the PCIB issued a memorandum finding Josephine grossly
negligent and requiring her to pay the amount which the bank erroneously paid to Harrington's impostor. When
Josephine asked for legal and factual basis for the finding of negligence, the PCIB refused to give any. Moreover,
the PCIB continued to make deductions on Josephine's salary, allowances, and bonuses.

The trial court and the CA also noted that while Josephine was penalized, other employees of the bank involved in
the subject transactions were not. It was Josephine who was made solely responsible for the loss without giving any
basis therefor. It was emphasized that the subject deposit could not have been received by the bank and entered in
Harrington's savings account without the participation of the other bank employees. The PCIB could have exercised
prudence before taking oppressive actions against Josephine.

All told, we find nothing in the record which would warrant the reversal of the position held by the RTC and the
CA. Based on the above discussion, we find the award of moral damages and attorney's fees in Josephine's favor
proper.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and consequently, the May 23, 2011 decision and
the December 7, 2011 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 68288 areAFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Velasco,* Villarama, Jr.,** Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Brion,** (Acting Chairperson)
Endnotes:
________________________________________
* Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per Special Order No. 2282 dated
November 13, 2015.

** Designated as Acting Chairperson in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, per Special Order No. 2281
dated November 13, 2015.

** Designated as Additional Member per Raffle dated September 5, 2012.

1Rollo, pp. 8-25.

2 Id. at 27-38; penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser, and concurred in by Associate Justice Hakim S.
Abdulwahid and Associate Justice Ricardo R. Rosario.

3 Id. at 40-41.

4 See Article 113 of the Labor Code.

5 San Miguel Corp. Employees Union-PTGWO v. Judge Bersamira, G.R. No. 87700, June 13, 1990, 264
Phil. 875, 884, to wit:
"The claim of SanMig that the action below is for damages under Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code would
not suffice to keep the case within the jurisdictional boundaries of regular Courts. That claim for damages is
interwoven with a labor dispute existing between the parties and would have to be ventilated before the
administrative machinery established for the expeditious settlement of those disputes. To allow the action filed
below to prosper would bring about "split jurisdiction" which is obnoxious to the orderly administration of justice
(Philippine Communications, Electronics and Electricity Workers Federation vs. Hon. Nolasco, L-24984, 29 July
1968, 24 SCRA 321)."
6Yusen Air and Sea Service Phils, v. Villamor, G.R, No. 154060, August 16, 2005, 504 Phil. 437, 446-447, citing

Ocheda v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 85517, October 16, 1992, 214 SCRA 629.

7 G.R. No. L-47739, June 22, 1983,122 SCRA 671, 676.

8 G.R. No. L-38088, August 30, 1974, 58 SCRA 771, 774.

9 Article 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same.

10 Article 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs, or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages.

11 G.R. No. 156841, June 30, 2005, 462 SCRA 466, 479-480, citing Globe Mackay Cable and Radio

Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989, 176 SCRA 778, 783-784.
Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 116100 February 9, 1996
SPOUSES CRISTINO and BRIGIDA CUSTODIO and SPOUSES LITO and MARIA CRISTINA
SANTOS,petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HEIRS OF PACIFICO C. MABASA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PASIG,
METRO MANILA, BRANCH 181, respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the decision of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
29115, promulgated on November 10, 1993, which affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, as
well as its resolution dated July 8, 1994 denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.1
On August 26, 1982, Civil Case No. 47466 for the grant of an easement of right of way was filed by Pacifico
Mabasa against Cristino Custodio, Brigida R. Custodio, Rosalina R. Morato, Lito Santos and Maria Cristina C.
Santos before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig and assigned to Branch 22 thereof.2
The generative facts of the case, as synthesized by the trial court and adopted by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
Perusing the record, this Court finds that the original plaintiff Pacifico Mabasa died during the pendency of this
case and was substituted by Ofelia Mabasa, his surviving spouse [and children].
The plaintiff owns a parcel of land with a two-door apartment erected thereon situated at Interior P. Burgos St.,
Palingon, Tipas, Tagig, Metro Manila. The plaintiff was able to acquire said property through a contract of sale with
spouses Mamerto Rayos and Teodora Quintero as vendors last September 1981. Said property may be described to
be surrounded by other immovables pertaining to defendants herein. Taking P. Burgos Street as the point of
reference, on the left side, going to plaintiff's property, the row of houses will be as follows: That of defendants
Cristino and Brigido Custodio, then that of Lito and Maria Cristina Santos and then that of Ofelia Mabasa. On the
right side (is) that of defendant Rosalina Morato and then a Septic Tank (Exhibit "D"). As an access to P. Burgos
Street from plaintiff's property, there are two possible passageways. The first passageway is approximately one
meter wide and is about 20 meters distan(t) from Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street. Such path is passing in
between the previously mentioned row of houses. The second passageway is about 3 meters in width and length
from plaintiff Mabasa's residence to P. Burgos Street; it is about 26 meters. In passing thru said passageway, a less
than a meter wide path through the septic tank and with 5-6 meters in length, has to be traversed.
When said property was purchased by Mabasa, there were tenants occupying the remises and who were
acknowledged by plaintiff Mabasa as tenants. However, sometime in February, 1982, one of said tenants vacated
the apartment and when plaintiff Mabasa went to see the premises, he saw that there had been built an adobe fence
in the first passageway making it narrower in width. Said adobe fence was first constructed by defendants Santoses
along their property which is also along the first passageway. Defendant Morato constructed her adobe fence and
even extended said fence in such a way that the entire passageway was enclosed. (Exhibit "1-Santoses and
Custodios, Exh. "D" for plaintiff, Exhs. "1-C", "1-D" and "1-E") And it was then that the remaining tenants of said
apartment vacated the area. Defendant Ma. Cristina Santos testified that she constructed said fence because there
was an incident when her daughter was dragged by a bicycle pedalled by a son of one of the tenants in said
apartment along the first passageway. She also mentioned some other inconveniences of having (at) the front of her
house a pathway such as when some of the tenants were drunk and would bang their doors and windows. Some of
their footwear were even lost. . . .3 (Emphasis in original text; corrections in parentheses supplied)
On February 27, 1990, a decision was rendered by the trial court, with this dispositive part:
Accordingly, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1) Ordering defendants Custodios and Santoses to give plaintiff permanent access ingress and egress, to the public
street;
2) Ordering the plaintiff to pay defendants Custodios and Santoses the sum of Eight Thousand Pesos (P8,000) as
indemnity for the permanent use of the passageway.
The parties to shoulder their respective litigation expenses.4
Not satisfied therewith, therein plaintiff represented by his heirs, herein private respondents, went to the Court of
Appeals raising the sole issue of whether or not the lower court erred in not awarding damages in their favor. On
November 10, 1993, as earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision affirming the judgment of the trial
court with modification, the decretal portion of which disposes as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION only
insofar as the herein grant of damages to plaintiffs-appellants. The Court hereby orders defendants-appellees to pay
plaintiffs-appellants the sum of Sixty Five Thousand (P65,000) Pesos as Actual Damages, Thirty Thousand
(P30,000) Pesos as Moral Damages, and Ten Thousand (P10,000) Pesos as Exemplary Damages. The rest of the
appealed decision is affirmed to all respects.5
On July 8, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.6 Petitioners then took the
present recourse to us, raising two issues, namely, whether or not the grant of right of way to herein private
respondents is proper, and whether or not the award of damages is in order.
With respect to the first issue, herein petitioners are already barred from raising the same. Petitioners did not appeal
from the decision of the court a quo granting private respondents the right of way, hence they are presumed to be
satisfied with the adjudication therein. With the finality of the judgment of the trial court as to petitioners, the issue
of propriety of the grant of right of way has already been laid to rest.
For failure to appeal the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals, petitioners cannot obtain any affirmative
relief other than those granted in the decision of the trial court. That decision of the court below has become final as
against them and can no longer be reviewed, much less reversed, by this Court. The rule in this jurisdiction is that
whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case, an appellee who has not himself appealed may not obtain from the
appellate court any affirmative relief other than what was granted in the decision of the lower court. The appellee
can only advance any argument that he may deem necessary to defeat the appellant's claim or to uphold the decision
that is being disputed, and he can assign errors in his brief if such is required to strengthen the views expressed by
the court a quo. These assigned errors, in turn, may be considered by the appellate court solely to maintain the
appealed decision on other grounds, but not for the purpose of reversing or modifying the judgment in the appellee's
favor and giving him other affirmative reliefs.7
However, with respect to the second issue, we agree with petitioners that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding
damages in favor of private respondents. The award of damages has no substantial legal basis. A reading of the
decision of the Court of Appeals will show that the award of damages was based solely on the fact that the original
plaintiff, Pacifico Mabasa, incurred losses in the form of unrealized rentals when the tenants vacated the leased
premises by reason of the closure of the passageway.
However, the mere fact that the plaintiff suffered losses does not give rise to a right to recover damages. To warrant
the recovery of damages, there must be both a right of action for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and
damage resulting to the plaintiff therefrom. Wrong without damage, or damage without wrong, does not constitute a
cause of action, since damages are merely part of the remedy allowed for the injury caused by a breach or wrong.8
There is a material distinction between damages and injury. Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is
the loss, hurt, or harm which results from the injury; and damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for
the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not
the result of a violation of a legal duty. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.9
In order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must establish that such
injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff a concurrence of injury to the
plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it.10 The underlying basis for the award of tort damages is
the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be the breach of some
duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; it is not sufficient to state that
there should be tort liability merely because the plaintiff suffered some pain and suffering.11
Many accidents occur and many injuries are inflicted by acts or omissions which cause damage or loss to another
but which violate no legal duty to such other person, and consequently create no cause of action in his favor. In
such cases, the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone. The law affords no remedy for damages
resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong.12
In other words, in order that the law will give redress for an act causing damage, that act must be not only hurtful,
but wrongful. There must be damnum et injuria.13 If, as may happen in many cases, a person sustains actual
damage, that is, harm or loss to his person or property, without sustaining any legal injury, that is, an act or
omission which the law does not deem an injury, the damage is regarded as damnum absque injuria.14
In the case at bar, although there was damage, there was no legal injury. Contrary to the claim of private
respondents, petitioners could not be said to have violated the principle of abuse of right. In order that the principle
of abuse of right provided in Article 21 of the Civil Code can be applied, it is essential that the following requisites
concur: (1) The defendant should have acted in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy;
(2) The acts should be willful; and (3) There was damage or injury to the plaintiff.15
The act of petitioners in constructing a fence within their lot is a valid exercise of their right as owners, hence not
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. The law recognizes in the owner the right to enjoy and dispose
of a thing, without other limitations than those established by law.16 It is within the right of petitioners, as owners,
to enclose and fence their property. Article 430 of the Civil Code provides that "(e)very owner may enclose or fence
his land or tenements by means of walls, ditches, live or dead hedges, or by any other means without detriment to
servitudes constituted thereon."
At the time of the construction of the fence, the lot was not subject to any servitudes. There was no easement of
way existing in favor of private respondents, either by law or by contract. The fact that private respondents had no
existing right over the said passageway is confirmed by the very decision of the trial court granting a compulsory
right of way in their favor after payment of just compensation. It was only that decision which gave private
respondents the right to use the said passageway after payment of the compensation and imposed a corresponding
duty on petitioners not to interfere in the exercise of said right.
Hence, prior to said decision, petitioners had an absolute right over their property and their act of fencing and
enclosing the same was an act which they may lawfully perform in the employment and exercise of said right. To
repeat, whatever injury or damage may have been sustained by private respondents by reason of the rightful use of
the said land by petitioners is damnum absque injuria.17
A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the
purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts
done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause
damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. 18 When the owner of
property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or
enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the incovenience arising
from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life. 19
The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute a legal wrong for which an action will lie, 20 although the
act may result in damage to another, for no legal right has been invaded. 21 One may use any lawful means to
accomplish a lawful purpose and though the means adopted may cause damage to another, no cause of action arises
in the latter's favor. An injury or damage occasioned thereby is damnum absque injuria. The courts can give no
redress for hardship to an individual resulting from action reasonably calculated to achieve a lawful means. 22
WHEREFORE, under the compulsion of the foregoing premises, the appealed decision of respondent Court of
Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the judgment of the trial court is correspondingly
REINSTATED.
Romero and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., took no part.

Footnotes
1 Penned by Justice Lourdes K. Tayao-Jaguros, with Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Jesus M. Elbinias,
concurring.
2 Original Record, 1.
3 Rollo, 28-29.
4 Ibid., 38.
5 Ibid., 31.
6 Ibid., 34.
7 See Lumibao vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al., G.R. No. 64677, September 13, 1990, 189 SCRA
469; SMI Fish Industries, Inc., et al. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al., G.R. Nos. 96952-56,

September 2, 1992, 213 SCRA 444; Heirs of Juan Oclarit, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 96644,
June 17, 1994, 233 SCRA 239.
8 22 Am Jur 2d, Damages, Sec. 4, 35-36.
9 Ibid., 13.
10 1 Am Jur 2d, Actions, Sec. 65, 595; see The Board of Liquidators vs. Kalaw, et al., L-18805, August 14, 1967,
20 SCRA 987.
11 Plummer vs. Abbott Laboratories (DC RI), 568, F Supp. 920, CCH Prod Liab Rep 9878.
12 Ibid., 598.
13 Comstock vs. Wilson, 257 NY 231, 177 NE 421, 76 ALR 676; Haldeman vs. Bruckhart, 45, 45 Pa 514.
14 U.S.-Premier Malt Roducts Co. vs. Kasser, 23 F. (2d) 98.
15 Jurado, D.P., Personal and Family Law, 1984 ed., 41.
16 Jovellanos, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 100728, June 18, 1992, 210 SCRA 126.
17 See Escano, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-47207, September 25, 1980, 100 SCRA 197; Ilocos Norte

Electric Co. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 53401, November 6, 1989, 179 SCRA 5; Albenson
Enterprises Corporation, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16.
18 1 C.J.S., Actions, Sec. 15, 1007-1008.
19 Tolentino, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. II (1987), 59, citing
8 Salvat 614.
20 Coyne vs. Mississippi & R.R. Boom Co., 72, 533, 75 NW 748.
21 White vs. Kincaid, 149 NC 415, 63 SE 109; Fahn vs. Reichart, 8 Wis 255.
22 O'Keefee vs. Local 463, United Asso. P. & G. 277 NY 300, 14 NE 300, 14 NE 2d 77, 117 ALR 817.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 156168. December 14, 2004]
EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. JOSE T. CALDERON, respondent.
DECISION
GARCIA, J.:
Thru this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Equitable Banking
Corporation (EBC), seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision dated November 25, 2002[1] of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 60016, which partially affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at
Makati City, Branch 61, insofar as it grants moral damages and costs of suit to herein respondent, Jose T. Calderon.
The decision under review recites the factual background of the case, as follows:
Plaintiff-appellee [now respondent] Jose T. Calderon (Calderon for brevity), is a businessman engaged in several
business activities here and abroad, either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. In addition
thereto, he is a stockholder of PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a seasoned
traveler, who travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, the defendant-
appellant [now petitioner] Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC for brevity), is one of the leading commercial
banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of deposits, extension
of loans and credit card facilities, among others.
xxx xxx xxx
Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card (Visa card for
brevity). The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the Philippines.
The credit limit for the peso transaction is TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the dollar
transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the balance of
dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.
In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates, went to Hongkong for
business and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went
to Gucci Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel (Hongkong). There and then, Calderon
purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase amounted to
HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card (No. 4921
6400 0001 9373) to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the saleslady
who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the presence of his
friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card was blacklisted.
Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter simply did not
honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.
Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci
goods and items that he bought.
Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and embarrassment on account of
EBCs wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon
filed with the Regional Trial Court at Makati City a complaint for damages[2] against EBC.
In its Answer,[3] EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that the latters credit card privileges for dollar
transactions were earlier placed under suspension on account of Calderons prior use of the same card in excess of
his credit limit, adding that Calderon failed to settle said prior credit purchase on due date, thereby causing his
obligation to become past due. Corollarily, EBC asserts that Calderon also failed to maintain the required minimum
deposit of $3,000.00.
To expedite the direct examination of witnesses, the trial court required the parties to submit affidavits, in question-
and-answer form, of their respective witnesses, to be sworn to in court, with cross examination to be made in open
court.
Eventually, in a decision dated October 10, 1997,[4] the trial court, concluding that defendant bank was negligent if
not in bad faith, in suspending, or blacklisting plaintiffs credit card without notice or basis, rendered judgment in
favor of Calderon, thus:
WHEREFORE PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as against
defendant EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, which is hereby ORDERED to pay plaintiff as follows:
1. the sum of US$150.00 as actual damages;
2. the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;
3. the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;
4. the sum of P100,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P500.00 per court hearing and
5. costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Therefrom, EBC went to the Court of Appeals (CA), whereat its recourse was docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 60016.
After due proceedings, the CA, in a decision dated November 25, 2002,[5] affirmed that of the trial court but only
insofar as the awards of moral damages, the amount of which was even reduced, and the costs of suits are
concerned. More specifically, the CA decision dispositively reads:[6]
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the decision of the court a quo dated 10 October
1997 is AFFIRMED insofar as the awards of moral damages and costs of suit are concerned. However, anent the
award of moral damages, the same is reduced to One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos.
The rest of the awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
Evidently unwilling to accept a judgment short of complete exemption from any liability to Calderon, EBC is now
with us via the instant petition on its lone submission that THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING
THAT PETITIONERS ACTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ATTENDED WITH ANY MALICE OR BAD FAITH.[7]
The petition is impressed with merit.
In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.[8] However, to be entitled to the award
thereof, it is not enough that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of
the actuations of the other party.[9] In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,[10] we
have had the occasion to reiterate the conditions to be met in order that moral damages may be recovered, viz:
An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established;
thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained by
the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by Articles
2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.
Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant
has acted fraudulently or in bad faith,[11] or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in
wanton disregard of his contractual obligations.[12] Verily, the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad
faith, oppressive or abusive.[13]
Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith attended petitioners dishonor of respondents credit
card. For, as found no less by the same court, petitioner was justified in doing so under the provisions of its Credit
Card Agreement[14] with respondent, paragraph 3 of which states:
xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all charges incurred
including charges incurred through the use of the extension CARD/S, if any in excess of credit limit shall become
due and demandable and the credit privileges shall be automatically suspended without notice to the
CARDHOLDER in accordance with Section 11 hereof.
We are thus at a loss to understand why, despite its very own finding of absence of bad faith or malice on the part of
the petitioner, the CA nonetheless adjudged it liable for moral damages to respondent.
Quite evidently, in holding petitioner liable for moral damages, the CA justified the award on its assessment that
EBC was negligent in not informing Calderon that his credit card was already suspended even before he left for
Hongkong, ratiocinating that petitioners right to automatically suspend a cardholders privileges without notice
should not have been indiscriminately used in the case of respondent because the latter has already paid his past
obligations and has an existing dollar deposit in an amount more than the required minimum for credit card at the
time he made his purchases in Hongkong. But, as explained by the petitioner in the memorandum it filed with this
Court,[15] which explanations were never controverted by respondent:
xxx prior to the incident in question (i.e., April 30, 1986 when the purchases at the Gucci store in Hongkong were
made), respondent made credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong from August to September 1985 amounting to
US$14,226.12, while only having a deposit of US$3,639.00 in his dollar account as evidenced by the pertinent
monthly statement of respondents credit card transactions and his bank passbook, thus exceeding his credit limit;
these purchases were accommodated by the petitioner on the condition that the amount needed to cover the same
will be deposited in a few days as represented by respondents secretary and his companys general manager a certain
Mrs. Zamora and Mr. F.R. Oliquiano; respondent however failed to make good on his commitment; later,
respondent likewise failed to make the required deposit on the due date of the purchases as stated in the pertinent
monthly statement of account; as a consequence thereof, his card privileges for dollar transactions were suspended;
it was only four months later on 31 January 1986, that respondent deposited the sum of P14,501.89 in his dollar
account to cover his purchases; the said amount however was not sufficient to maintain the required minimum
dollar deposit of $3,000.00 as the respondents dollar deposit stood at only US$2,704.94 after satisfaction of his
outstanding accounts; a day before he left for Hongkong, respondent made another deposit of US$14,000.00 in his
dollar account but did not bother to request the petitioner for the reinstatement of his credit card privileges for
dollar transactions, thus the same remained under suspension.[16]
The foregoing are based on the sworn affidavit of petitioners Collection Manager, a certain Lourdes Canlas, who
was never cross examined by the respondent nor did the latter present any evidence to refute its veracity.
Given the above, and with the express provision on automatic suspension without notice under paragraph 3, supra,
of the parties Credit Card Agreement, there is simply no basis for holding petitioner negligent for not notifying
respondent of the suspended status of his credit card privileges.
It may be so that respondent, a day before he left for Hongkong, made a deposit of US$14,000.00 to his dollar
account with petitioner. The sad reality, however, is that he never verified the status of his card before departing for
Hongkong, much less requested petitioner to reinstate the same.[17]
And, certainly, respondent could not have justifiably assumed that petitioner must have reinstated his card by reason
alone of his having deposited US$14,000.00 a day before he left for Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has
the option to decide whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on
considerations which the petitioner deemed proper, not the least of which are the cardholders payment record,
capacity to pay and compliance with any additional requirements imposed by it. That option, after all, is expressly
embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement, paragraph 12 of which unmistakably states:
The issuer shall likewise have the option of reinstating the card holders privileges which have been terminated for
any reason whatsoever upon submission of a new accomplished application form if required by the issuer and upon
payment of an additional processing fee equivalent to annual fee.[18]
Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not have been properly adjudged liable for moral
damages.
Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card. There is, however, a material
distinction between damages and injury. To quote from our decision in BPI Express Card Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals:[19]
Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered. Thus, there can be damage without
injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal duty. In such cases the
consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for damages resulting from an
act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often called damnum absque injuria.
In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff- a concurrence
of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the award of tort
damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must first be a breach of
some duty and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded; and the breach of such
duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. (Emphasis supplied).
In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.
We do not take issue with the appellate court in its observation that the Credit Card Agreement herein involved is a
contract of adhesion, with the stipulations therein contained unilaterally prepared and imposed by the petitioner to
prospective credit card holders on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. As said by us in Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals:[20]
A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the contracting parties imposes a ready-made form of contract which
the other party may accept or reject, but cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the contract, while the
other party merely affixes his signature or his adhesion thereto giving no room for negotiation and depriving the
latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.
On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that such a contract is as binding as ordinary contracts, the
reason being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely.[21]
Moreover, the provision on automatic suspension without notice embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement is
couched in clear and unambiguous term, not to say that the agreement itself was entered into by respondent who, by
his own account, is a reputable businessman engaged in business activities here and abroad.
On a final note, we emphasize that moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the
claim for actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer.[22]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision under review REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

________________________________________
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Bienvenido L. Reyes and concurred in by Associate Justices Romeo A. Brawner
and Danilo B. Pine.
[2] Rollo, pp. 37-41.
[3] Rollo, pp. 42-47.
[4] Rollo, pp. 50-55.
[5] Rollo, pp. 28-36.
[6] Rollo, p. 36.
[7] Rollo, p. 19.
[8] Article 2217, Civil Code.
[9] Ace Haulers Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 572 [2000].
[10] 388 SCRA 270, [2002].
[11] Article 2220, Civil Code.
[12] Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 277.
[13] Herbosa vs. CA, 374, 578, 579 [2002].
[14] Exhibit 1.
[15] Rollo, pp. 92-108, at p. 95 thereof.
[16] Rollo, p. 96.
[17] TSN, p. 18, Dec. 13, 1990.
[18] Rollo, p. 17.
[19] 296 SCRA 260 [1998].
[20] 296 SCRA 247, 255 [1998].
[21] Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, supra, at p. 256.
[22] Francisco vs. Ferrer, 353 SCRA 261 [2001].
Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 154259 February 28, 2005
NIKKO HOTEL MANILA GARDEN and RUBY LIM, petitioners,
vs.
ROBERTO REYES, a.k.a. "AMAY BISAYA," respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners Nikko Hotel Manila Garden (Hotel Nikko)1 and Ruby Lim assail
the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 reversing the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 104, as well as the Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals dated 09 July 2002 which
denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The cause of action before the trial court was one for damages brought under the human relations provisions of the
New Civil Code. Plaintiff thereat (respondent herein) Roberto Reyes, more popularly known by the screen name
"Amay Bisaya," alleged that at around 6:00 oclock in the evening of 13 October 1994, while he was having coffee
at the lobby of Hotel Nikko,5 he was spotted by his friend of several years, Dr. Violeta Filart, who then approached
him.6 Mrs. Filart invited him to join her in a party at the hotels penthouse in celebration of the natal day of the
hotels manager, Mr. Masakazu Tsuruoka.7 Mr. Reyes asked if she could vouch for him for which she replied: "of
course."8 Mr. Reyes then went up with the party of Dr. Filart carrying the basket of fruits which was the latters
present for the celebrant.9 At the penthouse, they first had their picture taken with the celebrant after which Mr.
Reyes sat with the party of Dr. Filart.10 After a couple of hours, when the buffet dinner was ready, Mr. Reyes lined-
up at the buffet table but, to his great shock, shame and embarrassment, he was stopped by petitioner herein, Ruby
Lim, who claimed to speak for Hotel Nikko as Executive Secretary thereof.11 In a loud voice and within the
presence and hearing of the other guests who were making a queue at the buffet table, Ruby Lim told him to leave
the party ("huwag ka nang kumain, hindi ka imbitado, bumaba ka na lang").12 Mr. Reyes tried to explain that he
was invited by Dr. Filart.13 Dr. Filart, who was within hearing distance, however, completely ignored him thus
adding to his shame and humiliation.14 Not long after, while he was still recovering from the traumatic experience,
a Makati policeman approached and asked him to step out of the hotel.15 Like a common criminal, he was escorted
out of the party by the policeman.16 Claiming damages, Mr. Reyes asked for One Million Pesos actual damages,
One Million Pesos moral and/or exemplary damages and Two Hundred Thousand Pesos attorneys fees.17
Ruby Lim, for her part, admitted having asked Mr. Reyes to leave the party but not under the ignominious
circumstance painted by the latter. Ms. Lim narrated that she was the Hotels Executive Secretary for the past
twenty (20) years.18 One of her functions included organizing the birthday party of the hotels former General
Manager, Mr. Tsuruoka.19 The year 1994 was no different. For Mr. Tsuruokas party, Ms. Lim generated an
exclusive guest list and extended invitations accordingly.20 The guest list was limited to approximately sixty (60)
of Mr. Tsuruokas closest friends and some hotel employees and that Mr. Reyes was not one of those invited.21 At
the party, Ms. Lim first noticed Mr. Reyes at the bar counter ordering a drink.22 Mindful of Mr. Tsuruokas wishes
to keep the party intimate, Ms. Lim approached Mr. Boy Miller, the "captain waiter," to inquire as to the presence of
Mr. Reyes who was not invited.23 Mr. Miller replied that he saw Mr. Reyes with the group of Dr. Filart.24 As Dr.
Filart was engaged in conversation with another guest and as Ms. Lim did not want to interrupt, she inquired
instead from the sister of Dr. Filart, Ms. Zenaida Fruto, who told her that Dr. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.25 Ms.
Lim then requested Ms. Fruto to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.26 Mr. Reyes, however,
lingered prompting Ms. Lim to inquire from Ms. Fruto who said that Mr. Reyes did not want to leave.27 When Ms.
Lim turned around, she saw Mr. Reyes conversing with a Captain Batung whom she later approached.28Believing
that Captain Batung and Mr. Reyes knew each other, Ms. Lim requested from him the same favor from Ms. Fruto,
i.e., for Captain Batung to tell Mr. Reyes to leave the party as he was not invited.29 Still, Mr. Reyes lingered. When
Ms. Lim spotted Mr. Reyes by the buffet table, she decided to speak to him herself as there were no other guests in
the immediate vicinity.30 However, as Mr. Reyes was already helping himself to the food, she decided to wait.31
When Mr. Reyes went to a corner and started to eat, Ms. Lim approached him and said: "alam ninyo, hindo ho kayo
dapat nandito. Pero total nakakuha na ho kayo ng pagkain, ubusin na lang ninyo at pagkatapos kung pwede lang po
umalis na kayo."32 She then turned around trusting that Mr. Reyes would show enough decency to leave, but to her
surprise, he began screaming and making a big scene, and even threatened to dump food on her.331awphi1.nt
Dr. Violeta Filart, the third defendant in the complaint before the lower court, also gave her version of the story to
the effect that she never invited Mr. Reyes to the party.34 According to her, it was Mr. Reyes who volunteered to
carry the basket of fruits intended for the celebrant as he was likewise going to take the elevator, not to the
penthouse but to Altitude 49.35 When they reached the penthouse, she reminded Mr. Reyes to go down as he was
not properly dressed and was not invited.36 All the while, she thought that Mr. Reyes already left the place, but she
later saw him at the bar talking to Col. Batung.37 Then there was a commotion and she saw Mr. Reyes shouting.38
She ignored Mr. Reyes.39 She was embarrassed and did not want the celebrant to think that she invited him.40
After trial on the merits, the court a quo dismissed the complaint,41 giving more credence to the testimony of Ms.
Lim that she was discreet in asking Mr. Reyes to leave the party. The trial court likewise ratiocinated that Mr. Reyes
assumed the risk of being thrown out of the party as he was uninvited:
Plaintiff had no business being at the party because he was not a guest of Mr. Tsuruoka, the birthday celebrant. He
assumed the risk of being asked to leave for attending a party to which he was not invited by the host. Damages are
pecuniary consequences which the law imposes for the breach of some duty or the violation of some right. Thus, no
recovery can be had against defendants Nikko Hotel and Ruby Lim because he himself was at fault (Garciano v.
Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 436). He knew that it was not the party of defendant Violeta Filart even if she allowed
him to join her and took responsibility for his attendance at the party. His action against defendants Nikko Hotel
and Ruby Lim must therefore fail.42
On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the ruling of the trial court as it found more commanding of belief the
testimony of Mr. Reyes that Ms. Lim ordered him to leave in a loud voice within hearing distance of several guests:
In putting appellant in a very embarrassing situation, telling him that he should not finish his food and to leave the
place within the hearing distance of other guests is an act which is contrary to morals, good customs . . ., for which
appellees should compensate the appellant for the damage suffered by the latter as a consequence therefore (Art. 21,
New Civil Code). The liability arises from the acts which are in themselves legal or not prohibited, but contrary to
morals or good customs. Conversely, even in the exercise of a formal right, [one] cannot with impunity
intentionally cause damage to another in a manner contrary to morals or good customs.43
The Court of Appeals likewise ruled that the actuation of Ms. Lim in approaching several people to inquire into the
presence of Mr. Reyes exposed the latter to ridicule and was uncalled for as she should have approached Dr. Filart
first and both of them should have talked to Mr. Reyes in private:
Said acts of appellee Lim are uncalled for. What should have been done by appellee Lim was to approach appellee
Mrs. Filart and together they should have told appellant Reyes in private that the latter should leave the party as the
celebrant only wanted close friends around. It is necessary that Mrs. Filart be the one to approach appellant because
it was she who invited appellant in that occasion. Were it not for Mrs. Filarts invitation, appellant could not have
suffered such humiliation. For that, appellee Filart is equally liable.
...
The acts of [appellee] Lim are causes of action which are predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of
one person, which calls not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity. Under Article 20 of the
Civil Code, every person who violates this duty becomes liable for damages, especially if said acts were attended
by malice or bad faith. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty to some motive or
interest or ill-will that partakes of the nature of fraud (Cojuangco, Jr. v. CA, et al., 309 SCRA 603).44
Consequently, the Court of Appeals imposed upon Hotel Nikko, Ruby Lim and Dr. Violeta Filart the solidary
obligation to pay Mr. Reyes (1) exemplary damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); (2)
moral damages in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000); and (3) attorneys fees in the amount of
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000).45 On motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals affirmed its earlier decision
as the argument raised in the motion had "been amply discussed and passed upon in the decision sought to be
reconsidered."46
Thus, the instant petition for review. Hotel Nikko and Ruby Lim contend that the Court of Appeals seriously erred
in
I.
NOT APPLYING THE DOCTRINE OF VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA CONSIDERING THAT BY ITS OWN
FINDINGS, AMAY BISAYA WAS A GATE-CRASHER
II.
HOLDING HOTEL NIKKO AND RUBY LIM JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH DR. FILART
FOR DAMAGES SINCE BY ITS OWN RULING, AMAY BISAYA "COULD NOT HAVE SUFFERED SUCH
HUMILIATION," "WERE IT NOT FOR DR. FILARTS INVITATION"
III.
DEPARTING FROM THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT AS REGARDS THE
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT ALLEGEDLY CAUSED THE HUMILIATION OF AMAY BISAYA
IV.
IN CONCLUDING THAT AMAY BISAYA WAS TREATED UNJUSTLY BECAUSE OF HIS POVERTY,
CONSIDERING THAT THIS WAS NEVER AN ISSUE AND NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED IN THIS
REGARD
V.
IN FAILING TO PASS UPON THE ISSUE ON THE DEFECTS OF THE APPELLANTS BRIEF, THEREBY
DEPARTING FROM THE ACCEPTED AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
Petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko contend that pursuant to the doctrine of volenti non fit injuria, they cannot be
made liable for damages as respondent Reyes assumed the risk of being asked to leave (and being embarrassed and
humiliated in the process) as he was a "gate-crasher."
The doctrine of volenti non fit injuria ("to which a person assents is not esteemed in law as injury"47 ) refers to
self-inflicted injury48 or to the consent to injury49 which precludes the recovery of damages by one who has
knowingly and voluntarily exposed himself to danger, even if he is not negligent in doing so.50 As formulated by
petitioners, however, this doctrine does not find application to the case at bar because even if respondent Reyes
assumed the risk of being asked to leave the party, petitioners, under Articles 19 and 21 of the New Civil Code,
were still under obligation to treat him fairly in order not to expose him to unnecessary ridicule and shame.
Thus, the threshold issue is whether or not Ruby Lim acted abusively in asking Roberto Reyes, a.k.a. "Amay
Bisaya," to leave the party where he was not invited by the celebrant thereof thereby becoming liable under Articles
19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Parenthetically, and if Ruby Lim were so liable, whether or not Hotel Nikko, as her
employer, is solidarily liable with her.
As the trial court and the appellate court reached divergent and irreconcilable conclusions concerning the same facts
and evidence of the case, this Court is left without choice but to use its latent power to review such findings of
facts. Indeed, the general rule is that we are not a trier of facts as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and
revising errors of law.51 One of the exceptions to this general rule, however, obtains herein as the findings of the
Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court.52 The lower court ruled that Ms. Lim did not abuse her
right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party as she talked to him politely and discreetly. The appellate court, on the
other hand, held that Ms. Lim is liable for damages as she needlessly embarrassed Mr. Reyes by telling him not to
finish his food and to leave the place within hearing distance of the other guests. Both courts, however, were in
agreement that it was Dr. Filarts invitation that brought Mr. Reyes to the party.
The consequential question then is: Which version is credible?
From an in depth review of the evidence, we find more credible the lower courts findings of fact.
First, let us put things in the proper perspective.
We are dealing with a formal party in a posh, five-star hotel,53 for-invitation-only, thrown for the hotels former
Manager, a Japanese national. Then came a person who was clearly uninvited (by the celebrant)54 and who could
not just disappear into the crowd as his face is known by many, being an actor. While he was already spotted by the
organizer of the party, Ms. Lim, the very person who generated the guest list, it did not yet appear that the celebrant
was aware of his presence. Ms. Lim, mindful of the celebrants instruction to keep the party intimate, would
naturally want to get rid of the "gate-crasher" in the most hush-hush manner in order not to call attention to a glitch
in an otherwise seamless affair and, in the process, risk the displeasure of the celebrant, her former boss. To
unnecessarily call attention to the presence of Mr. Reyes would certainly reflect badly on Ms. Lims ability to
follow the instructions of the celebrant to invite only his close friends and some of the hotels personnel. Mr. Reyes,
upon whom the burden rests to prove that indeed Ms. Lim loudly and rudely ordered him to leave, could not offer
any satisfactory explanation why Ms. Lim would do that and risk ruining a formal and intimate affair. On the
contrary, Mr. Reyes, on cross-examination, had unwittingly sealed his fate by admitting that when Ms. Lim talked
to him, she was very close. Close enough for him to kiss:
Q: And, Mr. Reyes, you testified that Miss Lim approached you while you were at the buffet table? How close was
she when she approached you?
A: Very close because we nearly kissed each other.
Q: And yet, she shouted for you to go down? She was that close and she shouted?
A: Yes. She said, "wag kang kumain, hindi ka imbitado dito, bumaba ka na lang."
Q: So, you are testifying that she did this in a loud voice?
...
A: Yes. If it is not loud, it will not be heard by many.55
In the absence of any proof of motive on the part of Ms. Lim to humiliate Mr. Reyes and expose him to ridicule and
shame, it is highly unlikely that she would shout at him from a very close distance. Ms. Lim having been in the
hotel business for twenty years wherein being polite and discreet are virtues to be emulated, the testimony of Mr.
Reyes that she acted to the contrary does not inspire belief and is indeed incredible. Thus, the lower court was
correct in observing that
Considering the closeness of defendant Lim to plaintiff when the request for the latter to leave the party was made
such that they nearly kissed each other, the request was meant to be heard by him only and there could have been no
intention on her part to cause embarrassment to him. It was plaintiffs reaction to the request that must have made
the other guests aware of what transpired between them. . .
Had plaintiff simply left the party as requested, there was no need for the police to take him out.56
Moreover, another problem with Mr. Reyess version of the story is that it is unsupported. It is a basic rule in civil
cases that he who alleges proves. Mr. Reyes, however, had not presented any witness to back his story up. All his
witnesses Danny Rodinas, Pepito Guerrero and Alexander Silva - proved only that it was Dr. Filart who invited
him to the party.57
Ms. Lim, not having abused her right to ask Mr. Reyes to leave the party to which he was not invited, cannot be
made liable to pay for damages under Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Necessarily, neither can her employer,
Hotel Nikko, be held liable as its liability springs from that of its employee.58
Article 19, known to contain what is commonly referred to as the principle of abuse of rights,59 is not a panacea for
all human hurts and social grievances. Article 19 states:
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give
everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.1awphi1.nt
Elsewhere, we explained that when "a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the norms
enshrined in Article 19 and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the
wrongdoer must be responsible."60 The object of this article, therefore, is to set certain standards which must be
observed not only in the exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties.61 These standards are
the following: act with justice, give everyone his due and observe honesty and good faith.62 Its antithesis,
necessarily, is any act evincing bad faith or intent to injure. Its elements are the following: (1) There is a legal right
or duty; (2) which is exercised in bad faith; (3) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.63 When Article
19 is violated, an action for damages is proper under Articles 20 or 21 of the Civil Code. Article 20 pertains to
damages arising from a violation of law64 which does not obtain herein as Ms. Lim was perfectly within her right
to ask Mr. Reyes to leave. Article 21, on the other hand, states:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
Article 2165 refers to acts contra bonus mores and has the following elements: (1) There is an act which is legal; (2)
but which is contrary to morals, good custom, public order, or public policy; and (3) it is done with intent to
injure.66
A common theme runs through Articles 19 and 21,67 and that is, the act complained of must be intentional.68
As applied to herein case and as earlier discussed, Mr. Reyes has not shown that Ms. Lim was driven by animosity
against him. These two people did not know each other personally before the evening of 13 October 1994, thus, Mr.
Reyes had nothing to offer for an explanation for Ms. Lims alleged abusive conduct except the statement that Ms.
Lim, being "single at 44 years old," had a "very strong bias and prejudice against (Mr. Reyes) possibly influenced
by her associates in her work at the hotel with foreign businessmen."69 The lameness of this argument need not be
belabored. Suffice it to say that a complaint based on Articles 19 and 21 of the Civil Code must necessarily fail if it
has nothing to recommend it but innuendos and conjectures.
Parenthetically, the manner by which Ms. Lim asked Mr. Reyes to leave was likewise acceptable and humane under
the circumstances. In this regard, we cannot put our imprimatur on the appellate courts declaration that Ms. Lims
act of personally approaching Mr. Reyes (without first verifying from Mrs. Filart if indeed she invited Mr. Reyes)
gave rise to a cause of action "predicated upon mere rudeness or lack of consideration of one person, which calls
not only protection of human dignity but respect of such dignity."70 Without proof of any ill-motive on her part,
Ms. Lims act of by-passing Mrs. Filart cannot amount to abusive conduct especially because she did inquire from
Mrs. Filarts companion who told her that Mrs. Filart did not invite Mr. Reyes.71 If at all, Ms. Lim is guilty only of
bad judgment which, if done with good intentions, cannot amount to bad faith.
Not being liable for both actual and moral damages, neither can petitioners Lim and Hotel Nikko be made
answerable for exemplary damages72 especially for the reason stated by the Court of Appeals. The Court of
Appeals held
Not a few of the rich people treat the poor with contempt because of the latters lowly station in life.l^vvphi1.net
This has to be limited somewhere. In a democracy, such a limit must be established. Social equality is not sought by
the legal provisions under consideration, but due regard for decency and propriety (Code Commission, pp. 33-34).
And by way of example or correction for public good and to avert further commission of such acts, exemplary
damages should be imposed upon appellees.73
The fundamental fallacy in the above-quoted findings is that it runs counter with the very facts of the case and the
evidence on hand.l^vvphi1.net It is not disputed that at the time of the incident in question, Mr. Reyes was "an actor
of long standing; a co-host of a radio program over DZRH; a Board Member of the Music Singer Composer
(MUSICO) chaired by popular singer Imelda Papin; a showbiz Coordinator of Citizen Crime Watch; and 1992
official candidate of the KBL Party for Governor of Bohol; and an awardee of a number of humanitarian
organizations of the Philippines."74 During his direct examination on rebuttal, Mr. Reyes stressed that he had
income75 and nowhere did he say otherwise. On the other hand, the records are bereft of any information as to the
social and economic standing of petitioner Ruby Lim. Consequently, the conclusion reached by the appellate court
cannot withstand scrutiny as it is without basis.
All told, and as far as Ms. Lim and Hotel Nikko are concerned, any damage which Mr. Reyes might have suffered
through Ms. Lims exercise of a legitimate right done within the bounds of propriety and good faith, must be his to
bear alone.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition filed by Ruby Lim and Nikko Hotel Manila Garden is
GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 26 November 2001 and its Resolution dated 09 July 2002
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104,
dated 26 April 1999 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Now Dusit Hotel Nikko.
2 Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador
concurring (Rollo, pp. 48-57).
3 Penned by Judge Thelma A. Ponferrada.
4 Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria with Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Rebecca de Guia-Salvador
concurring (Rollo, pp. 59-60).
5 TSN, 08 March 1995, p. 8.
6 Id. at 10.
7 Ibid.
8 Id. 11.
9 Id. at 13.
10 Id. at 13 & 16.
11 COMPLAINT, RTC Record, p. 2.
12 Supra, note 5 at 17.
13 Supra, note 11.
14 Ibid.
15 Id. at 2-3.
16 Id. at 3.
17 Ibid.
18 TSN, 27 July 1996, p. 9.
19 Id. at 10.
20 Id. at 12-13, 15.
21 Id. at 15-17, 25.
22 Id. at 25.
23 Id. at 27.
24 Ibid.
25 Id. at 31-32.
26 Id. at 33.
27 Id. at 37.
28 Id. at 38-39.
29 Ibid.
30 Petition, Rollo, p. 18.
31 Supra, note 29 at 41-42.
32 Id. at 42-43.
33 Answer, pp. 32-33, RTC Records; RTC Decision, Rollo p. 62; TSN, 27 July 1995, pp. 43-46.
34 TSN, 05 November 1997, p. 15.
35 Violeta Filarts "ANSWER WITH COMPULSORY COUNTERCLAIM," RTC Records, p. 21.
36 Supra, note 34 at 17.
37 Or "Captain Batung" from the testimony of Ruby Lim; Id. at 18.
38 Id. at 19.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid.
41 Dismissed as well were the counterclaims filed by then defendants Nikko Hotel Manila Garden, Ruby Lim and
Violeta Filart, RTC Records, p. 347.
42 RTC Records, p. 342.
43 CA Rollo, p. 205.
44 Id. at 208-209.
45 Id. at 238.
46 CA Rollo, pp. 239-240.
47 E.L. Pineda, Torts and Damages Annotated, p. 52 (2004 ed).
48 Garciano v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96126, 10 August 1992, 212 SCRA 436, 440.
49 cf. Servicewide Specialists, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74553, 08 June 1989, 174
SCRA 80, 88.
50 Sangco, Torts and Damages Vol.1 , pp. 83-84.
51 Floro v. Llenado, G.R. No. 75723, 02 June 1995, 244 SCRA 713, 720.
52 Ibid.
53 TSN, 22 May 1999, p. 11.
54 Admitted by Mr. Reyes, see TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 10.
55 TSN, 15 March 1995, p. 20.
56 RTC Records, pp. 340-341.
57 Danny Rodinas and Pepito Guerrero (TSN, 18 May 1995), Alexander Silva (TSN, 21 June 1995).
58 Article 2180, Civil Code.
59 Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, 25 August 1989, 176 SCRA
779, 783.
60 Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88694, 11 January 1993, 217 SCRA 16, 25.
61 Supra, note 61 at 783-784.
62 Ibid.
63 Supra, note 62.
64 Art. 20. Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify
the latter for the same. See Globe Mackay, supra, note 61 at 784.
65 Civil Code.
66 Supra, note 62 at 25.
67 Civil Code.
68 Ibid.
69 "COMMENT," Rollo, p. 302; "MEMORANDUM," Rollo, p. 417.
70 CA Rollo, p. 209.
71 In fact, Mrs. Filart herself, in her testimony and in her pleadings, consistently disclaimed having invited Mr.
Reyes to the party such that when Mr. Reyes was being escorted out of the penthouse, she lifted nary a finger to his
rescue.
72 Art. 2234, Civil Code.
73 CA Rollo, pp. 209-210.
74 Appellants Brief, CA Rollo, p. 27; see also TSN, 08 March 1995, pp. 7-8.
75 TSN, 29 October 1998, p. 11.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

SECOND DIVISION
EDUARDO P. MANUEL, G.R. No. 165842
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, - versus - CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. November 29, 2005

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
26877, affirming the Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City, Branch 3, convicting Eduardo
P. Manuel of bigamy in Criminal Case No. 19562-R.

Eduardo was charged with bigamy in an Information filed on November 7, 2001, the accusatory portion of which
reads:

That on or about the 22nd day of April, 1996, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused EDUARDO P. MANUEL, being then previously and legally married to
RUBYLUS [GAA] and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with TINA GANDALERA-MANUEL, herein complainant,
who does not know the existence of the first marriage of said EDUARDO P. MANUEL to Rubylus [Gaa].

CONTRARY TO LAW. [3]

The prosecution adduced evidence that on July 28, 1975, Eduardo was married to Rubylus Gaa before Msgr.
Feliciano Santos in Makati, which was then still a municipality of the Province of Rizal.[4] He met the private
complainant Tina B. Gandalera in Dagupan City sometime in January 1996. She stayed in Bonuan, Dagupan City
for two days looking for a friend. Tina was then 21 years old, a Computer Secretarial student, while Eduardo was
39. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio City to visit her. Eventually, as one thing led to another, they went to a
motel where, despite Tinas resistance, Eduardo succeeded in having his way with her. Eduardo proposed marriage
on several occasions, assuring her that he was single. Eduardo even brought his parents to Baguio City to meet
Tinas parents, and was assured by them that their son was still single.

Tina finally agreed to marry Eduardo sometime in the first week of March 1996. They were married on April 22,
1996 before Judge Antonio C. Reyes, the Presiding Judge of theRTC of Baguio City, Branch 61.[5] It appeared in
their marriage contract that Eduardo was single.

The couple was happy during the first three years of their married life. Through their joint efforts, they were able to
build their home in Cypress Point, Irisan, Baguio City. However, starting 1999, Manuel started making himself
scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice a year. Tina was jobless, and whenever she asked money from
Eduardo, he would slap her.[6] Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return.
Worse, he stopped giving financial support.

Sometime in August 2001, Tina became curious and made inquiries from the National Statistics Office (NSO) in
Manila where she learned that Eduardo had been previously married. She secured an NSO-certified copy of the
marriage contract.[7] She was so embarrassed and humiliated when she learned that Eduardo was in fact already
married when they exchanged their own vows.[8]

For his part, Eduardo testified that he met Tina sometime in 1995 in a bar where she worked as a Guest Relations
Officer (GRO). He fell in love with her and married her. He informed Tina of his previous marriage to Rubylus
Gaa, but she nevertheless agreed to marry him. Their marital relationship was in order until this one time when he
noticed that she had a love-bite on her neck. He then abandoned her. Eduardo further testified that he declared he
was single in his marriage contract with Tina because he believed in good faith that his first marriage was invalid.
He did not know that he had to go to court to seek for the nullification of his first marriage before marrying Tina.

Eduardo further claimed that he was only forced to marry his first wife because she threatened to commit suicide
unless he did so. Rubylus was charged with estafa in 1975 and thereafter imprisoned. He visited her in jail after
three months and never saw her again. He insisted that he married Tina believing that his first marriage was no
longer valid because he had not heard from Rubylus for more than 20 years.

After trial, the court rendered judgment on July 2, 2002 finding Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.
He was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum, to ten (10)
years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant Tina Gandalera the amount of P200,000.00
by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.[9]

The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of bigamy
under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. It declared that Eduardos belief, that his first marriage had been
dissolved because of his first wifes 20-year absence, even if true, did not exculpate him from liability for bigamy.
Citing the ruling of this Court inPeople v. Bitdu,[10] the trial court further ruled that even if the private complainant
had known that Eduardo had been previously married, the latter would still be criminally liable for bigamy.
Eduardo appealed the decision to the CA. He alleged that he was not criminally liable for bigamy because when he
married the private complainant, he did so in good faith and without any malicious intent. He maintained that at the
time that he married the private complainant, he was of the honest belief that his first marriage no longer subsisted.
He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the Revised Penal Code, there must be malice for one to be criminally
liable for a felony. He was not motivated by malice in marrying the private complainant because he did so only out
of his overwhelming desire to have a fruitful marriage. He posited that the trial court should have taken into account
Article 390 of the New Civil Code. To support his view, the appellant cited the rulings of this Court in United States
v. Pealosa[11] and Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals.[12]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) averred that Eduardos defense of good faith and reliance on the Courts
ruling in United States v. Enriquez[13] were misplaced; what is applicable is Article 41 of the Family Code, which
amended Article 390 of the Civil Code. Citing the ruling of this Court in Republic v. Nolasco,[14] the OSG further
posited that as provided in Article 41 of the Family Code, there is a need for a judicial declaration of presumptive
death of the absent spouse to enable the present spouse to marry. Even assuming that the first marriage was void,
the parties thereto should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of the marriage;
the matter should be submitted to the proper court for resolution. Moreover, the OSG maintained, the private
complainants knowledge of the first marriage would not afford any relief since bigamy is an offense against the
State and not just against the private complainant.

However, the OSG agreed with the appellant that the penalty imposed by the trial court was erroneous and sought
the affirmance of the decision appealed from with modification.

On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification as to the penalty
of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy. Contrary to the contention
of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply. Before Manuel could lawfully marry the private
complainant, there should have been a judicial declaration of Gaas presumptive death as the absent spouse. The
appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in Mercado v. Tan[15] and Domingo v. Court of Appeals[16] to
support its ruling. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the Decision promulgated on July 31, 2002 is hereby MODIFIED to
reflect, as it hereby reflects, that accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum.
Said Decision is AFFIRMED in all other respects.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Eduardo, now the petitioner, filed the instant petition for review on certiorari, insisting that:
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONERS FIRST WIFE CANNOT BE LEGALLY PRESUMED DEAD UNDER ARTICLE 390 OF THE
CIVIL CODE AS THERE WAS NO JUDICIAL DECLARATION OF PRESUMPTIVE DEATH AS PROVIDED
FOR UNDER ARTICLE 41 OF THE FAMILY CODE.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE
AWARD OF PHP200,000.00 AS MORAL DAMAGES AS IT HAS NO BASIS IN FACTAND IN LAW.[18]

The petitioner maintains that the prosecution failed to prove the second element of the felony, i.e., that the marriage
has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
under the Civil Code. He avers that when he married Gandalera in 1996, Gaa had been absent for 21 years since
1975; under Article 390 of the Civil Code, she was presumed dead as a matter of law. He points out that, under the
first paragraph of Article 390 of the Civil Code, one who has been absent for seven years, whether or not he/she is
still alive, shall be presumed dead for all purposes except for succession, while the second paragraph refers to the
rule on legal presumption of death with respect to succession.

The petitioner asserts that the presumptive death of the absent spouse arises by operation of law upon the
satisfaction of two requirements: the
specified period and the present spouses reasonable belief that the absentee is dead. He insists that he was able to
prove that he had not heard from his first wife since 1975 and that he had no knowledge of her whereabouts or
whether she was still alive; hence, under Article 41 of the Family Code, the presumptive death of Gaa had arisen by
operation of law, as the two requirements of Article 390 of the Civil Code are present. The petitioner concludes that
he should thus be acquitted of the crime of bigamy.

The petitioner insists that except for the period of absences provided for in Article 390 of the Civil Code, the rule
therein on legal presumptions remains valid and effective. Nowhere under Article 390 of the Civil Code does it
require that there must first be a judicial declaration of death before the rule on presumptive death would apply. He
further asserts that contrary to the rulings of the trial and appellate courts, the requirement of a judicial declaration
of presumptive death under Article 41 of the Family Code is only a requirement for the validity of the subsequent or
second marriage.

The petitioner, likewise, avers that the trial court and the CA erred in awarding moral damages in favor of the
private complainant. The private complainant was a GRO before he married her, and even knew that he was already
married. He genuinely loved and took care of her and gave her financial support. He also pointed out that she had
an illicit relationship with a lover whom she brought to their house.
In its comment on the petition, the OSG maintains that the decision of the CA affirming the petitioners conviction is
in accord with the law, jurisprudence and the evidence on record. To bolster its claim, the OSG cited the ruling of
this Court in Republic v. Nolasco.[19]

The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, which defines and penalizes bigamy, reads:

Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a second or
subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

The provision was taken from Article 486 of the Spanish Penal Code, to wit:

El que contrajere Segundo o ulterior matrimonio sin hallarse legtimamente disuelto el anterior, ser castigado con la
pena de prision mayor. xxx

The reason why bigamy is considered a felony is to preserve and ensure the juridical tie of marriage established by
law.[20] The phrase or before the absent spouse had been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment
rendered in the proper proceedings was incorporated in the Revised Penal Code because the drafters of the law were
of the impression that in consonance with the civil law which provides for the presumption of death after an
absence of a number of years, the judicial declaration of presumed death like annulment of marriage should be a
justification for bigamy.[21]

For the accused to be held guilty of bigamy, the prosecution is burdened to prove the felony: (a) he/she has been
legally married; and (b) he/she contracts a subsequent marriage without the former marriage having been lawfully
dissolved. The felony is consummated on the celebration of the second marriage or subsequent marriage.[22] It is
essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requirements,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage.[23] Viada avers that a third element of the crime
is that the second marriage must be entered into with fraudulent intent (intencion fraudulente) which is an essential
element of a felony by dolo.[24] On the other hand, Cuello Calon is of the view that there are only two elements of
bigamy: (1) the existence of a marriage that has not been lawfully dissolved; and (2) the celebration of a second
marriage. It does not matter whether the first marriage is void or voidable because such marriages have juridical
effects until lawfully dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.[25] As the Court ruled in Domingo v. Court of
Appeals[26] and Mercado v. Tan,[27] under the Family Code of the Philippines, the judicial declaration of nullity of
a previous marriage is a defense.
In his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, Albert is of the same view as Viada and declared that there are three
(3) elements of bigamy: (1) an undissolved marriage; (2) a new marriage; and (3) fraudulent intention constituting
the felony of the act.[28] He explained that:

This last element is not stated in Article 349, because it is undoubtedly incorporated in the principle antedating all
codes, and, constituting one of the landmarks of our Penal Code, that, where there is no willfulness there is no
crime. There is no willfulness if the subject
believes that the former marriage has been dissolved; and this must be supported by very strong evidence, and if
this be produced, the act shall be deemed not to constitute a crime. Thus, a person who contracts a second marriage
in the reasonable and well-founded belief that his first wife is dead, because of the many years that have elapsed
since he has had any news of her whereabouts, in spite of his endeavors to find her, cannot be deemed guilty of the
crime of bigamy, because there is no fraudulent intent which is one of the essential elements of the crime.[29]

As gleaned from the Information in the RTC, the petitioner is charged with bigamy, a felony by dolo (deceit).
Article 3, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that there is deceit when the act is performed with
deliberate intent. Indeed, a felony cannot exist without intent. Since a felony by dolo is classified as an intentional
felony, it is deemed voluntary.[30]Although the words with malice do not appear in Article 3 of the Revised Penal
Code, such phrase is included in the word voluntary.[31]

Malice is a mental state or condition prompting the doing of an overt act without legal excuse or justification from
which another suffers injury.[32] When the act or omission defined by law as a felony is proved to have been done
or committed by the accused, the law presumes it to have been intentional.[33] Indeed, it is a legal presumption of
law that every man intends the natural or probable consequence of his voluntary act in the absence of proof to the
contrary, and such presumption must prevail unless a reasonable doubt exists from a consideration of the whole
evidence.[34]

For one to be criminally liable for a felony by dolo, there must be a confluence of both an evil act and an evil intent.
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea.[35]

In the present case, the prosecution proved that the petitioner was married to Gaa in 1975, and such marriage was
not judicially declared a nullity; hence, the marriage is presumed to subsist.[36] The prosecution also proved that
the petitioner married the private complainant in 1996, long after the effectivity of the Family Code.

The petitioner is presumed to have acted with malice or evil intent when he married the private complainant. As a
general rule, mistake of fact or good faith of the accused is a valid defense in a prosecution for a felony by dolo;
such defense negates malice or criminal intent. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is
presumed to know the law. Ignorantia legis neminem excusat.

It was the burden of the petitioner to prove his defense that when he married the private complainant in 1996, he
was of the well-grounded belief
that his first wife was already dead, as he had not heard from her for more than 20 years since 1975. He should have
adduced in evidence a decision of a competent court declaring the presumptive death of his first wife as required by
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Article 41 of the Family Code. Such judicial declaration also
constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith, and would negate criminal intent on his part when he
married the private complainant and, as a consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The
petitioner, however, failed to discharge his burden.

The phrase or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered on
the proceedings in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an aggroupment of empty or useless words. The
requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as
protection from the pains and the consequences of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged
and convicted of bigamy if the defense of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible.

The requirement of judicial declaration is also for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, the State shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. Marriage is a
social institution of the highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the
marital relation should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the
causes specified by law.[37] The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good
order, comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of the
proceedings. A civil marriage anchors an ordered society by encouraging stable relationships over transient ones; it
enhances the welfare of the community.

In a real sense, there are three parties to every civil marriage; two willing spouses and an approving State. On
marriage, the parties assume new relations to each other and the State touching nearly on every aspect of life and
death. The consequences of an invalid marriage to the parties, to innocent parties and to society, are so serious that
the law may well take means calculated to ensure the procurement of the most positive evidence of death of the first
spouse or of the presumptive death of the absent spouse[38] after the lapse of the period provided for under the law.
One such means is the requirement of the declaration by a competent court of the presumptive death of an absent
spouse as proof that the present spouse contracts a subsequent marriage on a well-grounded belief of the death of
the first spouse. Indeed, men readily believe what they wish to be true, is a maxim of the old jurists. To sustain a
second marriage and to vacate a first because one of the parties believed the other to be dead would make the
existence of the marital relation determinable, not by certain extrinsic facts, easily capable of forensic ascertainment
and proof, but by the subjective condition of individuals.[39] Only with such proof can marriage be treated as so
dissolved as to permit second marriages.[40] Thus, Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code has made the dissolution
of marriage dependent not only upon the personal belief of parties, but upon certain objective facts easily capable of
accurate judicial cognizance,[41] namely, a judgment of the presumptive death of the absent spouse.

The petitioners sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for bigamy is misplaced.

Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code provide

Art. 390. After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not, the absentee still lives, he shall be
presumed dead for all purposes, except for those of succession.

The absentee shall not be presumed dead for the purpose of opening his succession till after an absence of ten years.
If he disappeared after the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient in order that his
succession may be opened.

Art. 391. The following shall be presumed dead for all purposes, including the division of the estate among the
heirs:

(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aeroplane which is missing, who has not been
heard of for four years since the loss of the vessel or aeroplane;
(2) A person in the armed forces who has taken part in war, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other circumstances and his existence has not been known
for four years.

The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, is created by law and arises without any necessity of judicial declaration.[42] However, Article
41 of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, reads:

Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive
years and the spouse present had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead. In case of
disappearance where there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in the provisions of Article 391 of
the Civil Code, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient.

For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding as provided in this Court for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee,
without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.[43]

With the effectivity of the Family Code,[44] the period of seven years under the first paragraph of Article 390 of the
Civil Code was reduced to four consecutive years. Thus, before the spouse present may contract a subsequent
marriage, he or she must institute summary proceedings for the declaration of the presumptive death of the absentee
spouse,[45] without prejudice to the effect of the reappearance of the absentee spouse. As explained by this Court in
Armas v. Calisterio:[46]

In contrast, under the 1988 Family Code, in order that a subsequent bigamous marriage may exceptionally be
considered valid, the following conditions must concur, viz.: (a) The prior spouse of the contracting party must have
been absent for four consecutive years, or two years where there is danger of death under the circumstances stated
in Article 391 of the Civil Code at the time of disappearance; (b) the spouse present has a well-founded belief that
the absent spouse is already dead; and (c) there is, unlike the old rule, a judicial declaration of presumptive death of
the absentee for which purpose the spouse present can institute a summary proceeding in court to ask for that
declaration. The last condition is consistent and in consonance with the requirement of judicial intervention in
subsequent marriages as so provided in Article 41, in relation to Article 40, of the Family Code.

The Court rejects petitioners contention that the requirement of instituting a petition for declaration of presumptive
death under Article 41 of the Family Code is designed merely to enable the spouse present to contract a valid
second marriage and not for the acquittal of one charged with bigamy. Such provision was designed to harmonize
civil law and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and put to rest the confusion spawned by the rulings of this
Court and comments of eminent authorities on Criminal Law.

As early as March 6, 1937, this Court ruled in Jones v. Hortiguela[47] that, for purposes of the marriage law, it is
not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee before the spouse present may contract a
subsequent marriage. It held that the declaration of absence made in accordance with the provisions of the Civil
Code has for its sole purpose the taking of the necessary precautions for the administration of the estate of the
absentee. For the celebration of civil marriage, however, the law only requires that the former spouse had been
absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second marriage, that the spouse present does not know his or
her former spouse to be living, that such former spouse is generally reputed to be dead and the spouse present so
believes at the time of the celebration of the marriage.[48] In In Re Szatraw,[49] the Court declared that a judicial
declaration that a person is presumptively dead, because he or she had been unheard from in seven years, being a
presumption juris tantum only, subject to contrary proof, cannot reach the stage of finality or become final; and that
proof of actual death of the person presumed dead being unheard from in seven years, would have to be made in
another proceeding to have such particular fact finally determined. The Court ruled that if a judicial decree
declaring a person presumptively dead because he or she had not been heard from in seven years cannot become
final and executory even after the lapse of the reglementary period within which an appeal may be taken, for such
presumption is still disputable and remains subject to contrary proof, then a petition for such a declaration is
useless, unnecessary, superfluous and of no benefit to the petitioner. The Court stated that it should not waste its
valuable time and be made to perform a superfluous and meaningless act.[50] The Court also took note that a
petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse may even be made in collusion with the
other spouse.

In Lukban v. Republic of the Philippines,[51] the Court declared that the words proper proceedings in Article 349 of
the Revised Penal Code can only refer to those authorized by law such as Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil Code
which refer to the administration or settlement of the estate of a deceased person. In Gue v. Republic of the
Philippines,[52] the Court rejected the contention of the petitioner therein that, under Article 390 of the Civil Code,
the courts are authorized to declare the presumptive death of a person after an absence of seven years. The Court
reiterated its rulings in Szatraw, Lukban and Jones.

Former Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino was of the view that the provision of Article 349 or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment reached in the proper proceedings is
erroneous and should be considered as not written. He opined that such provision presupposes that, if the prior
marriage has not been legally dissolved and the absent first spouse has not been declared presumptively dead in a
proper court proceedings, the subsequent marriage is bigamous. He maintains that the supposition is not true.[53]A
second marriage is bigamous only when the circumstances in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 83 of the Civil Code are
not present.[54] Former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was, likewise, of the view that Article 349 seems to require
judicial decree of dissolution or judicial declaration of absence but even with such decree, a second marriage in
good faith will not constitute bigamy. He posits that a second marriage, if not illegal, even if it be annullable, should
not give rise to bigamy.[55] Former Justice Luis B. Reyes, on the other hand, was of the view that in the case of an
absent spouse who could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code, the spouse present cannot be
charged and convicted of bigamy in case he/she contracts a second marriage.[56]

The Committee tasked to prepare the Family Code proposed the amendments of Articles 390 and 391 of the Civil
Code to conform to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, in that, in a case where a spouse is absent for the
requisite period, the present spouse may contract a subsequent marriage only after securing a judgment declaring
the presumptive death of the absent spouse to avoid being charged and convicted of bigamy; the present spouse will
have to adduce evidence that he had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead.[57] Such
judgment is proof of the good faith of the present spouse who contracted a subsequent marriage; thus, even if the
present spouse is later charged with bigamy if the absentee spouse reappears, he cannot be convicted of the crime.
As explained by former Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy:

Such rulings, however, conflict with Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code providing that the present spouse must first
ask for a declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse in order not to be guilty of bigamy in case he or she
marries again.

The above Article of the Family Code now clearly provides that for the purpose of the present spouse contracting a
second marriage, he or she must file a summary proceeding as provided in the Code for the declaration of the
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the latters reappearance. This provision is intended to
protect the present spouse from a criminal prosecution for bigamy under Art. 349 of the Revised Penal Code
because with the judicial declaration that the missing spouses presumptively dead, the good faith of the present
spouse in contracting a second marriage is already established.[58]

Of the same view is former Dean Ernesto L. Pineda (now Undersecretary of Justice) who wrote that things are now
clarified. He says judicial declaration of presumptive death is now authorized for purposes of
remarriage. The present spouse must institute a summary proceeding for declaration of presumptive death of the
absentee, where the ordinary rules of procedure in trial will not be followed. Affidavits will suffice, with possible
clarificatory examinations of affiants if the Judge finds it necessary for a full grasp of the facts. The judgment
declaring an absentee as presumptively dead is without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the said absentee.

Dean Pineda further states that before, the weight of authority is that the clause before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead x x x should be disregarded because of Article 83, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. With
the new law, there is a need to institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of the presumptive death of the
absentee, otherwise, there is bigamy.[59]
According to Retired Supreme Court Justice Florenz D. Regalado, an eminent authority on Criminal Law, in some
cases where an absentee spouse is believed to be dead, there must be a judicial declaration of presumptive death,
which could then be made only in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate.[60] Before such declaration, it
was held that the remarriage of the other spouse is bigamous even if done in good faith.[61] Justice Regalado
opined that there were contrary views because of the ruling in Jones and the provisions of Article 83(2) of the Civil
Code, which, however, appears to have been set to rest by Article 41 of the Family Code, which requires a summary
hearing for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse before the other spouse can remarry.

Under Article 238 of the Family Code, a petition for a declaration of the presumptive death of an absent spouse
under Article 41 of the Family Code may be filed under Articles 239 to 247 of the same Code.[62]

On the second issue, the petitioner, likewise, faults the trial court and the CA for awarding moral damages in favor
of the private complainant. The petitioner maintains that moral damages may be awarded only in any of the cases
provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, and bigamy is not one of them. The petitioner asserts that the appellate
court failed to apply its ruling in People v. Bondoc,[63] where an award of moral damages for bigamy was
disallowed. In any case, the petitioner maintains, the private complainant failed to adduce evidence to prove moral
damages.

The appellate court awarded moral damages to the private complainant on its finding that she adduced evidence to
prove the same. The appellate court ruled that while bigamy is not included in those cases enumerated in Article
2219 of the Civil Code, it is not proscribed from awarding moral damages against the petitioner. The appellate court
ruled that it is not bound by the following ruling in People v. Bondoc:

... Pero si en dichos asuntos se adjudicaron daos, ello se debi indedublamente porque el articulo 2219 del Cdigo
Civil de Filipinas autoriza la adjudicacin de daos morales en los delitos de estupro, rapto, violacin, adulterio o
concubinato, y otros actos lascivos, sin incluir en esta enumeracin el delito de bigamia. No existe, por consiguiente,
base legal para adjudicar aqu los daos de P5,000.00 arriba mencionados.[64]

The OSG posits that the findings and ruling of the CA are based on the evidence and the law. The OSG, likewise,
avers that the CA was not bound by its ruling in People v. Rodeo.

The Court rules against the petitioner.

Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary computation, moral
damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or omission.[65] An
award for moral damages requires the confluence of the following conditions: first, there must be an injury, whether
physical, mental or psychological, clearly sustained by the claimant; second, there must be culpable act or omission
factually established; third, the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the injury
sustained by the claimant; and fourth, the award of damages is predicated on any of the cases stated in Article 2219
or Article 2220 of the Civil Code.[66]

Moral damages may be awarded in favor of the offended party only in criminal cases enumerated in Article 2219,
paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the Civil Code and analogous cases,viz.:
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34 and 35.

The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.

The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this
article in the order named.

Thus, the law does not intend that moral damages should be awarded in all cases where the aggrieved party has
suffered mental anguish, fright, moral anxieties, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social
humiliation and similar injury arising out of an act or omission of another, otherwise, there would not have been
any reason for the inclusion of specific acts in Article 2219[67] and analogous cases (which refer to those cases
bearing analogy or resemblance, corresponds to some others or resembling, in other respects, as in form,
proportion, relation, etc.)[68]

Indeed, bigamy is not one of those specifically mentioned in Article 2219 of the Civil Code in which the offender
may be ordered to pay moral damages to the private complainant/offended party. Nevertheless, the petitioner is
liable to the private complainant for moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the
Civil Code.

According to Article 19, every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith. This provision contains what is commonly
referred to as the principle of abuse of rights, and sets certain standards which must be observed not only in the
exercise of ones rights but also in the performance of ones duties. The standards are the following: act with justice;
give everyone his due; and observe honesty and good faith. The elements for abuse of rights are: (a) there is a legal
right or duty; (b) exercised in bad faith; and (c) for the sole intent of prejudicing or injuring another.[69]

Article 20 speaks of the general sanctions of all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own
sanction. When a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said
provision and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be
responsible.[70] If the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action for damages under either
Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper. Article 20 provides that every person who, contrary to
law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same. On the other hand,
Article 21 provides that any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for damages. The latter provision
is adopted to remedy the countless gaps in the statutes which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury should vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to prove for specifically in the statutes.
Whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in damages under Article 20 or Article 21
of the Civil Code or other applicable provisions of law depends upon the circumstances of each case.[71]

In the present case, the petitioner courted the private complainant and proposed to marry her. He assured her that he
was single. He even brought his parents to the house of the private complainant where he and his parents made the
same assurance that he was single. Thus, the private complainant agreed to marry the petitioner, who even stated in
the certificate of marriage that he was single. She lived with the petitioner and dutifully performed her duties as his
wife, believing all the while that he was her lawful husband. For two years or so until the petitioner heartlessly
abandoned her, the private complainant had no inkling that he was already married to another before they were
married.

Thus, the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners chicanery and heartless deception, the fraud
consisting not of a single act alone, but a continuous series of acts. Day by day, he maintained the appearance of
being a lawful husband to the private complainant, who
changed her status from a single woman to a married woman, lost the consortium, attributes and support of a single
man she could have married lawfully and endured mental pain and humiliation, being bound to a man who it turned
out was not her lawful husband.[72]

The Court rules that the petitioners collective acts of fraud and deceit before, during and after his marriage with the
private complainant were willful, deliberate and with malice and caused injury to the latter. That she did not sustain
any physical injuries is not a bar to an award for moral damages. Indeed, in Morris v. Macnab,[73] the New Jersey
Supreme Court ruled:

xxx The defendant cites authorities which indicate that, absent physical injuries, damages for shame, humiliation,
and mental anguish are not recoverable where the actor is simply negligent. See Prosser, supra, at p. 180; 2 Harper
& James, Torts, 1031 (1956). But the authorities all recognize that where the wrong is willful rather than negligent,
recovery may be had for the ordinary, natural, and proximate consequences though they consist of shame,
humiliation, and mental anguish. See Spiegel v. Evergreen Cemetery Co., 117 NJL 90, 94, 186 A 585 (Sup. Ct.
1936); Kuzma v. Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, 27 N.J. Super, 579, 591, 99 A.2d 833 (App. Div. 1953); Prosser,
supra, at p. 38. Here the defendants conduct was not merely negligent, but was willfully and maliciously wrongful.
It was bound to result in shame, humiliation, and mental anguish for the plaintiff, and when such result did ensue
the plaintiff became entitled not only to compensatory but also to punitive damages. See Spiegel v. Evergreen
Cemetery Co., supra; Kuzma v Millinery Workers, etc., Local 24, supra. CF. Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law
of Torts, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 517 (1957). The plaintiff testified that because of the defendants bigamous marriage to
her and the attendant publicity she not only was embarrassed and ashamed to go out but couldnt sleep but couldnt
eat, had terrific headaches and lost quite a lot of weight. No just basis appears for judicial interference with the
jurys reasonable allowance of $1,000 punitive damages on the first count. See Cabakov v. Thatcher, 37 N.J. Super
249, 117 A.2d 298 (App. Div.[74] 1955).

The Court thus declares that the petitioners acts are against public policy as they undermine and subvert the family
as a social institution, good morals and the interest and general welfare of society.

Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioners perfidy, she is not barred from claiming
moral damages. Besides, even considerations of public policy would not prevent her from recovery. As held in
Jekshewitz v. Groswald:[75]

Where a person is induced by the fraudulent representation of another to do an act which, in consequence of such
misrepresentation, he believes to be neither illegal nor immoral, but which is in fact a criminal offense, he has a
right of action against the person so inducing him for damages sustained by him in consequence of his having done
such act. Burrows v. Rhodes, [1899] 1 Q.B. 816. In Cooper v. Cooper, 147 Mass. 370, 17 N.E. 892, 9 Am. St. Rep.
721, the court said that a false representation by the defendant that he was divorced from his former wife, whereby
the plaintiff was induced to marry him, gave her a remedy in tort for deceit. It seems to have been assumed that the
fact that she had unintentionally violated the law or innocently committed a crime by cohabiting with him would be
no bar to the action, but rather that it might be a ground for enhancing her damages. The injury to the plaintiff was
said to be in her being led by the promise to give the fellowship and assistance of a wife to one who was not her
husband and to assume and act in a relation and condition that proved to be false and ignominious. Damages for
such an injury were held to be recoverable in Sherman v. Rawson, 102 Mass. 395 and Kelley v. Riley, 106 Mass.
339, 343, 8 Am. Rep. 336.

Furthermore, in the case at bar the plaintiff does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by
herself but upon the defendants misrepresentation. The criminal relations which followed, innocently on her part,
were but one of the incidental results of the defendants fraud for which damages may be assessed.

[7] Actions for deceit for fraudulently inducing a woman to enter into the marriage relation have been maintained in
other jurisdictions. Sears v. Wegner, 150 Mich. 388, 114 N.W. 224, 17 L.R. A. (N.S.) 819; Larson v. McMillan, 99
Wash. 626, 170 P. 324; Blossom v. Barrett, 37 N.Y. 434, 97 Am. Dec. 747; Morril v. Palmer, 68 Vt. 1, 33 A. 829, 33
L.R.A. 411. Considerations of public policy would not prevent recovery where the circumstances are such that the
plaintiff was conscious of no moral turpitude, that her illegal action was induced solely by the defendants
misrepresentation, and that she does not base her cause of action upon any transgression of the law by herself. Such
considerations
distinguish this case from cases in which the court has refused to lend its aid to the enforcement of a contract illegal
on its face or to one who has consciously and voluntarily become a party to an illegal act upon which the cause of
action is founded. Szadiwicz v. Cantor, 257 Mass. 518, 520, 154 N.E. 251, 49 A. L. R. 958.[76]

Considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the Court finds the award of P200,000.00 for moral damages
to be just and reasonable.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR.

Chief Justice

________________________________________
* On leave.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Reyes, Jr., with Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Rebecca de
Guia-Salvador, concurring; rollo, pp. 28-41.
[2] Penned by Judge Fernando Vil Pamintuan.
[3] Records, p. 1.
[4] Exhibit B, records, p. 7.
[5] Exhibit A, id. at 6.
[6] TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
[7] Exhibit B, records, p. 7.
[8] TSN, April 23, 2002, p. 15.
[9] Records, pp. 111-116.
[10] 58 Phil. 817 (1933).
[11] 1 Phil. 109 (1902).
[12] G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
[13] 32 Phil 202 (1915).
[14] G.R. No. 94053, March 17, 1993, 220 SCRA 20.
[15] G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

[16] G.R. No. 104818, September 17, 1993, 226 SCRA 572.
[17] Rollo, p. 41.
[18] Rollo, pp. 14-15.
[19] Supra, at note 14.
[20] CUELLO CALON, DERECHO PENAL REFORMADO, VOL. V, 627.
[21] AQUINO, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. III, 497 (1988 ed.) (emphasis supplied).
[22] Id. at 634.
[23] People v. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 247 (1935).
[24] Tres son los elementos esenciales del mismo; el vinculo matrimonial anterior, la celebracin de nuevo
matrimonio antes de la disolucin de ese vinculo anterior, y por ultimo, la intencin fraudulenta, que constituye la
criminalidad misma del acto. Este ultimo elemento no lo consigna el articulo, por hallarse indudablemente
embebido en ese principio anterior a todos los Codigos, e inscrito en el frontispicio del nuestro (Art. I.), que donde
no hay voluntad, no hay delito. xxx (CODIGO PENAL REFORMADO, TOMO 5, 560) Groizard is of the view that
bigamy may be committed by culpa. (id. at 558).
[25] DERECHO PENAL REFORMADO, VOL. 1, 629-630.
[26] Supra, at note 16.
[27] Supra, at note 15.
[28] ALBERT, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 819 (1932 ed.).
[29] Id.
[30] L.B. REYES, THE REVISED PENAL CODE, BOOK ONE, 37 (13th ed. 1993).
[31] United States v. Pealosa, 1 Phil. 109.
[32] WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, VOLUME 1, 302.
[33] People v. Vogel, 46 Cal.2d. 798; 299 P.2d 850 (1956).
[34] WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 1, 203.
G.R. No. 111656, March 20, 1996, 255 SCRA 202.
[35] Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,

[36] Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, G.R. No. 138509, July 31, 2000, 336 SCRA 747.
[37] People v. Bitdu, supra, at note 10.
[38] Geisselman v. Geisselman, 134 Md. 453, 107 A. 185 (1919).
[39] WHARTON CRIMINAL LAW, VOL. 2, 2377 (12th ed., 1932).
[40] Id.
[41] Id.
[42] TOLENTINO, THE NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. I, 690.
[43] Emphasis supplied.
[44] The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209) took effect on August 4, 1988.
[45] Navarro v. Domagtoy, A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, July 19, 1996, 259 SCRA 129.
[46] G.R. No. 136467, April 6, 2000, 330 SCRA 201.
[47] 64 Phil. 179 (1937).
[48] Id. at 83.
[49] 81 Phil. 461 (1948).
[50] Id. at 463.
[51] 98 Phil. 574 (1956).
[52] 107 Phil. 381 (1960).
[53] AQUINO, REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. III, 490.
[54] Id. at 497.
[55] PADILLA, COMMENTS ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE, VOL. IV, 717-718.
[56] THE REVISED PENAL CODE, 1981 ED., VOL. II, 906.
[57] Republic v. Nolasco, supra, at note 19.
[58] HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE, 48-49.
[59] THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES ANNOTATED, 62-63 (1992 ed.).
[60] REGALADO, CRIMINAL LAW CONSPECTUS, 633 (1st ed., 2000), citing Lukban v. Republic, supra.
[61] Id. citing People v. Reyes, CA- G.R. No. 12107-R, June 30, 1955, and People v. Malana, CA- G.R.
No. 5347, January 30, 1940.
[62] SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 358.
[63] CA- G.R. No. 22573-R, April 23, 1959.
[64] Article 2217, Civil Code.
[65] Francisco v. Ferrer, Jr., G.R. No. 142029, February 28, 2001, 353 SCRA 261.
[66] Id. at 266.

[67] TOLENTINO, NEW CIVIL CODE, VOL. II, 658, citing People v. Plaza, 52 O.G. 6609.
[68] Id.
G.R. No. 88694, January 11, 1993, 217 SCRA 16.
[69] Albenson Enterprises Corp. v. Court of Appeals,

[70] Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 81262, August 25, 1989,
176 SCRA 778.
[71] Id.
[72] Leventhal v. Liberman, 186 N.E. 675 (1933).
[73] 135 A.2d 657 (1957).
[74] Id. at 662.
[75] Id. at 611-612.
[76] 164 N.E. 609 (1929).
 Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17396 May 30, 1962
CECILIO PE, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
ALFONSO PE, defendant-appellee.
Cecilio L. Pe for and in his own behalf as plaintiff-appellant.
Leodegario L. Mogol for defendant-appellee.
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Plaintiffs brought this action before the Court of First Instance of Manila to recover moral, compensatory,
exemplary and corrective damages in the amount of P94,000.00 exclusive of attorney's fees and expenses of
litigation.
Defendant, after denying some allegations contained in the complaint, set up as a defense that the facts alleged
therein, even if true, do not constitute a valid cause of action.
After trial, the lower court, after finding that defendant had carried on a love affair with one Lolita Pe, an unmarried
woman, being a married man himself, declared that defendant cannot be held liable for moral damages it appearing
that plaintiffs failed to prove that defendant, being aware of his marital status, deliberately and in bad faith tried to
win Lolita's affection. So it rendered decision dismissing the complaint.1wph1.t
Plaintiffs brought this case on appeal before this Court on the ground that the issues involved are purely of law.
The facts as found by the trial court are: Plaintiffs are the parents, brothers and sisters of one Lolita Pe. At the time
of her disappearance on April 14, 1957, Lolita was 24 years old and unmarried. Defendant is a married man and
works as agent of the La Perla Cigar and Cigarette Factory. He used to stay in the town of Gasan, Marinduque, in
connection with his aforesaid occupation. Lolita was staying with her parents in the same town. Defendant was an
adopted son of a Chinaman named Pe Beco, a collateral relative of Lolita's father. Because of such fact and the
similarity in their family name, defendant became close to the plaintiffs who regarded him as a member of their
family. Sometime in 1952, defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the pretext that he wanted her to teach him
how to pray the rosary. The two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine trysts not only in
the town of Gasan but also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. They exchanged love notes with
each other the contents of which reveal not only their infatuation for each other but also the extent to which they
had carried their relationship. The rumors about their love affairs reached the ears of Lolita's parents sometime, in
1955, and since then defendant was forbidden from going to their house and from further seeing Lolita. The
plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. The affair between
defendant and Lolita continued nonetheless.
Sometime in April, 1957, Lolita was staying with her brothers and sisters at their residence at 54-B Espaa
Extension, Quezon City. On April 14, 1957, Lolita disappeared from said house. After she left, her brothers and
sisters checked up her thing and found that Lolita's clothes were gone. However, plaintiffs found a note on a
crumpled piece of paper inside Lolita's aparador. Said note, written on a small slip of paper approximately 4" by 3"
in size, was in a handwriting recognized to be that of defendant's. In English it reads:
Honey, suppose I leave here on Sunday night, and that's 13th of this month and we will have a date on the 14th,
that's Monday morning at 10 a.m.
Reply
Love
The disappearance of Lolita was reported to the police authorities and the NBI but up to the present there is no
news or trace of her whereabouts.
The present action is based on Article 21 of the New Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner which is contrary to morals, good customs or
public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
There is no doubt that the claim of plaintiffs for damages is based on the fact that defendant, being a married man,
carried on a love affair with Lolita Pe thereby causing plaintiffs injury in a manner contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy. But in spite of the fact that plaintiffs have clearly established that in illicit affair was
carried on between defendant and Lolita which caused great damage to the name and reputation of plaintiffs who
are her parents, brothers and sisters, the trial court considered their complaint not actionable for the reason that they
failed to prove that defendant deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita's affection Thus, the trial court said:
"In the absence of proof on this point, the court may not presume that it was the defendant who deliberately induced
such relationship. We cannot be unmindful of the uncertainties and sometimes inexplicable mysteries of the human
emotions. It is a possibility that the defendant and Lolita simply fell in love with each other, not only without any
desire on their part, but also against their better judgment and in full consciousness of what it will bring to both of
them. This is specially so with respect to Lolita, being an unmarried woman, falling in love with defendant who is a
married man."
We disagree with this view. The circumstances under which defendant tried to win Lolita's affection cannot lead, to
any other conclusion than that it was he who, thru an ingenious scheme or trickery, seduced the latter to the extent
of making her fall in love with him. This is shown by the fact that defendant frequented the house of Lolita on the
pretext that he wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Because of the frequency of his visits to the latter's
family who was allowed free access because he was a collateral relative and was considered as a member of her
family, the two eventually fell in love with each other and conducted clandestine love affairs not only in Gasan but
also in Boac where Lolita used to teach in a barrio school. When the rumors about their illicit affairs reached the
knowledge of her parents, defendant was forbidden from going to their house and even from seeing Lolita.
Plaintiffs even filed deportation proceedings against defendant who is a Chinese national. Nevertheless, defendant
continued his love affairs with Lolita until she disappeared from the parental home. Indeed, no other conclusion can
be drawn from this chain of events than that defendant not only deliberately, but through a clever strategy,
succeeded in winning the affection and love of Lolita to the extent of having illicit relations with her. The wrong he
has caused her and her family is indeed immeasurable considering the fact that he is a married man. Verily, he has
committed an injury to Lolita's family in a manner contrary to morals, good customs and public policy as
contemplated in Article 21 of the new Civil Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced to pay the plaintiffs the sum
of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.
Padilla, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and Dizon, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-14628 September 30, 1960
FRANCISCO HERMOSISIMA, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., respondents.
Regino Hermosisima for petitioner.
F.P. Gabriel, Jr. for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
An appeal by certiorari, taken by petitioner Francisco Hermosisima, from a decision of Court of Appeals modifying
that of the Court of First Instance of Cebu.
On October 4, 1954, Soledad Cagigas, hereinafter referred to as complaint, filed with said of her child, Chris
Hermosisima, as natural child and moral damages for alleged breach of promise. Petitioner admitted the paternity of
child and expressed willingness to support the latter, but denied having ever promised to marry the complainant.
Upon her motion, said court ordered petitioner, on October 27, 1954, to pay, by way of alimonypendente lite,
P50.00 a month, which was, on February 16, 1955, reduced to P30.00 a month. In due course, later on, said court
rendered a decision the dispositive part of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, declaring the child, Chris Hermosisima, as the natural daughter of
defendant, and confirming the order pendente lite, ordering defendant to pay to the said child, through plaintiff, the
sum of thirty pesos (P30.00), payable on or before the fifth day of every month sentencing defendant to pay to
plaintiff the sum of FOUR THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P4,500.00) for actual and compensatory
damages; the sum of FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P5,000.00) as moral damages; and the further sum of FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) as attorney's fees for plaintiff, with costs against defendant.
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Court of Appeals affirmed this decision, except as to the actual and compensatory
damages and the moral damages, which were increased to P5,614.25 and P7,000.00, respectively.
The main issue before us is whether moral damages are recoverable, under our laws, for breach of promise to
marry. The pertinent facts are:
Complainant Soledad Cagigas, was born in July 1917. Since 1950, Soledad then a teacher in the Sibonga Provincial
High School in Cebu, and petitioner, who was almost ten (10) years younger than she, used to go around together
and were regarded as engaged, although he had made no promise of marriage prior thereto. In 1951, she gave up
teaching and became a life insurance underwriter in the City of Cebu, where intimacy developed among her and the
petitioner, since one evening in 1953, when after coming from the movies, they had sexual intercourse in his cabin
on board M/V "Escao," to which he was then attached as apprentice pilot. In February 1954, Soledad advised
petitioner that she was in the family way, whereupon he promised to marry her. Their child, Chris Hermosisima,
was born on June 17, 1954, in a private maternity and clinic. However, subsequently, or on July 24, 1954, defendant
married one Romanita Perez. Hence, the present action, which was commenced on or about October 4, 1954.
Referring now to the issue above referred to, it will be noted that the Civil Code of Spain permitted the recovery of
damages for breach to marry. Article 43 and 44 of said Code provides:
ART. 43. A mutual promise of marriage shall not give rise to an obligation to contract marriage. No court shall
entertain any complaint by which the enforcement of such promise is sought.
ART. 44. If the promise has been in a public or private instrument by an adult, or by a minor with the concurrence
of the person whose consent is necessary for the celebration of the marriage, or if the banns have been published,
the one who without just cause refuses to marry shall be obliged to reimburse the other for the expenses which he or
she may have incurred by reason of the promised marriage.
The action for reimbursement of expenses to which the foregoing article refers must be brought within one year,
computed from the day of the refusal to celebrate the marriage.
Inasmuch as these articles were never in force in the Philippines, this Court ruled in De Jesus vs. Syquia (58 Phil.,
866), that "the action for breach of promises to marry has no standing in the civil law, apart from the right to
recover money or property advanced . . . upon the faith of such promise". The Code Commission charged with the
drafting of the Proposed Civil Code of the Philippines deem it best, however, to change the law thereon. We quote
from the report of the Code Commission on said Proposed Civil Code:
Articles 43 and 44 the Civil Code of 1889 refer to the promise of marriage. But these articles are not enforced in the
Philippines. The subject is regulated in the Proposed Civil Code not only as to the aspect treated of in said articles
but also in other particulars. It is advisable to furnish legislative solutions to some questions that might arise relative
to betrothal. Among the provisions proposed are: That authorizing the adjudication of moral damages, in case of
breach of promise of marriage, and that creating liability for causing a marriage engagement to be
broken.1awphl.nt
Accordingly, the following provisions were inserted in said Proposed Civil Code, under Chapter I, Title III, Book I
thereof:
Art. 56. A mutual promise to marry may be made expressly or impliedly.
Art. 57. An engagement to be married must be agreed directly by the future spouses.
Art. 58. A contract for a future marriage cannot, without the consent of the parent or guardian, be entered into by a
male between the ages of sixteen and twenty years or by a female between the ages of sixteen and eighteen years.
Without such consent of the parents or guardian, the engagement to marry cannot be the basis of a civil action for
damages in case of breach of the promise.
Art. 59. A promise to marry when made by a female under the age of fourteen years is not civilly actionable, even
though approved by the parent or guardian.
Art. 60. In cases referred to in the proceeding articles, the criminal and civil responsibility of a male for seduction
shall not be affected.
Art. 61. No action for specific performance of a mutual promise to marry may be brought.
Art. 62. An action for breach of promise to marry may be brought by the aggrieved party even though a minor
without the assistance of his parent or guardian. Should the minor refuse to bring suit, the parent or guardian may
institute the action.
Art. 63. Damages for breach of promise to marry shall include not only material and pecuniary losses but also
compensation for mental and moral suffering.
Art. 64. Any person, other than a rival, the parents, guardians and grandparents, of the affianced parties, who cause
a marriage engagement to be broken shall be liable for damages, both material and moral, to the engaged person
who is rejected.
Art. 65. In case of breach of promise to marry, the party breaking the engagement shall be obliged to return what he
or she has received from the other as gift on account of the promise of the marriage.
These article were, however, eliminated in Congress. The reason therefor are set forth in the report of the
corresponding Senate Committee, from which we quote:
The elimination of this Chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decide in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia, 58 Phil., 866. The history of breach of promise suit in the United States
and in England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and
unscrupulous men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of the rights of action in the so-called Balm
suit in many of the American States.
See statutes of:
Florida 1945 pp. 1342 1344
Maryland 1945 pp. 1759 1762
Nevada 1943 p. 75
Maine 1941 pp. 140 141
New Hampshire 1941 p. 223
California 1939 p. 1245
Massachusetts 1938 p. 326
Indiana 1936 p. 1009
Michigan 1935 p. 201
New York 1935
Pennsylvania p. 450
The Commission perhaps though that it has followed the more progression trend in legislation when it provided for
breach of promise to marry suits. But it is clear that the creation of such causes of action at a time when so many
States, in consequence of years of experience are doing away with them, may well prove to be a step in the wrong
direction. (Congressional Record, Vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, May 19, 1949, p. 2352.)
The views thus expressed were accepted by both houses of Congress. In the light of the clear and manifest intent of
our law making body not to sanction actions for breach of promise to marry, the award of moral damages made by
the lower courts is, accordingly, untenable. The Court of Appeals said award:
Moreover, it appearing that because of defendant-appellant's seduction power, plaintiff-appellee, overwhelmed by
her love for him finally yielded to his sexual desires in spite of her age and self-control, she being a woman after
all, we hold that said defendant-appellant is liable for seduction and, therefore, moral damages may be recovered
from him under the provision of Article 2219, paragraph 3, of the new Civil Code.
Apart from the fact that the general tenor of said Article 2219, particularly the paragraphs preceding and those
following the one cited by the Court of Appeals, and the language used in said paragraph strongly indicates that the
"seduction" therein contemplated is the crime punished as such in Article as such in Article 337 and 338 of the
Revised Penal Code, which admittedly does not exist in the present case, we find ourselves unable to say that
petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is approximately ten (10) years younger than the
complainant who around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as highly enlightened as a former high school teacher
and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice
pilot, but, also, because, the court of first instance found that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner
because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to bind" "by having a fruit of their engagement even
before they had the benefit of clergy."
The court of first instance sentenced petitioner to pay the following: (1) a monthly pension of P30.00 for the
support of the child: (2) P4,500, representing the income that complainant had allegedly failed to earn during her
pregnancy and shortly after the birth of the child, as actual and compensation damages; (3) P5,000, as moral
damages; and (4) P500.00, as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals added to the second item the sum of P1,114.25
consisting of P144.20, for hospitalization and medical attendance, in connection with the parturiation, and the
balance representing expenses incurred to support the child and increased the moral damages to P7,000.00.
With the elimination of this award for damages, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore,
in all other respects, without special pronouncement as to cost in this instance. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes and
Dizon, JJ., concur.

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________________________________________

Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17248 January 29, 1962
BEATRIZ GALANG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, MAXIMO QUINIT and RODRIGO QUINIT, respondents.
R. Meris-Morales for petitioner.
De Santos, Herrera and Delfino for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is an action against Rodrigo Quinit and his father Maximo Quinit to recover damages claimed to have been
sustained by plaintiff Beatriz Galang for an alleged breach of promise on the part of Rodrigo Quinit to marry her. In
due course, the Court of First Instance of Baguio, in which the case was originally instituted, rendered a decision
sentencing the defendants jointly and severally to pay the sums of P275.00, by way of actual damages, P5,000.00,
as moral damages, and P500.00, as attorney's fees, apart from the costs. On appeal, taken by the defendants, the
Court of Appeals absolved Maximino Quinit, and accordingly, reversed said decision insofar as he is concerned,
and modified it as regards Rodrigo Quinit, by eliminating the awards for moral damages and attorney's fees. The
case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by plaintiff Beatriz Galang.
As found by the Court of Appeals, it appears that plaintiff "and Rodrigo Quinit were engaged, but Rodrigo's parents
were strongly opposed to their marriage"; that "from April 27, 1955", plaintiff "and Rodrigo lived as husband and
wife in the house of Adolfo Dagawan located at Colorado Falls, Tuba, Mountain Province, until May 9 when
Rodrigo left and never returned"; that "both were from the same town of Sison, Pangasinan and their love relations
started in the year 1953, the two having exchanged a long series of love letters since then until they separated", and
that "at the time when went to Colorado Falls, both were of age." .
The evidence on other pertinent facts is, however, conflicting. In the language of the decision appealed from
plaintiff also referred to therein as appellee tried to prove .
"... that Rodrigo courted her in 1953 and they, thereafter, became engaged, albeit Rodrigo's mother was opposed to
their marriage; that on April 15, 1955 Rodrigo and his father went to her house and her marriage with Rodrigo were
arranged, with the concurrence of her mother, appellant Maximino Quinit having agreed to give dowry and to
defray the expenses of the marriage, with the exception of the wedding dress of appellee; that they agreed to have
the marriage celebrated in Baguio, for which reason on April 27, 1955, appellee, Rodrigo and the latter's father left
for Baguio; that upon arriving at Colorado Falls, however, Maximino made them alight from the bus and took them
to the house of Adolfo Dagawan with whom Maximino agreed that appellee and Rodrigo would stay in said house,
Maximino to pay P5.00 daily for their lodging and asked Dagawan to make all arrangements for their wedding in
Baguio and to act as their sponsor; that after making these arrangements Maximino left, while appellee and Rodrigo
remained in Dagawan's house where they lived as husband and wife until May 9, that on May 7, appellee and
Rodrigo, accompanied by Dagawan, went to Baguio to secure a marriage license but failed because Rodrigo did not
have a residence certificate, although both prospective contracting parties signed the corresponding application; that
on May 9, on the pretext that he going to their hometown to get his residence certificate, Rodrigo left Colorado
Falls and never returned; that when appellee returned to their hometown (Sison, Pangasinan), she found out that
Rodrigo's parents had sprinted him away because, in their opinion, appellee's reputation was unsavory." .
Upon the other hand, the defendants sought to establish that Rodrigo and plaintiff .
"... were engaged; that Rodrigo's parents were opposed to their marriage; that while Rodrigo was agreeable to
marrying appellee, he wanted the marriage to take place after his graduation, while appellee was impatient and
wanted the marriage to be held at an earlier date; that on April 26, 1955, in view of Rodrigo's continued relations
with appellee, his parents told him to leave the parental home, for which reason on that date he left their house with
his belongings and some gantas of rice; that before leaving their hometown he passed by the house of appellee and
told her what had happened and further told her that he was intending to go to Manila to look for a job; that
appellee convinced him to go, instead to Colorado Falls where they could discuss their plans and so there he went -
followed later by appellee - both staying at the house of Dagawan; that because Rodrigo persistently refused to
marry appellee, the latter's relatives, accompanied by policemen and constabulary soldiers, arrived at the place and
tried to intimidate him; that in view of his continued refusal they brought him down to Sison where he was allowed
to go home; that thereupon his parents placed him under the custody of Mayor Madriaga of the neighboring town of
Rosario where he stayed from May 1, to June, 1955; that sometime during the month of June, Adolfo Dagawan
sought Rodrigo on the pretext that he was going to tell him something important and was able to lure him to a
secluded place where he was made to sign an application for a marriage license; that because of his non-appearance
before a notary public, the latter refused to acknowledge the application.
"With respect to Maximino Quinit the evidence for appellants tends to show that he had never agreed to have his
son marry appellee nor to give a dowry to the latter; that he did not go with appellee and Rodrigo to Colorado Falls
and that he did not concoct, much less carry out any plan to have his son satisfy his lust and then get rid of
appellee." .
The court of first instance sustained plaintiff's pretense, but the Court of Appeals considered her evidence unworthy
of credence, and, hence, absolved Maximino Quinit. Plaintiff maintains that the Court of Appeals had erred in the
appreciation of the evidence, but the findings of said Court on the credibility of said evidence are beyond our power
of review on appeal by certiorari and, consequently, conclusive upon us.
It is next urged that said Court had also erred in not awarding moral damages to plaintiff, who insists that moral
damages for breach of promise to marry are collectible under our laws, but this question has already been settled
adversely to plaintiff's pretense in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628 (September 30, 1960).1wph1.t
The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, therefore, without special pronouncement as to
cost. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and De Leon, J.J., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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 Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 97336 February 19, 1993

GASHEM SHOOKAT BAKSH, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MARILOU T. GONZALES, respondents.
Public Attorney's Office for petitioner.
Corleto R. Castro for private respondent.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to review and set aside the Decision 1of
the respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 24256 which affirmed in toto the 16 October 1939 Decision of
Branch 38 (Lingayen) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 16503. Presented is the
issue of whether or not damages may be recovered for a breach of promise to marry on the basis of Article 21 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
The antecedents of this case are not complicated:
On 27 October 1987, private respondent, without the assistance of counsel, filed with the aforesaid trial court a
complaint 2 for damages against the petitioner for the alleged violation of their agreement to get married. She
alleges in said complaint that: she is twenty-two (22) years old, single, Filipino and a pretty lass of good moral
character and reputation duly respected in her community; petitioner, on the other hand, is an Iranian citizen
residing at the Lozano Apartments, Guilig, Dagupan City, and is an exchange student taking a medical course at the
Lyceum Northwestern Colleges in Dagupan City; before 20 August 1987, the latter courted and proposed to marry
her; she accepted his love on the condition that they would get married; they therefore agreed to get married after
the end of the school semester, which was in October of that year; petitioner then visited the private respondent's
parents in Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan to secure their approval to the marriage; sometime in 20 August 1987, the
petitioner forced her to live with him in the Lozano Apartments; she was a virgin before she began living with him;
a week before the filing of the complaint, petitioner's attitude towards her started to change; he maltreated and
threatened to kill her; as a result of such maltreatment, she sustained injuries; during a confrontation with a
representative of the barangay captain of Guilig a day before the filing of the complaint, petitioner repudiated their
marriage agreement and asked her not to live with him anymore and; the petitioner is already married to someone
living in Bacolod City. Private respondent then prayed for judgment ordering the petitioner to pay her damages in
the amount of not less than P45,000.00, reimbursement for actual expenses amounting to P600.00, attorney's fees
and costs, and granting her such other relief and remedies as may be just and equitable. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. 16503.
In his Answer with Counterclaim, 3 petitioner admitted only the personal circumstances of the parties as averred in
the complaint and denied the rest of the allegations either for lack of knowledge or information sufficient to form a
belief as to the truth thereof or because the true facts are those alleged as his Special and Affirmative Defenses. He
thus claimed that he never proposed marriage to or agreed to be married with the private respondent; he neither
sought the consent and approval of her parents nor forced her to live in his apartment; he did not maltreat her, but
only told her to stop coming to his place because he discovered that she had deceived him by stealing his money
and passport; and finally, no confrontation took place with a representative of the barangay captain. Insisting, in his
Counterclaim, that the complaint is baseless and unfounded and that as a result thereof, he was unnecessarily
dragged into court and compelled to incur expenses, and has suffered mental anxiety and a besmirched reputation,
he prayed for an award of P5,000.00 for miscellaneous expenses and P25,000.00 as moral damages.
After conducting a pre-trial on 25 January 1988, the trial court issued a Pre-Trial Order 4 embodying the stipulated
facts which the parties had agreed upon, to wit:
1. That the plaintiff is single and resident (sic) of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, while the defendant is single,
Iranian citizen and resident (sic) of Lozano Apartment, Guilig, Dagupan City since September 1, 1987 up to the
present;
2. That the defendant is presently studying at Lyceum Northwestern, Dagupan City, College of Medicine, second
year medicine proper;
3. That the plaintiff is (sic) an employee at Mabuhay Luncheonette , Fernandez Avenue, Dagupan City since July,
1986 up to the present and a (sic) high school graduate;
4. That the parties happened to know each other when the manager of the Mabuhay Luncheonette, Johhny Rabino
introduced the defendant to the plaintiff on August 3, 1986.
After trial on the merits, the lower court, applying Article 21 of the Civil Code, rendered on 16 October 1989 a
decision 5 favoring the private respondent. The petitioner was thus ordered to pay the latter damages and attorney's
fees; the dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT of the foregoing consideration, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendant.
1. Condemning (sic) the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos as moral
damages.
2. Condemning further the defendant to play the plaintiff the sum of three thousand (P3,000.00) pesos as atty's fees
and two thousand (P2,000.00) pesos at (sic) litigation expenses and to pay the costs.
3. All other claims are denied. 6
The decision is anchored on the trial court's findings and conclusions that (a) petitioner and private respondent were
lovers, (b) private respondent is not a woman of loose morals or questionable virtue who readily submits to sexual
advances, (c) petitioner, through machinations, deceit and false pretenses, promised to marry private respondent, d)
because of his persuasive promise to marry her, she allowed herself to be deflowered by him, (e) by reason of that
deceitful promise, private respondent and her parents in accordance with Filipino customs and traditions
made some preparations for the wedding that was to be held at the end of October 1987 by looking for pigs and
chickens, inviting friends and relatives and contracting sponsors, (f) petitioner did not fulfill his promise to marry
her and (g) such acts of the petitioner, who is a foreigner and who has abused Philippine hospitality, have offended
our sense of morality, good customs, culture and traditions. The trial court gave full credit to the private
respondent's testimony because, inter alia, she would not have had the temerity and courage to come to court and
expose her honor and reputation to public scrutiny and ridicule if her claim was false. 7
The above findings and conclusions were culled from the detailed summary of the evidence for the private
respondent in the foregoing decision, digested by the respondent Court as follows:
According to plaintiff, who claimed that she was a virgin at the time and that she never had a boyfriend before,
defendant started courting her just a few days after they first met. He later proposed marriage to her several times
and she accepted his love as well as his proposal of marriage on August 20, 1987, on which same day he went with
her to her hometown of Baaga, Bugallon, Pangasinan, as he wanted to meet her parents and inform them of their
relationship and their intention to get married. The photographs Exhs. "A" to "E" (and their submarkings) of
defendant with members of plaintiff's family or with plaintiff, were taken that day. Also on that occasion, defendant
told plaintiffs parents and brothers and sisters that he intended to marry her during the semestral break in October,
1987, and because plaintiff's parents thought he was good and trusted him, they agreed to his proposal for him to
marry their daughter, and they likewise allowed him to stay in their house and sleep with plaintiff during the few
days that they were in Bugallon. When plaintiff and defendant later returned to Dagupan City, they continued to live
together in defendant's apartment. However, in the early days of October, 1987, defendant would tie plaintiff's
hands and feet while he went to school, and he even gave her medicine at 4 o'clock in the morning that made her
sleep the whole day and night until the following day. As a result of this live-in relationship, plaintiff became
pregnant, but defendant gave her some medicine to abort the fetus. Still plaintiff continued to live with defendant
and kept reminding him of his promise to marry her until he told her that he could not do so because he was already
married to a girl in Bacolod City. That was the time plaintiff left defendant, went home to her parents, and thereafter
consulted a lawyer who accompanied her to the barangay captain in Dagupan City. Plaintiff, her lawyer, her
godmother, and a barangay tanod sent by the barangay captain went to talk to defendant to still convince him to
marry plaintiff, but defendant insisted that he could not do so because he was already married to a girl in Bacolod
City, although the truth, as stipulated by the parties at the pre-trial, is that defendant is still single.
Plaintiff's father, a tricycle driver, also claimed that after defendant had informed them of his desire to marry
Marilou, he already looked for sponsors for the wedding, started preparing for the reception by looking for pigs and
chickens, and even already invited many relatives and friends to the forthcoming wedding. 8
Petitioner appealed the trial court's decision to the respondent Court of Appeals which docketed the case as CA-
G.R. CV No. 24256. In his Brief, 9 he contended that the trial court erred (a) in not dismissing the case for lack of
factual and legal basis and (b) in ordering him to pay moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs.
On 18 February 1991, respondent Court promulgated the challenged decision 10 affirming in toto the trial court's
ruling of 16 October 1989. In sustaining the trial court's findings of fact, respondent Court made the following
analysis:
First of all, plaintiff, then only 21 years old when she met defendant who was already 29 years old at the time, does
not appear to be a girl of loose morals. It is uncontradicted that she was a virgin prior to her unfortunate experience
with defendant and never had boyfriend. She is, as described by the lower court, a barrio lass "not used and
accustomed to trend of modern urban life", and certainly would (sic) not have allowed
"herself to be deflowered by the defendant if there was no persuasive promise made by the defendant to marry her."
In fact, we agree with the lower court that plaintiff and defendant must have been sweethearts or so the plaintiff
must have thought because of the deception of defendant, for otherwise, she would not have allowed herself to be
photographed with defendant in public in so (sic) loving and tender poses as those depicted in the pictures Exhs.
"D" and "E". We cannot believe, therefore, defendant's pretense that plaintiff was a nobody to him except a waitress
at the restaurant where he usually ate. Defendant in fact admitted that he went to plaintiff's hometown of Baaga,
Bugallon, Pangasinan, at least thrice; at (sic) the town fiesta on February 27, 1987 (p. 54, tsn May 18, 1988), at (sic)
a beach party together with the manager and employees of the Mabuhay Luncheonette on March 3, 1987 (p. 50, tsn
id.), and on April 1, 1987 when he allegedly talked to plaintiff's mother who told him to marry her daughter (pp. 55-
56, tsn id.). Would defendant have left Dagupan City where he was involved in the serious study of medicine to go
to plaintiff's hometown in Baaga, Bugallon, unless there was (sic) some kind of special relationship between
them? And this special relationship must indeed have led to defendant's insincere proposal of marriage to plaintiff,
communicated not only to her but also to her parents, and (sic) Marites Rabino, the owner of the restaurant where
plaintiff was working and where defendant first proposed marriage to her, also knew of this love affair and
defendant's proposal of marriage to plaintiff, which she declared was the reason why plaintiff resigned from her job
at the restaurant after she had accepted defendant's proposal (pp. 6-7, tsn March 7, 1988).
Upon the other hand, appellant does not appear to be a man of good moral character and must think so low and
have so little respect and regard for Filipino women that he openly admitted that when he studied in Bacolod City
for several years where he finished his B.S. Biology before he came to Dagupan City to study medicine, he had a
common-law wife in Bacolod City. In other words, he also lived with another woman in Bacolod City but did not
marry that woman, just like what he did to plaintiff. It is not surprising, then, that he felt so little compunction or
remorse in pretending to love and promising to marry plaintiff, a young, innocent, trustful country girl, in order to
satisfy his lust on her. 11
and then concluded:
In sum, we are strongly convinced and so hold that it was defendant-appellant's fraudulent and deceptive
protestations of love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him
and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these
(sic) fraud and deception on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him
preparatory to their supposed marriage. And as these acts of appellant are palpably and undoubtedly against morals,
good customs, and public policy, and are even gravely and deeply derogatory and insulting to our women, coming
as they do from a foreigner who has been enjoying the hospitality of our people and taking advantage of the
opportunity to study in one of our institutions of learning, defendant-appellant should indeed be made, under Art. 21
of the Civil Code of the Philippines, to compensate for the moral damages and injury that he had caused plaintiff, as
the lower court ordered him to do in its decision in this case. 12
Unfazed by his second defeat, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 March 1991; he raises therein the single
issue of whether or not Article 21 of the Civil Code applies to the case at bar. 13
It is petitioner's thesis that said Article 21 is not applicable because he had not committed any moral wrong or injury
or violated any good custom or public policy; he has not professed love or proposed marriage to the private
respondent; and he has never maltreated her. He criticizes the trial court for liberally invoking Filipino customs,
traditions and culture, and ignoring the fact that since he is a foreigner, he is not conversant with such Filipino
customs, traditions and culture. As an Iranian Moslem, he is not familiar with Catholic and Christian ways. He
stresses that even if he had made a promise to marry, the subsequent failure to fulfill the same is excusable or
tolerable because of his Moslem upbringing; he then alludes to the Muslim Code which purportedly allows a
Muslim to take four (4) wives and concludes that on the basis thereof, the trial court erred in ruling that he does not
posses good moral character. Moreover, his controversial "common law life" is now his legal wife as their marriage
had been solemnized in civil ceremonies in the Iranian Embassy. As to his unlawful cohabitation with the private
respondent, petitioner claims that even if responsibility could be pinned on him for the live-in relationship, the
private respondent should also be faulted for consenting to an illicit arrangement. Finally, petitioner asseverates that
even if it was to be assumed arguendo that he had professed his love to the private respondent and had also
promised to marry her, such acts would not be actionable in view of the special circumstances of the case. The mere
breach of promise is not actionable. 14
On 26 August 1991, after the private respondent had filed her Comment to the petition and the petitioner had filed
his Reply thereto, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda, which they subsequently complied with.
As may be gleaned from the foregoing summation of the petitioner's arguments in support of his thesis, it is clear
that questions of fact, which boil down to the issue of the credibility of witnesses, are also raised. It is the rule in
this jurisdiction that appellate courts will not disturb the trial court's findings as to the credibility of witnesses, the
latter court having heard the witnesses and having had the opportunity to observe closely their deportment and
manner of testifying, unless the trial court had plainly overlooked facts of substance or value which, if considered,
might affect the result of the case. 15
Petitioner has miserably failed to convince Us that both the appellate and trial courts had overlooked any fact of
substance or values which could alter the result of the case.
Equally settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court. It is not the function of this Court to analyze or weigh all over again the evidence
introduced by the parties before the lower court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. Thus,
inMedina vs. Asistio, Jr., 16 this Court took the time, again, to enumerate these exceptions:
xxx xxx xxx
(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro,
93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurb or impossible (Luna v. Linatok,
74 Phil. 15 [1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil. 453 [1955]); (4) When
the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v. Sosing,
L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957;
unrep.) (6) When the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the same is
contrary to the admissions of both appellate and appellee (Evangelista v. Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil.
401 [1958]);
(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 622 [1970]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as
well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and (10) The finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence
on record (Salazar v. Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).
Petitioner has not endeavored to joint out to Us the existence of any of the above quoted exceptions in this case.
Consequently, the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts must be respected.
And now to the legal issue.
The existing rule is that a breach of promise to marry per se is not an actionable wrong. 17 Congress deliberately
eliminated from the draft of the New Civil Code the provisions that would have made it so. The reason therefor is
set forth in the report of the Senate Committees on the Proposed Civil Code, from which We quote:
The elimination of this chapter is proposed. That breach of promise to marry is not actionable has been definitely
decided in the case of De Jesus vs. Syquia. 18 The history of breach of promise suits in the United States and in
England has shown that no other action lends itself more readily to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous
men. It is this experience which has led to the abolition of rights of action in the so-called Heart Balm suits in many
of the American states. . . . 19
This notwithstanding, the said Code contains a provision, Article 21, which is designed to expand the concept of
torts or quasi-delict in this jurisdiction by granting adequate legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs
which is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the statute books. 20
As the Code Commission itself stated in its Report:
But the Code Commission had gone farther than the sphere of wrongs defined or determined by positive law. Fully
sensible that there are countless gaps in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission has deemed it necessary, in the
interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed Civil Code the following rule:
Art. 23. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: "A" seduces the nineteen-year old daughter of "X". A
promise of marriage either has not been made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present
laws, there is no crime, as the girl is above nineteen years of age. Neither can any civil action for breach of promise
of marriage be filed. Therefore, though the grievous moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and
family have suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring action for damages. But under
the proposed article, she and her parents would have such a right of action.
Thus at one stroke, the legislator, if the forgoing rule is approved, would vouchsafe adequate legal remedy for that
untold number of moral wrongs which it is impossible for human foresight to provide for specifically in the
statutes. 21
Article 2176 of the Civil Code, which defines a quasi-delict thus:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
is limited to negligent acts or omissions and excludes the notion of willfulness or intent. Quasi-delict, known in
Spanish legal treatises as culpa aquiliana, is a civil law concept while torts is an Anglo-American or common law
concept. Torts is much broader than culpa aquiliana because it includes not only negligence, but international
criminal acts as well such as assault and battery, false imprisonment and deceit. In the general scheme of the
Philippine legal system envisioned by the Commission responsible for drafting the New Civil Code, intentional and
malicious acts, with certain exceptions, are to be governed by the Revised Penal Code while negligent acts or
omissions are to be covered by Article 2176 of the Civil Code. 22 In between these opposite spectrums are injurious
acts which, in the absence of Article 21, would have been beyond redress. Thus, Article 21 fills that vacuum. It is
even postulated that together with Articles 19 and 20 of the Civil Code, Article 21 has greatly broadened the scope
of the law on civil wrongs; it has become much more supple and adaptable than the Anglo-American law on torts.
23
In the light of the above laudable purpose of Article 21, We are of the opinion, and so hold, that where a man's
promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to
fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a sexual congress,
proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle scheme or
deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the
award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud and deceit
behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential, however, that
such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
In the instant case, respondent Court found that it was the petitioner's "fraudulent and deceptive protestations of
love for and promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to him and to live with
him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception
on appellant's part that made plaintiff's parents agree to their daughter's living-in with him preparatory to their
supposed marriage." 24 In short, the private respondent surrendered her virginity, the cherished possession of every
single Filipina, not because of lust but because of moral seduction the kind illustrated by the Code Commission
in its example earlier adverted to. The petitioner could not be held liable for criminal seduction punished under
either Article 337 or Article 338 of the Revised Penal Code because the private respondent was above eighteen (18)
years of age at the time of the seduction.
Prior decisions of this Court clearly suggest that Article 21 may be applied in a breach of promise to marry where
the woman is a victim of moral seduction. Thus, in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 25 this Court denied
recovery of damages to the woman because:
. . . we find ourselves unable to say that petitioner is morally guilty of seduction, not only because he is
approximately ten (10) years younger than the complainant who was around thirty-six (36) years of age, and as
highly enlightened as a former high school teacher and a life insurance agent are supposed to be when she
became intimate with petitioner, then a mere apprentice pilot, but, also, because the court of first instance found
that, complainant "surrendered herself" to petitioner because, "overwhelmed by her love" for him, she "wanted to
bind" him by having a fruit of their engagement even before they had the benefit of clergy.
In Tanjanco vs. Court of Appeals, 26 while this Court likewise hinted at possible recovery if there had been moral
seduction, recovery was eventually denied because We were not convinced that such seduction existed. The
following enlightening disquisition and conclusion were made in the said case:
The Court of Appeals seem to have overlooked that the example set forth in the Code Commission's memorandum
refers to a tort upon a minor who had been seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere
sexual intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement,
superior power or abuse of confidence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs.
Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that
To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some sufficient promise or inducement and the woman must yield
because of the promise or other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is from
mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent. Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56) She must be induced to depart from the
path of virtue by the use of some species of arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have
that effect, and which result in her person to ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces of her seducer
(27 Phil. 123).
And in American Jurisprudence we find:
On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion or deception is the essence of the injury;
and a mere proof of intercourse is insufficient to warrant a recovery.
Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual desire of curiosity of the female, and the
defendant merely affords her the needed opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to
allow a recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and would be a reward for
unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be swift to profit. (47 Am. Jur. 662)
xxx xxx xxx
Over and above the partisan allegations, the fact stand out that for one whole year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-
appellee, a woman of adult age, maintain intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse.
Such conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness and mutual passion; for
had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles
of the defendant, she would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting early
fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual relations upon finding that
defendant did not intend to fulfill his defendant did not intend to fulfill his promise. Hence, we conclude that no
case is made under article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of action being alleged, no error was committed
by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the complaint. 27
In his annotations on the Civil Code, 28 Associate Justice Edgardo L. Paras, who recently retired from this Court,
opined that in a breach of promise to marry where there had been carnal knowledge, moral damages may be
recovered:
. . . if there be criminal or moral seduction, but not if the intercourse was due to mutual lust. (Hermosisima vs.
Court of Appeals,
L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960; Estopa vs. Piansay, Jr., L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960; Batarra vs. Marcos, 7 Phil. 56 (sic);
Beatriz Galang vs. Court of Appeals, et al., L-17248, Jan. 29, 1962). (In other words, if the CAUSE be the promise
to marry, and the EFFECT be the carnal knowledge, there is a chance that there was criminal or moral seduction,
hence recovery of moral damages will prosper. If it be the other way around, there can be no recovery of moral
damages, because here mutual lust has intervened). . . .
together with "ACTUAL damages, should there be any, such as the expenses for the wedding presentations (See
Domalagon v. Bolifer, 33 Phil. 471).
Senator Arturo M. Tolentino 29 is also of the same persuasion:
It is submitted that the rule in Batarra vs. Marcos, 30 still subsists, notwithstanding the incorporation of the present
article 31 in the Code. The example given by the Code Commission is correct, if there wasseduction, not
necessarily in the legal sense, but in the vulgar sense of deception. But when the sexual act is accomplished without
any deceit or qualifying circumstance of abuse of authority or influence, but the woman, already of age, has
knowingly given herself to a man, it cannot be said that there is an injury which can be the basis for indemnity.
But so long as there is fraud, which is characterized by willfulness (sic), the action lies. The court, however, must
weigh the degree of fraud, if it is sufficient to deceive the woman under the circumstances, because an act which
would deceive a girl sixteen years of age may not constitute deceit as to an experienced woman thirty years of age.
But so long as there is a wrongful act and a resulting injury, there should be civil liability, even if the act is not
punishable under the criminal law and there should have been an acquittal or dismissal of the criminal case for that
reason.
We are unable to agree with the petitioner's alternative proposition to the effect that granting, for argument's sake,
that he did promise to marry the private respondent, the latter is nevertheless also at fault. According to him, both
parties are in pari delicto; hence, pursuant to Article 1412(1) of the Civil Code and the doctrine laid down in Batarra
vs. Marcos, 32 the private respondent cannot recover damages from the petitioner. The latter even goes as far as
stating that if the private respondent had "sustained any injury or damage in their relationship, it is primarily
because of her own doing, 33 for:
. . . She is also interested in the petitioner as the latter will become a doctor sooner or later. Take notice that she is a
plain high school graduate and a mere employee . . . (Annex "C") or a waitress (TSN, p. 51, January 25, 1988) in a
luncheonette and without doubt, is in need of a man who can give her economic security. Her family is in dire need
of financial assistance. (TSN, pp. 51-53, May 18, 1988). And this predicament prompted her to accept a proposition
that may have been offered by the petitioner. 34
These statements reveal the true character and motive of the petitioner. It is clear that he harbors a condescending, if
not sarcastic, regard for the private respondent on account of the latter's ignoble birth, inferior educational
background, poverty and, as perceived by him, dishonorable employment. Obviously then, from the very beginning,
he was not at all moved by good faith and an honest motive. Marrying with a woman so circumstances could not
have even remotely occurred to him. Thus, his profession of love and promise to marry were empty words directly
intended to fool, dupe, entice, beguile and deceive the poor woman into believing that indeed, he loved her and
would want her to be his life's partner. His was nothing but pure lust which he wanted satisfied by a Filipina who
honestly believed that by accepting his proffer of love and proposal of marriage, she would be able to enjoy a life of
ease and security. Petitioner clearly violated the Filipino's concept of morality and brazenly defied the traditional
respect Filipinos have for their women. It can even be said that the petitioner committed such deplorable acts in
blatant disregard of Article 19 of the Civil Code which directs every person to act with justice, give everyone his
due and observe honesty and good faith in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his obligations.
No foreigner must be allowed to make a mockery of our laws, customs and traditions.
The pari delicto rule does not apply in this case for while indeed, the private respondent may not have been
impelled by the purest of intentions, she eventually submitted to the petitioner in sexual congress not out of lust, but
because of moral seduction. In fact, it is apparent that she had qualms of conscience about the entire episode for as
soon as she found out that the petitioner was not going to marry her after all, she left him. She is not, therefore, in
pari delicto with the petitioner. Pari delicto means "in equal fault; in a similar offense or crime; equal in guilt or in
legal fault." 35 At most, it could be conceded that she is merely in delicto.
Equity often interferes for the relief of the less guilty of the parties, where his transgression has been brought about
by the imposition of undue influence of the party on whom the burden of the original wrong principally rests, or
where his consent to the transaction was itself procured by
fraud. 36
In Mangayao vs. Lasud, 37 We declared:
Appellants likewise stress that both parties being at fault, there should be no action by one against the other (Art.
1412, New Civil Code). This rule, however, has been interpreted as applicable only where the fault on both sides is,
more or less, equivalent. It does not apply where one party is literate or intelligent and the other one is not. (c.f.
Bough vs. Cantiveros, 40 Phil. 209).
We should stress, however, that while We find for the private respondent, let it not be said that this Court condones
the deplorable behavior of her parents in letting her and the petitioner stay together in the same room in their house
after giving approval to their marriage. It is the solemn duty of parents to protect the honor of their daughters and
infuse upon them the higher values of morality and dignity.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the challenged decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED, with
costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Romero and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

# Footnotes
1 Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, 53-62. Per Associate Justice Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, concurred in by Associate
Justices Jose C. Campos, Jr. and Jaime M. Lantin.
2 Annex "A" of Petition; Rollo, 20-22.
3 Annex "B" of Petition; Rollo, 23-24.
4 Annex "C", Id.; Id., 25.
5 Annex "D" of Petition; Rollo, 26-33. Per Judge Antonio M. Belen.
6 Id., 33.
7 Rollo, 31-33.
8 Rollo, 54-55.
9 Exhibit "E" of Petition; Rollo, 34-50.
10 Annex "G", Id.; Id.; 53-62.
11 Rollo, 58-59.
12 Rollo, 61.
13 Id., 11.
14 In support thereof, he cites Despi vs. Aliosco, [CA] 64 O.G.; Wassmer vs. Velez, 12 SCRA 648 [1964];
Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; and Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].
15 People vs. Garcia, 89 SCRA 440 [1979]; People vs. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465 [1979]; People vs. Abejuela, 92
SCRA 503 [1979]; People vs. Arciaga, 98 SCRA 1 [1980]; People vs. Marzan, 128 SCRA 203 [1984]; People vs.
Alcid, 135 SCRA 280 [1985]; People vs. Sanchez, 199 SCRA 414 [1991]; and People vs. Atilano, 204 SCRA 278
[1991].
16 191 SCRA 218 [1990], footnote omitted; see also, Remalante vs. Tibe, 158 SCRA 138 [1988].
17 Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, 109 Phil. 629 [1960]; Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640 [1960].
18 58 Phil. 866 [1933].
19 Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, Thursday, 14 May 1949, 2352.
20 Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 83 SCRA 237 [1978].
21 Report of the Code Commission, 39-40. This passage is quoted, except for the last paragraph, in Tanjanco vs.
Court of Appeals, 18 SCRA 994, 996-997 [1966]; the Article 23 referred to is now Article 21.
22 Report of the Code Commission, 161-162.
23 TOLENTINO, A.M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 72.
24. Rollo, 61.
25. Supra.
26. Supra.
27 At pages 997-999.
28 Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated, vol. I, Eleventh ed., (1984), 91-92.
29 Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 76-77, omitting
footnotes.
30 7 Phil. 156 [1906].
31 Article 21.
32 Supra.
33 Rollo, 16.
34 Id., 16-17.
35 Black's Law Dictionary, Fifth ed., 1004.
36 37 Am Jur 2d, 401, omitting citations.
37 11 SCRA 158 [1964]; see also, Liguez vs. Court of Appeals 102 Phil. 577 [1975].

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-20089 December 26, 1964
BEATRIZ P. WASSMER, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
FRANCISCO X. VELEZ, defendant-appellant.
Jalandoni & Jamir for defendant-appellant.
Samson S. Alcantara for plaintiff-appellee.
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
The facts that culminated in this case started with dreams and hopes, followed by appropriate planning and serious
endeavors, but terminated in frustration and, what is worse, complete public humiliation.
Francisco X. Velez and Beatriz P. Wassmer, following their mutual promise of love, decided to get married and set
September 4, 1954 as the big day. On September 2, 1954 Velez left this note for his bride-to-be:
Dear Bet
Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it. Am leaving on the Convair today.
Please do not ask too many people about the reason why That would only create a scandal.
Paquing
But the next day, September 3, he sent her the following telegram:
NOTHING CHANGED REST ASSURED RETURNING VERY SOON APOLOGIZE MAMA PAPA LOVE .
PAKING
Thereafter Velez did not appear nor was he heard from again.
Sued by Beatriz for damages, Velez filed no answer and was declared in default. Plaintiff adduced evidence before
the clerk of court as commissioner, and on April 29, 1955, judgment was rendered ordering defendant to pay
plaintiff P2,000.00 as actual damages; P25,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages; P2,500.00 as attorney's fees;
and the costs.
On June 21, 1955 defendant filed a "petition for relief from orders, judgment and proceedings and motion for new
trial and reconsideration." Plaintiff moved to strike it cut. But the court, on August 2, 1955, ordered the parties and
their attorneys to appear before it on August 23, 1955 "to explore at this stage of the proceedings the possibility of
arriving at an amicable settlement." It added that should any of them fail to appear "the petition for relief and the
opposition thereto will be deemed submitted for resolution."
On August 23, 1955 defendant failed to appear before court. Instead, on the following day his counsel filed a
motion to defer for two weeks the resolution on defendants petition for relief. The counsel stated that he would
confer with defendant in Cagayan de Oro City the latter's residence on the possibility of an amicable element.
The court granted two weeks counted from August 25, 1955.
Plaintiff manifested on June 15, 1956 that the two weeks given by the court had expired on September 8, 1955 but
that defendant and his counsel had failed to appear.
Another chance for amicable settlement was given by the court in its order of July 6, 1956 calling the parties and
their attorneys to appear on July 13, 1956. This time. however, defendant's counsel informed the court that chances
of settling the case amicably were nil.
On July 20, 1956 the court issued an order denying defendant's aforesaid petition. Defendant has appealed to this
Court. In his petition of June 21, 1955 in the court a quo defendant alleged excusable negligence as ground to set
aside the judgment by default. Specifically, it was stated that defendant filed no answer in the belief that an
amicable settlement was being negotiated.
A petition for relief from judgment on grounds of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, must be duly
supported by an affidavit of merits stating facts constituting a valid defense. (Sec. 3, Rule 38, Rules of Court.)
Defendant's affidavit of merits attached to his petition of June 21, 1955 stated: "That he has a good and valid
defense against plaintiff's cause of action, his failure to marry the plaintiff as scheduled having been due to
fortuitous event and/or circumstances beyond his control." An affidavit of merits like this stating mere conclusions
or opinions instead of facts is not valid. (Cortes vs. Co Bun Kim, L-3926, Oct. 10, 1951; Vaswani vs. P. Tarrachand
Bros., L-15800, December 29, 1960.)
Defendant, however, would contend that the affidavit of merits was in fact unnecessary, or a mere surplusage,
because the judgment sought to be set aside was null and void, it having been based on evidence adduced before the
clerk of court. In Province of Pangasinan vs. Palisoc, L-16519, October 30, 1962, this Court pointed out that the
procedure of designating the clerk of court as commissioner to receive evidence is sanctioned by Rule 34 (now Rule
33) of the Rules of Court. Now as to defendant's consent to said procedure, the same did not have to be obtained for
he was declared in default and thus had no standing in court (Velez vs. Ramas, 40 Phil. 787; Alano vs. Court of First
Instance, L-14557, October 30, 1959).
In support of his "motion for new trial and reconsideration," defendant asserts that the judgment is contrary to law.
The reason given is that "there is no provision of the Civil Code authorizing" an action for breach of promise to
marry. Indeed, our ruling in Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals (L-14628, Sept. 30, 1960), as reiterated in Estopa vs.
Biansay (L-14733, Sept. 30, 1960), is that "mere breach of a promise to marry" is not an actionable wrong. We
pointed out that Congress deliberately eliminated from the draft of the new Civil Code the provisions that would
have it so.
It must not be overlooked, however, that the extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with
impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of said Code provides that "any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage."
The record reveals that on August 23, 1954 plaintiff and defendant applied for a license to contract marriage, which
was subsequently issued (Exhs. A, A-1). Their wedding was set for September 4, 1954. Invitations were printed and
distributed to relatives, friends and acquaintances (Tsn., 5; Exh. C). The bride-to-be's trousseau, party drsrses and
other apparel for the important occasion were purchased (Tsn., 7-8). Dresses for the maid of honor and the flower
girl were prepared. A matrimonial bed, with accessories, was bought. Bridal showers were given and gifts received
(Tsn., 6; Exh. E). And then, with but two days before the wedding, defendant, who was then 28 years old,: simply
left a note for plaintiff stating: "Will have to postpone wedding My mother opposes it ... " He enplaned to his
home city in Mindanao, and the next day, the day before the wedding, he wired plaintiff: "Nothing changed rest
assured returning soon." But he never returned and was never heard from again.
Surely this is not a case of mere breach of promise to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an
actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the above-described preparation and publicity,
only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and
unjustifiably contrary to good customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with
Article 21 aforesaid.
Defendant urges in his afore-stated petition that the damages awarded were excessive. No question is raised as to
the award of actual damages. What defendant would really assert hereunder is that the award of moral and
exemplary damages, in the amount of P25,000.00, should be totally eliminated.
Per express provision of Article 2219 (10) of the New Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable in the cases
mentioned in Article 21 of said Code. As to exemplary damages, defendant contends that the same could not be
adjudged against him because under Article 2232 of the New Civil Code the condition precedent is that "the
defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." The argument is devoid of
merit as under the above-narrated circumstances of this case defendant clearly acted in a "wanton ... , reckless [and]
oppressive manner." This Court's opinion, however, is that considering the particular circumstances of this case,
P15,000.00 as moral and exemplary damages is deemed to be a reasonable award.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, with the above-indicated modification, the lower court's judgment is hereby affirmed,
with costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, and Zaldivar,
JJ.,concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

[ G.R. No. 143130. July 10, 2000]

ELSA NATIVIDAD, et al. vs. RONALD TUNAC, et al.
SECOND DIVISION
Gentlemen:
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 10 2000.
G.R. No. 143130. (Elsa Natividad, et al. vs. Ronald Tunac, et al.)
This case originated in a complaint for damages filed by petitioner Elsa Natividad against respondent Ronald Tunac
for breach of promise to marry. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 81, Quezon City rendered judgment for
petitioner, ordering respondent to pay moral and exemplary damages, but, on appeal, the decision was reversed by
the Court of Appeals. Hence, this petition for review oncertiorari.
It appears that petitioner Elsa Natividad and respondent Ronald Tunac grew up together in Barangay Quiling,
Talisay, Batangas where their respective parents, petitioners Marino and Clarita Natividad and respondent Eusebio
and Elisa Tunac, resided. At age nineteen (19), the two became lovers. One day, Ronald asked Elsa to go with him
to his boarding house in Pasig City to get the bio-data which he needed in connection with his application for
employment. Upon arrival at the boarding house, they found no one there. Ronald asked Elsa to go with him inside
his room and, once inside, started kissing Elsa until he succeeded in making love with her. Elsa cried at the loss of
her virginity, but Ronald appeased her by promising to marry her.
Their intimate relations continued, resulting in Elsa getting pregnant sometime in June 1992. Ronald reassured her,
again promising her marriage. True enough, on October 31, 1992, Ronald and his parents, accompanied by several
relatives numbering twenty in all, went to Elsa's house and asked her parents for the hand of their daughter.
The two families agreed to have the wedding in January 1993 as Elsa's sister had gotten married that year, and they
thought it was not good to have two weddings in a family within the same year. Meanwhile, Elsa started living with
Ronald in the house of the latter's family while waiting for the baby to be born. Unfortunately, on December 19,
1992, Elsa gave birth to a premature baby which died after five (5) hours in the incubator. After Elsa's discharge
from the hospital, the two families decided that Elsa should go back to her parents so her mother could take care of
her during her postnatal period. During said period, Ronald occasionally slept in Elsa's house.
It seems that after Elsa's miscarriage, a marked change in Ronald's attitude towards the former occurred. In January
of 1993, the Natividads confronted the Tunacs. In that meeting, Ronald informed Elsa that he no longer wanted to
get married to her. Hence, this case.
Petitioners succinctly contend they are suing respondents not merely because Elsa became pregnant but because
Ronald reneged on his promise to marry her after their agreement had already been much publicized in their town.
This contention has no merit. As correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, our laws do not provide for a right
to relief for cases arising purely from a breach of one's promise to marry another, the chapter on breach of promise
to marry proposed by the Code Commission having been deleted by Congress in enacting the Civil Code apparently
because of lessons from other countries, particularly the United States and England, that the action readily lends
itself to abuse by designing women and unscrupulous men (Congressional Record, vol. IV, No. 79, 14 May 1949,
2352).
In cases where this Court has allowed moral or exemplary damages arising from similar circumstances, there was
found moral seduction or misrepresentation (Gashem Shookat Basksh v. Court of Appeals (219 SCRA 115 (1993));
Hermosisima v. Court of Appeals (109 Phil. 629 (1960)). InBaksh, it was held -
[T]hat where a man's promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the acceptance of his love by a woman and
his representation to fulfill that promise thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in
a sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that the promise was only a subtle
scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could
justify the award of damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because of the fraud
and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation which followed thereafter. It is essential,
however, that such injury should have been committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs, or public
policy.
(Id., p. 128)
In the case at bar, it is clear that no moral seduction was employed by Ronald, much less by his parents. Form the
narration of the trial court, the evident conclusion is that the two became lovers before they engaged in any sexual
intercourse. Also, the moral seduction contemplated by the Code Commission in drafting Article 21 of the Civil
Code is one where the defendant is in a position of moral ascendancy in relation to the plaintiff. We fail to see any
of these circumstances in this case.
In addition, as the trial court noted, marriage plans were in fact arranged between the families of the parties. That
their relationship turned sour afterwards, or immediately after Elsa's miscarriage, is already beyond the punitive
scope of our laws. This is simply a case of a relationship gone awry.
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) TOMASITA B. MAGAY-DRIS

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
SECOND DIVISION

SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC.,

Petitioner,

- versus -

RRN INCORPORATED,*
Respondent. G.R. No. 172525
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

VELASCO, JR.,**
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,***
PERALTA, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 20, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying that the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated February 22, 2006, affirming the Decision of the Construction
Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC), and the CA Resolution[2] dated April 26, 2006, denying herein
petitioner's motion for reconsideration, be reversed and set aside.
The facts, as accurately narrated in the CA Decision, are as follows.

Petitioner Shinryo (Philippines) Company, Inc. (hereinafter petitioner) is a domestic corporation organized under
Philippine laws. Private respondent RRN Incorporated (hereinafter respondent) is likewise a domestic corporation
organized under Philippine laws.

Respondent filed a claim for arbitration against petitioner before CIAC for recovery of unpaid account which
consists of unpaid portions of the sub-contract, variations and unused materials in the total sum of P5,275,184.17
and legal interest in the amount of P442,014.73. Petitioner filed a counterclaim for overpayment in the amount of
P2,512,997.96.

The parties admitted several facts before the CIAC. It was shown that petitioner and respondent executed an
Agreement and Conditions of Sub-contract (hereafter Agreement signed on June 11, 1996 and June 14, 1996,
respectively. Respondent signified its willingness to accept and perform for petitioner in any of its projects, a part or
the whole of the works more particularly described in Conditions of Sub-Contract and other Sub-contract
documents.

On June 11, 2002, the parties executed a Supply of Manpower, Tools/Equipment, Consumables for the Electrical
Works-Power and Equipment Supply, Bus Duct Installation for the Phillip Morris Greenfield Project (hereafter
Project) covered by Purchase Order Nos. 4501200300-000274 and 4501200300-000275 amounting to
P15,724,000.00 and P9,276,000.00 respectively, or a total amount ofP25,000,000.00. The parties also agreed that
respondent will perform variation orders in the Project. In connection with the Project, petitioner supplied
manpower chargeable against respondent.

Respondent was not able to finish the entire works with petitioner due to financial difficulties. Petitioner paid
respondent a total amount of P26,547,624.76. On June 25, 2005 [should read 2003], respondent, through its former
counsel sent a letter to petitioner demanding for the payment of its unpaid balance amounting to P5,275,184.17.
Petitioner claimed material back charges in the amount ofP4,063,633.43. On September 26, 2003, respondent only
acknowledged P2,371,895.33 as material back charges. Thereafter, on October 16, 2003, respondent sent another
letter to petitioner for them to meet and settle their dispute.

On January 8, 2004, respondent sent another letter to petitioner regarding the cost of equipment rental and the use
of scaffolding. Thereafter, on August 12, 2004, petitioner sent a letter to respondent denying any unpaid account
and the failure in their negotiations for amicable settlement.

On September 3, 2004, respondent, through its new counsel, advised petitioner of their intention to submit the
matter to arbitration. Thereafter, their dispute was submitted to arbitration. During the preliminary conference, the
parties agreed in their Terms of Reference to resolve eight issues, to wit:
1. What should be the basis in evaluating the variation cost?

1.1 How much is the variation cost?

2. Is the Respondent (petitioner in the instant case) justified in charging claimant (herein respondent) the
equipment rental fee and for the use of the scaffoldings? If so, how much should be charged to Claimant?

3. What should be the basis in evaluating the total cost of materials supplied by Respondent to the Project
which is chargeable to Claimant?

3.1 How much is the total cost of materials supply chargeable to Claimant?

4. How much is the value of the remaining works left undone by the Claimant in the project?

5. Is the Claimant's claim for inventory of excess materials valid? If so, how much is the value thereof?

6. Is the Respondent entitled to its claim for an overpayment in the amount of P2,512,997.96?

7. Is Claimant entitled to its claim for interest? If so, how much?

8. Who between the parties shall bear the cost of Arbitration?

The CIAC rendered the assailed decision after the presentation of the parties' evidence. [The dispositive portion of
said decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the claimant and respondent is ordered to pay claimant its
unpaid account in the sum of P3,728,960.54 plus legal interest of 6% reckoned from June 25, 2003 up to the filing
of the case on October 11, 2004 and 12% of P3,728,960.54 from the finality of the judgment until fully paid and
arbitration cost of P104,333.82 representing claimant's share of the arbitration cost which respondent should
reimburse.

SO ORDERED.]

Petitioner accepts the ruling of the CIAC only in Issue No. 1 and Sub-Issue No. 1.1 and in Issue No. 2 in so far as
the amount of P440,000.00 awarded as back charges for the use of scaffoldings. x x x[3]

On February 22, 2006, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision affirming the decision of the CIAC. The CA
upheld the CIAC ruling that petitioner failed to adduce sufficient proof that the parties had an agreement regarding
charges for respondent's use of the manlift. As to the other charges for materials, the CA held that the evidence on
record amply supports the CIAC findings. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of said ruling, but the same was
denied per Resolution dated April 26, 2006.

Hence, this petition where it is alleged that:

I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN

IT DENIED PETITIONER'S CLAIM FOR MANLIFT EQUIPMENT RENTAL IN THE AMOUNT OF
P511,000.00 DESPITE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THAT RESPONDENT RRN ACTUALLY USED AND
BENEFITED FROM THE MANLIFT EQUIPMENT.

II. IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, THE

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD
WITH LAW AND/OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.

III. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN AFFIRMING THE
CIAC AWARD FOR THE VALUE OF INVENTORIED MATERIALS CONSIDERING THAT:

A. RESPONDENT RRN ADMITTED THE VALIDITY OF THE DEDUCTIONS ON ACCOUNT OF MATERIAL

SUPPLY, WHICH INCLUDED THE INVENTORIED MATERIALS.

B. RESPONDENT RRN HAS NO BASIS TO CLAIM BECAUSE ENGR. BONIFACIO ADMITTED THAT
RESPONDENT RRN FAILED TO ESTABLISH WHETHER THE MATERIALS CAME FROM RESPONDENT
RRN OR FROM PETITIONER AND THAT IT WAS PETITIONER THAT ACTUALLY INSTALLED THE SAID
MATERIALS AS PART OF REMAINING WORKS THAT PETITIONER TOOK OVER FROM RESPONDENT
RRN.

C. THE CLAIM FOR THE VALUE OF INVENTORIED MATERIALS IS A DOUBLE CLAIM OR DOUBLE
ENTRY BECAUSE IN THE COMPUTATION OF THE FINAL ACCOUNT, RESPONDENT RRN WAS
CREDITED THE FULL CONTRACT PRICE AND THE COST OF VARIATIONS, WHICH INCLUDED THE
INVENTORIED MATERIALS.

IV. IN RENDERING THE QUESTIONED DECISION AND QUESTIONED RESOLUTION, THE

COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR IN THAT IT COMPLETELY
DISREGARDED THE PROVISION OF THE SUBCONTRACT, WHICH ALLOWED PAYMENT OF ACTUAL
COST INCURRED BY PETITIONER IN COMPLETING THE REMAINING WORKS THAT PRIVATE
RESPONDENT ADMITTEDLY FAILED TO COMPLETE.

V. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT

COMPLETELY DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ON ACTUAL COST INCURRED BY PETITIONER IN
COMPLETING THE REMAINING WORKS.
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT AFFIRMED
THE CIAC AWARD FOR INTERESTS AND ARBITRATION COSTS IN FAVOR OF RESPONDENT RRN.[4]

The petition is bereft of merit.

Despite petitioner's attempts to make it appear that it is advancing questions of law, it is quite clear that what
petitioner seeks is for this Court to recalibrate the evidence it has presented before the CIAC. It insists that its
evidence sufficiently proves that it is entitled to payment for respondent's use of its manlift equipment, and even
absent proof of the supposed agreement on the charges petitioner may impose on respondent for the use of said
equipment, respondent should be made to pay based on the principle of unjust enrichment. Petitioner also questions
the amounts awarded by the CIAC for inventoried materials, and costs incurred by petitioner for completing the
work left unfinished by respondent.

As reiterated by the Court in IBEX International, Inc. v. Government Service Insurance System,[5] to wit:

It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality, especially when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals. In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators are final and conclusive and not
reviewable by this Court on appeal.

This rule, however, admits of certain exceptions. In Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda
Construction and Development Corporation, we said:

In David v. Construction Industry and Arbitration Commission, we ruled that, as exceptions, factual findings of
construction arbitrators may be reviewed by this Court when the petitioner proves affirmatively that: (1) the award
was procured by corruption, fraud or other undue means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption of the
arbitrators or any of them; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and
material to the controversy; (4) one or more of the arbitrators were disqualified to act as such under Section nine of
Republic Act No. 876 and willfully refrained from disclosing such disqualifications or of any other misbehavior by
which the rights of any party have been materially prejudiced; or (5) the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so
imperfectly executed them, that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject matter submitted to them was
not made.

Other recognized exceptions are as follows: (1) when there is a very clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
resulting in lack or loss of jurisdiction as when a party was deprived of a fair opportunity to present its position
before the Arbitral Tribunal or when an award is obtained through fraud or the corruption of arbitrators, (2) when
the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the CIAC, and (3) when a party is deprived of
administrative due process.[6]
A perusal of the records would reveal that none of the aforementioned circumstances, which would justify
exemption of this case from the general rule, are present here. Such being the case, the Court, not being a trier of
facts, is not duty-bound to examine, appraise and analyze anew the evidence presented before the arbitration body.
[7]

Petitioner's reliance on the principle of unjust enrichment is likewise misplaced. The ruling of the Court in
University of the Philippines v. Philab Industries, Inc.[8] is highly instructive, thus:

Unjust enrichment claims do not lie simply because one party benefits from the efforts or obligations of others, but
instead it must be shown that a party was unjustly enriched in the sense that the term unjustly could mean illegally
or unlawfully.

Moreover, to substantiate a claim for unjust enrichment, the claimant must unequivocally prove that another party
knowingly received something of value to which he was not entitled and that the state of affairs are such that it
would be unjust for the person to keep the benefit. Unjust enrichment is a term used to depict result or effect of
failure to make remuneration of or for property or benefits received under circumstances that give rise to legal or
equitable obligation to account for them; to be entitled to remuneration, one must confer benefit by mistake, fraud,
coercion, or request. Unjust enrichment is not itself a theory of reconvey. Rather, it is a prerequisite for the
enforcement of the doctrine of restitution.

Article 22 of the New Civil Code reads:

Every person who, through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.

In order that accion in rem verso may prosper, the essential elements must be present: (1) that the defendant has
been enriched, (2) that the plaintiff has suffered a loss, (3) that the enrichment of the defendant is without just or
legal ground, and (4) that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime or quasi-delict.

An accion in rem verso is considered merely an auxiliary action, available only when there is no other remedy on
contract, quasi-contract, crime, and quasi-delict. If there is an obtainable action under any other institution of
positive law, that action must be resorted to, and the principle of accion in rem verso will not lie.[9]

As found by both the CIAC and affirmed by the CA, petitioner failed to prove that respondent's free use of the
manlift was without legal ground based on the provisions of their contract. Thus, the third requisite, i.e., that the
enrichment of respondent is without just or legal ground, is missing. In addition, petitioner's claim is based on
contract, hence, the fourth requisite that the plaintiff has no other action based on contract, quasi-contract, crime
or quasi-delict is also absent. Clearly, the principle of unjust enrichment is not applicable in this case.
The other issues raised by petitioner all boil down to whether the CIAC or the CA erred in rejecting its claims for
costs of some materials.

Again, these issues are purely factual and cannot be properly addressed in this petition for review on certiorari. In
Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Dynamic Planners and Construction Corp.,[10] it was
emphasized that mathematical computations, the propriety of arbitral awards, claims for other costs and
abandonment are factual questions. Since the discussions of the CIAC and the CA in their respective Decisions
show that its factual findings are supported by substantial evidence, there is no reason why this Court should not
accord finality to said findings. Verily, to accede to petitioner's request for a recalibration of its evidence, which had
been thoroughly studied by both the CIAC and the CA would result in negating the objective of Executive Order
No. 1008, which created an arbitration body to ensure the prompt and efficient settlement of disputes in the
construction industry. Thus, the Court held in Uniwide Sales Realty and Resources Corporation v. Titan-Ikeda
Construction and Development Corporation,[11] that:

x x x The Court will not review the factual findings of an arbitral tribunal upon the artful allegation that such body
had "misapprehended facts" and will not pass upon issues which are, at bottom, issues of fact, no matter how
cleverly disguised they might be as "legal questions." The parties here had recourse to arbitration and chose the
arbitrators themselves; they must have had confidence in such arbitrators. The Court will not, therefore, permit the
parties to relitigate before it the issues of facts previously presented and argued before the Arbitral Tribunal, save
only where a clear showing is made that, in reaching its factual conclusions, the Arbitral Tribunal committed an
error so egregious and hurtful to one party as to constitute a grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack or loss of
jurisdiction.[12]

As discussed above, there is nothing in the records that point to any grave abuse of discretion committed by the
CIAC.

The awards for interests and arbitration costs are, likewise, correct as they are in keeping with prevailing
jurisprudence.[13]

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February
22, 2006 and its Resolution dated April 26, 2006 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Second Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

________________________________________
* The Court of Appeals, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, the Honorable Beda G. Fajardo, Joel J.
Marciano and Guillermo Claridad, in their capacities as Chairman and Member of the Arbitral Tribunal, who were
initially included as respondents in the petition should not be included as such pursuant to Section 4, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court.
** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per raffle dated
October 20, 2010.
*** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad, per Special Order No. 905,
dated October 5, 2010.
[1] Penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr., with Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Vicente Q.
Roxas, concurring; rollo, pp. 66-76..
[2] Id. at 78-79.
[3] Id. at 66-69.
[4] Id. at 17-19.
[5] G.R. No. 162095, October 12, 2009, 603 SCRA 306.
[6] Id. at 314-315. (Emphasis supplied.)
[7] Diesel Construction v. UPSI Property Holdings, Inc. G.R. No. 154885, March 24, 2008, 549 SCRA 12,
30.
[8] 482 Phil. 693 (2004)
[9] Id. at 709-711. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
[10] G.R. Nos. 169408 & 170144, April 30, 2008, 553 SCRA 541, 558, 565, 568.
[11] G.R. No. 126619, December 20, 2006 (quoting David v. Construction Industry Arbitration Commission,
479 Phil. 578 [2004]), 511 SCRA 335.
[12] Id. at 362.
[13] See Hanjin Heavy Industries and Construction Co., Ltd. v. Dynamic Planners and Construction Corp., supra
note 10, at 576.
THIRD DIVISION

CAR COOL PHILIPPINES, INC., G.R. No. 138088

represented in this act by its
President and General Manager Present:
VIRGILIO DELA ROSA, Quisumbing, J.,
Petitioner, Chairman,
Carpio,
Carpio Morales, and
- versus - Tinga, JJ.
USHIO REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT Promulgated:
CORPORATION,
Respondent. January 23, 2006
x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case
This is a petition for review[1] of the Decision[2] dated 13 August 1998 and the Resolution dated 10 March 1999 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43134. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of
the trial court by ordering the payment of P18,000 monthly rental starting 19 December 1995 until Car Cool
Philippines, Inc. vacates the premises.

The Facts

On 19 December 1995, Ushio Realty and Development Corporation (USHIO Realty) filed an ejectment case
against Car Cool Philippines, Inc. (CAR COOL) to recover possession of a parcel of land (property) located at No.
72 (137) Quezon Avenue, corner Victory Avenue, Quezon City.

USHIO Realty alleges that the former owners of the property, Spouses Hector and Gloria Hizon Lopez (Spouses
Lopez), leased the property to CAR COOL since 1972. In 1990, the Spouses Lopez and CAR COOL executed a
written lease agreement over the property for two years. On 16 August 1992, on the expiration of the written lease
agreement, the Spouses Lopez allowed CAR COOL to continue occupying the property upon payment of monthly
rentals. Later, a verbal month-to-month lease agreement continued until 31 August 1995. On 15 June 1995, Hector
Lopez wrote CAR COOL to inform it of his intention to sell the property. Hector Lopez gave CAR COOL the
option to buy the property before offering the same to other prospective buyers. CAR COOL failed to respond to
the offer. On 28 June 1995, Hector Lopez terminated the verbal lease agreement and gave CAR COOL until 31
August 1995 to vacate the property. In his subsequent letters dated 22 July, 1 August and 12 August 1995, Hector
Lopez reiterated his demand for CAR COOL to vacate the property. CAR COOL allegedly ignored the demands to
vacate the property and continued to occupy the same.
In a letter dated 31 August 1995, USHIO Realty informed CAR COOL that it had purchased the property from the
Spouses Lopez. USHIO Realty gave CAR COOL another 30 days from 31 August 1995 to vacate the property.
CAR COOL failed to respond to the demand letter and continued to occupy the property. On 3 December 1995,
USHIO Realty sent a final demand to CAR COOL, giving it a non-extendible 15 days within which to vacate the
property. CAR COOL refused to vacate the property, prompting USHIO Realty to file the complaint for ejectment
on 19 December 1995.

CAR COOL, on the other hand, alleges that USHIO Realty was aware of the lease agreement between CAR COOL
and the former owner, Hector Lopez. According to CAR COOL, on 20 January 1995, Hector Lopez agreed to
renew the lease for another two years to cover the period from 1 January 1995 to December 1996, for a monthly
rental of P18,000 and an additional security deposit of P216,000. In compliance with the agreement to renew the
lease, CAR COOL claims that it paid in advance to Hector Lopez P205,200 representing the monthly rentals for the
period from 1 January 1995 to 31 December 1995. CAR COOL also claims to have paid in advance P205,200
covering monthly rentals for the period from 1 January 1996 to 31 December 1996, plus P216,000 as additional
security deposit for 1 January 1996 to 1 January 1997. Upon his receipt of the advance rentals and security deposit,
Hector Lopez allegedly promised to execute a written contract of lease for two years covering the period from 1
January 1995 to 31 December 1996.

CAR COOL further alleges that USHIO Realty, despite its knowledge of the lease agreement, still demanded that
CAR COOL vacate the property on the ground that USHIO Realty had already bought the property from the
Spouses Lopez. On 1 October 1995, USHIO Realty allegedly broke into the leased premises, demolished the
improvements on the premises, and threatened and inflicted bodily injuries upon two employees of CAR COOL.
Virgilio de la Rosa, CAR COOLs President and General Manager, was able to enter the leased premises the
following day and found some personal items missing. On 9 October 1995, CAR COOL filed a complaint-affidavit
against the agents and representative of USHIO Realty for robbery with force upon things and malicious mischief.
[3] CAR COOL later amended the complaint-affidavit to include the charge of grave coercion.[4]

On 21 November 1995, CAR COOL filed a complaint for specific performance and damages with the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint sought to compel Hector Lopez to execute a written lease contract for
the period from 1 January 1995 until 31 December 1996 and for USHIO Realty to be bound by the contract.

On 19 June 1996, the Metropolitan Trial Court rendered a decision in the ejectment case in favor of USHIO Realty.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff USHIO Realty
Development Corporation and against the defendant CAR COOL Philippines, Inc. represented by President and
General Manager Virgilio dela Rosa as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant and all persons claiming right under her to surrender the possession of the premises to
the plaintiff and vacate therefrom;
2. Ordering the defendant to pay plaintiff the amount of P18,000.00 per month as reasonable compensation for
the use of the premises beginning October 1995 and every month thereafter until the premises is finally vacated;

3. Defendant to pay plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as and by way of attorneys fees; and

4. Defendant to pay [the] cost.

SO ORDERED.[5]

CAR COOL appealed to the Regional Trial Court. On 28 October 1996, the Regional Trial Court rendered its
decision affirming the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision with the modification that the payment of
P18,000 monthly rental should start from 19 December 1995 until CAR COOL finally vacates the property. The
Court of Appeals held that CAR COOLs possession of the property became unlawful only on 19 December 1995,
upon receipt of the demand to vacate the property and CAR COOLs refusal to surrender possession.[6]

On 15 September 1998, CAR COOL filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied. Hence,
the instant petition.

The Issue

CAR COOL raises the sole issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages by way of rentals and
attorneys fees in favor of USHIO.[7]

The Ruling of the Court

We find the petition partly meritorious.

Award of damages in the form of rentals

CAR COOL asserts that to award damages to USHIO Realty would constitute unjust enrichment at the expense of
CAR COOL. CAR COOL claims that it never benefited from its occupation of the property after USHIO Realtys
agents entered the property on 1 October 1995 and unlawfully destroyed CAR COOLs office, equipment and spare
parts. Because of the destruction of the equipment and spare parts needed to operate its business, CAR COOL
asserts that it was no longer possible to continue its business operations.[8]

We are not convinced.

Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, which governs the rule on ejectment (forcible entry and unlawful detainer),
provides under Sections 17 and 19 that:
Sec. 17. Judgment. If after trial the court finds that the allegations of the complaint are true, it shall render judgment
in favor of the plaintiff for the restitution of the premises, the sum justly due as arrears of rent or as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the premises, attorneys fees and costs. If it finds that said allegations
are not true, it shall render judgment for the defendant to recover his costs. If a counterclaim is established, the
court shall render judgment for the sum found in arrears from either party and award costs as justice requires.
(Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 19. Immediate execution of judgment; how to stay same. If judgment is rendered against the defendant,
execution shall issue immediately upon motion, unless an appeal has been perfected and the defendant to stay
execution files a sufficient supersedeas bond, approved by the Municipal Trial Court and executed in favor of the
plaintiff to pay the rents, damages, and costs accruing down to the time of the judgment appealed from, and unless,
during the pendency of the appeal, he deposits with the appellate court the amount of rent due from time to time
under the contract, if any, as determined by the judgment of the Municipal Trial Court. In the absence of a contract,
he shall deposit with the Regional Trial Court the reasonable value of the use and occupation of the premises for the
preceding month or period at the rate determined by the judgment of the lower court on or before the tenth day of
each succeeding month or period. The supersedeas bond shall be transmitted by the Municipal Trial Court, with the
other papers, to the clerk of the Regional Trial Court to which the action is appealed. (Emphasis supplied)

xxx

In this case, there is no dispute on the ownership of the property. An Absolute Deed of Sale dated 14 September
1995 shows that the Spouses Lopez sold the property to USHIO Realty.[9] On 19 September 1995, the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City issued a Transfer Certificate of Title for the property in the name of USHIO Realty.[10] On 3
December 1995, USHIO Realty sent a final demand to CAR COOL, giving it a non-extendible 15 days within
which to vacate the property. When CAR COOL still refused to vacate the property, USHIO Realty filed the
complaint for ejectment on 19 December 1995.

USHIO Realty, as the new owner of the property, has a right to physical possession of the property.[11] Since CAR
COOL deprived USHIO Realty of its property, CAR COOL should pay USHIO Realty rentals as reasonable
compensation for the use and occupation of the property.

Contrary to CAR COOLs allegations, the payment of damages in the form of rentals for the property does not
constitute unjust enrichment. The Court of Appeals held:

x x x [T]he alleged payment by the petitioner as rentals were given to the former owner (Lopez) and not to the
private respondent who was not privy to the transaction. As a matter of fact, it never benefited financially from the
alleged transaction. Aside from that, the postdated checks the private respondent admitted to have received, as
rental payments for September to December 1995, were never encashed. On the contrary, the private respondent
even offered to return the same to the petitioner, but was refused. [T]herefore, it did not amount to payment.[12]
We have held that [t]here is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or
when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good
conscience.[13] Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that [e]very person who through an act of performance by
another, or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just
or legal ground, shall return the same to him. The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two
conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at
anothers expense or damage.[14]

There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such benefit. Under Section 17
of Rule 70 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, USHIO Realty has the legal right to receive some amount as reasonable
compensation for CAR COOLs occupation of the property.[15] Thus, in Benitez v. Court of Appeals,[16] we held
that:

xxx Damages are recoverable in ejectment cases under Section 8, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court. These
damages arise from the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages which private
respondents may have suffered but which have no direct relation to their loss of material possession. Damages in
the context of Section 8, Rule 70 is limited to rent or fair market value for the use and occupation of the property.

The Metropolitan Trial Court and the Regional Trial Court assessed against CAR COOL the amount of P18,000 per
month as reasonable compensation for CAR COOLs use of the property. Both trial courts held that the P18,000
monthly payment should run from October 1995 until CAR COOL vacates the property. The Court of Appeals
sustained the P18,000 monthly rental but held that the start of payment should be from 19 December 1995 until
CAR COOL vacates the property.
The records show that CAR COOL already vacated the property on 18 November 1996. The Sheriff of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City certified that on 18 November 1996, he turned over the possession of the property to
USHIO Realty.[17] Thus, the P18,000 monthly rental for the use of the property should run from 19 December
1995 until 18 November 1996 or a period of 11 months. Therefore, the total amount due as reasonable
compensation for the use of the property is P198,000.[18] The trial court established this amount with reasonable
accuracy or certainty because the trial court based this amount on the latest monthly rental CAR COOL paid the
previous owner of the property.[19] Accordingly, this amount should earn interest at 6 percent per annum from 19
November 1996 until finality of this decision, after which the accrued interest, together with the P198,000, shall
earn interest at 12 percent per annum until full payment.[20]

Attorneys Fees

We cannot sustain the award of attorneys fees. The Court of Appeals failed to state explicitly in its decision the
basis for the award of attorneys fees. The award of attorneys fees is the exception rather than the rule and the court
must state explicitly the legal reason for the award of attorneys fees.[21] In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. CA,
[22] we held that:

The general rule is that attorneys fees cannot be recovered as part of damages because of the policy that no
premium should be placed on the right to litigate. They are not to be awarded every time a party wins a suit. The
power of the court to award attorneys fees under Article 2208 demands factual, legal, and equitable justification.
Even when a claimant is compelled to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his rights, still
attorneys fees may not be awarded where no sufficient showing of bad faith could be reflected in a partys
persistence in a case other than an erroneous conviction of the righteousness of his cause.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision dated 13 August 1998 and the Resolution dated 10 March 1999 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 43134 with the MODIFICATIONthat the P18,000 monthly rental for the use
of the property should run from 19 December 1995 until 18 November 1996, aggregating P198,000. This amount
shall earn 6 percent interest per annum from 19 November 1996 until finality of this decision, after which the
accrued interest, together with the P198,000, shall earn interest at 12 percent per annum until full payment. We
delete the award of attorneys fees. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

________________________________________
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Bernardo LL. Salas, with Associate Justices Minerva G. Reyes and Angelina
Sandoval-Gutierrez concurring.
[3] Rollo, pp. 139-140.
[4] Ibid., pp. 141-149.
[5] Ibid., p. 287.
[6] Ibid., pp. 45-57.
[7] Ibid., p. 28.

[8] Ibid., pp. 31-32.

[9] Ibid., pp. 182-184.
[10] Ibid., pp. 185-186.
[11] See Macasaet v. Macasaet, G.R. Nos. 154391-92, 30 September 2004, 439 SCRA 625.

[12] Ibid., p. 56.

[13] Reyes v. Lim, G.R. No. 134241, 11 August 2003, 408 SCRA 560.
[14] 1 J. VITUG, CIVIL LAW 30 (2003).
[15] See Asian Transmission Corporation v. Canlubang Sugar Estates, G.R. No. 142383, 29 August 2003,

410 SCRA 202; Shoemart, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86956, 1 October 1990, 190 SCRA 189.
[16] G.R. No. 104828, 16 January 1997, 266 SCRA 242.
[17] Records, pp. 580-581.
[18] P18,000 x 11 = P198,000.
[19] Article 2213 of the Civil Code reads: Interest cannot be recovered upon unliquidated claims or damages,
except when the demand can be established with reasonable certainty.
[20] Consing v. Court Appeals, G.R. No. 143584, 10 March 2004, 425 SCRA 192.
[21] Filipinas Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Ago Medical and Educational Center-Bicol Christian College of
Medicine (AMEC-BCCM), G.R. 141994, 17 January 2005, 448 SCRA 413 citing Inter-Asia Investment Ind., Inc. v.

Court of Appeals, 451 Phil. 554 (2003); Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, 3 June 2004, 430
SCRA 492.
[22] 361 Phil. 499 (1999).
Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 181995 July 16, 2012
BIBIANO C. ELEGIR, Petitioner,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set aside the
Decision1 dated August 6, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 79111, which reversed and set
aside the Decision2 dated March 18, 2002 and Order3 dated June 30, 2003 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-08-06135-97 and NLRC NCR CA No. 015030-98.
Factual Antecedents
As culled from the records, the instant case stemmed from the following factual antecedents:
Petitioner Bibiano C. Elegir (petitioner) was hired by Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) as a commercial pilot,
specifically designated as HS748 Limited First Officer, on March 16, 1971.4
In 1995, PAL embarked on a refleeting program and acquired new and highly sophisticated aircrafts. Subsequently,
it sent an invitation to bid to all its flight deck crew, announcing the opening of eight (8) B747-400 Captain
positions that were created by the refleeting program. The petitioner, who was then holding the position of A-300
Captain, submitted his bid and was fortunately awarded the same.5 The petitioner, together with seven (7) other
pilots, was sent for training at Boeing in Seattle, Washington, United States of America on May 8, 1995, to acquire
the necessary skills and knowledge in handling the new aircraft. He completed his training on September 19, 1995.6
On November 5, 1996, after rendering twenty-five (25) years, eight (8) months and twenty (20) days of continuous
service, the petitioner applied for optional retirement authorized under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA)
between PAL and the Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines (ALPAP), in which he was a member of good standing. In response, PAL asked him to reconsider his
decision, asseverating that the company has yet to recover the full value of the costs of his training. It warned him
that if he leaves PAL before he has rendered service for at least three (3) years, it shall be constrained to deduct the
costs of his training from his retirement pay.7
On November 6, 1996, the petitioner went on terminal leave for thirty (30) days and thereafter made effective his
retirement from service. Upon securing his clearance, however, he was informed that the costs of his training will
be deducted from his retirement pay, which will be computed at the rate of P 5,000.00 per year of service. The
petitioner, through his counsel, sent PAL a correspondence, asserting that his retirement benefits should be based on
the computation stated in Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7641, and that the
costs of his training should not be deducted therefrom. In its Reply dated August 4, 1997, PAL refused to yield to
the petitioners demand and maintained that his retirement pay should be based on PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan of
1967 (PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan) and that he should reimburse the company with the proportionate costs of his
training. Thus, on August 27, 1997, the petitioner filed a complaint for non-payment of retirement pay, moral
damages, exemplary damages and attorneys fees against PAL.8
On February 6, 1998, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision,9the pertinent portions of which read:
From the foregoing, it is manifestly clear that an employees retirement benefits under any collective bargaining
agreement shall not be less than those provided under the New Retirement Pay Law and if such benefits are less,
the employee shall pay the difference between the amount due the employee and that provided under the CBA or
individual agreement or retirement plan (Par. 3.2, Sec. 3, rules Implementing the New Retirement Pay Law).
Thus, applying the pertinent CBA provision in correlation with the New Retirement Pay Law, complainant should
receive the following amount, to wit:
22.5 x 26 yrs. x P138,447.00= P2,700,301.50
If we were to follow the PALs computation of petitioners retirement pay, the latters retirement benefits in the
amount of P125,000.00 based on Section 2, Article VII of the Retirement Plan of the CBA at P5,000.00 per every
year of service would be much less than his monthly salary of P138,477.00 at the time of his retirement. This was
never envisioned by the law. Instead, it is the clear intention of our law makers to provide a bigger and better
retirement pay or benefits under existing laws and/or existing CBA or other agreements.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we find PAL liable to the petitioner for the payment of his retirement
benefits as follows:
Retirement Benefits
(22.5 x 26 years x P138,477.00) P 2,700,301.50
Accrued Trip Leave 760,299.37
Accrued Vacation Leave 386,546.44
1996 Unutilized days off 105,089.46
Nov. 96 Prod. Allow. (net) 1,726.92
Unpaid Salary 12/1/-5/96 22,416.65
1996 w/tax refund 2,464.42
13th month backpay for the year
1988-1991 171,262.50
TOTAL ________________________________________P 4,150,106.20
plus legal interest of 12% per annum from November 06, 1996.
Finally, ten percent (10%) of all sums owing to petitioner is hereby adjudged as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.10
The LA ratiocinated that PAL had no right to withhold the payment of the petitioners retirement benefits simply
because he retired from service before the lapse of three (3) years. To begin with, there was no document
evidencing the fact that the petitioner was required to stay with PAL for three (3) years from the completion of his
training or that he was bound to reimburse the company of the costs of his training should he retire from service
before the completion of the period. The LA likewise dismissed the theory espoused by PAL that the petitioners
submission of his bid for the new position which necessarily requires training created an innominate contract of du
ut facias between him and the company since their relationship is governed by the CBA between the management
and the ALPAP.11
On appeal, the NLRC took a different stance and modified the decision of the LA in its Decision dated March 18,
2002, which pertinently states:
Considering that [petitioner] was only fifty-two (52) years when he opted to retire on November 6, 1996, he was,
strictly, not yet qualified to receive the benefits provided under said Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by
R.A. 7641. However, petitioner is eligible for retirement under the CBA between respondent PAL and ALPAP, as he
had already served for more than 25 years with said respondent. This is covered by the provision in the first
paragraph of Article 287 of the Labor Code which states that an employee may be retired upon reaching the
retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract,
inasmuch as the CBA in question does not provide for any retirement age, but limited itself to the number of years
of service or flying hours of the employee concerned. Consequently, anytime that an employee of respondent PAL
reaches twenty (20) years of service or 20,000 (flying) hours as a pilot of PAL, then his age at that precise time
would be considered as the retirement age, as far as he is concerned.
The retirement benefits of petitioner should, therefore, be computed in accordance with both Article 287 of the
Labor Code and the Retirement Plan in the CBA of PAL and ALPAP.
On the second issue, we rule that petitioner is under obligation to reimburse a portion of the expenses incurred for
his training as B747-400 Captain.
It would be grossly unfair and unjust to PAL if the petitioner would be allowed to reap the fruits of this training,
which upgraded his knowledge and skills that would enable him to demand higher pay, if he would not be made to
return said benefits in the form of service for a reasonable period of time, say three (3) years as PALs company
policy demands. x x x
xxxx
Thus, with the adjudged reimbursement for training expenses of P921,281.71 (sic), the awards due to petitioner
shall be, as follows:
Retirement Pay (P138,477.00 divided by 2 times 26) - P1,800,201.00
Service Incentive Leave (P138,477.00 divided by 30 x 5) - 23,074.50
Accrued Trip Leave - 386,546.44
13th Month Pay - 138,477.00
1996 Unutilized days off - 105,089.48
Nov. 1996 Productive Allowance (net) - 1,726.92
Unpaid salary 12/1-5/96 - 22,416.63
1996 w/ tax refund - 2,464.42
TOTAL - [P] 2,479.996.39
LESS:
Reimbursement of training expenses 981,281.71
1996 13thmonth pay overpayment 19,837.16
1996 Christmas bonus overpayment 11,539.75
PESALA 567.93
TOTAL - 1,013,226.55
RETIREMENT PAY STILL PAYABLE - [P] 1,466,769.81
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the Labor Arbiter should be MODIFIED by increasing the
awards to the petitioner to ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED SIXTY SIX THOUSAND SEVEN HUNDRED
SIXTY-NINE and 84/100 (P1,466,769.84) PESOS as computed above.
SO ORDERED.12
Both PAL and petitioner filed their respective motions for partial reconsideration from the decision of the NLRC. In
its Motion for Partial Reconsideration,13 PAL asseverated that the decision of the NLRC, directing the computation
of the petitioners retirement benefits based on Article 287 of the Labor Code, instead of the CBA, was inconsistent
with the disposition of this Court in Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines.14 It
emphasized that in said case, this Court sustained PALs position and directed the payment of retirement benefits of
the complainant pilot in accordance with the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan. However, in an Order15 dated June 30,
2003, the NLRC denied PALs motion for reconsideration.
Unyielding, PAL filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. In said petition, PAL emphasized that the petitioners
case should be decided in light of the ruling in Philippine Airlines, Inc., where this Court held that the computation
of the retirement pay of a PAL pilot who retired before reaching the retirement age of sixty (60) should be based on
the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan or at the rate of P5,000.00 for every year of service.16
In its Decision dated August 6, 2007, the CA ruled that the petitioners retirement pay should be computed in
accordance with PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan and the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan as was held in
Philippine Airlines, Inc. It held, thus:
The present case squarely falls within the state of facts upon which the ruling in Philippine Airlines, Inc., vs. Airline
Pilots Association of the Philippines was enunciated. Petitioner herein applies for retirement at an age below 60. A
distinction was made between a pilot who retires at the age of sixty and another who retires earlier. The Supreme
Court was explicit when it declared:
"A pilot who retires after twenty years of service or after flying 20,000 hours would still be in the prime of his life
and at the peak of his career, compared to one who retires at the age of 60 years old."
Furthermore, petitioner would not be getting less if his retirement pay is computed on the PAL-ALPAP retirement
plan rather than the formula provided by the Labor Code. Petitioner did not refute that he already got retirement
benefits from another retirement plan the PAL
Pilots Retirement Plan. It appearing that the retirement benefits amounting to P1,800,201.00 being the main bone of
contention herein, this Court proceeds to compute the balance of Capt. Elegirs retirement benefits as follows:
Retirement Pay (P5,000 x 25 years) P125,000.00
Trip Leave Pay 757,564.04
Vacation Leave Pay 385,155.76
1996 Unutilized Day-Off 104,711.38
Productivity Allowance for 1996 1,726.92
Unpaid Salary for December 1-5, 1996 22,335.00
1996 Withholding Tax Refund 2,464.42
________________________________________P1,398,957.52
Less Accountabilities:
Training Cost P981,281.71
1996 13th Month Pay Overpayment 19,837.16
1996 Christmas Bonus 11,539.75
PESALA 567.93
________________________________________ 1,013,226.55
________________________________________
BALANCE P 385,730.97
pursuant to the ruling in G.R. No. 143686.
xxxx
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of public respondent dated March 18, 2002 and its Order
of June 30, 2003 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The retirement benefits of petitioner Capt. Bibiano Elegir shall
be based on the 1967 PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan andthe PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan and the balance still
due him, pegged at P385,730.97.
SO ORDERED.17 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied in a Resolution18 dated February 21,
2008. Aggrieved, the petitioner appealed to this Court.
Essentially, we are called upon to rule on the following issues:
1. Whether the petitioners retirement benefits should be computed based on Article 287 of the Labor Code or on
PALs retirement plans;
2. Whether the petitioner should reimburse PAL with the proportionate costs of his training; and
3. Whether interest should be imposed on the monetary award in favor of the petitioner.
The Ruling of this Court
The petitioners retirement pay should be computed based on PALs retirement plans.
The petitioner maintains that it is Article 287 of the Labor Code which should be applied in the computation of his
retirement pay since the same provides for higher benefits. He contends that the CA erroneously resorted to the
ruling in Philippine Airlines, Inc. since the circumstances in the said case, which led this Court to rule in favor of
the applicability of PALs retirement plans in computing retirement benefits, are unavailing in the present case.
Specifically, he pointed out that the pilot in Philippine Airlines, Inc. retired at the age of forty-five (45), while he
opted to retire at fifty-two (52). He further emphasized that the ruling was anchored on a finding that the retirement
benefits that the pilot would get under Article 287 of the Labor Code are less than those he would get under PALs
retirement plans.19
Apparently, the petitioner failed to appreciate the heart behind the ruling in Philippine Airlines, Inc. To recapitulate,
the case stemmed from PALs unilateral act of retiring airline pilot Captain Albino Collantes (Collantes) under the
authority of Section 2, Article VII of the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan. Thereafter, ALPAP filed a Notice of Strike
with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), asseverating that the retirement of Collantes constituted
illegal dismissal and union busting. The Secretary of Labor assumed jurisdiction and eventually upheld PALs
action of retiring Collantes as a valid exercise of its option under Section 2, Article VII of the PAL-ALPAP
Retirement Plan. It further directed for the computation of Collantes retirement benefits on the basis of Article 287
of the Labor Code.20 Acting on Collantes petition for certiorari, the CA held that the pilots retirement benefits
should be based on Article 287 of the Labor Code and not on the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan. On appeal to this
Court, we reversed the CA and ruled that Collantes retirement benefits should be computed based on the PAL-
ALPAP Retirement Plan and the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan and not on Article 287 of the Labor Code
since the benefits under the two (2) plans are substantially higher than the latter. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the petition is GRANTED. The March 2, 2000 Decision and the June
19, 2000 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54403 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Order of the Secretary of Labor in NCMB-NCR-N.S. 12-514-97 dated June 13, 1998, is MODIFIED as follows:
The retirement benefits to be awarded to Captain Albino Collantes shall be based on the 1967 PAL-ALPAP
Retirement Plan and the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan. The directive contained in subparagraph (2) of the
dispositive portion thereof, which required petitioner to consult the pilot involved before exercising its option to
retire him, is DELETED. The said Order is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.21 (Emphasis supplied)
It bears reiterating that there are only two retirement schemes at point in this case: (1) Article 287 of the Labor
Code, and; (2) the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan and the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan. The two retirement
schemes are alternative in nature such that the retired pilot can only be entitled to that which provides for superior
benefits.
Article 287 of the Labor Code states:
Art. 287. Retirement. - Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age established in the collective
bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned
under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements: provided, however, that an
employees retirement benefits under any collective bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those
provided herein.
In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement plan providing for retirement benefits of employees in the
establishment, an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years
which is hereby declared as the compulsory retirement age, who has served at least five (5) years in the said
establishment, may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary
for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.
Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one-half (1/2) month salary shallmean fifteen (15) days
plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service
incentive leaves. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
It can be clearly inferred from the language of the foregoing provision that it is applicable only to a situation where
(1) there is no CBA or other applicable employment contract providing for retirement benefits for an employee, or
(2) there is a CBA or other applicable employment contract providing for retirement benefits for an employee, but it
is below the requirement set by law. The rationale for the first situation is to prevent the absurd situation where an
employee, deserving to receive retirement benefits, is denied them through the nefarious scheme of employers to
deprive employees of the benefits due them under existing labor laws. On the other hand, the second situation aims
to prevent private contracts from derogating from the public law.22
The primary application of existing CBA in computing retirement benefits is implied in the title of R.A. No. 7641
which amended Article 287 of the Labor Code. The complete title of R.A. No. 7641 reads: "An Act Amending
Article 287 of Presidential Decree No. 442, As Amended, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines,
By Providing for Retirement Pay to Qualified Private Sector in the Absence of Any Retirement Plan in the
Establishment."23
Emphasis must be placed on the fact that the purpose of the amendment is not merely to establish precedence in
application or accord blanket priority to existing CBAs in computing retirement benefits. The determining factor in
choosing which retirement scheme to apply is still superiority in terms of benefits provided. Thus, even if there is
an existing CBA but the same does not provide for retirement benefits equal or superior to that which is provided
under Article 287 of the Labor Code, the latter will apply. In this manner, the employee can be assured of a
reasonable amount of retirement pay for his sustenance.
Consistent with the purpose of the law, the CA correctly ruled for the computation of the petitioners retirement
benefits based on the two (2) PAL retirement plans because it is under the same that he will reap the most benefits.
Under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan, the petitioner, who qualified for late retirement after rendering more than
twenty (20) years of service as a pilot, is entitled to a lump sum payment of P125,000.00 for his twenty-five (25)
years of service to PAL. Section 2, Article VII of the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan provides:
Section 2. Late Retirement. Any member who remains in the service of the company after his normal retirement
date may retire either at his option or at the option of the Company, and when so retired he shall be entitled either:
(a) to a lump sum payment of P5,000.00 for each completed year of service rendered as a pilot, or (b) to such
termination pay benefits to which he may be entitled under existing laws, whichever is the greater amount.24
Apart from the abovementioned benefit, the petitioner is also entitled to the equity of the retirement fund under PAL
Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan, which pertains to the retirement fund raised from contributions exclusively from
PAL of amounts equivalent to 20% of each pilots gross monthly pay. Each pilot stands to receive the full amount of
the contribution upon his retirement which is equivalent to 240% of his gross monthly income for every year of
service he rendered to PAL. This is in addition to the amount of not less than P100,000.00 that he shall receive
under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan.25
In sum, therefore, the petitioner will receive the following retirement benefits:
(1) P125,000.00 (25 years x P5,000.00) for his 25 years of service to PAL under the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan,
and;
(2) 240% of his gross monthly salary for every year of his employment or, more specifically, the summation of
PALs monthly contribution of an amount equivalent to 20% of his actual monthly salary, under the PAL Pilots
Retirement Benefit Plan.
As stated in the records, the petitioner already received the amount due to him under the PAL Pilots Retirement
Benefit Plan.26 As much as we would like to demonstrate with specificity the amount of the petitioners entitlement
under said plan, we are precluded from doing so because there is no record of the petitioners salary, including
increments thereto, attached to the records of this case. To reiterate, the benefit under the PAL Pilots Retirement
Benefit Plan pertains to the totality of PALs monthly contribution for every pilot, which amounts to 20% of the
actual monthly salary. Necessarily, the computation of this benefit requires a record of the petitioners salary, which
was unfortunately not submitted by either of the parties. At any rate, the petitioner did not dispute the fact that he
already received his entitlement under the PAL Pilots Retirement Benefit Plan nor did he question the propriety of
the amount tendered. Thus, we can reasonably assume that he received the rightful amount of his entitlement under
the plan.
On the other hand, under Article 287 of the Labor Code, the petitioner would only be receiving a retirement pay
equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) of his monthly salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6)
months being considered as one whole year. To stress, one-half (1/2) month salary means 22.5 days: 15 days plus
2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for service incentive
leave.27
Comparing the benefits under the two (2) retirement schemes, it can readily be perceived that the 22.5 days worth
of salary for every year of service provided under Article 287 of the Labor Code cannot match the 240% of salary
or almost two and a half worth of monthly salary per year of service provided under the PAL Pilots Retirement
Benefit Plan, which will be further added to the P125,000.00 to which the petitioner is entitled under the PAL-
ALPAP Retirement Plan. Clearly then, it is to the petitioners advantage that PALs retirement plans were applied in
the computation of his retirement benefits.
The petitioner should reimburse PAL with the costs of his training.
As regards the issue of whether the petitioner should be obliged to reimburse PAL with the costs of his training, the
ruling in Almario v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.28 is controlling. Essentially, in the mentioned case, this Court
recognized the right of PAL to recoup the costs of a pilots training in the form of service for a period of at least
three (3) years. This right emanated from the CBA between PAL and ALPAP, which must be complied with good
faith by the parties. Thus:
"The CBA is the law between the contracting parties the collective bargaining representative and the employer-
company. Compliance with a CBA is mandated by the expressed policy to give protection to labor. In the same
vein, CBA provisions should be "construed liberally rather than narrowly and technically, and the courts must place
a practical and realistic construction upon it, giving due consideration to the context in which it is negotiated and
purpose which it is intended to serve." This is founded on the dictum that a CBA is not an ordinary contract but one
impressed with public interest. It goes without saying, however, that only provisions embodied in the CBA should
be so interpreted and complied with. Where a proposal raised by a contracting party does not find print in the CBA,
it is not a part thereof and the proponent has no claim whatsoever to its implementation."
In N.S. Case No. 11-506-87, "In re Labor Dispute at the Philippine Airlines, Inc.," the Secretary of the Department
of Labor and Employment (DOLE), passing on the failure of PAL and ALPAP to agree on the terms and conditions
for the renewal of their CBA which expired on December 31, 1987 and construing Section 1 of Article XXIII of the
1985-1987 CBA, held:
xxxx
Section 1, Article XXIII of the 1985-1987 CBA provides:
Pilots fifty-five (55) years of age or over who have not previously qualified in any Company turbo-jet aircraft shall
not be permitted to bid into the Companys turbo-jet operations. Pilots fifty-five (55) years of age or over who have
previously qualified in the companys turbo-jet operations may be by-passed at Company option, however, any such
pilot shall be paid the by-pass pay effective upon the date a junior pilot starts to occupy the bidded position.
x x x PAL x x x proposed to amend the provision in this wise:
The compulsory retirement age for all pilots is sixty (60) years. Pilots who reach the age of fifty-five (55) years and
over without having previously qualified in any Company turbo-jet aircraft shall not be permitted to occupy any
position in the Companys turbo-jet fleet. Pilots fifty-four (54) years of age and over are ineligible for promotion to
any position in Group I. Pilots reaching the age of fifty-five (55) shall be frozen in the position they currently
occupy at that time and shall be ineligible for any further movement to any other positions.
PALs contention is basically premised on prohibitive training costs. The return on this investment in the form of the
pilot promoted is allegedly five (5) years. Considering the pilots age, the chances of full recovery are asserted to be
quite slim.
ALPAP opposed the proposal and argued that the training cost is offset by the pilots maturity, expertise and
experience.
By way of compromise, we rule that a pilot should remain in the position where he is upon reaching age fifty-seven
(57), irrespective of whether or not he has previously qualified in the Companys turbo-jet operations. The rationale
behind this is that a pilot who will be compulsorily retired at age sixty (60) should no longer be burdened with
training for a new position. But if a pilot is only at age fifty-five (55), and promotional positions are available, he
should still be considered and promoted if qualified, provided he has previously qualified in any company turbo-jet
aircraft. In the latter case, the prohibitive training costs are more than offset by the maturity, expertise, and
experience of the pilot.
Thus, the provision on age limit should now read:
Pilots fifty-seven (57) years of age shall be frozen in their positions.1wphi1 Pilots fifty-five (55) [sic] years of age
provided they have previously qualified in any company turbo-jet aircraft shall be permitted to occupy any position
in the companys turbo-jet fleet.29 (Citations omitted and emphasis supplied)
Further, we considered PALs act of sending its crew for training as an investment which expects an equitable return
in the form of service within a reasonable period of time such that a pilot who decides to leave the company before
it is able to regain the full value of the investment must proportionately reimburse the latter for the costs of his
training. We ratiocinated:
It bears noting that when Almario took the training course, he was about 39 years old, 21 years away from the
retirement age of 60. Hence, with the maturity, expertise, and experience he gained from the training course, he was
expected to serve PAL for at least three years to offset "the prohibitive costs" thereof.
The pertinent provision of the CBA and its rationale aside, contrary to Almarios claim, Article 22 of the Civil Code
which reads:
"Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him,"
applies.
This provision on unjust enrichment recognizes the principle that one may not enrich himself at the expense of
another. An authority on Civil Law writes on the subject, viz:
"Enrichment of the defendant consists in every patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is
appreciable in money. It may consist of some positive pecuniary value incorporated into the patrimony of the
defendant, such as: (1) the enjoyment of a thing belonging to the plaintiff; (2) the benefits from service rendered by
the plaintiff to the defendant; (3) the acquisition of a right, whether real or personal; (4) the increase of value of
property of the defendant; (5) the improvement of a right of the defendant, such as the acquisition of a right of
preference; (6) the recognition of the existence of a right in the defendant; and (7) the improvement of the
conditions of life of the defendant.
x x x x"
Admittedly, PAL invested for the training of Almario to enable him to acquire a higher level of skill, proficiency, or
technical competence so that he could efficiently discharge the position of A-300 First Officer. Given that, PAL
expected to recover the training costs by availing of Almarios services for at least three years. The expectation of
PAL was not fully realized, however, due to Almarios resignation after only eight months of service following the
completion of his training course. He cannot, therefore, refuse to reimburse the costs of training without violating
the principle of unjust enrichment.30 (Citation omitted and emphasis supplied)
After perusing the records of this case, we fail to find any significant fact or circumstance that could warrant a
departure from the established jurisprudence. The petitioner admitted that as in Almario, the prevailing CBA
between PAL and ALPAP at the time of his retirement incorporated the same stipulation in Section 1, Article XXIII
of the 1985-1987 CBA31 which provides:
Pilots fifty-seven (57) years of age shall be frozen in their positions. Pilots fifty-five (55) [sic] years of age provided
they have previously qualified in any company turbo-jet aircraft shall be permitted to occupy any position in the
companys turbo-jet fleet.32
As discussed in Almario, the above provision initially set the age of fifty-five (55) years as the reckoning point
when a pilot becomes disqualified to bid for a higher position. The age of disqualification was set at 55 years old to
enable PAL to fully recover the costs of the pilots training within a period of five (5) years before the pilot reaches
the compulsory retirement age of sixty (60). The DOLE Secretary however lowered the age to fifty-seven (57),
thereby cutting the supposed period of recovery of investment to three (3) years. The DOLE Secretary justified the
amendment in that the "prohibitive training costs are more than offset by the maturity, expertise and the experience
of the pilot."33
By carrying over the same stipulation in the present CBA, both PAL and ALPAP recognized that the companys
effort in sending pilots for training abroad is an investment which necessarily expects a reasonable return in the
form of service for a period of at least three (3) years. This stipulation had been repeatedly adopted by the parties in
the succeeding renewals of their CBA, thus validating the impression that it is a reasonable and acceptable term to
both PAL and ALPAP. Consequently, the petitioner cannot conveniently disregard this stipulation by simply raising
the absence of a contract expressly requiring the pilot to remain within PALs employ within a period of 3 years
after he has been sent on training. The supposed absence of contract being raised by the petitioner cannot stand as
the CBA clearly covered the petitioners obligation to render service to PAL within 3 years to enable it to recoup the
costs of its investment.
Further, to allow the petitioner to leave the company before it has fulfilled the reasonable expectation of service on
his part will amount to unjust enrichment. Pertinently, Article 22 of the New Civil Code states:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him.
There is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the loss of another, or when a person retains
the money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity and good conscience. Two
conditions must concur: (1) a person is unjustly benefited; and (2) such benefit is derived at the expense of or with
damages to another. The main objective of the principle of unjust enrichment is to prevent one from enriching
oneself at the expense of another. It is commonly accepted that this doctrine simply means that a person shall not be
allowed to profit or enrich himself inequitably at anothers expense.34 The enrichment may consist of a
patrimonial, physical, or moral advantage, so long as it is appreciable in money.35 It must have a correlative
prejudice, disadvantage or injury to the plaintiff which may consist, not only of the loss of the property or the
deprivation of its enjoyment, but also of the non-payment of compensation for a prestation or service rendered to
the defendant without intent to donate on the part of the plaintiff, or the failure to acquire something what the latter
would have obtained.36
As can be gathered from the facts, PAL invested a considerable amount of money in sending the petitioner abroad
to undergo training to prepare him for his new appointment as B747-400 Captain. In the process, the petitioner
acquired new knowledge and skills which effectively enriched his technical know-how. As all other investors, PAL
expects a return on investment in the form of service by the petitioner for a period of 3 years, which is the estimated
length of time within which the costs of the latters training can be fully recovered. The petitioner is, thus, expected
to work for PAL and utilize whatever knowledge he had learned from the training for the benefit of the company.
However, after only one (1) year of service, the petitioner opted to retire from service, leaving PAL stripped of a
necessary manpower.
Undeniably, the petitioner was enriched at the expense of PAL. After undergoing the training fully shouldered by
PAL, he acquired a higher level of technical competence which, in the professional realm, translates to a higher
compensation. To prove this point, his monthly salary of P125,692.00 was increased to P131,703.00 while he was
still undergoing training. After his training, his salary was further increased to P137,977.00.37 Further, his training
broadened his opportunities for a better employment as in fact he was able to transfer to another airline company
immediately after he left PAL.38 To allow the petitioner to simply leave the company without reimbursing it for the
proportionate amount of the expenses it incurred for his training will only magnify the financial disadvantage
sustained by PAL. Reason and fairness dictate that he must return to the company a proportionate amount of the
costs of his training.
Award of interest not warranted under the circumstances.
The petitioner claims that the CA should have imposed interest on the monetary award in his favor. To support his
claim, he cited the case of Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,39 where this Court summarized the
rules in the imposition of the proper interest rates:
I. When an obligation, regardless of its source, i.e., law, contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts or quasi-delicts is
breached, the contravenor can be held liable for damages. The provisions under Title XVIII on "Damages" of the
Civil Code govern in determining the measure of recoverable damages.
II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages, the rate of
interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of
money, the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due
shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation, the rate of
interest shall be 12% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and
subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code.
2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached, an interest on the amount of
damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however,
shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages except when or until the demand can be established with
reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established with reasonable certainty, the interest shall
begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code) but when such
certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest shall begin to run only
from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to
have been reasonably ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case, be on the
amount finally adjudged.
3. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest,
whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 12% per annum from such finality until its
satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit.40 (Citations
omitted and emphasis supplied)
The petitioner, however, took the foregoing guidelines out of context and entertained a misplaced supposition that
all judgments which include a monetary award must be imposed with interest. The jurisprudential guideline clearly
referred to breach of an obligation consisting of a forbearance of money, goods or credit before the imposition of a
legal interest of 12% can be warranted. Such essential element is nowhere to be found in the facts of this case. Even
granting that an interest of 6% may be imposed in cases of breached obligations not constituting loan or forbearance
of money, loan or credit, such depends upon the discretion of the court. If at all, the monetary award in favor of the
petitioner will earn legal interest from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until the same is fully
satisfied, regardless of the nature of the breached obligation. The imposition is justified considering that the interim
period from the finality of judgment, awarding a monetary claim and until payment thereof, is deemed to be
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.41
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 6, 2007
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79111 is AFFIRMED. The Labor Arbiter is hereby DIRECTED to
compute Bibiano C. Elegir's retirement pay based on the 1967 PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan and the PAL Pilots'
Retirement Benefit Plan, crediting Philippine Airlines, Inc. for the amount it had already paid the petitioner under
the mentioned plans.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate justice
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Cout1's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Senior Associate Justice
(Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as Amended)

Footnotes
1 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo
(now a member of this Court) and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; rollo, pp. 29-37.
2 Penned by Presiding Commissioner Roy V. Seeres, with Commissioners Vicente S.E. Veloso (inhibited) and
Alberto R. Quimpo, concurring; id. at 111-125.
3 Penned by Presiding Commissioner Roy V. Seeres, with Commissioners Romeo L. Go and Vicente S.E. Veloso
(inhibited), concurring; id. at 137.
4 Id. at 70.
5 Id. at 50-51.
6 Id.
7 Id. at 71.
8 Id. at 41-42.
9 Id. at 70-77.
10 Id. at 74-77.
11 Id. at 75-76.
12 Id. at 121-124.
13 Id. at 126-131.
14 424 Phil. 356 (2002).
15 Rollo, pp. 137-138.
16 Id. at 149.
17 Id. at 35-37.
18 Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok, with Associate Justices Mariano C. del Castillo
(now a member of this Court) and Romeo F. Barza, concurring; id. at 39.
19 Id. at 16-17.
20 Supra note 14, at 359.
21 Id. at 365.
22 Obusan v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. 181178, July 26, 2010, 625 SCRA 542, citing Oxales v.
United Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 152991, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 26, 42.

23 Oxales v. United Laboratories, Inc., G.R. No. 152991, July 21, 2008, 559 SCRA 26, 45.
24 Rollo, p. 119.
25 Supra note 14, at 363.
26 Rollo, p. 36.
27 Capitol Wireless, Inc. v. Confesor, 332 Phil. 78, 89 (1996).
28 G.R. No. 170928, September 11, 2007, 532 SCRA 614.
29 Id. at 623-625, citing Samahang Manggagawa sa Top Form Mfg. v. NLRC, 356 Phil. 480, 490-491 (1998).
30 Id. at 627-628, citing Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I, pp. 80-81, 83, 2nd Ed.
31 Id. at 625.
32 Id. at 624.
33 Id.
34 Grandteq Industrial Steel Products, Inc. v. Margallo, G.R. No. 181393, July 28, 2009, 594 SCRA 223,

238, citing Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 74, 96.
35 Tolentino, CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE, Vol. I, p. 78.
36 Id. at 80.
37 Rollo, p. 91.
38 Id. at 93.
39 G.R. No. 97412, July 12, 1994, 234 SCRA 78.
40 Id. at 95-97.
41 Suatengco v. Reyes, G.R. No. 162729, December 17, 2008, 574 SCRA 187.
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation
________________________________________

Today is Wednesday, August 24, 2016

________________________________________
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 195670 December 3, 2012
WILLEM BEUMER, Petitioner,
vs.
AVELINA AMORES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of CoLlli assailing the October
8, 2009 Decision2 and January 24, 2011 Resolution3 of the court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940,
which affirmed the February 28, 2007 Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Branch 34
in Civil Case No. I 2884. The foregoing rulings dissolved the conjugal partnership of gains of Willem Beumer
(petitioner) and Avelina Amores (respondent) and distributed the properties forming part of the said property
regime.
The Factual Antecedents
Petitioner, a Dutch National, and respondent, a Filipina, married in March 29, 1980. After several years, the RTC of
Negros Oriental, Branch 32, declared the nullity of their marriage in the Decision5 dated November 10, 2000 on the
basis of the formers psychological incapacity as contemplated in Article 36 of the Family Code.
Consequently, petitioner filed a Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership6 dated December 14, 2000 praying
for the distribution of the following described properties claimed to have been acquired during the subsistence of
their marriage, to wit:
By Purchase:
a. Lot 1, Block 3 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 22846, containing an area of 252 square meters (sq.m.), including a residential house
constructed thereon.
b. Lot 2142 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21974, containing an area of 806 sq.m., including a
residential house constructed thereon.
c. Lot 5845 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 21306, containing an area of 756 sq.m.
d. Lot 4, Block 4 of the consolidated survey of Lots 2144 & 2147 of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No.
21307, containing an area of 45 sq.m.
By way of inheritance:
e. 1/7 of Lot 2055-A of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23567, containing an area of 2,635 sq.m. (the
area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 376.45 sq.m.).
f. 1/15 of Lot 2055-I of the Dumaguete Cadastre, covered by TCT No. 23575, containing an area of 360 sq.m. (the
area that appertains to the conjugal partnership is 24 sq.m.).7
In defense,8 respondent averred that, with the exception of their two (2) residential houses on Lots 1 and 2142, she
and petitioner did not acquire any conjugal properties during their marriage, the truth being that she used her own
personal money to purchase Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 out of her personal funds and Lots 2055-A and 2055-I by way
of inheritance.9 She submitted a joint affidavit executed by her and petitioner attesting to the fact that she purchased
Lot 2142 and the improvements thereon using her own money.10 Accordingly, respondent sought the dismissal of
the petition for dissolution as well as payment for attorneys fees and litigation expenses.11
During trial, petitioner testified that while Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 were registered in the name of respondent,
these properties were acquired with the money he received from the Dutch government as his disability
benefit12since respondent did not have sufficient income to pay for their acquisition. He also claimed that the joint
affidavit they submitted before the Register of Deeds of Dumaguete City was contrary to Article 89 of the Family
Code, hence, invalid.13
For her part, respondent maintained that the money used for the purchase of the lots came exclusively from her
personal funds, in particular, her earnings from selling jewelry as well as products from Avon, Triumph and
Tupperware.14 She further asserted that after she filed for annulment of their marriage in 1996, petitioner
transferred to their second house and brought along with him certain personal properties, consisting of drills, a
welding machine, grinders, clamps, etc. She alleged that these tools and equipment have a total cost of
P500,000.00.15
The RTC Ruling
On February 28, 2007, the RTC of Negros Oriental, Branch 34 rendered its Decision, dissolving the parties
conjugal partnership, awarding all the parcels of land to respondent as her paraphernal properties; the tools and
equipment in favor of petitioner as his exclusive properties; the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 as co-
owned by the parties, the dispositive of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered granting the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains between
petitioner Willem Beumer and respondent Avelina Amores considering the fact that their marriage was previously
annulled by Branch 32 of this Court. The parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. 22846,
21974, 21306, 21307, 23567 and 23575 are hereby declared paraphernal properties of respondent Avelina Amores
due to the fact that while these real properties were acquired by onerous title during their marital union, Willem
Beumer, being a foreigner, is not allowed by law to acquire any private land in the Philippines, except through
inheritance.
The personal properties, i.e., tools and equipment mentioned in the complaint which were brought out by Willem
from the conjugal dwelling are hereby declared to be exclusively owned by the petitioner.
The two houses standing on the lots covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 21974 and 22846 are hereby
declared to be co-owned by the petitioner and the respondent since these were acquired during their marital union
and since there is no prohibition on foreigners from owning buildings and residential units. Petitioner and
respondent are, thereby, directed to subject this court for approval their project of partition on the two houses
aforementioned.
The Court finds no sufficient justification to award the counterclaim of respondent for attorneys fees considering
the well settled doctrine that there should be no premium on the right to litigate. The prayer for moral damages are
likewise denied for lack of merit.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.16
It ruled that, regardless of the source of funds for the acquisition of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4, petitioner could not
have acquired any right whatsoever over these properties as petitioner still attempted to acquire them
notwithstanding his knowledge of the constitutional prohibition against foreign ownership of private lands.17 This
was made evident by the sworn statements petitioner executed purporting to show that the subject parcels of land
were purchased from the exclusive funds of his wife, the herein respondent.18 Petitioners plea for reimbursement
for the amount he had paid to purchase the foregoing properties on the basis of equity was likewise denied for not
having come to court with clean hands.
The CA Ruling
Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA, contesting only the RTCs award of Lots 1, 2142, 5845 and 4 in favor of
respondent. He insisted that the money used to purchase the foregoing properties came from his own capital funds
and that they were registered in the name of his former wife only because of the constitutional prohibition against
foreign ownership. Thus, he prayed for reimbursement of one-half (1/2) of the value of what he had paid in the
purchase of the said properties, waiving the other half in favor of his estranged ex-wife.19
On October 8, 2009, the CA promulgated a Decision20 affirming in toto the judgment rendered by the RTC of
Negros Oriental, Branch 34. The CA stressed the fact that petitioner was "well-aware of the constitutional
prohibition for aliens to acquire lands in the Philippines."21 Hence, he cannot invoke equity to support his claim for
reimbursement.
Consequently, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the CA Decision due to the
following error:
UNDER THE FACTS ESTABLISHED, THE COURT ERRED IN NOT SUSTAINING THE PETITIONERS
ATTEMPT AT SUBSEQUENTLY ASSERTING OR CLAIMING A RIGHT OF HALF OR WHOLE OF THE
PURCHASE PRICE USED IN THE PURCHASE OF THE REAL PROPERTIES SUBJECT OF THIS CASE.22
(Emphasis supplied)
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
The issue to be resolved is not of first impression. In In Re: Petition For Separation of Property-Elena Buenaventura
Muller v. Helmut Muller23 the Court had already denied a claim for reimbursement of the value of purchased
parcels of Philippine land instituted by a foreigner Helmut Muller, against his former Filipina spouse, Elena
Buenaventura Muller. It held that Helmut Muller cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is
clear that he willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the prohibition against foreign ownership of
Philippine land24 enshrined under Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which reads:
Section 7. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to
individuals, corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.
Undeniably, petitioner openly admitted that he "is well aware of the above-cited constitutional prohibition"25 and
even asseverated that, because of such prohibition, he and respondent registered the subject properties in the latters
name.26 Clearly, petitioners actuations showed his palpable intent to skirt the constitutional prohibition. On the
basis of such admission, the Court finds no reason why it should not apply the Muller ruling and accordingly, deny
petitioners claim for reimbursement.
As also explained in Muller, the time-honored principle is that he who seeks equity must do equity, and he who
comes into equity must come with clean hands. Conversely stated, he who has done inequity shall not be accorded
equity. Thus, a litigant may be denied relief by a court of equity on the ground that his conduct has been
inequitable, unfair and dishonest, or fraudulent, or deceitful.27
In this case, petitioners statements regarding the real source of the funds used to purchase the subject parcels of
land dilute the veracity of his claims: While admitting to have previously executed a joint affidavit that respondents
personal funds were used to purchase Lot 1,28 he likewise claimed that his personal disability funds were used to
acquire the same. Evidently, these inconsistencies show his untruthfulness. Thus, as petitioner has come before the
Court with unclean hands, he is now precluded from seeking any equitable refuge.
In any event, the Court cannot, even on the grounds of equity, grant reimbursement to petitioner given that he
acquired no right whatsoever over the subject properties by virtue of its unconstitutional purchase. It is well-
established that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly which, because of
public policy, cannot be done directly.29 Surely, a contract that violates the Constitution and the law is null and
void, vests no rights, creates no obligations and produces no legal effect at all.30 Corollary thereto, under Article
1412 of the Civil Code,31 petitioner cannot have the subject properties deeded to him or allow him to recover the
money he had spent for the purchase thereof. The law will not aid either party to an illegal contract or agreement; it
leaves the parties where it finds them.32 Indeed, one cannot salvage any rights from an unconstitutional transaction
knowingly entered into.
Neither can the Court grant petitioners claim for reimbursement on the basis of unjust enrichment.33 As held in
Frenzel v. Catito, a case also involving a foreigner seeking monetary reimbursement for money spent on purchase
of Philippine land, the provision on unjust enrichment does not apply if the action is proscribed by the Constitution,
to wit:
Futile, too, is petitioner's reliance on Article 22 of the New Civil Code which reads:
Art. 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or comes into
possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to
him.1wphi1
The provision is expressed in the maxim: "MEMO CUM ALTERIUS DETER DETREMENTO PROTEST" (No
person should unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another). An action for recovery of what has been paid
without just cause has been designated as an accion in rem verso. This provision does not apply if, as in this case,
the action is proscribed by the Constitution or by the application of the pari delicto doctrine. It may be unfair and
unjust to bar the petitioner from filing an accion in rem verso over the subject properties, or from recovering the
money he paid for the said properties, but, as Lord Mansfield stated in the early case of Holman v. Johnson: "The
objection that a contract is immoral or illegal as between the plaintiff and the defendant, sounds at all times very ill
in the mouth of the defendant. It is not for his sake, however, that the objection is ever allowed; but it is founded in
general principles of policy, which the defendant has the advantage of, contrary to the real justice, as between him
and the plaintiff."34 (Citations omitted)
Nor would the denial of his claim amount to an injustice based on his foreign citizenship.35 Precisely, it is the
Constitution itself which demarcates the rights of citizens and non-citizens in owning Philippine land. To be sure,
the constitutional ban against foreigners applies only to ownership of Philippine land and not to the improvements
built thereon, such as the two (2) houses standing on Lots 1 and 2142 which were properly declared to be co-owned
by the parties subject to partition. Needless to state, the purpose of the prohibition is to conserve the national
patrimony36 and it is this policy which the Court is duty-bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the assailed October 8, 2009 Decision and January 24, 2011
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 01940 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R T I F I C AT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo. pp. 11-25.
2 Penned by Acting Executive Justice Franchito N. Diamante, with Associate Justices Edgarclo L. Delos Santos and
Samuel II. Gaerlan, concurring. Id. at 26-38.
3 Penned by Associate Justice Edgardo L. Delos Santos, with Associate Justices Agnes Reyes-Carpio and Eduardo
B. Peralta, Jr., concurring. Id. at 45-46.
4 Penned by Judge Rosendo B. Bandal, Jr. Id. at 80-86.
5 See Annex "E" of the Petition. Penned by Judge Eleuterio E. Chiu (Civil Case No. 11754). Id. at 53-62.
6 Annex "E" of the Petition. Id. at 47-52.
7 Id. at 48-49a.
8 See attached as Annex "E" of the Petitioner. Respondents Answer. Id. at 76-79.
9 Id. at 76.
10 Id. at 79.
11 Id. at 77.
12 Id. at 81.
13 Id. at 82.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id. at 85-86.
17 Id. at 84, citing Cheesman v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74833, January 21, 1991, 193 SCRA
93, 103.
18 Id.
19 Id. at 91.
20 Id. at 26-38.
21 Id. at 33.
22 Id. at 17.
23 G.R. No. 149615, August 29, 2006, 500 SCRA 65.
24 Id. at 72.
25 Rollo, p. 17.
26 Id. at 18.
27 Supra note 23 at 73, citing University of the Philippines v. Catungal, Jr., 338 Phil. 728, 734-744 (1997).
28 Id. at 82.
29 Frenzel v. Catito, G.R. No. 143958, July 11, 2003, 406 SCRA 55, 70.
30 Id. at 69-70, citing Chavez s. Presidential Commission on Good Government, 307 SCRA 394 (1998).
31 Re: Art. 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal offense,
the following rules shall be observed:
(1) When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by virtue of the
contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking
xxxx
32 Id., citing Rellosa v. Hun, 93 Phil. 827 (1953).
33 Rollo, p. 20.
34 Supra note 29 at 74, citing I. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines (1990 ), p. 85 and Marissey v. Bologna,
123 So. 2d 537 (1960).
35 Rollo, pp. 19-21.
36 See Krivenko v. Register of Deeds. 79 Phil. 461 (1947).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

________________________________________

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
A.M. No. MTJ-92-721 September 30, 1994

JUVY N. COSCA, EDMUNDO B. PERALTA, RAMON C. SAMBO, and APOLLO A.

VILLAMORA, complainants,
vs.
HON. LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR., Presiding Judge, and NELIA B. ESMERALDA-BAROY, Clerk of
Court II, both of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, respondents.

Esteban R. Abonal for complainants.

Haide B. Vista-Gumba for respondents.

PER CURIAM, J.:

Complainants Juvy N. Cosca, Edmundo B. Peralta, Ramon C. Sambo, and Apollo Villamora, are Stenographer I,
Interpreter I, Clerk II, and Process Server, respectively, of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondents Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy are respectively the Presiding Judge and
Clerk of Court II of the same court.

In an administrative complaint filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on October 5, 1992, herein
respondents were charged with the following offenses, to wit: (1) illegal solemnization of marriage; (2) falsification
of the monthly reports of cases; (3) bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court; (4) non-issuance of
receipt for cash bond received; (5) infidelity in the custody of detained prisoners; and (6) requiring payment of
filing fees from exempted entities. 1

Pursuant to a resolution issued by this Court respondents filed their respective Comments. 2 A Reply to Answers of
Respondents was filed by complainants. 3 The case was thereafter referred to Executive Judge David C. Naval of
the Regional Trial Court, Naga City, for investigation report and recommendation. The case was however
transferred to First Assistant Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona when Judge Naval inhibited himself for the reason
that his wife is a cousin of respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. 4

The contending versions of the parties regarding the factual antecedents of this administrative matter, as culled from
the records thereof, are set out under each particular charge against respondents.

1. Illegal solemnization of marriage

Complainants allege that respondent judge solemnized marriages even without the requisite marriage license. Thus,
the following couples were able to get married by the simple expedient of paying the marriage fees to respondent
Baroy, despite the absence of a marriage license, viz.: Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin, Francisco Selpo and
Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Gacer, Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga, Arsenio Sabater and
Margarita Nacario, and Sammy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte. As a consequence, their marriage contracts (Exhibits B,
C, D, F, G, and A, respectively) did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, respondent judge did not
sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he allegedly had
to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar. Complainant Ramon Sambo, who
prepares the marriage contracts, called the attention of respondents to the lack of marriage licenses and its effect on
the marriages involved, but the latter opted to proceed with the celebration of said marriages.

Respondent Nelia Baroy claims that when she was appointed Clerk of Court II, the employees of the court were
already hostile to her, especially complainant Ramon Sambo who told her that he was filing a protest against her
appointment. She avers that it was only lately when she discovered that the court had a marriage Register which is
in the custody of Sambo; that it was Sambo who failed to furnish the parties copies of the marriage contract and to
register these with the local civil registrar; and that apparently Sambo kept these marriage contracts in preparation
for this administrative case. Complainant Sambo, however, claims that all file copies of the marriage contracts were
kept by respondent Baroy, but the latter insists that she had instructed Sambo to follow up the submission by the
contracting parties of their marriage licenses as part of his duties but he failed to do so.

Respondent Judge Palaypayon, Jr. contends that the marriage between Alano P. Abellano and Nelly Edralin falls
under Article 34 of the Civil Code, hence it is exempt from the marriage license requirement; that he gave strict
instructions to complainant Sambo to furnish the couple a copy of the marriage contract and to file the same with
the civil registrar, but the latter failed to do so; that in order to solve the problem, the spouses subsequently
formalized their marriage by securing a marriage license and executing their marriage contract, a copy of which
was filed with the civil registrar; that the other five marriages alluded to in the administrative complaint were not
illegally solemnized because the marriage contracts were not signed by him and they did not contain the date and
place of marriage; that copies of these marriage contracts are in the custody of complainant Sambo; that the alleged
marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido, Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor, Renato Gamay and
Maricris Belga, and of Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario were not celebrated by him since he refused to
solemnize them in the absence of a marriage license; that the marriage of Samy Bocaya and Gina Bismonte was
celebrated even without the requisite license due to the insistence of the parties in order to avoid embarrassment to
their guests but that, at any rate, he did not sign their marriage contract which remains unsigned up to the present.

2. Falsification of monthly report for July, 1991 regarding the number of marriages solemnized and
the number of documents notarized.

It is alleged that respondent judge made it appear that he solemnized seven (7) marriages in the month of July,
1992, when in truth he did not do so or at most those marriages were null and void; that respondents likewise made
it appear that they have notarized only six (6) documents for July, 1992, but the Notarial Register will show that
there were one hundred thirteen (113) documents which were notarized during that month; and that respondents
reported a notarial fee of only P18.50 for each document, although in fact they collected P20.00 therefor and failed
to account for the difference.

Respondent Baroy contends, however, that the marriage registry where all marriages celebrated by respondent
judge are entered is under the exclusive control and custody of complainant Ramon Sambo, hence he is the only
one who should be held responsible for the entries made therein; that the reported marriages are merely based on
the payments made as solemnization fees which are in the custody of respondent Baroy. She further avers that it is
Sambo who is likewise the custodian of the Notarial Register; that she cannot be held accountable for whatever
alleged difference there is in the notarial fees because she is liable only for those payments tendered to her by
Sambo himself; that the notarial fees she collects are duly covered by receipts; that of the P20.00 charged, P18.50 is
remitted directly to the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Development Fund and P150 goes to the general
fund of the Supreme Court which is paid to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent
theorizes that the discrepancies in the monthly report were manipulated by complainant Sambo considering that he
is the one in charge of the preparation of the monthly report.

Respondent Judge Palaypayon avers that the erroneous number of marriages celebrated was intentionally placed by
complainant Sambo; that the number of marriages solemnized should not be based on solemnization fees paid for
that month since not all the marriages paid for are solemnized in the same month. He claims that there were actually
only six (6) documents notarized in the month of July, 1992 which tallied with the official receipts issued by the
clerk of court; that it is Sambo who should be held accountable for any unreceipted payment for notarial fees
because he is the one in charge of the Notarial Register; and that this case filed by complainant Sambo is merely in
retaliation for his failure to be appointed as the clerk of court. Furthermore, respondent judge contends that he is not
the one supervising or preparing the monthly report, and that he merely has the ministerial duty to sign the same.

3. Bribery in consideration of an appointment in the court

Complainants allege that because of the retirement of the clerk of court, respondent judge forwarded to the Supreme
Court the applications of Rodel Abogado, Ramon Sambo, and Jessell Abiog. However, they were surprised when
respondent Baroy reported for duty as clerk of court on October 21, 1991. They later found out that respondent
Baroy was the one appointed because she gave a brand-new air-conditioning unit to respondent judge.

Respondent Baroy claims that when she was still in Naga City she purchased an air-conditioning unit but when she
was appointed clerk of court she had to transfer to Tinambac and, since she no longer needed the air conditioner,
she decided to sell the same to respondent judge. The installation and use thereof by the latter in his office was with
the consent of the Mayor of Tinambac.

Respondent judge contends that he endorsed all the applications for the position of clerk of court to the Supreme
Court which has the sole authority over such appointments and that he had no hand in the appointment of
respondent Baroy. He contends that the air-conditioning unit was bought from his
co-respondent on installment basis on May 29, 1992, eight (8) months after Baroy had been appointed clerk of
court. He claims that he would not be that naive to exhibit to the public as item which could not be defended as a
matter of honor and prestige.

4. Cash bond issued without a receipt

It is alleged that in Criminal Case No. 5438, entitled "People vs. Mendeza, et al., "bondswoman Januaria Dacara
was allowed by respondent judge to change her property bond to cash bond; that she paid the amount of P1,000.00
but was never issued a receipt therefor nor was it made to appear in the records that the bond has been paid; that
despite the lapse of two years, the money was never returned to the bondswoman; and that it has not been shown
that the money was turned over to the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.

Respondent Baroy counters that the cash bond was deposited with the former clerk of court, then turned over to the
acting clerk of court and, later, given to her under a corresponding receipt; that the cash bond is deposited with the
bank; and that should the bondswoman desire to withdraw the same, she should follow the proper procedure
therefor.

Respondent judge contends that Criminal Case No. 5438 was archieved for failure of the bondsman to deliver the
body of the accused in court despite notice; and that he has nothing to do with the payment of the cash bond as this
is the duty of the clerk of court.

5. Infidelity in the custody of prisoners

Complainants contend that respondent judge usually got detention prisoners to work in his house, one of whom was
Alex Alano, who is accused in Criminal Case No. 5647 for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act; that while Alano
was in the custody of respondent judge, the former escaped and was never recaptured; that in order to conceal this
fact, the case was archived pursuant to an order issued by respondent judge dated April 6, 1992.

Respondent judge denied the accusation and claims that he never employed detention prisoners and that he has
adequate household help; and that he had to order the case archived because it had been pending for more than six
(6) months and the accused therein remained at large.

6. Unlawful collection of docket fees

Finally, respondents are charged with collecting docket fees from the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, Inc.
although such entity is exempt by law from the payment of said fees, and that while the corresponding receipt was
issued, respondent Baroy failed to remit the amount to the Supreme Court and, instead, she deposited the same in
her personal account.

Respondents Baroy contends that it was Judge-Designate Felimon Montenegro (because respondent judge was on
sick leave) who instructed her to demand payment of docket fees from said rural bank; that the bank issued a check
for P800.00; that she was not allowed by the Philippine National Bank to encash the check and, instead, was
instructed to deposit the same in any bank account for clearing; that respondent deposited the same in her account;
and that after the check was cleared, she remitted P400.00 to the Supreme Court and the other P400.00 was paid to
the Municipal Treasurer of Tinambac.

On the basis of the foregoing contentions, First Vice-Executive Judge Antonio N. Gerona prepared and submitted to
us his Report and Recommendations dated May 20, 1994, together with the administrative matter. We have
perspicaciously reviewed the same and we are favorably impressed by the thorough and exhaustive presentation
and analysis of the facts and evidence in said report. We commend the investigating judge for his industry and
perspicacity reflected by his findings in said report which, being amply substantiated by the evidence and supported
by logical illations, we hereby approve and hereunder reproduce at length the material portions thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

The first charge against the respondents is illegal solemnization of marriage. Judge Palaypayon is
charged with having solemnized without a marriage license the marriage of Sammy Bocaya and
Gina Besmonte (Exh. A). Alano Abellano and Nelly Edralin (Exh. B), Francisco Selpo and Julieta
Carrido (Exh. C), Eddie Terrobias and Maria Emma Gaor (Exh. D), Renato Gamay and Maricris
Belga (Exh. F) and Arsenio Sabater and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G).

In all these aforementioned marriages, the blank space in the marriage contracts to show the number
of the marriage was solemnized as required by Article 22 of the Family Code were not filled up.
While the contracting parties and their witnesses signed their marriage contracts, Judge Palaypayon
did not affix his signature in the marriage contracts, except that of Abellano and Edralin when Judge
Palaypayon signed their marriage certificate as he claims that he solemnized this marriage under
Article 34 of the Family Code of the Philippines. In said marriages the contracting parties were not
furnished a copy of their marriage contract and the Local Civil Registrar was not sent either a copy
of the marriage certificate as required by Article 23 of the Family Code.

The marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte is shown to have been solemnized by Judge Palaypayon
without a marriage license. The testimonies of Bocay himself and Pompeo Ariola, one of the
witnesses of the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte, and the photographs taken when Judge
Palaypayon solemnized their marriage (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) sufficiently show that Judge Palaypayon
really solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they were advised by Judge Palaypayon to
return after ten (10) days after their marriage was solemnized and bring with them their marriage
license. In the meantime, they already started living together as husband and wife believing that the
formal requisites of marriage were complied with.

Judge Palaypayon denied that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and Besmonte because the
parties allegedly did not have a marriage license. He declared that in fact he did not sign the
marriage certificate, there was no date stated on it and both the parties and the Local Civil Registrar
did not have a copy of the marriage certificate.
With respect to the photographs which show that he solemnized the marriage of Bocaya and
Besmonte, Judge Palaypayon explains that they merely show as if he was solemnizing the marriage.
It was actually a simulated solemnization of marriage and not a real one. This happened because of
the pleading of the mother of one of the contracting parties that he consent to be photographed to
show that as if he was solemnizing the marriage as he was told that the food for the wedding
reception was already prepared, visitors were already invited and the place of the parties where the
reception would be held was more than twenty (20) kilometers away from the poblacion of
Tinambac.

The denial made by Judge Palaypayon is difficult to believe. The fact alone that he did not sign the
marriage certificate or contract, the same did not bear a date and the parties and the Local Civil
Registrar were not furnished a copy of the marriage certificate, do not by themselves show that he
did not solemnize the marriage. His uncorroborated testimony cannot prevail over the testimony of
Bocaya and Ariola who also declared, among others, that Bocaya and his bride were advised by
Judge Palaypayon to return after ten (10) days with their marriage license and whose credibility had
not been impeached.

The pictures taken also from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage
certificate in front of Judge Palaypayon and on his table (Exhs. K-3, K-3-a, K-3-b, K-3-c, K-4, K-4-
a, K-4-b, K-4-c,
K-4-d, K-5, K-5-a, K-5-b, K-6, K-7, K-8, K-8-a and K-9), cannot possibly be just to show a
simulated solemnization of marriage. One or two pictures may convince a person of the explanation
of Judge Palaypayon, but not all those pictures.

Besides, as a judge it is very difficult to believe that Judge Palaypayon would allows himself to be
photographed as if he was solemnizing a marriage on a mere pleading of a person whom he did not
even know for the alleged reasons given. It would be highly improper and unbecoming of him to
allow himself to be used as an instrument of deceit by making it appear that Bocaya and Besmonte
were married by him when in truth and in fact he did not solemnize their marriage.

With respect to the marriage of Abellano and Edralin (Exh. B), Judge Palaypayon admitted that he
solemnized their marriage, but he claims that it was under Article 34 of the Family Code, so a
marriage license was not required. The contracting parties here executed a joint affidavit that they
have been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already (Exh. 12; Exh. AA).

In their marriage contract which did not bear any date either when it was solemnized, it was stated
that Abellano was only eighteen (18) years, two (2) months and seven (7) days old. If he and Edralin
had been living together as husband and wife for almost six (6) years already before they got married
as they stated in their joint affidavit, Abellano must ha(ve) been less than thirteen (13) years old
when he started living with Edralin as his wife and this is hard to believe. Judge Palaypayon should
ha(ve) been aware of this when he solemnized their marriage as it was his duty to ascertain the
qualification of the contracting parties who might ha(ve) executed a false joint affidavit in order to
have an instant marriage by avoiding the marriage license requirement.

On May 23, 1992, however, after this case was already filed, Judge Palaypayon married again
Abellano and Edralin, this time with a marriage license (Exh. BB). The explanation given by Judge
Palaypayon why he solemnized the marriage of the same couple for the second time is that he did
not consider the first marriage he solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code as (a) marriage at
all because complainant Ramon Sambo did not follow his instruction that the date should be placed
in the marriage certificate to show when he solemnized the marriage and that the contracting parties
were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate.

This act of Judge Palaypayon of solemnizing the marriage of Abellano and Edralin for the second
time with a marriage license already only gave rise to the suspicion that the first time he solemnized
the marriage it was only made to appear that it was solemnized under exceptional character as there
was not marriage license and Judge Palaypayon had already signed the marriage certificate. If it was
true that he solemnized the first marriage under exceptional character where a marriage license was
not required, why did he already require the parties to have a marriage license when he solemnized
their marriage for the second time?

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon that the first marriage of Abellano and Edralin was not a
marriage at all as the marriage certificate did not state the date when the marriage was solemnized
and that the contracting parties were not furnished a copy of their marriage certificate, is not well
taken as they are not any of those grounds under Article(s) 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code
which declare a marriage void from the beginning. Even if no one, however, received a copy of the
marriage certificate, the marriage is still valid (Jones vs. H(o)rtiguela, 64 Phil. 179). Judge
Palaypayon cannot just absolve himself from responsibility by blaming his personnel. They are not
the guardian(s) of his official function and under Article 23 of the Family Code it is his duty to
furnish the contracting parties (a) copy of their marriage contract.

With respect to the marriage of Francisco Selpo and Julieta Carrido (Exh. C), and Arsenio Sabater
and Margarita Nacario (Exh. G), Selpo and Carrido and Sabater and Nacarcio executed joint
affidavits that Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize their marriage (Exh. 13-A and Exh. 1). Both
Carrido and Nacario testified for the respondents that actually Judge Palaypayon did not solemnize
their marriage as they did not have a marriage license. On cross-examination, however, both
admitted that they did not know who prepared their affidavits. They were just told, Carrido by a
certain Charito Palaypayon, and Nacario by a certain Kagawad Encinas, to just go to the Municipal
building and sign their joint affidavits there which were already prepared before the Municipal
Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.

With respect to the marriage of Renato Gamay and Maricris Belga (Exh. f), their marriage contract
was signed by them and by their two (2) witnesses, Atty. Elmer Brioso and respondent Baroy (Exhs.
F-1 and F-2). Like the other aforementioned marriages, the solemnization fee was also paid as
shown by a receipt dated June 7, 1992 and signed by respondent Baroy (Exh. F-4).

Judge Palaypayon also denied having solemnized the marriage of Gamay and Belga allegedly
because there was no marriage license. On her part, respondent Baroy at first denied that the
marriage was solemnized. When she was asked, however, why did she sign the marriage contract as
a witness she answered that she thought the marriage was already solemnized (TSN, p. 14; 10-28-
93).

Respondent Baroy was, and is, the clerk of court of Judge Palaypayon. She signed the marriage
contract of Gamay and Belga as one of the two principal sponsors. Yet, she wanted to give the
impression that she did not even know that the marriage was solemnized by Judge Palaypayon. This
is found very difficult to believe.

Judge Palaypayon made the same denial of having solemnized also the marriage of Terrobias and
Gaor (Exh. D). The contracting parties and their witnesses also signed the marriage contract and paid
the solemnization fee, but Judge Palaypayon allegedly did not solemnize their marriage due to lack
of marriage license. Judge Palaypayon submitted the affidavit of William Medina, Vice-Mayor of
Tinambac, to corroborate his testimony (Exh. 14). Medina, however, did not testify in this case and
so his affidavit has no probative value.

Judge Palaypayon testified that his procedure and practice have been that before the contracting
parties and their witnesses enter his chamber in order to get married, he already required
complainant Ramon Sambo to whom he assigned the task of preparing the marriage contract, to
already let the parties and their witnesses sign their marriage contracts, as what happened to Gamay
and Belga, and Terrobias and Gaor, among others. His purpose was to save his precious time as he
has been solemnizing marriages at the rate of three (3) to four (4) times everyday (TSN, p. 12;
2-1-94).

This alleged practice and procedure, if true, is highly improper and irregular, if not illegal, because
the contracting parties are supposed to be first asked by the solemnizing officer and declare that they
take each other as husband and wife before the solemnizing officer in the presence of at least two (2)
witnesses before they are supposed to sign their marriage contracts (Art. 6, Family Code).

The uncorroborated testimony, however, of Judge Palaypayon as to his alleged practice and
procedure before solemnizing a marriage, is not true as shown by the picture taken during the
wedding of Bocaya and Besmonte (Exhs. K-3 to K-9) and by the testimony of respondent Baroy
herself who declared that the practice of Judge Palaypayon ha(s) been to let the contracting parties
and their witnesses sign the marriage contract only after Judge Palaypayon has solemnized their
marriage (TSN, p. 53;
10-28-93).
Judge Palaypayon did not present any evidence to show also that he was really solemnizing three (3)
to four (4) marriages everyday. On the contrary his monthly report of cases for July, 1992 shows that
his court had only twenty-seven (27) pending cases and he solemnized only seven (7) marriages for
the whole month (Exh. E). His monthly report of cases for September, 1992 shows also that he
solemnized only four (4) marriages during the whole month (Exh. 7).

In this first charge of having illegally solemnized marriages, respondent Judge Palaypayon has
presented and marked in evidence several marriage contracts of other persons, affidavits of persons
and certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar (Exhs. 12-B to 12-H). These persons who
executed affidavits, however, did not testify in this case. Besides, the marriage contracts and
certification mentioned are immaterial as Judge Palaypayon is not charged of having solemnized
these marriages illegally also. He is not charged that the marriages he solemnized were all illegal.

The second charge against herein respondents, that of having falsified the monthly report of cases
submitted to the Supreme Court and not stating in the monthly report the actual number of
documents notarized and issuing the corresponding receipts of the notarial fees, have been
sufficiently proven by the complainants insofar as the monthly report of cases for July and
September, 1992 are concerned.

The monthly report of cases of the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur for July, 1992 both signed by
the respondents, show that for said month there were six (6) documents notarized by Judge
Palaypayon in his capacity as Ex-Officio Notary Public (Exhs. H to H-1-b). The notarial register of
the MTC of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, however, shows that there were actually one hundred thirteen
(113) documents notarized by Judge Palaypayon for the said month (Exhs. Q to Q-45).

Judge Palaypayon claims that there was no falsification of the monthly report of cases for July, 1992
because there were only six (6) notarized documents that were paid (for) as shown by official
receipts. He did not, however, present evidence of the alleged official receipts showing that the
notarial fee for the six (6) documetns were paid. Besides, the monthly report of cases with respect to
the number of documents notarized should not be based on how many notarized documents were
paid of the notarial fees, but the number of documents placed or recorded in the notarial register.

Judge Palaypayon admitted that he was not personally verifying and checking anymore the
correctness of the monthly reports because he relies on his co-respondent who is the Clerk of Court
and whom he has assumed to have checked and verified the records. He merely signs the monthly
report when it is already signed by respondent Baroy.

The explanation of Judge Palaypayon is not well taken because he is required to have close
supervision in the preparation of the monthly report of cases of which he certifies as to their
correctness. As a judge he is personally responsible for the proper discharge of his functions (The
Phil. Trial Lawyer's Asso. Inc. vs. Agana, Sr., 102 SCRA 517). In Nidera vs. Lazaro, 174 SCRA 581,
it was held that "A judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or mismanagement of his court
personnel."

On the part of respondent Baroy, she puts the blame of the falsification of the monthly report of
cases on complainant Sambo whom she allegedly assigned to prepare not only the monthly report of
cases, but the preparation and custody of marriage contracts, notarized documents and the notarial
register. By her own admission she has assigned to complainant Sambo duties she was supposed to
perform, yet according to her she never bother(ed) to check the notarial register of the court to find
out the number of documents notarized in a month (TSN, p. 30; 11-23-93).

Assuming that respondent Baroy assigned the preparation of the monthly report of cases to Sambo,
which was denied by the latter as he claims that he only typed the monthly report based on the data
given to him by her, still it is her duty to verify and check whether the report is correct.

The explanation of respondent Baroy that Sambo was the one in custody of marriage contracts,
notarized documents and notarial register, among other things, is not acceptable not only because as
clerk of court she was supposed to be in custody, control and supervision of all court records
including documents and other properties of the court (p. 32, Manual for Clerks of Court), but she
herself admitted that from January, 1992 she was already in full control of all the records of the court
including receipts (TSN, p. 11; 11-23-93).

The evidence adduced in this cases in connection with the charge of falsification, however, also
shows that respondent Baroy did not account for what happened to the notarial fees received for
those documents notarized during the month of July and September, 1992. The evidence adduced in
this case also sufficiently show that she received cash bond deposits and she did not deposit them to
a bank or to the Municipal Treasurer; and that she only issued temporary receipts for said cash bond
deposits.

For July, 1992 there were only six (6) documents reported to have been notarized by Judge
Palaypayon although the documents notarized for said month were actually one hundred thirteen
(113) as recorded in the notarial register. For September, 1992, there were only five (5) documents
reported as notarized for that month, though the notarial register show(s) that there were fifty-six
(56) documents actually notarized. The fee for each document notarized as appearing in the notarial
register was P18.50. Respondent Baroy and Sambo declared that what was actually being charged
was P20.00. Respondent Baroy declared that P18.50 went to the Supreme Court and P1.50 was
being turned over to the Municipal Treasurer.

Baroy, however, did not present any evidence to show that she really sent to the Supreme Court the
notarial fees of P18.50 for each document notarized and to the Municipal Treasurer the additional
notarial fee of P1.50. This should be fully accounted for considering that Baroy herself declared that
some notarial fees were allowed by her at her own discretion to be paid later. Similarly, the
solemnization fees have not been accounted for by Baroy considering that she admitted that even
(i)n those instances where the marriages were not solemnized due to lack of marriage license the
solemnization fees were not returned anymore, unless the contracting parties made a demand for
their return. Judge Palaypayon declared that he did not know of any instance when solemnization fee
was returned when the marriage was not solemnized due to lack of marriage license.

Respondent Baroy also claims that Ramon Sambo did not turn over to her some of the notarial fees.
This is difficult to believe. It was not only because Sambo vehemently denied it, but the minutes of
the conference of the personnel of the MTC of Tinambac dated January 20, 1992 shows that on that
date Baroy informed the personnel of the court that she was taking over the functions she assigned to
Sambo, particularly the collection of legal fees (Exh. 7). The notarial fees she claims that Sambo did
not turn over to her were for those documents notarized (i)n July and September, 1992 already.
Besides there never was any demand she made for Sambo to turn over some notarial fees supposedly
in his possession. Neither was there any memorandum she issued on this matter, in spite of the fact
that she has been holding meetings and issuing memoranda to the personnel of the court (Exhs. V, W,
FF, FF-1, FF-2, FF-3; Exhs. 4-A (supplement(s), 5-8, 6-S, 7-S and 8-S).

It is admitted by respondent Baroy that on October 29, 1991 a cash bond deposit of a certain Dacara
in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos was turned over to her after she assumed office
and for this cash bond she issued only a temporary receipt (Exh. Y). She did not deposit this cash
bond in any bank or to the Municipal Treasurer. She just kept it in her own cash box on the alleged
ground that the parties in that case where the cash bond was deposited informed her that they would
settle the case amicably.

Respondent Baroy declared that she finally deposited the aforementioned cash bond of One
Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) in February, 1993, after
this administrative case was already filed (TSN, pp. 27-28; 12-22-93). The Pass Book, however,
shows that actually Baroy opened an account with the LBP, Naga Branch, only on March 26, 1993
when she deposited an amount of Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos (Exhs. 8 to 8-1-a). She claims
that One Thousand (P1,000.000) Pesos of the initial deposit was the cash bond of Dacara. If it were
true, it was only after keeping to herself the cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for
around one year and five months when she finally deposited it because of the filing of this case.

On April 29, 1993, or only one month and two days after she finally deposited the One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos cash bond of Dacara, she withdrew it from the bank without any authority or
order from the court. It was only on July 23, 1993, or after almost three (3) months after she
withdrew it, when she redeposited said cash bond (TSN, p. 6; 1-4-94).

The evidence presented in this case also show that on February 28, 1993 respondent Baroy received
also a cash bond of Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from a certain Alfredo Seprones in Crim.
Case No. 5180. For this cash bond deposit, respondent Baroy issued only an annumbered temporary
receipt (Exh. X and X-1). Again Baroy just kept this Three Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos cash bond to
herself. She did not deposit it either (in) a bank or (with) the Municipal Treasurer. Her explanation
was that the parties in Crim. Case No. 5180 informed her that they would settle the case amicably. It
was on April 26, 1993, or almost two months later when Judge Palaypayon issued an order for the
release of said cash bond (Exh. 7).

Respondent Baroy also admitted that since she assumed office on October 21, 1991 she used to issue
temporary receipt only for cash bond deposits and other payments and collections she received. She
further admitted that some of these temporary receipts she issued she failed to place the number of
the receipts such as that receipt marked Exhibit X (TSN, p. 35; 11-23-93). Baroy claims that she did
not know that she had to use the official receipts of the Supreme Court. It was only from February,
1993, after this case was already filed, when she only started issuing official receipts.

The next charge against the respondents is that in order to be appointed Clerk of Court, Baroy gave
Judge Palaypayon an air conditioner as a gift. The evidence adduced with respect to this charge,
show that on August 24, 1991 Baroy bought an air conditioner for the sum of Seventeen Thousand
Six Hundred (P17,600.00) Pesos (Exhs. I and I-1). The same was paid partly in cash and in check
(Exhs. I-2 and I-3). When the air conditioner was brought to court in order to be installed in the
chamber of Judge Palaypayon, it was still placed in the same box when it was bought and was not
used yet.

The respondents claim that Baroy sold it to Judge Palaypayon for Twenty Thousand (P20,00.00)
Pesos on installment basis with a down payment of Five Thousand (P5,000.00) Pesos and as proof
thereof the respondents presented a typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1993 (Exh. 22). The receipt
was signed by both respondents and by the Municipal Mayor of Tinambac, Camarines Sur and
another person as witness.

The alleged sale between respondents is not beyond suspicion. It was bought by Baroy at a time
when she was applying for the vacant position of Clerk of Court (to) which she was eventually
appointed in October, 1991. From the time she bought the air conditioner on August 24, 1991 until it
was installed in the office of Judge Palaypayon it was not used yet. The sale to Judge Palaypayon
was only evidenced by a mere typewritten receipt dated May 29, 1992 when this case was already
filed. The receipt could have been easily prepared. The Municipal Mayor of Tinambac who signed in
the receipt as a witness did not testify in this case. The sale is between the Clerk of Court and the
Judge of the same court. All these circumstances give rise to suspicion of at least impropriety. Judges
should avoid such action as would subject (them) to suspicion and (their) conduct should be free
from the appearance of impropriety (Jaagueta vs. Boncasos, 60 SCRA 27).

With respect to the charge that Judge Palaypayon received a cash bond deposit of One Thousand
(P1,000.00) Pesos from Januaria Dacara without issuing a receipt, Dacara executed an affidavit
regarding this charge that Judge Palaypayon did not give her a receipt for the P1,000.00 cash bond
she deposited (Exh. N). Her affidavit, however, has no probative value as she did not show that this
cash bond of P1,000.00 found its way into the hands of respondent Baroy who issued only a
temporary receipt for it and this has been discussed earlier.

Another charge against Judge Palaypayon is the getting of detention prisoners to work in his house
and one of them escaped while in his custody and was never found again. To hide this fact, the case
against said accused was ordered archived by Judge Palaypayon. The evidence adduced with respect
to this particular charge, show that in Crim. Case No. 5647 entitled People vs. Stephen Kalaw, Alex
Alano and Allan Adupe, accused Alex Alano and Allan Adupe were arrested on April 12, 1991 and
placed in the municipal jail of Tinambac, Camarines Sur (Exhs. 0, 0-1, 0-2 and 0-3; Exh. 25). The
evidence presented that Alex Alano was taken by Judge Palaypayon from the municipal jail where
said accused was confined and that he escaped while in custody of Judge Palaypayon is solely
testimonial, particularly that of David Ortiz, a former utility worker of the MTC of Tinambac.

Herein investigator finds said evidence not sufficient. The complainants should have presented
records from the police of Tinambac to show that Judge Palaypayon took out from the municipal jail
Alex Alano where he was under detention and said accused escaped while in the custody of Judge
Palaypayon.

The order, however, of Judge Palaypayon dated April 6, 1992 in Crim. Case No. 5047 archiving said
case appears to be without basis. The order states: "this case was filed on April 12, 1991 and the
records show that the warrant of arrest (was) issued against the accused, but up to this moment there
is no return of service for the warrant of arrest issued against said accused" (Exh. 0-4). The records
of said case, however, show that in fact there was a return of the service of the warrant of arrest
dated April 12, 1991 showing that Alano and Adupe were arrested (Exh. 0-3).

Judge Palaypayon explained that his order dated April 6, 1992 archiving Crim. Case No. 5047
referred only to one of the accused who remained at large. The explanation cannot be accepted
because the two other accused, Alano and Adupe, were arrested. Judge Palaypayon should have
issued an order for the arrest of Adupe who allegedly jumped bail, but Alano was supposed to be
confined in the municipal jail if his claim is true that he did not take custody of Alano.

The explanation also of Judge Palaypayon why he ordered the case archived was because he heard
from the police that Alano escaped. This explanation is not acceptable either. He should ha(ve) set
the case and if the police failed to bring to court Alano, the former should have been required to
explain in writing why Alano was not brought to court. If the explanation was that Alano escaped
from jail, he should have issued an order for his arrest. It is only later on when he could not be
arrested when the case should have been ordered archived. The order archiving this case for the
reason that he only heard that Alano escaped is another circumstance which gave rise to a suspicion
that Alano might have really escaped while in his custody only that the complainants could not
present records or other documentary evidence to prove the same.
The last charge against the respondents is that they collected filing fees on collection cases filed by
the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur which was supposed to be exempted in paying filing
fees under existing laws and that the filing fees received was deposited by respondent Baroy in her
personal account in the bank. The evidence presented show that on February 4, 1992 the Rural Bank
of Tinambac filed ten (10) civil cases for collection against farmers and it paid the total amount of
Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos representing filing fees. The complainants cited Section 14 of
Republic Act 720, as amended, which exempts Rural Banks (from) the payment of filing fees on
collection of sums of money cases filed against farmers on loans they obtained.

Judge Palaypayon, however, had nothing to do with the payment of the filing fees of the Rural Bank
of Tinambac as it was respondent Baroy who received them and besides, on February 4, 1992, he
was on sick leave. On her part Baroy claims that the bank paid voluntarily the filing fees. The
records, however, shows that respondent Baroy sent a letter to the manager of the bank dated January
28, 1992 to the effect that if the bank would not pay she would submit all Rural Bank cases for
dismissal (Annex 6, comment by respondent Baroy).

Respondent Baroy should have checked whether the Rural Bank of Tinambac was really exempt
from the payment of filing fees pursuant to Republic Act 720, as amended, instead of threatening the
bank to have its cases be submitted to the court in order to have them dismissed. Here the payment
of the filing fees was made on February 4, 1992, but the Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos was only
turned over to the Municipal Treasurer on March 12, 1992. Here, there is an undue delay again in
complying with her obligation as accountable officer.

In view of the foregoing findings that the evidence presented by the complainants sufficiently show
that respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon, Jr. had solemnized marriages, particularly that of
Sammy Bocaya and Gina Besmonte, without a marriage license, and that it having been shown that
he did not comply with his duty in closely supervising his clerk of court in the preparation of the
monthly report of cases being submitted to the Supreme Court, particularly for the months of July
and September, 1992 where it has been proven that the reports for said two (2) months were falsified
with respect to the number of documents notarized, it is respectfully recommended that he be
imposed a fine of TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS with a warning that the same or similar
offenses will be more severely dealt with.

The fact that Judge Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts or certificates of those marriages
he solemnized without a marriage license, there were no dates placed in the marriage contracts to
show when they were solemnized, the contracting parties were not furnished their marriage contracts
and the Local Civil Registrar was not being sent any copy of the marriage contract, will not absolve
him from liability. By solemnizing alone a marriage without a marriage license he as the solemnizing
officer is the one responsible for the irregularity in not complying (with) the formal requ(i)sites of
marriage and under Article 4(3) of the Family Code of the Philippines, he shall be civilly, criminally
and administratively liable.
Judge Palaypayon is likewise liable for his negligence or failure to comply with his duty of closely
supervising his clerk of court in the performance of the latter's duties and functions, particularly the
preparation of the monthly report of cases (Bendesula vs. Laya, 58 SCRA 16). His explanation that
he only signed the monthly report of cases only when his clerk of court already signed the same,
cannot be accepted. It is his duty to closely supervise her, to check and verify the records if the
monthly reports prepared by his clerk of court do not contain false statements. It was held that "A
judge cannot take refuge behind the inefficiency or incompetence of court personnel (Nidua vs.
Lazaro, 174 SCRA 158).

In view also of the foregoing finding that respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy, the clerk of court of
the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur, has been found to have falsified the monthly
report of cases for the months of July and September, 1992 with respect to the number of documents
notarized, for having failed to account (for) the notarial fees she received for said two (2) months
period; for having failed to account (for) the solemnization fees of those marriages allegedly not
solemnized, but the solemnization fees were not returned; for unauthorized issuance of temporary
receipts, some of which were issued unnumbered; for receiving the cash bond of Dacara on October
29, 1991 in the amount of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos for which she issued only a temporary
receipt (Exh. Y) and for depositing it with the Land Bank of the Philippines only on March 26, 1993,
or after one year and five months in her possession and after this case was already filed; for
withdrawing said cash bond of One Thousand (P1,000.00) Pesos on April 29, 1993 without any court
order or authority and redepositing it only on July 23, 1993; for receiving a cash bond of Three
Thousand (P3,000.00) Pesos from Alfredo Seprones in Crim. Case No. 5180, MTC, Tinambac,
Camarines Sur, for which she issued only an unnumbered temporary receipt (Exhs. X and X-1) and
for not depositing it with a bank or with the Municipal Treasurer until it was ordered released; and
for requiring the Rural Bank of Tinambac, Camarines Sur to pay filing fees on February 4, 1992 for
collection cases filed against farmers in the amount of Four Hundred (P400.00) Pesos, but turning
over said amount to the Municipal Treasurer only on March 12, 1992, it is respectfully
recommended that said respondent clerk of court Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy be dismissed from the
service.

It is provided that "Withdrawal of court deposits shall be by the clerk of court who shall issue
official receipt to the provincial, city or municipal treasurer for the amount withdrawn. Court
deposits cannot be withdrawn except by order of the court, . . . ." (Revised Manual of Instructions for
Treasurers, Sec. 183, 184 and 626; p. 127, Manual for Clerks of Court). A circular also provides that
the Clerks of Court shall immediately issue an official receipt upon receipt of deposits from party
litigants and thereafter deposit intact the collection with the municipal, city or provincial treasurer
and their deposits, can only be withdrawn upon proper receipt and order of the Court (DOJ Circular
No. 52, 26 April 1968; p. 136, Manual for Clerks of Court). Supreme Court Memorandum Circular
No. 5, 25 November 1982, also provides that "all collections of funds of fiduciary character
including rental deposits, shall be deposited immediately by the clerk of court concerned upon
receipt thereof with City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer where his court is located" and that "no
 withdrawal of any of such deposits shall be made except upon lawful order of the court exercising
jurisdiction over the subject matter.

Respondent Baroy had either failed to comply with the foregoing circulars, or deliberately
disregarded, or even intentionally violated them. By her conduct, she demonstrated her callous
unconcern for the obligations and responsibility of her duties and functions as a clerk of court and
accountable officer. The gross neglect of her duties shown by her constitute(s) a serious misconduct
which warrant(s) her removal from office. In the case of Belen P. Ferriola vs. Norma Hiam, Clerk of
Court, MTCC, Branch I, Batangas City; A.M. No. P-90-414; August 9, 1993, it was held that "The
clerk of court is not authorized to keep funds in his/her custody; monies received by him/her shall be
deposited immediately upon receipt thereof with the City, Municipal or Provincial Treasurer.
Supreme Court Circular Nos. 5 dated November 25, 1982 and 5-A dated December 3, 1982.
Respondent Hiam's failure to remit the cash bail bonds and fine she collected constitutes serious
misconduct and her misappropriation of said funds constitutes dishonesty. "Respondent Norma Hiam
was found guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service
and (the Court) ordered her immediate dismissal (from) the service.

xxx xxx xxx

We here emphasize once again our adjuration that the conduct and behavior of everyone connected with an office
charged with the dispensation of justice, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, should be circumscribed
with the heavy burden of responsibility. His conduct, at all times, must not only be characterized by propriety and
decorum but, above all else, must be beyond suspicion. Every employee should be an example of integrity,
uprightness and honesty. 5 Integrity in a judicial office is more than a virtue, it is a necessity. 6 It applies, without
qualification as to rank or position, from the judge to the least of its personnel, they being standard-bearers of the
exacting norms of ethics and morality imposed upon a Court of justice.

On the charge regarding illegal marriages the Family Code pertinently provides that the formal requisites of
marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. 7 Complementarily, it
declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab
initio and that, while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable. 8

The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriages, and what we are
providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal
responsibility. The Revised Penal Code provides that "(p)riests or ministers of any religious denomination or sect,
or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance
with the provisions of the Marriage Law." 9 This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of
the Government.
The recommendation with respect to the administrative sanction to be imposed on respondent judge should,
therefore, be modified. For one, with respect to the charge of illegal solemnization of marriages, it does appear that
he had not taken to heart, but actually trifled with, the law's concern for the institution of marriage and the legal
effects flowing from civil status. This, and his undeniable participation in the other offenses charged as hereinbefore
narrated in detail, approximate such serious degree of misconduct and of gross negligence in the performance of
judicial duties as to ineludibly require a higher penalty.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby imposes a FINE of P20,000.00 on respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon. Jr.,
with a stern warning that any repetition of the same or similar offenses in the future will definitely be severely dealt
with. Respondent Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and with prejudice to employment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations.

Let copies of this decision be spread on their records and furnished to the Office of the Ombudsman for appropriate
action.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., took no part.

Bidin, J., is on leave.

Today is Saturday, September 03, 2016

search

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 85140 May 17, 1990

TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro
City, and the Private Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely:
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN, respondents.

G.R. No. 86470 May 17, 1990.

TOMAS EUGENIO, petitioner-appellant,

vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City,
CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, FELIX VARGAS, ERNESTO VARGAS, NATIVIDAD VARGAS-CAGAPE,
NENITA VARGAS-CADENAS, LUDIVINA VARGAS-DE LOS SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-
BENTULAN, respondents-appellees.

Maximo G. Rodriguez for petitioner.

Erasmo B. Damasing and Oliver Asis Improso for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:

On 5 October 1988, petitioner came to this Court with a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for

restraining order and/or injunction (docketed as G.R. No. 85140) seeking to enjoin respondent Judge from
proceeding with the Habeas Corpus case (Sp. Proc. No. 88- 55, RTC, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City), * the
respondent Sheriff from enforcing and implementing the writ and orders of the respondent Judge dated 28, 29, and
30 September 1988, and to declare said writ and orders as null and void. In a resolution issued on 11 October 1988,
this Court required comment from the respondents on the petition but denied the application for a temporary
restraining order.

The records disclose the following:

Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her full blood brothers and
sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on 27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus
before the RTC of Misamis Oriental (Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken
from her residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis
Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived of her liberty without any legal authority. At
the time the petition was filed, it was alleged that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner
Tomas Eugenio.

The respondent court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the writ was
returned unsatisfied. Petitioner refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana (who had died on 28 August 1988) to the
respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according
to petitioner, he had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of Health,
authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a
registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is the Supreme President and Founder.

Petitioner also alleged that Vitaliana died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in his residence on 28 August
1988. As her common law husband, petitioner claimed legal custody of her body. These reasons were incorporated
in an explanation filed before the respondent court. Two (2) orders dated 29 and 30 September 1988 were then
issued by respondent court, directing delivery of the deceased's body to a funeral parlor in Cagayan de Oro City and
its autopsy.

Petitioner (as respondent in the habeas corpus proceedings) filed an urgent motion to dismiss the petition therein,
claiming lack of jurisdiction of the court over the nature of the action under sec. 1(b) of Rule 16 in relation to sec. 2,
Rule 72 of the Rules of Court. 1 A special proceeding for habeas corpus, petitioner argued, is not applicable to a
dead person but extends only to all cases of illegal confinement or detention of a live person.

Before resolving the motion to dismiss, private respondents (as petitioners below) were granted leave to amend
their petition. 2 Claiming to have knowledge of the death of Vitaliana only on 28 September 1988 (or after the filing
of the habeas corpus petition), private respondents (Vargases') alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in
any way related to Vitaliana was wrongfully interfering with their (Vargases') duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305
and 308 of the Civil Code, 3 the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana. An exchange of pleadings followed. The motion to dismiss was
finally submitted for resolution on 21 October 1988.

In the absence of a restraining order from this Court, proceedings continued before the respondent court; the body
was placed in a coffin, transferred to the Greenhills Memorial Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, viewed by the
presiding Judge of respondent court, and examined by a duly authorized government pathologist. 4

Denying the motion to dismiss filed by petitioner, the court a quo held in an order, 5 dated 17 November 1988, that:

It should be noted from the original petition, to the first amended petition, up to the second amended petition that
the ultimate facts show that if the person of Vitaliana Vargas turns out to be dead then this Court is being prayed to
declare the petitioners as the persons entitled to the custody, interment and/or burial of the body of said deceased.
The Court, considering the circumstance that Vitaliana Vargas was already dead on August 28, 1988 but only
revealed to the Court on September 29, 1988 by respondent's counsel, did not lose jurisdiction over the nature and
subject matter of this case because it may entertain this case thru the allegations in the body of the petition on the
determination as to who is entitled to the custody of the dead body of the late Vitaliana Vargas as well as the burial
or interment thereof, for the reason that under the provisions of Sec. 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, which reads as
follows:

Sec. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:

(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation;

xxx xxx xxx

(5) In all actions involving the contract of marriage and marital relations;

(6) In all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions:

xxx xxx xxx

it so provides that the Regional Trial Court has exclusive original jurisdiction to try this case. The authority to try
the issue of custody and burial of a dead person is within the lawful jurisdiction of this Court because of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 and because of the allegations of the pleadings in this case, which are enumerated in Sec. 19,
pars. 1, 5 and 6 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

Thereafter, the court a quo proceeded as in or civil cases and, in due course, rendered a decision on 17 January
1989, 6 resolving the main issue of whether or not said court acquired jurisdiction over the case by treating it as an
action for custody of a dead body, without the petitioners having to file a separate civil action for such relief, and
without the Court first dismissing the original petition for habeas corpus.

Citing Sections 19 and 20 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981), 7 Sections 5 and
6 of Rule 135 of the Rules of Court 8 Articles 305 and 308 in relation to Article 294 of the Civil Code and Section
1104 of the Revised Administrative Code, 9 the decision stated:

. . . . By a mere reading of the petition the court observed that the allegations in the original petition as well as in the
two amended petitions show that Vitaliana Vargas has been restrained of her liberty and if she were dead then relief
was prayed for the custody and burial of said dead person. The amendments to the petition were but elaborations
but the ultimate facts remained the same, hence, this court strongly finds that this court has ample jurisdiction to
entertain and sit on this case as an action for custody and burial of the dead body because the body of the petition
controls and is binding and since this case was raffled to this court to the exclusion of all other courts, it is the
primary duty of this court to decide and dispose of this case. . . . . 10

Satisfied with its jurisdiction, the respondent court then proceeded to the matter of rightful custody over the dead
body, (for purposes of burial thereof). The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was used as the basis
of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants, the brothers and sisters were
preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse, the latter being himself legally married to another
woman. 11

On 23 January 1989, a new petition for review with application for a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary

injunction was filed with this Court ( G.R. No. 86470). Raised therein were pure questions of law, basically
Identical to those raised in the earlier petition ( G.R. No. 85140); hence, the consolidation of both cases. 12
On 7 February 1989, petitioner filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an injunction to maintain status quo
pending appeal, which this Court denied in a resolution dated 23 February 1989 stating that "Tomas Eugenio has so
far failed to sufficiently establish a clear legal right to the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana Vargas, which now
needs a decent burial." The petitions were then submitted for decision without further pleadings.

Between the two (2) consolidated petitions, the following issues are raised:

1. propriety of a habeas corpus proceeding under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court to recover custody of the dead
body of a 25 year old female, single, whose nearest surviving claimants are full blood brothers and sisters and a
common law husband.

2. jurisdiction of the RTC over such proceedings and/or its authority to treat the action as one for
custody/possession/authority to bury the deceased/recovery of the dead.

3. interpretation of par. 1, Art. 294 of the Civil Code (Art. 199 of the new Family Code) which states:

Art. 294. The claim for support, when proper and two or more persons are obliged to give it, shall be made in
the following order:

(1) From the spouse;

xxx xxx xxx

Section 19, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 provides for the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts
over civil cases. Under Sec. 2, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus may be granted by a Court
of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court). It is an elementary rule of procedure that what controls is not the
caption of the complaint or petition; but the allegations therein determine the nature of the action, and even without
the prayer for a specific remedy, proper relief may nevertheless be granted by the court if the facts alleged in the
complaint and the evidence introduced so warrant. 13

When the petition for habeas corpus was filed before the court a quo, it was not certain whether Vitaliana was dead
or alive. While habeas corpus is a writ of right, it will not issue as a matter of course or as a mere perfimetory
operation on the filing of the petition. Judicial discretion is exercised in its issuance, and such facts must be made to
appear to the judge to whom the petition is presented as, in his judgment, prima facie entitle the petitioner to the
writ. 14 While the court may refuse to grant the writ if the petition is insufficient in form and substance, the writ
should issue if the petition complies with the legal requirements and its averments make a prima facie case for
relief. However, a judge who is asked to issue a writ of habeas corpus need not be very critical in looking into the
petition for very clear grounds for the exercise of this jurisdiction. The latter's power to make full inquiry into the
cause of commitment or detention will enable him to correct any errors or defects in the petition. 15

In Macazo and Nunez vs. Nunez, 16 the Court frowned upon the dismissal of a habeas corpus petition filed by a
brother to obtain custody of a minor sister, stating:

All these circumstances notwithstanding, we believe that the case should not have been dismissed. The court below
should not have overlooked that by dismissing the petition, it was virtually sanctioning the continuance of an
adulterous and scandalous relation between the minor and her married employer, respondent Benildo Nunez against
all principles of law and morality. It is no excuse that the minor has expressed preference for remaining with said
respondent, because the minor may not chose to continue an illicit relation that morals and law repudiate.

xxx xxx xxx

The minor's welfare being the paramount consideration, the court below should not allow the technicality, that
Teofilo Macazo was not originally made a party, to stand in the way of its giving the child full protection. Even in a
habeas corpus proceeding the court had power to award temporary custody to the petitioner herein, or some other
suitable person, after summoning and hearing all parties concerned. What matters is that the immoral situation
disclosed by the records be not allowed to continue. 17

After the fact of Vitaliana's death was made known to the petitioners in the habeas corpus proceedings, amendment
of the petition for habeas corpus, not dismissal, was proper to avoid multiplicity of suits. Amendments to pleadings
are generally favored and should be liberally allowed in furtherance of justice in order that every case may so far as
possible be determined on its real facts and in order to expedite the trial of cases or prevent circuity of action and
unnecessary expense, unless there are circumstances such as inexcusable delay or the taking of the adverse party by
surprise or the like, which justify a refusal of permission to amend. 18 As correctly alleged by respondents, the writ
of habeas corpus as a remedy became moot and academic due to the death of the person allegedly restrained of
liberty, but the issue of custody remained, which the court a quo had to resolve.

Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse used therein not
being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification, he is the rightful custodian of
Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise. Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize
common law marriages. A man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife,
who represent themselves to the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the
community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines. 19
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in our society, and
that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by law, 20 authority exists in case law
to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way
be incapacitated to contract marriage. 21 In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another
woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of
Cavite, 22 ,the Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving Spouse
and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however that with respect to 'spouse',
the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces common law relation
for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief committed or
caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose
cohabitation is sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. 23 But this
view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a lawfully wedded
spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally
capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and sisters (the Vargases).
Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. The immediate duty of burying the body of a deceased
person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow
specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child, and left any kin, the duty of burial shall
devolve upon the nearest of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines and in possession of
sufficient means to defray the necessary expenses.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Both petitions are hereby DISMISSED. No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Medialdea
and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gancayco and Grino-Aquino, JJ., are on leave.

Footnotes

* Hon. Alejandro Velez, presiding.

1 Rule 16 (Motion to Dismiss):

Sec. 1. Grounds. Within the time for pleading a motion to dismiss the action may be made on any of the
following grounds:

(a) ...

(b) That the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the action or suit;

Rule 72 (Subject Matter and Applicability of General Rules)

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Applicability of rules of civil actions. In the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in
ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable in special proceedings.

2 3 and 11 October 1988 orders, Record of Regional Trial Court Proceedings, pp. 74, 75 & 102.

3 Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the funeral of a relative shall be in accordance
with the order established for support, under article 294. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of brothers
and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the paternal shall have a better right.

Art. 308. No human remains shall be retained, interred disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the persons
mentioned in Articles 294 and 305.

4 Record of RTC Proceedings, pp. 296-297.

5 Ibid., p. 338.

6 Record of RTC Proceedings, p. 577.

7 Supra.

8 Sec. 5 Inherent power of courts; Sec. 6 means to carry jurisdiction into effect.
9 Sec. 1104. Right of custody to body Any person charged by law with the duty of burying the body of
a deceased person is entitled to the custody of such body for the purpose of burying it, except when an inquest is
required by law for the purpose of determining the cause of death; and, in case of death due to or accompanied by a
dangerous communicable disease, such body shall until buried remain in the custody of the local board of health or
local health officer, or if there be no such, then in the custody of the municipal council.

10 G.R. No. 86470, Rollo at 34.

11 Annexes 7 & 8, Petition, G.R. No. 85140, Rollo at 85 and 86.

12 Resolution of 26 January 1989, G.R. No. 85140, Rollo at 114.

13 Ras v. Sua, G.R. No. L-23302, September 25, 1968, 25 SCRA 158-159; Nactor v. IAC, G.R.
No. 74122, March 15, 1988, 158 SCRA 635.
14 39 Am. Jur., 2d, Habeas corpus 129.

15 Ibid., 130.

16 G.R. No. L-12772, 24 January 1959, 105 Phil. 55.

17 Ibid.

18 PNB vs. CA, G.R. No. L-45770, 30 March 1988, 159 SCRA 933.
19 Fiel vs. Banawa, No. 56284-R, March 26, 1979, 76 OG 619.

20 Article 144 of the Civil Code provides:

When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is void
from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages
and salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership.

21 Aznar, et al. vs. Garcia, et al., G.R. Nos. L-11483-84, 14 February 1958, 102 Phil. 1055.

22 G.R. Nos. 61700-03, September 24, 1987, 153 SCRA 728.

23 People vs. Constantino, No. 01897-CR, September 6, 1963, 60 O.G. 3603.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 145226. February 06, 2004]
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision[1] dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment[2] dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this
petition is the resolution[3] of the appellate court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigos motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City,
Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4) years (from 1974-1978).

After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with each other.

In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from Singapore. The former replied and
after an exchange of letters, they became sweethearts.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work there. While in Canada, they
maintained constant communication.

In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to
get married, thus they were married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar,
Bohol.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant
which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago[4] at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish,
Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of
nullity of accuseds marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information[5] filed by the City Prosecutor of
Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.[6]

The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case for judicial nullification of
his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently
denied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follows:

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from
Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as
maximum.

SO ORDERED.[7]

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioners claim that his first marriage to Lucia was null
and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,[8] the trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage
ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that
their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.

Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,[9] which held that the court
of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for
the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a
divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in
contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,[10] everyone is presumed to
know the law, and the fact that one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him
from the consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.

Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the appellate court, the trial
court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initio
since no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final
and executory.

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.[11]

In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of
nullity of Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought
to be punished by Article 349[12] of the Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the
first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the beginning
is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.

The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not
be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 15[13] of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is
contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 17[14] of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy
cannot be rendered ineffectual by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate courts decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v.
People,[15] allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a
basis for good faith.

On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.[16] However, the denial was by a
split vote. The ponente of the appellate courts original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S.
Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never
married, he cannot be convicted beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy.

The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:

A.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN
CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONERS LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS.
BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

C.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH
AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT.[17]

To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, whether his
defense of good faith is valid.

The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario
court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon
bigamy would not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction
or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal
Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses
that there is a difference between the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does
not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.

For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a
convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[18] which
held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article
40[19] of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not
the petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law. The OSG
counters that petitioners contention that he was in good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario
court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lucia.

Before we delve into petitioners defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must first determine whether
all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,[20] we laid down the elements of
bigamy thus:

(1) the offender has been legally married;

(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not
been judicially declared presumptively dead;

(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the
RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered
into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the
Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.

SO ORDERED.[21]

The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a
solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the
presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with
Articles 3[22] and 4[23] of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it,
This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date
of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the
first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes of
the law, never married.[24] The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil
Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.

The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case,
legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of.
Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married from the
beginning. The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion,
for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but
logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The
petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.[25] In the latter case, the judicial
declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated.
We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally
contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of
bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as void.[26]

It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first
before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in
religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab
initio.

In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer.
Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a
marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held
liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.

The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused
and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the
circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we
need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot
and academic.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000,
denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio
Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven
with moral certainty.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, pp. 38-44. Penned by Associate Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria and concurred in by Associate Justices
Marina L. Buzon and Edgardo P. Cruz.

[2] Records, pp. 114-119.

[3] Rollo, pp. 46-58. Per Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia and Marina L.
Buzon, concurring and Eugenio S. Labitoria and Bernardo P. Abesamis, dissenting.

[4] Her correct name is Maria Jececha Limbago (Italics for emphasis). See Exh. B, the copy of their marriage
contract. Records, p. 10.
[5]The accusatory portion of the charge sheet found in Records, p. 1, reads:

That, on or about the 4th day of October, 1992, in the City of Tagbilaran, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being previously united in lawful marriage with Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Maria Jececha Limbago to the damage and prejudice of
Lucia Barrete in the amount to be proved during trial.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.

[6] Rollo, pp. 38-40.

[7] Records, p. 119.

[8] G.R. No. 104818, 17 September 1993, 226 SCRA 572.

[9] 42 Phil. 855, 863 (1918).

[10] 58 Phil. 817 (1933).

[11] Rollo, p. 43.

[12] ART. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision mayor shall be imposed upon any person who shall contract a
second or subsequent marriage before the former marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse
has been declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.

[13] Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are
binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

[14] Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall be governed by the
laws of the country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines
in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution.

Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order,
public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by
determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
[15] G.R. Nos. 89983-84, 6 March 1992, 207 SCRA 85.

[16] Rollo, p. 51.

[17] Id. at 20-21.

[18] G.R. No. 138509, 31 July 2000, 336 SCRA 747, 752-753.
[19] Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis
solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

[20] Supra.

[21] CA Rollo, p. 38.

[22] Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:

(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;

(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and

(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.

[23] Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except
as stated in Article 35 (2).

A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.

An irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage but the party or parties
responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively liable.

[24] Rollo, p. 54.

[25] G.R. No. 137110, 1 August 2000, 337 SCRA 122.

[26] Id. at 124.
THIRD DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.
x------------------x
FELISA TECSON-DAYOT,
Petitioner,

- versus -

JOSE A. DAYOT,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 175581

G.R. No. 179474

Present:
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,
Acting Chairperson,
TINGA,*
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO,** and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 28, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before us are two consolidated petitions. G.R. No.

175581 and G.R. No.
179474 are Petitions for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by the Republic of the Philippines and Felisa Tecson-Dayot
(Felisa), respectively, both challenging the Amended Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November 2006,
in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, which declared the marriage between Jose Dayot (Jose) and Felisa void ab initio.
The records disclose that on 24 November 1986, Jose and Felisa were married at the Pasay City Hall. The marriage
was solemnized by Rev. Tomas V. Atienza.[2] In lieu of a marriage license, Jose and Felisa executed a sworn
affidavit,[3] also dated 24 November 1986, attesting that both of them had attained the age of maturity, and that
being unmarried, they had lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

On 7 July 1993, Jose filed a Complaint[4] for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Bian, Laguna, Branch 25. He contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham, as
no marriage ceremony was celebrated between the parties; that he did not execute the sworn affidavit stating that he
and Felisa had lived as husband and wife for at least five years; and that his consent to the marriage was secured
through fraud.

In his Complaint, Jose gave his version of the events which led to his filing of the same. According to Jose, he was
introduced to Felisa in 1986. Immediately thereafter, he came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter being
his landlady. Some three weeks later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, ostensibly so
she could claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi Arabia. At the Pasay City Hall, upon a pre-arranged
signal from Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to
sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However, Felisa
cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had learned about their
relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man who immediately left. It was in
February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of
paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house. When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a
copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When he confronted Felisa, the latter feigned ignorance.

In opposing the Complaint, Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended the validity of their marriage. She declared
that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980,
but that she had deferred contracting marriage with him on account of their age difference.[5] In her pre-trial brief,
Felisa expounded that while her marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain
Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on 31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose.
Subsequently, she filed an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and
Rufina were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.[6] The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of suspension from
service for one year without emolument.[7]

On 26 July 2000, the RTC rendered a Decision[8] dismissing the Complaint. It disposed:

WHEREFORE, after a careful evaluation and analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, this Court finds
and so holds that the [C]omplaint does not deserve a favorable consideration. Accordingly, the above-entitled case
is hereby ordered DISMISSED with costs against [Jose].[9]

The RTC ruled that from the testimonies and evidence presented, the marriage celebrated between Jose and Felisa
on 24 November 1986 was valid. It dismissed Joses version of the story as implausible, and rationalized that:

Any person in his right frame of mind would easily suspect any attempt to make him or her sign a blank sheet of
paper. [Jose] could have already detected that something was amiss, unusual, as they were at Pasay City Hall to get
a package for [Felisa] but it [was] he who was made to sign the pieces of paper for the release of the said package.
Another indirect suggestion that could have put him on guard was the fact that, by his own admission, [Felisa] told
him that her brother would kill them if he will not sign the papers. And yet it took him, more or less, three months
to discover that the pieces of paper that he signed was [sic] purportedly the marriage contract. [Jose] does not seem
to be that ignorant, as perceived by this Court, to be taken in for a ride by [Felisa.]

[Joses] claim that he did not consent to the marriage was belied by the fact that he acknowledged Felisa Tecson as
his wife when he wrote [Felisas] name in the duly notarized statement of assets and liabilities he filled up on May
12, 1988, one year after he discovered the marriage contract he is now claiming to be sham and false. [Jose], again,
in his company I.D., wrote the name of [Felisa] as the person to be contacted in case of emergency. This Court does
not believe that the only reason why her name was written in his company I.D. was because he was residing there
then. This is just but a lame excuse because if he really considers her not his lawfully wedded wife, he would have
written instead the name of his sister.
When [Joses] sister was put into the witness stand, under oath, she testified that she signed her name voluntarily as
a witness to the marriage in the marriage certificate (T.S.N., page 25, November 29, 1996) and she further testified
that the signature appearing over the name of Jose Dayot was the signature of his [sic] brother that he voluntarily
affixed in the marriage contract (page 26 of T.S.N. taken on November 29, 1996), and when she was asked by the
Honorable Court if indeed she believed that Felisa Tecson was really chosen by her brother she answered yes. The
testimony of his sister all the more belied his claim that his consent was procured through fraud.[10]

Moreover, on the matter of fraud, the RTC ruled that Joses action had prescribed. It cited Article 87[11] of the New
Civil Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party
within four years after the discovery of the fraud. Thus:

That granting even for the sake of argument that his consent was obtained by [Felisa] through fraud, trickery and
machinations, he could have filed an annulment or declaration of nullity of marriage at the earliest possible
opportunity, the time when he discovered the alleged sham and false marriage contract. [Jose] did not take any
action to void the marriage at the earliest instance. x x x.[12]

Undeterred, Jose filed an appeal from the foregoing RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 11
August 2005, the Court of Appeals found the appeal to be without merit. The dispositive portion of the appellate
courts Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.[13]

The Court of Appeals applied the Civil Code to the marriage between Jose and Felisa as it was solemnized prior to
the effectivity of the Family Code. The appellate court observed that the circumstances constituting fraud as a
ground for annulment of marriage under Article 86[14] of the Civil Code did not exist in the marriage between the
parties. Further, it ruled that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground of fraud was filed beyond the
prescriptive period provided by law. The Court of Appeals struck down Joses appeal in the following manner:

Nonetheless, even if we consider that fraud or intimidation was employed on Jose in giving his consent to the
marriage, the action for the annulment thereof had already prescribed. Article 87 (4) and (5) of the Civil Code
provides that the action for annulment of marriage on the ground that the consent of a party was obtained by fraud,
force or intimidation must be commenced by said party within four (4) years after the discovery of the fraud and
within four (4) years from the time the force or intimidation ceased. Inasmuch as the fraud was allegedly discovered
by Jose in February, 1987 then he had only until February, 1991 within which to file an action for annulment of
marriage. However, it was only on July 7, 1993 that Jose filed the complaint for annulment of his marriage to
Felisa.[15]
Likewise, the Court of Appeals did not accept Joses assertion that his marriage to Felisa was void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license. It ruled that the marriage was solemnized under Article 76[16] of the Civil Code as one of
exceptional character, with the parties executing an affidavit of marriage between man and woman who have lived
together as husband and wife for at least five years. The Court of Appeals concluded that the falsity in the affidavit
to the effect that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife for the period required by Article 76 did not
affect the validity of the marriage, seeing that the solemnizing officer was misled by the statements contained
therein. In this manner, the Court of Appeals gave credence to the good-faith reliance of the solemnizing officer
over the falsity of the affidavit. The appellate court further noted that on the dorsal side of said affidavit of
marriage, Rev. Tomas V. Atienza, the solemnizing officer, stated that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other
qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal impediment to their marriage. Finally, the Court of
Appeals dismissed Joses argument that neither he nor Felisa was a member of the sect to which Rev. Tomas V.
Atienza belonged. According to the Court of Appeals, Article 56[17] of the Civil Code did not require that either
one of the contracting parties to the marriage must belong to the solemnizing officers church or religious sect. The
prescription was established only in Article 7[18] of the Family Code which does not govern the parties marriage.

Differing with the ruling of the Court of Appeals, Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereof. His central
opposition was that the requisites for the proper application of the exemption from a marriage license under Article
76 of the Civil Code were not fully attendant in the case at bar. In particular, Jose cited the legal condition that the
man and the woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the marriage.
Essentially, he maintained that the affidavit of marital cohabitation executed by him and Felisa was false.

The Court of Appeals granted Joses Motion for Reconsideration and reversed itself. Accordingly, it rendered an
Amended Decision, dated 7 November 2006, the fallo of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated August 11, 2005 is RECALLED and SET ASIDE and another one entered
declaring the marriage between Jose A. Dayot and Felisa C. Tecson void ab initio.
Furnish a copy of this Amended Decision to the Local Civil Registrar of Pasay City.[19]

In its Amended Decision, the Court of Appeals relied on the ruling of this Court in Nial v. Bayadog,[20] and
reasoned that:

In Nial v. Bayadog, where the contracting parties to a marriage solemnized without a marriage license on the basis
of their affidavit that they had attained the age of majority, that being unmarried, they had lived together for at least
five (5) years and that they desired to marry each other, the Supreme Court ruled as follows:

x x x In other words, the five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of
celebration of marriage, should be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-
year period should be the years immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation
characterized by exclusivity meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that
is unbroken. Otherwise, if that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the
parties were capacitated to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning
immorality and encouraging parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with
those who lived faithfully with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its
requirements must be strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband
and wife is based on the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any
excuse to not comply with every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived
escape ground to nullify their marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the
circumstances clearly fall within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to
notify the public that two persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has
knowledge of any impediment to the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.

Article 80(3) of the Civil Code provides that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of
exceptional character, shall be void from the beginning. Inasmuch as the marriage between Jose and Felisa is not
covered by the exception to the requirement of a marriage license, it is, therefore, void ab initio because of the
absence of a marriage license.[21]

Felisa sought reconsideration of the Amended Decision, but to no avail. The appellate court rendered a
Resolution[22] dated 10 May 2007, denying Felisas motion.

Meanwhile, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a Petition for

Review before this Court in G.R. No. 175581, praying that the Court of Appeals Amended Decision dated 7
November 2006 be reversed and set aside for lack of merit, and that the marriage between Jose and Felisa be

declared valid and subsisting. Felisa filed a separate Petition for Review, docketed as G.R. No. 179474,
similarly assailing the appellate courts Amended Decision. On 1 August 2007, this Court resolved to consolidate the
two Petitions in the interest of uniformity of the Court rulings in similar cases brought before it for resolution.[23]

The Republic of the Philippines propounds the following arguments for the allowance of its Petition, to wit:

RESPONDENT FAILED TO OVERTHROW THE PRESUMPTION OF THE VALIDITY OF HIS MARRIAGE

TO FELISA.

II

RESPONDENT DID NOT COME TO THE COURT WITH CLEAN HANDS AND SHOULD NOT BE
ALLOWED TO PROFIT FROM HIS OWN FRAUDULENT CONDUCT.

III
RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM ASSAILING THE LEGALITY OF HIS MARRIAGE FOR LACK OF
MARRIAGE LICEN[S]E.[24]

Correlative to the above, Felisa submits that the Court of Appeals misapplied Nial.[25] She differentiates the case at
bar from Nial by reasoning that one of the parties therein had an existing prior marriage, a circumstance which does
not obtain in her cohabitation with Jose. Finally, Felisa adduces that Jose only sought the annulment of their
marriage after a criminal case for bigamy and an administrative case had been filed against him in order to avoid
liability. Felisa surmises that the declaration of nullity of their marriage would exonerate Jose from any liability.

For our resolution is the validity of the marriage between Jose and Felisa. To reach a considered ruling on the issue,
we shall jointly tackle the related arguments vented by petitioners Republic of the Philippines and Felisa.

The Republic of the Philippines asserts that several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage
exists between Jose and Felisa. For her part, Felisa echoes the claim that any doubt should be resolved in favor of
the validity of the marriage by citing this Courts ruling in Hernandez v. Court of Appeals.[26] To buttress its
assertion, the Republic points to the affidavit executed by Jose and Felisa, dated 24 November 1986, attesting that
they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, which they used in lieu of a marriage license. It
is the Republics position that the falsity of the statements in the affidavit does not affect the validity of the marriage,
as the essential and formal requisites were complied with; and the solemnizing officer was not required to
investigate as to whether the said affidavit was legally obtained. The Republic opines that as a marriage under a
license is not invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated
by the fact that the parties incorporated a fabricated statement in their affidavit that they cohabited as husband and
wife for at least five years. In addition, the Republic posits that the parties marriage contract states that their
marriage was solemnized under Article 76 of the Civil Code. It also bears the signature of the parties and their
witnesses, and must be considered a primary evidence of marriage. To further fortify its Petition, the Republic
adduces the following documents: (1) Joses notarized Statement of Assets and Liabilities, dated 12 May 1988
wherein he wrote Felisas name as his wife; (2) Certification dated 25 July 1993 issued by the Barangay Chairman
192, Zone ZZ, District 24 of Pasay City, attesting that Jose and Felisa had lived together as husband and wife in
said barangay; and (3) Joses company ID card, dated 2 May 1988, indicating Felisas name as his wife.

The first assignment of error compels this Court to rule on the issue of the effect of a false affidavit under Article 76
of the Civil Code. A survey of the prevailing rules is in order.

It is beyond dispute that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was celebrated on 24 November 1986, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code. Accordingly, the Civil Code governs their union. Article 53 of the Civil Code spells
out the essential requisites of marriage as a contract:

ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character. (Emphasis ours.)

Article 58[27] makes explicit that no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local
civil registrar of the municipality where either contracting party habitually resides, save marriages of an exceptional
character authorized by the Civil Code, but not those under Article 75.[28] Article 80(3)[29] of the Civil Code
makes it clear that a marriage performed without the corresponding marriage license is void, this being nothing
more than the legitimate consequence flowing from the fact that the license is the essence of the marriage contract.
[30] This is in stark contrast to the old Marriage Law,[31] whereby the absence of a marriage license did not make
the marriage void. The rationale for the compulsory character of a marriage license under the Civil Code is that it is
the authority granted by the State to the contracting parties, after the proper government official has inquired into
their capacity to contract marriage.[32]

Under the Civil Code, marriages of exceptional character are covered by Chapter 2, Title III, comprising Articles 72
to 79. To wit, these marriages are: (1) marriages in articulo mortis or at the point of death during peace or war, (2)
marriages in remote places, (2) consular marriages,[33] (3) ratification of marital cohabitation, (4) religious
ratification of a civil marriage, (5) Mohammedan or pagan marriages, and (6) mixed marriages.[34]

The instant case pertains to a ratification of marital cohabitation under Article 76 of the Civil Code, which provides:

ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of majority
and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry each
other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to
administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he
took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

The reason for the law,[35] as espoused by the Code Commission, is that the publicity attending a marriage license
may discourage such persons who have lived in a state of cohabitation from legalizing their status.[36]

It is not contested herein that the marriage of Jose and Felisa was performed without a marriage license. In lieu
thereof, they executed an affidavit declaring that they have attained the age of maturity; that being unmarried, they
have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years; and that because of this union, they desire to marry
each other.[37] One of the central issues in the Petition at bar is thus: whether the falsity of an affidavit of marital
cohabitation, where the parties have in truth fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement, effectively renders
the marriage void ab initio for lack of a marriage license.

We answer in the affirmative.

Marriages of exceptional character are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule on the indispensability of the formal
requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of statutory construction, exceptions, as a general rule, should be
strictly[38] but reasonably construed.[39] They extend only so far as their language fairly warrants, and all doubts
should be resolved in favor of the general provisions rather than the exception.[40] Where a general rule is
established by statute with exceptions, the court will not curtail the former or add to the latter by implication.[41]
For the exception in Article 76 to apply, it is a sine qua non thereto that the man and the woman must have attained
the age of majority, and that, being unmarried, they have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years.

A strict but reasonable construction of Article 76 leaves us with no other expediency but to read the law as it is
plainly written. The exception of a marriage license under Article 76 applies only to those who have lived together
as husband and wife for at least five years and desire to marry each other. The Civil Code, in no ambiguous terms,
places a minimum period requirement of five years of cohabitation. No other reading of the law can be had, since
the language of Article 76 is precise. The minimum requisite of five years of cohabitation is an indispensability
carved in the language of the law. For a marriage celebrated under Article 76 to be valid, this material fact cannot be
dispensed with. It is embodied in the law not as a directory requirement, but as one that partakes of a mandatory
character. It is worthy to mention that Article 76 also prescribes that the contracting parties shall state the requisite
facts[42] in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths; and that the official, priest or
minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and
other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.

It is indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their
sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. The Republic admitted that Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage.[43] The Court of Appeals also noted
Felisas testimony that Jose was introduced to her by her neighbor, Teresita Perwel, sometime in February or March
1986 after the EDSA Revolution.[44] The appellate court also cited Felisas own testimony that it was only in June
1986 when Jose commenced to live in her house.[45]

Moreover, it is noteworthy that the question as to whether they satisfied the minimum five-year requisite is factual
in nature. A question of fact arises when there is a need to decide on the truth or falsehood of the alleged facts.[46]
Under Rule 45, factual findings are ordinarily not subject to this Courts review.[47] It is already well-settled that:

The general rule is that the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court. A recognized
exception to this rule is when the Court of Appeals and the trial court, or in this case the administrative body, make
contradictory findings. However, the exception does not apply in every instance that the Court of Appeals and the
trial court or administrative body disagree. The factual findings of the Court of Appeals remain conclusive on this
Court if such findings are supported by the record or based on substantial evidence.[48]
Therefore, the falsity of the affidavit dated 24 November 1986, executed by Jose and Felisa to exempt them from
the requirement of a marriage license, is beyond question.

We cannot accept the insistence of the Republic that the falsity of the statements in the parties affidavit will not
affect the validity of marriage, since all the essential and formal requisites were complied with. The argument
deserves scant merit. Patently, it cannot be denied that the marriage between Jose and Felisa was celebrated without
the formal requisite of a marriage license. Neither did Jose and Felisa meet the explicit legal requirement in Article
76, that they should have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, so as to be excepted from the
requirement of a marriage license.

Anent petitioners reliance on the presumption of marriage, this Court holds that the same finds no applicability to
the case at bar. Essentially, when we speak of a presumption of marriage, it is with reference to the prima facie
presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract
of marriage.[49] Restated more explicitly, persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the
absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married.[50] The present case does
not involve an apparent marriage to which the presumption still needs to be applied. There is no question that Jose
and Felisa actually entered into a contract of marriage on 24 November 1986, hence, compelling Jose to institute a
Complaint for Annulment and/or Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, which spawned the instant consolidated
Petitions.

In the same vein, the declaration of the Civil Code[51] that every intendment of law or fact leans towards the
validity of marriage will not salvage the parties marriage, and extricate them from the effect of a violation of the
law. The marriage of Jose and Felisa was entered into without the requisite marriage license or compliance with the
stringent requirements of a marriage under exceptional circumstance. The solemnization of a marriage without prior
license is a clear violation of the law and would lead or could be used, at least, for the perpetration of fraud against
innocent and unwary parties, which was one of the evils that the law sought to prevent by making a prior license a
prerequisite for a valid marriage.[52] The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense
of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.[53] To permit a false affidavit to take the
place of a marriage license is to allow an abject circumvention of the law. If this Court is to protect the fabric of the
institution of marriage, we must be wary of deceptive schemes that violate the legal measures set forth in our laws.

Similarly, we are not impressed by the ratiocination of the Republic that as a marriage under a license is not
invalidated by the fact that the license was wrongfully obtained, so must a marriage not be invalidated by a
fabricated statement that the parties have cohabited for at least five years as required by law. The contrast is
flagrant. The former is with reference to an irregularity of the marriage license, and not to the absence of one. Here,
there is no marriage license at all. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the
period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath. If the essential matter in the sworn
affidavit is a lie, then it is but a mere scrap of paper, without force and effect. Hence, it is as if there was no affidavit
at all.

In its second assignment of error, the Republic puts forth the argument that based on equity, Jose should be denied
relief because he perpetrated the fabrication, and cannot thereby profit from his wrongdoing. This is a misplaced
invocation. It must be stated that equity finds no room for application where there is a law.[54] There is a law on the
ratification of marital cohabitation, which is set in precise terms under Article 76 of the Civil Code. Nonetheless,
the authorities are consistent that the declaration of nullity of the parties marriage is without prejudice to their
criminal liability.[55]

The Republic further avers in its third assignment of error that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality
of his marriage for lack of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to
1990, notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose seven
years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in.

This is erroneous. An action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.[56] Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated
sans a marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right to
impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time.

Lastly, to settle all doubts, jurisprudence has laid down the rule that the five-year common-law cohabitation period
under Article 76 means a five-year period computed back from the date of celebration of marriage, and refers to a
period of legal union had it not been for the absence of a marriage.[57] It covers the years immediately preceding
the day of the marriage, characterized by exclusivity - meaning no third party was involved at any time within the
five years - and continuity that is unbroken.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Petitions are DENIED. The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated 7 November
2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 68759, declaring the marriage of Jose Dayot to Felisa Tecson-Dayot void ab initio, is
AFFIRMED, without prejudice to their criminal liability, if any. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

DANTE O. TINGA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Acting Chairpersons attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* Per Special Order No. 497, dated 14 March 2008, signed by Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno designating Associate
Justice Dante O. Tinga to replace Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, who is on official leave under the
Courts Wellness Program and assigning Associate Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez as Acting Chairperson.
** Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. was designated to sit as additional member replacing Justice Antonio Eduardo
B. Nachura per Raffle dated 12 September 2007.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon with Associate Justices Mario L. Guaria III and Santiago Javier

Ranada, concurring; rollo ( G.R. No. 175581), pp. 65-70; rollo, (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 156-161.
[2] Records, p. 170.
[3] Id.
[4] Id. at 1-8.
[5] The marriage contract shows that at the time of the celebration of the parties marriage, Jose was 27 years old,
while Felisa was 37.
[6] The Administrative complaint before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman
was docketed as OMB-ADM-0-93-0466; Records, pp. 252-258.
[7] Id. at 257.
[8] Id. at 313-323.
[9] Id. at 323.
[10] Id. at 321-322.
[11] ART. 87. - The action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the parties and within the periods as
follows:
(1) For causes mentioned in Number 1 of Article 85, by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within four years after attaining the age of twenty or eighteen years, as the case may be; or by the parent or
guardian or person having legal charge, at any time before such party has arrived at the age of twenty or eighteen
years;
(2) For causes mentioned in Number 2 of Article 85, by the spouse who has been absent, during his or her lifetime;
or by either spouse of the subsequent marriage during the lifetime of the other;
(3) For causes mentioned in Number 3 of Article 85, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the other's
insanity; or by any relative or guardian of the party of unsound mind, at any time before the death of either party;
(4) For causes mentioned in Number 4, by the injured party, within four years after the discovery of the fraud;
(5) For causes mentioned in Number 5, by the injured party, within four years from the time the force or
intimidation ceased;
(6) For causes mentioned in Number 6, by the injured party, within eight years after the marriage.
[12] Records, p. 322.
[13] Rollo ( G.R. No. 179474), p. 125.
[14] ART. 86. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute fraud referred to in number 4 of the preceding
article:
(1) Misrepresentation as to the identity of one of the contracting parties;
(2) Nondisclosure of the previous conviction of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude, and the
penalty imposed was imprisonment for two years or more;
(3) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her
husband;
No other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give
grounds for action for the annulment of marriage.
[15] Rollo ( G.R. No. 179474), p. 122.
[16] ART. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have attained the age of
majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, desire to marry
each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law
to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall also state in an affidavit that
he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties and that he found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
[17] ART. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justices of the Court of Appeals;
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the peace;
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospel of any denomination, church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided
in Article 92; and
(7) Ship captains, airplane chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in special cases provided in
Articles 74 and 75.
[18] ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction;
(2) Any priest, rabbi, imam, or minister of any church or religious sect duly authorized by his church or religious
sect and registered with the civil registrar general, acting within the limits of the written authority granted him by
his church or religious sect and provided that at least one of the contracting parties belongs to the solemnizing
officer's church or religious sect;
(3) Any ship captain or airplane chief only in the cases mentioned in Article 31;
(4) Any military commander of a unit to which a chaplain is assigned, in the absence of the latter, during a military
operation, likewise only in the cases mentioned in Article 32; or
(5) Any consul-general, consul or vice-consul in the case provided in Article 10.
[19] CA rollo, p. 279.
[20] 384 Phil. 661 (2000).
[21] CA rollo, pp. 278-279.
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), pp. 173-174.
[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 180.

[24] Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), pp. 44-45.

[25] Erroneously cited as Nio v. Bayadog; rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 18.
[26] 377 Phil. 919 (1999).
[27] ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
[28] ART. 75. Marriages between Filipino citizens abroad may be solemnized by consuls and vice-consuls of the
Republic of the Philippines. The duties of the local civil registrar and of a judge or justice of the peace or mayor
with regard to the celebration of marriage shall be performed by such consuls and vice-consuls.
[29] ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.
[30] People v. De Lara, No. 12583-R, 14 February 1955, 51 O.G. 4079, 4082.
[31] The Marriage Law, otherwise known as Act No. 3613, requires the following essential requisites: (1) legal
capacity of the contracting parties; and (2) their mutual consent.
[32] Report of the Code Commission, pp. 79-80; see also Ambrosio Padilla, Civil Code Annotated, 1956 Edition,
Vol. I, p. 195.
[33] Must be read with Article 58 of the Civil Code which provides:
ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
[34] Edgardo L. Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines Annotated (1984 Eleventh Ed.), pp. 302-310.
[35] In Nial v. Bayadog (supra note 20 at 668-669), this Court articulated the spirit behind Article 76 of the Civil
Code, thus:
However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76, referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together
and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years
before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status. To preserve peace in the family, avoid
the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the publication of
their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that requirement.
[36] The Report of the Code Commission states that No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a
woman who have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years desire to marry each other. In such case, the publicity attending a marriage license may
discourage such persons from legalizing their status, Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[37] Records, p. 49. The affidavit was denominated by the parties as an Affidavit on (sic) Marriage Between Man
and Woman Who Haved (sic) Lived Together as Husband and Wife for at Least Five Years.
[38] Benedicto v. Court of Appeals, 416 Phil. 722, 744 (2001).
[39] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 130, 137 (1999).
[40] Id.
[41] Id. citing Samson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-43182, 25 November 1986, 145 SCRA 654, 659.
[42] The first part of Article 76 states, No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who have
attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five
years, desire to marry each other x x x.
[43] Rollo (G.R. No. 175581), p. 38.
[44] Rollo (G.R. No. 179474), p. 158, citing TSN (Civil Case No. B-4143), 15 April 1999.
[45] Id. at 159.
[46] First Dominion Resources Corporation v. Pearanda, G.R. No. 166616, 27 January 2006, 480 SCRA 504,
508.
[47] Civil Service Commission v. Ledesma, G.R. No. 154521, 30 September 2005, 471 SCRA 589, 605.
[48] Id.
[49] Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 708 (1999).
[50] Id.
[51] ART. 220. In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law
or fact leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children,
the community of property during marriage, the authority of parents over their children, and the validity of defense
for any member of the family in case of unlawful aggression.
[52] People v. De Lara, supra note 30 at 4083.
[53] Malcampo-Sin v. Sin, 407 Phil. 583, 588 (2001).
[54] Salavarria v. Letran College, 357 Phil. 189, 196 (1998); Aparente, Sr. v. National Labor Relations Commission,
387 Phil. 96, 108 (2000).
[55] Supra note 33 at 306. Alicia V. Sempio-Diy in A Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines (1995 Ed.,
p. 38) wrote that If the parties falsify their affidavit in order to have an instant marriage, although the truth is that
they have not been cohabiting for five years, their marriage will be void for lack of a marriage license, and they will
also be criminally liable. Article 76 of the Civil Code is now Article 34 of the Family Code, which reads:
ART. 34. No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband
and wife for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall
state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing
officer shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.
[56] Nial v. Bayadog, supra note 20 at 134.
[57] Id. at 130-131.
[58] Id.

Today is Saturday, September 03, 2016

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329 March 8, 2001

(Formerly A.M. No. OCA IPI No. 99-706-MTJ)

HERMINIA BORJA-MANZANO, petitioner,

vs.
JUDGE ROQUE R. SANCHEZ, MTC, Infanta, Pangasinan, respondent.

RESOLUTION

DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:

The solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who were both bound by a prior existing marriage
is the bone of contention of the instant complaint against respondent Judge Roque R. Sanchez, Municipal Trial
Court, Infanta, Pangasinan. For this act, complainant Herminia Borja-Manzano charges respondent Judge with
gross ignorance of the law in a sworn Complaint-Affidavit filed with the Office of the Court Administrator on 12
May 1999.

Complainant avers that she was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano, having been married to him on 21 May
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish, Araneta Avenue, Caloocan City.1 Four children were born out of that
marriage.2 On 22 March 1993, however, her husband contracted another marriage with one Luzviminda Payao
before respondent Judge.3 When respondent Judge solemnized said marriage, he knew or ought to know that the
same was void and bigamous, as the marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were "separated."

Respondent Judge, on the other hand, claims in his Comment that when he officiated the marriage between
Manzano and Payao he did not know that Manzano was legally married. What he knew was that the two had been
living together as husband and wife for seven years already without the benefit of marriage, as manifested in their
joint affidavit.4 According to him, had he known that the late Manzano was married, he would have advised the
latter not to marry again; otherwise, he (Manzano) could be charged with bigamy. He then prayed that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and for being designed merely to harass him.

After an evaluation of the Complaint and the Comment, the Court Administrator recommended that respondent
Judge be found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and be ordered to pay a fine of P2,000, with a warning that a
repetition of the same or similar act would be dealt with more severely.

On 25 October 2000, this Court required the parties to manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for
resolution on the basis of the pleadings thus filed. Complainant answered in the affirmative.

For his part, respondent Judge filed a Manifestation reiterating his plea for the dismissal of the complaint and
setting aside his earlier Comment. He therein invites the attention of the Court to two separate affidavits5 of the late
Manzano and of Payao, which were allegedly unearthed by a member of his staff upon his instruction. In those
affidavits, both David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao expressly stated that they were married to Herminia Borja
and Domingo Relos, respectively; and that since their respective marriages had been marked by constant quarrels,
they had both left their families and had never cohabited or communicated with their spouses anymore. Respondent
Judge alleges that on the basis of those affidavits, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in question in accordance
with Article 34 of the Family Code.

We find merit in the complaint.

Article 34 of the Family Code provides:

No license shall be necessary for the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived together as husband and wife
for at least five years and without any legal impediment to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the
foregoing facts in an affidavit before any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The solemnizing officer
shall also state under oath that he ascertained the qualifications of the contracting parties and found no legal
impediment to the marriage.

For this provision on legal ratification of marital cohabitation to apply, the following requisites must concur:

1. The man and woman must have been living together as husband and wife for at least five years before the
marriage;
2. The parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other;

3. The fact of absence of legal impediment between the parties must be present at the time of marriage;

4. The parties must execute an affidavit stating that they have lived together for at least five years [and are without
legal impediment to marry each other]; and

5. The solemnizing officer must execute a sworn statement that he had ascertained the qualifications of the parties
and that he had found no legal impediment to their marriage.6

Not all of these requirements are present in the case at bar. It is significant to note that in their separate affidavits
executed on 22 March 1993 and sworn to before respondent Judge himself, David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao
expressly stated the fact of their prior existing marriage. Also, in their marriage contract, it was indicated that both
were "separated."

Respondent Judge knew or ought to know that a subsisting previous marriage is a diriment impediment, which
would make the subsequent marriage null and void.7 In fact, in his Comment, he stated that had he known that the
late Manzano was married he would have discouraged him from contracting another marriage. And respondent
Judge cannot deny knowledge of Manzanos and Payaos subsisting previous marriage, as the same was clearly
stated in their separate affidavits which were subscribed and sworn to before him.

The fact that Manzano and Payao had been living apart from their respective spouses for a long time already is
immaterial. Article 63(1) of the Family Code allows spouses who have obtained a decree of legal separation to live
separately from each other, but in such a case the marriage bonds are not severed. Elsewise stated, legal separation
does not dissolve the marriage tie, much less authorize the parties to remarry. This holds true all the more when the
separation is merely de facto, as in the case at bar.

Neither can respondent Judge take refuge on the Joint Affidavit of David Manzano and Luzviminda Payao stating
that they had been cohabiting as husband and wife for seven years. Just like separation, free and voluntary
cohabitation with another person for at least five years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage.
Marital cohabitation for a long period of time between two individuals who are legally capacitated to marry each
other is merely a ground for exemption from marriage license. It could not serve as a justification for respondent
Judge to solemnize a subsequent marriage vitiated by the impediment of a prior existing marriage.

Clearly, respondent Judge demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous
marriage. The maxim "ignorance of the law excuses no one" has special application to judges,8 who, under Rule
1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, should be the embodiment of competence, integrity, and independence. It is
highly imperative that judges be conversant with the law and basic legal principles.9 And when the law transgressed
is simple and elementary, the failure to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.10
ACCORDINGLY, the recommendation of the Court Administrator is hereby ADOPTED, with the
MODIFICATION that the amount of fine to be imposed upon respondent Judge Roque Sanchez is increased to
P20,000.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Annex "A" of Complaint.

2 Annexes "B" to "E" of Complaint.

3 Annex "F" of Complaint.

4 Attached to the Marriage Contract (Annex "F" of Complaint).

5 Annexes "B" and "C" of Respondent Judges Manifestation.

6 DISIDERIO P. JURADO, CIVIL LAW REVIEWER 63 (1989).

7 Article 41, Family Code.

8 Espiritu v. Jovellanos, 280 SCRA 579, 589 [1997]; Vercide v. Hernandez, A.M. No. MTJ-00-1265, 6 April 2000.

9 Macasasa v. Imbing, 312 SCRA 385, 395 [1999].

10 Madredijo v. Loyao, 316 SCRA 544, 568 [1999]; Agunday v. Tresvalles, 319 SCRA 134, 146 [1999]; Villanueva
v. Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1221, 16 March 2000.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 133778. March 14, 2000]

ENGRACE NIAL for Herself and as Guardian ad Litem of the minors BABYLINE NIAL, INGRID NIAL,
ARCHIE NIAL & PEPITO NIAL, JR., petitioners, vs. NORMA BAYADOG, respondent. Ncmmis

DECISION

YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:

May the heirs of a deceased person file a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage after his death?

Pepito Nial was married to Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. Out of their marriage were born herein
petitioners. Teodulfa was shot by Pepito resulting in her death on April 24, 1985. One year and 8 months thereafter
or on December 11, 1986, Pepito and respondent Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. In lieu
thereof, Pepito and Norma executed an affidavit dated December 11, 1986 stating that they had lived together as
husband and wife for at least five years and were thus exempt from securing a marriage license. On February 19,
1997, Pepito died in a car accident. After their fathers death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of
the marriage of Pepito to Norma alleging that the said marriage was void for lack of a marriage license. The case
was filed under the assumption that the validity or invalidity of the second marriage would affect petitioners
successional rights. Norma filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that petitioners have no cause of action since
they are not among the persons who could file an action for "annulment of marriage" under Article 47 of the Family
Code.

Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City, Cebu, Branch 59, dismissed the petition after
finding that the Family Code is "rather silent, obscure, insufficient" to resolve the following issues:

(1) Whether or not plaintiffs have a cause of action against defendant in asking for the declaration of the nullity of
marriage of their deceased father, Pepito G. Nial, with her specially so when at the time of the filing of this instant
suit, their father Pepito G. Nial is already dead;

(2) Whether or not the second marriage of plaintiffs deceased father with defendant is null and void ab initio;

(3) Whether or not plaintiffs are estopped from assailing the validity of the second marriage after it was dissolved
due to their fathers death.[1]

Thus, the lower court ruled that petitioners should have filed the action to declare null and void their fathers
marriage to respondent before his death, applying by analogy Article 47 of the Family Code which enumerates the
time and the persons who could initiate an action for annulment of marriage.[2] Hence, this petition for review with
this Court grounded on a pure question of law. Scnc m

This petition was originally dismissed for non-compliance with Section 11, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, and because "the verification failed to state the basis of petitioners averment that the allegations in the
petition are true and correct." It was thus treated as an unsigned pleading which produces no legal effect under
Section 3, Rule 7, of the 1997 Rules.[3] However, upon motion of petitioners, this Court reconsidered the dismissal
and reinstated the petition for review.[4]

The two marriages involved herein having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code (FC), the
applicable law to determine their validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of their
celebration.[5] A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code,[6] the absence
of which renders the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[7] in relation to Article 58.[8] The
requirement and issuance of marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in
every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[9] This interest proceeds from the
constitutional mandate that the State recognizes the sanctity of family life and of affording protection to the family
as a basic "autonomous social institution."[10] Specifically, the Constitution considers marriage as an "inviolable
social institution," and is the foundation of family life which shall be protected by the State.[11] This is why the
Family Code considers marriage as "a special contract of permanent union"[12] and case law considers it "not just
an adventure but a lifetime commitment."[13]

However, there are several instances recognized by the Civil Code wherein a marriage license is dispensed with,
one of which is that provided in Article 76,[14] referring to the marriage of a man and a woman who have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five
years before the marriage. The rationale why no license is required in such case is to avoid exposing the parties to
humiliation, shame and embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid
marriage due to the publication of every applicants name for a marriage license. The publicity attending the
marriage license may discourage such persons from legitimizing their status.[15] To preserve peace in the family,
avoid the peeping and suspicious eye of public exposure and contain the source of gossip arising from the
publication of their names, the law deemed it wise to preserve their privacy and exempt them from that
requirement. Sdaa miso

There is no dispute that the marriage of petitioners father to respondent Norma was celebrated without any marriage
license. In lieu thereof, they executed an affidavit stating that "they have attained the age of majority, and, being
unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least five years, and that we now desire to marry each
other."[16] The only issue that needs to be resolved pertains to what nature of cohabitation is contemplated under
Article 76 of the Civil Code to warrant the counting of the five year period in order to exempt the future spouses
from securing a marriage license. Should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties are capacitated to marry each
other during the entire five-year continuous period or should it be a cohabitation wherein both parties have lived
together and exclusively with each other as husband and wife during the entire five-year continuous period
regardless of whether there is a legal impediment to their being lawfully married, which impediment may have
either disappeared or intervened sometime during the cohabitation period?

Working on the assumption that Pepito and Norma have lived together as husband and wife for five years without
the benefit of marriage, that five-year period should be computed on the basis of a cohabitation as "husband and
wife" where the only missing factor is the special contract of marriage to validate the union. In other words, the
five-year common-law cohabitation period, which is counted back from the date of celebration of marriage, should
be a period of legal union had it not been for the absence of the marriage. This 5-year period should be the years
immediately before the day of the marriage and it should be a period of cohabitation characterized by exclusivity
meaning no third party was involved at any time within the 5 years and continuity that is unbroken. Otherwise, if
that continuous 5-year cohabitation is computed without any distinction as to whether the parties were capacitated
to marry each other during the entire five years, then the law would be sanctioning immorality and encouraging
parties to have common law relationships and placing them on the same footing with those who lived faithfully
with their spouse. Marriage being a special relationship must be respected as such and its requirements must be
strictly observed. The presumption that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife is based on
the approximation of the requirements of the law. The parties should not be afforded any excuse to not comply with
every single requirement and later use the same missing element as a pre-conceived escape ground to nullify their
marriage. There should be no exemption from securing a marriage license unless the circumstances clearly fall
within the ambit of the exception. It should be noted that a license is required in order to notify the public that two
persons are about to be united in matrimony and that anyone who is aware or has knowledge of any impediment to
the union of the two shall make it known to the local civil registrar.[17] The Civil Code provides:

Article 63: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the marriage to
advice the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 64: "Upon being advised of any alleged impediment to the marriage, the local civil registrar shall forthwith
make an investigation, examining persons under oath. x x x" Sdaad

This is reiterated in the Family Code thus:

Article 17 provides in part: "x x x. This notice shall request all persons having knowledge of any impediment to the
marriage to advise the local civil registrar thereof. x x x."

Article 18 reads in part: "x x x. In case of any impediment known to the local civil registrar or brought to his
attention, he shall note down the particulars thereof and his findings thereon in the application for a marriage
license. x x x."

This is the same reason why our civil laws, past or present, absolutely prohibited the concurrence of multiple
marriages by the same person during the same period. Thus, any marriage subsequently contracted during the
lifetime of the first spouse shall be illegal and void,[18] subject only to the exception in cases of absence or where
the prior marriage was dissolved or annulled. The Revised Penal Code complements the civil law in that the
contracting of two or more marriages and the having of extramarital affairs are considered felonies, i.e., bigamy and
concubinage and adultery.[19] The law sanctions monogamy.

In this case, at the time of Pepito and respondents marriage, it cannot be said that they have lived with each other as
husband and wife for at least five years prior to their wedding day. From the time Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with respondent, only about twenty months had elapsed. Even assuming that
Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and respondent had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the
cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the law but
rendered imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. Pepito had a subsisting marriage at the time when
he started cohabiting with respondent. It is immaterial that when they lived with each other, Pepito had already been
separated in fact from his lawful spouse. The subsistence of the marriage even where there was actual severance of
the filial companionship between the spouses cannot make any cohabitation by either spouse with any third party as
being one as "husband and wife". Scs daad

Having determined that the second marriage involved in this case is not covered by the exception to the requirement
of a marriage license, it is void ab initio because of the absence of such element.

The next issue to be resolved is: do petitioners have the personality to file a petition to declare their fathers marriage
void after his death?

Contrary to respondent judges ruling, Article 47 of the Family Code[20] cannot be applied even by analogy to
petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage. The second ground for annulment of marriage relied upon by the
trial court, which allows "the sane spouse" to file an annulment suit "at any time before the death of either party" is
inapplicable. Article 47 pertains to the grounds, periods and persons who can file an annulment suit, not a suit for
declaration of nullity of marriage. The Code is silent as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage. Voidable and void marriages are not identical. A marriage that is annulable is valid until otherwise
declared by the court; whereas a marriage that is void ab initio is considered as having never to have taken
place[21] and cannot be the source of rights. The first can be generally ratified or confirmed by free cohabitation or
prescription while the other can never be ratified. A voidable marriage cannot be assailed collaterally except in a
direct proceeding while a void marriage can be attacked collaterally. Consequently, void marriages can be
questioned even after the death of either party but voidable marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the marriage had
been perfectly valid.[22] That is why the action or defense for nullity is imprescriptible, unlike voidable marriages
where the action prescribes. Only the parties to a voidable marriage can assail it but any proper interested party may
attack a void marriage. Void marriages have no legal effects except those declared by law concerning the properties
of the alleged spouses, regarding co-ownership or ownership through actual joint contribution,[23] and its effect on
the children born to such void marriages as provided in Article 50 in relation to Article 43 and 44 as well as Article
51, 53 and 54 of the Family Code. On the contrary, the property regime governing voidable marriages is generally
conjugal partnership and the children conceived before its annulment are legitimate. Sup rema

Contrary to the trial courts ruling, the death of petitioners father extinguished the alleged marital bond between him
and respondent. The conclusion is erroneous and proceeds from a wrong premise that there was a marriage bond
that was dissolved between the two. It should be noted that their marriage was void hence it is deemed as if it never
existed at all and the death of either extinguished nothing.

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a
marriage.[24] "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their original rights or to
make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of
good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the marriage
should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent jurisdiction."[25] "Under ordinary
circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as
though no marriage had ever taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil
court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife,
and upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by
the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in direct proceeding
instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage cannot be impeached, and is
made good ab initio.[26] But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage[27]
and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect.[28] For the same reason, the law
makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible.[29]
Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same
cannot be considered imprescriptible. Juris

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage an absolute
nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a
child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass
upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to
the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case. When such need
arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause
"on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes
that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court, Toledo City, Cebu,
Branch 59, dismissing Civil Case No. T-639, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The said case is ordered
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., (Chairman), Puno, and Kapunan, JJ., concur. Sc juris

Pardo, J., on official business abroad.

[1] The dispositive portion of the Order dated March 27, 1998 issued by Judge Ferdinand J. Marcos of Regional
Trial Court (RTC) - Branch 59, Toledo City, reads: "WHEREFORE, premises considered, defendants motion to
dismiss is hereby granted and this instant case is hereby ordered dismissed without costs." (p. 6; Rollo, p. 21).
[2] Order, p. 4; Rollo, p. 19.
[3] Minute Resolution dated July 13, 1998; Rollo, p. 39.
[4] Minute Resolution dated October 7, 1998; Rollo, p. 50.
[5] Tamano v. Ortiz, 291 SCRA 584 (1998).
[6] Now Article 3, Family Code. Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all the requisites are complied
with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties; their consent, freely given;

(2) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(3) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

[7] Now Article 4, Family Code. Art. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxxxxxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.

xxxxxxxxx
[8] Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
[9] Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).
[10] Section 12, Article II, 1987 Constitution; Hernandez v. CA, G. R. No. 126010, December 8, 1999; See also
Tuason v. CA, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).
[11] Section 2, Article XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution.
[12] Article 1, Family Code provides: "Marriage is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal or family life. x x x.
[13] Santos v. CA, 58 SCAD 17 (1995); 310 Phil. 21, 41 (1995).
[14] Now Article 34, Family Code. Art. 76. No marriage license shall be necessary when a man and a woman who
have attained the age of majority and who, being unmarried, have lived together as husband and wife for at least
five years, desire to marry each other. The contracting parties shall state the foregoing facts in an affidavit before
any person authorized by law to administer oaths. The official, priest or minister who solemnized the marriage shall
also state in an affidavit that he took steps to ascertain the ages and other qualifications of the contracting parties
and that he found no legal impediment to the marriage.
[15] Report of the Code Commission, p. 80.
[16] Rollo, p. 29.
[17] Articles 63 and 64, Civil Code; Article 17 and 18, Family Code.
[18] Article 83, Civil Code provides "Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of
the first spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its
performance, unless:
(1) the first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) the first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years."

Article 41 of the Family Code reads: "A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous
marriage shall be null and void, unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been
absent for four consecutive years"
[19] Arts. 333 and 334, Revised Penal Code.
[20] Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by the following persons and within the periods
indicated herein:

(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-one; or by the parent or guardian or person having legal
charge of the minor, at any time before such party has reached the age of twenty-one;

(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the sane spouse, who had no knowledge of the others
insanity; or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of the insane, at any time before the death of
either party, or by the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regaining sanity;

(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the discovery of the
fraud;

(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;

For causes mentioned in numbers 5 and 6 of Article 45, by the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
[21] Suntay v. Cojuanco-Suntay, 300 SCRA 760 (1998); People v. Retirement Board, 272 Ill. App. 59 cited in I
Tolentino, Civil Code, 1990 ed. p. 271.
[22] In re Conzas Estate, 176 Ill. 192; Miller v. Miller, 175 Cal. 797, 167 Pac. 394 cited in I Tolentino, Civil Code,
1990 ed., p. 271.
[23] Article 148-149, Family Code; Article 144, Civil Code.
[24] Odayat v. Amante, 77 SCRA 338 (1977); Weigel v. Sempio-Dy, 143 SCRA 499 (1986); People v. Mendoza, 95
Phil. 845 (1954); 50 O.G. (10) 4767 cited in People v. Aragon, 100 Phil. 1033 (1957); 53 O.G. 3749.
[25] 35 Am. Jur. 219-220.
[26] 18 RCL 446-7; 35 Am Jur. 221.
[27] Apiag v. Cantero, 335 Phil. 511 (1997); 268 SCRA 47 (1997); Atienza v. Judge Brillantes, Jr., 60 SCAD 119;
312 Phil. 939 (1995).
[28] Domingo v. CA, 226 SCRA 572 (1993).
[29] Article 39, Family Code as amended by E.O. 209 and 227 s. 1987 and further amended by R.A. No. 8533 dated
February 23, 1998.
SECOND DIVISION

JOSELITO R. PIMENTEL, G.R. No. 172060

Petitioner,
Present:

CARPIO, J., Chairperson,

- versus - PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,*
ABAD, and
VILLARAMA, JR.,** JJ.
MARIA CHRYSANTINE
L. PIMENTEL and PEOPLE Promulgated:
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondents. September 13, 2010
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review[1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court of Appeals, promulgated on 20
March 2006, in CA-G.R. SP No. 91867.

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are stated in the Court of Appeals decision:

On 25 October 2004, Maria Chrysantine Pimentel y Lacap (private respondent) filed an action for frustrated
parricide against Joselito R. Pimentel (petitioner), docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415, before the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, which was raffled to Branch 223 (RTC Quezon City).

On 7 February 2005, petitioner received summons to appear before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City,
Branch 72 (RTC Antipolo) for the pre-trial and trial of Civil Case No. 04-7392 (Maria Chrysantine Lorenza L.
Pimentel v. Joselito Pimentel) for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage under Section 36 of the Family Code on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
On 11 February 2005, petitioner filed an urgent motion to suspend the proceedings before the RTC Quezon City on
the ground of the existence of a prejudicial question. Petitioner asserted that since the relationship between the
offender and the victim is a key element in parricide, the outcome of Civil Case No. 04-7392 would have a bearing
in the criminal case filed against him before the RTC Quezon City.

The Decision of the Trial Court

The RTC Quezon City issued an Order dated 13 May 2005[3] holding that the pendency of the case before the RTC
Antipolo is not a prejudicial question that warrants the suspension of the criminal case before it. The RTC Quezon
City held that the issues in Criminal Case No. Q-04-130415 are the injuries sustained by respondent and whether
the case could be tried even if the validity of petitioners marriage with respondent is in question. The RTC Quezon
City ruled:

WHEREFORE, on the basis of the foregoing, the Motion to Suspend Proceedings On the [Ground] of the Existence
of a Prejudicial Question is, for lack of merit, DENIED.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. In its 22 August 2005 Order,[5] the RTC Quezon City denied the
motion.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with application for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order before the Court of Appeals, assailing the 13 May 2005 and 22 August 2005 Orders of the RTC
Quezon City.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 20 March 2006 Decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. The Court of Appeals ruled that in the
criminal case for frustrated parricide, the issue is whether the offender commenced the commission of the crime of
parricide directly by overt acts and did not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, the issue in the civil action for annulment of
marriage is whether petitioner is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The
Court of Appeals ruled that even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent would be declared void, it
would be immaterial to the criminal case because prior to the declaration of nullity, the alleged acts constituting the
crime of frustrated parricide had already been committed. The Court of Appeals ruled that all that is required for the
charge of frustrated parricide is that at the time of the commission of the crime, the marriage is still subsisting.

Petitioner filed a petition for review before this Court assailing the Court of Appeals decision.
The Issue

The only issue in this case is whether the resolution of the action for annulment of marriage is a prejudicial question
that warrants the suspension of the criminal case for frustrated parricide against petitioner.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Civil Case Must be Instituted

Before the Criminal Case

Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure[6] provides:

Section 7. Elements of Prejudicial Question. - The elements of a prejudicial question are: (a) the previously
instituted civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the subsequent criminal
action and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.

The rule is clear that the civil action must be instituted first before the filing of the criminal action. In this case, the
Information[7] for Frustrated Parricide was dated 30 August 2004. It was raffled to RTC Quezon City on 25
October 2004 as per the stamped date of receipt on the Information. The RTC Quezon City set Criminal Case No.
Q-04-130415 for pre-trial and trial on 14 February 2005. Petitioner was served summons in Civil Case No. 04-7392
on 7 February 2005.[8] Respondents petition[9] in Civil Case No. 04-7392 was dated 4 November 2004 and was
filed on 5 November 2004. Clearly, the civil case for annulment was filed after the filing of the criminal case for
frustrated parricide. As such, the requirement of Section 7, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure was
not met since the civil action was filed subsequent to the filing of the criminal action.

Annulment of Marriage is not a Prejudicial Question

in Criminal Case for Parricide

Further, the resolution of the civil action is not a prejudicial question that would warrant the suspension of the
criminal action.

There is a prejudicial question when a civil action and a criminal action are both pending, and there exists in the
civil action an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed because
howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in the criminal case.[10] A prejudicial question is defined as:

x x x one that arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the
cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the
crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon
which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil
case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.[11]

The relationship between the offender and the victim is a key element in the crime of parricide,[12] which punishes
any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his ascendants or
descendants, or his spouse.[13] The relationship between the offender and the victim distinguishes the crime of
parricide from murder[14] or homicide.[15] However, the issue in the annulment of marriage is not similar or
intimately related to the issue in the criminal case for parricide. Further, the relationship between the offender and
the victim is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused.

The issue in the civil case for annulment of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code is whether petitioner is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations. The issue in parricide is whether the
accused killed the victim. In this case, since petitioner was charged with frustrated parricide, the issue is whether he
performed all the acts of execution which would have killed respondent as a consequence but which, nevertheless,
did not produce it by reason of causes independent of petitioners will.[16] At the time of the commission of the
alleged crime, petitioner and respondent were married. The subsequent dissolution of their marriage, in case the
petition in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is granted, will have no effect on the alleged crime that was committed at the
time of the subsistence of the marriage. In short, even if the marriage between petitioner and respondent is annulled,
petitioner could still be held criminally liable since at the time of the commission of the alleged crime, he was still
married to respondent.

We cannot accept petitioners reliance on Tenebro v. Court of Appeals[17] that the judicial declaration of the nullity
of a marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity retroacts to the date of the celebration of the marriage
insofar as the vinculum between the spouses is concerned x x x. First, the issue in Tenebro is the effect of the
judicial declaration of nullity of a second or subsequent marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on a
criminal liability for bigamy. There was no issue of prejudicial question in that case. Second, the Court ruled in
Tenebro that [t]here is x x x a recognition written into the law itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio,
may still produce legal consequences.[18] In fact, the Court declared in that case that a declaration of the nullity of
the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is of absolutely no moment insofar as the States
penal laws are concerned.[19]

In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the decision of the Court of Appeals. The trial in Criminal Case No. Q-
04-130415 may proceed as the resolution of the issue in Civil Case No. 04-7392 is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of petitioner in the criminal case.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the 20 March 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 91867.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

* Designated additional member per Special Order No. 886 dated 1 September 2010.
** Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 September 2010.
[1] Under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2] Rollo, pp. 27-34. Penned by Associate Justice Regalado E. Maambong with Associate Justices Rodrigo V.
Cosico and Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring.
[3] Id. at 50-51. Penned by Presiding Judge Ramon A. Cruz.
[4] Id. at 51.
[5] Id. at 53.
[6] Dated 1 December 2000.
[7] Rollo, p. 54.
[8] Id. at 56.
[9] Id. at 61-65.
[10] Jose v. Suarez, G.R. No. 176795, 30 June 2008, 556 SCRA 773.
[11] Go v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 150329-30, 11 September 2007, 532 SCRA 574, 577-578.
[12] People v. Dalag, 450 Phil. 304 (2003).
[13] Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
[14] Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
[15] Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code.
[16] See Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code.
[17] 467 Phil. 723 (2004).
[18] Id. at 744. Italicization in the original.
[19] Id. at 742.
Synopsis/Syllabi
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999]
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE MUNICIPALITY
OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
[ G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999]
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY
OF PASIG, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings
pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.

G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves the
proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the
Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own
jurisdiction/territory.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its mother
Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be
known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996,
creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City.[1] Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for
June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City.[2] Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the
respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as
COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016)[3] and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both
Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute.[4] According to the Municipality of
Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence,
the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided
by the court.

In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite
on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the

boundary dispute involving the two municipalities.[5] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of
Pasig.
The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for being moot in view of
the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified

and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein.[6] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the
Municipality of Cainta.

The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments.

To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary
dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.

The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action
and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule,
this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42,[7] that, in the interest of good order, we can very
well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays
Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in
controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig
has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the
creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or
less permanent natural boundaries.[8] Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil
case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra
vires acts of such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[9] we held that

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice
the peoples welfare.

Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance
the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are
truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.
Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay
Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised
by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.

In Tan v. Commission on Elections,[10] we struck down the moot and academic argument as follows --

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites,
the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case
before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by
this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the
very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents urging that, as there has been
fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of
political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.

Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final
resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay
Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while

2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in
UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the
creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in
abeyance until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-300.

No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing Purisima, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
Pardo, J., no part; was COMELEC Chairman.

[1] Petition, G.R. No. 125646, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 23-25.1

[2] Petition, G.R. No. 128663, Annex, Rollo, pp. 37-39.2

[3] Petition, G.R. No. 125646, Annex B, Rollo, pp. 26-31.3

[4] Petition, G.R. No. 125646, Annex Q, Civil Case No. 94-3006, Rollo, pp. 170-177; Petition, G.R.
No. 128663, Annex J, Rollo, pp. 42-45.4

[5] See Petition, G.R. No. 125646, Annex D, Order, UND No. 96-016, Rollo, pp. 35-36.5

[6] See Petition, G.R. No. 128663, Annex M, Order, UND No. 97-002, Rollo, pp. 67-68.6

[7] See Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, G.R. No. 98084, 227 SCRA 271, 276 (1993).7
[8] Sec. 386(b), R.A. No. 7160.8

[9] G.R. Nos. 118577 and 118627, 242 SCRA 211, 217 (1995).9

[10] G.R. No. 73155, 142 SCRA 727, 741-742 (1986).10

Today is Saturday, September 03, 2016

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 26795 July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing through her parents, ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN,
plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.

Godardo Jacinto for defendant-appellee.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal on points of law from an order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre Sison
Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and another order
denying amendment of the same pleading.

The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follows:

Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below. In her complaint it was
averred that the parties were neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidential relations; that defendant
Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and
intimidation, and without her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied by
defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month, damages and
attorney's fees.

Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that
the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and dismissed the
complaint.

Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later
given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment was allowable,
since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given
by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of
the defendant-appellee (whose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the
said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as
prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in
preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).

ART. 742. Donations made to conceived and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally
represent them if they were already born.

ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living
at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but
the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.

If the omitted compulsory heirs should die before the testator, the institution shall be effectual, without prejudice to
the right of 'representation.

It is thus clear that the lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation
of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates Article 40
aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that Article 40
prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it" adds further
"provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the
time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish Civil Code, clearly points
this out:

Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturus no son simples expectativas, ni aun en el sentido tecnico que la moderna
doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de
pendenci'; el nacimiento del sujeto en las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de
aquellos derechos (que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene efectos declarativos. (1
Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not his wife to
yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his
victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good
customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.

The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:

ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....

Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action for
damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action was
doubly in error.

WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings conformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

Mariano H. de Joya for petitioner.

A.P. Salvador for respondents.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

This petition for certiorari brings up for review question whether the husband of a woman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages from physician who caused the same.

The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz, ordering
the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal, Court of
Appeals, in a special division of five, sustained the award by a majority vote of three justices as against two, who
rendered a separate dissenting opinion.

The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follows:

Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 through her aunt Paula
Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal
her pregnancy from her parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she had herself aborted by the defendant. After
her marriage with the plaintiff, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the Commission on
Elections and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October
1953. Less than two years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo and P. Gomez
streets in Manila, where the three met the defendant and his wife. Nita was again aborted, of a two-month old
foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The plaintiff was at this time in the province
of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the
abortion.

It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and award of damages. Upon
application of the defendant Geluz we granted certiorari.

The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the award of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This we believe to be error,
for the said article, in fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of an
unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality. Under the system of our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva no
alcanza la categoria de persona natural y en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho" (Casso-
Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured,
it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of
the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a
cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no
transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical personality (or juridical capacity as
distinguished from capacity to act). It is no answer to invoke the provisional personality of a conceived child
(conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article expressly limits such
provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided it be
born later with the condition specified in the following article". In the present case, there is no dispute that the child
was dead when separated from its mother's womb.

The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had for
the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton, 52 Am.
Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).

This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be those
inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from the injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his right to
life and physical integrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services from an unborn child,
they would normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development of the spes
hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the disappointment of
their parental expectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as well as to exemplary damages, if the circumstances should
warrant them (Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals have not found
any basis for an award of moral damages, evidently because the appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of
his wife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his
parental hopes and affections. The lower court expressly found, and the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals
did not contradict it, that the appellee was aware of the second abortion; and the probabilities are that he was
likewise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to
investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after
learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal
cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at obtaining from the doctor a large
money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00 damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that,
under the circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:

It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband who righteously feels outraged by the abortion which his wife
has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician would be highminded rather than mercenary; and that his
primary concern would be to see to it that the medical profession was purged of an unworthy member rather than
turn his wife's indiscretion to personal profit, and with that idea in mind to press either the administrative or the
criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of abandoning them in favor of a civil action for damages of which not
only he, but also his wife, would be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's wife, without medical necessity
to warrant it, was a criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned; and the consent
of the woman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the act does not justify an
award of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factual or legal basis.

The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for their
information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may warrant.

Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and Natividad, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, J., took no part.
De Leon, J., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

THIRD DIVISION

CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

- versus -

HON. ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO and NAGKAKAISANG

MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER),
Respondents.

G.R. No. 182836

Present:

CARPIO, J.,
Chairperson,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

Promulgated:

October 13, 2009

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[1]
dated 27 February 2008 and the Resolution[2] dated 9 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
101697, affirming the Resolution[3] dated 20 November 2007 of respondent Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty.
Allan S. Montao (Montao) granting bereavement leave and other death benefits to Rolando P. Hortillano
(Hortillano), grounded on the death of his unborn child.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) and a
member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade Unions in the
Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed on 9 January 2006, a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union, which reads:

ARTICLE X: LEAVE OF ABSENCE

xxxx

Section 2. BEREAVEMENT LEAVEThe Company agrees to grant a bereavement leave with pay to any employee
in case of death of the employees legitimate dependent (parents, spouse, children, brothers and sisters) based on the
following:
2.1 Within Metro Manila up to Marilao, Bulacan - 7 days

2.2 Provincial/Outside Metro Manila - 11 days

xxxx

ARTICLE XVIII: OTHER BENEFITS

xxxx

Section 4. DEATH AND ACCIDENT INSURANCEThe Company shall grant death and accidental insurance to the
employee or his family in the following manner:

xxxx

4.3 DEPENDENTSEleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (Php11,550.00) in case of death of the employees
legitimate dependents (parents, spouse, and children). In case the employee is single, this benefit covers the
legitimate parents, brothers and sisters only with proper legal document to be presented (e.g. death certificate).[4]

The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife, Marife V. Hortillano, had a
premature delivery on 5 January 2006 while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy.[5] According to the Certificate
of Fetal Death dated 7 January 2006, the female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to
uteroplacental insufficiency.[6]

Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement
leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance.[7]

Seeking the reversal of the denial by Continental Steel of Hortillanos claims for bereavement and other death
benefits, the Union resorted to the grievance machinery provided in the CBA. Despite the series of conferences
held, the parties still failed to settle their dispute,[8] prompting the Union to file a Notice to Arbitrate before the
National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
National Capital Region (NCR).[9] In a Submission Agreement dated 9 October 2006, the Union and Continental
Steel submitted for voluntary arbitration the sole issue of whether Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and
other death benefits pursuant to Article X, Section 2

and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA.[10] The parties mutually chose Atty. Montao, an Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator, to resolve said issue.[11]
When the preliminary conferences again proved futile in amicably settling the dispute, the parties proceeded to
submit their respective Position Papers, [12] Replies,[13] and Rejoinders[14] to Atty. Montao.

The Union argued that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave and other death benefits pursuant to the CBA.
The Union maintained that Article X, Section 2 and Article XVIII, Section 4.3 of the CBA did not specifically state
that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her
subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. The Union cited cases wherein employees of MKK
Steel Corporation (MKK Steel) and Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation (Mayer Steel), sister companies of Continental
Steel, in similar situations as Hortillano were able to receive death benefits under similar provisions of their CBAs.

The Union mentioned in particular the case of Steve L. Dugan (Dugan), an employee of Mayer Steel, whose wife
also prematurely delivered a fetus, which had already died prior to the delivery. Dugan was able to receive paternity
leave, bereavement leave, and voluntary contribution under the CBA between his union and Mayer Steel.[15]
Dugans child was only 24 weeks in the womb and died before labor, as opposed to Hortillanos child who was
already 37-38 weeks in the womb and only died during labor.

The Union called attention to the fact that MKK Steel and Mayer Steel are located in the same compound as
Continental Steel; and the representatives of MKK Steel and Mayer Steel who signed the CBA with their respective
employees unions were the same as the representatives of Continental Steel who signed the existing CBA with the
Union.

Finally, the Union invoked Article 1702 of the Civil Code, which provides that all doubts in labor legislations and
labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety of and decent living for the laborer.

On the other hand, Continental Steel posited that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of
an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the
benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case.
Continental Steel, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42[16] of the Civil Code, contended that only one with civil
personality could die. Hence, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality.
Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of
delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired
juridical personality. A fetus that was delivered dead could not be considered a dependent, since it never needed any
support, nor did it ever acquire the right to be supported.

Continental Steel maintained that the wording of the CBA was clear and unambiguous. Since neither of the parties
qualified the terms used in the CBA, the legally accepted definitions thereof were deemed automatically accepted
by both parties. The failure of the Union to have unborn child included in the definition of dependent, as used in the
CBA the death of whom would have qualified the parent-employee for bereavement leave and other death benefits
bound the Union to the legally accepted definition of the latter term.
Continental Steel, lastly, averred that similar cases involving the employees of its sister companies, MKK Steel and
Mayer Steel, referred to by the Union, were irrelevant and incompetent evidence, given the separate and distinct
personalities of the companies. Neither could the Union sustain its claim that the grant of bereavement leave and
other death benefits to the parent-employee for the loss of an unborn child constituted company practice.

On 20 November 2007, Atty. Montao, the appointed Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator, issued a Resolution[17] ruling
that Hortillano was entitled to bereavement leave with pay and death benefits.

Atty. Montao identified the elements for entitlement to said benefits, thus:

This Office declares that for the entitlement of the benefit of bereavement leave with pay by the covered employees
as provided under Article X, Section 2 of the parties CBA, three (3) indispensable elements must be present: (1)
there is death; (2) such death must be of employees dependent; and (3) such dependent must be legitimate.

On the otherhand, for the entitlement to benefit for death and accident insurance as provided under Article XVIII,
Section 4, paragraph (4.3) of the parties CBA, four (4) indispensable elements must be present: (a) there is death;
(b) such death must be of employees dependent; (c) such dependent must be legitimate; and (d) proper legal
document to be presented.[18]

Atty. Montao found that there was no dispute that the death of an employees legitimate dependent occurred. The
fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely
on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of
someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Therefore, the fetus was already a dependent, although he/she died
during the labor or delivery. There was also no question that Hortillano and his wife were lawfully married, making
their dependent, unborn child, legitimate.

In the end, Atty. Montao decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, a resolution is hereby rendered ORDERING [herein petitioner Continental
Steel] to pay Rolando P. Hortillano the amount of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00),
representing his bereavement leave pay and the amount of Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00)
representing death benefits, or a total amount of P16,489.00

The complaint against Manuel Sy, however, is ORDERED DISMISSED for lack of merit.

All other claims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.

Further, parties are hereby ORDERED to faithfully abide with the herein dispositions.
Aggrieved, Continental Steel filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review on Certiorari,[19] under Section
1, Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 101697.

Continental Steel claimed that Atty. Montao erred in granting Hortillanos claims for bereavement leave with pay
and other death benefits because no death of an employees dependent had occurred. The death of a fetus, at
whatever stage of pregnancy, was excluded from the coverage of the CBA since what was contemplated by the
CBA was the death of a legal person, and not that of a fetus, which did not acquire any juridical personality.
Continental Steel pointed out that its contention was bolstered by the fact that the term death was qualified by the
phrase legitimate dependent. It asserted that the status of a child could only be determined upon said childs birth,
otherwise, no such appellation can be had. Hence, the conditions sine qua non for Hortillanos entitlement to
bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA were lacking.

The Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated 27 February 2008, affirmed Atty. Montaos Resolution dated 20
November 2007. The appellate court interpreted death to mean as follows:

[Herein petitioner Continental Steels] exposition on the legal sense in which the term death is used in the CBA fails
to impress the Court, and the same is irrelevant for ascertaining the purpose, which the grant of bereavement leave
and death benefits thereunder, is intended to serve. While there is no arguing with [Continental Steel] that the
acquisition of civil personality of a child or fetus is conditioned on being born alive upon delivery, it does not
follow that such event of premature delivery of a fetus could never be contemplated as a death as to be covered by
the CBA provision, undoubtedly an event causing loss and grief to the affected employee, with whom the dead fetus
stands in a legitimate relation. [Continental Steel] has proposed a narrow and technical significance to the term
death of a legitimate dependent as condition for granting bereavement leave and death benefits under the CBA.
Following [Continental Steels] theory, there can be no experience of death to speak of. The Court, however, does
not share this view. A dead fetus simply cannot be equated with anything less than loss of human life, especially for
the expectant parents. In this light, bereavement leave and death benefits are meant to assuage the employee and the
latters immediate family, extend to them solace and support, rather than an act conferring legal status or personality
upon the unborn child. [Continental Steels] insistence that the certificate of fetal death is for statistical purposes
only sadly misses this crucial point.[20]

Accordingly, the fallo of the 27 February 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed
Resolution dated November 20, 2007 of Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao is hereby
AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against [herein petitioner Continental Steel].[21]

In a Resolution[22] dated 9 May 2008, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration[23] of
Continental Steel.

Hence, this Petition, in which Continental Steel persistently argues that the CBA is clear and unambiguous, so that
the literal and legal meaning of death should be applied. Only one with juridical personality can die and a dead
fetus never acquired a juridical personality.

We are not persuaded.

As Atty. Montao identified, the elements for bereavement leave under Article X, Section 2 of the CBA are: (1)
death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, i.e., parent, spouse, child, brother, or sister, of an employee; and (3)
legitimate relations of the dependent to the employee. The requisites for death and accident insurance under Article
XVIII, Section 4(3) of the CBA are: (1) death; (2) the death must be of a dependent, who could be a parent, spouse,
or child of a married employee; or a parent, brother, or sister of a single employee; and (4) presentation of the
proper legal document to prove such death, e.g., death certificate.

It is worthy to note that despite the repeated assertion of Continental Steel that the provisions of the CBA are clear
and unambiguous, its fundamental argument for denying Hortillanos claim for bereavement leave and other death
benefits rests on the purportedly proper interpretation of the terms death and dependent as used in the CBA. If the
provisions of the CBA are indeed clear and unambiguous, then there is no need to resort to the interpretation or
construction of the same. Moreover, Continental Steel itself admitted that neither management nor the Union sought
to define the pertinent terms for bereavement leave and other death benefits during the negotiation of the CBA.
The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is
misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41
defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death.

First, the issue of civil personality is not relevant herein. Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code on natural
persons, must be applied in relation to Article 37 of the same Code, the very first of the general provisions on civil
personality, which reads:

Art. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may
be lost.

We need not establish civil personality of the unborn child herein since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act
as a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us whether the unborn child acquired any rights or incurred
any obligations prior to his/her death that were passed on to or assumed by the childs parents. The rights to
bereavement leave and other death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to the parents of the unborn child
upon the latters death.
Second, Sections 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the
Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that
only those who have acquired juridical personality could die.

And third, death has been defined as the cessation of life.[24] Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One
need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No
less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception,[25] that the State must protect equally
with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being
delivered, qualifies as death.

Likewise, the unborn child can be considered a dependent under the CBA. As Continental Steel itself defines, a
dependent is one who relies on another for support; one not able to exist or sustain oneself without the power or aid
of someone else. Under said general definition,[26] even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos
child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos
wife, for sustenance. Additionally, it is explicit in the CBA provisions in question that the dependent may be the
parent, spouse, or child of a married employee; or the parent, brother, or sister of a single employee. The CBA did
not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired
civil personality, as Continental Steel avers. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more
general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb.

The term legitimate merely addresses the dependent childs status in relation to his/her parents. In Angeles v.
Maglaya,[27] we have expounded on who is a legitimate child, viz:

A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage. Remove the element of
lawful union and there is strictly no legitimate filiation between parents and child. Article 164 of the Family Code
cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or born during the marriage of the parents are
legitimate. (Emphasis ours.)

Conversely, in Briones v. Miguel,[28] we identified an illegitimate child to be as follows:

The fine distinctions among the various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated in the Family Code.
Now, there are only two classes of children -- legitimate (and those who, like the legally adopted, have the rights of
legitimate children) and illegitimate. All children conceived and born outside a valid marriage are illegitimate,
unless the law itself gives them legitimate status. (Emphasis ours.)

It is apparent that according to the Family Code and the afore-cited jurisprudence, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of
a child attaches upon his/her conception. In the present case, it was not disputed that Hortillano and his wife were
validly married and that their child was conceived during said marriage, hence, making said child legitimate upon
her conception.

Also incontestable is the fact that Hortillano was able to comply with the fourth element entitling him to death and
accident insurance under the CBA, i.e., presentation of the death certificate of his unborn child.

Given the existence of all the requisites for bereavement leave and other death benefits under the CBA, Hortillanos
claims for the same should have been granted by Continental Steel.

We emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if
possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said
that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a
gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive
but died subsequently.

Being for the benefit of the employee, CBA provisions on bereavement leave and other death benefits should be
interpreted liberally to give life to the intentions thereof. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating
that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor
of labor.[29] In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. In Marcopper
Mining v. National Labor Relations Commission,[30] we pronounced:

Finally, petitioner misinterprets the declaration of the Labor Arbiter in the assailed decision that "when the
pendulum of judgment swings to and fro and the forces are equal on both sides, the same must be stilled in favor of
labor." While petitioner acknowledges that all doubts in the interpretation of the Labor Code shall be resolved in
favor of labor, it insists that what is involved-here is the amended CBA which is essentially a contract between
private persons. What petitioner has lost sight of is the avowed policy of the State, enshrined in our Constitution, to
accord utmost protection and justice to labor, a policy, we are, likewise, sworn to uphold.

In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation v. NLRC [183 SCRA 451 (1990)], we categorically stated that:

When conflicting interests of labor and capital are to be weighed on the scales of social justice, the heavier
influence of the latter should be counter-balanced by sympathy and compassion the law must accord the
underprivileged worker.

Likewise, in Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)], we declared:

Any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 27 February 2008 and Resolution dated 9 May
2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 101697, affirming the Resolution dated 20 November 2007 of
Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Atty. Allan S. Montao, which granted to Rolando P. Hortillano bereavement leave
pay and other death benefits in the amounts of Four Thousand Nine Hundred Thirty-Nine Pesos (P4,939.00) and
Eleven Thousand Five Hundred Fifty Pesos (P11,550.00), respectively, grounded on the death of his unborn child,
are AFFIRMED. Costs against Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Acting Chief Justice

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Martin S. Villarama, Jr. with Associate Justices Noel G. Tijam and Sesinando E.
Villon concurring; rollo, pp. 32-40.
[2] Id. at 42.
[3] Penned by Atty. Allan S. Montao, Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator; records, pp. 381-392.
[4] CA rollo, p. 26.
[5] Rollo, pp. 84-92.
[6] Id. at 93.
[7] Id. at 86.
[8] Id. at 33.
[9] CA rollo, p. 60.
[10] Id. at 67.
[11] Id. at 46.
[12] Id. at 25.
[13] Id. at 62-65.
[14] Id at 66-72.
[15] Records, pp. 46-53.
[16] Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that
are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article.
Article 41. For civil purposes, the foetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from
the mothers womb. However, if the foetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born
if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb.
Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the
deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will.
[17] CA rollo, pp. 24-34.
[18] Id. at 32.
[19] Id. at 2-18.
Art. 262-A of the Labor Code as amended in relation to Section 7, Rule XIX of Department Order No. 40-03 series
of 2003 provides that the decision, order, resolution or award of the Voluntary Arbitrator shall be final and
executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties and that it
shall not be subject of a motion for reconsideration.

[20] Rollo, pp. 38-39.

[21] Id. at 39.
[22] Id. at 153.
[23] Id. at 136-143.
[24] Blacks Law Dictionary
[25] Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution reads in full:
Sec. 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from
conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
[26] As opposed to the more limited or precise definition of a dependent child for income tax purposes, which
means a legitimate, illegitimate or legally adopted child chiefly dependent upon and living with the taxpayer if such
dependent is not more than twenty-one (21) years of age, unmarried and not gainfully employed or if such
dependent, regardless of age, is incapable of self-support because of mental or physical defect.
[27] G.R. No. 153798, 2 September 2005, 469 SCRA 363, 369.
[28] 483 Phil. 483, 491 (2004).

[29] Faculty Association of Mapua Institute of Technology (FAMIT) v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164060,
15 June 2007, 524 SCRA 709, 716.
[30] 325 Phil. 618, 634-635 (1996).

FIRST DIVISION

CORAZON CATALAN, G.R. No. 159567

LIBRADA CATALAN-LIM,
EULOGIO CATALAN,
MILA CATALAN-MILAN,
ZENAIDA CATALAN, Present:
ALEX CATALAN, DAISY
CATALAN, FLORIDA PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CATALAN and GEMMA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CATALAN, Heirs of the late CORONA,
FELICIANO CATALAN, AZCUNA, and
Petitioners, GARCIA, JJ.
- versus -
Promulgated:

JOSE BASA, MANUEL BASA,

LAURETA BASA, DELIA BASA,
JESUS BASA and ROSALINDA
BASA, Heirs of the late MERCEDES
CATALAN,
Respondents. July 31, 2007
x------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

PUNO, C.J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court of the Court of Appeals
decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073, which affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69,
Lingayen, Pangasinan, in Civil Case No. 17666, dismissing the Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership, and damages.
The facts, which are undisputed by the parties, follow:
On October 20, 1948, FELICIANO CATALAN (Feliciano) was discharged from active military service. The Board
of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs found that he was unfit to render military service due to
his schizophrenic reaction, catatonic type, which incapacitates him because of flattening of mood and affect,
preoccupation with worries, withdrawal, and sparce (sic) and pointless speech.[1]
On September 28, 1949, Feliciano married Corazon Cerezo.[2]
On June 16, 1951, a document was executed, titled Absolute Deed of Donation,[3] wherein Feliciano allegedly
donated to his sister MERCEDES CATALAN(Mercedes) one-half of the real property described, viz:
A parcel of land located at Barangay Basing, Binmaley, Pangasinan. Bounded on the North by heirs of Felipe Basa;
on the South by Barrio Road; On the East by heirs of Segundo Catalan; and on the West by Roman Basa.
Containing an area of Eight Hundred One (801) square meters, more or less.

The donation was registered with the Register of Deeds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 2876, and, in lieu thereof, issued Tax Declaration No. 18080[4] to Mercedes for the 400.50 square
meters donated to her. The remaining half of the property remained in Felicianos name under Tax Declaration No.
18081.[5]
On December 11, 1953, Peoples Bank and Trust Company filed Special Proceedings No. 4563[6] before the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan to declare Feliciano incompetent. On December 22, 1953, the trial court issued its
Order for Adjudication of Incompetency for Appointing Guardian for the Estate and Fixing Allowance[7] of
Feliciano. The following day, the trial court appointed Peoples Bank and Trust Company as Felicianos guardian.[8]
Peoples Bank and Trust Company has been subsequently renamed, and is presently known as the Bank of the
Philippine Islands (BPI).
On November 22, 1978, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lots 1 and 3 of their property, registered under
Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 18920, to their son Eulogio Catalan.[9]
On March 26, 1979, Mercedes sold the property in issue in favor of her children Delia and Jesus Basa.[10] The
Deed of Absolute Sale was registered with the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 20, 1992, and Tax
Declaration No. 12911 was issued in the name of respondents.[11]
On June 24, 1983, Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 2 of the aforementioned property registered under
OCT No. 18920 to their children Alex Catalan, Librada Catalan and Zenaida Catalan. On February 14, 1983,
Feliciano and Corazon Cerezo donated Lot 4 (Plan Psu-215956) of the same OCT No. 18920 to Eulogio and Florida
Catalan.[12]
On April 1, 1997, BPI, acting as Felicianos guardian, filed a case for Declaration of Nullity of Documents,
Recovery of Possession and Ownership,[13] as well as damages against the herein respondents. BPI alleged that the
Deed of Absolute Donation to Mercedes was void ab initio, as Feliciano never donated the property to Mercedes. In
addition, BPI averred that even if Feliciano had truly intended to give the property to her, the donation would still
be void, as he was not of sound mind and was therefore incapable of giving valid consent. Thus, it claimed that if
the Deed of Absolute Donation was void ab initio, the subsequent Deed of Absolute Sale to Delia and Jesus Basa
should likewise be nullified, for Mercedes Catalan had no right to sell the property to anyone. BPI raised doubts
about the authenticity of the deed of sale, saying that its registration long after the death of Mercedes Catalan
indicated fraud. Thus, BPI sought remuneration for incurred damages and litigation expenses.
On August 14, 1997, Feliciano passed away. The original complaint was amended to substitute his heirs in lieu of
BPI as complainants in Civil Case No. 17666.
On December 7, 1999, the trial court found that the evidence presented by the complainants was insufficient to
overcome the presumption that Feliciano was sane and competent at the time he executed the deed of donation in
favor of Mercedes Catalan. Thus, the court declared, the presumption of sanity or competency not having been duly
impugned, the presumption of due execution of the donation in question must be upheld.[14] It rendered judgment,
viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:
1. Dismissing plaintiffs complaint;
2. Declaring the defendants Jesus Basa and Delia Basa the lawful owners of the land in question which is now
declared in their names under Tax Declaration No. 12911 (Exhibit 4);
3. Ordering the plaintiff to pay the defendants Attorneys fees of P10,000.00, and to pay the Costs.(sic)
SO ORDERED.[15]
Petitioners challenged the trial courts decision before the Court of Appeals via a Notice of Appeal pursuant to Rule
41 of the Revised Rules of Court.[16] The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court and held, viz:
In sum, the Regional Trial Court did not commit a reversible error in disposing that plaintiff-appellants failed to
prove the insanity or mental incapacity of late (sic) Feliciano Catalan at the precise moment when the property in
dispute was donated.
Thus, all the elements for validity of contracts having been present in the 1951 donation coupled with compliance
with certain solemnities required by the Civil Code in donation inter vivos of real property under Article 749, which
provides:
xxx
Mercedes Catalan acquired valid title of ownership over the property in dispute. By virtue of her ownership, the
property is completely subjected to her will in everything not prohibited by law of the concurrence with the rights
of others (Art. 428, NCC).

The validity of the subsequent sale dated 26 March 1979 (Exhibit 3, appellees Folder of Exhibits) of the property by
Mercedes Catalan to defendant-appellees Jesus Basa and Delia Basa must be upheld. Nothing of the infirmities
which allegedly flawed its authenticity is evident much less apparent in the deed itself or from the evidence
adduced. As correctly stated by the RTC, the fact that the Deed of Absolute Sale was registered only in 1992, after
the death of Mercedes Catalan does not make the sale void ab initio. Moreover, as a notarized document, the deed
of absolute sale carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon such public document with respect to its due
execution (Garrido vs. CA 236 SCRA 450). In a similar vein, jurisprudence has it that documents acknowledged
before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity, and to contradict the same, there must be
evidence that is clear, convincing and more than preponderant (Salame vs. CA, 239 SCRA 256).
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Decision dated December 7, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 69, is hereby affirmed.
SO ORDERED.[17]
Thus, petitioners filed the present appeal and raised the following issues:
1. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV
NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN HOLDING THAT THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT A
REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DISPOSING THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANTS (PETITIONERS) FAILED TO
PROVE THE INSANITY OR MENTAL INCAPACITY OF THE LATE FELICIANO CATALAN AT THE
PRECISE MOMENT WHEN THE PROPERTY IN DISPUTE WAS DONATED;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE CERTIFICATE OF DISABILITY FOR DISCHARGE (EXHIBIT S) AND

THE REPORT OF A BOARD OF OFFICERS CONVENED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF ARMY
REGULATIONS (EXHIBITS S-1 AND S-2) ARE ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE;

3. WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED CA-G.R. CV

NO. 66073 IN A WAY PROBABLY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR WITH THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS
OF THE HONORABLE COURT IN UPHOLDING THE SUBSEQUENT SALE OF THE PROPERTY IN
DISPUTE BY THE DONEE MERCEDES CATALAN TO HER CHILDREN RESPONDENTS JESUS AND
DELIA BASA; AND-

4. WHETHER OR NOT CIVIL CASE NO. 17666 IS BARRED BY PRESCRIPTION AND LACHES.
[18]

Petitioners aver that the presumption of Felicianos competence to donate property to Mercedes had been rebutted
because they presented more than the requisite preponderance of evidence. First, they presented the Certificate of
Disability for the Discharge of Feliciano Catalan issued on October 20, 1948 by the Board of Medical Officers of
the Department of Veteran Affairs. Second, they proved that on December 22, 1953, Feliciano was judged an
incompetent by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, and put under the guardianship of BPI. Based on these
two pieces of evidence, petitioners conclude that Feliciano had been suffering from a mental condition since 1948
which incapacitated him from entering into any contract thereafter, until his death on August 14, 1997. Petitioners
contend that Felicianos marriage to Corazon Cerezo on September 28, 1948 does not prove that he was not insane
at the time he made the questioned donation. They further argue that the donations Feliciano executed in favor of
his successors (Decision, CA-G.R. CV No. 66073) also cannot prove his competency because these donations were
approved and confirmed in the guardianship proceedings.[19] In addition, petitioners claim that the Deed of
Absolute Sale executed on March 26, 1979 by Mercedes Catalan and her children Jesus and Delia Basa is simulated
and fictitious. This is allegedly borne out by the fact that the document was registered only on February 20, 1992,
more that 10 years after Mercedes Catalan had already died. Since Delia Basa and Jesus Basa both knew that
Feliciano was incompetent to enter into any contract, they cannot claim to be innocent purchasers of the property in
question.[20] Lastly, petitioners assert that their case is not barred by prescription or laches under Article 1391 of
the New Civil Code because they had filed their case on April 1, 1997, even before the four year period after
Felicianos death on August 14, 1997 had begun.[21]
The petition is bereft of merit, and we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals and the trial court.
A donation is an act of liberality whereby a person disposes gratuitously a thing or right in favor of another, who
accepts it.[22] Like any other contract, an agreement of the parties is essential. Consent in contracts presupposes the
following requisites: (1) it should be intelligent or with an exact notion of the matter to which it refers; (2) it should
be free; and (3) it should be spontaneous.[23] The parties' intention must be clear and the attendance of a vice of
consent, like any contract, renders the donation voidable.[24]
In order for donation of property to be valid, what is crucial is the donors capacity to give consent at the time of the
donation. Certainly, there lies no doubt in the fact that insanity impinges on consent freely given.[25] However, the
burden of proving such incapacity rests upon the person who alleges it; if no sufficient proof to this effect is
presented, capacity will be presumed.[26]
A thorough perusal of the records of the case at bar indubitably shows that the evidence presented by the petitioners
was insufficient to overcome the presumption that Feliciano was competent when he donated the property in
question to Mercedes. Petitioners make much ado of the fact that, as early as 1948, Feliciano had been found to be
suffering from schizophrenia by the Board of Medical Officers of the Department of Veteran Affairs. By itself,
however, the allegation cannot prove the incompetence of Feliciano.
A study of the nature of schizophrenia will show that Feliciano could still be presumed capable of attending to his
property rights. Schizophrenia was brought to the attention of the public when, in the late 1800s, Emil Kraepelin, a
German psychiatrist, combined hebrephrenia and catatonia with certain paranoid states and called the condition
dementia praecox. Eugene Bleuler, a Swiss psychiatrist, modified Kraepelins conception in the early 1900s to
include cases with a better outlook and in 1911 renamed the condition schizophrenia. According to medical
references, in persons with schizophrenia, there is a gradual onset of symptoms, with symptoms becoming
increasingly bizarre as the disease progresses. The condition improves (remission or residual stage) and worsens
(relapses) in cycles. Sometimes, sufferers may appear relatively normal, while other patients in remission may
appear strange because they speak in a monotone, have odd speech habits, appear to have no emotional feelings and
are prone to have ideas of reference. The latter refers to the idea that random social behaviors are directed against
the sufferers.[27] It has been proven that the administration of the correct medicine helps the patient. Antipsychotic
medications help bring biochemical imbalances closer to normal in a schizophrenic. Medications reduce delusions,
hallucinations and incoherent thoughts and reduce or eliminate chances of relapse.[28] Schizophrenia can result in a
dementing illness similar in many aspects to Alzheimers disease. However, the illness will wax and wane over
many years, with only very slow deterioration of intellect.[29]
From these scientific studies it can be deduced that a person suffering from schizophrenia does not necessarily lose
his competence to intelligently dispose his property. By merely alleging the existence of schizophrenia, petitioners
failed to show substantial proof that at the date of the donation, June 16, 1951, Feliciano Catalan had lost total
control of his mental faculties. Thus, the lower courts correctly held that Feliciano was of sound mind at that time
and that this condition continued to exist until proof to the contrary was adduced.[30] Sufficient proof of his
infirmity to give consent to contracts was only established when the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan declared
him an incompetent on December 22, 1953.[31]
It is interesting to note that the petitioners questioned Felicianos capacity at the time he donated the property, yet
did not see fit to question his mental competence when he entered into a contract of marriage with Corazon Cerezo
or when he executed deeds of donation of his other properties in their favor. The presumption that Feliciano
remained competent to execute contracts, despite his illness, is bolstered by the existence of these other contracts.
Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed,
are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.[32]

Needless to state, since the donation was valid, Mercedes had the right to sell the property to whomever she chose.
[33] Not a shred of evidence has been presented to prove the claim that Mercedes sale of the property to her
children was tainted with fraud or falsehood. It is of little bearing that the Deed of Sale was registered only after the
death of Mercedes. What is material is that the sale of the property to Delia and Jesus Basa was legal and binding at
the time of its execution. Thus, the property in question belongs to Delia and Jesus Basa.
Finally, we note that the petitioners raised the issue of prescription and laches for the first time on appeal before this
Court. It is sufficient for this Court to note that even if the present appeal had prospered, the Deed of Donation was
still a voidable, not a void, contract. As such, it remained binding as it was not annulled in a proper action in court
within four years.[34]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, there being no merit in the arguments of the petitioners, the petition is DENIED. The
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 66073 is affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Exhibit S, Original Records, p. 112.

[2] Exhibit 11, Folder of Exhibits for Defendants.
[3] Exhibit A and 1, rollo, p. 59.
[4] Exhibit P, Folder of Exhibits for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 24.
[5] Exhibit O, id. at 23.
[6] Exhibit G, id. at 8.
[7] Exhibit H, rollo, p. 57.
[8] Exhibit I, Folder of Exhibits for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 10.
[9] Exhibit N-2, id. at 18.
[10] Exhibit B, rollo, p. 60.
[11] Exhibit R and Exhibit 4, Folder of Exhibits for Plaintiffs-Appellants, p. 26.
[12] Supra note 9.
[13] Civil Case No. 17666.
[14] Rollo, p. 44.
[15] Id. at 3.
[16] Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 66073.
[17] Rollo, pp. 40-42.
[18] Id. at 4.
[19] Id. at 10.
[20] Id. at 12.
[21] Article 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years. This period shall begin: In cases of
intimidation, violence or undue influence, from the time the defect of the consent ceases.
In case of mistake or fraud, from the time of the discovery of the same.
And when the action refers to contracts entered into by minors or other incapacitated persons, from the time the
guardianship ceases.
[22] CIVIL CODE, Art. 725.
[23] Lim, Jr. v. San, G.R. No. 159723, September 9, 2004, 438 SCRA 102, 106-107.
[24] Vitug, Civil Law Annotated, Vol. II, 2003 edition, p. 149, citing Espino v. Spouses Vicente. G.R. No.
168396, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 330.
See also Article 1330 of the New Civil Code:
ARTICLE 1330. A contract where consent is given through mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence, or
fraud is voidable.
[25] See CIVIL CODE, Art. 1327 (2) in relation to Art. 1318 (1).
G.R. No.
[26] Miguela Carillo v. Justimiano Jaojoco, 46 Phil 957, 960 (1924), Vitalista, et al. v. Perez, et al.,
164147, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 127.
[27] Kahn, Ada P. and Fawcett, Jan. The Encyclopedia of Mental Health. New York, 1993, p. 326.
[28] Id. at 327.
[29] Samuels, Martin A., ed. Manual of Neurologic Therapeutics With Essentials of Diagnosis, Third Edition.
Boston/Toronto, Little, Brown and Company, 1986, p. 49.
[30] Mendozana, et al. v. Ozamiz et al., G.R. No. 143370, February 6, 2002, 376 SCRA 482, citing 29 Am
Jur 2d Evidence 295; Norwood v. Norwood, 207 Ga 148, 60 SE2d 449.
[31] Exhibit H, rollo, p. 57.
[32] Supra note 30, citing Blochowitz v. Blochowitz, 122 Neb 385, 240 NW 586, 82 ALR 949.
[33] Article 428 of the New Civil Code. The owner has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without other
limitations than those established by law.
The owner has also a right of action against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.
[34] CIVIL CODE, Art. 1390. The following contracts are voidable or annullable, even though there may have been
no damage to the contracting parties:
(1) Those where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to a contract;
(2) Those where the consent is vitiated by mistake, violence, intimidation, undue influence or fraud.
These contracts are binding, unless they are annulled by a proper action in court. They are susceptible of
ratification.
Art. 1391. The action for annulment shall be brought within four years xxx.

Today is Saturday, September 03, 2016

search

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 127540 October 17, 2001

EUGENIO DOMINGO, CRISPIN MANGABAT and SAMUEL CAPALUNGAN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, FELIPE C. RIGONAN and CONCEPCION R. RIGONAN, respondents.

EUGENIO DOMINGO, CRISPIN MANGABAT and SAMUEL CAPALUNGAN, petitioners,

vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and FELIPE C. RIGONAN and CONCEPCION R.
RIGONAN, respondents.

QUISUMBNG, J.:

This petition1 seeks to annul the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 29, 1996, which set aside the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 582-17 for
reinvindicacion consolidated with Cadastral Case No. 1.2 The petition likewise seeks to annul the resolution dated
December 11, 1996, denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.

The facts of this case, culled from the records, are as follows:

Paulina Rigonan owned three (3) parcels of land, located at Batac and Espiritu, Ilocos Norte, including the house
and warehouse on one parcel. She allegedly sold them to private respondents, the spouses Felipe and Concepcion
Rigonan, who claim to be her relatives. In 1966, herein petitioners Eugenio Domingo, Crispin Mangabat and
Samuel Capalungan, who claim to be her closest surviving relatives, allegedly took possession of the properties by
means of stealth, force and intimidation, and refused to vacate the same. Consequently, on February 2, 1976, herein
respondent Felipe Rigonan filed a complaint for reinvindicacion against petitioners in the Regional Trial Court of
Batac, Ilocos Norte. On July 3, 1977, he amended the complaint and included his wife as co-plaintiff. They alleged
that they were the owners of the three parcels of land through the deed of sale executed by Paulina Rigonan on
January 28, 1965; that since then, they had been in continuous possession of the subject properties and had
introduced permanent improvements thereon; and that defendants (now petitioners) entered the properties illegally,
and they refused to leave them when asked to do so.
Herein petitioners, as defendants below, contested plaintiffs' claims. According to defendants, the alleged deed of
absolute sale was void for being spurious as well as lacking consideration. They said that Paulina Rigonan did not
sell her properties to anyone. As her nearest surviving kin within the fifth degree of consanguinity, they inherited
the three lots and the permanent improvements thereon when Paulina died in 1966. They said they had been in
possession of the contested properties for more than 10 years. Defendants asked for damages against plaintiffs.

During trial, Juan Franco, Notary Public Evaristo P. Tagatag3 and plaintiff Felipe Rigonan testified for plaintiffs
(private respondents now).

Franco testified that he was a witness to the execution of the questioned deed of absolute sale. However, when
cross-examined and shown the deed he stated that the deed was not the document he signed as a witness, but rather
it was the will and testament made by Paulina Rigonan.

Atty. Tagatag testified that he personally prepared the deed, he saw Paulina Rigonan affix her thumbprint on it and
he signed it both as witness and notary public. He further testified that he also notarized Paulina's last will and
testament dated February 19, 1965. The will mentioned the same lots sold to private respondents. When asked why
the subject lots were still included in the last will and testament, he could not explain. Atty. Tagatag also mentioned
that he registered the original deed of absolute sale with the Register of Deeds.

Plaintiff Felipe Rigonan claimed that he was Paulina's close relative. Their fathers were first cousins. However, he
could not recall the name of Paulina's grandfather. His claim was disputed by defendants, who lived with Paulina as
their close kin. He admitted the discrepancies between the Register of Deeds' copy of the deed and the copy in his
possession. But he attributed them to the representative from the Office of the Register of Deeds who went to
plaintiffs house after that Office received a subpoena duces tecum. According to him, the representative showed
him blanks in the deed and then the representative filled in the blanks by copying from his (plaintiffs) copy.

Counsel for defendants (petitioners herein) presented as witnesses Jose Flores, the owner of the adjacent lot; Ruben
Blanco, then acting Registrar of Deeds in Ilocos Norte; and Zosima Domingo, wife of defendant Eugenio Domingo.

Jose Flores testified that he knew defendants, herein petitioners, who had lived on the land with Paulina Rigonan
since he could remember and continued to live there even after Paulina's death. He said he did not receive any
notice nor any offer to sell the lots from Paulina, contrary to what was indicated in the deed of sale that the vendor
had notified all the adjacent owners of the sale. He averred he had no knowledge of any sale between Paulina and
private respondents.

Ruben Blanco, the acting Registrar of Deeds, testified that only the carbon copy, also called a duplicate original, of
the deed of sale was filed in his office, but he could not explain why this was so.

Zosima Domingo testified that her husband, Eugenio Domingo, was Paulina's nephew. Paulina was a first cousin of
Eugenio's father. She also said that they lived with Paulina and her husband, Jose Guerson, since 1956. They took
care of her, spent for her daily needs and medical expenses, especially when she was hospitalized prior to her death.
She stated that Paulina was never badly in need of money during her lifetime.

On March 23, 1994, the trial court rendered judgment in favor of defendants (now the petitioners). It disposed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of defendants and against the plaintiffs,
and as prayed for, the Amended Complaint is hereby DISMISSED.

Defendants are hereby declared, by virtue of intestate succession, the lawful owners and possessors of the house
including the bodega and the three (3) parcels of land in suit and a Decree of Registration adjudicating the
ownership of the said properties to defendants is hereby issued.

The alleged deed of sale ( Exhs. "A", "A-1", "1" and "1-a") is hereby declared null and void and fake and the prayer
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby denied.

Plaintiffs are hereby ordered to pay defendants:

a) P20,000.00 as moral damages;

b) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages;

c) P10,000.00 attorney's fees and other litigation expenses.

No pronouncement as to costs.4

Private respondents herein appealed to the Court of Appeals.

On August 29, 1996, the CA reversed the trial court's decision, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated March 23, 1994 is hereby SET ASIDE. The plaintiffs-appellants Felipe Rigonan
and Concepcion Rigonan are declared the owners of the properties under litigation and the defendants-appellees are
hereby ordered to VACATE the subject properties and SURRENDER the possession thereof to the heirs of the
plaintiffs-appellants.

Costs against the defendants-appellees.5

Hence, this petition assigning the following as errors:

I
THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED QUESTIONS OF LEGAL SUBSTANCE AND
SIGNIFICANCE NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, LAW AND WITH THE APPLICABLE
DECISIONS OF THIS HONORABLE COURT.

II

THAT THE FINDINGS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE
TRIAL COURT AND CLEARLY VIOLATES THE RULE THAT THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF TRIAL
COURTS ARE ENTITLED TO GREAT WEIGHT AND RESPECT ON APPEAL, ESPECIALLY WHEN SAID
FINDINGS ARE ESTABLISHED BY UNREBUTTED TESTIMONIAL AND DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE.

III

THAT THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE GROUNDED
ENTIRELY ON SPECULATIONS, SURMISES, CONJECTURES, OR ON INFERENCES MANIFESTLY
MISTAKEN.

IV

THAT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED CERTAIN RELEVANT

FACTS NOT DISPUTED BY THE PARTIES AND WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD JUSTIFY
A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION.

THAT THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ARE PREMISED ON SUPPOSED
ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE BUT IS CONTRADICTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD THUS
CONSTITUTES GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.6

The basic issue for our consideration is, did private respondents sufficiently establish the existence and due
execution of the Deed of Absolute and Irrevocable Sale of Real Property? Marked as Exhibits "A," "A-1," "1" and
"1-a," this deed purportedly involved nine (9) parcels of land, inclusive of the three (3) parcels in dispute, sold at
the price of P850 by Paulina Rigonan to private respondents on January 28, 1965, at Batac, Ilocos Norte.7 The trial
court found the deed "fake," being a carbon copy with no typewritten original presented; and the court concluded
that the document's execution "was tainted with alterations, defects, tamperings, and irregularities which render it
null and void ab initio".8

Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in not applying the doctrine that factual findings of trial courts are
entitled to great weight and respect on appeal, especially when said findings are established by unrebutted
testimonial and documentary evidence. They add that the Court of Appeals, in reaching a different conclusion, had
decided the case contrary to the evidence presented and the law applicable to the case. Petitioners maintain that the
due execution of the deed of sale was not sufficiently established by private respondents, who as plaintiffs had the
burden of proving it. First, the testimonies of the two alleged instrumental witnesses of the sale, namely, Juan
Franco and Efren Sibucao, were dispensed with and discarded when Franco retracted his oral and written testimony
that he was a witness to the execution of the subject deed. As a consequence, the appellate court merely relied on
Atty. Tagatag's (the notary public) testimony, which was incredible because aside from taking the double role of a
witness and notary public, he was a paid witness. Further his testimony, that the subject deed was executed in the
house of Paulina Rigonan, was rebutted by Zosima Domingo, Paulina's housekeeper, who said that she did not see
Atty. Tagatag, Juan Franco and Efren Sibucao in Paulina's house on the alleged date of the deed's execution.

Secondly, petitioners said that private respondents failed to account for the typewritten original of the deed of sale
and that the carbon copy filed with the Register of Deeds was only a duplicate which contained insertions and
erasures. Further, the carbon copy was without an affidavit of explanation, in violation of the Administrative Code
as amended, which requires that if the original deed of sale is not presented or available upon registration of the
deed, the carbon copy or so-called "duplicate original" must be accompanied by an affidavit of explanation,
otherwise, registration must be denied.9

Thirdly, petitioners aver that the consideration of only P850 for the parcels of land sold, together with a house and a
warehouse, was another indication that the sale was fictitious because no person who was financially stable would
sell said property at such a grossly inadequate consideration.

Lastly, petitioners assert that there was abundant evidence that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale,
Paulina Rigonan was already senile. She could not have consented to the sale by merely imprinting her thumbmark
on the deed.

In their comment, private respondents counter that at the outset the petition must be dismissed for it lacks a
certification against forum shopping. Nonetheless, even disregarding this requirement, the petition must still be
denied in due course for it does not present any substantial legal issue, but factual or evidentiary ones which were
already firmly resolved by the Court of Appeals based on records and the evidence presented by the parties. Private
respondents' claim that the factual determination by the trial court lacks credibility for it was made by the trial judge
who presided only in one hearing of the case. The trial judge could not validly say that the deed of absolute sale was
"fake" because no signature was forged, according to private respondents; and indeed a thumbmark, said to be the
seller's own, appears thereon.

In their reply, petitioners said that the copy of the petition filed with this Court was accompanied with a certification
against forum shopping. If private respondents' copy did not contain same certification, this was only due to
inadvertence. Petitioners ask for the Court's indulgence for anyway there was substantial compliance with Revised
Circular No. 28-91.

On the contention that here only factual issues had been raised, hence not the proper subject for review by this
Court, petitioners reply that this general rule admits of exceptions, as when the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contradictory; when the findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; and when the Court of Appeals overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties which if
properly considered would justify a different conclusion. All these, according to petitioners, are present in this case.

Before proceeding to the main issue, we shall first settle procedural issues raised by private respondents.

While the trial judge deciding the case presided over the hearings of the case only once, this circumstance could not
have an adverse effect on his decision. The continuity of a court and the efficacy of its proceedings are not affected
by the death, resignation or cessation from the service of the presiding judge. A Judge may validly render a decision
although he has only partly heard the testimony of the witnesses.10 After all, he could utilize and rely on the
records of the case, including the transcripts of testimonies heard by the former presiding judge.

On the matter of the certification against forum-shopping, petitioners aver that they attached one in the copy
intended for this Court. This is substantial compliance. A deviation from a rigid enforcement of the rules may be
allowed to attain their prime objective for, after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the court's
existence.11

While the issues raised in this petition might appear to be mainly factual, this petition is properly given due course
because of the contradictory findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Further, the later court apparently
overlooked certain relevant facts which justify a different conclusion.12 Moreover, a compelling sense to make sure
that justice is done, and done rightly in the light of the issues raised herein, constrains us from relying on
technicalities alone to resolve this petition.

Now, on the main issue. Did private respondents establish the existence and due execution of the deed of sale? Our
finding is in the negative. First, note that private respondents as plaintiffs below presented only a carbon copy of
this deed. When the Register of Deeds was subpoenaed to produce the deed, no original typewritten deed but only a
carbon copy was presented to the trial court. Although the Court of Appeals calls it a "duplicate original," the deed
contained filled in blanks and alterations. None of the witnesses directly testified to prove positively and
convincingly Paulina's execution of the original deed of sale. The carbon copy did not bear her signature, but only
her alleged thumbprint. Juan Franco testified during the direct examination that he was an instrumental witness to
the deed. However, when cross-examined and shown a copy of the subject deed, he retracted and said that said deed
of sale was not the document he signed as witness.13 He declared categorically he knew nothing about it.14

We note that another witness, Efren Sibucao, whose testimony should have corroborated Atty. Tagatag's, was not
presented and his affidavit was withdrawn from the court,15 leaving only Atty. Tagatag's testimony, which aside
from being uncorroborated, was self-serving.

Secondly, we agree with the trial court that irregularities abound regarding the execution and registration of the
alleged deed of sale. On record, Atty. Tagatag testified that he himself registered the original deed with the Register
of Deeds.16 Yet, the original was nowhere to be found and none could be presented at the trial. Also, the carbon
copy on file, which is allegedly a duplicate original, shows intercalations and discrepancies when compared to
purported copies in existence. The intercalations were allegedly due to blanks left unfilled by Atty. Tagatag at the
time of the deed's registration. The blanks were allegedly filled in much later by a representative of the Register of
Deeds. In addition, the alleged other copies of the document bore different dates of entry: May 16, 1966, 10:20
A.M.17 and June 10, 1966, 3:16 P.M.,18 and different entry numbers: 66246, 74389 19 and 64369. 20 The deed
was apparently registered long after its alleged date of execution and after Paulina's death on March 20, 1966.21
Admittedly, the alleged vendor Paulina Rigonan was not given a copy.22

Furthermore, it appears that the alleged vendor was never asked to vacate the premises she had purportedly sold.
Felipe testified that he had agreed to let Paulina stay in the house until her death.23 In Alcos v. IAC, 162 SCRA 823
(1988), the buyer's immediate possession and occupation of the property was deemed corroborative of the
truthfulness and authenticity of the deed of sale. The alleged vendor's continued possession of the property in this
case throws an inverse implication, a serious doubt on the due execution of the deed of sale. Noteworthy, the same
parcels of land involved in the alleged sale were still included in the will subsequently executed by Paulina and
notarized by the same notary public, Atty. Tagatag.24 These circumstances, taken together, militate against
unguarded acceptance of the due execution and genuineness of the alleged deed of sale.

Thirdly, we have to take into account the element of consideration for the sale. The price allegedly paid by private
respondents for nine (9) parcels, including the three parcels in dispute, a house and a warehouse, raises further
questions. Consideration is the why of a contract, the essential reason which moves the contracting parties to enter
into the contract.25 On record, there is unrebutted testimony that Paulina as landowner was financially well off. She
loaned money to several people.26 We see no apparent and compelling reason for her to sell the subject parcels of
land with a house and warehouse at a meager price of P850 only.

In Rongavilla vs. CA, 294 SCRA 289 (1998), private respondents were in their advanced years, and were not in dire
need of money, except for a small amount of P2,000 which they said were loaned by petitioners for the repair of
their house's roof. We ruled against petitioners, and declared that there was no valid sale because of lack of
consideration.

In the present case, at the time of the execution of the alleged contract, Paulina Rigonan was already of advanced
age and senile. She died an octogenarian on March 20, 1966, barely over a year when the deed was allegedly
executed on January 28, 1965, but before copies of the deed were entered in the registry allegedly on May 16 and
June 10, 1966. The general rule is that a person is not incompetent to contract merely because of advanced years or
by reason of physical infirmities.27 However, when such age or infirmities have impaired the mental faculties so as
to prevent the person from properly, intelligently, and firmly protecting her property rights then she is undeniably
incapacitated. The unrebutted testimony of Zosima Domingo shows that at the time of the alleged execution of the
deed, Paulina was already incapacitated physically and mentally. She narrated that Paulina played with her waste
and urinated in bed. Given these circumstances, there is in our view sufficient reason to seriously doubt that she
consented to the sale of and the price for her parcels of land. Moreover, there is no receipt to show that said price
was paid to and received by her. Thus, we are in agreement with the trial court's finding and conclusion on the
matter:
The whole evidence on record does not show clearly that the fictitious P850.00 consideration was ever delivered to
the vendor. Undisputably, the P850.00 consideration for the nine (9) parcels of land including the house and bodega
is grossly and shockingly inadequate, and the sale is null and void ab initio.28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated August 29,
1996 and December 11, 1996, respectively, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Batac, Ilocos Norte, Branch 17, dated March 23, 1994, is REINSTATED.

Costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 4-30.

2 Id. at 34-44.

3 Also spelled as "Tagatag".

4 Rollo, p. 72.

5 Id. at 43-44.

6 Id. at 6-7.

7 Records, Civil Case No. 582-17, pp. 108-109.

8 Decision penned by Judge Ariston Rubio, Rollo, p. 67.

9 Rollo, p. 22.

10 Ayco vs. Fernandez, 195 SCRA 328, 333 (1991).

11 Philippine Coconut Authority vs. Corona International, Inc., G.R. No. 139910, September 29, 2000, p. 8.
12 Medel vs. People, G.R. No. 137143, December 8, 2000, p. 7.
13 Records, p. 101.

14 TSN, July 6, 1978, pp. 5-26.

15 TSN, January 15, 1981, p. 26.

16 TSN, August 22, 1979, p. 19.

17 Records, pp. 19 and 112.

18 Id. at 19.

19 Id. at 108, 109 and 112.

20 Id. at 112.

21 Records for Cadastral Case for lot no. 949, p. 138.

22 TSN, August 22, 1979, p. 23.

23 Records, pp. 94 and 100.

24 TSN August 22, 1979, p. 14.

25 Villamor vs. Court of Appeals, 202 SCRA 607, 615 (1991).

26 Records, p. 139.

27 Loyola, et al. vs Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 115734, February 23, 200, p. 8.
28 Decision, p. 11; CA Rollo, p. 89; Rollo, p. 71.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 143370. February 6, 2002]
MARIO J. MENDEZONA and TERESITA M. MENDEZONA, LUIS J. MENDEZONA and MARICAR L.
MENDEZONA and TERESITA ADAD VDA. DE MENDEZONA, petitioners, vs. JULIO H. OZAMIZ,
ROBERTO J. MONTALVAN, JOSE MA. OZAMIZ, CARMEN H. OZAMIZ, PAZ O. MONTALVAN, MA.
TERESA O.F. ZARRAGA, CARLOS O. FORTICH, JOSE LUIS O. ROS, PAULITA O. RODRIGUEZ, and
LOURDES O. LON, respondents.
DECISION
DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] and the Resolution[2] of the Court of Appeals
dated July 27, 1998 and May 19, 2000, respectively, in CA-G.R. CV No. 39752 which reversed and set aside the
Decision[3] dated September 23, 1992 rendered in favor of the petitioners by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Cebu City, Branch 6 in Civil Case No. CEB-10766.

Civil Case No. CEB-10766 is a suit for quieting of title. It was instituted on September 25, 1991 by petitioner
spouses Mario J. Mendezona and Teresita M. Mendezona as initial plaintiffs,[4] and in the amended complaint filed
on October 7, 1991, herein co-petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona and Maricar L. Mendezona and Teresita Adad
Vda. de Mendezona joined as co-plaintiffs.[5]

In their complaint, the petitioners, as plaintiffs therein, alleged that petitioner spouses Mario J. Mendezona and
Teresita M. Mendezona, petitioner spouses Luis J. Mendezona and Maricar L. Mendezona, and petitioner Teresita
Adad Vda. de Mendezona own a parcel of land each in the Banilad Estate, Lahug, Cebu City with almost similar
areas of 3,462 square meters, 3,466 square meters and 3,468 square meters, covered and described in Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 116834, 116835, and 116836 respectively, of the Registry of Deeds of Cebu City.[6]

The petitioners ultimately traced their titles of ownership over their respective properties from a notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale[7] dated April 28, 1989 executed in their favor by Carmen Ozamiz for and in consideration of the
sum of One Million Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,040,000.00).

The petitioners initiated the suit to remove a cloud on their said respective titles caused by the inscription thereon of
a notice of lis pendens, which came about as a result of an incident in Special Proceeding No. 1250 of the RTC of
Oroquieta City. Special Proceeding No. 1250 is a proceeding for guardianship over the person and properties of
Carmen Ozamiz initiated by the respondents Julio H. Ozamiz, Jose Ma. Ozamiz, Carmen H. Ozamiz,[8] Paz O.
Montalvan, Ma. Teresa O.F. Zarraga, Carlos O. Fortich, Jose Luis O. Ros, Paulita O. Rodriguez and Lourdes O.
Lon.[9]

It appears that on January 15, 1991, the respondents instituted the petition for guardianship with the Regional Trial
Court of Oroquieta City, alleging therein that Carmen Ozamiz, then 86 years old, after an illness in July 1987, had
become disoriented and could not recognize most of her friends; that she could no longer take care of herself nor
manage her properties by reason of her failing health, weak mind and absent-mindedness. Mario Mendezona and
Luis Mendezona, herein petitioners who are nephews of Carmen Ozamiz, and Pilar Mendezona, a sister of Carmen
Ozamiz, filed an opposition to the guardianship petition.
In the course of the guardianship proceeding, the petitioners and the oppositors thereto agreed that Carmen Ozamiz
needed a guardian over her person and her properties, and thus respondent Paz O. Montalvan was designated as
guardian over the person of Carmen Ozamiz while petitioner Mario J. Mendezona, respondents Roberto J.
Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz were designated as joint guardians over the properties of the said ward.

As guardians, respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz filed on August 6, 1991 with the
guardianship court their inventories and Accounts,[10] listing therein Carmen Ozamizs properties, cash, shares of
stock, vehicles and fixed assets, including a 10,396 square meter property known as the Lahug property. Said Lahug
property is the same property covered by the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen
Ozamiz in favor of the petitioners. Respondents Roberto J. Montalvan and Julio H. Ozamiz caused the inscription
on the titles of petitioners a notice of lis pendens,[11] regarding Special Proceeding No. 1250, thus giving rise to the
suit for quieting of title, Civil Case No. CEB-10766, filed by herein petitioners.

In their Answer[12] in Civil Case No. CEB-10766 the respondents opposed the petitioners claim of ownership of
the Lahug property and alleged that the titles issued in the petitioners names are defective and illegal, and the
ownership of the said property was acquired in bad faith and without value inasmuch as the consideration for the
sale is grossly inadequate and unconscionable. Respondents further alleged that at the time of the sale on April 28,
1989 Carmen Ozamiz was already ailing and not in full possession of her mental faculties; and that her properties
having been placed in administration, she was in effect incapacitated to contract with petitioners.

The issues for resolution were delimited in the pre-trial to: (a) the propriety of recourse to quieting of title; (b) the
validity or nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 executed by Carmen Ozamiz in favor of herein
petitioners; (c) whether the titles over the subject parcel of land in plaintiffs names be maintained or should they be
cancelled and the subject parcels of land reconveyed; and (d) damages and attorneys fees.[13]

Trial on the merits ensued with the parties presenting evidence to prove their respective allegations. Petitioners
Mario Mendezona, Teresita Adad Vda. de Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, as plaintiffs therein, testified on the
circumstances surrounding the sale. Carmencita Cedeno and Martin Yungco, instrumental witnesses to the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989, and, Atty. Asuncion Bernades, the notary public who notarized the said
document, testified that on the day of execution of the said contract that Carmen Ozamiz was of sound mind and
that she voluntarily and knowingly executed the said deed of sale.

For the defendants, the testimonies of respondent Paz O. Montalvan, a sister of Carmen Ozamiz; Concepcion Agac-
ac, an assistant of Carmen Ozamiz; respondent Julio Ozamiz; Carolina Lagura, a househelper of Carmen Ozamiz;
Joselito Gunio, an appraiser of land; Nelfa Perdido, a part-time bookkeeper of Carmen Ozamiz, and the deposition
of Dr. Faith Go, physician of Carmen Ozamiz, were offered in evidence.

The petitioners presented as rebuttal witnesses petitioners Mario Mendezona and Luis Mendezona, to rebut the
testimony of respondent Julio H. Ozamiz; and, Dr. William Buot, a doctor of neurology to rebut aspects of the
deposition of Dr. Faith Go on the mental capacity of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the sale.
During the trial, the trial court found that the following facts have been duly established:[14]

(1) On April 28, 1989, Carmen Ozamiz sold to her nephews, Mario, Antonio and Luis, all surnamed Mendezona,
three (3) parcels of residential land in Cebu City, per a Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. D) for a consideration of
P1,040,000.00, in which deed the usufructuary rights were reserved during her lifetime.

(2) The three parcels of land were subsequently transferred to the names of the three vendees per TCTs Nos.
108729, 108730 and 108731 (Exhs. J, K & L, respectively). A partition agreement was entered into by the three
vendees (Exh. 3) and the parcels of land are now titled in the names of the plaintiffs.

Mario Mendezona TCT No. 116834 (Exh. A);

Luis Mendezona TCT No. 116835 (Exh. B);

Antonio Mendezona TCT No. 116836 (Exh. C);

(3) The reservation of the usufructuary rights to the vendor Carmen Ozamiz during her lifetime was confirmed by
the plaintiffs-spouses Mario Mendezona and Teresita Moraza and plaintiffs spouses Luis Mendezona and Maricar
Longa in a sworn statement (Exh. I) executed on October 15, 1990, which was duly annotated on the titles of the
property;

(4) The capital gains tax was paid (Exh. H) on May 5, 1989 and a certificate (Exh. H-1) was issued by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue authorizing the Register of Deeds to transfer the property to the vendees;

(5) A petition for guardianship over the person and properties of Carmen Ozamiz (Exh. E) was filed by all the
defendants, (except the defendant Roberto Montalvan) on January 15, 1991 with the Regional Trial Court of
Oroquieta City, denominated as Spec. Proc. No. 1250 and subsequently, an Inventories and Accounts (Exh. F) was
filed by court-appointed guardians Roberto Montalvan and Julio Ozamiz, in which the property was listed (Exh. F-
1) and a Notice of Lis Pendens was filed with the Register of Deeds of Cebu City on August 13, 1991 by said joint
guardians. Plaintiff Mario Mendezona, as another joint guardian over Carmen Ozamiz, filed his opposition (Exh. R)
to the Inventories and Accounts, with the Oroquieta Court as to the inclusion of the property (Exh.R-1).

(6) Prior to his death, the deceased husband of plaintiff Teresita Adad Mendezona was granted a General Power of
Attorney (Exh. 1) by Carmen Ozamiz on March 23, 1988 and after his demise, Carmen Ozamiz granted Mario
Mendezona a General Power of Attorney (Exh. 2.) on August 11, 1990. Both powers of attorney relate to the
administration of the property, subject of this action, in Cebu City.

On September 23, 1992 the trial court rendered its decision in favor of the petitioners, the dispositive portion of
which reads, to wit:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Court is of the opinion and so declares that:

1. The property described in the complaint was sold, with reservation of usufructuary rights by Carmen Ozamiz to
the plaintiffs under a valid contract, voluntarily and deliberately entered into while she was of sound mind, for
sufficient and good consideration, and without fraud, force, undue influence or intimidation having been exercised
upon her, and consequently, the Court orders the defendants herein to acknowledge and recognize the plaintiffs title
to the aforecited property and to refrain from further clouding the same;

2. That the one-third (1/3) share erroneously titled to Antonio Mendezona should be titled in the name of Teresita
Adad vda. de Mendezona as her paraphernal property and the Register of Deeds of Cebu City is hereby ordered to
do so;

3. The Notice of Lis Pendens affecting the property should be eliminated from the record and the Register of Deeds
of Cebu City is ordered to expunge the same.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the appellate court reversed the factual findings of the trial court and ruled that
the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract since the petitioners failed to prove that
the consideration was actually paid, and, furthermore, that at the time of the execution of the contract the mental
faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired. Thus, the appellate court declared that the Deed of
Absolute Sale of April 28, 1989 is null and void. It ordered the cancellation of the certificates of title issued in the
petitioners names and directed the issuance of new certificates of title in favor of Carmen Ozamiz or her estate.

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision of the appellate court. Subsequent thereto, the
petitioners filed a motion for a new trial and/or for reception of evidence. They contended, among other things, that
the appellate court totally ignored the testimony of Judge Teodorico Durias regarding the mental condition of
Carmen Ozamiz a month before the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale in question. The said testimony was
taken in the Special Proceeding No. 1250 in the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City. However, Judge Durias
was not presented as a witness in Civil Case No. CEB-10766 in the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City. Petitioners
alleged that Judge Duriass testimony is a newly-discovered evidence which could not have been discovered prior to
the trial in the court below by the exercise of due diligence.

The appellate court denied both motions in its Resolution dated May 19, 2000. Hence, the instant petition anchored
on the following grounds:[15]

I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THE APRIL 28, 1989 DEED OF
ABSOLUTE SALE WAS A SIMULATED CONTRACT.

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTIONS OF

ACTUAL AND SUFFICIENT CONSIDERATION FOR, AND OF THE REGULARITY AND TRUTHFULNESS
OF, THE NOTARIZED DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.

B.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING ON THE PETITIONERS THE BURDEN OF
PROVING PAYMENT, AND IN REFUSING TO RECOGNIZE AND RULE THAT IT WAS THE
RESPONDENTS - AS THE PARTIES ASSAILING THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE - WHO HAD FAILED
TO DISCHARGE THEIR BURDEN OF PROVING THAT THERE WAS NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE
TRANSACTION.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING TO RECEIVE IN EVIDENCE THE THREE (3)
CHECKS, WHICH PROVED BEYOND ANY DOUBT THAT THE PURCHASE PRICE FOR THE LAHUG
PROPERTY HAD BEEN PAID TO CARMEN OZAMIZ, AFTER ASKING FOR THEM AND HAVING THEM
PRESENTED TO IT IN OPEN COURT, THUS COOPERATING WITH RESPONDENTS EFFORTS TO
SUPPRESS THE CHECKS (WHICH THE COURT ITSELF AND RESPONDENTS CHALLENGED
PETITIONERS TO PRODUCE).

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT CARMEN OZAMIZS MENTAL
FACULTIES WERE SERIOUSLY IMPAIRED WHEN SHE EXECUTED THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE ON
APRIL 28, 1989.

A.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING THE STATUTORY PRESUMPTION THAT
CARMEN OZAMIZ WAS OF SOUND MIND AND HAD THE REQUISITE CAPACITY TO CONTRACT
WHEN SHE EXECUTED THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE, AND IN REFUSING TO RULE THAT IT WAS
THE RESPONDENTS - AS THE PARTIES ALLEGING MENTAL INCAPACITY- WHO HAD FAILED TO
DISCHARGE THEIR BURDEN OF REBUTTING THAT PRESUMPTION.

B.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN REFUSING TO ACCEPT AND GIVE DUE AND
PREPONDERANT WEIGHT TO UNREFUTED EVIDENCE, INCLUDING THE UNREFUTED TESTIMONIES
OF THE INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES AND OF THE NOTARY PUBLIC, THAT CARMEN OZAMIZ
EXECUTED THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE FREELY, VOLUNTARILY, KNOWINGLY, AND
INTELLIGENTLY.

C.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING WEIGHT TO THE HEARSAY TESTIMONY OF
DR. FAITH GO ON THE MENTAL CONDITION OF CARMEN OZAMIZ ON THE DATE SHE EXECUTED
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE.

D.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN IGNORING, AND IN REFUSING TO RECEIVE IN

EVIDENCE, JUDGE TEODORICO DURIASS TESTIMONY (THAT CARMEN OZAMIZ WAS OF SOUND
MIND WHEN SHE EXECUTED ANOTHER CONTRACT BARELY A MONTH BEFORE SHE EXECUTED
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE) ON THE GROUND THAT THAT TESTIMONY WAS FORGOTTEN
EVIDENCE.

We shall first rule on the issue of whether to consider the testimony of Judge Durias as newly discovered evidence.
A motion for new trial upon the ground of newly discovered evidence is properly granted only where there is
concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (a) the evidence had been discovered after trial; (b) the evidence
could not have been discovered and produced during trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; and (c) the
evidence is material and not merely corroborative, cumulative or impeaching and is of such weight that if admitted,
would probably alter the result. All three (3) requisites must characterize the evidence sought to be introduced at the
new trial.

We find that the requirement of reasonable diligence has not been met by the petitioners. As early as the pre-trial of
the case at bar, the name of Judge Durias has already cropped up as a possible witness for the defendants, herein
respondents. That the respondents chose not to present him is not an indicia per se of suppression of evidence, since
a party in a civil case is free to choose who to present as his witness. Neither can Judge Durias testimony in another
case be considered as newly discovered evidence since the facts to be testified to by Judge Durias which were
existing before and during the trial, could have been presented by the petitioners at the trial below.[16] The
testimony of Judge Durias has been in existence waiting only to be elicited from him by questioning.[17]

It has been held that a lack of diligence is exhibited where the newly discovered evidence was necessary or proper
under the pleadings, and its existence must have occurred to the party in the course of the preparation of the case,
but no effort was made to secure it; there is a failure to make inquiry of persons who were likely to know the facts
in question, especially where information was not sought from co-parties; there is a failure to seek evidence
available through public records; there is a failure to discover evidence that is within the control of the complaining
party; there is a failure to follow leads contained in other evidence; and, there is a failure to utilize available
discovery procedures.[18] Thus, the testimony of Judge Durias cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence
to warrant a new trial.

In this petition at bench, herein petitioners essentially take exception to two (2) main factual findings of the
appellate court, namely, (a) that the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 was a simulated contract,
and (b) that Carmen Ozamizs mental faculties were seriously impaired when she executed the said contract on April
28, 1989. The petitioners allege that both conclusions are contrary or opposed to well-recognized statutory
presumptions of regularity enjoyed by a notarized document and that a contracting party to a notarized contract is of
sound and disposing mind when she executes the contract.

The respondents posit a different view. They contend that clear and convincing evidence refuted the presumptions
on regularity of execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale and existence of consideration thereof. Relying upon the
testimonies of Paz O. Montalvan, Concepcion Agac-ac, Carolina Lagura and Dr. Faith Go, they aver that they were
able to show that Carmen Ozamiz was already physically and mentally incapacitated since the latter part of 1987
and could not have executed the said Deed of Absolute Sale on April 28, 1989 covering the disputed Lahug
property. They also alleged that no error is ascribable to the appellate court for not considering the allegedly
rehearsed testimonies of the instrumental witnesses and the notary public.

Factual findings of the appellate court are generally conclusive on this Court which is not a trier of facts. It is not
the function of the Supreme Court to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. However, this rule is not without
exception. If there is a showing that the appellate courts findings of facts complained of are totally devoid of
support in the record or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion, this Court
must discard such erroneous findings of facts.[19] We find that the exception applies in the case at bench.

Simulation is defined as the declaration of a fictitious will, deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order
to produce, for the purposes of deception, the appearances of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from
what that which was really executed.[20] The requisites of simulation are: (a) an outward declaration of will
different from the will of the parties; (b) the false appearance must have been intended by mutual agreement; and
(c) the purpose is to deceive third persons.[21] None of these were clearly shown to exist in the case at bar.

Contrary to the erroneous conclusions of the appellate court, a simulated contract cannot be inferred from the mere
non-production of the checks. It was not the burden of the petitioners to prove so. It is significant to note that the
Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 is a notarized document duly acknowledged before a notary public. As
such, it has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with
respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity and is entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face.[22]

Payment is not merely presumed from the fact that the notarized Deed of Absolute Sale dated April 28, 1989 has
gone through the regular procedure as evidenced by the transfer certificates of title issued in petitioners names by
the Register of Deeds. In other words, whosoever alleges the fraud or invalidity of a notarized document has the
burden of proving the same by evidence that is clear, convincing, and more than merely preponderant.[23]
Therefore, with this well-recognized statutory presumption, the burden fell upon the respondents to prove their
allegations attacking the validity and due execution of the said Deed of Absolute Sale. Respondents failed to
discharge that burden; hence, the presumption in favor of the said deed stands. But more importantly, that notarized
deed shows on its face that the consideration of One Million Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,040,000.00) was
acknowledged to have been received by Carmen Ozamiz.

Simulation cannot be inferred from the alleged absence of payment based on the testimonies of Concepcion Agac-
ac, assistant of Carmen Ozamiz, and Nelfa Perdido, part-time bookkeeper of Carmen Ozamiz. The testimonies of
these two (2) witnesses are unreliable and inconsistent.

While Concepcion Agac-ac testified that she was aware of all the transactions of Carmen Ozamiz, she also admitted
that not all income of Carmen Ozamiz passed through her since Antonio Mendezona, as appointed administrator,
directly reported to Carmen Ozamiz.[24] With respect to Nelfa Perdido, she testified that most of the transactions
that she recorded refer only to rental income and expenses, and the amounts thereof were reported to her by
Concepcion Agac-ac only, not by Carmen Ozamiz. She does not record deposits or withdrawals in the bank
accounts of Carmen Ozamiz.[25] Their testimonies hardly deserve any credit and, hence, the appellate court
misplaced reliance thereon.

Considering that Carmen Ozamiz acknowledged, on the face of the notarized deed, that she received the
consideration at One Million Forty Thousand Pesos (P1,040,000.00), the appellate court should not have placed too
much emphasis on the checks, the presentation of which is not really necessary. Besides, the burden to prove
alleged non-payment of the consideration of the sale was on the respondents, not on the petitioners. Also, between
its conclusion based on inconsistent oral testimonies and a duly notarized document that enjoys presumption of
regularity, the appellate court should have given more weight to the latter. Spoken words could be notoriously
unreliable as against a written document that speaks a uniform language.[26]

Furthermore, the appellate court erred in ruling that at the time of the execution of the Deed of Absolute Sale on
April 28, 1989 the mental faculties of Carmen Ozamiz were already seriously impaired.[27] It placed too much
reliance upon the testimonies of the respondents witnesses. However, after a thorough scrutiny of the transcripts of
the testimonies of the witnesses, we find that the respondents core witnesses all made sweeping statements which
failed to show the true state of mind of Carmen Ozamiz at the time of the execution of the disputed document. The
testimonies of the respondents witnesses on the mental capacity of Carmen Ozamiz are far from being clear and
convincing, to say the least.

Carolina Lagura, a househelper of Carmen Ozamiz, testified that when Carmen Ozamiz was confronted by Paz O.
Montalvan in January 1989 with the sale of the Lahug property, Carmen Ozamiz denied the same. She testified that
Carmen Ozamiz understood the question then.[28] However, this declaration is inconsistent with her (Carolinas)
statement that since 1988 Carmen Ozamiz could not fully understand the things around her, that she was physically
fit but mentally could not carry a conversation or recognize persons who visited her.[29] Furthermore, the disputed
sale occurred on April 28, 1989 or three (3) months after this alleged confrontation in January 1989. This
inconsistency was not explained by the respondents.

The revelation of Dr. Faith Go did not also shed light on the mental capacity of Carmen Ozamiz on the relevant day
- April 28, 1989 when the Deed of Absolute Sale was executed and notarized. At best, she merely revealed that
Carmen Ozamiz was suffering from certain infirmities in her body and at times, she was forgetful, but there was no
categorical statement that Carmen Ozamiz succumbed to what the respondents suggest as her alleged second
childhood as early as 1987. The petitioners rebuttal witness, Dr. William Buot, a doctor of neurology, testified that
no conclusion of mental incapacity at the time the said deed was executed can be inferred from Dr. Faith Gos
clinical notes nor can such fact be deduced from the mere prescription of a medication for episodic memory loss.

It has been held that a person is not incapacitated to contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of
physical infirmities. Only when such age or infirmities impair her mental faculties to such extent as to prevent her
from properly, intelligently, and fairly protecting her property rights, is she considered incapacitated.[30] The
respondents utterly failed to show adequate proof that at the time of the sale on April 28, 1989 Carmen Ozamiz had
allegedly lost control of her mental faculties.

We note that the respondents sought to impugn only one document, namely, the Deed of Absolute Sale dated April
28, 1989, executed by Carmen Ozamiz. However, there are nine (9) other important documents that were, signed by
Carmen Ozamiz either before or after April 28, 1989 which were not assailed by the respondents.[31] Such is
contrary to their assertion of complete incapacity of Carmen Ozamiz to handle her affairs since 1987. We agree
with the trial courts assessment that it is unfair for the [respondents] to claim soundness of mind of Carmen Ozamiz
when it benefits them and otherwise when it disadvantages them.[32] A person is presumed to be of sound mind at
any particular time and the condition is presumed to continue to exist, in the absence of proof to the contrary.[33]
Competency and freedom from undue influence, shown to have existed in the other acts done or contracts executed,
are presumed to continue until the contrary is shown.[34]

All the foregoing considered, we find the instant petition to be meritorious and the same should be granted.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated September 23, 1992 of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City, Branch 6, in Civil Case No. CEB-10766 is REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Emeterio C. Cui and concurred in by Associate Justices Eubulo G. Verzola and
Artemio G. Tuquero, Second Division, Rollo, pp. 9-17.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Eubulo G. Verzola and concurred in by Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and
Elvi John S. Asuncion, Special Tenth Division, Rollo, pp. 18-23.

[3] Penned by Judge Ramon Am. Torres, Original Records, pp. 374-394; Rollo, pp. 300-320.

[4] Original Records, pp. 1-7.

[5] Original Records, pp. 28-35.

[6] Original Records, pp. 36-42.

[7] Original Records, p. 43.

[8] Carmen H. Ozamiz is a cousin of the Mendezonas and a niece of Carmen Ozamiz.

[9] Original Records, pp. 44-51

[10] Original Records, pp. 52-55.

[11] Original Records, pp. 56-57.

[12] Original Records, pp. 66-68.

[13] Original Records, p. 144.

[14] Original Records, pp. 377-378.

[15] Rollo, pp. 69-71.

[16] Arce, et al., v. Arce, et al. 106 Phil. 630, 636-637 [1959].

[17] Boysaw v. Interphil Promotions, Inc., 148 SCRA 635, 647 [1987]. See Morans Comments on the Rules of
Court, p. 55, 1975 Ed., Lim Tek Goan v. Azores, 76 Phil. 363 [1946].

[18] 58 Am Jur 2d New Trial 429.

[19] Heirs of Cesario Velasquez v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 552, 565-566 [2000]; Borlongan v. Madrideo, 323
SCRA 248, 255 [2000].

[20] Loyola v. Court of Appeals, 326 SCRA 285, 293 [2000] citing A.M. Tolentino, IV Civil Code of the
Philippines 1991 Ed., p.516.
[21] Loyola v. Court of Appeals, supra at 294 citing R.B. Rodriguez, Absolutely or Relatively Simulated Contracts,
159 SCRA 186, 187-188 [1998].

[22] Lao v. Villones-Lao, 306 SCRA 387, 396 [1999]; Arrieta v. Llosa, 282 SCRA 248, 252 [1997]; Garrido v.
Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 450, 457 [1994].

[23] Caoili v. Court of Appeals, 314 SCRA 345, 361 [1999]; Salame v. Court of Appeals, 239 SCRA 356, 359
[1994]; Yturralde v. Azurin 28 SCRA 407, 417 [1969].

[24] TSN, May 26, 1992, pp. 25-26.

[25] TSN, May 27, 1992, pp. 77, 82, 84, 87, 112-113, 126.

[26] De Leon v. Court of Appeals, 205 SCRA 612 , 622 [1992]; Abella v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 482, 487
[1996].

[27] Rollo, p. 41.

[28] TSN, May 26, 1992, pp. 7-10.

[29] TSN, May 26, 1992, pp. 7-10.

[30] Loyola v. Court of Appeals, see Note No. 20, supra at 295 citing Alberts v. Dunlavey (Coshocton Co), 54 Ohio
App. 111, 7 Ohio Ops. 432, 6 NE 2d 26; Monroe v. Shrivers (Morgan Co), 29 Ohio App. 109, 162 NE 780.

[31] These are:

1. Special Power of Attorney in favor of Antonio Mendezona dated November 18, 1988 (Exh. V);

2. General Power of Attorney in favor of Antonio Mendezona dated March 23, 1988 (Exhs. Z and 1);

3. General Power of Attorney in favor of Mario Mendezona on August 11, 1990 (Exhs. AA and 2);

4. Marriage Contract between Julio Ozamiz and Marietta Figueroa dated March 11, 1989 (Exh. CC);

5. Letter of Antonio Mendezona, dated January 29, 1990 (Exh. PP);

6. Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Consuela Ozamiz dated April 15, 1988 (Exh. II);

7. Receipt for money dated June 24, 1989 (Exh. JJ);

8. Certification dated August 4, 1987 (Exh KK); and

9. Residence Certificate issued on January 12, 1988 (Exh. 5).

[32] Rollo, pp. 374-375.

[33] 29 Am Jur 2d Evidence 295; Norwood v. Norwood, 207 Ga 148, 60 SE2d 449.

[34] Blochowitz v. Blochowitz, 122 Neb 385, 240 NW 586, 82 ALR 949.

Today is Saturday, September 03, 2016

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5426 May 29, 1953

RAMON JOAQUIN, petitioner,

vs.
ANTONIO C. NAVARRO, respondent.

Agrava, Peralta & Agrava for petitioner.

Leonardo Abola for respondent.

TUASON, J.:

This three proceedings was instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila in the summary settlement of states of
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his wife Angela Joaquin de Navarro, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Pilar Navarro, deceased. All of
them having been heard jointly, Judge Rafael Amparo handed down a single decision which was appealed to the
Court of Appeals, whose decision, modifying that the Court of First Instance, in turn was elevated to the Supreme
Court for review.
The main question represented in the first two courts related to the sequence of the deaths of Joaquin Navarro, Sr.,
his wife, and their children, all of whom were killed in the massacre of civilians by Japanese troops in Manila in
February 1945. The trial court found the deaths of this persons to have accurred in this order: 1st. The Navarro girls,
named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad; 2nd. Joaquin Navarro, Jr.; 3rd. Angela Joaquin de Navarro, and 4th,
Joaquin Navarro, Sr. The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angela Joaquin
de Navarro and Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother.

It is this modification of the lower court's finding which is now being contested by the petitioner. The importance of
the question whether Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before Joaquin Navarro, Jr., or vice versa, lies in the fact that
it radically affects the rights of succession of Ramon Joaquin, the present petitioner who was an acknowledged
natural child of Angela Joaquin and adopted child of the deceased spouses, and Antonio C. Navarro, respondent,
son of Joaquin Navarro, Sr. by first marriage.

The facts, which is not disputed, are outlined in the statement in the decision of the Court of Appeals as follows:

"On February 6, 1945, while the battle for the liberation of Manila was raging, the spouses Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and
Angela Joaquin, together with their three daughters, Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad, and their son Joaquin
Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Adela Conde, sought refuge in the ground floor of the building known as the
German Club, at the corner of San Marcelino and San Luis Streets of this City. During their stay, the building was
packed with refugees, shells were exploding around, and the Club was set on fire. Simultaneously, the Japanese
started shooting at the people inside the building, especially those who were trying to escape. The three daughters
were hit and fell of the ground near the entrance; and Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his son decided to abandon the
premises to seek a safer heaven. They could not convince Angela Joaquin who refused to join them; and son
Joaquin Navarro, Sr., his son, Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and the latter's wife, Angela Conde, and a friend and former
neighbor, Francisco Lopez, dashed out of the burning edifice. As they came out, Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot in
the head by a Japanese soldier and immediately dropped. The others lay flat on the ground in front of the Club
premises to avoid the bullets. Minutes later, the German Club, already on fire, collapsed, trapping many people
inside, presumably including Angela Joaquin.

"Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and Francisco Lopez managed to reach an air raid shelter nearby,
the stayed there about three days, until February 10, 1915, when they were forced to leave the shelter be- cause the
shelling tore it open. They flied toward the St. Theresa Academy in San Marcelino Street, but unfortunately met
Japanese Patrols, who fired at the refugees, killing Joaquin Navarro, Sr., and his daughter-in-law.

"At the time of the masaccre, Joaquin Navarro, Sr. was aged 70; his wife Angela Joaquin was about 67 years old;
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., about 30; Pilar Navarro was two or three years older than her brother; while the other sisters,
Concepcion and Natividad Navarro y Joaquin, were between 23 and 25."

The Court of Appeals' finding were all taken from the testimony of Francisco Lopez, who miraculously survived
the holocaust, and upon them the Court of Appeals opined that, "as between the mother Angela Joaquin and the son
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the evidence of the survivorship is uncertain and insufficient" and the statutory presumption
must be applied. The appellate Court's reasoning for its conclusion is thus stated:

"It does not require argument to show that survivorship cannot be established by proof of the death of only one of
the parties; but that there must be adequate proof that one was alive when the other had already died. Now in this
case before us, the testimony of the sole witness Lopez is to the effect that Joaquin Navarro, Jr. was shot and died
shortly after the living the German Club in the company of his father and the witness, and that the burning edified
entirely collapsed minutes after the shooting of the son; but there is not a scintilla of evidence, direct or
circumstantial, from which we may infer the condition of the mother, Angela Joaquin, during the appreciable
interval from the instant his son turned his back to her, to dash out to the Club, until he died. All we can glean from
the evidence is that Angela Joaquin was unhurt when her son left her to escape from the German Club; but she
could have died almost immediately after, from a variety of causes. She might have been shot by the Japanese, like
her daughters, killed by falling beams from the burning edifice, overcome by the fumes, or fatally struck by
splinters from the exploding shells. We cannot say for certain. No evidence is available on the point. All we can
decide is that no one saw her alive after her son left her aside, and that there is no proof when she died. Clearly, this
circumstance alone cannot support a finding that she died latter than her son, and we are thus compelled to fall back
upon the statutory presumption. In deed, it could be said that the purpose of the presumption of survivorship would
be precisely to afford a solution to uncertainties like these. Hence the son Joaquin Navarro, Jr. aged 30, must be
deemed to have survived his mother, Angela Joaquin, who was admittedly above 60 years of age (Rule 123, sec. 69,
subsec. (ii), Rules of Court).

"The total lack of evidence on how Angela Joaquin died likewise disposes of the question whether she and her
deceased children perished in the same calamity. There being no evidence to the contrary, the only guide is the
occasion of the deaths, which is identical for all of them; that battle for the liberation of Manila. A second reason is
that the law, in declaring that those fallen in the same battle are to be regarded as perishing in the same calamity,
could not overlooked that a variety of cause of death can ( and usually do) operate in the source of combats. During
the same battle, some may die from wounds, other from gages, fire, or drowning. It is clear that the law disregards
episodic details, and treats the battle as an overall cause of death in applying the presumption of survivorship.

"We are thus led the conclusion that the order in which the members of the Navarro-Joaquin family met their end is
as follows: first, the three daughters Pilar, Concepcion, and Natividad; then the mother Angela Joaquin; then the son
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., and days later (of which there is no doubt), the father Joaquin Navarro, Sr."

Much space in the briefs is taken in a discussion of whether section 334(37) of Act No. 129, now section 69 (ii) of
Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, has repealed article 33 of the civil code of 1889, now article 43 of the New Civil
Code. It is the contention of the petitioner that it did not, and that on the assumption that there is total lack of
evidence, as the Court of Appeals said, then Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under article 33, be
held to have died at the same time.
The point is not of much if any relevancy and will be left open for the consideration when obsolute necessity there
for arises. We say irrelevant because our opinion is that neither of the two provisions is applicable for the reasons to
be presently set forth.

Rule 123, section 69 (ii) of the Revised Rules of Court, reads:

When two person perish in the same calamity, such as wreck, battle or conflagration, and it is not (1) shown who
died first, and there are no (2) particular circumstances from when it can be inferred, the survivorship is presumed
from the probabilities resulting from the strength and ages of the sexes, according to the following rules:

xxx xxx xxx

Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889 of the following tenor:

Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die to the two or more persons who would inherent one from
the other, the persons who alleges the prior death of either must prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the
presumption shall be that they died at the same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take
place.

Most provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intended as a substitute for lacks and so are not to be
available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii) of Rule 123, "the situation which it
present is one in which the facts are not only unknown but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific
evidence as to the time of death . . . ." . . . it is assumed that no evidence can be produced. . . . Since the facts are
unknown and unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situation that
arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)

In In re Wallace's Estate, 220 Pac. 683, which the Court of Appeals cited the applied with the respect to the deaths
of the Navarro girls, pointing out that "our rule is taken from the Fourth Division of sec. 1936 of the California
Code of Civil Procedure," the Supreme Court of California said:

When the statue speaks of "particular circumstances from which it can be inferred" that one died before the other it
means that there are circumstances from which the fact of death by one before the other may be inferred as a
relation conclusion from the facts proven. The statue does not mean circumstances which would shown, or which
would tend to show, probably that one died before the other. Grand Lodge A.O.W.W. vs. Miller, 8 Cal. App. 28, 96
Pac. 22. When by circumstantial evidence alone, a party seeks to prove a survivorship contrary to the statutory
presumption, the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are competent and
sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases. The inference of survivorship cannot rest upon
mere surmise, speculation, or conjecture. As was said in Grand Lodge vs. Miller, supra, "if the matter is left to
probably, then the statue of the presumption."
It is manifest from the language of section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 and of that of the foregoing decision that the evidence
of the survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial, or inferential. Where there are facts,
known or knowable, from which a rational conclusion can be made, the presumption does not step in, and the rule
of preponderance of evidence controls.

Are there particular circumstances on record from which reasonable inference of survivorship between Angela
Joaquin and her son can be drawn? Is Francisco Lopez' testimony competent and sufficient for this purpose? For a
better appreciation of this issue, it is convenient and necessary to detail the testimony, which was described by the
trial court as "disinterested and trustworthy" and by the Court of Appeals as "entitled to credence."

Lopez testified:

Q. You said you were also heat at that time as you leave the German Club with Joaquin Navarro, Sr., Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. and the latter's wife?- A. Yes, sir.

Q. Did you fall? A. I fell down.

Q. And you said you fell down close to Joaquin Navarro, Jr.? A. Yes, sir.

Q. When the German Club collapsed where were you? A. We were out 15 meters away from the building but I
could see what was going on.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Could there have been an interval of fifteen minutes between the two events, that is the shooting of Joaquin
Navarro, Jr. and the collapse of the German Club? A. Yes, sir, I could not say exactly, Occasions like that, you
know, you are confused.

Q. Could there (have) been an interval of an hour instead of fifteen minutes? A. Possible, but not probable.

Q. Could it have been 40 minutes? A. Yes, sir, about 40 minutes.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You also know that Angela Joaquin is already dead? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you tell the Honorable Court when did Angela Joaquin die? A. Well, a few minutes after we have dashed
out, the German Club, which was burning, collapsed over them, including Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. From your testimony it would appear that while you can give positive evidence to the fact that Pilar, Concepcion
and Natividad Navarro, and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died, you can not give the same positive evidence to the fact that
Angela Joaquin also died? A. Yes, sir, in the sense that I did not see her actually die, but when the building
collapsed over her I saw and I am positive and I did not see her come out of that building so I presumed she died
there.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Why did you have to dash out of the German Club, you, Mr. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. and Mr. Joaquin Navarro Jr.
and the latter's wife? A. Because the Japanese had set fire to the Club and they were shooting people outside, so
we thought of running away rather than be roasted.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. You mean to say that before you jumped out of the German Club all the Navarro girls, Pilar, Concepcion, and
Natividad, were already wounded? A. to my knowledge, yes.

Q. They were wounded? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Were they lying on the ground or not? A. On the ground near the entrance, because most of the people who
were shot by the Japanese were those who were trying to escape, and as far as I can remember they were among
those killed.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. So you noticed that they were killed or shot by the Japanese a few minutes before you left the place? A. That
is what I think, because those Japanese soldiers were shooting the people inside especially those trying to escape.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And none of them was not except the girls, is that what you mean? A . There were many people shot because
they were trying to escape.

xxx xxx xxx

Q. How come that these girls were shot when they were inside the building, can you explain that? A. They were
trying to escape probably.

It is our opinion that the preceding testimony contains facts quite adequate to solve the problem of survivorship
between Angela Joaquin and Joaquin Navarro, Jr. and keep the statutory presumption out of the case. It is believed
that in the light of the conditions painted by Lopez, a fair and reasonable inference can be arrived at, namely: that
Joaquin Navarro, Jr. died before his mother.

While the possibility that the mother died before the son can not be ruled out, it must be noted that this possibility is
entirely speculative and must yield to the more rational deduction from proven facts that it was the other way
around. Joaquin Navarro, Jr., it will be recalled, was killed, while running, in front of, and 15 meters from, the
German Club. Still in the prime of life, 30, he must have negotiated that distance in five seconds or less, and so died
within that interval from the time he dashed out of the building. Now, when Joaquin Navarro, Jr. with his father and
wife started to flee from the clubhouse, the old lady was alive and unhurt, so much so that the Navarro father and
son tried hard to have her come along. She could have perished within those five or fewer seconds, as stated, but the
probabilities that she did seem very remote. True, people in the building were also killed but these, according to
Lopez, were mostly refugees who had tried to slip away from it and were shot by Japanese troops. It was not very
likely that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro, Sr. made an attempt to escape. She even made frantic efforts to dissuade her
husband and son from leaving the place and exposing themselves to gun fire.

This determination of Mrs. Angela Joaquin to stay where she was may well give an idea, at the same time, of a
condition of relative safety in the clubhouse at the moment her husband, son, and daughter-in-law left her. It
strongly tends to prove that, as the situation looked to her, the perils of death from staying were not so imminent.
And it lends credence to Mr. Lopez' statement that the collapse of the clubhouse occurred about 40 minutes after
Joaquin Navarro the son was shot in the head and dropped dead, and that it was the collapse that killed Mrs. Angela
Navarro. The Court of Appeals said the interval between Joaquin Navarro's death and the breaking down of the
edifice was "minutes". Even so, it was much longer than five seconds, long enough to warrant the inference that
Mrs. Angela Joaquin was sill alive when her son expired

The Court of Appeals mentioned several causes, besides the collapse of the building, by which Mrs. Navarro could
have been killed. All these are speculative , and the probabilities, in the light of the known facts, are against them.
Dreading Japanese sharpshooters outside as evidenced by her refusal to follow the only remaining living members
of her family, she could not have kept away form protective walls. Besides, the building had been set on fire trap
the refugees inside, and there was no necessity for the Japanese to was their ammunition except upon those who
tried to leave the premises. Nor was Angela Joaquin likely to have been killed by falling beams because the
building was made of concrete and its collapse, more likely than not, was sudden. As to fumes, these do not cause
instantaneous death; certainly not within the brief space of five seconds between her son's departure and his death.

It will be said that all this is indulging in inferences that are not conclusive. Section 69(ii) of Rule 123 does not
require that the inference necessary to exclude the presumption therein provided be certain. It is the "particular
circumstances from which it (survivorship) can be inferred" that are required to be certain as tested by the rules of
evidence. In speaking of inference the rule can not mean beyond doubt, for "inference is never certainty, but if may
be plain enough to justify a finding of fact." (In re Bohenko's Estate, 4 N.Y.S. 2nd. 427, citing Tortora vs. State of
New York, 269 N.Y. 199 N.E. 44; Hart vs. Hudson River Bridge Co., 80 N.Y.). 622.) As the California courts have
said, it is enough that "the circumstances by which it is sought to prove the survivorship must be such as are
competent and sufficient when tested by the general rules of evidence in civil cases." (In re Wallace's Estate, supra.)
"Juries must often reason," says one author, "according to probabilities, drawing an inference that the main fact in
issue existed from collateral facts not directly proving, but strongly tending to prove, its existence. The vital
question in such cases is the cogency of the proof afforded by the secondary facts. How likely, according to
experience, is the existence of the primary fact if certain secondary facts exist?" (1 Moore on Facts, Sec. 596.) The
same author tells us of a case where "a jury was justified in drawing the inference that the person who was caught
firing a shot at an animal trespassing on his land was the person who fired a shot about an hour before at the same
animal also trespassing." That conclusion was not airtight, but rational. In fact, the circumstances in the illustration
leave greater room for another possibility than do the facts of the case at hand.

In conclusion the presumption that Angela Joaquin de Navarro died before her son is based purely on surmises,
speculations, or conjectures without any sure foundation in the evidence. the opposite theory that the mother
outlived her son is deduced from established facts which, weighed by common experience, engender the
inference as a very strong probability. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by, which civil cases
are decided, this inference ought to prevail. It can not be defeated as in an instance, cited by Lord Chief Justice
Kenyon, "bordering on the ridiculous, where in an action on the game laws it was suggested that the gun with
which the defendant fired was not charged with shot, but that the bird might have died in consequence of the
fright." (1 Moore on Facts, 63, citing Wilkinson vs. Payne, 4 T. R. 468.)

It is said that part of the decision of the Court of Appeals which the appellant impugns, and which has been
discussed, involves findings of fact which can not be disturbed. The point is not, in our judgment, well considered.
The particular circumstances from which the parties and the Court of Appeals drew conclusions are, as above seen,
undisputed, and this being the case, the correctness or incorrectness of those conclusions raises a question of law,
not of fact, which the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to look into. As was said in 1 Moran Commentaries on the
Rules of ?Court, 3rd Ed. 856, 857, "Undisputed evidence is one thing, and contradicted evidence is another. An
incredible witness does not cease to be such because he is not impeached or contradicted. But when the evidence is
purely documentary, the authenticity of which is not questioned and the only issue is the construction to be placed
thereon, or where a case is submitted upon an agreement of facts, or where all the facts are stated in the judgment
and the issue is the correctness of the conclusions drawn therefrom, the question is one of law which may be
reviewed by the Supreme Court."

The question of whether upon given facts the operation of the statutory presumption is to be invoked is a question
of law.

The prohibition against intermeddling with decisions on questions of evidence refers to decisions supported by
substantial evidence. By substantial evidence is meant real evidence or at least evidence about which reasonable
men may disagree. Findings grounded entirely on speculations, surmises, or conjectures come within the exception
to the general rule.

We are constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the distribution of the decedents' estates
should be made in accordance with the decision of the trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing
upon the question of "reserva troncal" which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin
Navarro's death preceded that of her son. Without costs.

Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it
is aimed. 1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one
year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the
1973 Constitution seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community." 3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the
First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following
information in item no. 8: 4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING

THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.

On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of
Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification" 5 with the
Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his
petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement
for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 3349772 6 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy." 7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven"
months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate. 8 On the same day, the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:

[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out
of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office
in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head
office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original
Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding
the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always
maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:

When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and
run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a
letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a
petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in
the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the
creation of another legislative district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose.
However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition
for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the judgment and
verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May
8, 1995. 12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came
up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2)
striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her
original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the validity of amending the original
Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's
compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:

Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an
"honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be
allowed. She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First
District, to which she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore,
in her memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a
resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the
Municipality of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a
component of the First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.

Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she
would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was
rebuffed when petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of
Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.

This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of
Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of
origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate
of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is
not easy to believe because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the
Certificate of Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.

From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.

To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v.
COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to
the "inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions
intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered
the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of
form or an inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent
seeks to be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those
intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To
admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of
the detriment of the integrity of the election.

Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by
claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The
arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be
gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she
is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said
accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994,
requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the
respondent's consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila
only for such limited period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum
up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it
was an error.

xxx xxx xxx

Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.

xxx xxx xxx

Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the
one year residency requirement of the Constitution.

In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports
not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs.
RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence
she chose was not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila
and not Tacloban.

This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing
more than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold
ground in the face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her
husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In
1965, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro
Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore,
when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of
San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer
of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she
may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have
been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.

In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a
voter in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her
school days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other
different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new
domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain
there; and (3) intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with
animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention
to stay there by registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed
to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.

Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention.
Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any
evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what
was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.

It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."

To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than
one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No.
18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it
refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of
Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the
district for six months only. 15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of
Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely
stated:

After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial
matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for
disqualification. 18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the
canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of
Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the
proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the highest number of votes. 19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the
elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed
by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said
Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.

On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District
of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for
relief.

Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified
into two general areas:

I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications

Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year
at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.

II. The Jurisdictional Issue

a) Prior to the elections

Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period
mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.

b) After the Elections

Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification

A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of
settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement
with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the
Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not
intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as
required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective
position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.

Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the
concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or
for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a
fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.

Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the
physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence
and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken
up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to
remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is
thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can
only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another
domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:

There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the
intention of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not
domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of
residence is generally his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence
without intention of remaining will constitute domicile.

For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws.
As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that
residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.

In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not
only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held
that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the
place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our
election law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.

The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed
beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only
"domicile" to wit:

Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an
attempt to require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So
my question is: What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?

Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the
proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not
less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29

xxx xxx xxx

Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same
point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.

Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.

Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence
rather than mere intention to reside?

Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the
Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to
stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987
Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having
the same meaning as domicile. 32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency
requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry
in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?

It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining
whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement
becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately
and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.

It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the
space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned
entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her
actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in
the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's
questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she
would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo
opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in
her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down
in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion:
the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a
candidate seeks election thus:

7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO

BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.

Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's
claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile.
The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring
domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led
to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not,
however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.

In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the
Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time
when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to
be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following
the election of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In
1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could
not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is
where the confusion lies.

We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given
place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do
other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by
the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed
her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence
in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we stressed:

[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with
his family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and
provincial positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.

More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:

A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and
that, of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is
to be held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his
ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his
professional or business activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is
not willing to give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in
national elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of
origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds
justification in the natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of
attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.

From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner
was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously
referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled
jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the
provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which
we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from
high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House
of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of
Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she
and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was
elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a
voter in San Miguel, Manila.

[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and
filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan,
Metro Manila.

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held
various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point
to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in
Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her
adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even
during her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her
domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and hometown,
and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power either through
the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile
of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were
entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of
the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.

Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did
not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her
residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it
follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by
operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary
to private respondent's averments.

Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;

2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and

3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.

In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or
residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin
in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).

In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a
result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established
distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred from the use of
the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are
well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:

In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations
between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical,
independent of the necessity of physical presence. 40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with
the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the
female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her
domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:

La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo,
podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais
extranjero.

Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever
(the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence
because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when
the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home
or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only
once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept
of actual residence.

The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and
unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of
origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a
single place of actual residence.

Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which
obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:

Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support.

The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into
account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to
stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may
"live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence."
Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for
professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:

Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is
synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a
consideration of the purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at
other times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx

Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can
have two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in
place; on the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is
that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an
iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our
jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other
such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously
practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.
Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the
Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances
where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be compelled to live with
her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:

Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country
to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where
the property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we
are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to
compel the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the
courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is
extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent
party to live with the other and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges
who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen,
President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the
English law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence,
equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse,
but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the
practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the
restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the
basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted
to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife
was ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana
similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not
been fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation
by process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).

In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to
do so, to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from
the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order
for the return of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that
would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her
disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.

Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged by
virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The
problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal
and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence.
But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon
marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.

On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a
result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To
underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence
has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and
spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's
rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the
spouses. 46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code)
and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the
rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not
a domicilium necessarium.

Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only
acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country
clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the
PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in
Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act
which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not
have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by
vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely qualified as
temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific
situations where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original
domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within
the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.

In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are
persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's
claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.

II. The jurisdictional issue

Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions
were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not
the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance
with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.

It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to
be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the
statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American
authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the
reason being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days
within which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions
which may be thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually
those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the
Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed
merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after
the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and
other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a
decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is
evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification
case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge
of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not being a member of the House of
Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or
deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a
distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including
the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual
what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the
past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat
in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April
24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order
the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of
Leyte.

SO ORDERED.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:

It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the
residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify her and treat
her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and
legal propositions:

First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in
Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and
thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of
choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of
choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.

Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By
contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article
110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living
with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)

In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of
the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the
husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the
other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where
union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the
husband and wife "to live together."

Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto
resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause
her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the
domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife,
in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior
domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Via, 6

. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their
husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that
will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the
husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a
wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile
legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her
domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.

In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile
and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and
throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has
been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they
lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was
elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and
Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of
the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he
did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage
loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually
lives or what she believes or intends." 7

Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President
Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of
thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily
relying on American authorities. 8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last
domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.

I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile
is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law
identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her
own separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine.
The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the
desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 The
presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept.
The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was
under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied
the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator."
Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d 14 are American state court
decisions handed down between the years 1917 15 and 1938, 16 or before the time when women were accorded
equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations
in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise
liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US
Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an
Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held
that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law
and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of
married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris
Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has
been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common
law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known
to the law." 19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable
American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of
statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."
20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that
demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this
common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the
Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida
Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows: 21

xxx xxx xxx

Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives

Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other
than from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents,
parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her
profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is
sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds"
for objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.

xxx xxx xxx

Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of
the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced
spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the
husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as
the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways
specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which
amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent
without just cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.

With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in
common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not
leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to
engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot
similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.

And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.

Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality
between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect
which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.
22

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-
based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family
property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint parental
authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the
support of the family; 25 the right to jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's
exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity. 27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69
of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it
jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible
with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together,
former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now
refuse to live with her husband, thus: 28

(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:

(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;

(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and
they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);

(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated
his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);

(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and
at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);

(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);

(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).

The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the
husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of
his rare lectures after retirement: 29

xxx xxx xxx

The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive
control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the
husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties
and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the
family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family.
(Emphasis supplied)

In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by
the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her
dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed
by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by
giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary
determination of her dead husband.

Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due
process and equal protection of
law. 30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's
domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not
rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge.
Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality
between sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of
women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation
building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the
sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.

Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that
petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no
domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This
stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the
Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see
the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be
released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her
deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the
grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law
should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither
rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.

But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban
domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent
COMELEC, petitioner averred:

xxx xxx xxx

36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied
by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.

37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which
the Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.

38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG,
however, did not permit and allow me.

39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's
apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in
Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose,
Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents'
burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and scattered.

41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to

. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us
the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.

xxx xxx xxx

42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon
Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part
of his letter:

Dear Col. Kempis,

Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered
properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered
properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take
over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the
necessary courtesy to her.

xxx xxx xxx

43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I
wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San
Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live
there.

It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that
in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she
transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are
within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of
Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995
elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented
petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the
date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's
Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the
district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte.
Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove
that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the
First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor.
Private respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she placed
seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no
evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to
correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held
in Alialy v. COMELEC, 34 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of candidacy
presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the
certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law,
and the defect was cured.

It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as
evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2)
brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of
Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private
respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to
represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.

Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench
will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from
running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to
disqualify her, she averred: 36

xxx xxx xxx

10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When
respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by
writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of
respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to
transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme

Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's
(Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District
and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having,
failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is
afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of
the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.

These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion, 37 held:

xxx xxx xxx

Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the
Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the
Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and
South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively
Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of
Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol,
Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec
Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer.
Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo)
filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a
favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner
herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the
Second District.

It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a "Decision,"
penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of
Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the
Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City
and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.

All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious
discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic
violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment
and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is
but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way
to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.

Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be
contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place.
None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate.
The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes,
while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is
clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics.
We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean
towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.

A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status
between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women
and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is
eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous
balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the
glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based
discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the
Constitution forbids it.

I vote to grant the petition.

Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.

FRANCISCO, J., concurring:

I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the
First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's
domicile.

Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode,
or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent
home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for
like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent.
(Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)

Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a
domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is
legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or
reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has
elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention
of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one
called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or
animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is
domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual
residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the
relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).

In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind,
public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's
disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence
requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as
voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than
his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil.
294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's
intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.

It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a
domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her
husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite
untenable.

Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac,
Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile
of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital
duties and obligations to one another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the
legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her
marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the
reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband,
would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to
hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.

It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to
disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other
place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost
his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino,
supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as
against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the
record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new
domicile to replace her domicile of origin.

The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence
requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the
Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties
forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the
Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San
Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and
resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was
allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).
3 It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan,
Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From
this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila.
The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the
1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August
of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and
Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a
year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with
the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for
Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her
proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as
has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its
shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division
disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the
denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election;
then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass
should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won
overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins,
her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.

Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given
to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is
important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had
resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents
lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she
married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly
released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may
confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of
choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by
the ponente and in the other separate opinions.

In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the
domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased
husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot
possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.

It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the
family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale
underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of
the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise
of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To
answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile.
Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time.
Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as
defined by the law be is subject to.

At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the
conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according
petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the
human rights of women, no less than men.

Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned,
is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over
three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to
our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of
the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the
husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to
make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue
before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the
support of the wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal
property, with a few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes
specified under the law; 6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent. 7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the
legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers. 8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity
are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled
persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except
from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. 9 With respect to
her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or
engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his
opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the
effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her husband,
unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the
parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his
will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental
authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.

All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them
until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable
lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the
Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of
the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)

It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist
movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines
bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. .
. adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the
CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons
and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).

CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of
the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President
of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for
equality between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights" 16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17

A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the
grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given
the right jointly to fix the family domicile; 18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support
of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly; 20 the father and mother shall now
jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child 21 and several others.

Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law
popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act" 22 Among the rights given to married
women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:

(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements
under the same conditions as men;

(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit,
loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;

(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and
other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.

As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first
to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full
participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself a
Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer
is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not
excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from
their proper places under the sun.

In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more
rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil,
political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death
of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?

I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of
the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but
exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by
overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together,
the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.

The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and
render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A
compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well
become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect
and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.

Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law.
These provisions read:

Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except
the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for
a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to
the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of
candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).

The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The
issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least
inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the
long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of
discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.

I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term
"residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official
duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time).
For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the
controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as
used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends
to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in
turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse
of discretion in its assailed resolution.

The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since
become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the
proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the
number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance
of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its
particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be
required by law before a proclamation is properly done.

The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of
authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory
pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating
to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.

Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to
cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later
than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before
an election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his
violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.

I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific
instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument
that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as
such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument,
nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of
Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687
[1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo
vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211
SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a
unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo
were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can
replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number
of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985.
In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer
won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote.
(Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De
la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the
Court held:

. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do
not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)

Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on
the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that
the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the
COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement
to submit their dispute to that body.

The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's
qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No.
7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo
warranto proceedings against winning candidates.

To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of
the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence
or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office.
There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases
involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.

These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:

12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.

The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from
his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)

68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97
and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is
a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)

78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis added)

the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):

6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis
added).

7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove
provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):

40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:

(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue
to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation
and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material
representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on
the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the
position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten
(10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its
resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the
basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false
representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.

Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy
under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is
important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to
disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a
person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of
Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.

Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the
allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy
with regard to their citizenship, 1 age, 2 or residence. 3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed
upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests 4 or quo
warranto proceedings 5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.

Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his
eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is
why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has
been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply

demonstrated in the companion case ( G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995.
This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. 7 The law is
satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to
fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are
elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC
given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve
the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under
the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.

By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the
results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the
same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any
inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:

Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such
an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C,
2(3))

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in
40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race
either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this
sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of
the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in 4.

Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or
offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation
and prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery
for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a
candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a
proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming
office even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for
quo warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With
respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.)
such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as
provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must
be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification
proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation
cases against such candidates.

For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its
proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the
HRET.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No.
95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995,
declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the
First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes
proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered
void.

The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.

Narvasa, C.J., concurs.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.

As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision
itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular
controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous
with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1 where significantly
the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of
origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.

With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase
"a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.

The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that
he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.

A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the
luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the
minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.

In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his
domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether
his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.

The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different
districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus
non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.

All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires
to be elected.

To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all
situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent
in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if
not versatility.

In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of
the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from
high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City.
In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of
Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was
elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered
as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the
election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of
Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for
Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-
A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the
Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that
she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).

On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has
been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries
therein are as follows:

7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker

8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months

10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my
knowledge.

(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos

(Signature of Candidate) 2

Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of
her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the
constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."

It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is
disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte)
immediately preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."

Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important
issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.

I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1,
1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil.
238 that:

. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no
one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.

Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84
O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision
quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final
judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that in
all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated
the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case
a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified.

Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt
is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the
highest number of votes.

It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
"winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest
number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.

As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-
examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly
elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.

Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:

While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same
conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality
of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and
which I have simplified as follows:

1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a
legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school
there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that city.

2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by
operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.

3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a
Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace
in San Miguel, Manila.

4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal,
and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.

5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever
abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in
all elections.

6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in
Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which
she claimed to have been merely temporary residences.

7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she
indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.

8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters
in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas,
San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which
purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she
had resided in that municipality for six months.

10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she
sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the
original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading
"SINCE CHILDHOOD."

The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency
requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.

I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence
and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of
international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our
jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil,
commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.

Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from
her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its
permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in
American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.

My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of
origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a
different place. 1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was
what is now Tacloban City.

Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice,
and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the
second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential,
as that of a wife arising from marriage, 3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the
domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently
acquired by the party.

When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or
American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.

Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu,
Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new
domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or
misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them.
Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her
will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice. 5

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in
Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of
choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score,
we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a)
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.

We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether
what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation
of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her
domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the
object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.

To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections, 7 and advances this novel proposition.

It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention
on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation
of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically
reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of
origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any
given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their
own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that
petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what
is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.

Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law.
However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile
of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner
lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am
impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions.
Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the
former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original
domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same
as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy,
unsuccessfully tried to do.

One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not
only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence,
that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained
another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and
obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate
this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.

Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that
she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed
through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and
legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that
with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her
domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of
marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a
state of suspended animation.

Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect
her own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual
change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal
residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death. 11

I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family
domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never
exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband,
long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile,
but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married
and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or
material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the
matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.

I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the
affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have
searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication
supports the majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of
petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world
of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the
well-turned phrase.

In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically
reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it
is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her
pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in
the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election.
These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner.

ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more
particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.

Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may
be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc
vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).

Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has,
undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.

My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second
Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave
abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the
facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood
facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.

The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has
abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by
documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is
Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became
her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the
election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional
District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.

It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman
(later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a
person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the
wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil
Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte.
Said Article reads as follows:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living
with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:

Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in
the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But
because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it
impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may
be exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by
the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a
suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith.
(Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).

Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of
her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the
sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by
changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).

It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no
longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement
the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses
may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the
duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).

The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the
majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by
law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own
domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile
12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she
exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62,
45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.

Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his
death which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila,
were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their
residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a
widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May
1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in
that place.

On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her
own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy
of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this
sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy
of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy
of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy
of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.

The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit
attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her
"domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did
she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her
Voter's Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves
that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage
and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.

I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such
residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer
of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public
service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with
law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a
woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this
Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an
abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly
mentioned the same.

This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of
her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is
Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always
intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the
Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954
conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo et
facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).

Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest
mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the
certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all
sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated
was the truth.

The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue
has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the
petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The
majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile
at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article
110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her
revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to
acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.

I vote to deny the petition.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:

It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike
should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness. 1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the
residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution. 2 We cannot disqualify her and treat
her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from the following factual and
legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in
Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and
thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of
choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and her domicile of
choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.

Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By
contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article
110 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living
with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic. 3 (Emphasis supplied)

In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano, 4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of
the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the
husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the
other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where
union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with this objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the
husband and wife "to live together."

Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto
resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause
her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the
domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of his wife,
in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his wife's prior
domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Via, 6

. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their
husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .

It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that
will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the
husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a
wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile
legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her
domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.

In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile
and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and
throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has
been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as Senator, when they
lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965 when her husband was
elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and
Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of
the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he
did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage
loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually
lives or what she believes or intends." 7

Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President
Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of
thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily
relying on American authorities. 8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the wife retains the last
domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.

I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile
is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law
identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her
own separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this common law doctrine.
The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband." 10 The second reason lies in "the
desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law." 11 The
presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept.
The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence against women. It was
under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women were denied
the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs
to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator."
Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d 14 are American state court
decisions handed down between the years 1917 15 and 1938, 16 or before the time when women were accorded
equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state legislations
in the United States to eliminate gender inequality. 17 Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise
liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US
Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed, 18 struck a big blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an
Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members over females as estate administrators. It held
that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law
and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of
married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris
Secundum editors did not miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has
been declared that under modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common
law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known
to the law." 19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable
American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of
statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."
20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that
demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this
common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the
Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida
Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows: 21

xxx xxx xxx

Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives

Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other
than from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents,
parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her
profession or occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is
sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds"
for objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.

xxx xxx xxx

Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of
the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced
spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the
husband and wife on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as
the grounds for absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways
specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which
amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent
without just cause for a period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.

With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in
common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not
leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to
engage in acts and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot
similarly bind the partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the
legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.

Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality
between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect
which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.
22

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-
based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family
property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership; 23 joint parental
authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties; 24 joint responsibility for the
support of the family; 25 the right to jointly manage the household; 26 and, the right to object to their husband's
exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity. 27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69
of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it
jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:

Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.

The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid
and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible
with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together,
former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now
refuse to live with her husband, thus: 28

(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:

(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;

(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life impossible;

(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-law and
they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);

(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and treated
his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);

(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and necessities, and
at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);

(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).

The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the
husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of
his rare lectures after retirement: 29

xxx xxx xxx

The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive
control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the
husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties
and exercise joint authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the
family. The husband will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family.
(Emphasis supplied)

In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by
the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her
dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed
by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by
giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary
determination of her dead husband.

Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due
process and equal protection of
law. 30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's
domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not
rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge.
Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality
between sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of
women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation
building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the
sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.

Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her
Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that
petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no
domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time. This
stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110 of the
Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see
the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be
released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her
deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot rule her beyond the
grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these, common law
should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither
rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.

But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban
domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent
COMELEC, petitioner averred:

xxx xxx xxx

36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied
by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.

37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which
the Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.

38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG,
however, did not permit and allow me.

39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's
apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in
Makati.

40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose,
Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my parents'
burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and scattered.

41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to

. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them livable for us
the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx

42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon
Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part
of his letter:

Dear Col. Kempis,

Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our sequestered
properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered
properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said repairs is not authorization for her to take
over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the
necessary courtesy to her.

xxx xxx xxx

43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I
wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San
Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live
there.

It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that
in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she
transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are
within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of
Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995
elections.

The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He presented
petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the
date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995. 31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's
Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1) year residence in the
district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte.
Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove
that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the
First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor.
Private respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 32 where she placed
seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the constituency where I
seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no
evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy, 33 petitioner wrote "since childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to
correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held
in Alialy v. COMELEC, 34 viz.:

xxx xxx xxx

The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of candidacy
presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the
certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law,
and the defect was cured.

It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as
evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2)
brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of
Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private
respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to
represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.

Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be
free from any form of harassment and discrimination." 35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench
will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from
running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the petition to
disqualify her, she averred: 36

xxx xxx xxx

10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When
respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by
writing a letter stating that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of
respondent's affidavit, Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to
transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme

Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's
(Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District
and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having,
failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is
afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of
the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.

These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion, 37 held:

xxx xxx xxx

Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the
Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the
Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and
South Cotabato, Out of Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively
Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of
Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol,
Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec
Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on Elections refused to make the proposed transfer.
Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo)
filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on

Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a
favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner
herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the
Second District.

It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a "Decision,"
penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of Capoocan of
the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of
Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the municipality of Tolosa
from the First District to the Second District of the province of Leyte. No costs.

Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the
Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City
and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.

All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious
discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic
violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment
and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is
but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way
to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and bitterness.

Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera, 38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or
newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an
elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be
contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place.
None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.

Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate.
The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes,
while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is
clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not a sleight of statistics.
We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we should lean
towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.

A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status
between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women
and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is
eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and anomalous
balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the
glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based
discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the
Constitution forbids it.

I vote to grant the petition.

Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.

FRANCISCO, J., concurring:

I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the
First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's
domicile.

Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode,
or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent
home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or pleasure, or for
like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent.
(Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)

Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a
domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is
legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or
reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the person has
elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or foundation the intention
of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one
called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new
locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or
animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is
domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent of his own intention or actual
residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the
relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).

In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral
Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind,
public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's
disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year residence
requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and registration as
voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban,
Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than
his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil.
294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's
intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.

It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a
domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her
husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite
untenable.

Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac,
Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile
of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital
duties and obligations to one another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the fact that it was the
legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while the wife retains her
marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the
reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband,
would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to
hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death
without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to
disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other
place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has abandoned or lost
his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v. Quirino,
supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as
against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the
record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new
domicile to replace her domicile of origin.

The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence
requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the
Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and other properties
forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached as Annex I of the
Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San
Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate 2 and
resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was
allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).
3 It was in the same month of August when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan,
Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From
this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila.
The fact which private respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the
1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August
of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and
Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a
year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with
the one-year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.

I vote to grant the petition.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for
Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her
proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as
has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its
shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second Division
disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the
denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election;
then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass
should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won
overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins,
her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.

Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given
to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat. 1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is
important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had
resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents
lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed when she
married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his death certainly
released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may
confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of
choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by
the ponente and in the other separate opinions.

In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the
domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased
husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot
possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.

It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the
family, as laid down in the Civil Code, 2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale
underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of
the present.

At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise
of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To
answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile.
Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same purpose at any given time.
Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no domicile, as
defined by the law be is subject to.

At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the
conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to
illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according
petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to recognize and protect the
human rights of women, no less than men.

Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned,
is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over
three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to
our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the imposition on our government of
the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to accept such concepts as the
husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the right to
make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue
before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the
support of the wife and the rest of the family, 4 he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal
property, with a few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes
specified under the law; 6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the
husband's consent. 7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the
legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers. 8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity
are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled
persons. To illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except
from her ascendants, descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree. 9 With respect to
her employment, the husband wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or
engages in business, provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his
opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the
effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her husband,
unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the
parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided in his
will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise parental
authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.

All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them
until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable
lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the
Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of
the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the
dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis supplied)

It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist
movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly
which entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines
bound itself to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. .
. adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy
of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the
CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons
and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).

CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of
the Philippines and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President
of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for
equality between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect for human rights" 16 and "The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men." 17

A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the
grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given
the right jointly to fix the family domicile; 18 concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the support
of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household; 19 the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly; 20 the father and mother shall now
jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child 21 and several others.

Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law
popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act" 22 Among the rights given to married
women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:

(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements
under the same conditions as men;

(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit,
loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;

(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and

(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and
other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.

As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first
to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full
participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself a
Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this writer
is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not
excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from
their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more
rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil,
political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death
of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?

I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of
the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but
exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply demonstrated by
overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added together,
the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as
Representative of the First District of Leyte.

In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:

The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.

The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and
render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A
compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well
become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it remains, we owe it respect
and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory
needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.

Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).

The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law.
These provisions read:

Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except
the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for
a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be
the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each
Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of
Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the
political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The
senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.

The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to
the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of
candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under the
COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).

The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The
issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least
inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the
long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of
discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.

I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term
"residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official
duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time).
For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the
domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the
controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7,
Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:

In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as
used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed
place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile"
denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends
to return. . . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in
turn, to acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality,
(2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of
choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the
place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.

Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse
of discretion in its assailed resolution.

The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since
become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the
proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the
number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance
of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in its
particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be
required by law before a proclamation is properly done.

The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of
authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their
exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory
pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating
to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.

Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of
Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall give priority to
cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later
than seven days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast
for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before
an election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his
violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific
instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument
that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as
such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument,
nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of
Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687
[1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo
vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211
SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a
unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano,
Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo
were on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:

Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can
replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number
of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.

The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985.
In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer
won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three
dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote.
(Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)

Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De
la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the
Court held:

. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a
candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the
representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do
not choose him.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can
be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)

Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on
the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that
the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo
warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the COMELEC but, as in this case, in
the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings in the
COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement
to submit their dispute to that body.

The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's
qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the
Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No.
7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo
warranto proceedings against winning candidates.

To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of
the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence
or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office.
There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy, but it applies only to cases
involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.

These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:

12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or
has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has
been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be
disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from
his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)

68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final
decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material
consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b)
committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of
that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97
and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall
be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is
a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in
accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)

78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of

candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by
any person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section
74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of
the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the
election. (Emphasis added)

the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):

6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and; upon motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis
added).

7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure hereinabove
provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):

40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by
one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;

(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;

(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;

(d) Those with dual citizenship;

(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;

(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue
to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and

(g) The insane or feeble-minded.

The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation
and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material
representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on
the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified from running for the
position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less than ten
(10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its
resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the
basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any finding that she had made false
representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.

Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy
under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is
important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose to
disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to disqualify a
person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the House of
Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.

Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the
allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy
with regard to their citizenship, 1 age, 2 or residence. 3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed
upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election protests 4 or quo
warranto proceedings 5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the
qualifications of a candidate.

First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his
eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting
election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is being sought. That is
why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has
been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside. 6

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply

demonstrated in the companion case ( G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8, 1995.
This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law
makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. 7 The law is
satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to
fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and only in the event they are
elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC
given jurisdiction.

Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to preserve
the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under
the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the President and Vice
President, as the case may be.

By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the
results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the
same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any
inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.

Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:

Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as
provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for
disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such
an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the
exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the right to vote, which
essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C,
2(3))

The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in
40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or
from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race
either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications
prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for
declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.

Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this
sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in 2 of
the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in 4.

Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or
offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation
and prolonging the election protest," 8 through the use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery
for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for determining a
candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a
proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming
office even though in end he prevails.

To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for
quo warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With
respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.)
such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or Municipal Trial Courts, as
provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition must
be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with
the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification
proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President, Vice President, Senators and
members of the House of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation
cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its
proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the
HRET.

Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No.
95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995,
declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the
First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes
proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it should considered
void.

The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.

Narvasa, C.J., concurs.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.

As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision
itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular
controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the House of
Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election, is at least
twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)

It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous
with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1 where significantly
the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of
origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in the place, coupled with conduct
indicative of such intention.

With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase
"a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.

The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that
he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the
luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the
minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.

In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his
domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether
his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.

The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different
districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus
non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.

All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires
to be elected.

To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all
situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to represent
in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if
not versatility.

In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of
the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from
high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City.
In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of
Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was
elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered
as a voter. In 1965 when her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted
and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for
election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a
resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the
election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of
Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for
Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-
A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the
Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that
she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).

On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has
been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries
therein are as follows:

7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker

8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte

9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY

PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months

10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.

THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees
promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily,
without mental reservation or purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my
knowledge.

(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos

(Signature of Candidate) 2

Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of
her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the
constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is
disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May
1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately
preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."

Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important
issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.

I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1,
1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil.
238 that:

. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of
votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no
one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality
of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)

The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not
eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or
non-eligible person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence
of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the
sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or
meaningless.

Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84
O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:

. . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court
or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision
quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final
judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is clear that in
all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has also validated
the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case
a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified.

Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt
is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared
disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the
highest number of votes.

It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
"winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest
number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.

As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-
examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications
prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly
elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.

Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:

While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same
conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality
of a petitioner in a case."

I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and
which I have simplified as follows:

1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a
legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school
there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that city.

2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by
operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a
Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace
in San Miguel, Manila.

4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal,
and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.

5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever
abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in
all elections.

6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in
Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which
she claimed to have been merely temporary residences.

7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she
indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.

8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters
in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's
Previous Registration wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas,
San Juan, Metro Manila and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which
purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she
had resided in that municipality for six months.

10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First
District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she
sought to be elected.

11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the
original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading
"SINCE CHILDHOOD."

The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency
requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence
and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of
international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our
jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for purposes of civil,
commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.

Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from
her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its
permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in
American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.

My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of
origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a
different place. 1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was
what is now Tacloban City.

Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice,
and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the
second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential,
as that of a wife arising from marriage, 3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is no debate that the
domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently
acquired by the party.

When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or
American but of our own enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and
correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.

Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu,
Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new
domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or
misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or the loss of them.
Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed, against her
will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice. 5

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in
Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of
choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score,
we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a)
an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether
what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation
of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her
domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the
object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.

To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections, 7 and advances this novel proposition.

It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal
domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention
on her part to abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation
of the provisions of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically
reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).

Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of
origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any
given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their
own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time, 8 the majority would be suggesting that
petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what
is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.

Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law.
However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile
of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner
lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that effect thereof. I am
impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of inventions.
Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.

If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the
former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original
domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same
as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy,
unsuccessfully tried to do.

One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not
only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence,
that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well have obtained
another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin. Significantly and
obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate
this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.

Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that
she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed
through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and
legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we reject the proposition that
with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her
domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of
marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a
state of suspended animation.

Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect
her own domicile, 9 she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual
change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal
residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death. 11

I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the
Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family
domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never
exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband,
long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or family domicile,
but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married
and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or
material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the
matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.

I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the
affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have
searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication
supports the majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium originis of
petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue, there is a world
of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the
well-turned phrase.

In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically
reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it
is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her
pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in
the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months prior to the election.
These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:

I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more
particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.

Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may
be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc
vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).

Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has,
undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.

My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second
Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave
abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the
facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of
residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied, miscomprehended, or misunderstood
facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.

The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has
abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by
documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is
Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that became
her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the day of the
election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional
District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.

It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman
(later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a
person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal domestic relations as that of the
wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the Civil
Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte.
Said Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living
with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:

Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in
the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But
because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it
impossible for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may
be exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by
the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a
suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith.
(Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).

Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of
her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the
sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by
changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).

It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no
longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement
the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses
may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may destroy the
duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the
Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).

The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the
majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by
law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own
domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile
12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is revived, but until she
exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62,
45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.

Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his
death which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila,
were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their
residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she was already a
widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of May
1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in
that place.

On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her
own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and permanent residence" (photocopy
of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted this
sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy
of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy
of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy
of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.

The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit
attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her
"domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did
she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate in her
Voter's Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves
that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage
and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her memory.

I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of such
residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides that transfer
of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and public
service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the
constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with
law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a
woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were the intention of this
Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not operate as an
abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly
mentioned the same.

This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of
her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is
Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always
intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article 110 of the
Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in 1954
conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo et
facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).

Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest
mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the
certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all
sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she stated
was the truth.

The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue
has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp.
vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the
petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of her husband. The
majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile
at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article
110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her
revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to
acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.

I vote to deny the petition.

Footnotes

1 Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1881).

2 CONST, art. VI, states:

Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.

See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1.

3 Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941).

4 Rollo, p. 114, Annex "D".

5 Rollo, p. 110, Annex "D".

6 Rollo, p. 113.
7 Rollo, p. 111.

8 Rollo, p. 115, Annex "E".

9 Signed by Virgilo S. Oledan, Provincial Election Supervisor IV, Leyte; Rollo,

p. 116, Annex "F".

10 Rollo, p. 117, Annex "G". Petitioner explained the circumstances surrounding the filling up of the original
certificate thus:

1. On March 8, 1995, I filed my certificate of candidacy for Member of the House of Representatives
(Congresswoman) of the First Legislative District of the province of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filomeno A.
Zeta.

2. I learned lately that Congressman Cirilo Montejo wants to disqualify me as I allegedly lack residence in the
constituency because of the entry of the word "SEVEN" in Item No. 8 of my certificate of candidacy.

3. I read my certificate of candidacy before signing it and thought of the word "RESIDENCE" to mean actual
or physical residence, and the word "SEVEN" merely reflected my actual and physical residence in Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte.

3.1. The word "SEVEN" was placed on my certificate of candidacy to indicate that at lease one (1) month had
passed from my registration as voter of Tolosa, Leyte, on January 28, 1995, when I wrote "06" months under
"PERIOD OF RESIDENCE" as my actual or physical residence in the town.

4. I thought then that the sense in Item No. 10 of my certificate of candidacy stating "THAT I AM eligible for
said Office" was sufficient to affirm that I possess all the qualifications, including my residence, for Member of the
House of Representatives for which I am aspiring in the May 8, 1995 elections.

5. The fact, however, is that my domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City, a component city of the First
Legislative District of Leyte I never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which I always
intended to return whenever absent; indeed in 1992, I returned to Tacloban City to live and stay there. On
November 5, 1992; I bought my Residence Certificate No. 15226186L there, which is made an integral part hereof
as Annex "I" (Annex "2" hereof).

11 Id., at p. 120. See also, Rollo, p. 130-133, Annex "I", petitioner's Affidavit explaining her residence:

13. I established my domicile, however in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City in 1938, when was little over eight
(8) years old. Shortly after my mother died on April 7, 1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez,
brought me and my brothers. . .and my sisters to Tacloban, Leyte (now Tacloban City) his hometown.
xxx xxx xxx

18. I have always considered Tacloban City as my permanent residence or residence of origin have not
abandoned and have never intended to abandon my permanent residence or residence of origin there. To it I always
intend to return whenever absent.

19. In 1952, I went to Manila to work with my cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.

20. In May, 1954, I married President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still the congressman of Ilocos, Norte.

21. As a dutiful wife who loved him deeply, I lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered as a voter
there.

22. In 1965, my husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. Together, we lived in
Malacaang Palace and I registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.

23. My registration as voter in Batac, Ilocos Norte; San Juan, Rizal (now San Juan, Metro Manila); and San
Miguel, Manila, was for convenience because I had to live with my husband to serve him when he was
congressman, Senator and President of the Republic of the Philippines. During those years however, I never
intended nor desired to abandon my domicile or residence of origin in Tacloban City, which I established since I
was a child.

xxx xxx xxx

33. Throughout the Marcos Presidency, I spent most of my birthday anniversaries and attended the Sto. Nini
Fiesta in Tacloban City. I regularly visited my domicile or residence of origin in Leyte and even held important
functions and entertained guests and foreign dignitaries there.

34. After President Ferdinand E. Marcos and I, together with our children and innocent grandchildren were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii, in February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequestered by the
PCGG, and were destroyed and cannibalized.

xxx xxx xxx

38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG,
however, did not permit and allow me.
xxx xxx xxx

40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose,
Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and
Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.

12 Rollo, p. 122.

13 Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores formed the majority opinion.
Commissioner Remedies A. Salazar-Fernando dissented.

14 Rollo, p. 64.

15 Rollo, p. 57-64.

16 Petitioner filed a "Motion to Recall Resolution Promulgated on April 24, 1995 and to Dismiss the Petition
Because of Lapse of Jurisdiction; Alternatively, Motion for Reconsideration." The Commission's May 7, 1995
Resolution treated the same simply as a Motion for Reconsideration.

17 Commissioners Regalado E. Maambong, Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando and Julio F. Desamito dissented.

All filed separate dissenting opinions. In disqualifying petitioner, the majority held:

As it stands now, only the Certificate of Candidacy respondent filed on March 8, 1995, stands, and on the basis of
the entries therein, she is disqualified to run for failure to meet the constitutional requirement of one (1) year of
residence in the place where she wanted to be elected.

18 Rollo, p. 78, Annex "B".

19 Rollo, Annex "D".

20 19 SCRA 966 (1967). See also, Corre v. Corre, 100 Phil. 221 (1956).

21 Id. at 969.

22 Uytengsu v. Republic, 95 Phil. 890 (1954).

23 Id.

24 52 Phil. 645 (1928).

25 Citing People v. Bender 144 N.Y.S., 145.

26 61 Phil. 36 (1934).

27 96 Phil. 294 (1954).

28 Id, see also Ujano v. Republic, 17 SCRA 147 (1966); Nuval v. Guray, supra

note 22.

29 II RECORD OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, 110 (July 22, 1986).

30 Id.

31 199 SCRA 692 (1991).

32 Id, at 714.

33 61 Phil. 36 (1934).

34 96 Phil. 294, 299-300 (1954).

35 B.P. 881, sec. 117 states:

xxx xxx xxx

Any person who transfers residence to another city, municipality or country solely by reason of his occupation;
profession; employment in private or public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations;
service in the army, navy or air force; the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in
government institutions in accordance with law shall not be deemed to have lost his original residence.

36 Rollo, p. 38.

37 18 Am Jur 219-220.

38 20 Am Jur 71.

39 TOLENTINO 1 COMMENTARIES & JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987).

40 Id.
41 TOLENTINO, 1 COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON CIVIL CODE, 220 (1987).

42 Under modern laws, it is clear that many exceptions to the rule that the domicile of the wife is determined
by that of her husband must obtain. Accordingly, the wife may acquire another and separate domicile from that of
her husband where the theoretical unity of the husband and wife is dissolved, as it is by the institution of divorce
proceedings; or where the husband has given cause for divorce; or where there is a separation of the parties by
agreement, or a permanent separation due to desertion of the wife by the husband or attributable to cruel treatment
on the part of the husband; or where there has been a forfeiture by the wife of the benefit of the husband's domicile.
9 R.C.L., 545, cited in De La Vina, supra. If the law allows the wife to automatically revert to her original domicile
or acquire a new domicile under these situations, all the more should it sanction a reversion or the acquisition of
a new domicile by the wife upon the death of her husband.

43 41 Phi. 13 (1920).

44 The rule that the wife automatically acquires or follows her husband's domicile is not an absolute one. A
specific situation recognized in Spanish jurisprudence involves the one in which husband acquiesces (1 Manresa
223) or gives his tacit consent (Scaevola, Civil Code; 354.)

45 42 Phil. 54 (1921).

46 Justice Alicia Sempio-Diy recognizes the same Civil Code distinction. However, taking another approach,
she writes:

(6) The above Article (Article 69, FC) uses the term "family domicile" instead of family residence because the
spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences, which may
destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits. SEMPIO-DIY, HANDBOOK ON
THE FAMILY CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 102 (1988).

47 Rollo, pp. 132-133.

48 The provision reads: Section 78. Petition to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy. A
verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any person
exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under
Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of
filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election.

49 Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51 (1983).

50 American Tupe Founders Co. v. Justice's Court, 133 Cal. 819, 65 Pac. 742; Heillen v. Phillipps, 88 Cal. 557,
26 Pac. 366; Drake v. Bagley, 69 Mo. App. 39; State v. Davis, 194 Mo. 585.
51 Supra, note 39, citing Huffines v. Gold 154 Tenn. 583, 588; 288 S.W. 353, 354.

52 Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be
disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning
number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

Sec. 7 Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate Candidacy.

The procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.

53 CONST., art. VI, sec. 11 states:

The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all
questions relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . .

PUNO, J., concurring:

1 Aristotle, Ethica Nichomachea, bk., v. 3, 1131 (a) (W. Ross translation, 1925 ed).

2 It provides: "No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural born
citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write,
and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident
thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Emphasis supplied)

3 There are two (2) other instances when a married woman may have a domicile different from the husband:
(1) if they are legally separated pursuant to par. 1, Art. 106 of the Civil Code, and (2) if the husband forcibly ejects
the wife from the conjugal home to have illicit relations with another. (De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano, 41 Phil.
13 [1920]).

4 Op cit.

5 Id., at pp. 16-17.

6 Id., at p. 20, citing 1 Manresa 223.

7 25 AM JUR 2nd S. 48, p. 37.

8 28 CJS on Domicile, S. 12, 27; 25 AM JUR 2nd on Domicile S. 62, 46.

9 28 CJS, S. 12, p. 24.

10 Restatement of the Law, 2d, Conflict of Laws 2d., S. 21, p. 84.

11 Ibid.

12 83 U.S. 442; 21 Law Ed. 442; S.C. 16 Wall 130.

13 Supra.

14 Supra.

15 In re Green's Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800, 165 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582.

16 Clark et al. v. Baker et al., 196 SE 750, 186 Ga 65.

17 Lefcourt, Women and The Law, 1990 ed.

18 404 US 71.

19 28 CJS S. 12, p. 25 citing Shute v. Sargent, 36 A 282, 67 N.H. 305.

20 Op cit., p. 84.

21 Women's Status in Philippine Society, UP Law Center, 1979, pp. 4-6.

22 In submitting the draft of the Family Code to President Corazon Aquino, the Civil Code Revision
Committee stated:

Close to forty years of experience under the Civil Code adopted in 1949 and changes and developments in all
aspects of Filipino Life since then have revealed the unsuitability of certain provisions of that Code, implanted from
foreign sources, to Philippine culture; the unfairness, unjustness, and gaps or inadequacies of others; and the need to
attune them to contemporary developments and trends.

In particular to cite only a few instances (1) the property regime of conjugal partnership of gains is not in
accord with Filipino custom, especially in the rural areas, which is more congenial to absolute community of
property; (2) there have considerably been more grounds for annulment of marriage by the Church than those
provided by the Code, thus giving rise to the absurd situation of several marriages already annulled under Canon
Law but still considered subsisting under the Civil Law and making it necessary to make the grounds for annulment
under both laws to coincide; (3) unequal treatment of husband and wife as to rights and responsibilities, which
necessitates a response to the long-standing clamor for equality between men and women now mandated as a policy
to be implemented under the New Constitution; (4) the inadequacy of the safeguards for strengthening marriage and
the family as basic social institutions recognized as such by the New Constitution; (5) recent developments have
shown the absurdity of limiting the grounds for legal separation to the antiquated two grounds provided under the
Civil Code; (6) the need for additional safeguards to protect our children in the matter of adoption by foreigners;
and (7) to bring our law on paternity and filiation in step with or abreast of the latest scientific discoveries."
(Emphasis supplied)

23 Article 96, Family Code.

24 Article 225, Family Code.

25 Article 70, Family Code.

26 Article 71, Family Code.

27 Article 73, Family Code.

28 Op cit., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 98-99.

29 As cited in Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, pp. 184-185.

30 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides: "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."

31 Exhibit "E"; see also Exhibit "B" in SPA No. 95-001.

32 Exhibit "A" in SPA No. 95-009.

33 Exhibit "2" in SPA No. 95-009.

34 2 SCRA 957, 960 (1961); See Canceran v. COMELEC, 107 Phil. 607 (1960); Gabaldon v. COMELEC, 99
Phil. 898 (1956).

35 Section 26, Article II of the Constitution also provides: "The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service . . . ."

36 Annex "G," Petition.

37 Petition, Annex "B-1" pp. 6-7.

38 73 Phil. 453, 459 (1951).

FRANCISCO, J., concurring:

1 See Articles 68-73 of E.O. 209, as amended, otherwise known as The Family Code of the Philippines.

2 Residence Certificate No. 15226186L, dated Nov. 5, 1992.

3 PCGG Chairman Gunigundo's letter addressed to Col. Kempis.

ROMERO, J., separate opinion:

1 Art. VI, Sec. 6, Const.: "No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to
read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election."

2 Art. 110: "The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from
living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.

3 Art. 110, Civil Code.

4 Art. 111, Civil Code.

5 Art. 112, Civil Code.

6 Art. 171, Civil Code.

7 Art. 172, Civil Code.

8 Art. 320, Civil Code.

9 Art. 114, Civil Code.

10 Art. 117, Civil Code.

11 Art. 84, Civil Code.

12 Art. 328, Civil Code.

13 Art. II, Sec. 2, Const.

14 Part IV, Art. 15, Paragraph 4, CEDAW.

15 Executive Order No. 209, July 6, 1987, as amended by Executive Order No. 227, July 17,1987, which took
effect on August 3, 1988.

16 Art. II Sec. 11, Const.

17 Art. II, Sec. 14, Const.

18 Art. 69, Family Code.

19 Art. 71, Family Code.

20 Art. 96, Family Code.

21 Art. 225, Family Code.

22 Republic Act No. 7192 approved February 12, 1992.

23 Ibid., Sec. 5.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:

1 Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, 211 SCRA 297 (1992) (for mayor).

2 Loong v. COMELEC, 216 SCRA 760 (1992) (for regional vice governor).

3 Abella v. Larrazabal, 180 SCRA 509 (1989); Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 (1991) (for provincial
governor).

4 Co. v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991) (election protest against a Congressman).

5 Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294 (1954) (quo warranto against a governor); Gallego v. Verra, 73 Phil. 453
(1941) (quo warranto against a mayor); Larena v. Teves, 61 Phil. 36 (1934) (quo warranto against a provincial
board member); Tanseco v. Arteche, 57 Phil. 227 (1932) (quo warranto against a governor): Yra v. Abao, 52 Phil.
380 (1928) (quo warranto against a municipal president); Vivero v. Murillo, 52 Phil. 694 (1929) (quo warranto
against a municipal president). Cf. Aznar v. COMELEC, 185 SCRA 703 (1990) (quo warranto although
prematurely filed, against a governor-elect).
6 R.A. No. 6646, 6; Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC, supra note 1.

7 OEC, 76.

8 Lagumbay v. COMELEC, 16 SCRA 175 (1966).

PADILLA, J., dissenting:

1 G.R. No. 30241, December 29, 1928; Larena vs. Teves, G.R.
Nuval vs. Guray,

No. 42439, December 10, 1934; Gallego vs. Verra, G.R. No. 48641, November 24, 1941; De los Reyes vs.

Solidum, G.R. No. 42798. August 31, 1935; but see Romualdez vs. RTC, Br. 7 Tacloban City, where a
sudden departure from the country was not deemed "voluntary" so as to constitute abandonment of domicile both in
fact and in law.

2 Annex "A" Petition, pp. 2-4.

REGALADO, J., dissenting:

1 Struble vs. Struble, Tex. Civ. App., 177 S.W. 2d, 279, 283.

2 This is also referred to as natural domicile or domicile by birth (Johnson vs. Twenty-One Bales, 13 Fed.
Cas. 863).

3 Story, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 46; Railroad Co. vs. Kimbrough, 115 Ky 512, 74 S.W. 229; and Johnson vs.
Harvey, 261 Ky. 522, 88 S.W. 2d 42, 46, 47, as cited in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th ed.

4 Article 110, Civil Code.

5 Towson vs. Towson, 126 Va. 640, 102 S.E. 48, 52; Fisher vs. Jordan, C.C.A. Tex., 116 F. 2d. 183, 186;
Minick vs. Minick, 111 Fla. 469, 149 So. 483, 488; Hartzler vs. Radeka, 265 Mich. 451, 251 N.W. 554.

6 Citing 18 Am. Jur. 219-220.

7 Montejo vs. Marcos, En Banc, May 10, 1995.

8 Citing 20 Am. Jur. 71.

9 Cheely vs. Clayton, D.C., 110 U.S. 701, L. Ed. 298.

10 In re Gates' Estate, 191 N.Y.S. 757, 117 Misc. 800 In re Green's Estate, 164 N.Y.S. 1063, 99 Misc. 582,
affirmed 165 N.Y.S. 1088, 179 App. Div. 890, as reported in 28 C.J.S. 27.

11 Clark vs. Baker, 196 S.E. 750, 186 Ga. 65, op. cit. 37.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[Syllabus]
FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 112193. March 13, 1996]
JOSE E. ARUEGO, JR., SIMEONA SAN JUAN ARUEGO, MA. IMMACULADA T. ALANON, ROBERTO A.
TORRES, CRISTINA A. TORRES, JUSTO JOSE TORRES and AGUSTIN TORRES, petitioners, vs. THE HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, THIRTEENTH DIVISION and ANTONIA ARUEGO, respondents.
DECISION
HERMOSISIMA, JR., J.:

On March 7, 1983, a Complaint[1] for Compulsory Recognition and Enforcement of Successional Rights was filed
before Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila by the minors, private respondent Antonia F. Aruego and
her alleged sister Evelyn F. Aruego, represented by their mother and natural guardian, Luz M. Fabian. Named
defendants therein were Jose E. Aruego, Jr. and the five (5) minor children of the deceased Gloria A. Torres,
represented by their father and natural guardian, Justo P. Torres, Jr., now the petitioners herein.

In essence, the complaint avers that the late Jose M. Aruego, Sr., a married man, had an amorous relationship with
Luz M. Fabian sometime in 1959 until his death on March 30, 1982. Out of this relationship were born Antonia F.
Aruego and Evelyn F. Aruego on October 5, 1962 and September 3, 1963, respectively. The complaint prayed for
an Order praying that herein private respondent and Evelyn be declared the illegitimate children of the deceased
Jose M. Aruego, Sr; that herein petitioners be compelled to recognize and acknowledge them as the compulsory
heirs of the deceased Jose M. Aruego; that their share and participation in the estate of their deceased father be
determined and ordered delivered to them.

The main basis of the action for compulsory recognition is their alleged open and continuous possession of the
status of illegitimate children as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the Complaint, to wit:

6. The plaintiffs father, Jose M. Aruego, acknowledged and recognized the herein plaintiffs as his children verbally
among plaintiffs and their mothers family friends, as well as by myriad different paternal ways, including but not
limited to the following:

(a) Regular support and educational expenses;

(b) Allowance to use his surname;

(c) Payment of maternal bills;

(d) Payment of baptismal expenses and attendance therein;

(e) Taking them to restaurants and department stores on occasions of family rejoicing;

(f) Attendance to school problems of plaintiffs;

(g) Calling and allowing plaintiffs to his office every now and then;

(h) Introducing them as such children to family friends.

7. The plaintiffs are thus, in continuous possession of the status of (illegitimate) children of the deceased Jose M.
Aruego who showered them, with the continuous and clear manifestations of paternal care and affection as above
outlined.[2]

Petitioners denied all these allegations.

After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, dated June 15, 1992, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered -

1. Declaring Antonia Aruego as illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego and Luz Fabian;

2. Evelyn Fabian is not an illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz Fabian;

3. Declaring that the estate of deceased Jose Aruego are the following:

xxxxxxxxx

4. Antonia Aruego is entitled to a share equal to portion of share of the legitimate children of Jose Aruego;

5. Defendants are hereby ordered to recognize Antonia Aruego as the illegitimate daughter of Jose Aruego with Luz
Fabian;

6. Defendants are hereby ordered to deliver to Antonia Aruego (her) share in the estate of Jose Aruego, Sr.;

7. Defendants to play (sic) plaintiffs (Antonia Aruego) counsel the sum of P10,000.00 as atty.s fee;
8. Cost against the defendants.[3]

Herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the decision alleging loss of jurisdiction on the part
of the trial court over the complaint by virtue of the passage of Executive Order No. 209 (as amended by Executive
Order No. 227), otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines which took effect on August 3, 1988. This
motion was denied by the lower court in the Order, dated January 14, 1993.

Petitioners interposed an appeal but the lower court refused to give it due course on the ground that it was filed out
of time.

A Petition for Prohibition and Certiorari with prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by herein
petitioners before respondent Court of Appeals, the petition was dismissed for lack of merit in a decision
promulgated on August 31, 1993. A Motion for Reconsideration when filed was denied by the respondent court in a
minute resolution, dated October 13, 1993.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 alleging the following grounds:

RESPONDENT COURT HAD DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH
THE LAW AND IS DIRECTLY CONTRADICTORY TO THE APPLICABLE DECISION ALREADY ISSUED
BY THIS HONORABLE COURT.

RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FILED BY PETITIONERS BEFORE IT
DOES NOT INVOLVE A QUESTION OF JURISDICTION.

RESPONDENT COURT HAD CLEARLY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE IS NO PERCEPTIBLE

DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION AND THOSE OF THE FAMILY CODE ANENT
THE TIME AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION MAY BE MADE AND THAT THERE IS NO
DIFFERENCE UNDER THE CIVIL CODE FROM THAT OF THE FAMILY CODE CONCERNING THE
REQUIREMENT THAT AN ACTION FOR COMPULSORY RECOGNITION ON THE GROUND OF
CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF AN ILLEGITIMATE CHILD SHOULD BE FILED
DURING THE LIFETIME OF THE PUTATIVE PARENT, IN UTTER DISREGARD OF THE RULING OF THIS
HONORABLE COURT IN THE UYGUANGCO CASE THAT THE CIVIL CODE PROVISION HAD BEEN
SUPERSEDED, OR AT LEAST MODIFIED BY THE CORRESPONDING ARTICLES IN THE FAMILY CODE.

D
RESPONDENT COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PETITIONERS PETITION FOR PROHIBITION AND IN
HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS REMEDY IS THAT OF AN APPEAL WHICH ALLEGEDLY HAD ALREADY
BEEN LOST.[4]

Private respondents action for compulsory recognition as an illegitimate child was brought under Book I, Title VIII
of the Civil Code on PERSONS, specifically Article 285 thereof, which states the manner by which illegitimate
children may prove their filiation, to wit:

Art. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the presumed
parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before
the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority; x x x.

Petitioners, on the other hand, submit that with the advent of the New Family Code on August 3, 1988, the trial
court lost jurisdiction over the complaint of private respondent on the ground of prescription, considering that under
Article 175, paragraph 2, in relation to Article 172 of the New Family Code, it is provided that an action for
compulsory recognition of illegitimate filiation, if based on the open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, must be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent without any exception, otherwise the
action will be barred by prescription. The law cited reads:

Article 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Article 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence
as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173 [during the lifetime of the child], except
when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during
the lifetime of the alleged parent.
In the case at bench, petitioners point out that, since the complaint of private respondent and her alleged sister was
filed on March 7, 1983, or almost one (1) year after the death of their presumed father on March 30, 1982, the
action has clearly prescribed under the new rule as provided in the Family Code. Petitioners, further, maintain that
even if the action was filed prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, this new law must be applied to the instant
case pursuant to Article 256 of the Family Code which provides:

This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

The basic question that must be resolved in this case, therefore, appears to be: Should the provisions of the Family
Code be applied in the instant case? As a corollary Will the application of the Family Code in this case prejudice or
impair any vested right of the private respondent such that it should not be given retroactive effect in this particular
case?

The phrase vested or acquired rights under Article 256, is not defined by the Family Code. The Committee did not
define what is meant by a vested or acquired right, thus leaving it to the courts to determine what it means as each
particular issue is submitted to them. It is difficult to provide the answer for each and every question that may arise
in the future.[5]

In Tayag vs. Court of Appeals,[6] a case which involves a similar complaint denominated as Claim for Inheritance
but treated by this court as one to compel recognition as an illegitimate child brought prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code by the mother of the minor child, and based also on the open and continuous possession of the status
of an illegitimate child, we had occasion to rule that:

Under the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, we hold that the right of action of the minor child has been
vested by the filing of the complaint in court under the regime of the Civil Code and prior to the effectivity of the
Family Code. We herein adopt our ruling in the recent case of Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, et.
al.[7] where we held that the fact of filing of the petition already vested in the petitioner her right to file it and to
have the same proceed to final adjudication in accordance with the law in force at the time, and such right can no
longer be prejudiced or impaired by the enactment of a new law.

xxx xxx xxx

Accordingly, Article 175 of the Family Code finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably
affect adversely a right of private respondent and, consequentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which
have been vested with the filing of the complaint in court. The trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the
provisions of Article 285 of the Civil Code and in holding that private respondents cause of action has not yet
prescribed.
Tayag applies four-square with the case at bench. The action brought by private respondent Antonia Aruego for
compulsory recognition and enforcement of successional rights which was filed prior to the advent of the Family
Code, must be governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code and not by Article 175, paragraph 2 of the Family Code.
The present law cannot be given retroactive effect insofar as the instant case is concerned, as its application will
prejudice the vested right of private respondent to have her case decided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. The
right was vested to her by the fact that she filed her action under the regime of the Civil Code. Prescinding from
this, the conclusion then ought to be that the action was not yet barred, notwithstanding the fact that it was brought
when the putative father was already deceased, since private respondent was then still a minor when it was filed, an
exception to the general rule provided under Article 285 of the Civil Code. Hence, the trial court, which acquired
jurisdiction over the case by the filing of the complaint, never lost jurisdiction over the same despite the passage of
E.O. No. 209, also known as the Family Code of the Philippines.

Our ruling herein reinforces the principle that the jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once
attached cannot be ousted by subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have prevented
jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, and it retains jurisdiction until it finally disposes of the case.[8]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993 and its
Resolution dated October 13, 1993 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo, and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., also believes that the Court of Appeals did not err in holding that the petition before it did not involve a
question of jurisdiction and cannot thus be a substitute for a lost appeal.

[1] Docketed as Civil Case No. 83-16093.

[2] Rollo, p. 45.

[3] Rollo, pp. 10-11.

[4] Rollo, p. 55.

[5] Sempio-Diy, Alicia V., Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, 1988 ed., p. 325.

[6] 209 SCRA 665 [1992].

[7] 205 SCRA 356 [1992].

[8] Regalado, Florenz D., Remedial Law Compendium, Volume One, Fifth Revised Edition, p.9, citing Ramos, et
al. v. Central Bank, L-29352, October 4, 1971; Dioquino v. Cruz, et al., L-38579, September 9, 1982; Republic v.

Pielago, et al., G.R. No. 72218, July 21, 1986.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 140500. January 21, 2002]
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, vs. CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the
Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four years from attaining
majority age within which to file an action for recognition.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition[1] for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for (1) the
nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals[2] (CA) Decision[3] in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the October
14, 1999 CA Resolution[4] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the
two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on the merits.[5]

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three (23) years, herein
plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal
Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina
as the sole surviving heir.

On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be declared an
acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabes
estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of the Family
Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x x x.[6]

Orders of the Trial Court

In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabes Motion for Reconsideration of the trial
courts Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code,
the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action.

In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not acknowledged or
recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been filed during the lifetime of the
alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the childs filiation.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to prove that
he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article
285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has
attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.

Hence, this appeal.[7]

Issues

In her Memorandum,[8] petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate daughter of the
putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative fathers death in the absence of any
written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.

II

Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years from the attainment
of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its
repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable
Court of Appeals.

III
Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for failure to implead the Court
of Appeals as one of the respondents.[9]

The Courts Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition

Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.

Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article 285 of the Civil
Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter Code should be given
retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.

Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:

ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of the
presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file the action before
the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing had been heard and
in which either or both parents recognize the child.

In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document.

The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles 172, 173 and
175 of the Family Code, which we quote:

ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned.

In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall be
transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall
have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of the parties.

ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same, evidence
as legitimate children.

The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is based on the
second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.

Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the lifetime of the
alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a minor when the latter died.
Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that illegitimate
children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their existence.
x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny the childs filiation, and this, he or
she cannot do if he or she is already dead.[10]

Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its enactment should
not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:

ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.

The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrians right to an action for recognition, which was granted
by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is
affirmative.

A vested right is defined as one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of which no obstacle
exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a contingency x x x.[11] Respondent
however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is procedural in nature and that as a general rule, no
vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws.[12]

Bustos v. Lucero[13] distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:

x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be synonymous.
Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal system prior to the
disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights,
or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights
or obtains redress for their invasion.[14] (Citations omitted)

Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,[15] the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is procedural or
substantive:

[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the lower
courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really regulates procedure,
that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly
administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested right, it is not
procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it
operates as a means of implementing an existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure.[16]

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as it gives
Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the
Family Code cannot impair or take Adrians right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already
vested prior to its enactment.

Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals[17] is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff therein sought
recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of
Appeals[18] the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be
affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right had already vested.

Not Limited to Natural Children

To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of natural children. Thus, petitioner
contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time of his conception, his parents
were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he is not a natural child.

A natural child is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal impediment from
marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,[19] the Court explained:

A childs parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for him to qualify
as a natural child.[20]

A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in the aforesaid case of
Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents were disqualified from marrying
each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason
with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for
recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In short,
at the time of their conception, the two childrens parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The
Court allowed the Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed
father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.

Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,[21] the Court said that the rules on voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action, may likewise be
applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder:

The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known as bastards,
include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other
than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and
successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.

How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the paternity or
maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The
implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.

Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation of natural
children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious
children.

That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with respect to natural
children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of natural children are
utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.

A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record,
or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.

In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may be established
by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283
and 284.

The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children, as provided
for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children.[22] (Citations omitted, italics supplied)

Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious ones.[23] However,
Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and whose
putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil
Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away
by the passage of the Family Code.

Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed suit, on their
own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his Memorandum,[24] the State
as parens patriae should protect a minors right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family
Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in court.

Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA

Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead the lower courts or
judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents. Under Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be
furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a
reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.

Vitug, J., no part. Relationship with family.

[1] Rollo, pp. 3-14. The Petition was signed by Atty. Wenceslao B. Trinidad.

[2] Special First Division; penned by J. Jesus M. Elbinias (presiding justice and Division chairman); concurred in
by JJ Delilah Vidallon Magtolis and Edgardo P. Cruz (members).

[3] Rollo, pp. 33-37.

[4] Rollo, p. 18. J. Andres B. Reyes Jr. signed for J. Magtolis who was on leave.

[5] Assailed Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 37.

[6] Assailed Decision, pp. 1-2; Rollo, pp. 33-34.

[7] This case was deemed submitted for decision on August 16, 2000, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners
Memorandum signed by Atty. Jose Allan M. Tebelin. Respondents Memorandum, signed by Attys. Felix D. Carao
Jr. and R.A.V. Saguisag, was received by this Court on August 14, 2000.
[8] Rollo, pp. 103-116; original underscored and in upper case.

[9] Memorandum for petitioner, p. 4; Rollo, p. 106.

[10] Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code (1995 ed.), p. 282.

[11] Reyes v. Commission on Audit, 305 SCRA 512, 518, March 29, 1999, per Pardo, J.

[12] Medina Investigation & Security Corporation v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 144074, March 20, 2001, per
Gonzaga-Reyes, J.

[13] 81 Phil. 648, March 8, 1949.

[14] Ibid., pp. 649-650, per Tuason, J.

[15] 295 SCRA 470, 492, September 16, 1998.

[16] Ibid., p. 492, per Regalado, J.

[17] 178 SCRA 684, October 26, 1989.

[18] 254 SCRA 711, March 13, 1996.

[19] 251 SCRA 206, December 12, 1995.

[20] Ibid., p. 212, per Romero, J.

[21] 72 SCRA 307, August 10, 1976.

[22] Ibid., pp. 314-315, per Aquino, J. (later CJ).

[23] Cf. Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, (1993 rev. ed.), p.218.

[24] Pages 12-15.

Today is Saturday, September 03, 2016

search

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 145370 March 4, 2004

MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,

vs.
RODOLFO S. ANCHETA, respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Resolution1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550
which dismissed the petitioners petition under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure to annul the Order2 of
the Regional Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15 in Special Proceedings No. NC-662 nullifying the marriage of
the petitioner and the respondent Rodolfo S. Ancheta, and of the resolution of the appellate court denying the
motion for reconsideration of the said resolution.

This case arose from the following facts:

After their marriage on March 5, 1959, the petitioner and the respondent resided in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.
They had eight children during their coverture, whose names and dates of births are as follows:

a. ANA MARIE B . ANCHETA born October 6, 1959

b. RODOLFO B. ANCHETA, JR. born March 7, 1961

c. VENANCIO MARIANO B. ANCHETA born May 18, 1962

d. GERARDO B. ANCHETA born April 8, 1963

e. KATHRINA B. ANCHETA born October 29, 1965

f. ANTONIO B. ANCHETA born March 6, 1967

g. NATASHA MARTINA B. ANCHETA - born August 2, 1968

h. FRITZIE YOLANDA B. ANCHETA born November 19, 19703

On December 6, 1992, the respondent left the conjugal home and abandoned the petitioner and their children. On
January 25, 1994, petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 40,
against the respondent for the dissolution of their conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with a
plea for support and support pendente lite. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. M-3735. At that time, the
petitioner was renting a house at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro
Manila.4

On April 20, 1994, the parties executed a Compromise Agreement5 where some of the conjugal properties were
adjudicated to the petitioner and her eight children, including the following:

b. A parcel of land (adjoining the two lots covered by TCT Nos. 120082 and TCT No. 120083-Cavite) located at
Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, registered in the name of the family Ancheta. Biofood Corporation under TCT No.
310882, together with the resort Munting Paraiso, Training Center, four-storey building, pavilion, swimming pool
and all improvements. All of the shares of stocks of Ancheta Biofoods Corporation were distributed one-third (1/3)
to the petitioner and the eight children one-twelfth (1/12) each.6

The court rendered judgment based on the said compromise agreement. Conformably thereto, the respondent
vacated, on June 1, 1994, the resort Munting Paraiso and all the buildings and improvements thereon. The
petitioner, with the knowledge of the respondent, thenceforth resided in the said property.

In the meantime, the respondent intended to marry again. On June 5, 1995, he filed a petition with the Regional
Trial Court of Naic, Cavite, Branch 15, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the
ground of psychological incapacity. The case was docketed as Sp. Proc. No. NC-662. Although the respondent
knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he,
nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon,
BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons."7 The clerk of court
issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition.8 The sheriff served the summons and a copy
of the petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioners son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at
his residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.9

On June 21, 1995, Sheriff Jose R. Salvadora, Jr. submitted a Return of Service to the court stating that the summons
and a copy of the petition were served on the petitioner through her son Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III on June 6,
1995:
RETURN OF SERVICE

This is to certify that the summons together with the copy of the complaint and its annexes was received by the
herein defendant thru his son Venancio M.B. Ancheta [III] as evidenced by the signature appearing on the
summons. Service was made on June 6, 1995.

June 21, 1995, Naic, Cavite.

(Sgd.) JOSE R. SALVADORA, JR.

Sheriff10

The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to
Declare Defendant as in Default" setting it for hearing on June 27, 1995 at 8:30 a.m. During the hearing on the said
date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The public prosecutor appeared for the State and offered no
objection to the motion of the respondent who appeared with counsel. The trial court granted the motion and
declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. The respondent testified
in his behalf and adduced documentary evidence. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the
petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio.11 The clerk of court issued a Certificate of Finality
of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996.12

On February 14, 1998, Valentines Day, the respondent and Teresita H. Rodil were married in civil rights before the
municipal mayor of Indang, Cavite.13

On July 7, 2000, the petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule
47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings
No. NC-662. The case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59550. The petitioner alleged, inter alia, that the
respondent committed gross misrepresentations by making it appear in his petition in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 that she
was a resident of No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Pias, Metro Manila, when in
truth and in fact, the respondent knew very well that she was residing at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
According to the petitioner, the respondent did so to deprive her of her right to be heard in the said case, and
ultimately secure a favorable judgment without any opposition thereto. The petitioner also alleged that the
respondent caused the service of the petition and summons on her by substituted service through her married son,
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, a resident of Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, where the respondent was a resident.
Furthermore, Venancio M.B. Ancheta III failed to deliver to her the copy of the petition and summons. Thus,
according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of
jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the respondent. She further contended
that there was no factual basis for the trial courts finding that she was suffering from psychological incapacity.
Finally, the petitioner averred that she learned of the Order of the RTC only on January 11, 2000. Appended to the
petition, inter alia, were the affidavits of the petitioner and of Venancio M.B. Ancheta III.

The petitioner prayed that, after due proceedings, judgment be rendered in her favor, thus:
WHEREFORE, petitioner respectfully prays this Honorable Court to render Judgment granting the Petition.

1. Declaring null and void the Order dated June 7, 1995 (of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Naic, Cavite).

2. Ordering respondent to pay petitioner

a. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;

b. P500,000.00 as exemplary damages;

c. P200,000.00 as attorneys fees plus P7,500.00 per diem for every hearing;

d. P100,000.00 as litigation expenses;

e. Costs of suit.14

On July 13, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution dismissing the petition on the following ground:

We cannot give due course to the present petition in default or in the absence of any clear and specific averment by
petitioner that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no
longer available through no fault of petitioner. Neither is there any averment or allegation that the present petition is
based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Nor yet that, on the assumption that extrinsic
fraud can be a valid ground therefor, that it was not availed of, or could not have been availed of, in a motion for
new trial, or petition for relief.15

The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration of the said resolution, appending thereto an amended petition
in which she alleged, inter alia, that:

4. This petition is based purely on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.

5. This petition has not prescribed; it was filed within the four-year period after discovery of the extrinsic fraud.

6. The ground of extrinsic fraud has not been availed of, or could not have been availed of in a motion for new trial
or petition for relief.

7. The ground of lack of jurisdiction is not barred by laches and/or estoppel.

8. The ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies were no longer
available through no fault of petitioner; neither has she ever availed of the said remedies. This petition is the only
available remedy to her.16
The petitioner also alleged therein that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the respondents marriage was
null and void for the court a quos failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct an investigation on whether
there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor General to appear for the State.

On September 27, 2000, the CA issued a Resolution denying the said motion.

The petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari with this Court alleging that the CA erred as follows:

1. In failing to take into consideration the kind of Order which was sought to be annulled.

2. In finding that the Petition was procedurally flawed.

3. In not finding that the Petition substantially complied with the requirements of the Rules of Court.

4. In failing to comply with Section 5, Rule 47, Rules of Court.

5. In not even considering/resolving Petitioners Motion to Admit the Amended Petition; and in not admitting the
Amended Petition.

6. In failing to apply the Rules of Procedure with liberality.17

The petition is meritorious.

An original action in the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, to annul a judgment or
final order or resolution in civil actions of the RTC may be based on two grounds: (a) extrinsic fraud; or (b) lack of
jurisdiction. If based on extrinsic fraud, the remedy is subject to a condition precedent, namely, the ordinary
remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no
fault of the petitioner.18 The petitioner must allege in the petition that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief from judgment, under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court are no longer available through no fault of
hers; otherwise, the petition will be dismissed. If the petitioner fails to avail of the remedies of new trial, appeal or
relief from judgment through her own fault or negligence before filing her petition with the Court of Appeals, she
cannot resort to the remedy under Rule 47 of the Rules; otherwise, she would benefit from her inaction or
negligence.19

It is not enough to allege in the petition that the said remedies were no longer available through no fault of her own.
The petitioner must also explain and justify her failure to avail of such remedies. The safeguard was incorporated in
the rule precisely to avoid abuse of the remedy.20 Access to the courts is guaranteed. But there must be limits
thereto. Once a litigants rights have been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, he should not
be granted an unbridled license to sue anew. The prevailing party should not be vexed by subsequent suits.21
In this case, the petitioner failed to allege in her petition in the CA that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
and petition for relief, were no longer available through no fault of her own. She merely alleged therein that she
received the assailed order of the trial court on January 11, 2000. The petitioners amended petition did not cure the
fatal defect in her original petition, because although she admitted therein that she did not avail of the remedies of
new trial, appeal or petition for relief from judgment, she did not explain why she failed to do so.

We, however, rule that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the original petition and denying admission of the
amended petition. This is so because apparently, the Court of Appeals failed to take note from the material
allegations of the petition, that the petition was based not only on extrinsic fraud but also on lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner, on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-
662 were not served on her. While the original petition and amended petition did not state a cause of action for the
nullification of the assailed order on the ground of extrinsic fraud, we rule, however, that it states a sufficient cause
of action for the nullification of the assailed order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the person
of the petitioner, notwithstanding the absence of any allegation therein that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration, or appeal are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.

In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the
Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or
subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or
reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal therefrom are no longer available through no fault of her
own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void
and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in
any action or proceeding whenever it is invoked,22 unless barred by laches.23

In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material
averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the
person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the
complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III,
who, however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint.

Even a cursory reading of the material averments of the original petition and its annexes will show that it is, prima
facie meritorious; hence, it should have been given due course by the Court of Appeals.

In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon,24 we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the
person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service
of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed
against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or
the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the judgment of the court null and
void.25 Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case
against him unless he is validly served with summons.26
Summons and complaint may be served on the defendant either by handing a copy thereof to him in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to her.27 However, if there is impossibility of prompt service of the
summons personally on the defendant despite diligent efforts to find him, service of the summons may be effected
by substituted service as provided in Section 7, Rule 14 of the said Rules:

SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a reasonable time as
provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendants
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies of
defendants office or regular place of business with some competent person in charge thereof.28

In Miranda v. Court of Appeals,29 we held that the modes of service should be strictly followed in order that the
court may acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Thus, it is only when a defendant cannot be served
personally within a reasonable time that substituted service may be made by stating the efforts made to find him and
personally serve on him the summons and complaint and the fact that such effort failed.30 This statement should be
made in the proof of service to be accomplished and filed in court by the sheriff. This is necessary because
substituted service is a derogation of the usual method of service. It has been held that substituted service of
summons is a method extraordinary in character; hence, may be used only as prescribed and in the circumstances
categorized by statutes.31

As gleaned from the petition and the amended petition in the CA and the annexes thereof, the summons in Sp. Proc.
No. NC-662 was issued on June 6, 1995.32 On the same day, the summons was served on and received by Venancio
Mariano B. Ancheta III,33 the petitioners son. When the return of summons was submitted to the court by the
sheriff on June 21, 1995, no statement was made on the impossibility of locating the defendant therein within a
reasonable time, or that any effort was made by the sheriff to locate the defendant. There was no mention therein
that Venancio Mariano Ancheta III was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza,
Las Pias, where the petitioner (defendant therein) was allegedly residing. It turned out that Venancio Mariano B.
Ancheta III had been residing at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, and that his father merely showed him the summons and
the complaint and was made to affix his signature on the face of the summons; he was not furnished with a copy of
the said summons and complaint.

4. From the time my father started staying at Munting Paraiso, Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, I have been residing on
the adjoining land consisting of two (2) lots later apportioned to my father as his share of the conjugal partnership.
Since then, I have been residing therein up to the present.

5. On June 6, 1995, at Bancal, Carmona, Cavite (at my residence situated on my fathers lot), my father came to see
me and then asked me to sign and I did sign papers which he (my father) and the Sheriff did not allow me to read.
Apparently, these papers are for the Summons to my mother in the case for annulment of marriage filed by my
father against her. I was not given any copy of the Summons and/or copy of the complaint/petition.34
We, thus, rule that the Court of Appeals acted arbitrarily in dismissing the original petition of the petitioner and the
amended petition for annulment of the assailed order grounded on lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.

The action in Rule 47 of the Rules of Court does not involve the merits of the final order of the trial court.
However, we cannot but express alarm at what transpired in the court a quo as shown by the records. The records
show that for the petitioners failure to file an answer to the complaint, the trial court granted the motion of the
respondent herein to declare her in default. The public prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he
interposed no objection to the motion of the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the
respondent ex-parte and rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article 48 of the Family
Code, which reads:

Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court shall order the
prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to prevent collusion
between the parties and to take care that evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.

In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a stipulation of facts or
confession of judgment.35

The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9,
Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:

Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation. If the defendant in an action for
annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court shall order the prosecuting attorney to
investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the
State in order to see to it that the evidence submitted is not fabricated.36

In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,37 this Court laid down the guidelines in the interpretation and
application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and
the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for
the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a certification, which will be quoted
in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the
petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification
within fifteen (15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor
General shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.38

This Court in the case of Malcampo-Sin v. Sin39 reiterated its pronouncement in Republic v. Court of Appeals,40
regarding the role of the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
State.41 The trial court, abetted by the ineptitude, if not sheer negligence of the public prosecutor, waylaid the
Rules of Court and the Family Code, as well as the rulings of this Court.

The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous participation and not
mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true
and genuine union but the exposure of an invalid one as well.42

A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion. Hence, in all
cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is
ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take
care that their evidence is not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the
court cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if
collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal
separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is
dubious and fabricated.

Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law
is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.43
Whether or not a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the whims
and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological imbalance, incapacitating such party
to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated
July 13, 2000 and September 27, 2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 are hereby SET ASIDE and REVERSED. Let the
records of CA-G.R. SP No. 59550 be remanded to the Court of Appeals for further proceedings conformably with
the Decision of this Court and Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended.

SO ORDERED.

Quisumbing, (Acting Chairman), Austria-Martinez, and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Puno, J., (Chairman), on leave.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Renato C. Dacudao, with Associate Justices Cancio C. Garcia (Chairman) and B.A.
Adefuin-de la Cruz, concurring.

2 Penned by Judge Enrique M. Almario.

3 CA Rollo, pp. 26-27.

4 Id. at 26.

5 Rollo, pp. 95-102.

6 CA Rollo, pp. 4-5.

7 Id. at 49.

8 Id. at 53.

9 Id.

10 Id. at 54.

11 Id. at 57-59.

12 Id. at 212.

13 Id. at 213.

14 Id. at 21.

15 Id. at 101.

16 Id. at 109.

17 Rollo, p. 36.

18 Rule 47, Section 1.

19 Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 352 SCRA 235 (2001).

20 Herrera, Remedial Law, Vol. III, 1997 ed., p. 549.

21 Pacquing v. Court of Appeals, 115 SCRA 117 (1982).

22 Ramos v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 635 (1989).

23 SEC. 3. Period for filing action.If based on extrinsic fraud, the action must be filed within four (4) years from
its discovery; and if based on lack of jurisdiction, before it is barred by laches or estoppel.

24 211 SCRA 879 (1992).

25 Umandap v. Sabio, Jr., 339 SCRA 243 (2000).

26 United Coconut Planters Bank v. Ongpin, 368 SCRA 464 (2001).

27 Rule 14, Section 6, Rules of Court.

28 Supra.

29 326 SCRA 278 (2000).

30 Keister v. Navarro, 77 SCRA 209 (1977).

31 Ibid.

32 CA Rollo, p. 53.

33 Ibid.

34 Id. at 55-56.

35 Supra.

36 Supra.

37 268 SCRA 198 (1997).

38 Id. at 213.

39 355 SCRA 285 (2001).

40 Supra.

41 The procedure has been modified by the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter No. 02-11-10-SC which took
effect on March 15, 2003.
Sec. 8. Answer.(1) The respondent shall file his answer within fifteen days from service of summons, or within
thirty days from the last issue of publication in case of service of summons by publication. The answer must be
verified by the respondent himself and not by counsel or attorney-in-fact.

(2) If the respondent fails to file an answer, the court shall not declare him or her in default.

(3) Where no answer is filed or if the answer does not tender an issue, the court shall order the public prosecutor to
investigate whether collusion exists between the parties.

Sec. 9. Investigation report of public prosecutor.(1) Within one month after receipt of the court order mentioned
in paragraph (3) of Section 8 above, the public prosecutor shall submit a report to the court stating whether the
parties are in collusion and serve copies thereof on the parties and their respective counsels, if any.

(2) If the public prosecutor finds that collusion exists, he shall state the basis thereof in his report. The parties shall
file their respective comments on the finding of collusion within ten days from receipt of a copy of the report. The
court shall set the report for hearing and, if convinced that the parties are in collusion, it shall dismiss the petition.

(3) If the public prosecutor reports that no collusion exists, the court shall set the case for pre-trial. It shall be the
duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the State at the pre-trial.

42 See note 39.

43 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 256 SCRA 158 (1996).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

[Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995.]

MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, Complainant, v. JUDGE JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th MCTC,
Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL CODE; PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; WHEN SANCTITY THEREOF
VIOLATED; EFFECT IN CASE AT BAR. Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla
Baybayan only after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal home in 1966, it
appears from the record that he had been scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as
1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on
September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while
respondents marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of
Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which provide that, after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether
or not the absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of
succession, cannot be invoked by Respondent. By respondents own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the
conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan
in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was
already dead for all purposes. Thus, respondents actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his
marriage to Teresita B. Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery
of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as a basic social institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis
of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new
relation, an institution on the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment
of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony." (Civil Code, 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino). By
committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed to
live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson, 229
SCRA 690).

2. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATION; CONSTRUED; WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. An

examination of the birth certificates of respondents three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan clearly
indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the entry therein. It is important
to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970,
1971, and 1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer
and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot
be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at
bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which provides: Art. 269. Only
natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural. Legitimation is limited to
natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez v. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family
Code (Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned provision
thus: Art. 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the conception
of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The reasons for this limitation are given as follows: 1) The rationale of
legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights; 3)
There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very scandalous,
especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio
Diy).
4. LEGAL ETHICS; NOTARY PUBLIC; COMPENSATION; RULE; WHEN VIOLATED; CASE AT BAR.
Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the documents wherein he charged notarial fees.
Though he was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees therefor due to the fact that there has been no
Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts.
Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus: Sec. 252. Compensation of Notaries Public No fee,
compensation, or reward of any sort, except such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by law, shall be collected
or received for any service rendered by a notary public. Such money collected by notaries public proper shall
belong to them personally. Officers acting as notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their services the fees
prescribed by law and account therefor as for Government funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of
the Philippines, p. 202.) Respondents failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by him as Ex-
Officio notary to the municipal government as required by law raises the presumption that he had put such fund to
his personal use.

5. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; VIOLATION OF THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; CASE AT BAR.
With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala
for which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein, respondent merely denied the said
imputation but failed to offer any evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v.
Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this remind him once
again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit: Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

"We have a list of these crooked judges whose actuations have been found to be patently wrong and indefensible.
There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out from the service. If they are not booted out
now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this Augeun stable." 1

Indeed, our judicial structure is supposed to be manned by magistrates chosen for their probity, integrity,
impartiality, dedication and learning. And so, any judge wanting in any of these qualities should be broomed off and
out of the bench in order to improve the judicial landscape. Screening off the misfits, considering the great number
of judges and justices in the country at present, is the arduous and Herculean task of this Court. The effort if
dramatized with rectitude and sincerity should bring about the strengthening of the peoples abiding faith in
democracy and the integrity of our courts of justice.
The herein administrative case arose from a complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma. Blyth B. Abadilla, a
Clerk of Court assigned at the sala of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands charged with "gross immorality, deceitful conduct, and
corruption unbecoming of a judge."cralaw virtua1aw library

In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in respect to the charge of gross immorality on the part of the
respondent, contends that respondent had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan
during the existence of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela. Adding ignominy to an ignominious
situation, respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May 23,
1986. Complainants claims that this was a bigamous union because of the fact that the respondent was then still
very much married to Teresita Banzuela.

Furthermore, respondent falsely represented himself as "single" in the marriage contract (Exh. "A") and dispensed
with the requirements of a marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with Baybayan for five years.

Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality is the fact that, earlier, respondents wife filed a complaint in the
case entitled, Teresita B. Tabiliran v. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA 451. Respondent stood charged therein
for abandoning the family home and living with a certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son.

In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct, complainant claims that respondent caused to be registered as
"legitimate", his three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan, namely:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Buenasol B. Tabiliran born on July 14, 1970

Venus B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 7, 1971

Saturn B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 20, 1975

by falsely executing separate affidavits stating that the delayed registration was due to inadvertence, excusable
negligence or oversight, when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that these children cannot be legally registered
as legitimate.

The following acts are alleged to have constituted the charge of corruption:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

(1) Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in the private practice of law by the preparation and
notarization of documents, out of which he charged fees beyond the authorized rates allowed as Ex-Officio Notary
Public. These acts which, according to the charge, amount to the private practice of law, prejudice public interest.

Complainant submitted the following documents in support of these allegations:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) Affidavit of Ponciana Geromo (Annex "B"), attesting to the fact that respondent Judge Tabiliran prepared a
Simultaneous Deed of Sale, (Annex "C", Doc. No. 901, Page No. 77, Book No. V, Series of 1991 of Ex-Officio
Notary Public Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr.) and collect P600.00 from the vendees (par. 10(a) a-1 Complaint, p. 9 records);

b) Receipt prepared under instruction of the respondent showing that he received P250.00 thru MCTC Aide
Ely O. Inot for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit declaring the correct ages of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila
Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai dated November 12, 1991, when the legal fees therefor should
have been P10.00 only (Annex "D") (par. 10(a) a-2 Complaint, p. 9 records);

c) Another receipt (Annex "E") prepared thru the direction of the respondent dated November 12, 1991,
showing that said respondent received from Reynaldo Subebe the sum of P150.00 for preparation and notarization
by him of a Joint Affidavit declaring the correct age of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias (par. 10
(a) a-c Complaint, p. 9 records);

d) Still another receipt (Annex "F") dated November 12, 1991, signed by the respondent himself showing that
he received from Nelly Baradas the sum of P50.00 for preparation and notarization of Joint Affidavit attesting to the
correct age of one Luzviminda Jacoba (par. 10(a) a-d Complaint, p. 9 records);

e) Another receipt (Annex "G" dated November 12, 1991, issued by the respondent, showing that he received
from Torres P. Modai the sum of P50.00, thru the same Ely O. Inot, MCTC Aide, for the preparation of Joint
Affidavit attesting to the correct age of Flores Jalampangan (par. 10 (a) a-e Complaint, pp. 9 & 10 records).

(2) Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his Court as supported by an affidavit (Annex "M") executed by a
certain Calixto Calunod, a court aide, stating that he saw Edna Siton, complainant in a criminal case tried by
respondent, hand over to the latter a bag of fish and squid which respondent Judge received.

(3) Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case filed with his sala out of which he collected the amount of
P500.00 from the accused Antonio Oriola, as supported by the affidavits of Arcelita Salvador, the complainant
therein, and Benito Sagario, one of the persons present when the accused perpetrated the acts aforesaid. (Submitted
as Annexes "I" and "J", respectively.)

Complainant manifests that the commission by the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him unfit to occupy the
exalted position of a dispenser of justice. By the example shown by the respondent, the public had allegedly lost
confidence in the administration of justice, perceiving as is evident to see that the person occupying the position of
a judge lacks the morality and probity required of one occupying such a high office.

Respondent, in his comment, dated December 25, 1992, declared that his cohabitation with Priscilla Baybayan is
not and was neither bigamous nor immoral because he started living with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife
had already left and abandoned the family home in 1966 and, since then, and until the present her whereabouts is
not known and respondent has had no news of her being alive. He further avers that 25 years had already elapsed
since the disappearance of his first wife when he married Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.
Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code in order to show the
legality of his acts:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"After the absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead
for all purposes except for those of succession." (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules of Court.)

"After an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, he shall be presumed
dead for all purposes, except for those of succession." (Art. 390, Civil Code.)

The case of Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179, where this Court held that for the purpose of the civil marriage law, it
is not necessary to have the former spouse judicially declared an absentee is to respondents mind, a case in point.

He admits that he indicated in his marriage contract that he was then "single", but he denied the charge that he acted
with deceit or false misrepresentation, claiming that, since there were only three words to choose from, namely:
Single, Widow or Divorced, he preferred to choose the word "single", it being the most appropriate. Besides, both
he and Priscilla executed a joint affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela was honestly divulged.

On the charge of corruption, respondent submitted certifications (Annexes "4" & "5") from the Mayor of Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte, attesting to the fact that there was no Notary Public in Manukan and, as such, respondent
may be allowed to notarize documents. He denied having charged exorbitant fees. He claims all amounts received
by him were used to subsidize office expenses, since the funds he had been receiving from the municipal
government were not enough to cover expenses in maintaining his office. Respondent submitted a certification
(Annex "6") from the Accounting Department of the Municipal Government of Manukan to the effect that his
yearly expenditures were more than the yearly appropriations.

Respondent finds support in Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"A Judge may, with due regard to official duties, engage in activities to improve . . . the administration of
justice."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent vehemently denies the charge of bribery claiming that it was inconceivable for him to receive a bag full
of fish and squid since his residence was 42 kilometers from Jose Dalman where his courtroom or office was
located. It takes one an hour and a half by bus to reach Katipunan and so, by the time he reaches his house, the fish
and the squid should have become rotten. In support of his denials, respondent submitted as Annex "8", an affidavit
of Ely D. Inot, their court Interpreter who declared:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x x x
"3. That last June 6, 1991, I was with the Municipal Judge, Jose C Tabiliran, Jr., from the morning until we
went home in the afternoon and we in fact dined together in the local Carenderia of Jose Dalman as it is the usual
ways of the Judge to eat lunch together with the court personnel;

"4. That when we went home in the afternoon of that day we were also together riding in a bus, the Lilian
Express and until I drop in Roxas and he proceeded to Katipunan where his residence is;

5. That all the time during that day I did not noticed him bringing anything except his Hand Bag which he
used to carry in going to the office;" (Annex "8", Affidavit of Ely O. Inot, December 17, 1992.)

x x x

Finally, respondent tags as a fabricated lie the charge that he prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a case pending
in his sala and thereafter charged the accused, Antonio Oriola, the sum of P500.00 for legal services. The
complainant, he said, was the one who induced Arcelita Salvador (the complainant in the rape case) to execute an
affidavit (Annex "I") in support of the charge of corruption against Respondent.

Complainants filing of the present case was motivated by revenge and resentment because, earlier, respondent filed
an administrative case (A. M. No. P-91-597) against her for "Insubordination and Serious Misconduct." The
Supreme Court decided to reprimand her with a warning that a repetition of her acts will be severely dealt with.
Respondent claims that the complainant had nevertheless repeatedly continued to do acts of insubordination in the
following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) She continues to keep court records and has kept refusing to hand them over to respondent inspite of verbal
and written orders;

2) She refused to receive a memorandum from the Vice-Mayor requiring the Clerk of Court to submit an
Annual report;

3) She refused to prepare the said annual report required of her as Clerk of Court;

4) She continue to refuse to obey just and lawful orders of the Court

On April 12, 1993, by resolution of this Court En Banc, the herein administrative case was referred to Executive
Judge Jesus O. Angeles of the Regional Trial Court, Dipolog City, for investigation, report and recommendation.
Judge Angeles found respondent guilty only on two (2) counts of corruption: (1) for acting as notary public and
collecting fees for his services; and (2) for preparing an affidavit of desistance in a case pending in his Court and
receiving payment for it.
In his report and recommendation dated August 3, 1993, Executive Judge Angeles found that:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library

ON GROSS IMMORALITY:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

In contracting marriage with Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986, (p. 13 of the records), respondent did not hide
the fact that he was married to Teresita T. Banzuela, having disclosed it in his affidavit jointly executed with
Priscilla Q. Baybayan on May 23, 1986 (p. 115 of the records), particularly paragraph 4 thereof which reads.

"4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly married to Teresita T. Banzuela but who left and abandoned
their family home sometime in 1965 in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, and until now at present her whereabouts
is not known."cralaw virtua1aw library

It was therefore a marriage contracted under Article 83 (2) of the Civil Code which, although bigamous, remains
valid until automatically terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42,
Family Code). Respondents assertion that since 1965 to the present, his first wife Teresita T. Banzuela had left their
conjugal dwelling and did not return, her whereabouts being unknown, was not controverted. Living as husband
and wife pursuant to an authorized bigamous marriage, respondent cannot be said to be acting in an immoral and
scandalous manner, and the immoral stigma of extra-marital union since 1969 duly declared in their aforesaid joint
affidavit, may be considered cleansed by their marriage in 1986, if Art. 1395 of the Civil Code on ratification on
contracts in general is allowed to be applied, it being ratification of marital cohabitation. Article 76 of Civil Code,
now Art. 34 of the Family Code was intended to facilitate and encourage the marriage of persons who have been
living in a state of concubinage for more than five years (Tolentino, Civil Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 245, cited in
Ernesto L. Pineda, Family Code, 1992 Ed., p. 38). Indicating his civil status in the marriage contract as "single" is
hardly considered a misrepresentation of fact, specially to the solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto C.
Ruedas, Jr. to whom the aforesaid joint affidavit was submitted.

ON DECEITFUL CONDUCT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Respondents children begotten with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, namely: Buenasol B. Tabiliran, Venus B. Tabiliran and
Saturn B. Tabiliran, all of whom were born before their marriage, were disclosed and made known to the
solemnizing officer and the latter himself, in his affidavit dated May 23, 1986 (p. 116 of the records) which
supports the marriage contract of respondent with Priscilla Q. Baybayan, having shown such fact.

Exhibit P which purports to be an affidavit of Lydia T. Zanoria dated May 27, 1993, consisting of three pages, was
submitted by the complainant for the purpose of proving her charge that the respondent falsely executed his three
separate affidavits, namely: Exhibit K dated May 24, 1983 regarding the late registration of birth of his daughter
Buenasol B. Tabiliran; Exhibit M dated May 28, 1988 regarding the late registration of birth of his third child
Saturn B. Tabiliran; and his affidavit dated May 27, 1988, Exhibit O, in reference to the late registration of birth of
his second child Venus B. Tabiliran, stating inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight as the reasons for the
delayed registration of their births, without however presenting said affiant Mrs. Zanoria, consequently denying
respondent the opportunity to cross examine her. Her affidavit is not among those brought out in the pre-hearing
conference, and was not discussed during the hearing itself, submitting it only after the investigation proper was
terminated. The supposed affiant claimed she was the government midwife who attended to the births of
respondents three children, denying, as the affidavit shows, negligence, inadvertence or oversight on her part to
register their birth on time. Not having been presented for respondent to confront her, or an opportunity to do so,
Exhibit P cannot be considered evidence of the charge. An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant is presented
(People v. Villeza, 127 SCRA, 349), or admitted by the party against whom it is presented.

ON CORRUPTION:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Acting as Notary Public during office hours, and collecting fees:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Respondent has admitted having prepared the documents and collected fees, in the instances specified in par. 10 of
the complaint, namely: (1) affidavit of Ponciana Geromo; (2) Joint Affidavit of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco,
Kadapi Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai; (3) Joint Affidavit of Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser
Adrias; (4) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of Luzviminda Jacoba; and (5) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of
Flores Jalampangan, but not necessarily on the accuracy of the amounts therein stated as having been collected by
him from them (please see Pre-Hearing order of May 20, 1993 of the Investigating Judge). Seeking justification of
his acts, respondent submitted Annexes 4 & 5 of his comments (pp. 118 and 119, records) which are certifications
of Manukan Mayor Eugene U. Caballero attesting that in the absence of a Notary Public in Manukan town,
respondent who is a Judge thereat was allowed "to prepare and ligalize (sic) documents" .

He declared "the fees derived from the preparation and notarization of documents were mostly used by respondent
to buy supplies and materials of his Office", explaining that his office needs cannot be sustained by the
appropriations of the local government which are inadequate. On page 120 of the records, his Annex 6 shows a
shortage in his appropriations for supplies. And supplies from the Supreme Court can only be obtained if secured
personally but has to assume the expenses for transportation, freight and handling.

Respondent Judge maintains that the Code of Judicial conduct does not prohibit him from acting as Notary Public,
and the fees he has received were much lower than the rates prescribed by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
Zamboanga del Norte Chapter, submitting Annex 3, p. 117 of the records, to prove it.

Further justifying his act under Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides that a judge
may, with due regard to official duties, engaged in activities to improve the administration of justice, respondent
claims that due to his efforts, he was able to secure an extension room of his office covering a floor area of 24
square meters, from the Sangguniang Pampook of Region IX based in Zamboanga City, costing P19,000.00 per
certification shown in his Annex 7 (page 121 of the records).

In the light of 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis a vis the power of Municipal Trial Court Judges and Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judges to act in the capacity of Notary Public Ex-Officio, the Honorable Supreme Court in A.M.
No. 89-11-1303, MTC, Dec. 19, 1989, has ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may, in their
capacity as notary public ex-officio perform any act within the competency of a regular Notary Public, provided
that: (1) all notarial fees charged be for the account of the Government and turned-over to the municipal treasurer
(Lapea, Jr. v. Marcos, Adm. Matter No. 1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and (2) certification be made in
the notarized documents attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary public in such municipality or circuit."cralaw
virtua1aw library

Although absence of a notary public commissioned for, and residing in Manukan town, even in Jose Dalman which
is within his circuit is confirmed, respondent Judge while he may be justified in so acting as notary public, did not,
however, comply with requirement No. 1 which obliged him to charge for the account of the Government and turn-
over to the municipal treasurer all notarial fees. And there is no way of determining the truth of his assertion that the
notarial fees he collected were "mostly used" to buy supplies and materials for this office, absent any accounting.

2. Accepting Bribe from Parties-litigants:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Admitting the existence of Annex H found on page 21 in the records, respondent, however, denied the imputation
therein contained by affiant Calixto Calunod that he received a sando bag full of fish and squid from a certain Edna
Siton who had a case with respondents court as complainant in a certain criminal case. Instead of calling the affiant
himself, complainant presented the Court Interpreter Ely O. Inot, who "confirmed that there was squid and fish
contained in a plastic bag which was left in Aseniero Carenderia by a person unknown to her and some members of
the Court staff. When informed by the carenderia owner that the stuff was intended for Judge Tabiliran, the latter
told them to cook it, and they afterwards partook of it without the Judge who already boarded the passenger bus."
(Record of Proceedings, p. 1, par. No. 1, dated June 11, 1993). Being her witness, complainant is bound by her
testimony. This particular charge is, therefore, not proved.

3. Preparing Affidavit of Desistance and Collecting Fee for his Services:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Under this count, two affidavits both sworn before 2nd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Valeriano B. Lagula were submitted:
one by Arcelita Salvador, complainant in an attempted rape case who was categorical in her declaration that
respondent Judge asked and received from Pitoy Oriola, brother of accused Antonio Oriola the amount of P500.00
after the Judge prepared the affidavit of desistance and motion to dismiss which he made her sign (Annex I, p. 40
records). Benito Sagario who was present executed another separate affidavit, Annex J found on page 41 in the
records, confirming it. In admitting the affidavit, respondent, however, denied the imputation, asserting that it is
false, but without confronting them or presenting witnesses to dispute their accusation. He could have demanded
that the affiants, including the persons they mentioned were present in transaction, namely: accused Antonio Oriola,
his brother Pitoy Oriola, Ignacio Salvador, and INC Minister Antonio Calua be required to appear for his
confrontation, but respondent chose not, contended himself only with explanation that it was just the handiwork of
complainant Abadilla and her husband, a major in the military who is an active member of the Iglesia Ni Cristo of
which affiant Arcelita Salvador also belonged, which is bare and unsubstantiated. No other conclusion can be drawn
other than holding, as the Investigating Judge does, that this particular charge is true. Evidently, Judge Tabiliran
wants to avoid meeting them by way of confrontation. If he is innocent, and is certain the charge is fabricated, he
will surely raise hell to insist that he confronts them face to face. Clearly, his deportment betrays his insistence of
innocence.

On Respondents Counterclaim:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

It was not proven. On the contrary, the controverting evidence shows that the records of Criminal Case No. 2279
referred to in his Annex 9, p. 123 of the records, were not in the possession of complainant. Quite obviously, Ely O.
Inot, respondents Court Interpreter tried to cover up the fact that the same were already being kept by Judge
Tabiliran before he issued the memorandum, Annex 9. Complainant, who is respondents Clerk of Court was not,
therefore, in a position to comply with his Order.

Also, Mrs. Abadillas failure to prepare the annual report of the Court in 1992 as called for in Annexes 10 and 10-A
was, contrary to respondents claim, not by reason of her obstinate refusal to obey her superior but, by sheer
impossibility to comply, considering that monthly reports upon which the annual report shall be based, were not
prepared by her, not because of her refusal to do so which is among those included in her job description, but
because the Judge himself took the work from her for no other reason than to establish the false impression that the
complainant is disobedient to the Judge, and does not attend to her duties.

By and large, there is no harmony in their office. Complainant and respondent are not in talking terms. They are
hostile to each other. Respondents complaint that Mrs. Abadilla spat saliva in front of him whenever they meet
each other; destroying the Court dry seal by throwing it at him one time she was mad; showing face; and sticking
out her tongue to him, are all puerile acts which the undersigned cannot conclude as sufficiently established even
with the testimony of Mrs. Ely O. Inot which is far from being definite and categorical, whose actuation is
understandable because Judge Tabiliran, being her superior, has moral ascendancy over her (Record of Proceedings,
June 11, 1993).

The undersigned believes that the problem is on Judge Tabiliran, and not on Mrs. Abadilla, who has been in the
service as Clerk of Court under a previous Judge of the same Court for quite long without any complaint having
been filed. The evidence disputing his counterclaim tends to show that respondent tried to build up a situation of
undesirability against his Clerk of Court whom he wanted pulled out from her position in his Court.

Other Matters Not Covered By The Complaint And Comments:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The authority to investigate being confined only to matters alleged in the complaint on the basis of which
respondent filed his comments, other matters not therein covered which complainant brought out by way of
presenting documentary exhibits, (from Exhibit AAA to HHH), are not subject of this report and recommendation.

RECOMMENDATION:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The charge of GROSS IMMORALITY and DECEITFUL CONDUCT have not been proven, but the undersigned
believes evidence is sufficient to sustain a pronouncement of guilt on two counts of CORRUPTION, namely: acting
as notary public and collecting fees for his services in preparing affidavit of desistance of a case in his Court.
Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and false imputation against his Clerk of Court are found duly established.

WHEREFORE, suspension of the respondent Judge from the service for a period of three months is recommended.

THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the respondent culpable for gross immorality, he having scandalously
and openly cohabited with the said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence of his marriage with Teresita B.
Tabiliran.

Contrary to his protestations that he started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife, Teresita
Tabiliran, had long abandoned him and the conjugal home in 1966, it appears from the record that he had been
scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot
three children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14,
1970; Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20, 1975. Evidently, therefore,
respondent and Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even while respondents marriage to his first wife was
still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code which
provide that, after an absence of seven years, It being unknown whether or not the absentee still lives, the absent
spouse shall be considered dead for all purposes, except for those of succession, cannot be invoked by Respondent.
By respondents own allegation, Teresita B. Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From that time on up to the
time that respondent started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970, only four years had elapsed. Respondent
had no right to presume therefore that Teresita B. Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes. Thus, respondents
actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita B. Tabilaran was still valid
and subsisting constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of marriage as
a basic social institution. According to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world
is that of marriage. It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation, an institution on the maintenance of which
the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony."
(Civil Code 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p. 122, Ramon C. Aquino).

By committing the immorality in question, respondent violated the trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed
to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson,
229 SCRA 690).

As to respondents act of eventually marrying Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We are not in a position to determine the
legality thereof, absent all the facts for a proper determination. Sufficient for Our consideration is the finding of the
Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is authorized under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code.

With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct, We hold that the charge has likewise been duly established. An
examination of the birth certificates (Exhs. "J", "L", & "M") of respondents three illegitimate children with
Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these children are his legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused the
entry therein. It is important to note that these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of respondent to
Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know that, despite his subsequent
marriage to Priscilla, these three children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be considered legitimate since at the
time they were born, there was an existing valid marriage between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B.
Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A.
386 as amended) which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 269. Only natural children can be legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other, are natural.

Legitimation is limited to natural children and cannot include those born of adulterous relations (Ramirez v. Gmur,
42 Phil. 855). The Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on August 3, 1988, reiterated the
above-mentioned provision thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

ARTICLE 177. Only children conceived and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.

The reasons for this limitation are given as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1) The rationale of legitimation would be destroyed;

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in terms of successional rights;

3) There will be the problem of public scandal, unless social mores change;

4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of legitimation to adulterous children as it will destroy the sanctity of
marriage;

5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the parents marry many years after the birth of the child. (The
Family Code, p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio Diy).

It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision, whether old or new, can give refuge to the deceitful actuations of the
Respondent.

It is also erroneous for respondent to state that his first wife Teresita disappeared in 1966 and has not been heard
from since then. It appears that on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint against respondent entitled,

Tabiliran v. Tabiliran (G.R. No. 1155451) which was decided by this Court in 1982. In the said case,
respondent was sued for abandonment of his family home and for living with another woman with whom he
allegedly begot a child. Respondent was, however, exonerated because of the failure of his wife to substantiate the
charges. However, respondent was reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of Settlement of Spouses To Live
Separately from Bed", with a stipulation that they allow each of the other spouse to live with another man or
woman as the case may be, without the objection and intervention of the other. It was also in the same case where
respondent declared that he has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran,
who are his legitimate issues. Thus, his statements in his affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that Saturn
and Venus are his third and second children respectively, are erroneous, deceitful, misleading and detrimental to his
legitimate children.

With respect to the charge of corruption, We agree with the findings of the Investigating Judge that respondent
should be found culpable for two counts of corruption: (1) acting as Notary Public; and (2) collecting legal fees in
preparing an Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court.

Respondent himself admitted that he prepared and notarized the documents (Annexes "C", "D", "E", "F" and "G")
wherein he charged notarial fees. Though he was legally allowed to notarize documents and charge fees therefor
due to the fact that there has been no Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this defense is not sufficient to justify
his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts;

Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly provides thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SECTION 252. Compensation of Notaries Public. No fee, compensation, or reward of any sort, except
such as is expressly prescribed and allowed by law, shall be collected or received for any service rendered by a
notary public. Such money collected by notaries public proper shall belong to them personally. Officers acting as
notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their services the fees prescribed by law and account therefor as for
Government funds. (Notarial Law, Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p. 202.)

Respondents failure to properly account and turn over the fees collected by him as Ex-Officio notary to the
municipal government as required by law raises the presumption that he had put such fund to his personal use.

With respect to the charge that respondent prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a rape case filed before his sala for
which he collected the amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein, respondent merely denied the said
imputation but failed to offer any evidence to support such denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v.
Amaguin, 229 SCRA 166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed to adhere to, and let this remind him once
again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Canon 2

A judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross immorality, deceitful conduct
and corruption and, consequently, orders his dismissal from the service. Such dismissal shall carry with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement benefits, and disqualification from re-
employment in the government-service, all without prejudice to criminal or civil liability.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza,
Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Panganiban, J., took no part.

SECOND DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE G.R. No. 155733

ESTATES OF THE DECEASED JOSEFA
DELGADO AND GUILLERMO RUSTIA

CARLOTA DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA and other HEIRS OF LUIS DELGADO, namely, HEIRS OF
CONCHA VDA. DE AREVALO, HEIRS OF LUISA DELGADO VDA. DE DANAO, ANGELA DELGADO
ARESPACOCHAGA, TERESA DELGADO PERLAS, CAROLINA DELGADO-ARESPACOCHAGA,
RODOLFO DELGADO, BENJAMIN DELGADO, GLICERIA DELGADO and CLEOFAS DELGADO; and
HEIRS OF GORGONIO DELGADO, namely, RAMON DELGADO CAMPO, CARLOS DELGADO CAMPO,
CLARITA DELGADO CAMPO-REIZA, YOLANDA DELGADO ENCINAS, FELISA DELGADO CAMPO-
ENCINAS and MELINDA DELGADO CAMPO-MADARANG,
Petitioners, Present :

PUNO, J., Chairman,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

HEIRS OF MARCIANA RUSTIA VDA. DE DAMIAN, namely, GUILLERMO R. DAMIAN and JOSE R.
DAMIAN; HEIRS OF HORTENCIA RUSTIA CRUZ, namely, TERESITA CRUZ-SISON, HORACIO R. CRUZ,
JOSEFINA CRUZ-RODIL, AMELIA CRUZ-ENRIQUEZ and FIDEL R. CRUZ, JR.; HEIRS OF ROMAN
RUSTIA, SR., namely, JOSEFINA RUSTIA ALBANO, VIRGINIA RUSTIA PARAISO, ROMAN RUSTIA, JR.,
SERGIO RUSTIA, FRANCISCO RUSTIA, LETICIA RUSTIA-MIRANDA; and GUILLERMINA RUSTIA, as
Oppositors;[1] and GUILLERMA RUSTIA, as Intervenor,[2]
Respondents.[3] Promulgated :

January 27, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners seek to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 55,[4] in SP Case No. 97668, which was reversed and set aside by the Court of
Appeals in its decision[5] dated October 24, 2002.

FACTS OF THE CASE

This case concerns the settlement of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado.[6] The main issue
in this case is relatively simple: who, between petitioners and respondents, are the lawful heirs of the decedents.
However, it is attended by several collateral issues that complicate its resolution.

The claimants to the estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado may be divided into two groups: (1) the
alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and
grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters,[7] his
nephews and nieces,[8] his illegitimate child,[9] and the de facto adopted child[10] (ampun-ampunan) of the
decedents.

THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO

The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa[11] Delgado by one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five
other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, and Gorgonio, all surnamed
Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to Lucio Campo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all
natural children of Felisa Delgado.
However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him was Ramon Osorio[12]
with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. But, unlike her relationship with Lucio Campo which was admittedly
one without the benefit of marriage, the legal status of Ramon Osorios and Felisa Delgados union is in dispute.
The question of whether Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio ever got married is crucial to the claimants because the
answer will determine whether their successional rights fall within the ambit of the rule against reciprocal intestate
succession between legitimate and illegitimate relatives.[13] If Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado had been validly
married, then their only child Luis Delgado was a legitimate half-blood brother of Josefa Delgado and therefore
excluded from the latters intestate estate. He and his heirs would be barred by the principle of absolute separation
between the legitimate and illegitimate families. Conversely, if the couple were never married, Luis Delgado and
his heirs would be entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgados intestate estate, as they would all be within the
illegitimate line.
Petitioners allege that Ramon Osorio and Felisa Delgado were never married. In support thereof, they assert that no
evidence was ever presented to establish it, not even so much as an allegation of the date or place of the alleged
marriage. What is clear, however, is that Felisa retained the surname Delgado. So did Luis, her son with Ramon
Osorio. Later on, when Luis got married, his Partida de Casamiento[14] stated that he was hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado (the natural child of Felisa Delgado),[15] significantly omitting any mention of the name and other
circumstances of his father.[16] Nevertheless, oppositors (now respondents) insist that the absence of a record of the
alleged marriage did not necessarily mean that no marriage ever took place.

Josefa Delgado died on September 8, 1972 without a will. She was survived by Guillermo Rustia and some
collateral relatives, the petitioners herein. Several months later, on June 15, 1973, Guillermo Rustia executed an
affidavit of self-

adjudication of the remaining properties comprising her estate.

THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO

Sometime in 1917, Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado[17] but whether a marriage in fact took
place is disputed. According to petitioners, the two eventually lived together as husband and wife but were never
married. To prove their assertion, petitioners point out that no record of the contested marriage existed in the civil
registry. Moreover, a baptismal certificate naming Josefa Delgado as one of the sponsors referred to her as Seorita
or unmarried woman.

The oppositors (respondents here), on the other hand, insist that the absence of a marriage certificate did not of
necessity mean that no marriage transpired. They maintain that Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado were married
on June 3, 1919 and from then on lived together as husband and wife until the death of Josefa on September 8,
1972. During this period spanning more than half a century, they were known among their relatives and friends to
have in fact been married. To support their proposition, oppositors presented the following pieces of evidence:

1. Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated [December 1, 1944] issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by
Carlos P. Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines;

2. Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947;
3. Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active
Military or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans
Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself
[swore] to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on 3 June 1919;[18]

4. Titles to real properties in the name of Guillermo Rustia indicated that he was married to Josefa
Delgado.

THE ALLEGED HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children. With no children of their own, they took into their
home the youngsters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the
couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan.

During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child,[19] the
intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria. According to Guillerma, Guillermo Rustia
treated her as his daughter, his own flesh and blood, and she enjoyed open and continuous possession of that status
from her birth in 1920 until her fathers demise. In fact, Josefa Delgados obituary which was prepared by Guillermo
Rustia, named the intervenor-respondent as one of their children. Also, her report card from the University of Santo
Tomas identified Guillermo Rustia as her parent/guardian.[20]

Oppositors (respondents here) nonetheless posit that Guillerma Rustia has no interest in the intestate estate of
Guillermo Rustia as she was never duly acknowledged as an illegitimate child. They contend that her right to
compulsory acknowledgement prescribed when Guillermo died in 1974 and that she cannot claim voluntary
acknowledgement since the documents she presented were not the authentic writings prescribed by the new Civil
Code.[21]

On January 7, 1974, more than a year after the death of Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia filed a petition for the
adoption[22] of their ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia. He stated under oath [t]hat he ha[d] no legitimate,
legitimated, acknowledged natural children or natural children by legal fiction.[23] The petition was overtaken by
his death on February 28, 1974.

Like Josefa Delgado, Guillermo Rustia died without a will. He was survived by his sisters Marciana Rustia vda. de
Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz, and by the children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia Sr., namely,
Josefina Rustia Albano, Virginia Rustia Paraiso, Roman Rustia, Jr., Sergio Rustia, Francisco Rustia and Leticia
Rustia Miranda.[24]

ANTECEDENT PROCEEDINGS
On May 8, 1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao, the daughter of Luis Delgado, filed the original petition for letters
of administration of the intestate estates of the spouses Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia with the RTC of
Manila, Branch 55.[25] This petition was opposed by the following: (1) the sisters of Guillermo Rustia, namely,
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia-Cruz;[26] (2) the heirs of Guillermo Rustias late brother,
Roman Rustia, Sr., and (3) the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia. The opposition was grounded on the
theory that Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao and the other claimants were barred under the law from inheriting from
their illegitimate half-blood relative Josefa Delgado.

In November of 1975, Guillerma Rustia filed a motion to intervene in the proceedings, claiming she was the only
surviving descendant in the direct line of Guillermo Rustia. Despite the objections of the oppositors (respondents
herein), the motion was granted.
On April 3, 1978, the original petition for letters of administration was amended to state that Josefa Delgado and
Guillermo Rustia were never married but had merely lived together as husband and wife.
On January 24, 1980, oppositors (respondents herein) filed a motion to dismiss the petition in the RTC insofar as
the estate of Guillermo Rustia was concerned. The motion was denied on the ground that the interests of the
petitioners and the other claimants remained in issue and should be properly threshed out upon submission of
evidence.
On March 14, 1988, Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa substituted for her sister, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao,
who had died on May 18, 1987.
On May 11, 1990, the RTC appointed Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa as administratrix of both estates.[27] The
dispositive portion of the decision read:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, petitioner and her co-claimants to the estate of the late Josefa Delgado
listed in the Petitions, and enumerated elsewhere in this Decision, are hereby declared as the only legal heirs of the
said Josefa Delgado who died intestate in the City of Manila on September 8, 1972, and entitled to partition the
same among themselves in accordance with the proportions referred to in this Decision.

Similarly, the intervenor Guillerma S. Rustia is hereby declared as the sole and only surviving heir of the late Dr.
Guillermo Rustia, and thus, entitled to the entire estate of the said decedent, to the exclusion of the oppositors and
the other parties hereto.

The Affidavit of Self-Adjudication of the estate of Josefa Delgado executed by the late Guillermo J. Rustia on June
15, 1973 is hereby SET ASIDE and declared of no force and effect.

As the estates of both dece[d]ents have not as yet been settled, and their settlement [is] considered consolidated in
this proceeding in accordance with law, a single administrator therefor is both proper and necessary, and, as the
petitioner Carlota Delgado Vda. de dela Rosa has established her right to the appointment as administratrix of the
estates, the Court hereby APPOINTS her as the ADMINISTRATRIX of the intestate estate of the decedent JOSEFA
DELGADO in relation to the estate of DR. GUILLERMO J. RUSTIA.
Accordingly, let the corresponding LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION issue to the petitioner CARLOTA
DELGADO VDA. DE DE LA ROSA upon her filing of the requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Finally, oppositor GUILLERMINA RUSTIA RUSTIA is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of
administration of the subject estates, and is likewise ordered to turn over to the appointed administratix all her
collections of the rentals and income due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers,
records and titles pertaining to such estates to the petitioner and appointed administratix CARLOTA DELGADO
VDA. DE DE LA ROSA, immediately upon receipt of this Decision. The same oppositor is hereby required to
render an accounting of her actual administration of the estates in controversy within a period of sixty (60) days
from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.[28]

On May 20, 1990, oppositors filed an appeal which was denied on the ground that the record on appeal was not
filed on time.[29] They then filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus[30] which was dismissed by the Court of
Appeals.[31] However, on motion for reconsideration and after hearing the parties oral arguments, the Court of
Appeals reversed itself and gave due course to oppositors appeal in the interest of substantial justice.[32]
In a petition for review to this Court, petitioners assailed the resolution of the Court of Appeals, on the ground that
oppositors failure to file the record on appeal within the reglementary period was a jurisdictional defect which
nullified the appeal. On October 10, 1997, this Court allowed the continuance of the appeal. The pertinent portion
of our decision[33] read:

As a rule, periods prescribed to do certain acts must be followed. However, under exceptional circumstances, a
delay in the filing of an appeal may be excused on grounds of substantial justice.

xxx xxx xxx

The respondent court likewise pointed out the trial courts pronouncements as to certain matters of substance,
relating to the determination of the heirs of the decedents and the party entitled to the administration of their estate,
which were to be raised in the appeal, but were barred absolutely by the denial of the record on appeal upon too
technical ground of late filing.

xxx xxx xxx

In this instance, private respondents intention to raise valid issues in the appeal is apparent and should not have
been construed as an attempt to delay or prolong the administration proceedings.

xxx xxx xxx

A review of the trial courts decision is needed.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby AFFIRMS the Resolution dated
November 27, 1991 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 23415, for the APPROVAL of the private
respondents Record on Appeal and the CONTINUANCE of the appeal from the Manila, Branch LV Regional Trial
Courts May 11, 1990 decision.

SO ORDERED.

Acting on the appeal, the Court of Appeals[34] partially set aside the trial courts decision. Upon motion for
reconsideration,[35] the Court of Appeals amended its earlier decision.[36] The dispositive portion of the amended
decision read:

With the further modification, our assailed decision is RECONSIDERED and VACATED. Consequently, the
decision of the trial court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby RENDERED declaring: 1.) Dr.
Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Rustia to have been legally married; 2.) the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo
Rustia, Jacoba Delgado-Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) entitled to partition among
themselves the intestate estate of Josefa D. Rustia in accordance with the proportion referred to in this decision; 3.)
the oppositors-appellants as the legal heirs of the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia and thereby entitled to partition his
estate in accordance with the proportion referred to herein; and 4.) the intervenor-appellee Guillerma S. Rustia as
ineligible to inherit from the late Dr. Guillermo Rustia; thus revoking her appointment as administratrix of his
estate.

The letters of administration of the intestate estate of Dr. Guillermo Rustia in relation to the intestate estate of
Josefa Delgado shall issue to the nominee of the oppositors-appellants upon his or her qualification and filing of the
requisite bond in the sum of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

Oppositor-appellant Guillermina Rustia Rustia is hereby ordered to cease and desist from her acts of administration
of the subject estates and to turn over to the appointed administrator all her collections of the rentals and incomes
due on the assets of the estates in question, including all documents, papers, records and titles pertaining to such
estates to the appointed administrator, immediately upon notice of his qualification and posting of the requisite
bond, and to render an accounting of her (Guillermina Rustia Rustia) actual administration of the estates in
controversy within a period of sixty (60) days from notice of the administrators qualification and posting of the
bond.
The issue of the validity of the affidavit of self-adjudication executed by Dr. Guillermo Rustia on June 15, 1973 is
REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings to determine the extent of the shares of Jacoba Delgado-
Encinas and the children of Gorgonio Delgado (Campo) affected by the said adjudication.
Hence, this recourse.

The issues for our resolution are:

1. whether there was a valid marriage between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado;

2. who the legal heirs of the decedents Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado are;

3. who should be issued letters of administration.

THE MARRIAGE OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA AND JOSEFA DELGADO

A presumption is an inference of the existence or non-existence of a fact which courts are permitted to draw from
proof of other facts. Presumptions are classified into presumptions of law and presumptions of fact. Presumptions
of law are, in turn, either conclusive or disputable.[37]

Rule 131, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxx xxx xxx

(aa) That a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of
marriage;

xxx xxx xxx

In this case, several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo
Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. Their family and friends
knew them to be married. Their reputed status as husband and wife was such that even the original petition for
letters of administration filed by Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao in 1975 referred to them as spouses.

Yet, petitioners maintain that Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia had simply lived together as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage. They make much of the absence of a record of the contested marriage, the
testimony of a witness[38] attesting that they were not married, and a baptismal certificate which referred to Josefa
Delgado as Seorita or unmarried woman.[39]

We are not persuaded.

First, although a marriage contract is considered a primary evidence of marriage, its absence is not always proof
that no marriage in fact took place.[40] Once the presumption of marriage arises, other evidence may be presented
in support thereof. The evidence need not necessarily or directly establish the marriage but must at least be enough
to strengthen the presumption of marriage. Here, the certificate of identity issued to Josefa Delgado as Mrs.
Guillermo Rustia,[41] the passport issued to her as Josefa D. Rustia,[42] the declaration under oath of no less than
Guillermo Rustia that he was married to Josefa Delgado[43] and the titles to the properties in the name of
Guillermo Rustia married to Josefa Delgado, more than adequately support the presumption of marriage. These are
public documents which are prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein.[44] No clear and convincing evidence
sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truth of the recitals therein was presented by petitioners.

Second, Elisa vda. de Anson, petitioners own witness whose testimony they primarily relied upon to support their
position, confirmed that Guillermo Rustia had proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado and that eventually, the two
had lived together as husband and wife. This again could not but strengthen the presumption of marriage.

Third, the baptismal certificate[45] was conclusive proof only of the baptism administered by the priest who
baptized the child. It was no proof of the veracity of the declarations and statements contained therein,[46] such as
the alleged single or unmarried (Seorita) civil status of Josefa Delgado who had no hand in its preparation.

Petitioners failed to rebut the presumption of marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. In this jurisdiction,
every intendment of the law leans toward legitimizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together apparently in marriage
are presumed to be in fact married. This is the usual order of things in society and, if the parties are not what they
hold themselves out to be, they would be living in constant violation of the common rules of law and propriety.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. Always presume marriage.[47]

THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO

To determine who the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado are, the questioned status of the cohabitation of her mother
Felisa Delgado with Ramon Osorio must first be addressed.

As mentioned earlier, presumptions of law are either conclusive or disputable. Conclusive presumptions are
inferences which the law makes so peremptory that no contrary proof, no matter how strong, may overturn them.
[48] On the other hand, disputable presumptions, one of which is the presumption of marriage, can be relied on only
in the absence of sufficient evidence to the contrary.

Little was said of the cohabitation or alleged marriage of Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio. The oppositors (now
respondents) chose merely to rely on the disputable presumption of marriage even in the face of such countervailing
evidence as (1) the continued use by Felisa and Luis (her son with Ramon Osorio) of the surname Delgado and (2)
Luis Delgados and Caridad Concepcions Partida de Casamiento[49] identifying Luis as hijo natural de Felisa
Delgado (the natural child of Felisa Delgado).[50]
All things considered, we rule that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage.
Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her
relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,
Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,[51] were her natural children.[52]

Pertinent to this matter is the following observation:

Suppose, however, that A begets X with B, and Y with another woman, C; then X and Y would be natural brothers
and sisters, but of half-blood relationship. Can they succeed each other reciprocally?

The law prohibits reciprocal succession between illegitimate children and legitimate children of the same parent,
even though there is unquestionably a tie of blood between them. It seems that to allow an illegitimate child to
succeed ab intestato (from) another illegitimate child begotten with a parent different from that of the former, would
be allowing the illegitimate child greater rights than a legitimate child. Notwithstanding this, however, we submit
that
succession should be allowed, even when the illegitimate brothers and sisters are only of the half-blood. The reason
impelling the prohibition on reciprocal successions between legitimate and illegitimate families does not apply to
the case under consideration. That prohibition has for its basis the difference in category between illegitimate and
legitimate relatives. There is no such difference when all the children are illegitimate children of the same parent,
even if begotten with different persons. They all stand on the same footing before the law, just like legitimate
children of half-blood relation. We submit, therefore, that the rules regarding succession of legitimate brothers and
sisters should be applicable to them. Full blood illegitimate brothers and sisters should receive double the portion of
half-blood brothers and sisters; and if all are either of the full blood or of the half-blood, they shall share equally.
[53]

Here, the above-named siblings of Josefa Delgado were related to her by full-blood, except Luis Delgado, her half-
brother. Nonetheless, since they were all illegitimate, they may inherit from each other. Accordingly, all of them are
entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado.

We note, however, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of
Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes
place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be
exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.[54] Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are
entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time
of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.[55] The records not
being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or
their children) of Josefa Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,[56] they are entitled to
inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:[57]
Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be
entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half.
Since Josefa Delgado had heirs other than Guillermo Rustia, Guillermo could not have validly adjudicated Josefas
estate all to himself. Rule 74, Section 1 of the Rules of Court is clear. Adjudication by an heir of the decedents
entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allowed only if he is the sole heir to the estate:

SECTION 1. Extrajudicial settlement by agreement between heirs. If the decedent left no will and no debts and the
heirs are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial or legal representatives duly authorized for the
purpose, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see
fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do
so in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir, he may adjudicate to himself the estate by means of an
affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. x x x (emphasis supplied)

THE LAWFUL HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA

Intervenor (now co-respondent) Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child[58] of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may
be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.[59] She, however,
claimed the status of an acknowledged illegitimate child of Guillermo Rustia only after the death of the latter on
February 28, 1974 at which time it was already the new Civil Code that was in effect.

Under the old Civil Code (which was in force till August 29, 1950), illegitimate children absolutely had no
hereditary rights. This draconian edict was, however, later relaxed in the new Civil Code which granted certain
successional rights to illegitimate children but only on condition that they were first recognized or acknowledged by
the parent.

Under the new law, recognition may be compulsory or voluntary.[60] Recognition is compulsory in any of the
following cases:

(1) in cases of rape, abduction or seduction, when the period of the offense coincides more or less with that
of the conception;
(2) when the child is in continuous possession of status of a child of the alleged father (or mother)[61] by
the direct acts of the latter or of his family;
(3) when the child was conceived during the time when the mother cohabited with the supposed father;
(4) when the child has in his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant is his father. [62]

On the other hand, voluntary recognition may be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of
record or in any authentic writing.[63]
Intervenor Guillerma sought recognition on two grounds: first, compulsory recognition through the open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child and second, voluntary recognition through authentic
writing.

There was apparently no doubt that she possessed the status of an illegitimate child from her birth until the death of
her putative father Guillermo Rustia. However, this did not constitute acknowledgment but a mere ground by which
she could have compelled acknowledgment through the courts.[64] Furthermore, any (judicial) action for
compulsory acknowledgment has a dual limitation: the lifetime of the child and the lifetime of the putative parent.
[65] On the death of either, the action for compulsory recognition can no longer be filed.[66] In this case, intervenor
Guillermas right to claim compulsory acknowledgment prescribed upon the death of Guillermo Rustia on February
28, 1974.
The claim of voluntary recognition (Guillermas second ground) must likewise fail. An authentic writing, for
purposes of voluntary recognition, is understood as a genuine or indubitable writing of the parent (in this case,
Guillermo Rustia). This includes a public instrument or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.[67] Did
intervenors report card from the University of Santo Tomas and Josefa Delgados obituary prepared by Guillermo
Rustia qualify as authentic writings under the new Civil Code? Unfortunately not. The report card of intervenor
Guillerma did not bear the signature of Guillermo Rustia. The fact that his name appears there as intervenors
parent/guardian holds no weight since he had no participation in its preparation. Similarly, while witnesses testified
that it was Guillermo Rustia himself who drafted the notice of death of Josefa Delgado which was published in the
SUNDAY TIMES on September 10, 1972, that published obituary was not the authentic writing contemplated by
the law. What could have been admitted as an authentic writing was the original manuscript of the notice, in the
handwriting of Guillermo Rustia himself and signed by him, not the newspaper clipping of the obituary. The failure
to present the original signed manuscript was fatal to intervenors claim.

The same misfortune befalls the ampun-ampunan, Guillermina Rustia Rustia, who was never adopted in accordance
with law. Although a petition for her adoption was filed by Guillermo Rustia, it never came to fruition and was
dismissed upon the latters death. We affirm the ruling of both the trial court and the Court of Appeals holding her a
legal stranger to the deceased spouses and therefore not entitled to inherit from them ab intestato. We quote:

Adoption is a juridical act, a proceeding in rem, which [created] between two persons a relationship similar to that
which results from legitimate paternity and filiation. Only an adoption made through the court, or in pursuance with
the procedure laid down under Rule 99 of the Rules of Court is valid in this jurisdiction. It is not of natural law at
all, but is wholly and entirely artificial. To establish the relation, the statutory requirements must be strictly carried
out, otherwise, the adoption is an absolute nullity. The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must be affirmatively
[proven] by the person claiming its existence.[68]

Premises considered, we rule that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor
Guillerma Rustia and the ampun-ampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under
Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving
spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of
Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,[69] nieces and nephews.[70]

ENTITLEMENT TO LETTERS OF ADMINISTRATION

An administrator is a person appointed by the court to administer the intestate estate of the decedent. Rule 78,
Section 6 of the Rules of Court prescribes an order of preference in the appointment of an administrator:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or
executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give a bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be
granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to
such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing
to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be
incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of
the person to apply for administration or to request that the administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court
may select.

In the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be
appointed.[71] The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases
where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates,[72] a
situation which obtains here.
It is in this light that we see fit to appoint joint administrators, in the persons of Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa
and a nominee of the nephews and nieces of Guillermo Rustia. They are the next of kin of the deceased spouses
Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Rustia, respectively.

WHEREFORE, the petition (which seeks to reinstate the May 11, 1990 decision of the RTC Manila, Branch 55) is
hereby DENIED. The assailed October 24, 2002 decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the following
modifications:
1. Guillermo Rustias June 15, 1973 affidavit of self-adjudication is hereby ANNULLED.
2. the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The
remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b) the children
of any of Josefa Delgados full- or half-siblings who may have predeceased her, also surviving at the time of her
death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. In this connection, the trial
court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her
estate.
3. Guillermo Rustias estate (including its one-half share of Josefa Delgados estate) shall be inherited by
Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz (whose respective shares shall be per capita) and the
children of the late Roman Rustia, Sr. (who survived Guillermo Rustia and whose respective shares shall be per
stirpes). Considering that Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz are now deceased, their
respective shares shall pertain to their estates.
4. Letters of administration over the still unsettled intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado
shall issue to Carlota Delgado vda. de de la Rosa and to a nominee from among the heirs of Guillermo Rustia, as
joint administrators, upon their qualification and filing of the requisite bond in such amount as may be determined
by the trial court.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

W E C O N C U R:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice
AT T E S T AT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, I hereby certify
that the conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1] Oppositors in SP Case No. 97668 with the RTC Manila, Branch 55.
[2] Intervenor in SP Case No. 97668 with the RTC Manila, Branch 55.
[3] In the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners, the oppositors were identified as oppositors-
respondents, while intervenor was identified as intervenor-respondent. For clarity, we shall refer to them
collectively as respondents in this decision. The Court of Appeals was also impleaded as public respondent but this
was not necessary since this is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[4] Judge Hermogenes Liwag, Rollo, pp. 92-106.
[5] Penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Oswaldo D. Agcaoili and
Sergio L. Pestao of the former 15th Division, Rollo, pp. 75-90.
[6] The original action was a petition for letters of administration of the intestate estates of Guillermo Rustia and
Josefa Delgado, Rollo, p. 92.
[7] Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz, both deceased and now substituted by their
respective heirs.
[8] The children of Guillermo Rustias deceased brother Roman Rustia, Sr.
[9] Intervenor Guillerma Rustia.
[10] Oppositor Guillermina Rustia Rustia.
[11] In some pleadings, this was spelled as Feliza.
[12] In some pleadings, this was spelled as Osario and in others, Oscorro.
[13] Art. 992, new CIVIL CODE. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate
children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.
[14] Rollo, p. 1262.
[15] Id., pp. 1200-1201.
[16] In relation, the Civil Code of Spain (the old Civil Code) provided that when the acknowledgment was made
separately by either parent, the name of the other parent shall not be revealed. Nor shall any circumstance be
mentioned by which such person might be recognized (Article 132). This showed the intent of the said Code to
protect the identity of the non-acknowledging parent.
[17] One of the children of Felisa Delgado with Lucio Campo.
[18] CA decision, Rollo, pp. 77-78.
[19] Under the old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of Guillerma Rustias birth in 1920, she was an
illegitimate child, not a natural child, since she was born of parents who at the time of conception were disqualified
to marry each other.
[20] Rollo, p. 920.
[21] Law in effect at the time of the death of Guillermo Rustia.
[22] Filed before the then Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila.
[23] Rollo, p. 1149.
[24] Most of the respondents herein.
[25] Filed on behalf of the surviving brothers, sisters, nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa
Delgado.
[26] Now represented by their heirs as respondents.
[27] Id.
[28] Rollo, pp. 105-106.
[29] Dated September 25, 1990.
[30] This petition was initially filed with the Supreme Court but was referred to the Court of Appeals, the latter
having concurrent jurisdiction with the Supreme Court over the petition.
[31] Penned by Associate Justice Artemon Luna, and concurred in by Associate Justices Serafin Camilon and Celso
Magsino of the Seventh Division, dated March 20, 1991, Rollo, pp. 627-644.
[32] Resolution dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 656-671.
[33] De la Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 678 (1997).
[34] Decision penned by Associate Justice Jose L. Sabio, Jr., and concurred in by Associate Justices Oswaldo D.
Agcaoili and Sergio L. Pestao of the 15th Division, dated January 31, 2002, Rollo, pp. 46-63.
[35] Both the petitioner and the oppositors filed a motion for reconsideration of the January 31, 2002 decision of the
Court of Appeals.
[36] Dated October 24, 2002.
[37] II Florenz D. Regalado, REMEDIAL LAW COMPENDIUM 672 (9th rev. ed. 2001).
[38] Elisa vda. de Anson.
[39] Rollo, p. 1266.
[40] Balogbog v. Court of Appeals, 336 Phil. 252 (1997).
[41] Certificate of Identity No. 9592 dated December 1, 1944 issued to Mrs. Guillermo J. Rustia by Carlos P.
Romulo, then Resident Commissioner to the United States of the Commonwealth of the Philippines.
[42] Philippine Passport No. 4767 issued to Josefa D. Rustia on June 25, 1947.
[43] Veterans Application for Pension or Compensation for Disability Resulting from Service in the Active Military
or Naval Forces of the United States- Claim No. C-4, 004, 503 (VA Form 526) filed with the Veterans
Administration of the United States of America by Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia wherein Dr. Guillermo J. Rustia himself
stated under oath to his marriage to Josefa Delgado in Manila on June 3, 1919.
[44] Rule 132, Section 23, Rules of Court.
[45] Josefa Delgado stood as sponsor in the baptism of Luisa Delgado on September 14, 1919, Rollo, p. 1266. In
1975, Luisa Delgado vda. de Danao filed a petition for letters of administration for the intestate estate of Josefa
Delgado; supra, note 25.
[46] Acebedo v. Arquero, 447 Phil. 76 (2003).
[47] Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693 (1999), citing Perido v. Perido, No. L-28248, 12 March 1975,
63 SCRA 97.
[48] Ricardo Francisco, EVIDENCE 400 (3rd ed. 1996).
[49] Rollo, p. 1262.
[50] Id., pp. 1200-1201.
[51] Old CIVIL CODE, art. 134. An acknowledged natural child is entitled:
1. To bear the surname of the person acknowledging it.
2. To receive support from such person, in accordance with article 143.
3. To receive the hereditary portion, if available, determined by this Code.
[52] The records do not indicate the dates of birth of Felisa Delgados children. The dates when Felisa Delgado
cohabited with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo were likewise not stated. From the limited facts of the case on this
issue, it is safe to assume that they were all born during the effectivity of the old Civil Code. Under the said Code,
children born out of wedlock of parents who, at the time of conception, could have married, were natural children.
[53] III Arturo M. Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 493-494 (1979 ed.) citing 7 Manresa 139.
[54] Desiderio P. Jurado, COMMENTS AND JURISPRUDENCE ON SUCCESSION 391 (8th ed. 1991).
[55] In case the surviving collateral relatives are already deceased at the time of execution of this judgment, their
shares in the inheritance of Josefa Delgado shall accrue to their respective estates.
[56] Then surviving spouse, now represented by his intestate estate.
[57] Law in effect at the time of the death of Josefa Delgado.
[58] Under the old Civil Code, which was in effect at the time of Guillerma Rustias birth in 1920, she is an
illegitimate child, not a natural child, since she was born of parents who, at the time of conception, were
disqualified to marry each other.
[59] Paterno v. Paterno, No. L- 23060, 30 June 1967, 20 SCRA 585.
[60] I Arturo M. Tolentino, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 577 (1985 ed.).
[61] Art. 284 of the new Civil Code provided that the mother is obliged to recognize her natural child in any of the
cases referred to in Art. 283.
[62] New CIVIL CODE, Art. 283.
[63] New CIVIL CODE, Art. 278.
[64] Supra, note 60, at 283.
[65] This was provided in Article 285 of the new Civil Code and carried over to Article 175 of the Family Code.
While there are exceptions to this rule, Guillermas case does not fall within the exceptions.
[66] Subject to exceptions provided in paragraphs (1) and (2) of Article 285 of the new Civil Code.
[67] I Tolentino, supra note 60, at 585-586.
[68] RTC decision, Rollo, p. 104.
[69] Marciana Rustia vda. de Damian and Hortencia Rustia Cruz, represented by their heirs in this
petition.
[70] Children of his predeceased brother Roman Rustia, Sr.
[71] II Regalado, supra note 37, at 39.
[72] Gabriel et al. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 101512, 7 August 1992, 212 SCRA 413.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 83598. March 7, 1997]
LEONCIA BALOGBOG and GAUDIOSO BALOGBOG, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
RAMONITO BALOGBOG and GENEROSO BALOGBOG, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City (Branch IX), declaring private respondents heirs of the deceased Basilio and Genoveva
Balogbog entitled to inherit from them.

The facts are as follows. Petitioners Leoncia and Gaudioso Balogbog are the children of Basilio Balogbog and
Genoveva Arnibal who died intestate in 1951 and 1961, respectively. They had an older brother, Gavino, but he
died in 1935, predeceasing their parents.
In 1968, private respondents Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog brought an action for partition and accounting
against petitioners, claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such,
they were entitled to the one-third share of Gavino in the estate of their grandparents.

In their answer, petitioners denied knowing private respondents. They alleged that their brother Gavino died single
and without issue in their parents residence at Tag-amakan, Asturias, Cebu. In the beginning they claimed that the
properties of the estate had been sold to them by their mother when she was still alive, but they later withdrew this
allegation.

Private respondents presented Priscilo Y. Trazo,[2] then 81 years old, mayor of the municipality of Asturias from
1928 to 1934, who testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and Ramonito to be their first
child. On crossexamination, Trazo explained that he knew Gavino and Catalina because they performed at his
campaign rallies, Catalina as balitaw dancer and Gavino Balogbog as her guitarist. Trazo said he attended the
wedding of Gavino and Catalina sometime in 1929, in which Rev. Father Emiliano Jomao-as officiated and
Egmidio Manuel, then a municipal councilor, acted as one of the witnesses.

The second witness presented was Matias Pogoy,[3] a family friend of private respondents, who testified that
private respondents are the children of Gavino and Catalina. According to him, the wedding of Gavino and Catalina
was solemnized in the Catholic Church of Asturias, Cebu and that he knew this because he attended their wedding
and was in fact asked by Gavino to accompany Catalina and carry her wedding dress from her residence in
Camanaol to the poblacion of Asturias before the wedding day. He testified that Gavino died in 1935 in his
residence at Obogon, Balamban, Cebu, in the presence of his wife. (This contradicts petitioners claim made in their
answer that Gavino died in the ancestral house at Tag-amakan, Asturias.) Pogoy said he was a carpenter and he was
the one who had made the coffin of Gavino. He also made the coffin of the couples son, Petronilo, who died when
he was six.

Catalina Ubas testified concerning her marriage to Gavino.[4] She testified that after the wedding, she was handed a
receipt, presumably the marriage certificate, by Fr. Jomao-as, but it was burned during the war. She said that she
and Gavino lived together in Obogon and begot three children, namely, Ramonito, Petronilo, and Generoso.
Petronilo died after an illness at the age of six. On crossexamination, she stated that after the death of Gavino, she
lived in common law relation with a man for a year and then they separated.

Private respondents produced a certificate from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar (Exh. P) that the Register of
Marriages did not have a record of the marriage of Gavino and Catalina, another certificate from the Office of the
Treasurer (Exh. L) that there was no record of the birth of Ramonito in that office and, for this reason, the record
must be presumed to have been lost or destroyed during the war, and a certificate by the Parish Priest of Asturias
that there was likewise no record of birth of Ramonito in the church, the records of which were either lost or
destroyed during the war. (Exh. M)
On the other hand, as defendant below, petitioner Leoncia Balogbog testified[5] that Gavino died single at the
family residence in Asturias. She denied that her brother had any legitimate children and stated that she did not
know private respondents before this case was filed. She obtained a certificate (Exh. 10) from the Local Civil
Registrar of Asturias to the effect that that office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina. The
certificate was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer Juan Maranga, who testified that there was no record of
the marriage of Gavino and Catalina in the Book of Marriages between 1925 to 1935.[6]

Witness Jose Narvasa testified[7] that Gavino died single in 1935 and that Catalina lived with a certain Eleuterio
Keriado after the war, although he did not know whether they were legally married. He added, however, that
Catalina had children by a man she had married before the war, although he did not know the names of the children.
On crossexamination, Narvasa stated that Leoncia Balogbog, who requested him to testify, was also his bondsman
in a criminal case filed by a certain Mr. Cuyos.

Ramonito Balogbog was presented[8] to rebut Leoncia Balogbogs testimony.

On June 15, 1973, the Court of First Instance of Cebu City rendered judgment for private respondents (plaintiffs
below), ordering petitioners to render an accounting from 1960 until the finality of its judgment, to partition the
estate and deliver to private respondents one-third of the estate of Basilio and Genoveva, and to pay attorneys fees
and costs.

Petitioners filed a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration, contending that the trial court erred in not giving
weight to the certification of the Office of the Municipal Treasurer of Asturias (Exh. 10) to the effect that no
marriage of Gavino and Catalina was recorded in the Book of Marriages for the years 1925-1935. Their motion was
denied by the trial court, as was their second motion for new trial and/or reconsideration based on the church
records of the parish of Asturias which did not contain the record of the alleged marriage in that church.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It held that private respondents failed to overcome the legal presumption
that a man and a woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are in fact married, that a child is presumed to
be legitimate, and that things happen according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.[9]
Hence, this petition.

We find no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals.

First. Petitioners contend that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with
Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time the alleged marriage was
celebrated. Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a
certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or have been
lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of the continuous
possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that the registration of the
birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.
This Court noted long ago, however, that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 1889 of Spain did not take effect,
having been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code to this
country.[10] Consequently, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court in
1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code, which repealed
the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights,[11] and the rules on evidence.
Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting themselves as husband and wife
are legally married.[12] This presumption may be rebutted only by cogent proof to the contrary.[13] In this case,
petitioners claim that the certification presented by private respondents (to the effect that the record of the marriage
had been lost or destroyed during the war) was belied by the production of the Book of Marriages by the assistant
municipal treasurer of Asturias. Petitioners argue that this book does not contain any entry pertaining to the alleged
marriage of private respondents parents.

This contention has no merit. In Pugeda v. Trias,[14] the defendants, who questioned the marriage of the plaintiffs,
produced a photostatic copy of the record of marriages of the Municipality of Rosario, Cavite for the month of
January, 1916, to show that there was no record of the alleged marriage. Nonetheless, evidence consisting of the
testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage. Indeed, although a marriage contract is
considered primary evidence of marriage,[15] the failure to present it is not proof that no marriage took place. Other
evidence may be presented to prove marriage.[16] Here, private respondents proved, through testimonial evidence,
that Gavino and Catalina were married in 1929; that they had three children, one of whom died in infancy; that their
marriage subsisted until 1935 when Gavino died; and that their children, private respondents herein, were
recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

Neither is there merit in the argument that the existence of the marriage cannot be presumed because there was no
evidence showing in particular that Gavino and Catalina, in the presence of two witnesses, declared that they were
taking each other as husband and wife.[17] An exchange of vows can be presumed to have been made from the
testimonies of the witnesses who state that a wedding took place, since the very purpose for having a wedding is to
exchange vows of marital commitment. It would indeed be unusual to have a wedding without an exchange of vows
and quite unnatural for people not to notice its absence.

The law favors the validity of marriage, because the State is interested in the preservation of the family and the
sanctity of the family is a matter of constitutional concern. As stated in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee:[18]

The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage. (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro
matrimonio Always presume marriage. (U.S. vs. Villafuerte and Rabano [1905], 4 Phil., 476; Son Cui vs.
Guepangco, supra; U.S. vs. Memoracion and Uri [1916], 34 Phil., 633; Teter vs. Teter [1884], 101 Ind., 129.)

Second. Petitioners contend that private respondents reliance solely on testimonial evidence to support their claim
that private respondents had been in the continuous possession of the status of legitimate children is contrary to Art.
265 of the Civil Code which provides that such status shall be proven by the record of birth in the Civil Register, by
an authentic document or by final judgment. But in accordance with Arts. 266 and 267, in the absence of titles
indicated in Art. 265, the filiation of children may be proven by continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child and by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court or special laws. Thus the Civil Code provides:

ART. 266. In the absence of the titles indicated in the preceding article, the filiation shall be proved by the
continuous possession of status of a legitimate child

ART. 267. In the absence of a record of birth, authentic document, final judgment or possession of status, legitimate
filiation may be proved by any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Petitioners contend that there is no justification for presenting testimonies as to the possession by private
respondents of the status of legitimate children because the Book of Marriages for the years 1928-1929 is available.

What is in issue, however, is not the marriage of Gavino and Catalina but the filiation of private respondents as their
children. The marriage of Gavino and Catalina has already been shown in the preceding discussion. The treasurer of
Asturias, Cebu certified that the records of birth of that municipality for the year 1930 could not be found,
presumably because they were lost or destroyed during the war (Exh. L). But Matias Pogoy testified that Gavino
and Catalina begot three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six. Catalina testified that private
respondents Ramonito and Generoso are her children by Gavino Balogbog. That private respondents are the
children of Gavino and Catalina Balogbog cannot therefore be doubted.

Moreover, the evidence in the record shows that petitioner Gaudioso Balogbog admitted to the police of Balamban,
Cebu that Ramonito is his nephew. As the Court of Appeals found:

Ironically, it is appellant Gaudioso himself who supplies the clincher that tips the balance in favor of the appellees.
In an investigation before the Police Investigating Committee of Balamban, Cebu, held on March 8, 1968,
conducted for the purpose of inquiring into a complaint filed by Ramonito against a patrolman of the Balamban
police force, Gaudioso testified that the complainant in that administrative case is his nephew. Excerpts from the
transcript of the proceedings conducted on that date (Exhs. N, N-1, N-2, N-3 and N-4) read:

Atty. Kiamco - May it please this investigative body.

Q.- Do you know the complainant in this Administrative Case No. 1?

A.- Yes I know.

Q.- Why do you know him?

A.- I know because he is my nephew.

Q.- Are you in good terms with your nephew, the complainant?

A.- Yes.

Q.- Do you mean to say that you are close to him?

A.- Yes. We are close.

Q.- Why do you say you are close?

A.- We are close because aside from the fact that he is my nephew we were also leaving (sic) in the same house in
Butuan City, and I even barrow (sic) from him money in the amount of P300.00, when I return to Balamban, Cebu.

xxxxxxxxx

Q.- Why is Ramonito Balogbog your nephew?

A.- Because he is the son of my elder brother.

This admission of relationship is admissible against Gaudioso although made in another case. It is considered as a
reliable declaration against interest (Rule 130, Section 22). Significantly, Gaudioso did not try to offer any
explanation to blunt the effects of that declaration. He did not even testify during the trial. Such silence can only
mean that Ramonito is indeed the nephew of Gaudioso, the former being the son of Gavino.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur

[1] Per Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, J., concurred in by Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and Jose C. Campos, Jr.

[2] TSN, December 3, 1969, pp. 2-6.

[3] TSN, July 9, 1970, pp. 3-28.

[4] TSN, July 25, 1980, pp. 3-28.

[5] TSN, Aug. 12, 1972, pp. 5-18.

[6] TSN, Aug. 28, 1972, p. 13.

[7] TSN, Sept. 16, 1972, pp. 4-20.

[8] TSN, July 7, 1983, pp. 3-5.

[9] 1964 Rules of Court, Rule 131, 5 (z), (bb), and (cc).

[10] Benedicto v. De la Rama, 3 Phil. 34 (1903).

[11] Civil Code, Art. 2270.

[12] 1964 Rules of Court, Rule 131, 5(bb).

[13] Alavado v. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230, 235 (1985); Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97, 102-103
(1975).

[14] 4 SCRA 849 (1962). See Madridejo v. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1 (1930); Jones v. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179 (1937);
People v. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).

[15] Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete, 66 SCRA 425 (1975).

[16] Tolentino v. Paras, 122 SCRA 525 (1983); United States v. Memoracion, 34 Phil. 633 (1916); People v.
Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 (1984).

[17] Civil Code, Art. 55.

[18] 43 Phil. 43, 56 (1922). Accord, Perido v. Perido, 63 SCRA 97 (1975).

FIRST DIVISION

ROMMEL JACINTO DANTES G.R. No. 174689

SILVERIO,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES,
Respondent. Promulgated:
October 22, 2007

x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

When God created man, He made him in the likeness of God; He created them male and female. (Genesis 5:1-2)

Amihan gazed upon the bamboo reed planted by Bathala and she heard voices coming from inside the bamboo. Oh
North Wind! North Wind! Please let us out!, the voices said. She pecked the reed once, then twice. All of a sudden,
the bamboo cracked and slit open. Out came two human beings; one was a male and the other was a female.
Amihan named the man Malakas (Strong) and the woman Maganda (Beautiful). (The Legend of Malakas and
Maganda)

When is a man a man and when is a woman a woman? In particular, does the law recognize the changes made by a
physician using scalpel, drugs and counseling with regard to a persons sex? May a person successfully petition for a
change of name and sex appearing in the birth certificate to reflect the result of a sex reassignment surgery?

On November 26, 2002, petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name
and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 8. The petition, docketed as SP Case
No. 02-105207, impleaded the civil registrar of Manila as respondent.

Petitioner alleged in his petition that he was born in the City of Manila to the spouses Melecio Petines Silverio and
Anita Aquino Dantes on April 4, 1962. His name was registered as Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio in his
certificate of live birth (birth certificate). His sex was registered as male.

He further alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and
that he had always identified himself with girls since childhood.[1] Feeling trapped in a mans body, he consulted
several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment and breast
augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a woman culminated on January 27, 2001 when he underwent
sex reassignment surgery[2] in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr.,
a plastic and reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner)
had in fact undergone the procedure.

From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name
in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely, and his sex from male to female.

An order setting the case for initial hearing was published in the Peoples Journal Tonight, a newspaper of general
circulation in Metro Manila, for three consecutive weeks.[3] Copies of the order were sent to the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) and the civil registrar of Manila.

On the scheduled initial hearing, jurisdictional requirements were established. No opposition to the petition was
made.

During trial, petitioner testified for himself. He also presented Dr. Reysio-Cruz, Jr. and his American fianc, Richard
P. Edel, as witnesses.

On June 4, 2003, the trial court rendered a decision[4] in favor of petitioner. Its relevant portions read:

Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex.

The sole issue here is whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

The [c]ourt rules in the affirmative.

Firstly, the [c]ourt is of the opinion that granting the petition would be more in consonance with the principles of
justice and equity. With his sexual [re-assignment], petitioner, who has always felt, thought and acted like a woman,
now possesses the physique of a female. Petitioners misfortune to be trapped in a mans body is not his own doing
and should not be in any way taken against him.

Likewise, the [c]ourt believes that no harm, injury [or] prejudice will be caused to anybody or the community in
granting the petition. On the contrary, granting the petition would bring the much-awaited happiness on the part of
the petitioner and her [fianc] and the realization of their dreams.

Finally, no evidence was presented to show any cause or ground to deny the present petition despite due notice and
publication thereof. Even the State, through the [OSG] has not seen fit to interpose any [o]pposition.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered GRANTING the petition and ordering the Civil Registrar of Manila to
change the entries appearing in the Certificate of Birth of [p]etitioner, specifically for petitioners first name from
Rommel Jacinto to MELY and petitioners gender from Male to FEMALE. [5]
On August 18, 2003, the Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the
Court of Appeals.[6] It alleged that there is no law allowing the change of entries in the birth certificate by reason of
sex alteration.

On February 23, 2006, the Court of Appeals[7] rendered a decision[8] in favor of the Republic. It ruled that the trial
courts decision lacked legal basis. There is no law allowing the change of either name or sex in the certificate of
birth on the ground of sex reassignment through surgery. Thus, the Court of Appeals granted the Republics petition,
set aside the decision of the trial court and ordered the dismissal of SP Case No. 02-105207. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration but it was denied.[9] Hence, this petition.

Petitioner essentially claims that the change of his name and sex in his birth certificate is allowed under Articles
407 to 413 of the Civil Code, Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court and RA 9048.[10]

The petition lacks merit.

A PERSONS FIRST NAME CANNOT BE CHANGED ON THE GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT

Petitioner invoked his sex reassignment as the ground for his petition for change of name and sex. As found by the
trial court:
Petitioner filed the present petition not to evade any law or judgment or any infraction thereof or for any unlawful
motive but solely for the purpose of making his birth records compatible with his present sex. (emphasis supplied)

Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil
registry changes sought. We disagree.

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification.[11] A change
of name is a privilege, not a right.[12] Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes.[13] In this
connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.

This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048
provides:

SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. No
entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical
errors and change of first name or nickname which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal
civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and
regulations.

RA 9048 now governs the change of first name.[14] It vests the power and authority to entertain petitions for
change of first name to the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general concerned. Under the law, therefore,
jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is now primarily lodged with the aforementioned
administrative officers. The intent and effect of the law is to exclude the change of first name from the coverage of
Rules 103 (Change of Name) and 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court, until and unless an administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently denied.[15] It
likewise lays down the corresponding venue,[16] form[17] and procedure. In sum, the remedy and the proceedings
regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allowed:

SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. The petition for change of first name or nickname
may be allowed in any of the following cases:

(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely
difficult to write or pronounce;

(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has
been publicly known by that first name or nickname in the community; or

(3) The change will avoid confusion.

Petitioners basis in praying for the change of his first name was his sex reassignment. He intended to make his first
name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into through surgery. However, a change of name
does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status.[18] RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the
ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioners first name for his declared
purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.

Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling
reason justifying such change.[19] In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and
official name.[20] In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of
using his true and official name.

In sum, the petition in the trial court in so far as it prayed for the change of petitioners first name was not within
that courts primary jurisdiction as the petition should have been filed with the local civil registrar concerned,
assuming it could be legally done. It was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that
is, that provided under RA 9048. It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the
Civil Registrar of Manila where his birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his
true and official name does not prejudice him at all. For all these reasons, the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed
petitioners petition in so far as the change of his first name was concerned.

NO LAW ALLOWS THE CHANGE OF ENTRY IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO SEX ON THE
GROUND OF SEX REASSIGNMENT

The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes.[21] In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376 of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by RA 9048 in so far as clerical or
typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made through
administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, RA 9048 removed from the ambit of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors.[22] Rule 108 now applies only to substantial changes
and corrections in entries in the civil register.[23]

Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a clerical or typographical error is:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:

xxx xxx xxx

(3) Clerical or typographical error refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing,
copying, transcribing or typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled
name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can
be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records: Provided, however, That no
correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)

Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical
error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:[24]

ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.

ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.

The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
after birth.[25] However, no reasonable interpretation of the provision can justify the conclusion that it covers the
correction on the ground of sex reassignment.
To correct simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from while to change means to replace
something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute.[26] The birth
certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including those corresponding to his first name and
sex, were all correct. No correction is necessary.

Article 407 of the Civil Code authorizes the entry in the civil registry of certain acts (such as legitimations,
acknowledgments of illegitimate children and naturalization), events (such as births, marriages, naturalization and
deaths) and judicial decrees (such as legal separations, annulments of marriage, declarations of nullity of marriages,
adoptions, naturalization, loss or recovery of citizenship, civil interdiction, judicial determination of filiation and
changes of name). These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal
capacity, status and nationality of a person. Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex
reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither is it recognized nor even
mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.

Status refers to the circumstances affecting the legal situation (that is, the sum total of capacities and incapacities)
of a person in view of his age, nationality and his family membership.[27]

The status of a person in law includes all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not
ordinarily terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not. The
comprehensive term status include such matters as the beginning and end of legal personality, capacity to have
rights in general, family relations, and its various aspects, such as birth, legitimation, adoption, emancipation,
marriage, divorce, and sometimes even succession.[28] (emphasis supplied)

A persons sex is an essential factor in marriage and family relations. It is a part of a persons legal capacity and civil
status. In this connection, Article 413 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.

But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to
petitioners cause.
Moreover, Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law) provides:

SEC. 5. Registration and certification of births. The declaration of the physician or midwife in attendance at the
birth or, in default thereof, the declaration of either parent of the newborn child, shall be sufficient for the
registration of a birth in the civil register. Such declaration shall be exempt from documentary stamp tax and shall
be sent to the local civil registrar not later than thirty days after the birth, by the physician or midwife in attendance
at the birth or by either parent of the newborn child.

In such declaration, the person above mentioned shall certify to the following facts: (a) date and hour of birth; (b)
sex and nationality of infant; (c) names, citizenship and religion of parents or, in case the father is not known, of the
mother alone; (d) civil status of parents; (e) place where the infant was born; and (f) such other data as may be
required in the regulations to be issued.

xxx xxx xxx (emphasis supplied)

Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth.
[29] Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife)
by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the
determination of a persons sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by error,[30] is immutable.[31]

When words are not defined in a statute they are to be given their common and ordinary meaning in the absence of
a contrary legislative intent. The words sex, male and female as used in the Civil Register Law and laws concerning
the civil registry (and even all other laws) should therefore be understood in their common and ordinary usage,
there being no legislative intent to the contrary. In this connection, sex is defined as the sum of peculiarities of
structure and function that distinguish a male from a female[32] or the distinction between male and female.[33]
Female is the sex that produces ova or bears young[34] and male is the sex that has organs to produce spermatozoa
for fertilizing ova.[35] Thus, the words male and female in everyday understanding do not include persons who
have undergone sex reassignment. Furthermore, words that are employed in a statute which had at the time a well-
known meaning are presumed to have been used in that sense unless the context compels to the contrary.[36] Since
the statutory language of the Civil Register Law was enacted in the early 1900s and remains unchanged, it cannot
be argued that the term sex as used then is something alterable through surgery or something that allows a post-
operative male-to-female transsexual to be included in the category female.

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for that reason.
Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his birth certificate.
NEITHER MAY ENTRIES IN THE BIRTH CERTIFICATE AS TO FIRST NAME OR SEX BE CHANGED ON
THE GROUND OF EQUITY

The trial court opined that its grant of the petition was in consonance with the principles of justice and equity. It
believed that allowing the petition would cause no harm, injury or prejudice to anyone. This is wrong.

The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First,
even the trial court itself found that the petition was but petitioners first step towards his eventual marriage to his
male fianc. However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman.[37] One of its essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who
must be a male and a female.[38] To grant the changes sought by petitioner will substantially reconfigure and
greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which
apply particularly to women such as the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women,[39] certain
felonies under the Revised Penal Code[40] and the presumption of survivorship in case of calamities under Rule
131 of the Rules of Court,[41] among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which
could be substantially affected if petitioners petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that [n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by
reason of the silence, obscurity or insufficiency of the law. However, it is not a license for courts to engage in
judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law, not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should
govern the recognition of the effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly
important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-based.

To reiterate, the statutes define who may file petitions for change of first name and for correction or change of
entries in the civil registry, where they may be filed, what grounds may be invoked, what proof must be presented
and what procedures shall be observed. If the legislature intends to confer on a person who has undergone sex
reassignment the privilege to change his name and sex to conform with his reassigned sex, it has to enact legislation
laying down the guidelines in turn governing the conferment of that privilege.

It might be theoretically possible for this Court to write a protocol on when a person may be recognized as having
successfully changed his sex. However, this Court has no authority to fashion a law on that matter, or on anything
else. The Court cannot enact a law where no law exists. It can only apply or interpret the written word of its co-
equal branch of government, Congress.

Petitioner pleads that [t]he unfortunates are also entitled to a life of happiness, contentment and [the] realization of
their dreams. No argument about that. The Court recognizes that there are people whose preferences and orientation
do not fit neatly into the commonly recognized parameters of social convention and that, at least for them, life is
indeed an ordeal. However, the remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely
by the legislature, not by the courts.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Petitioner went for his elementary and high school, as well as his Bachelor of Science in Statistics and Master of
Arts, in the University of the Philippines. He took up Population Studies Program, Master of Arts in Sociology and
Doctor of Philosophy in Sociology at the University of Hawaii, in Manoa, Hawaii, U.S.A. Rollo, p. 48.
[2] This consisted of penectomy [surgical removal of penis] bilateral oschiectomy [or orchiectomy which is the
surgical excision of the testes] penile skin inversion vaginoplasty [plastic surgery of the vagina] clitoral hood
reconstruction and augmentation mammoplasty [surgical enhancement of the size and shape of the breasts]. Id.
[3] On January 23, 2003, January 30, 2003 and February 6, 2003.
[4] Penned by Judge Felixberto T. Olalia, Jr. Rollo, pp. 51-53.
[5] Id., pp. 52-53 (citations omitted).
[6] Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 78824.
[7] Special Sixth Division.
[8] Penned by Associate Justice Arcangelita M. Romilla-Lontok with Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and
Aurora Santiago-Lagman concurring. Rollo, pp. 25-33.
[9] Resolution dated September 14, 2006, id., pp. 45-46.
[10] An Act Authorizing the City or Municipal Civil Registrar or the Consul General to Correct a Clerical or
Typographical Error in an Entry and/or Change of First Name or Nickname in the Civil Register Without Need of a
Judicial Order, Amending for the Purpose Articles 376 and 412 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
[11] Wang v. Cebu City Civil Registrar, G.R. No. 159966, 30 March 2005, 454 SCRA 155.
[12] Id.
[13] K v. Health Division, Department of Human Resources, 277 Or. 371, 560 P.2d 1070 (1977).
[14] Under Section 2 (6) of RA 9048, first name refers to a name or nickname given to a person which may consist
of one or more names in addition to the middle names and last names. Thus, the term first name will be used here to
refer both to first name and nickname.
[15] The last paragraph of Section 7 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 7. Duties and Powers of the Civil Registrar General. xxx xxx xxx
Where the petition is denied by the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general, the petitioner may either
appeal the decision to the civil registrar general or file the appropriate petition with the proper court.
[16] SECTION 3. Who May File the Petition and Where. Any person having direct and personal interest in the
correction of a clerical or typographical error in an entry and/or change of first name or nickname in the civil
register may file, in person, a verified petition with the local civil registry office of the city or municipality where
the record being sought to be corrected or changed is kept.

In case the petitioner has already migrated to another place in the country and it would not be practical for such
party, in terms of transportation expenses, time and effort to appear in person before the local civil registrar keeping
the documents to be corrected or changed, the petition may be filed, in person, with the local civil registrar of the
place where the interested party is presently residing or domiciled. The two (2) local civil registrars concerned will
then communicate to facilitate the processing of the petition.

Citizens of the Philippines who are presently residing or domiciled in foreign countries may file their petition, in
person, with the nearest Philippine Consulates.

The petitions filed with the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general shall be processed in accordance
with this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.
All petitions for the clerical or typographical errors and/or change of first names or nicknames may be availed of
only once.
[17] SECTION 5. Form and Contents of the Petition. The petition shall be in the form of an affidavit, subscribed
and sworn to before any person authorized by the law to administer oaths. The affidavit shall set forth facts
necessary to establish the merits of the petition and shall show affirmatively that the petitioner is competent to
testify to the matters stated. The petitioner shall state the particular erroneous entry or entries, which are sought to
be corrected and/or the change sought to be made.
The petition shall be supported with the following documents:
(1) A certified true machine copy of the certificate or of the page of the registry book containing the entry or
entries sought to be corrected or changed;
(2) At least two (2) public or private documents showing the correct entry or entries upon which the
correction or change shall be based; and
(3) Other documents which the petitioner or the city or municipal civil registrar or the consul general may
consider relevant and necessary for the approval of the petition.

In case of change of first name or nickname, the petition shall likewise be supported with the documents mentioned
in the immediately preceding paragraph. In addition, the petition shall be published at least once a week for two (2)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. Furthermore, the petitioner shall submit a certification
from the appropriate law enforcement agencies that he has no pending case or no criminal record.
[18] Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97906, 21 May 1992, 209 SCRA 189.
[19] Supra note 11.
[20] Id.
[21] In re Ladrach, 32 Ohio Misc.2d 6, 513 N.E.2d 828 (1987).
[22] Lee v. Court of Appeals, 419 Phil. 392 (2001).
[23] Id.
[24] Co v. Civil Register of Manila, G.R. No. 138496, 23 February 2004, 423 SCRA 420.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Beduya v. Republic of the Philippines, 120 Phil. 114 (1964).
[28] Salonga, Jovito, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1995 Edition, Rex Bookstore, p. 238.
[29] This, of course, should be taken in conjunction with Articles 407 and 412 of the Civil Code which authorizes
the recording of acts, events and judicial decrees or the correction or change of errors including those that occur
after birth. Nonetheless, in such cases, the entries in the certificates of birth are not be corrected or changed. The
decision of the court granting the petition shall be annotated in the certificates of birth and shall form part of the
civil register in the Office of the Local Civil Registrar. (Co v. Civil Register of Manila, supra note 24)
[30] The error pertains to one where the birth attendant writes male or female but the genitals of the child are that of
the opposite sex.
[31] Moreover, petitioners female anatomy is all man-made. The body that he inhabits is a male body in all aspects
other than what the physicians have supplied.
[32] Blacks Law Dictionary, 8th edition (2004), p.1406.
[33] Words and Phrases, volume 39, Permanent Edition, p. 106.
[34] In re Application for Marriage License for Nash, 2003-Ohio-7221 (No. 2002-T-0149, slip op., Not Reported in
N.E.2d, 2003 WL 23097095 (Ohio App. 11 Dist., December 31, 2003), citing Websters II New College Dictionary
(1999).
[35] Id.
[36] Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), 31 S.Ct. 502, 55 L.Ed. 619.
[37] Article 1, Family Code.
[38] Article 2(1), Id.
[39] These are Articles 130 to 138 of the Labor Code which include nightwork prohibition, facilities for women,
prohibition on discrimination and stipulation against marriage, among others.
[40] These include Article 333 on adultery, Articles 337 to 339 on qualified seduction, simple seduction and acts of
lasciviousness with the consent of the offended party and Articles 342 and 343 on forcible and consented abduction,
among others.
[41] Section 3(jj)(4).

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

- versus -

JENNIFER B. CAGANDAHAN,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 166676
Present:

QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

September 12, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising purely questions of law and seeking a
reversal of the Decision[1] dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 33 of Siniloan,
Laguna, which granted the Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate filed by Jennifer B. Cagandahan
and ordered the following changes of entries in Cagandahans birth certificate: (1) the name Jennifer Cagandahan
changed to Jeff Cagandahan and (2) gender from female to male.
The facts are as follows.
On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth
Certificate[2] before the RTC, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna.
In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate
of Live Birth but while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and
female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral hyperthropy in her early years and
at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual
development. She then alleged that for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has
become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be corrected such that her gender be changed from
female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.
The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in
conspicuous places by the sheriff of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.
To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of
Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate
stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He explained that genetically respondent is female but because
her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she has two sex organs female
and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack
of female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is
permanent and recommended the change of gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her
chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.
The RTC granted respondents petition in a Decision dated January 12, 2005 which reads:
The Court is convinced that petitioner has satisfactorily shown that he is entitled to the reliefs prayed [for].
Petitioner has adequately presented to the Court very clear and convincing proofs for the granting of his petition. It
was medically proven that petitioners body produces male hormones, and first his body as well as his action and
feelings are that of a male. He has chosen to be male. He is a normal person and wants to be acknowledged and
identified as a male.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Civil Register of Pakil, Laguna is hereby ordered to make the following
corrections in the birth [c]ertificate of Jennifer Cagandahan upon payment of the prescribed fees:
a) By changing the name from Jennifer Cagandahan to JEFF CAGANDAHAN; and
b) By changing the gender from female to MALE.
It is likewise ordered that petitioners school records, voters registry, baptismal certificate, and other pertinent
records are hereby amended to conform with the foregoing corrected data.
SO ORDERED.[3]
Thus, this petition by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) seeking a reversal of the abovementioned ruling.
The issues raised by petitioner are:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE PETITION CONSIDERING THAT:
I.
THE REQUIREMENTS OF RULES 103 AND 108 OF THE RULES OF COURT HAVE NOT BEEN COMPLIED
WITH; AND,
II.
CORRECTION OF ENTRY UNDER RULE 108 DOES NOT ALLOW CHANGE OF SEX OR GENDER IN THE
BIRTH CERTIFICATE, WHILE RESPONDENTS MEDICAL CONDITION, i.e., CONGENITAL ADRENAL
HYPERPLASIA DOES NOT MAKE HER A MALE.[4]
Simply stated, the issue is whether the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of
respondent to change her sex or gender, from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as
CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.
The OSG contends that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the
Rules of Court because while the local civil registrar is an indispensable party in a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries under Section 3, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court, respondents petition before the court a quo
did not implead the local civil registrar.[5] The OSG further contends respondents petition is fatally defective since
it failed to state that respondent is a bona fide resident of the province where the petition was filed for at least three
(3) years prior to the date of such filing as mandated under Section 2(b), Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[6] The
OSG argues that Rule 108 does not allow change of sex or gender in the birth certificate and respondents claimed
medical condition known as CAH does not make her a male.[7]
On the other hand, respondent counters that although the Local Civil Registrar of Pakil, Laguna was not formally
named a party in the Petition for Correction of Birth Certificate, nonetheless the Local Civil Registrar was furnished
a copy of the Petition, the Order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in the
course of the proceedings,[8] respondent is actually a male person and hence his birth certificate has to be corrected
to reflect his true sex/gender,[9] change of sex or gender is allowed under Rule 108,[10] and respondent
substantially complied with the requirements of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court.[11]
Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court provide:
Rule 103
CHANGE OF NAME
SECTION 1. Venue. A person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Regional Trial Court of
the province in which he resides, [or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court].
SEC. 2. Contents of petition. A petition for change of name shall be signed and verified by the person desiring his
name changed, or some other person on his behalf, and shall set forth:
(a) That the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3)
years prior to the date of such filing;
(b) The cause for which the change of the petitioner's name is sought;
(c) The name asked for.
SEC. 3. Order for hearing. If the petition filed is sufficient in form and substance, the court, by an order reciting the
purpose of the petition, shall fix a date and place for the hearing thereof, and shall direct that a copy of the order be
published before the hearing at least once a week for three (3) successive weeks in some newspaper of general
circulation published in the province, as the court shall deem best. The date set for the hearing shall not be within
thirty (30) days prior to an election nor within four (4) months after the last publication of the notice.
SEC. 4. Hearing. Any interested person may appear at the hearing and oppose the petition. The Solicitor General or
the proper provincial or city fiscal shall appear on behalf of the Government of the Republic.
SEC. 5. Judgment. Upon satisfactory proof in open court on the date fixed in the order that such order has been
published as directed and that the allegations of the petition are true, the court shall, if proper and reasonable cause
appears for changing the name of the petitioner, adjudge that such name be changed in accordance with the prayer
of the petition.
SEC. 6. Service of judgment. Judgments or orders rendered in connection with this rule shall be furnished the civil
registrar of the municipality or city where the court issuing the same is situated, who shall forthwith enter the same
in the civil register.
Rule 108
CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES
IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil
status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or
correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil
registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil
register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h)
adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship;
(l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes
of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place
for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition.
The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. The court in which the proceedings is brought may make orders expediting the
proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending such
proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order granting the cancellation or
correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar
concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.
The OSG argues that the petition below is fatally defective for non-compliance with Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules
of Court because respondents petition did not implead the local civil registrar. Section 3, Rule 108 provides that the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties
to the proceedings. Likewise, the local civil registrar is required to be made a party in a proceeding for the
correction of name in the civil registry. He is an indispensable party without whom no final determination of the
case can be had.[12] Unless all possible indispensable parties were duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall
be considered as falling much too short of the requirements of the rules.[13] The corresponding petition should also
implead as respondents the civil registrar and all other persons who may have or may claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby.[14] Respondent, however, invokes Section 6,[15] Rule 1 of the Rules of Court which
states that courts shall construe the Rules liberally to promote their objectives of securing to the parties a just,
speedy and inexpensive disposition of the matters brought before it. We agree that there is substantial compliance
with Rule 108 when respondent furnished a copy of the petition to the local civil registrar.
The determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue and the court must look to the
statutes. In this connection, Article 412 of the Civil Code provides:

ART. 412. No entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order.

Together with Article 376[16] of the Civil Code, this provision was amended by Republic Act No. 9048[17] in so
far as clerical or typographical errors are involved. The correction or change of such matters can now be made
through administrative proceedings and without the need for a judicial order. In effect, Rep. Act No. 9048 removed
from the ambit of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court the correction of such errors. Rule 108 now applies only to
substantial changes and corrections in entries in the civil register.[18]
Under Rep. Act No. 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or
typographical error. It is a substantial change for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
[19]
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are
those provided in Articles 407 and 408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil
register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10)
naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of
filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of name.
The acts, events or factual errors contemplated under Article 407 of the Civil Code include even those that occur
after birth.[20]
Respondent undisputedly has CAH. This condition causes the early or inappropriate appearance of male
characteristics. A person, like respondent, with this condition produces too much androgen, a male hormone. A
newborn who has XX chromosomes coupled with CAH usually has a (1) swollen clitoris with the urethral opening
at the base, an ambiguous genitalia often appearing more male than female; (2) normal internal structures of the
female reproductive tract such as the ovaries, uterus and fallopian tubes; as the child grows older, some features
start to appear male, such as deepening of the voice, facial hair, and failure to menstruate at puberty. About 1 in
10,000 to 18,000 children are born with CAH.
CAH is one of many conditions[21] that involve intersex anatomy. During the twentieth century, medicine adopted
the term intersexuality to apply to human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female.[22] The term is
now of widespread use. According to Wikipedia, intersexuality is the state of a living thing of a gonochoristic
species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are determined to be neither
exclusively male nor female. An organism with intersex may have biological characteristics of both male and
female sexes.
Intersex individuals are treated in different ways by different cultures. In most societies, intersex individuals have
been expected to conform to either a male or female gender role.[23] Since the rise of modern medical science in
Western societies, some intersex people with ambiguous external genitalia have had their genitalia surgically
modified to resemble either male or female genitals.[24] More commonly, an intersex individual is considered as
suffering from a disorder which is almost always recommended to be treated, whether by surgery and/or by taking
lifetime medication in order to mold the individual as neatly as possible into the category of either male or female.
In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as
variations which should not be subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground
between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are neither truly male nor truly female.[25] The
current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a female, but
this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.
In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth
certificate entry for gender. But if we determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing
the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the
subjects birth certificate entry is in order.
Biologically, nature endowed respondent with a mixed (neither consistently and categorically female nor
consistently and categorically male) composition. Respondent has female (XX) chromosomes. However,
respondents body system naturally produces high levels of male hormones (androgen). As a result, respondent has
ambiguous genitalia and the phenotypic features of a male.
Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in
his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with
good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as a male and considering that his body
produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him as
being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive.
It is at maturity that the gender of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.
Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with
what he was born with. And accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have
undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong medication,[26] to force his body into the categorical
mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in respondents
development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately
private as ones sexuality and lifestyle preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to
reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not choosing to
undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to undergo
treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this
gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the
human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what
courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that
respondent is an incompetent[27] and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will
harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and
justified the respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.
In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with
what nature has handed out. In other words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to
be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot but respect how respondent deals with his
unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.
As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of
right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will
follow.[28] The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a
feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the
change of the entry in his birth certificate from female to male.
WHEREFORE, the Republics petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 12, 2005 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna, is AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

AT T E S T AT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Rollo, pp. 29-32. Penned by Judge Florenio P. Bueser.

[2] Id. at 33-37.
[3] Id. at 31-32.
[4] Id. at 97.
[5] Id. at 99.
[6] Id. at 103.
[7] Id. at 104.
[8] Id. at 136.
[9] Id. at 127.
[10] Id. at 134.
[11] Id. at 136.
G.R. No. 103695, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA 99, 106.
[12] Republic v. Court of Appeals,

[13] Ceruila v. Delantar, G.R. No. 140305, December 9, 2005, 477 SCRA 134, 147.

[14] Republic v. Benemerito, G.R. No. 146963, March 15, 2004, 425 SCRA 488, 492.
[15] SEC. 6. Construction.- These Rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote their objective of securing
a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding.
[16] Art. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
[17] AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE CITY OR MUNICIPAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OR THE CONSUL GENERAL
TO CORRECT A CLERICAL OR TYPOGRAPHICAL ERROR IN AN ENTRY AND/OR CHANGE OF FIRST
NAME OR NICKNAME IN THE CIVIL REGISTRAR WITHOUT NEED OF A JUDICIAL ORDER,
AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE ARTICLES 376 AND 412 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES.
APPROVED, MARCH 22, 2001.
[18] Silverio v. Republic of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174689, October 19, 2007, 537 SCRA 373, 388.
[19] Id. at 389.
[20] Id. at 389.
[21] (1) 5-alpha reductase deficiency; (2) androgen insensitivity syndrome; (3) aphallia; (4) clitoromegaly; (5)
congenital adrenal hyperplasia; (6) gonadal dysgenesis (partial & complete); (7) hypospadias; (8) Kallmann
syndrome; (9) Klinefelter syndrome; (10) micropenis; (11) mosaicism involving sex chromosomes; (12) MRKH
(mullerian agenesis; vaginal agenesis; congenital absence of vagina); (13) ovo-testes (formerly called true
hermaphroditism); (14) partial androgen insensitivity syndrome; (15) progestin induced virilization; (16) Swyer
syndrome; (17) Turner syndrome. [Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15,
2008).]
[22] Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).
[23] Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008), citing Gagnon and Simon
1973.
[24] Intersexuality <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intersexual> (visited August 15, 2008).
[25] M.T. v. J.T. 140 N.J. Super 77 355 A. 2d 204.
[26] The goal of treatment is to return hormone levels to normal. This is done by taking a form of cortisol
(dexamethasone), fludrocortisone, or hydrocortisone) every day. Additional doses of medicine are needed during
times of stress, such as severe illness or surgery.
xxxx
Parents of children with congenital adrenal hyperplasia should be aware of the side effects of steroid therapy. They
should report signs of infection and stress to their health care provider because increases in medication may be
required. In additional, steroid medications cannot be stopped suddenly, or adrenal insufficiency will result.
xxxx
The outcome is usually associated with good health, but short stature may result even with treatment. Males have
normal fertility. Females may have a smaller opening of the vagina and lower fertility. Medication to treat this
disorder must be continued for life. (Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia
<http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/encyclopedia.html>.)
[27] The word incompetent includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are of unsound mind, even though
they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and
other similar causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their property, becoming
thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation. (See Sec. 2 of Rule 92 of the Rules of Court)
[28] Yu v. Republic of the Philippines, 123 Phil. 1106, 1110 (1966).

Today is Saturday, September 03, 2016

search

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 198780 October 16, 2013

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules t of Court assailing the September 29, 2011
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 95414, which affirmed the April 25, 2008Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court, Imus, Cavite (RTC). declaring the marriage of Daniel Lee Fringer (Fringer) and
respondent Liberty Albios (A/bios) as void from the beginning.

The facts

On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge Ofelia I. Calo of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC), as evidenced by a Certificate of Marriage with
Register No. 2004-1588.3

On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity 4 of her marriage with Fringer.
She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived as husband and wife because they
never really had any intention of entering into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital
obligations. She described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio .

Summons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007, Albios filed a motion to set
case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief. The RTC ordered the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to conduct an
investigation and determine the existence of a collusion. On October 2, 2007, the Assistant Prosecutor complied and
reported that she could not make a determination for failure of both parties to appear at the scheduled investigation.

At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared. Fringer did not attend the hearing despite
being duly notified of the schedule. After the pre-trial, hearing on the merits ensued.

Ruling of the RTC

In its April 25, 2008 Decision,5 the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio, the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage of Liberty Albios and
Daniel Lee Fringer as void from the very beginning. As a necessary consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner
shall cease using the surname of respondent as she never acquired any right over it and so as to avoid a
misimpression that she remains the wife of respondent.

xxxx
SO ORDERED.6

The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only. Giving credence to the
testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter into a marriage to enable her to acquire American
citizenship; that in consideration thereof, she agreed to pay him the sum of $2,000.00; that after the ceremony, the
parties went their separate ways; that Fringer returned to the United States and never again communicated with her;
and that, in turn, she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because he never processed her petition for citizenship. The
RTC, thus, ruled that when marriage was entered into for a purpose other than the establishment of a conjugal and
family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its inception.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a motion for
reconsideration. The RTC issued the Order, 7 dated February 5, 2009, denying the motion for want of merit. It
explained that the marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage
as they had no intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00.

Not in conformity, the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.

Ruling of the CA

In its assailed decision, dated September 29, 2011, the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential
requisite of consent was lacking. The CA stated that the parties clearly did not understand the nature and
consequence of getting married and that their case was similar to a marriage in jest. It further explained that the
parties never intended to enter into the marriage contract and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a
family. It concluded that their purpose was primarily for personal gain, that is, for Albios to obtain foreign
citizenship, and for Fringer, the consideration of $2,000.00.

Hence, this petition.

Assignment of Error

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAWWHEN IT HELD THAT A MARRIAGE

CONTRACTED FOR THEPURPOSE OF OBTAINING FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP WAS DONEIN JEST, HENCE,
LACKING IN THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OFCONSENT.8

The OSG argues that albeit the intention was for Albios to acquire American citizenship and for Fringer to be paid
$2,000.00, both parties freely gave their consent to the marriage, as they knowingly and willingly entered into that
marriage and knew the benefits and consequences of being bound by it. According to the OSG, consent should be
distinguished from motive, the latter being inconsequential to the validity of marriage.
The OSG also argues that the present case does not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest. The parties here
intentionally consented to enter into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to
acquire American citizenship would be rendered futile.

On October 29, 2012, Albios filed her Comment9 to the petition, reiterating her stand that her marriage was similar
to a marriage by way of jest and, therefore, void from the beginning.

On March 22, 2013, the OSG filed its Reply10 reiterating its arguments in its petition for review on certiorari.

Ruling of the Court

The resolution of this case hinges on this sole question of law: Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of
acquiring American citizenship in consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?

The Court resolves in the negative.

Before the Court delves into its ruling, It shall first examine the phenomenon of marriage fraud for the purposes of
immigration.

Marriage Fraud in Immigration

The institution of marriage carries with it concomitant benefits. This has led to the development of marriage fraud
for the sole purpose of availing of particular benefits. In the United States, marriages where a couple marries only
to achieve a particular purpose or acquire specific benefits, have been referred to as "limited purpose" marriages.11
A common limited purpose marriage is one entered into solely for the legitimization of a child.12 Another, which is
the subject of the present case, is for immigration purposes. Immigration law is usually concerned with the intention
of the couple at the time of their marriage,13 and it attempts to filter out those who use marriage solely to achieve
immigration status.14

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,15 established the principal test for
determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married. "This standard was modified with the
passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to instead
demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for the purpose of evading the immigration laws of the United
States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the intention to establish a life together, to determining the
intention of evading immigration laws.16 It must be noted, however, that this standard is used purely for
immigration purposes and, therefore, does not purport to rule on the legal validity or existence of a marriage.

The question that then arises is whether a marriage declared as a sham or fraudulent for the limited purpose of
immigration is also legally void and in existent. The early cases on limited purpose marriages in the United States
made no definitive ruling. In 1946, the notable case of
United States v. Rubenstein17 was promulgated, wherein in order to allow an alien to stay in the country, the parties
had agreed to marry but not to live together and to obtain a divorce within six months. The Court, through Judge
Learned Hand, ruled that a marriage to convert temporary into permanent permission to stay in the country was not
a marriage, there being no consent, to wit:

x x x But, that aside, Spitz and Sandler were never married at all. Mutual consent is necessary to every contract; and
no matter what forms or ceremonies the parties may go through indicating the contrary, they do not contract if they
do not in fact assent, which may always be proved. x x x Marriage is no exception to this rule: a marriage in jest is
not a marriage at all. x x x It is quite true that a marriage without subsequent consummation will be valid; but if the
spouses agree to a marriage only for the sake of representing it as such to the outside world and with the
understanding that they will put an end to it as soon as it has served its purpose to deceive, they have never really
agreed to be married at all. They must assent to enter into the relation as it is ordinarily understood, and it is not
ordinarily understood as merely a pretence, or cover, to deceive others.18

(Italics supplied)

On the other end of the spectrum is the 1969 case of Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines,19 which declared as valid a
marriage entered into solely for the husband to gain entry to the United States, stating that a valid marriage could
not be avoided "merely because the marriage was entered into for a limited purpose."20 The 1980 immigration case
of Matter of McKee,21 further recognized that a fraudulent or sham marriage was intrinsically different from a non
subsisting one.

Nullifying these limited purpose marriages for lack of consent has, therefore, been recognized as problematic. The
problem being that in order to obtain an immigration benefit, a legal marriage is first necessary.22 At present,
United States courts have generally denied annulments involving" limited purpose" marriages where a couple
married only to achieve a particular purpose, and have upheld such marriages as valid.23

The Court now turns to the case at hand.

Respondents marriage not void

In declaring the respondents marriage void, the RTC ruled that when a marriage was entered into for a purpose
other than the establishment of a conjugal and family life, such was a farce and should not be recognized from its
inception. In its resolution denying the OSGs motion for reconsideration, the RTC went on to explain that the
marriage was declared void because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no
intention to be legally bound by it and used it only as a means for the respondent to acquire American citizenship.
Agreeing with the RTC, the CA ruled that the essential requisite of consent was lacking. It held that the parties
clearly did not understand the nature and consequence of getting married. As in the Rubenstein case, the CA found
the marriage to be similar to a marriage in jest considering that the parties only entered into the marriage for the
acquisition of American citizenship in exchange of $2,000.00. They never intended to enter into a marriage contract
and never intended to live as husband and wife or build a family.

The CAs assailed decision was, therefore, grounded on the parties supposed lack of consent. Under Article 2 of the
Family Code, consent is an essential requisite of marriage. Article 4 of the same Code provides that the absence of
any essential requisite shall render a marriage void ab initio.

Under said Article 2, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the presence of a
solemnizing officer. A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter
into the marriage. Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices
of consent under Articles45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue influence.24
Consent must also be conscious or intelligent, in that the parties must be capable of intelligently understanding the
nature of, and both the beneficial or unfavorable consequences of their act.25 Their understanding should not be
affected by insanity, intoxication, drugs, or hypnotism.26

Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there was real consent because it
was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent. Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as
they understood the nature and the beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired
their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring
American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the legal tie that
would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

In ruling that Albios marriage was void for lack of consent, the CA characterized such as akin to a marriage by way
of jest. A marriage in jest is a pretended marriage, legal in form but entered into as a joke, with no real intention of
entering into the actual marriage status, and with a clear understanding that the parties would not be bound. The
ceremony is not followed by any conduct indicating a purpose to enter into such a relation.27 It is a pretended
marriage not intended to be real and with no intention to create any legal ties whatsoever, hence, the absence of any
genuine consent. Marriages in jest are void ab initio, not for vitiated, defective, or unintelligent consent, but for a
complete absence of consent. There is no genuine consent because the parties have absolutely no intention of being
bound in any way or for any purpose.

The respondents marriage is not at all analogous to a marriage in jest.1wphi1 Albios and Fringer had an
undeniable intention to be bound in order to create the very bond necessary to allow the respondent to acquire
American citizenship. Only a genuine consent to be married would allow them to further their objective,
considering that only a valid marriage can properly support an application for citizenship. There was, thus, an
apparent intention to enter into the actual marriage status and to create a legal tie, albeit for a limited purpose.
Genuine consent was, therefore, clearly present.
The avowed purpose of marriage under Article 1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a conjugal and
family life. The possibility that the parties in a marriage might have no real intention to establish a life together is,
however, insufficient to nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance with law. The same Article 1 provides
that the nature, consequences, and incidents of marriage are governed by law and not subject to stipulation. A
marriage may, thus, only be declared void or voidable under the grounds provided by law. There is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for purposes other than what the Constitution or law declares, such as
the acquisition of foreign citizenship. Therefore, so long as all the essential and formal requisites prescribed by law
are present, and it is not void or voidable under the grounds provided by law, it shall be declared valid.28

Motives for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictate on the kind of
life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions.29 The right to marital privacy allows married couples to
structure their marriages in almost any way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or no
children, to love one another or not, and so on.30 Thus, marriages entered into for other purposes, limited or
otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and title, provided that they comply with all the
legal requisites,31 are equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only
valid cause for marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.

Although the Court views with disdain the respondents attempt to utilize marriage for dishonest purposes, It cannot
declare the marriage void. Hence, though the respondents marriage may be considered a sham or fraudulent for the
purposes of immigration, it is not void ab initio and continues to be valid and subsisting.

Neither can their marriage be considered voidable on the ground of fraud under Article 45 (3) of the Family Code.
Only the circumstances listed under Article 46 of the same Code may constitute fraud, namely, (1) non- disclosure
of a previous conv1ctwn involving moral turpitude; (2) concealment by the wife of a pregnancy by another man; (3)
concealment of a sexually transmitted disease; and (4) concealment of drug addiction, alcoholism, or
homosexuality. No other misrepresentation or deceit shall constitute fraud as a ground for an action to annul a
marriage. Entering into a marriage for the sole purpose of evading immigration laws does not qualify under any of
the listed circumstances. Furthermore, under Article 47 (3), the ground of fraud may only be brought by the injured
or innocent party. In the present case, there is no injured party because Albios and Fringer both conspired to enter
into the sham marriage.

Albios has indeed made a mockery of the sacred institution of marriage. Allowing her marriage with Fringer to be
declared void would only further trivialize this inviolable institution. The Court cannot declare such a marriage void
in the event the parties fail to qualify for immigration benefits, after they have availed of its benefits, or simply have
no further use for it. These unscrupulous individuals cannot be allowed to use the courts as instruments in their
fraudulent schemes. Albios already misused a judicial institution to enter into a marriage of convenience; she
should not be allowed to again abuse it to get herself out of an inconvenient situation.

No less than our Constitution declares that marriage, as an in violable social institution, is the foundation of the
family and shall be protected by the State.32 It must, therefore, be safeguarded from the whims and caprices of the
contracting parties. This Court cannot leave the impression that marriage may easily be entered into when it suits
the needs of the parties, and just as easily nullified when no longer needed.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The September 29, 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CV No. 95414 is ANNULLED, and Civil Case No. 1134-06 is DISMISSED for utter lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO*

Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION**
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

AT T E S T AT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITER J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Footnotes

* Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen per Special Order No.
1570 dated October 14. 2013.

** Designated Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad. Per Special Order No. 1554dated
September 19, 2013.

1 Rollo. pp. 26-32; penned by Associate Justice Juan Q. Enriquez. Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justice Ramon
M. Bato. Jr. and Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino of the Fifth Division. Manila.

2 Id. at 38-39.

3 Id. at 37.

4 Id. at 33-35.

5 Id. at 38-39.

6 Id. at 39.

7 Id. at 48-49.

8 Id. at 13.

9 Id. at 61-71.

10 Id. at 89-95.

11 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract_id=2000956. Lutwak v. United States , 344 U.S. 604, 612-613 (U.S. 1953).

12 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract_id=2000956; citing Schibi v. Schibi , 69 A.2d 831 (Conn. 1949) (denying annulment where parties married
only to give a name to a prospective child); Bishop v. Bishop , 308 N.Y.S.2d 998 (Sup. Ct. 1970); Erickson v.
Erickson , 48 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1944) (holding similarly to Schibi ); Delfino v.Delfino , 35 N.Y.S.2d 693
(Sup. Ct. 1942) (denying annulment where purpose of marriage was to protect the girls name and there was an
understanding that the parties would not live together as man and wife); Bove v. Pinciotti , 46 Pa. D. & C. 159
(1942); Campbell v. Moore , 189 S.E.2d 497 (S.C.1939) (refusing an annulment where parties entered marriage for
the purpose of legitimizing a child); Chander v. Chander , No.2937-98-4, 1999 WL 1129721 (Va. Ct. App. June 22,
1999) (denying annulment where wife married husband to get his pension with no intention to consummate
marriage because husband knew that was the purpose of the marriage).

13 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing Immigration
and Nationality Act (INA), 237(a)(1)(G), 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(G) (2000).

14 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage ; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing 132
CONG.REC. 27,012, 27,015 (1986) (statement of Rep Mc Collum) (promoting the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986).

15 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

16 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf.

17 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

18 United States v. Rubenstein , 151 F.2d 915 (2d Cir. 1945).

19 Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd , 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971).

20 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud . 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract_id=2000956; citing Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd. , 323 F. Supp. 865 (S.D. Tex. 1969), affd, 440F.2d
1163 (5th Cir. 1971).

21 Matter of McKee, 17 I. & N. Dec. 332, 333 (B.I.A. 1980).

22 Lynn D. Wardle and Laurence C. Nolan, Family Law in the USA, (The Netherlands: Kluwer Law International,
2011) p. 86.

23 Abrams, Kerry. Marriage Fraud. 100 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (2012);http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?

abstract_id=2000956.

24 Alicia V. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, (Quezon City, Philippines: Joer Printing
Services, 2005), p. 4.

25 Melencio S. Sta. Maria, Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, (Quezon City, Philippines: Rex Printing
Company, Inc., 2010), Fifth Edition, p. 121.
26 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, (Manila,
Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231.

27 Arturo M. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, (Manila,
Philippines: Central Book Supply, Inc., 2004), Volume I, p. 231; citing McClurg v. Terry, 21 N.J. 225.

28 Article 4, Family Code.

29 Bark v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201 (9th Cir. 1975).

30 Abrams, Kerry. Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage; 91 Minn. L. Rev. 1625
(2007);http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Abrams_Final.pdf; citing McGuire v.
McGuire , 59 N.W.2d 336, 337 (Neb. 1953). Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 48586 (1965).

31 Article 4, Family Code.

32 Const. ( 1987), Article XV, Section 2.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1211. January 28, 2000]

ZENAIDA S. BESO, complainant, vs. Judge JUAN DAGUMAN, MCTC, Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan,
Samar, respondent. ALEX

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In this administrative complaint, respondent Judge stands charged with Neglect of Duty and Abuse of Authority. In
a Complaint-Affidavit dated December 12, 1997, Zenaida S. Beso charged Judge Juan J. Daguman, Jr. with
solemnizing marriage outside of his jurisdiction and of negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering the
marriage contract with the office of the Local Civil Registrar alleging

"a. That on August 28, 1997, I and my fiancee (sic) BERNARDITO A. YMAN got married and our marriage was
solemnized by judge (sic) Juan Daguman in his residence in J.P.R. Subdivision in Calbayog City, Samar; xxxalex
b. That the ceremony was attended by PACIFICO MAGHACOT who acted as our principal sponsor and spouses
RAMON DEAN and TERESITA DEAN; xxx

c. That after our wedding, my husband BERNARDITO YMAN abandoned me without any reason at all;

d. That I smell something fishy; so what I did was I went to Calbayog City and wrote the City Civil Registrar to
inquire regarding my Marriage Contract;

e. That to my surprise, I was informed by the Local Civil Registrar of Calbayog City that my marriage was not
registered; xxxSc lex

f. That upon advisement of the Local Civil Registrar, I wrote Judge Juan Daguman, to inquire;

g. That to my second surprise, I was informed by Judge Daguman that all the copies of the Marriage Contract were
taken by Oloy (Bernardito A. Yman);

h. That no copy was retained by Judge Daguman;

i. That I believe that the respondent judge committed acts prejudicial to my interest such as: x law

1. Solemnizing our marriage outside his jurisdiction;

2. Negligence in not retaining a copy and not registering our marriage before the office of the Local Civil
Registrar."

The Affidavit-Complaint was thereafter referred to respondent Judge for comment.

In his Comment, respondent Judge averred that:

1. The civil marriage of complainant Zenaida Beso and Bernardito Yman had to be solemnized by respondent in
Calbayog City though outside his territory as municipal Judge of Sta. Margarita, Samar due to the following and
pressing circumstances: Sc

1.1. On August 28, 1997 respondent was physically indisposed and unable to report to his station in Sta. Margarita.
In the forenoon of that date, without prior appointment, complainant Beso and Mr. Yman unexpectedly came to the
residence of respondent in said City, urgently requesting the celebration of their marriage right then and there, first,
because complainants said she must leave that same day to be able to fly from Manila for abroad as scheduled;
second, that for the parties to go to another town for the marriage would be expensive and would entail serious
problems of finding a solemnizing officer and another pair of witnesses or sponsors, while in fact former
Undersecretary Pacifico Maghacot, Sangguniang Panglunsod [member] Ramon Dean were already with them as
sponsors; third, if they failed to get married on August 28, 1997, complainant would be out of the country for a long
period and their marriage license would lapse and necessitate another publication of notice; fourth, if the parties go
beyond their plans for the scheduled marriage, complainant feared it would complicate her employment abroad;
and, last, all other alternatives as to date and venue of marriage were considered impracticable by the parties;

1.2. The contracting parties were ready with the desired cocuments (sic) for a valid marriage, which respondent
found all in order. Spped

1.3. Complainant bride is an accredited Filipino overseas worker, who, respondent realized, deserved more than
ordinary official attention under present Government policy.

2. At the time respondent solemnized the marriage in question, he believed in good faith that by so doing he was
leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may be not be too expensive and complicated for citizens to get
married.

3. Another point brought up in the complaint was the failure of registration of the duplicate and triplicate copies of
the marriage certificate, which failure was also occasioned by the following circumstances beyond the control of
respondent: Scmis

3.1. After handing to the husband the first copy of the marriage certificate, respondent left the three remaining
copies on top of the desk in his private office where the marriage ceremonies were held, intending later to register
the duplicate and triplicate copies and to keep the forth (sic) in his office.

3.2. After a few days following the wedding, respondent gathered all the papers relating to the said marriage but
notwithstanding diligent search in the premises and private files, all the three last copies of the certificate were
missing. Promptly, respondent invited by subpoena xxx Mr. Yman to shed light on the missing documents and he
said he saw complainant Beso put the copies of the marriage certificate in her bag during the wedding party.
Unfortunately, it was too late to contact complainant for a confirmation of Mr. Ymans claim. Mis sc

3.3. Considering the futility of contracting complainant now that she is out of the country, a reasonable conclusion
can be drawn on the basis of the established facts so far in this dispute. If we believe the claim of complainant that
after August 28, 1997 marriage her husband, Mr. Yman, abandoned her without any reason xxx but that said
husband admitted "he had another girl by the name of LITA DANGUYAN" xxx it seems reasonably clear who of
the two marriage contracting parties probably absconded with the missing copies of the marriage certificate. Jo
spped

3.4. Under the facts above stated, respondent has no other recourse but to protect the public interest by trying all
possible means to recover custody of the missing documents in some amicable way during the expected hearing of
the above mentioned civil case in the City of Marikina, failing to do which said respondent would confer with the
Civil Registrar General for possible registration of reconstituted copies of said documents.
The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) in an evaluation report dated August 11, 1998 found that respondent
Judge " committed non-feasance in office" and recommended that he be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
with a warning that the commission of the same or future acts will be dealt with more severely pointing out that:

"As presiding judge of the MCTC Sta. Margarita Tarangnan-Pagsanjan, Samar, the authority to solemnize marriage
is only limited to those municipalities under his jurisdiction. Clearly, Calbayog City is no longer within his area of
jurisdiction. Miso

Additionally, there are only three instances, as provided by Article 8 of the Family Code, wherein a marriage may
be solemnized by a judge outside his chamber[s] or at a place other than his sala, to wit:

(1) when either or both of the contracting parties is at the point of death;

(2) when the residence of either party is located in a remote place; Nex old

(3) where both of the parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage may be
solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect.

The foregoing circumstances are unavailing in the instant case.

Moreover, as solemnizing officer, respondent Judge neglected his duty when he failed to register the marriage of
complainant to Bernardito Yman.

Such duty is entrusted upon him pursuant to Article 23 of the Family Code which provides: Ncm

"It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties the original
of the marriage certificate referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the certificates
not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage was
solemnized. xxx" (underscoring ours)

It is clearly evident from the foregoing that not only has the respondent Judge committed non-feasance in office, he
also undermined the very foundation of marriage which is the basic social institution in our society whose nature,
consequences and incidents are governed by law. Granting that respondent Judge indeed failed to locate the
duplicate and triplicate copies of the marriage certificate, he should have exerted more effort to locate or
reconstitute the same. As a holder of such a sensitive position, he is expected to be conscientious in handling
official documents. His imputation that the missing copies of the marriage certificate were taken by Bernardito
Yman is based merely on conjectures and does not deserve consideration for being devoid of proof."

After a careful and thorough examination of the evidence, the Court finds the evaluation report of the OCA well-
taken. Mani kx
Jimenez v. Republic[1] underscores the importance of marriage as a social institution thus: "[M]arriage in this
country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested. The state has surrounded it with safeguards to
maintain its purity, continuity and permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it.
It is the interest and duty of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing about of a condition
that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its destruction."

With regard to the solemnization of marriage, Article 7 of the Family Code provides, among others, that

"ART. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by: Maniks

(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts jurisdiction; xxx" (Italics ours)

In relation thereto, Article 8 of the same statute mandates that:

ART. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers of the judge or in open court, in the church,
chapel or temple, or in the office of the consul-general, consul or vice-consul, as the case may be, and not
elsewhere, except in cases of marriages contracted at the point of death or in remote places in accordance with
Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the solemnizing officer in writing in which case the marriage
may be solemnized at a house or place designated by them in a sworn statement to that effect." (Italics ours) Spped
jo

As the above-quoted provision clearly states, a marriage can be held outside the judges chambers or courtroom only
in the following instances: 1.] at the point of death; 2.] in remote places in accordance with Article 29, or 3.] upon
the request of both parties in writing in a sworn statement to this effect.

In this case, there is no pretense that either complainant Beso or her fiance Yman was at the point of death or in a
remote place. Neither was there a sworn written request made by the contracting parties to respondent Judge that
the marriage be solemnized outside his chambers or at a place other than his sala. What, in fact, appears on record is
that respondent Judge was prompted more by urgency to solemnize the marriage of Beso and Yman because
complainant was "[a]n overseas worker, who, respondent realized deserved more than ordinary official attention
under present Government policy." Respondent Judge further avers that in solemnizing the marriage in question,
"[h]e believed in good faith that by doing so he was leaning on the side of liberality of the law so that it may not be
too expensive and complicated for citizens to get married." Manikan

A person presiding over a court of law must not only apply the law but must also live and abide by it and render
justice at all times without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for.[2] A judge is not only bound by oath to apply
the law;[3] he must also be conscientious and thorough in doing so.[4] Certainly, judges, by the very delicate nature
of their office should be more circumspect in the performance of their duties.[5]

If at all, the reasons proffered by respondent Judge to justify his hurried solemnization of the marriage in this case
only tends to degrade the revered position enjoyed by marriage in the hierarchy of social institutions in the country.
They also betray respondents cavalier proclivity on its significance in our culture which is more disposed towards
an extended period of engagement prior to marriage and frowns upon hasty, ill-advised and ill-timed marital
unions.Ncmmis

An elementary regard for the sacredness of laws let alone that enacted in order to preserve so sacrosanct an
inviolable social institution as marriage and the stability of judicial doctrines laid down by superior authority should
have given respondent judge pause and made him more vigilant in the exercise of his authority and the performance
of his duties as a solemnizing officer. A judge is, furthermore, presumed to know the constitutional limits of the
authority or jurisdiction of his court.[6] Thus respondent Judge should be reminded that

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only within
the area of the diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, Judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[7] Scnc m

Considering that respondent Judges jurisdiction covers the municipality of Sta. Margarita-Tarangan-Pagsanjan,
Samar only, he was not clothed with authority to solemnize a marriage in the City of Calbayog.[8]

Furthermore, from the nature of marriage, aside from the mandate that a judge should exercise extra care in the
exercise of his authority and the performance of his duties in its solemnization, he is likewise commanded to
observe extra precautions to ensure that the event is properly documented in accordance with Article 23 of the
Family Code which states in no uncertain terms that

ART. 23. - It shall be the duty of the person solemnizing the marriage to furnish either of the contracting parties, the
original of the marriage contract referred to in Article 6 and to send the duplicate and triplicate copies of the
certificate not later than fifteen days after the marriage, to the local civil registrar of the place where the marriage
was solemnized. Proper receipts shall be issued by the local civil registrar to the solemnizing officer transmitting
copies of the marriage certificate. The solemnizing officer shall retain in his file the quadruplicate copy of the
marriage certificate, the original of the marriage license and, in proper cases, the affidavit of the contracting party
regarding the solemnization of the marriage in a place other than those mentioned in Article 8. (Italics supplied)
Sdaad

In view of the foregoing, we agree with the evaluation of the OCA that respondent Judge was less than
conscientious in handling official documents. A judge is charged with exercising extra care in ensuring that the
records of the cases and official documents in his custody are intact. There is no justification for missing records
save fortuitous events.[9] However, the records show that the loss was occasioned by carelessness on respondent
Judges part. This Court reiterates that judges must adopt a system of record management and organize their dockets
in order to bolster the prompt and efficient dispatch of business.[10] It is, in fact, incumbent upon him to devise an
efficient recording and filing system in his court because he is after all the one directly responsible for the proper
discharge of his official functions.[11]

In the evaluation report, the OCA recommended that respondent Judge be fined Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
and warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. This Court adopts the
recommendation of the OCA. Juris

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00)
and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar infractions will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED. Mi sedp

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

[1] 109 Phil. 273 [1960].

[2] Ortiz v. Palaypon, 234 SCRA 391 [1994].
[3] Caram Resources Corp. v. Contreras, 237 SCRA 724 [1994].
[4] Benjamin, Sr. v. Alaba, 261 SCRA 429 [1996].
[5] Galvez v. Eduardo, 252 SCRA 570 [1996].
[6] Guieb v. Fontanilla, 247 SCRA 348 [1995].
[7] Navarro v. Domagtoy, 259 SCRA 129 [1996], citing Art. 4 Family Code; italics supplied.
[8] See Sempio-Diy A.V. Handbook On The Family Code Of The Philippines, 1988 ed., p. 70.
[9] Sabitsana v. Villamor, 202 SCRA 435 [1991], citing Longboan v. Polig, 186 SCRA 567 [1990].
[10] Bernardo v. Judge Amelia A. Fabros, AM No. MTJ-99-1189, 12 May 1999.
[11] OCA v. Judge Francisco D. Villanueva, 279 SCRA 267 [1997], citing Agcaoili v. Ramos, 229 SCRA 705
[1994]; see also OCA v. RTC Judge Amelita DK Benedicto, 296 SCRA 62 [1998]; Mamamayan ng Zapote I,
Bacoor, Cavite v. Balderian, 265 SCRA 360 [1996]; Celino v. Abrogar, 245 SCRA 304 [1995].

FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1390. April 11, 2002]

MERCEDITA MATA ARAES, petitioner, vs. JUDGE SALVADOR M. OCCIANO, respondent.

DECISION
PUNO, J.:

Petitioner Mercedita Mata Araes charges respondent judge with Gross Ignorance of the Law via a sworn Letter-
Complaint dated 23 May 2001. Respondent is the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur. Petitioner alleges that on 17 February 2000, respondent judge solemnized her marriage to her late
groom Dominador B. Orobia without the requisite marriage license and at Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside
his territorial jurisdiction.

They lived together as husband and wife on the strength of this marriage until her husband passed away. However,
since the marriage was a nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast properties left by Orobia was not recognized.
She was likewise deprived of receiving the pensions of Orobia, a retired Commodore of the Philippine Navy.

Petitioner prays that sanctions be imposed against respondent judge for his illegal acts and unethical
misrepresentations which allegedly caused her so much hardships, embarrassment and sufferings.

On 28 May 2001, the case was referred by the Office of the Chief Justice to then Acting Court Administrator
Zenaida N. Elepao for appropriate action. On 8 June 2001, the Office of the Court Administrator required
respondent judge to comment.

In his Comment dated 5 July 2001, respondent judge averred that he was requested by a certain Juan Arroyo on 15
February 2000 to solemnize the marriage of the parties on 17 February 2000. Having been assured that all the
documents to the marriage were complete, he agreed to solemnize the marriage in his sala at the Municipal Trial
Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, on 17 February 2000, Arroyo informed him that Orobia had a difficulty
walking and could not stand the rigors of travelling to Balatan which is located almost 25 kilometers from his
residence in Nabua. Arroyo then requested if respondent judge could solemnize the marriage in Nabua, to which
request he acceded.

Respondent judge further avers that before he started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents submitted
to him by petitioner. When he discovered that the parties did not possess the requisite marriage license, he refused
to solemnize the marriage and suggested its resetting to another date. However, due to the earnest pleas of the
parties, the influx of visitors, and the delivery of provisions for the occasion, he proceeded to solemnize the
marriage out of human compassion. He also feared that if he reset the wedding, it might aggravate the physical
condition of Orobia who just suffered from a stroke. After the solemnization, he reiterated the necessity for the
marriage license and admonished the parties that their failure to give it would render the marriage void. Petitioner
and Orobia assured respondent judge that they would give the license to him in the afternoon of that same day.
When they failed to comply, respondent judge followed it up with Arroyo but the latter only gave him the same
reassurance that the marriage license would be delivered to his sala at the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur.

Respondent judge vigorously denies that he told the contracting parties that their marriage is valid despite the
absence of a marriage license. He attributes the hardships and embarrassment suffered by the petitioner as due to
her own fault and negligence.

On 12 September 2001, petitioner filed her Affidavit of Desistance dated 28 August 2001 with the Office of the
Court Administrator. She attested that respondent judge initially refused to solemnize her marriage due to the want
of a duly issued marriage license and that it was because of her prodding and reassurances that he eventually
solemnized the same. She confessed that she filed this administrative case out of rage. However, after reading the
Comment filed by respondent judge, she realized her own shortcomings and is now bothered by her conscience.

Reviewing the records of the case, it appears that petitioner and Orobia filed their Application for Marriage License
on 5 January 2000. It was stamped in this Application that the marriage license shall be issued on 17 January 2000.
However, neither petitioner nor Orobia claimed it.

It also appears that the Office of the Civil Registrar General issued a Certification that it has no record of such
marriage that allegedly took place on 17 February 2000. Likewise, the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua,
Camarines Sur issued another Certification dated 7 May 2001 that it cannot issue a true copy of the Marriage
Contract of the parties since it has no record of their marriage.

On 8 May 2001, petitioner sought the assistance of respondent judge so the latter could communicate with the
Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur for the issuance of her marriage license. Respondent
judge wrote the Local Civil Registrar of Nabua, Camarines Sur. In a letter dated 9 May 2001, a Clerk of said office,
Grace T. Escobal, informed respondent judge that their office cannot issue the marriage license due to the failure of
Orobia to submit the Death Certificate of his previous spouse.

The Office of the Court Administrator, in its Report and Recommendation dated 15 November 2000, found the
respondent judge guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and for doing so outside
his territorial jurisdiction. A fine of P5,000.00 was recommended to be imposed on respondent judge.

We agree.

Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, or B.P.129, the authority of the regional trial court judges and
judges of inferior courts to solemnize marriages is confined to their territorial jurisdiction as defined by the
Supreme Court.

The case at bar is not without precedent. In Navarro vs. Domagtoy,[1] respondent judge held office and had
jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao del Norte. However, he solemnized
a wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte which did not fall within the
jurisdictional area of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos. We held that:

A priest who is commissioned and allowed by his local ordinance to marry the faithful is authorized to do so only
within the area or diocese or place allowed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless of the venue, as long as the requisites of
the law are complied with. However, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in weddings
only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his courts jurisdiction, there is
a resultant irregularity in the formal requisite laid down in Article 3, which while it may not affect the validity of
the marriage, may subject the officiating official to administrative liability.[2] (Emphasis supplied.)
In said case, we suspended respondent judge for six (6) months on the ground that his act of solemnizing a marriage
outside his jurisdiction constitutes gross ignorance of the law. We further held that:

The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sworn to
apply, more than the ordinary laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law.
It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles like the ones involved in the instant case. x x x
While magistrates may at times make mistakes in judgment, for which they are not penalized, the respondent judge
exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law, in an area which has greatly prejudiced the status of married
persons.[3]

In the case at bar, the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines
Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to
law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to gross ignorance of the law for he
allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating
the law on marriage.

Respondent judge should also be faulted for solemnizing a marriage without the requisite marriage license. In
People vs. Lara,[4] we held that a marriage which preceded the issuance of the marriage license is void, and that the
subsequent issuance of such license cannot render valid or even add an iota of validity to the marriage. Except in
cases provided by law, it is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to solemnize a
marriage. Respondent judge did not possess such authority when he solemnized the marriage of petitioner. In this
respect, respondent judge acted in gross ignorance of the law.

Respondent judge cannot be exculpated despite the Affidavit of Desistance filed by petitioner. This Court has
consistently held in a catena of cases that the withdrawal of the complaint does not necessarily have the legal effect
of exonerating respondent from disciplinary action. Otherwise, the prompt and fair administration of justice, as well
as the discipline of court personnel, would be undermined.[5] Disciplinary actions of this nature do not involve
purely private or personal matters. They can not be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may,
for one reason or another, condone a detestable act. We cannot be bound by the unilateral act of a complainant in a
matter which involves the Courts constitutional power to discipline judges. Otherwise, that power may be put to
naught, undermine the trust character of a public office and impair the integrity and dignity of this Court as a
disciplining authority.[6]

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of Balatan,
Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar offense
in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1] 259 SCRA 129 (1996).

[2] Id., pp. 135-136.

[3] Id., p. 136.

[4] C.A. O.G. 4079.

[5] Farrales vs. Camarista, 327 SCRA 84 (2000).

[6] Sandoval vs. Manalo, 260 SCRA 611 (1996).

THIRD DIVISION

RESTITUTO M. ALCANTARA,
Petitioner,

- versus -

ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS,

Respondents.

G.R. No. 167746

Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

Promulgated:

August 28, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari filed by petitioner Restituto Alcantara assailing the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated 30 September 2004 in CA-G.R. CV No. 66724 denying petitioners
appeal and affirming the decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 143, in Civil Case
No. 97-1325 dated 14 February 2000, dismissing his petition for annulment of marriage.

The antecedent facts are:

A petition for annulment of marriage[3] was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A. Alcantara alleging that
on 8 December 1982 he and respondent, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City
Hall for the purpose of looking for a person who could arrange a marriage for them. They met a person who, for a
fee, arranged their wedding before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC BR
Chapel.[4] They got married on the same day, 8 December 1982. Petitioner and respondent went through another
marriage ceremony at the San Jose de Manuguit Church in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was
likewise celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in
Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and
they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October
1985, respondent gave birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil
Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract[5] and its entry on file.[6]

Answering petitioners petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of their marriage and
maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Contrary to petitioners representation, respondent gave birth to their first child named
Rose Ann Alcantara on 14 October 1985 and to another daughter named Rachel Ann Alcantara on 27 October 1992.
[7] Petitioner has a mistress with whom he has three children.[8] Petitioner only filed the annulment of their
marriage to evade prosecution for concubinage.[9] Respondent, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against
petitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 60.[10] Respondent prays that the
petition for annulment of marriage be denied for lack of merit.
On 14 February 2000, the RTC of Makati City, Branch 143, rendered its Decision disposing as follows:

The foregoing considered, judgment is rendered as follows:

1. The Petition is dismissed for lack of merit;

2. Petitioner is ordered to pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) per month as support for
their two (2) children on the first five (5) days of each month; and

3. To pay the costs.[11]

As earlier stated, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the petitioners appeal. His Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied in a resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 6 April 2005.[12]

The Court of Appeals held that the marriage license of the parties is presumed to be regularly issued and petitioner
had not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption. Moreover, the parties marriage contract being a
public document is a prima facie proof of the questioned marriage under Section 44, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.[13]

In his Petition before this Court, petitioner raises the following issues for resolution:

a. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that the Petition for Annulment has
no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was no marriage license at the precise moment
of the solemnization of the marriage.

b. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it gave weight to the Marriage License No.
7054133 despite the fact that the same was not identified and offered as evidence during the trial, and was not the
Marriage license number appearing on the face of the marriage contract.

c. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to apply the ruling laid down by this

Honorable Court in the case of Sy vs. Court of Appeals. ( G.R. No. 127263, 12 April 2000 [330 SCRA 550]).
d. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it failed to relax the observance of
procedural rules to protect and promote the substantial rights of the party litigants.[14]

We deny the petition.

Petitioner submits that at the precise time that his marriage with the respondent was celebrated, there was no
marriage license because he and respondent just went to the Manila City Hall and dealt with a fixer who arranged
everything for them.[15] The wedding took place at the stairs in Manila City Hall and not in CDCC BR Chapel
where Rev. Aquilino Navarro who solemnized the marriage belongs.[16] He and respondent did not go to Carmona,
Cavite, to apply for a marriage license. Assuming a marriage license from Carmona, Cavite, was issued to them,
neither he nor the respondent was a resident of the place. The certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite, cannot be given weight because the certification states that Marriage License number 7054133
was issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario[17] but their marriage contract bears the
number 7054033 for their marriage license number.

The marriage involved herein having been solemnized on 8 December 1982, or prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the applicable law to determine its validity is the Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its
celebration.

A valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage under Article 53 of the Civil Code, the absence of which renders
the marriage void ab initio pursuant to Article 80(3)[18] in relation to Article 58 of the same Code.[19]

Article 53 of the Civil Code[20] which was the law applicable at the time of the marriage of the parties states:

Art. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation
in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is interested.[21]

Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his marriage. The cases where
the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut.

In Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,[22] the Local Civil Registrar issued a certification of due search
and inability to find a record or entry to the effect that Marriage License No. 3196182 was issued to the parties. The
Court held that the certification of due search and inability to find a record or entry as to the purported marriage
license, issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig, enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to
keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license. Based on said certification, the Court held
that there is absence of a marriage license that would render the marriage void ab initio.
In Cario v. Cario,[23] the Court considered the marriage of therein petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
Santiago S. Carino as void ab initio. The records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. The court held that the certification issued by the local civil registrar
is adequate to prove the non-issuance of the marriage license. Their marriage having been solemnized without the
necessary marriage license and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, the
marriage of the petitioner and the deceased is undoubtedly void ab initio.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals,[24] the marriage license was issued on 17 September 1974, almost one year after the
ceremony took place on 15 November 1973. The Court held that the ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was
indeed contracted without a marriage license.

In all these cases, there was clearly an absence of a marriage license which rendered the marriage void.

Clearly, from these cases, it can be deduced that to be considered void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license, the law requires that the absence of such marriage license must be apparent on the marriage contract, or at
the very least, supported by a certification from the local civil registrar that no such marriage license was issued to
the parties. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license
number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite.[25] The
certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license was
issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario, further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to
the parties herein.

The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite, reads:

This is to certify that as per the registry Records of Marriage filed in this office, Marriage License No. 7054133 was
issued in favor of Mr. Restituto Alcantara and Miss Rosita Almario on December 8, 1982.

This Certification is being issued upon the request of Mrs. Rosita A. Alcantara for whatever legal purpose or intents
it may serve.[26]

This certification enjoys the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the
marriage license was done in the regular conduct of official business.[27] The presumption of regularity of official
acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the
presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in support of the
presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officers act being lawful or unlawful, construction should be in favor of
its lawfulness.[28] Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel, admitted that a marriage license was,
indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.[29]
Petitioner, in a faint attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor
respondent is a resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul
petitioner and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of
either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or prior to the
completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not affect the validity of
the marriage.[30] An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not affect its validity but the party
or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and administratively liable.[31]

Again, petitioner harps on the discrepancy between the marriage license number in the certification of the
Municipal Civil Registrar, which states that the marriage license issued to the parties is No. 7054133, while the
marriage contract states that the marriage license number of the parties is number 7054033. Once more, this
argument fails to sway us. It is not impossible to assume that the same is a mere a typographical error, as a closer
scrutiny of the marriage contract reveals the overlapping of the numbers 0 and 1, such that the marriage license may
read either as 7054133 or 7054033. It therefore does not detract from our conclusion regarding the existence and
issuance of said marriage license to the parties.
Under the principle that he who comes to court must come with clean hands,[32] petitioner cannot pretend that he
was not responsible or a party to the marriage celebration which he now insists took place without the requisite
marriage license. Petitioner admitted that the civil marriage took place because he initiated it.[33] Petitioner is an
educated person. He is a mechanical engineer by profession. He knowingly and voluntarily went to the Manila City
Hall and likewise, knowingly and voluntarily, went through a marriage ceremony. He cannot benefit from his action
and be allowed to extricate himself from the marriage bond at his mere say-so when the situation is no longer
palatable to his taste or suited to his lifestyle. We cannot countenance such effrontery. His attempt to make a
mockery of the institution of marriage betrays his bad faith.[34]

Petitioner and respondent went through a marriage ceremony twice in a span of less than one year utilizing the
same marriage license. There is no claim that he went through the second wedding ceremony in church under
duress or with a gun to his head. Everything was executed without nary a whimper on the part of the petitioner.

In fact, for the second wedding of petitioner and respondent, they presented to the San Jose de Manuguit Church the
marriage contract executed during the previous wedding ceremony before the Manila City Hall. This is confirmed
in petitioners testimony as follows

WITNESS

As I remember your honor, they asked us to get the necessary document prior to the wedding.

COURT

What particular document did the church asked you to produce? I am referring to the San Jose de Manuguit church.

WITNESS
I dont remember your honor.

COURT

Were you asked by the church to present a Marriage License?

WITNESS

I think they asked us for documents and I said we have already a Marriage Contract and I dont know if it is good
enough for the marriage and they accepted it your honor.

COURT

In other words, you represented to the San Jose de Manuguit church that you have with you already a Marriage
Contract?

WITNESS

Yes your honor.

COURT

That is why the San Jose de Manuguit church copied the same marriage License in the Marriage Contract issued
which Marriage License is Number 7054033.

WITNESS

Yes your honor.[35]

The logical conclusion is that petitioner was amenable and a willing participant to all that took place at that time.
Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage, thereby cleansing whatever irregularity
or defect attended the civil wedding.[36]

Likewise, the issue raised by petitioner -- that they appeared before a fixer who arranged everything for them and
who facilitated the ceremony before a certain Rev. Aquilino Navarro, a Minister of the Gospel of the CDCC Br
Chapel -- will not strengthen his posture. The authority of the officer or clergyman shown to have performed a
marriage ceremony will be presumed in the absence of any showing to the contrary.[37] Moreover, the solemnizing
officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage license has been duly and regularly issued by the
local civil registrar. All the solemnizing officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent
official, and it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the duty to ascertain
whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.[38]

Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the marriage.[39] Every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The Courts look upon this
presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of
Appeals dated 30 September 2004 affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 143 of Makati City,
dated 14 February 2000, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G.
Tolentino, concurring; rollo, p. 25-32.
[2] Penned by Judge Salvador S. Abad Santos; CA rollo, pp. 257-258.
[3] Docketed as Civil Case No. 97-1325.
[4] Crusade of the Divine Church of Christ.
[5] Annex A, Records, p. 5; Annexes B to C, Records, pp. 6-7.
[6] Rollo, pp. 33-36.
[7] Id. at 185.
[8] TSN, 14 October 1999, p. 34.
[9] Rollo, p. 39.
[10] Id. at 46.
[11] Id. at 68-69.
[12] Id. at 21.
[13] Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a public
officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.
[14] Rollo, p. 206.
[15] Id. at 209.
[16] Records p. 1.
[17] Id. at 15-a.
[18] (3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character.
[19] Art. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.
[20] Now Article 3 of the Family Code.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
(2) A valid marriage license except in the cases provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the appearance of the contracting parties before the solemnizing
officer and their personal declaration that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of not less than
two witnesses of legal age.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35.
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable as provided in Article 45.
[21] Nial v. Bayadog, 384 Phil. 661, 667-668 (2000).
[22] G.R. No.103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.
[23] G.R. No.132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133.
[24] 386 Phil. 760, 769 (2000).
[25] Article 70 of the Civil Code, now Article 25 Family Code, provides:
The local civil registrar concerned shall enter all applications for marriage licenses filed with him in a register book
strictly in the order in which the same shall be received. He shall enter in said register the names of the applicants,
the dates on which the marriage license was issued, and such other data as may be necessary.
[26] Records, p. 15-a.
[27] Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. x x x
xxxx
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed. (Rule 131, Rules of Court.)
[28] Magsucang v. Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224-225 (2003).
[29] TSN. 23 November 1999, p. 4.
[30] Sta. Maria Jr., Persons and Family Relations Law, p. 125.
[31] Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code, p. 8; Moreno v. Bernabe, 316 Phil. 161, 168 (1995).
[32] Abacus Securities Corporation v. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, 27 February 2006, 483 SCRA 315, 337.
[33] TSN, 1 October 1998, p. 96.
[34] Atienza v. Judge Brilliantes, Jr., 312 Phil. 939, 944 (1995).
[35] TSN, 1 October 1998, pp. 33-35.
[36] Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 662 2003).
[37] Goshen v. New Orleans, 18 US 950.
[38] People v. Janssen, 54 Phil. 176, 180 (1929).
[39] Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco, G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 436; Sevilla v.

Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, 31 July 2006, 497 SCRA 428, 443.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 103047 September 2, 1994

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS AND ANGELINA M. CASTRO, respondents.

Parungao, Abesamis, Eleazar & Pulgar Law Offices for private respondent.

PUNO, J.:

The case at bench originated from a petition filed by private respondent Angelina M. Castro in the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage to Edwin F. Cardenas. 1 As ground
therefor, Castro claims that no marriage license was ever issued to them prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

Despite notice, defendant Edwin F. Cardenas failed to file his answer. Consequently, he was declared in default.
Trial proceeded in his absence.

The controlling facts are undisputed:

On June 24, 1970, Angelina M. Castro and Edwin F. Cardenas were married in a civil ceremony performed by
Judge Pablo M. Malvar, City Court Judge of Pasay City. The marriage was celebrated without the knowledge of
Castro's parents. Defendant Cardenas personally attended to the processing of the documents required for the
celebration of the marriage, including the procurement of the marriage, license. In fact, the marriage contract itself
states that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued in the name of the contracting parties on June 24, 1970 in
Pasig, Metro Manila.

The couple did not immediately live together as husband and wife since the marriage was unknown to Castro's
parents. Thus, it was only in March 1971, when Castro discovered she was pregnant, that the couple decided to live
together. However, their cohabitation lasted only for four (4) months. Thereafter, the couple parted ways. On
October 19, 1971, Castro gave birth. The baby was adopted by Castro's brother, with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby is now in the United States. Desiring to follow her daughter, Castro wanted to put in order her marital
status before leaving for the States. She thus consulted a lawyer, Atty. Frumencio E. Pulgar, regarding the possible
annulment of her marriage. Through her lawyer's efforts, they discovered that there was no marriage license issued
to Cardenas prior to the celebration of their marriage.

As proof, Angelina Castro offered in evidence a certification from the Civil Register of Pasig, Metro Manila. It
reads:

February 20, 1987

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that the names EDWIN F. CARDENAS and ANGELINA M. CASTRO who were allegedly
married in the Pasay City Court on June 21, 1970 under an alleged (s)upportive marriage license
no. 3196182 allegedly issued in the municipality on June 20, 1970 cannot be located as said license no. 3196182
does not appear from our records.

Issued upon request of Mr. Ed Atanacio.

(Sgd) CENONA D. QUINTOS

Senior Civil Registry Officer

Castro testified that she did not go to the civil registrar of Pasig on or before June 24, 1970 in order to apply for a
license. Neither did she sign any application therefor. She affixed her signature only on the marriage contract on
June 24, 1970 in Pasay City.

The trial court denied the petition. 2 It held that the above certification was inadequate to establish the alleged non-
issuance of a marriage license prior to the celebration of the marriage between the parties. It ruled that the "inability
of the certifying official to locate the marriage license is not conclusive to show that there was no marriage license
issued."

Unsatisfied with the decision, Castro appealed to respondent appellate court. She insisted that the certification from
the local civil registrar sufficiently established the absence of a marriage license.

As stated earlier, respondent appellate court reversed the Decision of the trial court. 3 It declared the marriage
between the contracting parties null and void and directed the Civil Registrar of Pasig to cancel the subject marriage
contract.

Hence this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines urges that respondent appellate court erred when it ruled that the certification
issued by the civil registrar that marriage license no. 3196182 was not in their record adequately proved that no
such license was ever issued. Petitioner also faults the respondent court for relying on the self-serving and
uncorroborated testimony of private respondent Castro that she had no part in the procurement of the subject
marriage license. Petitioner thus insists that the certification and the uncorroborated testimony of private respondent
are insufficient to overthrow the legal presumption regarding the validity of a marriage.

Petitioner also points that in declaring the marriage between the parties as null and void, respondent appellate court
disregarded the presumption that the solemnizing officer, Judge Pablo M. Malvar, regularly performed his duties
when he attested in the marriage contract that marriage license no. 3196182 was duly presented to him before the
solemnization of the subject marriage.

The issues, being interrelated, shall be discussed jointly.

The core issue presented by the case at bench is whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence presented
by private respondent are sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig
prior to the celebration of the marriage of private respondent to Edwin F. Cardenas.

We affirm the impugned Decision.

At the time the subject marriage was solemnized on June 24, 1970, the law governing marital relations was the New
Civil Code. The law 4 provides that no marriage shall be solemnized without a marriage license first issued by a
local civil registrar. Being one of the essential requisites of a valid marriage, absence of a license would render the
marriage void ab initio. 5

Petitioner posits that the certification of the local civil registrar of due search and inability to find a record or entry
to the effect that marriage license no. 3196182 was issued to the parties is not adequate to prove its non-issuance.
We hold otherwise. The presentation of such certification in court is sanctioned by Section 29, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, viz.:

Sec. 29. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an officer having custody of an official
record or by his deputy, that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the
records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of
his office contain no such record or entry.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. 6

The certification of "due search and inability to find" issued by the civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value,
he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Unaccompanied by any circumstance of suspicion and pursuant to Section 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, a
certificate of "due search and inability to find" sufficiently proved that his office did not issue marriage license no.
3196182 to the contracting parties.

The fact that private respondent Castro offered only her testimony in support of her petition is, in itself, not a
ground to deny her petition. The failure to offer any other witness to corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the
peculiar circumstances of the case. It will be remembered that the subject marriage was a civil ceremony performed
by a judge of a city court. The subject marriage is one of those commonly known as a "secret marriage" a legally
non-existent phrase but ordinarily used to refer to a civil marriage celebrated without the knowledge of the relatives
and/or friends of either or both of the contracting parties. The records show that the marriage between Castro and
Cardenas was initially unknown to the parents of the former.

Surely, the fact that only private respondent Castro testified during the trial cannot be held against her. Her husband,
Edwin F. Cardenas, was duly served with notice of the proceedings and a copy of the petition. Despite receipt
thereof, he chose to ignore the same. For failure to answer, he was properly declared in default. Private respondent
cannot be faulted for her husband's lack of interest to participate in the proceedings. There was absolutely no
evidence on record to show that there was collusion between private respondent and her husband Cardenas.

It is noteworthy to mention that the finding of the appellate court that the marriage between the contracting parties
is null and void for lack of a marriage license does not discount the fact that indeed, a spurious marriage license,
purporting to be issued by the civil registrar of Pasig, may have been presented by Cardenas to the solemnizing
officer.

In fine, we hold that, under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by
private respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED there being no showing of any reversible error committed by
respondent appellate court.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

#Footnotes

1 Filed on February 19, 1987 and docketed as Civil Case No. Q-50117.

2 Decision dated June 30, 1987, issued by Presiding Judge Antonio P. Solano, Quezon City RTC, Branch
LXXXVI; Rollo, pp. 46-48.

3 Sixteenth Division, penned by Mr. Justice Justo P. Torres, with Mr. Justices Ricardo J. Francisco and
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, concurring; Decision dated November 27, 1991, Rollo, pp. 38-42.

4 Articles 53 (4) and 58, New Civil Code.

5 Article 80 (3), New Civil Code.

6 Article 70, New Civil Code.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIO, respondent.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the two marriages contracted by the deceased
SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, whose death benefits is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans
whom he married. 1wphi1.nt

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, which affirmed in toto the decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.

During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, he contracted two marriages, the first was on June 20,
1969, with petitioner Susan Nicdao Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), with whom he had two
offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cario; and the second was on November 10, 1992, with respondent Susan
Yee Cario (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), with whom he had no children in their almost ten year cohabitation
starting way back in 1982.

In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cario became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary
tuberculosis. He passed away on November 23, 1992, under the care of Susan Yee, who spent for his medical and
burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits and financial assistance
pertaining to the deceased from various government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao was able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig, 3 while respondent Susan Yee
received a total of P21,000.00 from GSIS Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS). 4

On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against
petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia, that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one
hundred forty-six thousand pesos (P146,000.00) collectively denominated as death benefits which she (petitioner)
received from MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig. Despite service of summons,
petitioner failed to file her answer, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.

Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without
first obtaining a judicial declaration of nullity of, the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. She, however,
claimed that she had no knowledge of the previous marriage and that she became aware of it only at the funeral of
the deceased, where she met petitioner who introduced herself as the wife of the deceased. To bolster her action for
collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio
because the same was solemnized without the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented:
1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the petitioner which bears no marriage license number; 5 and 2) a
certification dated March 9, 1994, from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, which reads

This is to certify that this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGO CARINO (sic) and
SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in this municipality on June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a
true copy or transcription of Marriage License number from the records of this archives.

This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cario for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6

On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follows:

WHEREFORE, the defendant is hereby ordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount
which was paid to her in the form of death benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cario, plus
attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of suit.

IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the
instant petition, contending that:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE
LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.

II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT
CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.

III.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE
ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8

Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the
absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 9 However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to
declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship,
legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the
case. 10 In such instances, evidence must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of
grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final
judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11

It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed with sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the two marriages
in this case, as the same is essential to the determination of who is rightfully entitled to the subject death benefits
of the deceased.

Under the Civil Code, which was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased
was solemnized in 1969, a valid marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12 and the absence thereof, subject to
certain exceptions, 13 renders the marriage void ab initio. 14

In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fall within the
marriages exempt from the license requirement. A marriage license, therefore, was indispensable to the validity of
their marriage. This notwithstanding, the records reveal that the marriage contract of petitioner and the deceased
bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15 the Court held that such a
certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as
in the present case, the certification issued by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer
charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put
her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

It does not follow from the foregoing disquisition, however, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is
declared void ab initio, the death benefits under scrutiny would now be awarded to respondent Susan Yee. To
reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage, there must first be a prior judicial
declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherwise, the second marriage would also be void.

Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner
Susan Nicdao does not validate the second marriage of the deceased with respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains
that their marriage was solemnized without first obtaining a judicial decree declaring the marriage of petitioner
Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is, likewise,
void ab initio.

One of the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according
to the applicable property regime. 16 Considering that the two marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property
regime would not be absolute community or conjugal partnership of property, but rather, be governed by the
provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.

Under Article 148 of the Family Code, which refers to the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous
relationships, relationships in a state of concubine, relationships where both man and woman are married to other
persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17 -

... [O]nly the properties acquired by both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions ...

In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shall belong to
the co-ownership. Wages and salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too,
contributions in the form of care of the home, children and household, or spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded
in this regime. 18

Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been
solemnized during the subsistence of a previous marriage then presumed to be valid (between petitioner and the
deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.

The disputed P146,000.00 from MBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-
ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly renumerations, incentives and benefits from governmental agencies earned by the
deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents proof to the contrary, it could not be said that
she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are not
owned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right
whatsoever to claim the same. By intestate succession, the said death benefits of the deceased shall pass to his
legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal wife of the deceased is not one of them.

As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs.
This article applies to unions of parties who are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract
marriage, but whose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the absence of a marriage license. Article
147 of the Family Code reads -

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marry each other, live exclusively with each other as
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned
by them in equal shares and the property acquired by both of them through their work or industry shall be governed
by the rules on co-ownership.

In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this
Article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other party of any property shall be deemed to have
contributed jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts consisted in the care and maintenance of the
family and of the household.

xxx

When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-
ownership shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of or waiver by any or all of the
common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving descendants. In
the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall take place
upon termination of the cohabitation.

In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, wages and salaries earned by either party during the
cohabitation shall be owned by the parties in equal shares and will be divided equally between them, even if only
one party earned the wages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19 Conformably, even if the disputed death
benefits were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ownership in
respect thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present
case, both parties of the first marriage are presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject death
benefits under scrutiny shall go to the petitioner as her share in the property regime, and the other half pertaining
to the deceased shall pass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children with Susan Nicdao.

In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v.
Government Service Insurance System, 20 where the Court awarded one-half of the retirement benefits of the
deceased to the first wife and the other half, to the second wife, holding that:

... [S]ince the defendants first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership
established by that marriage has not ceased. Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of
her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his death should she survive him.
Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest
in the husbands share in the property here in dispute.... And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court
observed that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first
marriage was still subsisting, still there is need for judicial declaration of such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal
partnership formed by the second marriage was dissolved before judicial declaration of its nullity, [t]he only just
and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the
property acquired by her and her husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of
the first marriage. 21

It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule which requires a prior and
separate judicial declaration of nullity of marriage. This is the reason why in the said case, the Court determined the
rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.

In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22 however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a
prior and separate declaration of nullity of a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of
remarriage. That is, if a party who is previously married wishes to contract a second marriage, he or she has to
obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherwise the second marriage would be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void
because the parties are not free to determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. However, for
purposes other than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed
to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. All that a party has to do is to present
evidence, testimonial or documentary, that would prove that the marriage from which his or her rights flow is in
fact valid. Thereupon, the court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, will rule on the status of the
marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the parties in accordance with the applicable laws and
jurisprudence. Thus, in Nial v. Bayadog, 23 the Court explained:

[T]he court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long
as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the purpose is other than to
remarry. The clause on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void in Article 40 of the
Family Code connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263
which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the
sum of P73,000.00 plus attorneys fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint
in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1wphi1.nt

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.

Puno J., on official leave.

Footnotes
1. Rollo, pp. 43-47

2. Rollo, pp. 49-55

3. Exhibit F, Records, p. 38

4. Ibid

5. Exhibit D-1, Records, p. 36

6. Exhibit E, Records, p. 37

7. Rollo, p. 55

8. Rollo, p. 18

9. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 572, 579 [1993]

10. Nial, et al., v. Bayadog, G.R. No. 133778, March 14, 2000
11. Domingo v. Court of Appeals, supra

12. ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:
(1)Legal capacity of the contracting parties;
(2)Their consent, freely given;
(3)Authority of the person performing the marriage; and
(4)A marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.
13. ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional character;
xxx xxx xxx

15. 236 SCRA 257, 261-262; citing the Rules of Court, Rule 132, Section 29
16. Art. 50. The effects provided for in paragraphs (2), (3), (4) and (5) of Article 43 and in Article 44 shall also
apply in proper cases to marriages which are declared void ab initio or annulled by final judgment under Articles 40
and 45.

The final judgment in such cases shall provide for the liquidation, partition, and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children, and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless
such matters had been adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings.

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx

Art. 43. The termination of the subsequent marriage referred to in the preceding Article shall produce the following
effects:

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx

(2)The absolute community of property or the conjugal partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the
community property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in favor of the common children or, if there
are none, the children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or, in default of children, the innocent spouse;

14. ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:
xxx xxx xxx

Art. 44. If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked by
operation of law

17. Sempio-Diy, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, p. 233-234 (1995)

18 Id., p. 234.18
19. Id., p. 230

20. 37 SCRA 316 [1971]

21. Id., p. 326

22. Supra

23. Supra
The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 142293 February 27, 2003

VICENTE SY, TRINIDAD PAULINO, 6BS TRUCKING CORPORATION, and SBT1 TRUCKING
CORPORATION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and JAIME SAHOT, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition for review seeks the reversal of the decision2 of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 2000, in CA-
G.R. SP No. 52671, affirming with modification the decision3 of the National Labor Relations Commission
promulgated on June 20, 1996 in NLRC NCR CA No. 010526-96. Petitioners also pray for the reinstatement of the
decision4 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-06717-94.

Culled from the records are the following facts of this case:

Sometime in 1958, private respondent Jaime Sahot5 started working as a truck helper for petitioners family-owned
trucking business named Vicente Sy Trucking. In 1965, he became a truck driver of the same family business,
renamed T. Paulino Trucking Service, later 6Bs Trucking Corporation in 1985, and thereafter known as SBT
Trucking Corporation since 1994. Throughout all these changes in names and for 36 years, private respondent
continuously served the trucking business of petitioners.
In April 1994, Sahot was already 59 years old. He had been incurring absences as he was suffering from various
ailments. Particularly causing him pain was his left thigh, which greatly affected the performance of his task as a
driver. He inquired about his medical and retirement benefits with the Social Security System (SSS) on April 25,
1994, but discovered that his premium payments had not been remitted by his employer.

Sahot had filed a week-long leave sometime in May 1994. On May 27th, he was medically examined and treated
for EOR, presleyopia, hypertensive retinopathy G II (Annexes "G-5" and "G-3", pp. 48, 104, respectively),6 HPM,
UTI, Osteoarthritis (Annex "G-4", p. 105),7 and heart enlargement (Annex G, p. 107).8 On said grounds, Belen
Paulino of the SBT Trucking Service management told him to file a formal request for extension of his leave. At the
end of his week-long absence, Sahot applied for extension of his leave for the whole month of June, 1994. It was at
this time when petitioners allegedly threatened to terminate his employment should he refuse to go back to work.

At this point, Sahot found himself in a dilemma. He was facing dismissal if he refused to work, But he could not
retire on pension because petitioners never paid his correct SSS premiums. The fact remained he could no longer
work as his left thigh hurt abominably. Petitioners ended his dilemma. They carried out their threat and dismissed
him from work, effective June 30, 1994. He ended up sick, jobless and penniless.

On September 13, 1994, Sahot filed with the NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, a complaint for illegal dismissal,
docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-09-06717-94. He prayed for the recovery of separation pay and attorneys fees
against Vicente Sy and Trinidad Paulino-Sy, Belen Paulino, Vicente Sy Trucking, T. Paulino Trucking Service, 6Bs
Trucking and SBT Trucking, herein petitioners.

For their part, petitioners admitted they had a trucking business in the 1950s but denied employing helpers and
drivers. They contend that private respondent was not illegally dismissed as a driver because he was in fact
petitioners industrial partner. They add that it was not until the year 1994, when SBT Trucking Corporation was
established, and only then did respondent Sahot become an employee of the company, with a monthly salary that
reached P4,160.00 at the time of his separation.

Petitioners further claimed that sometime prior to June 1, 1994, Sahot went on leave and was not able to report for
work for almost seven days. On June 1, 1994, Sahot asked permission to extend his leave of absence until June 30,
1994. It appeared that from the expiration of his leave, private respondent never reported back to work nor did he
file an extension of his leave. Instead, he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal against the trucking company and
its owners.

Petitioners add that due to Sahots refusal to work after the expiration of his authorized leave of absence, he should
be deemed to have voluntarily resigned from his work. They contended that Sahot had all the time to extend his
leave or at least inform petitioners of his health condition. Lastly, they cited NLRC Case No. RE-4997-76, entitled
"Manuelito Jimenez et al. vs. T. Paulino Trucking Service," as a defense in view of the alleged similarity in the
factual milieu and issues of said case to that of Sahots, hence they are in pari material and Sahots complaint ought
also to be dismissed.
The NLRC NCR Arbitration Branch, through Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos, ruled that there was no illegal
dismissal in Sahots case. Private respondent had failed to report to work. Moreover, said the Labor Arbiter,
petitioners and private respondent were industrial partners before January 1994. The Labor Arbiter concluded by
ordering petitioners to pay "financial assistance" of P15,000 to Sahot for having served the company as a regular
employee since January 1994 only.

On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission modified the judgment of the Labor Arbiter. It declared that
private respondent was an employee, not an industrial partner, since the start. Private respondent Sahot did not
abandon his job but his employment was terminated on account of his illness, pursuant to Article 2849 of the Labor
Code. Accordingly, the NLRC ordered petitioners to pay private respondent separation pay in the amount of
P60,320.00, at the rate of P2,080.00 per year for 29 years of service.

Petitioners assailed the decision of the NLRC before the Court of Appeals. In its decision dated February 29, 2000,
the appellate court affirmed with modification the judgment of the NLRC. It held that private respondent was
indeed an employee of petitioners since 1958. It also increased the amount of separation pay awarded to private
respondent to P74,880, computed at the rate of P2,080 per year for 36 years of service from 1958 to 1994. It
decreed:

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. SB Trucking Corporation is
hereby directed to pay complainant Jaime Sahot the sum of SEVENTY-FOUR THOUSAND EIGHT HUNDRED
EIGHTY (P74,880.00) PESOS as and for his separation pay.10

Hence, the instant petition anchored on the following contentions:

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS IN PROMULGATING THE QUESTION[ED] DECISION AFFIRMING

WITH MODIFICATION THE DECISION OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION DECIDED
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND PUT AT NAUGHT ARTICLE 402 OF THE CIVIL CODE.11

II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS VIOLATED SUPREME COURT RULING THAT THE NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION IS BOUND BY THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE LABOR ARBITER
AS THE LATTER WAS IN A BETTER POSITION TO OBSERVE THE DEMEANOR AND DEPORTMENT OF
THE WITNESSES IN THE CASE OF ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES
VERSUS NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION (305 SCRA 233).12

III

PRIVATE RESPONDENT WAS NOT DISMISS[ED] BY RESPONDENT SBT TRUCKING CORPORATION.13

Three issues are to be resolved: (1) Whether or not an employer-employee relationship existed between petitioners
and respondent Sahot; (2) Whether or not there was valid dismissal; and (3) Whether or not respondent Sahot is
entitled to separation pay.

Crucial to the resolution of this case is the determination of the first issue. Before a case for illegal dismissal can
prosper, an employer-employee relationship must first be established.14

Petitioners invoke the decision of the Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente Santos which found that respondent Sahot was
not an employee but was in fact, petitioners industrial partner.15 It is contended that it was the Labor Arbiter who
heard the case and had the opportunity to observe the demeanor and deportment of the parties. The same
conclusion, aver petitioners, is supported by substantial evidence.16 Moreover, it is argued that the findings of fact
of the Labor Arbiter was wrongly overturned by the NLRC when the latter made the following pronouncement:

We agree with complainant that there was error committed by the Labor Arbiter when he concluded that
complainant was an industrial partner prior to 1994. A computation of the age of complainant shows that he was
only twenty-three (23) years when he started working with respondent as truck helper. How can we entertain in our
mind that a twenty-three (23) year old man, working as a truck helper, be considered an industrial partner. Hence
we rule that complainant was only an employee, not a partner of respondents from the time complainant started
working for respondent.17

Because the Court of Appeals also found that an employer-employee relationship existed, petitioners aver that the
appellate courts decision gives an "imprimatur" to the "illegal" finding and conclusion of the NLRC.

Private respondent, for his part, denies that he was ever an industrial partner of petitioners. There was no written
agreement, no proof that he received a share in petitioners profits, nor was there anything to show he had any
participation with respect to the running of the business.18

The elements to determine the existence of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employers power to control the
employees conduct. The most important element is the employers control of the employees conduct, not only as
to the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to accomplish it.19

As found by the appellate court, petitioners owned and operated a trucking business since the 1950s and by their
own allegations, they determined private respondents wages and rest day.20 Records of the case show that private
respondent actually engaged in work as an employee. During the entire course of his employment he did not have
the freedom to determine where he would go, what he would do, and how he would do it. He merely followed
instructions of petitioners and was content to do so, as long as he was paid his wages. Indeed, said the CA, private
respondent had worked as a truck helper and driver of petitioners not for his own pleasure but under the latters
control.
Article 176721 of the Civil Code states that in a contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to
contribute money, property or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among
themselves.22 Not one of these circumstances is present in this case. No written agreement exists to prove the
partnership between the parties. Private respondent did not contribute money, property or industry for the purpose
of engaging in the supposed business. There is no proof that he was receiving a share in the profits as a matter of
course, during the period when the trucking business was under operation. Neither is there any proof that he had
actively participated in the management, administration and adoption of policies of the business. Thus, the NLRC
and the CA did not err in reversing the finding of the Labor Arbiter that private respondent was an industrial partner
from 1958 to 1994.

On this point, we affirm the findings of the appellate court and the NLRC. Private respondent Jaime Sahot was not
an industrial partner but an employee of petitioners from 1958 to 1994. The existence of an employer-employee
relationship is ultimately a question of fact23 and the findings thereon by the NLRC, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, deserve not only respect but finality when supported by substantial evidence. Substantial evidence is such
amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.24

Time and again this Court has said that "if doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the
employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter."25 Here, we entertain no doubt. Private
respondent since the beginning was an employee of, not an industrial partner in, the trucking business.

Coming now to the second issue, was private respondent validly dismissed by petitioners?

Petitioners contend that it was private respondent who refused to go back to work. The decision of the Labor
Arbiter pointed out that during the conciliation proceedings, petitioners requested respondent Sahot to report back
for work. However, in the same proceedings, Sahot stated that he was no longer fit to continue working, and instead
he demanded separation pay. Petitioners then retorted that if Sahot did not like to work as a driver anymore, then he
could be given a job that was less strenuous, such as working as a checker. However, Sahot declined that
suggestion. Based on the foregoing recitals, petitioners assert that it is clear that Sahot was not dismissed but it was
of his own volition that he did not report for work anymore.

In his decision, the Labor Arbiter concluded that:

While it may be true that respondents insisted that complainant continue working with respondents despite his
alleged illness, there is no direct evidence that will prove that complainants illness prevents or incapacitates him
from performing the function of a driver. The fact remains that complainant suddenly stopped working due to
boredom or otherwise when he refused to work as a checker which certainly is a much less strenuous job than a
driver.26

But dealing the Labor Arbiter a reversal on this score the NLRC, concurred in by the Court of Appeals, held that:
While it was very obvious that complainant did not have any intention to report back to work due to his illness
which incapacitated him to perform his job, such intention cannot be construed to be an abandonment. Instead, the
same should have been considered as one of those falling under the just causes of terminating an employment. The
insistence of respondent in making complainant work did not change the scenario.

It is worthy to note that respondent is engaged in the trucking business where physical strength is of utmost
requirement (sic). Complainant started working with respondent as truck helper at age twenty-three (23), then as
truck driver since 1965. Complainant was already fifty-nine (59) when the complaint was filed and suffering from
various illness triggered by his work and age.

x x x27

In termination cases, the burden is upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination was for
lawful cause and validly made.28 Article 277(b) of the Labor Code puts the burden of proving that the dismissal of
an employee was for a valid or authorized cause on the employer, without distinction whether the employer admits
or does not admit the dismissal.29 For an employees dismissal to be valid, (a) the dismissal must be for a valid
cause and (b) the employee must be afforded due process.30

Article 284 of the Labor Code authorizes an employer to terminate an employee on the ground of disease, viz:

Art. 284. Disease as a ground for termination- An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has
been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to
his health as well as the health of his co-employees: xxx

However, in order to validly terminate employment on this ground, Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Omnibus
Implementing Rules of the Labor Code requires:

Sec. 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal- Where the employee suffers from a disease and his continued
employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer shall
not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by competent public health authority that the disease is
of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months even with proper medical
treatment. If the disease or ailment can be cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee
but shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate such employee to his former position
immediately upon the restoration of his normal health. (Italics supplied).

As this Court stated in Triple Eight integrated Services, Inc. vs. NLRC,31 the requirement for a medical certificate
under Article 284 of the Labor Code cannot be dispensed with; otherwise, it would sanction the unilateral and
arbitrary determination by the employer of the gravity or extent of the employees illness and thus defeat the public
policy in the protection of labor.
In the case at bar, the employer clearly did not comply with the medical certificate requirement before Sahots
dismissal was effected. In the same case of Sevillana vs. I.T. (International) Corp., we ruled:

Since the burden of proving the validity of the dismissal of the employee rests on the employer, the latter should
likewise bear the burden of showing that the requisites for a valid dismissal due to a disease have been complied
with. In the absence of the required certification by a competent public health authority, this Court has ruled against
the validity of the employees dismissal. It is therefore incumbent upon the private respondents to prove by the
quantum of evidence required by law that petitioner was not dismissed, or if dismissed, that the dismissal was not
illegal; otherwise, the dismissal would be unjustified. This Court will not sanction a dismissal premised on mere
conjectures and suspicions, the evidence must be substantial and not arbitrary and must be founded on clearly
established facts sufficient to warrant his separation from work.32

In addition, we must likewise determine if the procedural aspect of due process had been complied with by the
employer.

From the records, it clearly appears that procedural due process was not observed in the separation of private
respondent by the management of the trucking company. The employer is required to furnish an employee with two
written notices before the latter is dismissed: (1) the notice to apprise the employee of the particular acts or
omissions for which his dismissal is sought, which is the equivalent of a charge; and (2) the notice informing the
employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given reasonable opportunity to answer and to
be heard on his defense.33 These, the petitioners failed to do, even only for record purposes. What management did
was to threaten the employee with dismissal, then actually implement the threat when the occasion presented itself
because of private respondents painful left thigh.

All told, both the substantive and procedural aspects of due process were violated. Clearly, therefore, Sahots
dismissal is tainted with invalidity.

On the last issue, as held by the Court of Appeals, respondent Jaime Sahot is entitled to separation pay. The law is
clear on the matter. An employee who is terminated because of disease is entitled to "separation pay equivalent to at
least one month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater xxx."34
Following the formula set in Art. 284 of the Labor Code, his separation pay was computed by the appellate court at
P2,080 times 36 years (1958 to 1994) or P74,880. We agree with the computation, after noting that his last monthly
salary was P4,160.00 so that one-half thereof is P2,080.00. Finding no reversible error nor grave abuse of discretion
on the part of appellate court, we are constrained to sustain its decision. To avoid further delay in the payment due
the separated worker, whose claim was filed way back in 1994, this decision is immediately executory. Otherwise,
six percent (6%) interest per annum should be charged thereon, for any delay, pursuant to provisions of the Civil
Code.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 29, 2000 is
AFFIRMED. Petitioners must pay private respondent Jaime Sahot his separation pay for 36 years of service at the
rate of one-half monthly pay for every year of service, amounting to P74,880.00, with interest of six per centum
(6%) per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.

Austria-Martinez, J., no part.

Footnotes

1 Sometimes referred to as "SB Trucking Corp." in some parts of the records.

2 Rollo, pp. 9-17.

3 Id. at 88-95.

4 Id. at 145-150.

5 Substituted herein by his wife Editha Sahot. Jaime Sahot died on May 1, 1996, per Certificate of Death, Rollo, p.
241.

6 Rollo, pp. 131, 133.

7 Id. at 132.

8 Id. at 128.

9 ART. 284 . Disease as ground for termination.-An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has
been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial
to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at
least one (1) month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at
least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.

10 Rollo, p. 17.

11 Id. at 32.
12 Id. at 37.

13 Id. at 42.

14 Palomado v. National Labor Relations Commission, 257 SCRA 680, 695 (1996).

15 The Labor Arbiter based this pronouncement on alleged res judicata. It appears that a decision was rendered in
another case, NLRC Case No. RE 4997-76, where Labor Arbiter Crescencio J. Ramos declared that other drivers
also in the same company, were declared to be industrial partners and not employees. Labor Arbiter Ariel Cadiente
Santos adopted said findings. See Rollo, p. 114.

16 Consisting of the position paper of Petitioners and of a decision in a "similar" case decided by Labor Arbiter
Crescencio J. Ramos in NLRC Case No. RG-4997-76, entitled "Manuelito Jimenez, et al. versus T. Paulino
Trucking Service." See Rollo, pp. 35, 112-121.

17 Rollo, pp. 91-92.

18 Id. at 236.

19 Caurdanetaan Piece Workers Union v. Laguesma, 286 SCRA 401, 420 (1998); Maraguinot, Jr. v. NLRC, 284
SCRA 539, 552 (1998); APP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc. v. NLRC, 267 SCRA 47, 57 (1997); Aurora Land
Projects Corp. v. NLRC, 266 SCRA 48, 59 (1997); Encyclopedia Britannica (Phils.), Inc. v. NLRC, 264 SCRA 1,6-
7 (1996).

20 Rollo, p. 54.

21 ART. 1767. By the contract of partnership two or more persons bind themselves to contribute money, property,
or industry to a common fund, with the intention of dividing the profits among themselves.

Two or more persons may also form a partnership for the exercise of a profession.

22 Afisco Insurance Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 302 SCRA 1, 13 (1999).

23 Santos v. National Labor Relations Commission, 293 SCRA 113, 125 (1998).

24 Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC, 299 SCRA 608, 614 (1998).

25 Id. at 614-15.

26 Rollo, p. 149.
27 Id. at 93.

28 Supra, note 24 at 615.

29 Sevillana v. I.T. (International) Corp., 356 SCRA 451, 466 (2001).

30 Id. at 467.

31 Supra, note 24 at 618.

32 Supra, note 29 at 468.

33 Tiu v. NLRC, 251 SCRA 540, 551 (1992).

34 Labor Code, Art. 284, see note 9, supra.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Today is Saturday, September 03, 2016

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006

JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,

vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004 which set aside the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.

In a Complaint3 dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969,
through machinations, duress and intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father,
retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed forces of the Philippines, he and Carmelita went to the City Hall of
Manila and they were introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel. On
the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister
of the Gospel. According to Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita
and never did they obtain any marriage license from any Civil Registry, consequently, no marriage license was
presented to the solemnizing officer.

For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime were married civilly on 19
May 1969,4 and in a church ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695 at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon
City. Both marriages were registered with the local civil registry of Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is
estopped from invoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.

The trial court made the following findings:

In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared
before a certain Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila where they executed a
Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain Godofredo Occena who, plaintiff alleged, was an aide of
defendant's father accompanied them, and who, together with another person, stood as witness to the civil wedding.
That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 was indicated in
the marriage contract, the same was fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon
verifications made by him through his lawyer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, with the Civil Registry of San Juan, a
Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") was issued by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., Local Civil Registrar of San
Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by said office." On May 31, 1969, he and defendant
were again wed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish
Church in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, where they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") with the same
marriage license no. 2770792 used and indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception
were jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the church wedding, he and defendant resided in his house
at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, was born in March 1970. As his parents continued to support him
financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital
relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time.
They started living apart in 1976, but they underwent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It
was during this time when defendant's second son was born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained
a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later secured a judicial separation of their
conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counsel for the plaintiff, himself manifested that when his service was engaged by
plaintiff, and after the latter narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries with the Office of
Civil Registry of San Juan where the supposed marriage license was obtained and with the Church of the Most
Holy Redeemer Parish where the religious wedding ceremony was celebrated. His request letters dated March 3,
1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") were all sent
to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, who in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994
(Exh. "I"), and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no.
2770792 was ever issued by that office." Upon his inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified
copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a Certificate of Marriage dated April 11,
1994 (Exh. "G"), wherein it noted that it was a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on May 19,
1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."

Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March
4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and
testified that their office failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered
(TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).

Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they met and
were introduced to each other in October 1968. A model, she was compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng
Pilipinas beauty pageant when plaintiff who was afraid to lose her, asked her to run away with him to Baguio.
Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff in Baguio. When they
came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills where plaintiff's mother, Mrs.
Sevilla, told her not to worry. Her parents were hostile when they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla
convinced them that she will take care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff
was still fearful he may lose her, he asked her to marry him in civil rites, without the knowledge of her family, more
so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and where she was made to sign documents.
After the civil wedding, they had lunch and later each went home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church
wedding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came from hospital.
Her family did not participate in the wedding preparations. Defendant further stated that there was no sexual
consummation during their honeymoon and that it was after two months when they finally had sex. She learned
from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their wedding sponsors that plaintiff was undergoing psychiatric
therapy since age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit. She found
out plaintiff has unusual sexual behavior by his obsession over her knees of which he would take endless pictures
of. Moreover, plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in between the knees which she called "intrafemural sex,"
while real sex between them was far and between like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff
exhibited weird sexual behavior which defendant attributed to plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A
compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper who breaks things when he had tantrums. Plaintiff took drugs like
amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then would take barbiturates or
downers, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff away from drugs but failed as it has become a
habit to him. They had no fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half
years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law would send some financial support on and off, while defendant
worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, who was supposed to be studying, did nothing. Their marriage became
unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later, she
learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.

Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he was not aware of the civil wedding of his daughter with the
plaintiff; that his daughter and grandson came to stay with him after they returned home from Spain and have lived
with him and his wife ever since. His grandsons practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has
supported his daughter's expenses for medicines and hospital confinements (Exhs. "9" and "10").

Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it was plaintiff's family that attended to
all the preparations and arrangements for the church wedding of her sister with plaintiff, and that she didn't know
that the couple wed in civil rites some time prior to the church wedding. She also stated that she and her parents
were still civil with the plaintiff inspite of the marital differences between plaintiff and defendant.

As adverse witness for the defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differences with defendant and
in order for them to live their own lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that when he applied for and obtained a
divorce decree in the United States on June 14, 1983 (Exh. "13"), it was with the knowledge and consent of
defendant who in fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN, 12-7-2000, p. 21). During his
adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the
marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6

In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the
following justifications:

Thus, being one of the essential requisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders
the marriage void ab initio. It was shown under the various certifications (Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by
the office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25,
2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 was ever issued by that office, hence, the marriage license
no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31, 1969 (Exh.
"F") was fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probative value under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, x x x.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage between Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas
solemnized by Rev. Cirilo D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as well as their contract of
marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B. Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969,
NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of the parties under Registry
No. 601 (e-69) of the registry book of the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52
of the Family Code. Likewise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor General for its record and
information.7

Carmelita filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals
disagreed with the trial court and held:

In People v. De Guzman ( G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The
presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty. The presumption, however, prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."

In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed
to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee handling
is already retired." With said testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the
parties' marriage contract was not issued for in the end the failure of the office of the local civil registrar of San
Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license was attributable not to the fact that no such marriage license was
issued but rather, because it "failed to locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply
put, if the pertinent book were available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it would have contained an
entry on marriage license no. 2720792.

xxxx

Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his
union with defendant is defective with respect to an essential requisite of a marriage contract, a perception that
ultimately was not substantiated with facts on record.8

Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 which the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution
dated 6 April 2005.

This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.

He raises the following issues for Resolution.

1. Whether or not a valid marriage license was issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the
celebration of the marriages in question;

2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials
acts, particularly the issuance of a marriage license, arising solely from the contents of the marriage contracts in
question which show on their face that a marriage license was purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila, and

3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage arising from
the admitted "fact of marriage."9

At the core of this controversy is the determination of whether or not the certifications from the Local Civil
Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the
parties was issued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.

We agree with the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.

Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code which was the law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are
Articles 53,10 5811 and 80.12

Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essential requisite for the validity of marriage. The
marriage between Carmelita and Jaime is of no exception.

At first glance, this case can very well be easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the
ground of absence of a marriage license based on the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registar of San Juan.
As ruled by this Court in the case of Cario v. Cario13:

[A]s certified by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage
license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued
by the local civil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all
date relative to the issuance of a marriage license.

Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficiently
overcome. It then became the burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the
required marriage license. Although she was declared in default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely
met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and this
Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain from pursuing an argument that will put
her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.

It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage between petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been
solemnized without the necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage
license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.

The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the Local Civil Registrar should be
read in line with the decision in the earlier case of Republic v. Court of Appeals,14 where it was held that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify that despite diligent search, a particular document
does not exist in his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was not to be found in a register. As
custodians of public documents, civil registrars are public officers charged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to enter all applications for marriage licenses, including the names of the
applicants, the date the marriage license was issued and such other relevant data. (Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the certification to be issued by the Local Civil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not
exist in his office or the particular entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification
shall be sufficient proof of lack or absence of record as stated in Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. a written statement signed by an officer having the custody of an official record
or by his deputy that after diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of
his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.

We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan in connection
with Marriage License No. 2770792 complied with the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded
probative value.

The first Certification15 issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, was dated 11 March 1994.
It reads:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

No Marriage License Number 2770792 were (sic) ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License
Number 2880792,16 we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

March 11, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The second certification17 was dated 20 September 1994 and provides:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 were ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage
License Number 2880792, we exert all effort but we cannot find the said number.

Hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you our full force locating the above problem.

San Juan, Metro Manila

September 20, 1994

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

The third Certification,18 issued on 25 July 2000, states:

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application was filed and no
Marriage License No. 2770792 allegedly dated May 19, 1969 was issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O.
SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.

This is to further certify that the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and,
therefore, appear to be fictitious.

This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for whatever legal intent it may serve.

San Juan, Metro Manila

July 25, 2000

(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

Local Civil Registrar

Note that the first two certifications bear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded work cannot give you
our full force locating the above problem." It could be easily implied from the said statement that the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar could not exert its best efforts to locate and determine the existence of Marriage License No.
2770792 due to its "loaded work." Likewise, both certifications failed to state with absolute certainty whether or not
such license was issued.

This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative from the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of
San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, who stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in
charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the said person was not presented in
evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook was deceased or missing, or that his
testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all efforts to locate the logbook or prove the material
contents therein, had been exerted.

As testified to by Perlita Mercader:

Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you were required to bring to this Court among other things the register of
application of/or (sic) for marriage licenses received by the Office of the :Local Civil Registrar of San Juan,
Province of Rizal, from January 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did you bring with you those records?

A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.

Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?

A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .

Q Did you bring that with you?

A No, sir.

Q Why not?

A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.

Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as
required by the manual of the office of the Local Civil Registrar?

COURT

May I see that book and the portion marked by the witness.

xxxx

COURT

Why don't you ask her direct question whether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while
with respect to license no. 2770792 the office of the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it was
never issued. Then ask him how about no. 2880792 if the same was ever issued by their office. Did you ask this
2887092, but you could not find the record? But for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is which now,
was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19

Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the
logbook where Marriage License No. 2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of
performance of official function by the Local Civil Registrar in issuing the certifications, is effectively rebutted.

According to Section 3(m),20 Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed is among the disputable presumptions.

In one case, it was held:

A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on where there
is no other evidence to uphold the contention for which it stands, or one which may be overcome by other evidence.
One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is that an official act or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21

The presumption of regularity of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty.22

The presumption of regularity of performance of official duty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence
as in the case at bar where the presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second
certifications.

Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It
can also mean, as we believed true in the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of
showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, we cannot easily accept that absence of the same also
means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.

Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds.23 The courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be
lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great weight.24

The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic
autonomous social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.25

The parties have comported themselves as husband and wife and lived together for several years producing two
offsprings,26 now adults themselves. It took Jaime several years before he filed the petition for declaration of
nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.27 We are not ready to reward petitioner by
declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedom and in the process allow him to profit from his own
deceit and perfidy.28
Our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social institution. Our family law
is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a social institution in which the State is vitally
interested. The State can find no stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families
weakens our social and moral fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone.29

"The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is x x x marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not
only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply
interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling
together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or evidence special to the
case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what
they thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A
presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is `that a man and a woman deporting themselves as
husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.' Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio Always
presume marriage."30

This jurisprudential attitude towards marriage is based on the prima facie presumption that a man and a woman
deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.31

By our failure to come to the succor of Jaime, we are not trifling with his emotion or deepest sentiments. As we
have said in Carating-Siayngco v. Siayngco,32 regrettably, there are situations like this one, where neither law nor
society can provide the specific answers to every individual problem.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated
20 December 2004 and the Resolution dated 6 April 2005 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., J.J., concur.

Footnotes

1 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 74416, penned by Associate Justice Vicente S. E. Veloso with Associate Justices
Roberto A. Barrios and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; Rollo, pp. 20-31.

2 Rollo, p. 46. Penned by Judge Zeus C. Abrogar.

3 Records, Vol. I, pp. 1-4.

4 Id. at 5.
5 Id. at 232.

6 Rollo, pp. 47-50.

7 Id. at 50-52.

8 Id. at 29-31.

9 Id. at 80-81.

10 ART. 53. No marriage shall be solemnized unless all these requisites are complied with:

(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties;

(2) Their consent, freely given;

(3) Authority of the person performing the marriage; and

(4) a marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional character.

11 ART. 58. Save marriages of an exceptional character authorized in Chapter 2 of this Title, but not those under
Article 75, no marriage shall be solemnized without a license first being issued by the local civil registrar of the
municipality where either contracting party habitually resides.

12 ART. 80. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those solemnized without a marriage license, save marriages of exceptional charater.

13 G.R. No. 132529, 2 February 2001, 351 SCRA 127, 133-134.

14 G.R. No. 103047, 2 September 1994, 236 SCRA 257, 262.

15 Records, Vol. I, p. 103.

16 Atty. Josa Ma. Abola, counsel for Jaime Sevilla testified before the trial court that in his letter requesting for the
issuance of a certification, addressed to the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, he mistakenly read the Marriage
License No. as 2880792 instead of 2770792. (Records, Vol. II, pp. 725-726.)
17 Id. at 228.

18 Records, Vol. II, p. 888.

19 Id. at 735-737.

20 Rule 131. BURDEN OF PROOF AND PRESUMPTIONS

xxxx

SEC. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence;

xxxx

(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

21 People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 106025, 9 February 1994, 229 SCRA 795, 798-799.
22 Mabsucang v. Judge Balgos, 446 Phil. 217, 224 (2003).

23 Article 220 Civil Code, Bobis v. Bobis, 391 Phil. 648, 655 (2000).

24 Ricardo J. Francisco, BASIC EVIDENCE (2nd ed., 1999), p. 77.

25 Republic v. Quintero-Hamano, G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004, 428 SCRA 735, 740.
26 Records, Vol. II, p. 413, TSN, 11 April 1996.

27 Id. at p. 414.

28 Ty v. Court of Appeals, 399 Phil. 647, 663 (2000).

29 Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180-181 (1996) cited in Ancheta v. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370,
4 March 2004, 424 SCRA 725, 740.

30 Vda. de Jacob v. Court of Appeals, 371 Phil. 693, 709 (1999).

31 Id.

32 G.R. No. 158896, 27 October 2004, 441 SCRA 422, 439.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 201061 July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition for review1 assailing the 17 August 2011 Decision2 and the 14 March 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

The Antecedent Facts

On 15 March 2004, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43 (trial court). The
case was docketed as Civil Case No. 04109401. Benjamin alleged that on 10 September 1973, he married Azucena
Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan City. They had three children, namely, Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.
In 1979, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally GoBangayan (Sally) who was a customer in the
auto parts and supplies business owned by Benjamins family. In December 1981, Azucena left for the United
States of America. In February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. Sallys father was
against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in
Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status,
assured him that the marriage contract would not be registered.

Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced two children, Bernice and Bentley. During the period of their
cohabitation, they acquired the following real properties:

(1) property under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally as
spouses;

(2) properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin, married to Sally;

(3) properties under Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT) Nos. 8782 and 8783 registered in the name of Sally,
married to Benjamin; and

(4) properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 registered in the name of Sally as a single individual.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada, bringing Bernice and Bentley
with her. She then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin, using
their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for declaration of a non-existent
marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was
bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the
partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his
appointment as administrator of the properties during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice
and Bentley as illegitimate children. A total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the
trial court. Aside from the seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in
her answer.

After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence which the trial court denied. Sally filed a
motion for reconsideration which the trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals and asked for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or injunction which the Court of Appeals
never issued. Sally then refused to present any evidence before the trial court citing the pendency of her petition
before the Court of Appeals. The trial court gave Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February
2008, 10 July 2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November
2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her evidence, prompting the trial
court to consider the case submitted for decision.
The Decision of the Trial Court

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial court ruled in favor ofBenjamin. The trial court gave weight to the
certification dated 21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil Registrar, which was confirmed during trial, that only
Marriage License Series Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February 1982 and the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial court ruled that the marriage was
not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to
Benjamins subsisting marriage with Azucena.

The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the
second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes,
particularly, the lack of a marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case. The trial court did not
rule on the issue of the legitimacy status of Bernice and Bentley because they were not parties to the case. The trial
court denied Sallys claim for spousal support because she was not married to Benjamin. The trial court likewise
denied support for Bernice and Bentley who were both of legal age and did not ask for support.

On the issue of partition, the trial court ruled that Sally could not claim the 37 properties she named in her answer
as part of her conjugal properties with Benjamin. The trial court ruled that Sally was not legally married to
Benjamin. Further, the 37 properties that Sally was claiming were owned by Benjamins parents who gave the
properties to their children, including Benjamin, as advance inheritance. The 37 titles were in the names of
Benjamin and his brothers and the phrase "married to Sally Go" was merely descriptive of Benjamins civil status in
the title. As regards the two lots under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860, the trial court found that they were bought by
Benjamin using his own money and that Sally failed to prove any actual contribution of money, property or industry
in their purchase. The trial court found that Sally was a registered co-owner of the lots covered by TCT Nos. 61722,
N-193656, and 253681 as well as the two condominium units under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783. However, the trial
court ruled that the lot under TCT No. 61722 and the two condominium units were purchased from the earnings of
Benjamin alone. The trial court ruled that the properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720, and 190860 and CCT Nos.
8782 and 8783 were part of the conjugal partnership of Benjamin and Azucena, without prejudice to Benjamins
right to dispute his conjugal state with Azucena in a separate proceeding.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin was married to Azucena.
Applying Article 148 of the Family Code, the trial court forfeited Sallys share in the properties covered under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 in favor of Bernice and Bentley while Benjamins share reverted to his conjugal
ownership with Azucena.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts decision reads:

ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY S. GO on March 7, 1982 at
Santolan, Pasig, Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
Respondents claim as co-owner or conjugal owner of the thirtyseven (37) properties under TCT Nos. 17722,
17723, 17724, 17725, 126397, RT-73480, and RT-86821; in Manila, TCT Nos. 188949, 188950, 188951, 193035,
194620, 194621, 194622, 194623, 194624, 194625, 194626, 194627, 194628, 194629, 194630, 194631, 194632,
194633, 194634, 194635, 194636, 194637, 194638, 194639, 198651, 206209, 206210, 206211, 206213 and 206215
is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The registered owners, namely: Benjamin B. Bangayan, Jr., Roberto E. Bangayan,
Ricardo B. Bangayan and Rodrigo B. Bangayan are the owners to the exclusion of "Sally Go" Consequently, the
Registry of Deeds for Quezon City and Manila are directed to delete the words "married to Sally Go" from these
thirty-seven (37) titles.

Properties under TCT Nos. 61722, 61720 and 190860, CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 are properties acquired from
petitioners money without contribution from respondent, hence, these are properties of the petitioner and his lawful
wife. Consequently, petitioner is appointed the administrator of these five (5) properties. Respondent is ordered to
submit an accounting of her collections of income from these five (5) properties within thirty (30) days from notice
hereof. Except for lot under TCT No. 61722, respondent is further directed within thirty (30) days from notice
hereof to turn over and surrender control and possession of these properties including the documents of title to the
petitioner.

On the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and N-253681, these properties are under co-ownership of the parties
shared by them equally. However, the share of respondent is declared FORFEITED in favor of Bernice Go
Bangayan and Bentley Go Bangayan. The share of the petitioner shall belong to his conjugal ownership with
Azucena Alegre. The liquidation, partition and distribution of these two (2) properties shall be further processed
pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10 of March 15, 2003.

Other properties shall be adjudicated in a later proceeding pursuant to Section 21 of A.M. No. 02-11-10.

Respondents claim of spousal support, children support and counterclaims are DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Further, no declaration of the status of the parties children.

No other relief granted.

Furnish copy of this decision to the parties, their counsels, the Trial Prosecutor, the Solicitor General and the
Registry of Deeds in Manila, Quezon City and Caloocan.

SO ORDERED.6

Sally filed a Verified and Vigorous Motion for Inhibition with Motion for Reconsideration. In its Order dated 27
August 2009,7 the trial court denied the motion. Sally appealed the trial courts decision before the Court of
Appeals.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals partly granted the appeal. The Court of Appeals ruled that the
trial court did not err in submitting the case for decision. The Court of Appeals noted that there were six resettings
of the case, all made at the instance of Sally, for the initial reception of evidence, and Sally was duly warned to
present her evidence on the next hearing or the case would be deemed submitted for decision. However, despite the
warning, Sally still failed to present her evidence. She insisted on presenting Benjamin who was not around and
was not subpoenaed despite the presence of her other witnesses.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his action for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins action was based on his prior marriage to Azucena and there
was no evidence that the marriage was annulled or dissolved before Benjamin contracted the second marriage with
Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court committed no error in declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally
null and void.

The Court of Appeals ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally was governed by Article 148 of the
Family Code. The Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to their respective
contribution. The Court of Appeals ruled that the 37 properties being claimed by Sally rightfully belong to
Benjamin and his siblings.

As regards the seven properties claimed by both parties, the Court of Appeals ruled that only the properties under
TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 registered in the name of Benjamin belong to him exclusively because he was able to
establish that they were acquired by him solely. The Court of

Appeals found that the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 and under CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were
exclusive properties of Sally in the absence of proof of Benjamins actual contribution in their purchase. The Court
of Appeals ruled that the property under TCT No. 61722 registered in the names of Benjamin and Sally shall be
owned by them in common, to be shared equally. However, the share of Benjamin shall accrue to the conjugal
partnership under his existing marriage with Azucena while Sallys share shall accrue to her in the absence of a
clear and convincing proof of bad faith.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally failed to present clear and convincing evidence that would show bias
and prejudice on the part of the trial judge that would justify his inhibition from the case.

The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Order
dated March 26, 2009 and August 27, 2009, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 43, in Civil
Case No. 04-109401 are hereby AFFIRMED with modification declaring TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 to be
exclusively owned by the petitioner-appellee while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 as well as
CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 shall be solely owned by the respondent-appellant. On the other hand, TCT No. 61722
shall be owned by them and common and to be shared equally but the share of the petitioner-appellee shall accrue
to the conjugal partnership under his first marriage while the share of respondent-appellant shall accrue to her. The
rest of the decision stands.

SO ORDERED.8

Sally moved for the reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision. In its 14 March 2012 Resolution, the Court
of Appeals denied her motion.

Hence, the petition before this Court.

The Issues

Sally raised the following issues before this Court:

(1) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts ruling that Sally had
waived her right to present evidence;

(2) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming the trial courts decision declaring the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and non-existent; and

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals committed a reversible error in affirming with modification the trial courts
decision regarding the property relations of Benjamin and Sally.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.

Waiver of Right to Present Evidence

Sally alleges that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial courts ruling that she waived her right to present
her evidence. Sally alleges that in not allowing her to present evidence that she and Benjamin were married, the
trial court abandoned its duty to protect marriage as an inviolable institution.

It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of right but is addressed to
the discretion of the trial court.9 In this case, Sallys presentation of evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008.
Thereafter, there were six resettings of the case: on 10 July 2008, 4 and 11 September 2008, 2 and 28 October 2008,
and 28 November 2008. They were all made at Sallys instance. Before the scheduled hearing of 28 November
2008, the trial court warned Sally that in case she still failed to present her evidence, the case would be submitted
for decision. On the date of the scheduled hearing, despite the presence of other available witnesses, Sally insisted
on presenting Benjamin who was not even subpoenaed on that day. Sallys counsel insisted that the trial court could
not dictate on the priority of witnesses to be presented, disregarding the trial courts prior warning due to the
numerous resettings of the case. Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her
evidence because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court that it would
submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28 November 2008.

We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was deemed to have waived
her right to present them. As pointed out by the Court of Appeals, Sallys continued failure to present her evidence
despite the opportunities given by the trial court showed her lack of interest to proceed with the case. Further, it was
clear that Sally was delaying the case because she was waiting for the decision of the Court of Appeals on her
petition questioning the trial courts denial of her demurrer to evidence, despite the fact that the Court of Appeals
did not issue any temporary restraining order as Sally prayed for. Sally could not accuse the trial court of failing to
protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the duty to ensure that trial proceeds
despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one of the parties.10

Validity of the Marriage between Benjamin and Sally

Sally alleges that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to Benjamin because a
marriage could not be nonexistent and, at the same time, null and void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if she
were allowed to present her evidence, she would have proven her marriage to Benjamin. To prove her marriage to
Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin listed her as his wife by
declaring he was "married to" her; that Benjamin was the informant in their childrens birth certificates where he
stated that he was their father; and that Benjamin introduced her to his family and friends as his wife. In contrast,
Sally claims that there was no real property registered in the names of Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges
that Benjamin was not the informant in the birth certificates of his children with Azucena.

First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10 September 1973 was duly established before the trial court, evidenced
by a certified true copy of their marriage contract. At the time Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported marriage
on 7 March 1982, the marriage between Benjamin and Azucena was valid and subsisting.

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros), Registration Officer II of the Local
Civil Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there was no valid marriage license issued to Benjamin and Sally.
Oliveros confirmed that only Marriage Licence Nos. 6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the month of February
1982. Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the series issued for the month. Oliveros further testified that
the local civil registrar of Pasig City did not issue Marriage License No. N-07568 to Benjamin and Sally. The
certification from the local civil registrar is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license and absent any
suspicious circumstance, the certification enjoys probative value, being issued by the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if indeed Benjamin and Sally
entered into a marriage contract, the marriage was void from the beginning for lack of a marriage license.12

It was also established before the trial court that the purported marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. The lack of record was certified by Julieta
B. Javier, Registration Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13 Teresita
R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives Division of the Records Management and Archives Office, National Commission
for Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J. Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration Department of the National
Statistics Office.15 The documentary and testimonial evidence proved that there was no marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out by the trial court, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the instance of Sally, intended to cover her up from expected social
humiliation coming from relatives, friends and the society especially from her parents seen as Chinese
conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious marriage.

The fact that Benjamin was the informant in the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley was not a proof of the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that Benjamin was the informant in Bernices birth
certificate which stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 198218 while Sally was the informant in
Bentleys birth certificate which also stated that Benjamin and Sally were married on 8 March 1982.19 Benjamin
and Sally were supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which did not match the dates reflected on the birth
certificates.

We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and, at the
same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a license, except
those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, "shall be void from the beginning." In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It was duly established that no marriage
license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568 did not match the marriage license numbers
issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section
3 of Article 3520 which made their marriage void ab initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also
non-existent. Applying the general rules on void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code,
contracts which are absolutely simulated or fictitious are "inexistent and void from the beginning."21 Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err in sustaining the trial courts ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
null and void ab initio and non-existent.

Except for the modification in the distribution of properties, the Court of Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial
courts decision and ruled that "the rest of the decision stands."22 While the Court of Appeals did notdiscuss
bigamous marriages, it can be gleaned from the dispositive portion of the decision declaring that "the rest of the
decision stands" that the Court of Appeals adopted the trial courts discussion that the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally is not bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:

On whether or not the parties marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null and void. The marriage
of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being no evidence to the contrary and
there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage contract. However, if the second marriage
was void not because of the existence of the first marriage but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of
bigamy was not committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51 O.G., 4079], it was held that what was committed was
contracting marriage against the provisions of laws not under Article 349 but Article 350 of the Revised Penal
Code. Concluding, the marriage of the parties is therefore not bigamous because there was no marriage license. The
daring and repeated stand of respondent that she is legally married to petitioner cannot, in any instance, be
sustained. Assuming that her marriage to petitioner has the marriage license, yet the same would be bigamous,
civilly or criminally as it would be invalidated by a prior existing valid marriage of petitioner and Azucena.23

For bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for
the existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just
signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally did not
exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage.

Property Relations Between Benjamin and Sally

The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of
the Family Code which states:

Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and presumption shall apply to joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit.

If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by them through
their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in proportion to
their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the 37
properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamins father to his children as advance inheritance.
Sallys Answer to the petition before the trial court even admitted that "Benjamins late father himself conveyed a
number of properties to his children and their respective spouses which included Sally x x x."25

As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the Court of Appeals is more in accord with
the evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of Benjamin and
Sally as spouses.26 The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with the
descriptive title "married to Sally." The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 were registered in the name
of Sally28 with the descriptive title "married to Benjamin" while the properties under TCT Nos. N-193656 and
253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We have ruled that the words "married to"
preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil status of the registered owner.29 Such words do
not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-
ownership under Article 148 of the Family Code.30

Inhibition of the Trial Judge

Sally questions the refusal of Judge Roy G. Gironella (Judge Gironella) to inhibit himself from hearing the case.
She cited the failure of Judge Gironella to accommodate her in presenting her evidence. She further alleged that
Judge Gironella practically labeled her as an opportunist in his decision, showing his partiality against her and in
favor of Benjamin.

We have ruled that the issue of voluntary inhibition is primarily a matter of conscience and sound discretion on the
part of the judge.31 To justify the call for inhibition, there must be extrinsic evidence to establish bias, bad faith,
malice, or corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself.32
In this case, we have sufficiently explained that Judge Gironella did not err in submitting the case for decision
because of Sallys continued refusal to present her evidence.

We reviewed the decision of the trial court and while Judge Gironella may have used uncomplimentary words in
writing the decision, they are not enough to prove his prejudice against Sally or show that he acted in bad faith in
deciding the case that would justify the call for his voluntary inhibition.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August 2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 94226.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice

AT T E S T AT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated additional member per Raffle dated 8 October 2012.

1 Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

2 Rollo, pp. 29-40. Penned by Associate Justice (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Estela M. PerlasBernabe
with Associate Justices Bienvenido L. Reyes (now also a Supreme Court Associate Justice) and Samuel H. Gaerlan,
concurring.

3 Id. at 52. Penned by Associate Justice Samuel H. Gaerlan with Associate Justices Amelita G. Tolentino and
Ramon R. Garcia, concurring.

4 Id. at 107-123. Penned by Presiding Judge Roy G. Gironella.

5 Records, Vol. 2, p. 461.

6 Id. at 122-123.

7 Id. at 124-128.

8 Id. at 40.
9 See Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 157219, 28 May 2004, 430 SCRA 353.
10 Id.

11 Nicdao Cario v. Yee Cario, 403 Phil. 861 (2001).

12 Article 35 of the Family Code states:

Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the beginning:

(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age even with the consent of parents or guardians;

(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to perform marriages unless such marriages were
contracted with either or both parties believing in good faith that the solemnizing officer had the legal authority to
do so;

(3) Those solemnized without a license, except those covered by the preceding Chapter;

(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not falling under Article 41;

(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party as to the identity of the other; and

(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.

13 Records, Vol. 2, p. 458.

14 Id. at 459.

15 Id. at 460.

16 Rollo, p. 112.

17 Id.

18 Records, Vol. 1, p. 65.

19 Id. at 66.

20 Supra note 12.

21 Article 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

xxxx

(2) Those which are absolutely simulated or fictitious;

xxxx

22 Rollo, p. 40.

23 Id. at 112-113.

24 See Nollora, Jr. v. People, G.R. No. 191425, 7 September 2011, 657 SCRA 330.
25 Records, Vol. 1, p. 50.

26 Id. at 23.

27 Id. at 24-26.

28 Id. at 27-28.

29 Acre v. Yuttikki, 560 Phil. 495 (2007).

30 Id.

31 Kilosbayan Foundation v. Janolo, Jr., G.R. No. 180543, 27 July 2010, 625 SCRA 684.
32 Ramiscal, Jr. v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. 173057-74, 27 September 2010, 631 SCRA 312.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942

FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,

vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.

Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.

Jose G. Advincula for respondents.

BOCOBO, J.:

This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages
for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said
Fausto Barredo.

At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of
Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a carretela
guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino
Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and
one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right to
bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the sentence of the lower court in the
criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action
in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of
the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was modified by the Court
of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is
undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the
road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility, the Court of Appeals found:

... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In fact it is shown he was careless in employing
Fontanilla who had been caught several times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A)
violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself.
Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence,
his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person criminally
liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:

... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the
respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Article 1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said
article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of Book IV
of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those
(obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.

The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:

... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon him in this action is not a
civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed
in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or
employee.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto
Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the Penal Code, his
(defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been
sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main issue, we must cut through the
tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the
Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because
justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided
in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided
by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several
sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain.

Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under the
Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or
crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary and direct
responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.

The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:

CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts and omissions which
are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the
Penal Code.

ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law,
intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.

xxx xxx xxx

ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or negligence shall be
liable for the damage so done.

ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.

The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages caused by the minor
children who live with them.

Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their authority and living with
them.

Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages caused by their employees
while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the performance of their duties.

The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the damage shall have been
caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act performed, in which case the
provisions of the next preceding article shall be applicable.

Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while
they are under their custody.

The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove that they are exercised
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.

ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from the latter what he may
have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE

ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable.

ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal liability established in
subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code does not include exemption
from civil liability, which shall be enforced to the following rules:

First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by any imbecile or insane
person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years of age, who has acted
without discernment shall devolve upon those having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.

Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal guardianship, or control,
or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their own property, excepting
property exempt from execution, in accordance with the civil law.

Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the harm has been
prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.

The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be liable.

When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also attaches
to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the damage has
been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in the manner
prescribed by special laws or regulations.

Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear shall
be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always
to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.

ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of establishment. In default of
persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for
crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses
lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified
in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.

ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which,
had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of
arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.

Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have
constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."

It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the
driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even
simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been
crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer study shows
that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the civil
liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligent
act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.

The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal institution is of
ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also contributed to the
genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says:
"Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al otro, pero acaescio por su
culpa."

The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five sources
of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga
cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation shall be governed
by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively
devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the
Civil Code are:

1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.

2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.

3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law clearly
covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence intervenes."
However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility, such as begging in
contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt. (See
Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)

Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's primary
and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414)
says:

El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi,
existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal
alguna, y otra que es consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."

The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different persons. Thus, there is a
civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal responsibility, and another
which is a necessary consequence of the penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."

Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two
trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter
had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily responsible in
civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte,
had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico could still bring a civil action
for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part (Maura,
Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):

Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que
exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el
choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con
las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por delito o falta en los
derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena misma ataen al orden
publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se
enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta
eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para pedir
indemnizacion.

Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro
regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante de daos o
perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los
Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos
18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo, desenvuelven
y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley
comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria
intempestivo un paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil;
pero viene al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.

Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que
sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos
al servicio de los cuales estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto
de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La
obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de
aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes
y empleados de los establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones. Por
esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las causas criminales
con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y
aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.

Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial
la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en
distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes modos de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio
criminal la Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado,
ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no
hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para despues
del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que
tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y
mas que la accion para pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.

As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that there should be res
judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by the collision of the trains.
The title upon which the action for reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a
crime, because there exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects which
give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil
rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty itself, affect public order; for
this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means
the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence
of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for indemnity.

Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not pertinent and belong to
another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or omission causing losses
and damages in which culpa or negligence intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before
the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code,
bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop and regulate the matter of civil
responsibilities arising from a crime, separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as
aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa;
but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such differences.

Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil responsibilities among those who,
for different reasons, are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises
and establishments for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say, according
to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code
does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable,
not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the
persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts during their
service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial
decisions, that the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil
responsibility by reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to the obligation,
before the civil courts.

Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive justice and the civil courts
being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in different codes, as
well as different modes of procedure, and inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from
taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action
for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal
del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered.
Even if the verdict had not been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately
reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the
non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was the sole subject matter upon which the
Tribunal del Jurado had jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer
that the action for its enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil Code is
largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish
Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article 1903, Spanish
Civil Code:

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without including the author of the
act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act
committed by the employee, but it is not subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment
against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of
the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law, Spanish translation, Vol. 20,
pp. 734-735.)

Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the responsibility of
the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:

Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por
las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer
lugar, en que se funda el precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi
parece a primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun la que
las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que
tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto
es, de la imprudencia o de la negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro,
etc. Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad, incapacitados,
dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una
falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao. Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad
por un hecho ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de
que esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.

Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of those persons for who one
is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on
what the legal provision is based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so
at first sight; but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are personal,
and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on
the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the
imprudence or negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc.
Whenever anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons, employees,
apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore,
only apparent that there is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's
own act. The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol," says in Vol.
VII, p. 743:

Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas
por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que
motiva o razona la responsabilidad. Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo
de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y
subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo 1903, ha de entenderse
directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de
quienes se deba responder."

That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his own faults, this being
the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons with whom there is a bond
or tie which gives rise to the responsibility. Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law,
the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons on the
other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the latter, subsidiary (articles 20
and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be understood as
direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for
whom one should be responsible."

Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set forth:
that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the civil
responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily
and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.

One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente
died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de Traccion."
The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a civil action
against the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded
damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the
Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme
Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:

Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al
condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo,
desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el
mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y como
la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de
delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del
fallo absolutorio, el concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el
articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de establecimientos
o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo
civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la
indemnizacion del dao causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion
con el articulo 116 de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir atribuciones
ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.

Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the trial court, in
sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by the death of Ramon Lafuente
Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case
instituted on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same
act in its different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that the act in
question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only
basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source
of civil obligations according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among
other persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under
certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect
and in ordering the company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees,
far from violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal Procedure, strictly
followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way
contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)

It will be noted, as to the case just cited:

First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. This is
precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or
with his employer.

Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain
said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the
conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of criminal
negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the same. But the
plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence
which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo: first, the subsidiary
one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second,
Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose which course to
take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within their rights. It might be observed in
passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because Fontanilla was either
in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was probably without property which might be seized in
enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly,
notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him because
his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less
than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case while the
latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one
day to two years of prision correccional.

(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)

In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a railroad
company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently, refused
to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held that this action was properly
under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:

Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas
del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas
vacias que en su demanda relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y
alcoholes; 2., que llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe de
la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al
tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como
expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de
servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:

Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque la
demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de
transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo
contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de
Comercio, en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction de los daos y
perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la entrega de
las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente
sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia demandada como ligada
con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia administrativa.

Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it declares, in relation to the
evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that
the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2)
that when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by the station
agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these goods when they
were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale
vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by
the consignors of the receptacles:

Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as the original complaint
did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of transportation, because the action
was not based on the delay of the goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore,
article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits
to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the
unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the
sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue
of the next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage
by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)

The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the Civil
Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the subject
of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.

Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.

In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court
awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a
tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the plaintiff whose
leg was broken. This Court held:

It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary conclusion from these collated
laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which the official criminally
responsible must be made primarily liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory
the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not repairing the
track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable primarily by him and secondarily
by his employer.

This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes
obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title
XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:

"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done.

"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with
them.

xxx xxx xxx

"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.

xxx xxx xxx

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."

As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our
general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His
obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But
the answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these articles of effect, would
shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the
selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules
of proof prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a construction would be
unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of
Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a
suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal, might be
prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was suspended. According to
article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by
the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder
should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles 23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the
same subject.

An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles suffices to show that
the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended thereby, except as
expressly provided in the law. Where an individual is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required
that the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition
precedent to the enforcement of the civil right.

Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of
criminal actions against his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine
the existence of the criminal act from which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its
enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no
criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the provisions of the Penal Code
can not affect this action. This construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary
civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American
civil and criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.

The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the briefs before us to have
arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not punished by law," as applied to
the comprehensive definition of offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the
liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as
derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093. More than this,
however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are
regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood
to be those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed
give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are subject to
articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of this distinction may be found in the
consequences of a railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his
employee would arise out of the contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage,
while that to the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.

In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona brought
a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an
automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring the defendant to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:

If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to stop his auto before
crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street or were coming from the
opposite direction along Solana Street, it is to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said
Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the auto
which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely reached a clear way on Solana
Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not
have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of
crossing Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in the act of
crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had occurred in such a
way that after the automobile had run over the body of the child, and the child's body had already been stretched out
on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that
the automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant having blown the
horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the death of the
child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the
same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability
arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article
1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under
the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer
could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after such a conviction, he could have
been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.

Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House
and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal,
brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused by the fault and
negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban,
Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another municipality to attend the
same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in
front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants J. V. House, when an
automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so
frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street gutter where hot water
from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the
action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that there was no
contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic
occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:

Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the
dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of
the court depart from the stand taken by the trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could foresee the
coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot
water. The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7
Phil., 359), still rule. Article 1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the
child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in
reduction of the damages.

It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages
in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.

In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of the
plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the
child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had rented
the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta
of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the plaintiff. On appeal this
Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good
father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903. This Court said:

As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a
family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in good condition. The
workmen were likewise selected from a standard garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular
calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or constructive, of the
defective condition of the steering gear.

The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:

Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also provides when the
liability shall cease. It says:

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all
the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."

From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the matter or employer
either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that
presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if
the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and
diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.

This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant.

The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the
latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was
operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This
Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:

The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of a business or enterprise
and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's employment as such owner.

Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co.,
55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his seven-
year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber
fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and Francisco
Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime
of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying articles 1902 and
1903, held:

The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the
liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)

In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought an
action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the
defendant. This Court held (p. 526):

The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly licensed captain,
authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his services because of
his reputation as a captain, according to F. C. Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the
presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this court in the cases
cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.

It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above set
forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in
relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.

Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs. Manila
Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the
Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27. Sixto
Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through reckless
imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila for
P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the
City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that the defendant
was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This Court held, in part,
that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:

With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code
govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The
Civil Code negatives its application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall
be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling under
article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not
punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of
the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its
jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil
negligence.

xxx xxx xxx

Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out
by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving
that the master had exercised all diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That
would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or
predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be said further that the
statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect that article
0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)

It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals based its
decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not
on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case of City of Manila
vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an
employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the decision of the Court of
Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already
seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.

Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the
employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced,
among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce the
subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed exemption
from civil liability. But this Court held:

In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability
established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a good father of a family,
is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.

The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action there had for
its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar, the
plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the principle
that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is different in character from his
subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction
between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the latter type of
civil action.

The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth. Suffice it
to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two
cases above discussed.

The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the
Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil
Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code,
or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Still more
concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the employer in this case the
defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.

The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be inappropriate
to indicate their foundations.

Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to
hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would have very little
scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of
negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil liability arising
from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath
to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not
use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such
full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902
to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.

Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a
preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil wrongs.
Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver and
exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a more
expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the procedure
indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that
professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay
damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and
probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways
of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and
supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the profits
resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's
careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And
according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall upon the principal or
director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured person who could not
exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol.
12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of
representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before
third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del
dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the person of the
employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these observations acquire a peculiar force and
significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of
owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding
of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common practice to seek
damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy,
which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it
has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on
culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But
we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of
responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we
caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no
longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the better
safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason
that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and
entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.

In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs against
the defendant-petitioner.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

SAFEGUARD SECURITY G.R. NO. 165732

AGENCY, INC., and ADMER
PAJARILLO,
Petitioners,
Present:

PANGANIBAN, C.J.*
YNARES-SANTIAGO, (Working Chairperson)
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.

LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO,

VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN
LAURO TANGCO, VON LARRIE
TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO
and VIVIEN LAURIZ TANGCO, Promulgated:
Respondents. December 14, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer
Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the Decision[1] dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution[2] dated October 20, 2004
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462.
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline) went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan
Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time deposit per advise of the banks cashier as she would sign a specimen card.
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry the same outside her residence,
approached security guard Pajarillo, who was stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to
deposit the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service shotgun hitting her in the
abdomen instantly causing her death.

Lauro Tangco, Evangelines husband, together with his six minor children (respondents) filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0-
97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file a separate civil action in the said
criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January
19, 2000.[3] On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification as to the penalty in a
Decision[4] dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was made on August 25, 2001.

Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, a complaint[5] for
damages against Pajarillo for negligently shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security guard. Respondents prayed
for actual, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees.

In their Answer,[6] petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint and alleged that Safeguard exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangelines death was
not due to Pajarillos negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense. Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim
for moral damages and attorneys fees.

Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its Decision,[7] the dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs, the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against
defendants Admer Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said defendants to pay the plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, the following:

1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00),
as actual damages
2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death indemnity;
3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral damages;
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00), as exemplary damages;
5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as attorneys fees; and
6. costs of suit.

For lack of merit, defendants counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED. [8]

The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillos claim that he merely acted in self-
defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillos bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the
shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office and the police authorities. The RTC
further ruled that being the guard on duty, the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence
and necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead of shooting her instantly; that
Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to
proffer proof negating liability in the instant case.

The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that
while it may be conceded that Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees, particularly
of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the supervision of its employee; that Safeguards evidence simply showed that it required its guards to
attend trainings and seminars which is not the supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not
only the issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons and property, for the
guidance of their servants and employees, but also the duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are
faithfully complied with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA issued its assailed Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that
Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. No pronouncement as to costs.[9]

In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the applicable provisions are not Article 2180
in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from
felonies under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of Homicide in a final and
executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the
provisions of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the criminal action is one
solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is
also the civil liability that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a pronouncement
that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from
quasi-delict, the defense of diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of employees
is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that the liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary, not joint
or solidary.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a Resolution dated October 20, 2004.

Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following assignment of errors, to wit:

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment
of damages and other money claims.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding
petitioner Safeguard solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of damages and other money
claims.

The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be excused from any
liability.[10]

The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard
should be held solidarily liable for the damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based on culpa aquiliana under Article 2176[11] of
the Civil Code, in which case, its liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established
that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo, it should be exonerated from civil
liability.

We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a separate civil action against
petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of
Safeguard as employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code[12] is subsidiary and the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of employee is not available to it.

The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.

The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as
amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil

liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
34, and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed the same on January 14, 1998.

The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the crime of homicide, for which he had
already been found guilty of and serving sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.

We do not agree.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a felony, e.g., culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31 of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party is granted a right to file an action
independent and distinct from the criminal action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may
be enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party
cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under both causes.[13]

It is important to determine the nature of respondents cause of action. The nature of a cause of action is determined
by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.[14] The purpose of an action or suit and the
law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the action, made in his argument or brief, but
rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.[15]

The pertinent portions of the complaint read:

7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and posted in the Ecology Bank Katipunan Branch,
Quezon City, who was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. hence there is
employer-employee relationship between co-defendants.

The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage
to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco, who brought her firearm out of her bag,
suddenly without exercising necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of his shotgun, fired and
burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing her instantly. x x x

xxxx

16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly and severally liable for the death of Evangeline
M. Tangco.[16]

Thus, a reading of respondents complaint shows that the latter are invoking their right to recover damages against
Safeguard for their vicarious responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillos act of shooting and killing Evangeline
under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:

ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from negligence. In Dulay v. Court of
Appeals,[17] we held:

x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only acts committed with negligence, but also acts
which are voluntary and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77 SCRA 98 [1977]), this
Court already held that:

"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence," covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also
acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both
scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111,
refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for
the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the
criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly
stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)

The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability of Pajarillo in the criminal case but
one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
crime.[18] The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is a quasi-delict not an act or
omission punishable by law.

In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,[19] where the issue involved was whether the civil action filed by plaintiff-
appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict, we held:

x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime in view of the reservation made by the offended
party in the criminal case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to file a separate civil action.
Said the trial court:

It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption that defendant Pontino's negligence in the
accident of May 10, 1969 constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that assumption. In
Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had already appeared as complainants. While that case was
pending, the offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action. If, in a criminal case, the right to
file a separate civil action for damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and not on tort. That
was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct. 31, 1964.

We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx

In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice between an action to enforce the civil liability
arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-delict under Article 2176-
2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent act
of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of the diligence of a good father of the family.

In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that
appellants reserved their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action did not preclude them from
choosing to file a civil action for quasi-delict.[20] (Emphasis supplied)

Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide is already final and executory, such
judgment has no relevance or importance to this case.[21] It would have been entirely different if respondents cause
of action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct in finding Safeguard to be only
subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code.[22]

As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents cause of action is based on quasi-delict. Under
Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the employer either in the selection of the
servant or employee, or in the supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon petitioners to prove that they exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting Evangeline.

The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or not is a question of fact, which, as a
general rule, we cannot pass upon in a petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing
errors of law.[23] Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal. The established exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the findings are grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of
facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went beyond the issues
of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact
are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA manifestly
overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly considered, would justify a
different conclusion; and (9) when the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and are
contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]

A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason for us to deviate from the factual
finding of the trial court and affirmed by the CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting
Evangeline.

Respondents evidence established that Evangelines purpose in going to the bank was to renew her time deposit.[25]
On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus,
acting instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.

Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of about one meter or one arms
length[26] he stepped backward, loaded the chamber of his gun and shot her.[27] It is however unimaginable that
petitioner Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already pointed at him. Any movement
could have prompted Evangeline to pull the trigger to shoot him.

Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his mere apprehension that Evangeline
will stage a bank robbery. However, such claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to
the incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10 meters away from the bank[28] and
saw her talking to a man thereat;[29] that she left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the
bank. However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show that indeed Evangeline was seen
roaming near the vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no
evidence that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the banks branch manager regarding his concerns or
that he reported the same to the police authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she could have already apprised herself that
Pajarillo, who was posted outside the bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the
bank[30] manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really had a companion, she would leave
him under the fly-over which is 10 meters far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-
up. In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun at Pajarillo would not ensure
entrance to the bank as there were guards manning the entrance door.

Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in
itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our knowledge,
observation and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial
cognizance.[31]

That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and was actually in the act of pulling her
gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in
petitioners petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached the bank, she was seen pulling a
gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a
dangerous threat, shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct;[32] that the act of drawing a gun is a threatening
act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to be used against petitioner Pajarillo;[33] that the fear that
was created in the mind of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her purse was
suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-preservation.[34]

Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent, Pajarillos claim of self-defense cannot be
accepted specially when such claim was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his
testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillos apprehension that Evangeline will shoot him to stage a bank robbery
has no basis at all. It is therefore clear that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillos
imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.

Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence. Although she was a licensed firearm
holder, she had no business bringing the gun in such establishment where people would react instinctively upon
seeing the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo before drawing the gun and did
not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held the
gun with the nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.

We are not persuaded.

As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that Evangeline was seen roaming outside the
vicinity of the bank and acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangelines death was merely due to
Pajarillos negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline will rob the bank.

Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately shown that it had exercised the
diligence required in the selection and supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to
undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications and credentials which even the RTC found
to have been complied with; that the RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts monitoring of the activities of its personnel,
wherein supervisors are assigned to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include among
others, whether or not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment, as well as regular evaluations of the
employees performances; that the fact that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguards operating procedure
is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper supervision; that it was likewise error to say
that Safeguard was negligent in seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not properly implemented by
reason of one unfortunate event.

We are not convinced.

Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:

Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for ones own acts or omissions, but also
for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

xxxx

Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their employees and household helpers acting within the scope
of their assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any business or industry.

xxxx

The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for the quasi-delict committed by the
former. Safeguard is presumed to be negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law.
This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the employer exercised the care and the
diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and the supervision of its employee.

In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine them as to their qualifications,
experience, and service records.[35] On the other hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the
formulation of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the issuance of proper instructions
intended for the protection of the public and persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its
employees and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in case of breach or as may be
warranted to ensure the performance of acts indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To
this, we add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with said rules should be the
constant concern of the employer, acting through dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their
supervisory functions.[36] To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious liability, employers
must submit concrete proof, including documentary evidence.
We agree with the RTCs finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence in the selection of Pajarillo since the
record shows that Pajarillo underwent a psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin
de Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a certification on the Pre-licensing training
course for security guards, as well as police and NBI clearances.

The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required in the supervision of its employee,
particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who
testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned
To Banks,[37] Weapons Training,[38] Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson Plan,[39]
Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,[40] it had also been established during Cameros cross-examination that Pajarillo
was not aware of such rules and regulations.[41] Notwithstanding Cameros clarification on his re-direct
examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a basis of guidelines of the instructors
during classroom instructions and not necessary to give students copy of the same,[42] the records do not show that
Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and continuous evaluation of the security guards
performance. Pajarillo had only attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta. Rosa,
his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in collaboration with Safeguard. It was established
that the concept of such training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection of the life of the
employees.[43]

It had not been established that after Pajarillos training in Toyota, Safeguard had ever conducted further training of
Pajarillo when he was later assigned to guard a bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In
fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on duty in a factory since a bank is a very
sensitive area.[44]

Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangelines act of just depositing her firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of
immediately shooting her, confirms that there was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and
on human psychology.

Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors who go around the bank two times a
day to see the daily performance of the security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such
daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged suspicious act of Evangeline could
have been taken noticed and reported.

Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual damages in the amount P157,430.00 which
were the expenses incurred by respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by receipts.
The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of Evangeline is likewise in order.

As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that the spouse, legitimate children and
illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason
of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions or
amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the defendants
culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must
be proportionate to the suffering inflicted.[45] The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is
proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the
offender.[46]

In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by Evangelines death was so sudden causing
respondent Lauro to lose a wife and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her death. In People
v. Teehankee, Jr.,[47] we awarded one million pesos as moral damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who
was murdered. In Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[48] we likewise awarded the amount of
one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year high school student and who was also their
youngest child who died in a vehicular accident since the girls death left a void in their lives. Hence, we hold that
the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million pesos as Evangelines death left a void in the lives of
her husband and minor children as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.

We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the
Civil Code, exemplary damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.[49] It is awarded as a deterrent to socially deleterious
actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence.[50]

Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered when, as in the instant case, exemplary
damages are awarded. Hence, we affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16, 2004 of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. is
SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Working Chairperson
ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR. MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Working Chairperson, First Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Working Chairpersons attestation, it is
hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* Retired as of December 7, 2006.

[1] CA rollo, pp. 127-135; Penned by Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Josefina
Guevara-Salonga and Fernanda Lampas Peralta.
[2] Id. at 158.
[3] Penned by Judge Percival Mandap Lopez.
[4] Docketed as G.R. CR No. 23947; Penned by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis and concurred in by Justices
Godardo A. Jacinto (retired) and Eliezer R. delos Santos.
[5] Records, pp. 1-5; Docketed as Case No. 98-417-MK.
[6] Id. at 21-30.
[7] Id. at 320-336.
[8] Id. at 336.
[9] CA rollo, p.134.
[10] Rollo, p. 16.
[11] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
[12] REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern-keepers and proprietors of
establishments. - In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern-keepers, and any other persons or
corporations shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of
municipal ordinances or some general or special police regulations shall have been committed by them or their
employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposits of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's employees.
Art. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article
shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies
committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
[13] Cancio, Jr. v. Isip, 440 Phil. 29, 34-36 (2002).
[14] Dulay v. Court of Appeals, 313 Phil. 8, 20 (1995), citing Republic v. Estenzo, G.R. No. L-35512,
February 29, 1988, 158 SCRA 282, 285.
[15] Id. citing De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, Inc., 197 Phil. 919, 926 (1982).
[16] Records, pp. 3-4.
[17] Supra note 14, at 20-21.
[18] Bordas v. Canadalla, G.R. No. L-30036, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 37, 39.
[19] G.R. No. L-32055, February 26, 1988, 158 SCRA 168.
[20] Id. at 170-171.
[21] McKee v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 68102, July 16, 1992, 211 SCRA 517, 536.
[22] Id.
[23] Yambao v. Zuiga, 463 Phil. 650, 657 (2003).
[24] Child Learning Center Inc. v. Tagorio, G.R. No. 150920, November 25, 2005, 476 SCRA 236, 241-242.
[25] TSN, October 1, 1998, p. 33; TSN, November 12, 1998, p. 6.
[26] TSN, April 4, 2002, p. 36.
[27] Id. at 79.
[28] Id. at 42.
[29] Id. at 40-41.
[30] Id. at 99.
[31] Castaares v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. L-41269-70, August 6, 1979, 92 SCRA 568, 580.
[32] Rollo, p.17.
[33] Id. at 18.
[34] Id. at 19.
[35] Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 18, 32 (1998).
[36] Metro Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104408, June 21, 1993, 223 SCRA
521, 540-541.
[37] Records, pp. 263-267, Exhibit 10.
[38] Id. at 268-270, Exhibit 11.
[39] Id. at 271-274, Exhibit 12.
[40] Id. at 275-279, Exhibit 13.
[41] TSN, April 11, 2000, p. 26.
[42] Id. at 30-31.
[43] TSN, May 19, 1999, pp. 15-16.
[44] TSN, April 4, 2002, p. 83.
[45] Pleyto v. Lomboy, G.R. No. 148737, June 16, 2004, 432 SCRA 329, 342.
[46] Secosa v. Heirs of Erwin Suarez Francisco, G.R. No. 160039, June 29, 2004, 433 SCRA 273, 282.
[47] 319 Phil. 128, 216 (1995).
[48] Supra note 35, at 44.
[49] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2229.
[50] CIVIL CODE, Art. 2231.

Synopsis/Syllabi
EN BANC
[ G.R. No. 125646. September 10, 1999]
CITY OF PASIG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTION and THE MUNICIPALITY
OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, respondents.
[ G.R. No. 128663. September 10, 1999]
MUNICIPALITY OF CAINTA, PROVINCE OF RIZAL, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CITY
OF PASIG, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before us are two (2) petitions which both question the propriety of the suspension of plebiscite proceedings
pending the resolution of the issue of boundary disputes between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig.

G.R. No. 125646 involves the proposed Barangay Karangalan while G.R. No. 128663 involves the
proposed Barangay Napico. The City of Pasig claims these areas as part of its jurisdiction/territory while the
Municipality of Cainta claims that these proposed barangays encroached upon areas within its own
jurisdiction/territory.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be segregated from its mother
Barangays Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be
known as Barangay Karangalan, the City Council of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996,
creating Barangay Karangalan in Pasig City.[1] Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for
June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile, on September 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52, Series of 1996, creating
Barangay Napico in Pasig City.[2] Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend or cancel the
respective plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the Commission on Elections (hereinafter referred to as
COMELEC) on June 19, 1996 (UND No. 96-016)[3] and March 12, 1997 (UND No. 97-002), respectively. In both
Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute.[4] According to the Municipality of
Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of said pending case; hence,
the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended or cancelled until after the said case shall have been finally decided
by the court.

In UND No. 96-016, the COMELEC accepted the position of the Municipality of Cainta and ordered the plebiscite
on the creation of Barangay Karangalan to be held in abeyance until after the court has settled with finality the
boundary dispute involving the two municipalities.[5] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 125646 by the City of
Pasig.

The COMELEC, however, ruled differently in UND No. 97-002, dismissing the Petition for being moot in view of
the holding of the plebiscite as scheduled on March 15, 1997 where the creation of Barangay Napico was ratified

and approved by the majority of the votes cast therein.[6] Hence, the filing of G.R. No. 128663 by the
Municipality of Cainta.

The issue before us is whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and
Napico should be suspended or cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the two local
governments.

To begin with, we agree with the position of the COMELEC that Civil Case No. 94-3006 involving the boundary
dispute between the Municipality of Cainta and the City of Pasig presents a prejudicial question which must first be
decided before plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.

The City of Pasig argues that there is no prejudicial question since the same contemplates a civil and criminal action
and does not come into play where both cases are civil, as in the instant case. While this may be the general rule,
this Court has held in Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42,[7] that, in the interest of good order, we can very
well suspend action on one case pending the final outcome of another case closely interrelated or linked to the first.

In the case at bar, while the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed Barangays
Karangalan and Napico are within its territory, it can not deny that portions of the same area are included in the
boundary dispute case pending before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in
controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig
has material bearing to the creation of the proposed Barangays Karangalan and Napico. Indeed, a requisite for the
creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by more or
less permanent natural boundaries.[8] Precisely because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in the pending civil
case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed
barangays would only be an exercise in futility. Not only that, we would be paving the way for potentially ultra
vires acts of such barangays. Indeed, in Mariano, Jr. v. Commission on Elections,[9] we held that

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government cannot be
overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will prejudice
the peoples welfare.
Moreover, considering the expenses entailed in the holding of plebiscites, it is far more prudent to hold in abeyance
the conduct of the same, pending final determination of whether or not the entire area of the proposed barangays are
truly within the territorial jurisdiction of the City of Pasig.

Neither do we agree that merely because a plebiscite had already been held in the case of the proposed Barangay
Napico, the petition of the Municipality of Cainta has already been rendered moot and academic. The issues raised
by the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the
creation of Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo Regional Trial Court.

In Tan v. Commission on Elections,[10] we struck down the moot and academic argument as follows --

Considering that the legality of the plebiscite itself is challenged for non-compliance with constitutional requisites,
the fact that such plebiscite had been held and a new province proclaimed and its officials appointed, the case
before Us cannot truly be viewed as already moot and academic. Continuation of the existence of this newly
proclaimed province which petitioners strongly profess to have been illegally born, deserves to be inquired into by
this Tribunal so that, if indeed, illegality attaches to its creation, the commission of that error should not provide the
very excuse for perpetration of such wrong. For this Court to yield to the respondents urging that, as there has been
fait accompli, then this Court should passively accept and accede to the prevailing situation is an unacceptable
suggestion. Dismissal of the instant petition, as respondents so propose is a proposition fraught with mischief.
Respondents submission will create a dangerous precedent. Should this Court decline now to perform its duty of
interpreting and indicating what the law is and should be, this might tempt again those who strut about in the
corridors of power to recklessly and with ulterior motives, create, merge, divide and/or alter the boundaries of
political subdivisions, either brazenly or stealthily, confident that this Court will abstain from entertaining future
challenges to their acts if they manage to bring about a fait accompli.

Therefore, the plebiscite on the creation of Barangay Karangalan should be held in abeyance pending final
resolution of the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the Municipality of Cainta by the Regional Trial
Court of Antipolo City. In the same vein, the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the creation of Barangay
Napico, Pasig City, should be annulled and set aside.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

1. The Petition of the City of Pasig in G.R. No. 125646 is DISMISSED for lack of merit; while

2. The Petition of the Municipality of Cainta in G.R. No. 128663 is GRANTED. The COMELEC Order in
UND No. 97-002, dated March 21, 1997, is SET ASIDE and the plebiscite held on March 15, 1997 to ratify the
creation of Barangay Napico in the City of Pasig is declared null and void. Plebiscite on the same is ordered held in
abeyance until after the courts settle with finality the boundary dispute between the City of Pasig and the
Municipality of Cainta, in Civil Case No. 94-300.
No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing Purisima, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes,
JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., on official leave.
Pardo, J., no part; was COMELEC Chairman.

[1] Petition, G.R. No. 125646, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 23-25.1

[2] Petition, G.R. No. 128663, Annex, Rollo, pp. 37-39.2

[3] Petition, G.R. No. 125646, Annex B, Rollo, pp. 26-31.3

[4] Petition, G.R. No. 125646, Annex Q, Civil Case No. 94-3006, Rollo, pp. 170-177; Petition, G.R.
No. 128663, Annex J, Rollo, pp. 42-45.4

[5] See Petition, G.R. No. 125646, Annex D, Order, UND No. 96-016, Rollo, pp. 35-36.5

[6] See Petition, G.R. No. 128663, Annex M, Order, UND No. 97-002, Rollo, pp. 67-68.6

[7] See Vidad v. RTC of Negros Oriental, Br. 42, G.R. No. 98084, 227 SCRA 271, 276 (1993).7
[8] Sec. 386(b), R.A. No. 7160.8

[9] G.R. Nos. 118577 and 118627, 242 SCRA 211, 217 (1995).9

[10] G.R. No. 73155, 142 SCRA 727, 741-742 (1986).10

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000]
MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO
TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents.

DECISION

BUENA, J.:

This petition for review, filed under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, seeks to review and set aside the
Order dated January 28, 1999 issued by Judge Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City,
Branch 139 in Special Civil Case No. 98-3056, entitled "Meynardo Beltran vs. People of the Philippines and Hon.
Judge Alden Cervantes of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati city, Branch 61." The said Order denied
petitioners prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin Judge Cervantes from proceeding
with the trial of Criminal Case No. 236176, a concubinage case against petitioner on the ground that the pending
petition for declaration of nullity of marriage filed by petitioner against his wife constitutes a prejudicial question.

The antecedent facts of the case are undisputed:

Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married on June 16, 1973 at the Immaculate
Concepcion Parish Church in Cubao, Quezon City.[1]

On February 7, 1997, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children,[2] petitioner filed a petition for nullity
of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. Q-97-30192.[3]

In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner who abandoned
the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting.[4] Charmaine subsequently filed a
criminal complaint for concubinage[5] under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his
paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found
probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information[6] against them. The case, docketed as Criminal Case No.
236176, was filed before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 61.

On March 20, 1998, petitioner, in order to forestall the issuance of a warrant for his arrest, filed a Motion to Defer
Proceedings Including the Issuance of the Warrant of Arrest in the criminal case. Petitioner argued that the
pendency of the civil case for declaration of nullity of his marriage posed a prejudicial question to the determination
of the criminal case. Judge Alden Vasquez Cervantes denied the foregoing motion in the Order[7] dated August 31,
1998. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order of denial was likewise denied in an Order dated
December 9, 1998.
In view of the denial of his motion to defer the proceedings in the concubinage case, petitioner went to the Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 139 on certiorari, questioning the Orders dated August 31, 1998 and December
9, 1998 issued by Judge Cervantes and praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.[8] In an
Order[9] dated January 28, 1999, the Regional Trial Court of Makati denied the petition for certiorari. Said Court
subsequently issued another Order[10] dated February 23, 1999, denying his motion for reconsideration of the
dismissal of his petition.

Undaunted, petitioner filed the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the
suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife.

Petitioner also contends that there is a possibility that two conflicting decisions might result from the civil case for
annulment of marriage and the criminal case for concubinage. In the civil case, the trial court might declare the
marriage as valid by dismissing petitioner's complaint but in the criminal case, the trial court might acquit petitioner
because the evidence shows that his marriage is void on ground of psychological incapacity. Petitioner submits that
the possible conflict of the courts' ruling regarding petitioner's marriage can be avoided, if the criminal case will be
suspended, until the court rules on the validity of marriage; that if petitioner's marriage is declared void by reason of
psychological incapacity then by reason of the arguments submitted in the subject petition, his marriage has never
existed; and that, accordingly, petitioner could not be convicted in the criminal case because he was never before a
married man.

Petitioner's contentions are untenable.

The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential
elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action;
and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.[11]

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the
concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the
latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the
same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues
raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined.

Article 40 of the Family Code provides:

"The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a
final judgment declaring such previous marriage void."
In Domingo vs. Court of Appeals,[12] this Court ruled that the import of said provision is that for purposes of
remarriage, the only legally acceptable basis for declaring a previous marriage an absolute nullity is a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void, whereas, for purposes of other than remarriage, other evidence is
acceptable. The pertinent portions of said Decision read:

"xxx Undoubtedly, one can conceive of other instances where a party might well invoke the absolute nullity of a
previous marriage for purposes other than remarriage, such as in case of an action for liquidation, partition,
distribution and separation of property between the erstwhile spouses, as well as an action for the custody and
support of their common children and the delivery of the latters' presumptive legitimes. In such cases, evidence
needs must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These needs not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such
previous marriage void."

So that in a case for concubinage, the accused, like the herein petitioner need not present a final judgment declaring
his marriage void for he can adduce evidence in the criminal case of the nullity of his marriage other than proof of a
final judgment declaring his marriage void.

With regard to petitioner's argument that he could be acquitted of the charge of concubinage should his marriage be
declared null and void, suffice it to state that even a subsequent pronouncement that his marriage is void from the
beginning is not a defense.

Analogous to this case is that of Landicho vs. Reloval[13] cited in Donato vs. Luna[14] where this Court held that:

"xxx Assuming that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be
material to the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves
its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the
marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."

Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not
his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial
Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal
case for concubinage.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant petition is DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Amended complaint, Annex "E," Petition, Rollo, p. 61.

[2] Annex "E," Rollo, p. 61.
[3] Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.
[4] Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 14.
[5] Petition, Annex "F," Rollo, pp. 69-70.
[6] Petition, annex "H," Rollo, pp. 80-81.
[7] Petition, Annex "I," Rollo, pp. 82-83.
[8] Petition, Annex "J," Rollo, pp. 84-100.
[9] Petition, Annex "A," Rollo, pp. 33-39.
[10] Petition, Annex "C," Rollo, pp. 52-54.
[11] Carlos vs. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 25 (1997)
[12] 226 SCRA 572 (1993)
[13] 22 SCRA 731 (1968)
[14] 160 SCRA 441 (1988)

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15315 August 26, 1960

ABUNDIO MERCED, petitioner,

vs.
HON. CLEMENTINO V. DIEZ, ETC. ET AL., respondents.

Pedro A. Bandoquillo for petitioner.

Fulvio Pelaez for respondents.
LABRADOR, J.:

This is a petition for a writ of certiorari with prohibition to prohibit the judge presiding the Court of First Instance
of Negros Oriental, Hon. Clementino V. Diez, from proceeding further in the Criminal Case No. V-6520, entitled
People of the Philippines vs. Abundio Merced until after final termination of Civil Case No. R-5387, for the
annulment of the marriage of petitioner Abundio Merced with Elizabeth Ceasar, also pending in same court.

The record disclose the following proceedings in the court a quo: On January 30, 1958, Abundio Merced filed a
complaint for annulment of his second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar. The complaint is docketed as Civil Case No.
R-5387. The complaint alleges that defendant Elizabeth Ceasar and her relatives forced, threatened and intimated
him into signing an affidavit to the effect that he and defendant had been living together as husband and wife for
over five years, which is not true; that this affidavit was used by defendant in securing their marriage of exceptional
character, without the need for marriage license; that he was again forced, threatened and intimated by defendant
and her relatives into entering the marriage with her on August 21, 1957 before Municipal Judge Medardo A.
Conde; that immediately after the celebration of the marriage plaintiff left defendant and never lived with her; that
the defendant wrote him on October 29, 1957, admitting that he was forced into the marriage and asking him to go
to Cebu to have the marriage annulled, but he refused to go for fear he may be forced into living with the defendant.
Merced prays for annulment of the marriage and for moral damages in the amount of P2,000. On March 3, 1958,
Elizabeth Ceasar filed her answer to the complaint. In her answer, she denies the material allegations of the
complaint and avers as affirmative defenses that neither she nor her relatives know of plaintiff's previous marriage
to Eufrocina Tan; that sometime in July, 1957, plaintiff asked her mother to intercede on their behalf to secure her
father's consent to their marriage as plaintiff could not concentrate on his studies without marrying Elizabeth, but
that her mother advised him to finish his studies first; that sometime in April, 1957, defendant learned that plaintiff
was engaged to marry Eufrocina Tan, but plaintiff, upon being confronted with such discovery, showed her a letter
which he wrote breaking off his engagement with Tan. As a counterclaim defendant asks P50,000 as moral damages
for the deceit, fraud and insidious machinations committed upon her by plaintiff.

On February 19, 1958, after had filed Civil Case No. R-5387 defendant Elizabeth Ceasar filed a criminal complaint
for bigamy 39 3 against plaintiff Abundio Merced with the office of the City Fiscal of Cebu. On April 7, 1958 the
Assistant City Fiscal filed Criminal Case No. V-6520, charging Merced with bigamy for the second marriage. The
information reads.

The undersigned Assistant Fiscal of City of Cebu accuses Abundio Merced of the crime of bigamy, committed as
follows:

That on or about the 21st day of August, 1957, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the said accused Abundio Merced, being previously united in lawful marriage with Eufrocina
Tan, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved did then and there wilfully unlawfully, feloniously
contract a second marriage with Elizabeth Ceasar.
Contrary to Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. (Annex "2".)

Abundio Merced filed a motion to hold to trial of said criminal case in abeyance until final termination of Civil
Case No. R- 5387. Reason alleged for the motion is that the Civil Action involves facts which if proved will
determine the innocence of the accused. After an opposition thereto was filed by the assistant provincial fiscal, the
court granted the motion. However, upon motion for reconsideration filed by the fiscal, the order was set aside and
another entered denying the motion of accused for suspension of the criminal proceedings, which last order is the
one sough herein to be annulled. The court held in its last order that inasmuch as by virtue of the decision of the
Supreme Court in the case of People vs. Mendoza, 95 Phil., 50 Off. Gaz. [10], 4767, judicial declaration of nullity
of a second and bigamous marriage is not necessary, there is no need in this case to decide the nullity of the second
marriage, or to determine and declare the existence of the grounds for annulling the same, but that said grounds
should be used as a defense in the criminal action. A motion to reconsider the second order of the court having been
denied, petition herein was filed.

When the petition for certiorari with prohibition was filed, the petitioner secured from this Court a writ of
preliminary injunction to enjoin respondent judge from proceeding further in the criminal case.

Before this Court the sole question raised is whether an action to annul the second marriage is a prejudicial question
in a prosecution for bigamy.

The definition and the elements of a prejudicial question have been set forth by us as follows:

Prejudicial question has been defined to be that which arises in a case, the resolution of which (question) is a logical
antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another Tribunal (Cuestion
prejudicial, es 3o 3 la que surge en un pleito o causa cuya resolucion sean antecedente logico de la cuestion-objeto
del pleito o causa y cuyo conocimiento corresponda a los Tribunales de otro orden o jurisdiccion. Enciclopedia
Juridica Espaola, p. 228). The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court; this is its
first element. Jurisdiction to try said question must be lodged in another tribunal; this is the second element. In an
action for bigamy for example, if the accused claims that the first marriage is null and void and the right to decide
such validity is vested in another tribunal, the civil action for nullity must be first decided before the action for
bigamy can proceed, hence, the validity of the first marriage is a prejudicial question. (People vs. Aragon, 94 Phil.,
357; 50 Off. Gaz., No. 10, 4863).

In order that a person may be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the second and subsequent marriage must have all
the essential elements of a valid marriage, were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. This was the ruling of
this Court in People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil., 246, where we said:

It is an essential element of the crime of bigamy that the alleged second marriage, having all the essential requisites,
would be valid were it not for the subsistence of the first marriage. It appearing that the marriage alleged to have
been contracted by the accused with Sabdapal, her former marriage with Hassan being undissolved, can not be
considered as such, according to Mohameddan rites, there is no justification to hold her guilty of the crime charged
in the information. (People vs. Dumpo, 62 Phil. 246).

One of the essential elements of a valid marriage is that the consent thereto of the contracting parties must be freely
and voluntarily given. Without the element of consent a marriage would be illegal and void. (Section 29, Act No.
3613, otherwise known as the Marriage Law.) But the question of invalidity can not ordinarily be decided in the
criminal action for bigamy but in a civil action for annulment. Since the validity of the second marriage, subject of
the action for bigamy, cannot be determined in the criminal case and since prosecution for bigamy does not lie
unless the elements of the second marriage appear to exist, it is necessary that a decision in a civil action to the
effect that the second marriage contains all the essentials of a marriage must first be secured.

We have, therefore, in the case at bar, the issue of the validity of the second marriage, which must be determined
before hand in the civil action, before the criminal action can proceed. We have a situation where the issue of the
validity of the second marriage can be determined or must be determined in the civil action before the criminal
action for bigamy can be prosecuted. The question of the validity of the second marriage is, therefore, a prejudicial
question, because determination of the validity of the second marriage is determinable in the civil action and must
precede the criminal action for bigamy.

Spanish jurisprudence, from which the principle of prejudicial question has been taken, requires that the essential
element determinative of the criminal action must be cognizable by another court. This requirement of a different
court is demanded in Spanish jurisprudence because Spanish courts are divided according to their jurisdictions,
some courts being exclusively of civil jurisdiction, others of criminal jurisdiction. In the Philippines, where our
courts are vested with both civil and criminal jurisdiction, the principle of prejudicial question is to be applied even
if there is only one court before which the civil action and the criminal action are to be litigated. But in this case the
court when exercising its jurisdiction over the civil action for the annulment of marriage is considered as a court
distinct and different from itself when trying the criminal action for bigamy.

Our conclusion that the determination of the validity of the marriage in the civil action for annulment is a
prejudicial question, insofar as the criminal action for bigamy is concerned, is supported by Mr. Justice Moran in
his dissenting opinion in De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207 thus:

La regla general es que cuando hay una cuestion civil y otra criminal sobre un mismo delito u ofensa, la segunda
debe verse antes que la primera, por la razon de que las formas de un juicio criminal son las mas a proposito para la
averiguacion de un delito, y no las de un juicio civil. Esta regla tiene, sin embargo, una excepcion, y es la que se
refiere a una cueston civil prejudicial. Una cuestion civil es de caracter prejudicial y debe resolverse antes que una
cuestion criminal, cuando versa sonbre un hecho distinto y separado del delito, pero tan intimamente ligado a el que
determina la culpabilidad o inocencia del acusado. Por ejemplo, una accion criminal por bigamia.

The majority decision in said case of De Leon vs. Mabanag also sustains the theory that when a civil action is
pending in court, in which a validity of a document claimed to be false and fictitious is in issue, the fiscal may not
prosecute the person who allegedly executed the false document because the issue of the validity of the instrument
is sub judice and the prosecuting officer should be ordered to suspend the criminal action until the prejudicial
question has been finally determined. Thus the Court said"

Hablando en terminos generales la facultad del Fiscal y su deber perseguir los delitos no deben ser controlados ni
coartados por los tribunales; pero no hay duda que esa facultad puede ser regulada para que no se abuse de ella.
Cuando un miembro del Ministerio Fiscal se desvia de la ley y entorpece la recta administracion de justicia
procesando a una persona por hechos constituvos de delito que se encuentran sub-judice y de los cuales se propone
una cuestion prejudicial administrativa, es deber de los tribunales llamarle la atencion y obligarle que suspenda toda
accion criminal hasta que la cuestion prejudicial administrativa se haya decidido finalmente. (De Leon vs.
Mabanag, 70 Phil., 207.)

The case of People vs. Mendoza, supra, upon which the trial court and the respondents rely, presents a different sets
of facts from the case at bar. So is the ruling therein as contained in the syllabus. In the case of People vs. Mendoza,
Mendoza was charged with and convicted of bigamy for a marriage with one Carmencita Panlilio, contracted in
August, 1949. Mendoza was married for the first time in 1946 with Josefa de Asis; then married for the second time
with Olga Lema; and then married for the third time to Panlilio in 1949. On February 2, 1943, Josefa de Asis died.
The court citing the provisions of Article 29 of the marriage law, held that the second marriage of the appellant
Mendoza with Lema was operation of law null and void, because at the time of the second marriage in 1941,
appellant's former wife Josefa de Asis was still living. This marriage of appellant with Lema being null and void at
the time the appellant contracted the said marriage, the impediment of the second marriage did not exist. Hence the
appellant was acquitted of bigamy for the 1949 marriage because his previous marriage with Lema in 1941, by
operation of law, was void ab initio.

In the case at bar, in order that the petitioner be held guilty of the crime of bigamy, the marriage which she
contracted for the second time with Elizabeth Ceasar, must first be declared valid. But its validity has been
questioned in the civil action. This civil action must be decided before the prosecution for bigamy can proceed.

For the foregoing considerations, the petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari and prohibition is hereby
granted. The order of the court denying the petition of the herein petitioner to prohibit the Fiscal from prosecuting
the case for bigamy, criminal case no. V-6520, entitled People vs. Abundio Merced, is hereby set aside and the
preliminary injunction issued by this court to that effect is hereby made permanent. So Ordered.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

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Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-53642 April 15, 1988

LEONILO C. DONATO, petitioners,

vs.
HON. ARTEMON D. LUNA, PRESIDING JUDGE, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANIIA, BRANCH
XXXII HON. JOSE FLAMINIANO, CITY FISCAL OF MANILA; PAZ B. ABAYAN, respondents.

Leopoldo P. Dela Rosa for petitioner.

Emiterio C. Manibog for private respondent.

City Fiscal of Manila for public respondent.

GANCAYCO, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction, the question for the resolution of the Court
is whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the Court of First Itance of Manila should be suspended
in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court on the
ground that the latter constitutes a prejudicial question. The respondent judge ruled in the negative. We sustain him.

The pertinent facts as set forth in the records follow. On January 23, 1979, the City Fiscal of Manila acting thru
Assistant City Fiscal Amado N. Cantor filed an information for bigamy against herein petitioner, Leonilo C. Donato
with the Court of First Instance of Manila, docketed as Criminal Case No. 43554 and assigned to Branch XXXII of
said court. The information was filed based on the complaint of private respondent Paz B. Abayan.

On September 28, 1979, before the petitioner's arraignment, private respondent filed with the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Manila a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner
contracted on September 26, 1978, which action was docketed as Civil Case No. E-02627. Said civil case was
based on the ground that private respondent consented to entering into the marriage, which was petitioner Donato's
second one, since she had no previous knowledge that petitioner was already married to a certain Rosalinda R.
Maluping on June 30, 1978. Petitioner Donato's answer in the civil case for nullity interposed the defense that his
second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force, violence, intimidation
and undue influence were employed by private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the
solemnization of the subsequent or second marriage, petitioner and private respondent had lived together and
deported themselves as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for a period of at least five years as
evidenced by a joint affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978, for which reason, the requisite marriage
license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the New Civil Code pertaining to marriages of exceptional
character.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of Criminal Case No. 43554, petitioner filed a motion to suspend the
proceedings of said case contending that Civil Case No. E-02627 seeking the annulment of his second marriage
filed by private respondent raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or decided before the
criminal case can proceed.

In an order dated April 7, 1980. Hon. Artemon D. Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal
Case No. 43554 for bigamy. Respondent judge's basis for denial is the ruling laid down in the case of Landicho vs.
Relova. 1 The order further directed that the proceedings in the criminal case can proceed as scheduled.

A motion for reconsideration was flied by herein petitioner thru counsel citing as one of his grounds for suspension
of proceedings the ruling laid down by this Court in the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito 2 which was a much later
case than that cited by respondent judge in his order of denial.

The motion for reconsideration of the said order was likewise denied in an order dated April 14, 1980, for lack of
merit. Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction.

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which question is a
logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. 3 It is
one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the
guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case
involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be
determined. 4 A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action
may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de
jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in a criminal case. 5

The requisites of a prejudicial question do not obtain in the case at bar. It must be noted that the issue before the
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court touching upon the nullity of the second marriage is not determinative of
petitioner Donato's guilt or innocence in the crime of bigamy. Furthermore, it was petitioner's second wife, the
herein private respondent Paz B. Abayan who filed the complaint for annulment of the second marriage on the
ground that her consent was obtained through deceit.
Petitioner Donato raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by private respondent only sometime later
when he was required to answer the civil action for anulment of the second marriage. The doctrine elucidated upon
by the case of Landicho vs. Relova 6 may be applied to the present case. Said case states that:

The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a bigamy case does not
mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the case.
In order that the case of annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the
accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the one that was obtained by means
of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy. The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time
the petitioner was indicted for bigamy on February 27, 1963, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been
contracted appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed the action for
nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only on June 15, 1963, that petitioner, as
defendant in the civil action, filed a third-party complaint against the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her
should be declared null and void on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming that the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the case.
Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to
the judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void,
and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted
for bigamy. The lower court therefore, has not abused much less gravely abused, its discretion in failing to suspend
the hearing as sought by petitioner.

In the case at bar, petitioner has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has been
obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation.

Petitioner calls the attention of this Court to the fact that the case of De la Cruz vs. Ejercito is a later case and as
such it should be the one applied to the case at bar. We cannot agree. The situation in the case at bar is markedly
different. In the aforecited case it was accused Milagros dela Cruz who was charged with bigamy for having
contracted a second marriage while a previous one existed. Likewise, Milagros dela Cruz was also the one who
filed an action for annulment on the ground of duress, as contra-distinguished from the present case wherein it was
private respondent Paz B. Abayan, petitioner's second wife, who filed a complaint for annulment of the second
marriage on the ground that her consent was obtained through deceit since she was not aware that petitioner's
marriage was still subsisting. Moreover, in De la Cruz, a judgment was already rendered in the civil case that the
second marriage of De la Cruz was null and void, thus determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the
criminal case. In the present case, there is as yet no such judgment in the civil case.

Pursuant to the doctrine discussed in Landicho vs. Relova, petitioner Donato cannot apply the rule on prejudicial
questions since a case for annulment of marriage can be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case
against the accused only if it is proved that the petitioner's consent to such marriage was obtained by means of
duress, violence and intimidation in order to establish that his act in the subsequent marriage was an involuntary
one and as such the same cannot be the basis for conviction. The preceding elements do not exist in the case at bar.

Obviously, petitioner merely raised the issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case.
The records reveal that prior to petitioner's second marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with private
respondent Paz B. Abayan as husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage. Thus,
petitioner's averments that his consent was obtained by private respondent through force, violence, intimidation and
undue influence in entering a subsequent marriage is belled by the fact that both petitioner and private respondent
executed an affidavit which stated that they had lived together as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for
five years, one month and one day until their marital union was formally ratified by the second marriage and that it
was private respondent who eventually filed the civil action for nullity.

Another event which militates against petitioner's contentions is the fact hat it was only when Civil Case No. E-
02627 was filed on September 28, 1979, or more than the lapse of one year from the solemnization of the second
marriage that petitioner came up with the story that his consent to the marriage was secured through the use of
force, violence, intimidation and undue influence. Petitioner also continued to live with private respondent until
November 1978, when the latter left their abode upon learning that Leonilo Donato was already previously married.

In the light of the preceding factual circumstances, it can be seen that the respondent Judge did not err in his earlier
order. There is no pivotal issue that must be pre-emptively resolved in Civil Case No. E-02627 before proceedings
in the criminal action for bigamy can be undertaken.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the respondent judge
dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. We make no
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Narvasa, Cruz and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 22 SCRA 731.

2 68 SCRA 1.

3 People va. Aragon, 94 Phil. 357; Isip vs. Gonzales, 39 SCRA 255; Rojas vs. People, 57 SCRA 243.
4 Libra va. Coscolluela, Jr., 116 SCRA 303.

5 Ibid.

6 22 SCRA 73.

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SYLLABI/SYNOPSIS

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 119398. July 2, 1999]
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO JR., petitioner vs. COURT OF APPEALS, THE PHILIPPINE CHARITY
SWEEPSTAKES OFFICE and FERNANDO O. CARRASCOSO JR., respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

To hold public officers personally liable for moral and exemplary damages and for attorneys fees for acts done in
the performance of official functions, the plaintiff must prove that these officers exhibited acts characterized by
evident bad faith, malice, or gross negligence. But even if their acts had not been so tainted, public officers may still
be held liable for nominal damages if they had violated the plaintiffs constitutional rights.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision[1] of the
Court of Appeals[2] in CA-GR CV No. 39252 promulgated on September 9, 1994. The assailed Decision reversed
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 2, in Civil Case No. 91-55873, which disposed of the
controversy in favor of herein petitioner in the following manner:[3]

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants, ordering them,
jointly and severally the following:

ON THE FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION

1. To pay P143,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 26, 1986 until complete payment thereof;

2. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon [from] June 8, 1986 until complete payment thereof;
3. To pay P142,700.00 plus interest thereon from July 10, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

4. To pay P70,000.00 plus interest thereon from February 1, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

5. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from March 22, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

6. To pay P28,000.00 plus interest thereon from April 26, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

7. To pay P14,000.00 plus interest thereon from May 17, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

8. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from August 9, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

9. To pay P174,000.00 plus interest thereon from December 13, 1987 until complete payment thereof;

10. To pay P140,000.00 plus interest thereon from September 18, 1988 until complete payment thereof;

11. All income derived from the foregoing amounts.

ON THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION

Ordering defendant Fernando O. Carrascoso the following:

1. To pay moral damages in the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00);

2. To pay exemplary damages in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00);

3. To pay attorneys fees in the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00);

4. To pay the costs of suit.

The counterclaim is ordered dismissed, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

In a Resolution[4] dated March 7, 1995, Respondent Court denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

The Facts

The following is the Court of Appeals undisputed narration of the facts:

Plaintiff [herein petitioner] is a known businessman-sportsman owning several racehorses which he entered in the
sweepstakes races between the periods covering March 6, 1986 to September 18, 1989. Several of his horses won
the races on various dates, landing first, second or third places, respectively, and winning prizes together with the
30% due for trainer/grooms which are itemized as follows:

Date Place Stake Horse Racewinning 30% Due Net Amount

Winner Prize Claims Training Withheld by

Grooms PCSO

03/25/86 1st Hansuyen 200,000.00 57,000.00 143,000.00

06/08/86 2nd Stronghold 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00

07/10/86 1st Kahala 200,000.00 57,300.00 142,700.00

02/01/87 1st Devil's Brew 100,000.00 30,000.00 70,000.00

03/22/87 1st Time to Explode 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00

04/26/87 3rd Stormy Petril 40,000.00 12,000.00 28,000.00

05/17/87 1st Starring Role 20,000.00 6,000.00 14,000.00

08/09/87 1st Star Studded 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00

12/13/87 2nd Charade 250,000.00 75,000.00 174,000.00

09/18/88 1st Hair Trigger 200,000.00 60,000.00 140,000.00

TOTAL 1,450,000.00 429,300.00 1,020,700.00

[Herein petitioner] sent letters of demand (Exhibits A, dated July 3, 1986; B dated August 18, 1986; and C, dated
September 11, 1990) to the defendants [herein private respondents] for the collection of the prizes due him. And
[herein private respondents] consistently replied (Exhibits 2 and 3) that the demanded prizes are being withheld on
advice of Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz of the Presidential Commission on Good Government. Finally on January
30, 1991, this case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Manila. But before receipt of the summons on
February 7, 1991, Presidential Commission on Good Government advi[s]ed defendants that it poses no more
objection to the remittance of the prize winnings (Exh. 6) to [herein petitioner]. Immediately, this was
communicated to Atty. Estelito Mendoza by [Private Respondent Fernando] Carrascoso [Jr.].[5]
As culled from the pleadings of the parties, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, petitioners counsel, refused to accept the
prizes at this point, reasoning that the matter had already been brought to court.

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court ruled that Respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and its then chairman,
Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr., had no authority to withhold the subject racehorse winnings of petitioner,
since no writ of sequestration therefor had been issued by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG). It held that it was Carrascosos unwarranted personal initiative not to release the prizes. Having been a
previous longtime associate of petitioner in his horse racing and breeding activities, he had supposedly been aware
that petitioners winning horses were not ill-gotten. The trial court held that, by not paying the winnings, Carrascoso
had acted in bad faith amounting to the persecution and harassment of petitioner and his family.[6] It thus ordered
the PCSO and Carrascoso to pay in solidum petitioners claimed winnings plus interests. It further ordered
Carrascoso to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit.

While the case was pending with the Court of Appeals, petitioner moved for the partial execution pending appeal of
the RTC judgment, praying for the payment of the principal amount of his prize winnings. Private respondents
posed no objection thereto and manifested their readiness to release the amount prayed for. Hence, the trial court
issued on February 14, 1992, an Order[7] for the issuance of a writ of execution in the amount of P1,020,700.
Accordingly, on May 20, 1992, Respondent PCSO delivered the amount to petitioner.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the appellate court, herein private respondents assigned the following errors:[8]

THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN HOLDING THAT DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS ACTED IN BAD FAITH IN
WITHHOLDING PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE[S] PRIZE[S];

II.

THE COURT A QUO ERRED [IN] AWARDING MORAL DAMAGES, EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND
ATTORNEYS FEES IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE.

In reversing the trial courts finding of bad faith on the part of Carrascoso, the Court of Appeals held that the former
PCSO chairman was merely carrying out the instruction of the PCGG in regard to the prize winnings of petitioner.
It noted that, at the time, the scope of the sequestration of the properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos
and his cronies was not well-defined. Respondent Court explained:[9]
xxx Under those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the
PCGG, the official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize winnings of the [petitioner], and
more so, to obey the instructions subsequently given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on [petitioner] but
defendant Carrascoso had no alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within
the powers of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to
avoid a possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him.

The Court of Appeals also noted that the following actuations of Carrascoso negated bad faith: (1) he promptly
replied to petitioners demand for the release of his prizes, citing PCGGs instruction to withhold payment thereof;
(2) upon PCGGs subsequent advice to release petitioners winnings, he immediately informed petitioner thereof; and
(3) he interposed no objection to the partial execution, pending appeal, of the RTC decision. Respondent Court
finally disposed as follows:[10]

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new
one entered DISMISSING this case. No pronouncement as to costs.

On September 29, 1994, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was denied on March 7, 1995. Hence,
this petition.[11]

Issues

Petitioner asks this Court to resolve the following issues:

a. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the appeal of respondent Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office (PCSO);

b. Whether the appeal of respondent Carrascoso, Jr. should have been dismissed for his failure to file an appeal
brief;

c. Whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to review and reverse the judgment on a cause of action which was
not appealed from by the respondents;

d. Whether the award for damages against respondent Carrascoso, Jr. is warranted by evidence and the law.[12]

Being related, the first two issues will be discussed jointly.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is partly meritorious.

First and Second Issues: Effect of PCSOs Appeal Brief

Petitioner contends that the appeal filed by the PCSO before Respondent Court of Appeals should have been
dismissed outright. The appealed RTC decision ruled on two causes of action: (1) a judgment against both PCSO
and Carrascoso to jointly and severally pay petitioner his winnings plus interest and income; and (2) a judgment
against Carrascoso alone for moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorneys fees and costs. The PCSO, through
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), appealed only the second item: the impropriety of the
award of damages xxx. This appealed portion, however, condemned only Carrascoso, not the PCSO. Technically,
petitioner claims, PCSO could not have appealed the second portion of the RTC Decision which ruled against
Carrascoso only, and not against the government corporation.

Petitioner further avers that Carrascoso failed to file his own appeal brief; accordingly, his appeal should have been
dismissed. The PCSO brief, he submits, could not have inured to the benefit of Carrascoso, because the latter was
no longer chairman of that office at the time the brief was filed and, hence, could no longer be represented by the
OGCC.

On the other hand, respondents aver that the withholding of petitioners racehorse winnings by Respondent
Carrascoso occurred during the latters incumbency as PCSO chairman. According to him, he had honestly believed
that it was within the scope of his authority not to release said winnings, in view of then President Corazon C.
Aquinos Executive Order No. 2 (EO 2), in which she decreed the following:

(1) Freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs.
Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close friends, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees
have any interest or participation;

(2) Prohibit any person from transferring, conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such assets
and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer, encumbrance, concealment, or dissipation, under
pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law.

Moreover, he argues that he sought the advice of the PCGG as to the nature of the subject racehorse winnings, and
he was told that they were part of petitioners sequestered properties. Under these circumstances and in his belief
that said winnings were fruits of petitioners ill-gotten properties, he deemed it his duty to withhold them. The
chairman of the PCSO, he adds, is empowered by law to order the withholding of prize winnings.

The representation of the OGCC on behalf of the PCSO and Mr. Carrascoso is pursuant to its basic function to act
as the principal law office of all government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other corporate
offsprings and government acquired asset corporations and xxx [to] exercise control and supervision over all legal
departments or divisions maintained separately and such powers and functions as are now or may hereafter be
provided by law.[13] The OGCC was therefore duty-bound to defend the PCSO because the latter, under its charter,
[14] is a government-owned corporation. The government counsels representation extends to the concerned
government functionarys officers when the issue involves the latters official acts or duties.[15]
Granting that upon his separation from the government, Carrascoso ceased to be entitled to the legal services of the
government corporate counsel, this development does not automatically revoke or render ineffective his notice of
appeal of the trial courts Decision. The filing of an appellants brief is not an absolute requirement for the perfection
of an appeal.[16] Besides, when noncompliance with the Rules of Court is not intended for delay or does not
prejudice the adverse party, the dismissal of an appeal on a mere technicality may be stayed and the court may, at its
sound discretion, exercise its equity jurisdiction.[17] The emerging trend in our jurisprudence is to afford every
party-litigant the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.[18]

What is important is that Respondent Carrascoso filed his notice of appeal on time and that his counsel before the
lower court, who was presumed to have continued representing him on appeal,[19] had filed an appeal brief on his
behalf. The Manifestation of Carrascoso before the Court of Appeals that he intended to hire the services of another
counsel and to file his own brief did not ipso facto effect a change of counsel under the existing rules of procedure.
The former counsel must first file a formal petition withdrawing his appearance with the clients consent, and the
newly appointed attorney should formally enter his appearance before the appellate court with notice to the adverse
party.[20] But other than Carrascosos manifestation of his intention to hire a counsel of his own, the requisites for a
change of counsel were not fully complied with. Nevertheless, as stated earlier, even an effective change of attorney
will not abrogate the pleadings filed before the court by the former counsel.

All in all, we hold that the appellate court committed no reversible error in not dismissing the appeal, since this
matter was addressed to its sound discretion, and since such discretion was exercised reasonably in accordance with
the doctrine that cases should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits.

Third Issue: Scope of the Appeal Before Respondent Court

Petitioner is correct in asserting that the entire RTC judgment was not appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals.
The errors assigned in the appellants Brief, as quoted earlier, attacked only the trial courts (1) conclusion that
defendants-appellants acted in bad faith and (2) award of damages in favor of herein petitioner. In short, only those
parts relating to the second cause of action could be reviewed by the CA.

Respondent Court could not therefore reverse and set aside the RTC Decision in its entirety and dismiss the original
Complaint without trampling upon the rights that had accrued to the petitioner from the unappealed portion of the
Decision. It is well-settled that only the errors assigned and properly argued in the brief, and those necessarily
related thereto, may be considered by the appellate court in resolving an appeal in a civil case.[21] The appellate
court has no power to resolve unassigned errors, except those that affect the courts jurisdiction over the subject
matter and those that are plain or clerical errors.[22]

Having said that, we note, however, that Respondent Court in its Decision effectively recognized the confines of the
appeal, as it stated at the outset that this appeal shall be limited to the damages awarded in the [RTC] decision other
than the claims for race winning prizes.[23] The dispositive portion of the Decision must be understood together
with the aforequoted statement that categorically defined the scope of Respondent Courts review. Consequently,
what the assailed Decision reversed and set aside was only that part of the appealed judgment finding bad faith on
the part of herein Private Respondent Carrascoso and awarding damages to herein petitioner. It did not annul the
trial courts order for Respondent PCSO to pay Petitioner Cojuangco his racehorse winnings, because this Order had
never been assigned as an error sought to be corrected.

On the contrary, Respondent PCSO had probably never intended to further object to the payment, as it so
manifested before the trial court[24] in answer to Petitioner Cojuangcos Motion[25] for the partial execution of the
judgment. In fact, on May 20, 1992, PCSO willingly and readily paid the petitioner the principal amount of
P1,020,700 in accordance with the writ of execution issued by the trial court on February 14, 1992.[26] Obviously
and plainly, the RTC judgment, insofar as it related to the first cause of action, had become final and no longer
subject to appeal.

In any event, the Court of Appeals discussion regarding the indispensability of the PCGG as a party-litigant to the
instant case was not pivotal to its reversal of the appealed trial court Decision. It merely mentioned that the non-
joinder of the PCGG made the Complaint vulnerable or susceptible to dismissal. It did not rule that it was the very
ground, or at least one of the legal grounds, it relied upon in setting aside the appealed judgment. It could not have
legally done so anyway, because the PCGGs role in the controversy, if any, had never been an issue before the trial
court. Well-settled is the doctrine that no question, issue or argument will be entertained on appeal unless it has
been raised in the court a quo.[27]

The aforementioned discussion should therefore be construed only in light of the previous paragraphs relating to
Respondent Carrascosos good faith which, the appellate court surmised, was indicated by his reliance on PCGGs
statements that the subject prize winnings of Petitioner Cojuangco were part of the sequestered properties. In other
words, Respondent Courts view that the non-inclusion of PCGG as a party made the Complaint dismissible was a
mere aside that did not prejudice petitioner.

Fourth Issue: Damages

Petitioner insists that the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the trial courts finding that Respondent Carrascoso
acted in bad faith in withholding his winnings. We do not think so.

Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or simple negligence. It imports a dishonest purpose or some
moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach of a known duty due to some motive or interest or ill will
that partakes of the nature of fraud.[28]

We do not believe that the above judicially settled nature of bad faith characterized the questioned acts of
Respondent Carrascoso. On the contrary, we believe that there is sufficient evidence on record to support
Respondent Courts conclusion that he did not act in bad faith. It reasoned, and we quote with approval:[29]

A close examination of the June 10, 1986 letter of defendant Carrascoso to Jovito Salonga, then Chairman of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government, readily display uncertainties in the mind of Chairman Carrascoso
as to the extent of the sequestration against the properties of the plaintiff. In the said letter (Exhibit 1) the first prize
for the March 16, 1986 draw and the second prize for the June 8, 1986 draw, were, in the meantime, being withheld
to avoid any possible violation of your sequestration order on the matter because while he is aware of the
sequestration order issued against the properties of defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, he is not aware of the extent and
coverage thereof. It was for that reason that, in the same letter, defendant Carrascoso requested for a clarification
whether the prizes are covered by the order and if it is in the affirmative, for instructions on the proper disposal of
the two (2) prizes taking into account the shares of the trainer and the groom.

Correspondingly, in a letter dated June 13, 1986 (Exhibit 2) PCGG Commissioner Ramon A. Diaz authorized the
payment to the trainer and the groom but instructed the withholding of the amounts due plaintiff Eduardo
Cojuangco. This piece of evidence should be understood and appreciated in the light of the circumstances
prevailing at the time. PCGG was just a newly born legal creation and sequestration was a novel remedy which
even legal luminaries were not sure as to the actual procedure, the correct approach and the manner how the powers
of the said newly created office should be exercised and the remedy of sequestration properly implemented without
violating due process of law. To the mind of their newly installed power, the immediate concern is to take over and
freeze all properties of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate families, close associates and cronies.
There is no denying that plaintiff is a very close political and business associate of the former President. Under
those equivocalities, defendant Carrascoso could not be faulted in asking further instructions from the PCGG, the
official government agency on the matter, on what to do with the prize winnings of the plaintiff, and more so, to
obey the instructions subsequently given. The actions taken may be a hard blow on plaintiff but defendant
Carrascoso had no alternative. It was the safest he could do in order to protect public interest, act within the powers
of his position and serve the public demands then prevailing. More importantly, it was the surest way to avoid a
possible complaint for neglect of duty or misfeasance of office or an anti-graft case against him.

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, the finding of bad faith against defendant Carrascoso is overshadowed by the evidences showing his
good faith. He was just recently appointed chairman of the PCGG when he received the first demand for the
collection of the prize for the March 16, 1986 race which he promptly answered saying he was under instructions
by the PCGG to withhold such payment. But the moment he received the go signal from the PCGG that the prize
winnings of plaintiff Cojuangco could already be released, he immediately informed the latter thereof, interposed
no objection to the execution pending appeal relative thereto, in fact, actually paid off all the winnings due the
plaintiff. xxx

Carrascosos decision to withhold petitioners winnings could not be characterized as arbitrary or whimsical, or even
the product of ill will or malice. He had particularly sought from PCGG a clarification of the extent and coverage of
the sequestration order issued against the properties of petitioner.[30] He had acted upon the PCGGs statement that
the subject prizes were part of those covered by the sequestration order and its instruction to hold in a proper bank
deposits [sic] earning interest the amount due Mr. Cojuangco.[31] Besides, EO 2 had just been issued by then
President Aquino, freez[ing] all assets and properties in the Philippines [of] former President Marcos and/or his
wife, xxx their close friends, subordinates, business associates, xxx; and enjoining the transfer, encumbrance,
concealment, or dissipation [thereof], under pain of such penalties as prescribed by law. It cannot, therefore, be said
that Respondent Carrascoso, who relied upon these issuances, acted with malice or bad faith.

The extant rule is that a public officer shall not be liable by way of moral and exemplary damages for acts done in
the performance of official duties, unless there is a clear showing of bad faith, malice or gross negligence.[32]
Attorneys fees and expenses of litigation cannot be imposed either, in the absence of a clear showing of any of the
grounds provided therefor under the Civil Code.[33] The trial courts award of these kinds of damages must perforce
be deleted, as ruled by the Court of Appeals.

Nevertheless, this Court agrees with the petitioner and the trial court that Respondent Carrascoso may still be held
liable under Article 32 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats,
violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be
liable to the latter for damages:

xxx xxx xxx

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

xxx xxx xxx

In Aberca v. Ver,[34] this Court explained the nature and the purpose of this article as follows:

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with
impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield --
borrowing the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee -- to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is
necessary to remind ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the
transient needs or imperious demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish.
Our commitment to democratic principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to
nothing but the expression of the will of the predominant power in the community. Democracy cannot be a reign of
progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made.
Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a minimum of idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we
discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason
nevertheless controls.[35]

Under the aforecited article, it is not necessary that the public officer acted with malice or bad faith.[36] To be
liable, it is enough that there was a violation of the constitutional rights of petitioner, even on the pretext of
justifiable motives or good faith in the performance of ones duties.[37]
We hold that petitioners right to the use of his property was unduly impeded. While Respondent Carrascoso may
have relied upon the PCGGs instructions, he could have further sought the specific legal basis therefor. A little
exercise of prudence would have disclosed that there was no writ issued specifically for the sequestration of the
racehorse winnings of petitioner. There was apparently no record of any such writ covering his racehorses either.
The issuance of a sequestration order requires the showing of a prima facie case and due regard for the
requirements of due process.[38] The withholding of the prize winnings of petitioner without a properly issued
sequestration order clearly spoke of a violation of his property rights without due process of law.

Article 2221 of the Civil Code authorizes the award of nominal damages to a plaintiff whose right has been violated
or invaded by the defendant, for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing that right, not for indemnifying the
plaintiff for any loss suffered.[39] The court may also award nominal damages in every case where a property right
has been invaded.[40] The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, with the
relevant circumstances taken into account.[41]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Decision, as herein clarified, is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Private Respondent Fernando O. Carrascoso Jr. is ORDERED TO PAY
petitioner nominal damages in the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Romero, J., on official business abroad.

[1] Rollo, pp. 59-68.

[2] Fourteenth Division composed of J. Conrado Vasquez Jr. (ponente), with JJ. Jorge S. Imperial (chairman) and
Pacita Caizares-Nye (member) concurring.

[3] Rollo, pp. 59-60.

[4] Rollo, p. 70.

[5] Assailed Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 59.

[6] Rollo, pp. 63-65.

[7] Ibid., p. 78.

[8] Ibid., p. 61.

[9] Assailed Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 66.

[10] Ibid., pp. 10 & 68.

[11] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on December 21, 1998, upon receipt by this Court of Private
Respondent Carrascosos Memorandum. The memos of the other parties had been received earlier.

[12] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 10.

[13] 10, Chap. 3, Title III, Book IV of EO 292. Administrative Order No. 130 dated May 19, 1994, further provides:

Section 1. All legal matters pertaining to government-owned or controlled corporations, their subsidiaries, other
corporate offsprings and government acquired asset corporations (hereinafter collectively referred to as GOCCs)
shall be exclusively referred to and handled by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel xxx.

See also Confederation of Unions in Government Corporations and Offices v. Subido, 32 SCRA 394, April 30,
1970.

[14] RA 1169, as amended.

[15] Cf. Alinsug v. RTC Br. 8, San Carlos City, 225 SCRA 553, August 23, 1993, in which the Court enumerated
incidents when a government official may secure the services of a private counsel.

[16] See People v. Manambit, 271 SCRA 344, April 18, 1997; Farolan v. Court of Appeals, 241 SCRA 176,
February 7, 1995; Labitad v. Court of Appeals, 246 SCRA 434, July 17, 1995.

[17] Paraaque Kings Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 727, 738, February 26, 1997.

[18] Dela Rosa v. Court of Appeals, 280 SCRA 444, 455, October 10, 1997.

[19] 22, Rule 138, Rules of Court.

[20] 22 & 26, ibid. Bernardo v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 413, July 14, 1997; Nacuray v. NLRC, 270 SCRA 9,
March 18, 1997.

[21] Solid Homes, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 267, July 8, 1997; Garrido v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA
450, September 14, 1994.

[22] Bella v. Court of Appeals, 279 SCRA 497, September 26, 1997.

[23] Assailed Decision, p. 3; Rollo, p. 61.

[24] See Manifestations dated February 4 and May 25, 1992; Rollo, pp. 76 & 80.

[25]25 Rollo, p. 71.

[26] Ibid., p. 78.

[27] Mendoza v. Court of Appeals, 274 SCRA 527, June 20, 1997.

[28] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 557, February 6, 1997; Ford Philippines,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 320, February 3, 1997.

[29] Assailed Decision, pp. 7-9; Rollo, pp. 65-67.

[30] Letter of the PCSO chairman to the PCGG dated June 10, 1986; records, p. 26.

[31] Reply of the PCGG dated June 13, 1986; records, p. 28.

[32] 38 (1), Chap. 9, Book I, Administrative Code of 1987. Suarez v. Commission on Audit, GR No. 131077,
August 7, 1998; Yulo v. Civil Service Commission, 219 SCRA 470, March 3, 1993; Orocio v. Commission on
Audit, 213 SCRA 109, August 31, 1992; Chavez v. Sandiganbayan, 193 SCRA 282, January 24, 1991; Ynot v. IAC,
148 SCRA 659, March 20, 1987.

[33] Article 2208 of the Civil Code allows the recovery of attorneys fees and expenses of litigation only in the
following instances:

(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;

(2) When the defendants act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;

(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;

(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;

(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiffs plainly valid, just
and demandable claim;

(6) In actions for legal support;

(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmens compensation and employers liability laws;

(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;

(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;

(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable xxx.

[34] 160 SCRA 590, 601, April 15, 1988; per Yap, J.

[35] Ibid., quoting Joseph Charmont, French Legal Philosophy, 1921 ed., pp. 72-73.

[36] Arturo M. Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines. Commentaries and Jurisprudence, Vol. I, 1990 ed., pp. 129-
130. See also Jose C. Vitug, Compendium of Civil Law and Jurisprudence, 1993 ed., p. 22.

[37] Lim v. Ponce de Leon, 66 SCRA 299, 309, August 29, 1975; citing Dean Jorge Bocobo, chairman of the Code
Commission, The Lawyers Journal, Vol. XVI, No. 5, p. 258 (May 31, 1951). See also Better Buildings, Inc. v.
NLRC, 283 SCRA 242, December 15, 1997.

[38] BASECO v. PCGG, 150 SCRA 181, 215-216, May 27, 1987.

[39] Areola v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 643, 654, September 22, 1994; Citytrust Banking Corporation v. IAC,
232 SCRA 559, 565, May 27, 1994; Sumalpong v. Court of Appeals, 268 SCRA 764, 775, February 26, 1997;
Better Buildings v. NLRC, supra.

Today is Saturday, September 03, 2016

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45404 August 7, 1987

G. JESUS B. RUIZ, petitioner,
vs.
ENCARNACION UCOL and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J:

This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dismissing the plaintiff-appellant's
complaint for damages against defendant-appellee on the ground of res judicata. The issue involved being a pure
question of law, the appellate court certified the appeal to us for decision on the merits.

The facts are not disputed, Agustina Tagaca, laundrywoman for plaintiff-appellant Atty. Jesus B. Ruiz filed an
administrative charge against defendant-appellee Encarnacion Ucol, a midwife in the health center of Sarratt Ilocos
Norte. In her answer to the charges, Ucol alleged that Tagaca was merely used as a tool by Atty. Ruiz who wanted
to get back at the Ucol's because of a case filed by Encarnacion Ucol's husband against Ruiz. She was also alleged
to have made remarks that Atty. Ruiz instigated the complaint and fabricated the charges.

The administrative case was dismissed. Ruiz decided to file his own criminal complaint for libel against Ucol based
on the alleged libelous portion of Ucol's answer.

Upon arraignment, Ucol entered a plea of not guilty. During the proceedings in the libel case, complainant Atty.
Ruiz entered his appearance and participated as private prosecutor. After trial, the lower court rendered judgment
acquitting Ucol on the ground that her guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt. No pronouncement was
made by the trial court as to the civil liability of the accused.

Instead of appealing the civil aspects of the case, Ruiz filed a separate complaint for damages based on the same
facts upon which the libel case was founded.

Ucol filed a motion to dismiss stating that the action had prescribed and that the cause of action was barred by the
decision in the criminal case for libel.

The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. As earlier stated, on appeal, the Court of
Appeals certified the case to us, the only issue being whether or not the civil action for damages was already barred
by the criminal case of libel.

Before going into the merit of this appeal, it is noteworthy to mention that there are actually two cases now before
us involving the contending parties. Defendant-appellee Ucol filed an "appeal by certiorari" before this Court
questioning the dissenting opinion of the Court of Appeals.
Ucol prays for a ruling "that the respondent Court of Appeals committed a grave abuse of discretion in not
dismissing the present case but instead in ordering the same remanded to the lower court for further
proceedings ... ."

Any ordinary student in law school should readily know that what comprises a decision which can be the subject of
an appeal or a special civil action is the majority opinion of the members of the court, but never the dissenting
opinion. Moreover, no decision on appeal has as yet been rendered in this case. The act of the defendant-appellee's
counsel in filing such a petition defies logic or reason. It is totally inexplicable how a member of the bar could be so
careless or, if the act was deliberate, could have the courage to come before this Court asking us to review a
dissenting opinion. Counsel is warned that we do not find his mistake in the slightest bit amusing.

Turning now to the present appeal, plaintiff-appellant Ruiz contends that there can be no res judicata since nowhere
in its decision did the trial court pass upon the civil aspect of the criminal case nor did it make any express
declaration that the fact on which said case was predicated did not exist. He cites the pertinent provisions of Article
29 of the Civil Code and Rule III, Section 3 subsection (c) of the Rules of Court which respectively provide:

ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved
beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. ...

xxx xxx xxx

RULE III, Sec. 3(c)

Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. ...

We may also mention Article 33 of the Civil Code which gives an offended party in cases of defamation, among
others, the right to file a civil action separate and distinct from the criminal proceedings whether or not a
reservation was made to that effect.

The plaintiff-appellant's contentions have no merit. The right of the plaintiff-appellant under the above provisions to
file the civil action for damages based on the same facts upon which he instituted the libel case is not without
limitation.

We find the appeal of G. Jesus B. Ruiz without merit. We see no advantage or benefit in adding to the clogged
dockets of our trial courts what plainly appears from the records to be a harassment suit.

In acquitting Encarnacion Ucol of the libel charge, the trial court made these factual findings:
Clearly then, Atty. Ruiz filed the instant Criminal Case against Encarnacion Ucol as retaliation for what he believed
was an act of ingratitude to him on the part of her husband. The precipitate haste with which the administrative
complaint was filed shows that he was the one personally interested in the matter. All that Agustina Tagaca told him
was double hearsay. The incident, if there was, happened between the accused and Ceferino in the absence of
Agustina; so that, all that Ceferina allegedly told her, and she in turn told Atty. Ruiz, was undoubtedly double check
hearsay; and Atty. Ruiz should therefore check the facts with Ceferino, but he did not do that, and he did not even
present Ceferino as a witness. For these reasons, accused has every reason to believe that Atty. Ruiz was the author
who concocted the charges in the administrative complaint and had his laundry-woman, complainant Agustina
Tagaca, sign it. Agustina has very little education and could hardly speak English, yet the administrative complaint
was written in polished English, and who else but Atty. Ruiz could have authored those phrases in the complaint:
"The retention of Mrs. Ucol in this government service is inimical to the good intentions of the Department to serve
humanity and a disgrace and liability to present administration." As will be shown later on, it appears that it is this
complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the respondent's answer; and
even, assuming that the administrative complaint may not have been impelled by actual malice, the charge(s) were
certainly reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances. Court actions are not established for parties to give
bent to their prejudice. The poor and the humble are, as a general rule, grateful to a fault, that intrigues and
ingratitude are what they abhor. (Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 8-10).

The findings in the criminal case, therefore, show a pattern of harassment. First, petitioner Ruiz had something to
do with the administrative complaint. The complaint was dismissed. Second, he filed a criminal case for libel based
on portions of Mrs. Ucol's answer in the administrative case. Third, he acted as private prosecutor in the criminal
case actively handling as a lawyer the very case where he was the complainant. And fourth, after the accused was
acquitted on the basis of the facts stated above, Atty. Ruiz pursued his anger at the Ucols with implacability by
filing a civil action for damages. As stated by the trial judge, "court actions are not established for parties to give
bent to their prejudice." This is doubly true when the party incessantly filing cases is a member of the bar. He
should set an example in sobriety and in trying to prevent false and groundless suits.

In Roa v. de la Cruz, et al. (107, Phil. 10) this Court ruled:

Under the above provisions (Art. 33 of the Civil Code), independently of a criminal action for defamation, a civil
suit for the recovery of damages arising therefrom may be brought by the injured party. It is apparent, however,
from the use of the words "may be," that the institution of such suit is optional." (An Outline of Philippine Civil
Law by J.B.L. Reyes and R.C. Puno, Vol. I, p. 54) In other words, the civil liability arising from the crime charged
may still be determined in the criminal proceedings if the offended party does not waive to have it adjudged, or
does not reserve his right to institute a separate civil action against the defendant. (The case of Reyes v. de la Rosa
(52 Off. Gaz., [15] 6548; 99 Phil., 1013) cited by plaintiff in support of her contention that under Art. 33 of the New
Civil Code the injured party is not required to reserve her right to institute the civil action, is not applicable to the
present case. There was no showing in that case that the offended party intervened in the prosecution of the offense,
and the amount of damages sought to be recovered was beyond the jurisdiction of the criminal court so that a
reservation of the civil action was useless or unnecessary.) (Dionisio v. Alvendia, 102 Phil., 443; 55 Off. Gaz.,
[25]4633.])
In the instant case, it is not disputed that plaintiff Maria C. Roa upon whose initiative the criminal action for
defamation against the defendant Segunda de la Cruz was filed did not reserve her right to institute it, subject,
always to the direction and control of the prosecuting fiscal. (Section 15 in connection with section 4 of Rule 106,
Rules of Court; Lim Tek Goan v. Yatco, 94 Phil., 197). The reason of the law in not permitting the offended party to
intervene in the prosecution of the offense if he had waived or reserved his right to institute the civil action is that
by such action her interest in the criminal case has disappeared. Its prosecution becomes the sole function of the
public prosecutor. (Gorospe, et al., v. Gatmaitan, et al., 98 Phil., 600; 52 Off. Gaz., [15] 2526). The rule, therefore,
is that the right of intervention reserved to the injured party is for the sole purpose of enforcing the civil liability
born of the criminal act and not of demanding punishment of the accused. (People v. Orais, 65 Phil., 744; People v.

Velez, 77 Phil., 1026; People v. Flores, et al., G.R. No. L-7528, December 18,1957; see also U.S. v.
Malabon, 1 Phil., 731; U.S. v. Heery, 25 Phil., 600).

Plaintiff having elected to claim damages arising from the offense charged in the criminal case through her
appearance or intervention as private prosecutor we hold that the final judgment rendered therein constitutes a bar
to the present civil action for damages based upon the same cause. (See Tan v. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91
Phil., 672; 48 Off. Gaz., [7] 2745.).

We are, therefore, constrained to dismiss the present appeal. Atty. Ruiz has more than had his day in court. The then
court of first instance acquitted Mrs. Ucol and stated in the dispositive portion of its decision that her guilt was not
established beyond reasonable doubt. A review of the court's findings, however, indicates that the disputed Answer
of Mrs. Ucol in the administrative case contains no libel. As stated by the trial court, "As will be shown later, it
appears that it is this complaint signed by Agustina, but authored by Atty. Ruiz, that is libelous and not the
respondent's answer." (Emphasis supplied). The court found the charges against Ucol, if not malicious, at least
reckless in the face of proven facts and circumstances.

The trial court stated.

Analyzing defendant's answer Exh. "5", even with meticulous care, the Court did not find any defamatory
imputation which causes dishonor or discredit to the complainant. She was the victim of an unprovoked, unjustified
and libelous attack against her honor, honesty, character and reputation; she has a right to self-defense, which she
did in her answer, to protect her honesty and integrity and the very job upon which her family depend for their
livelihood. Every sentence in her answer (Exh. "5") is relevant, and constitutes privileged matter. She did not go
further than her interest or duties require. She did not go beyond explaining what was said of her in the complaint
for the purpose of repairing if not entirely removing the effects of the charge against her. She had absolutely no
motive to libel Atty. Ruiz who, by the way, cast the first stone. ... (Amended Record on Appeal pp. 10-11)

WHEREFORE, the appeal filed by appellant Jesus B. Ruiz is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition filed by
petitioner Encarnacion Ucol is likewise DISMISSED for patent lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Melencio-Herrera, J., is on leave.

Gancayco, J., took no part.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

FIRST DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 133978. November 12, 2002]
JOSE S. CANCIO, JR., represented by ROBERTO L. CANCIO, petitioner, vs. EMERENCIANA ISIP, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raises pure questions of law involving the
March 20, 1998[1] and June 1, 1998[2] Orders[3] rendered by the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in
Civil Case No. G-3272.

The undisputed facts are as follows:

Petitioner, assisted by a private prosecutor, filed three cases of Violation of B.P. No. 22 and three cases of Estafa,
against respondent for allegedly issuing the following checks without sufficient funds, to wit: 1) Interbank Check
No. 25001151 in the amount of P80,000.00; 2) Interbank Check No. 25001152 in the amount of P 80,000.00; and 3)
Interbank Check No. 25001157 in the amount of P30,000.00.[4]

The Office of the Provincial Prosecutor dismissed Criminal Case No. 13356, for Violation of B.P. No. 22 covering
check no. 25001151 on the ground that the check was deposited with the drawee bank after 90 days from the date of
the check. The two other cases for Violation of B.P. No. 22 (Criminal Case No. 13359 and 13360) were filed with
and subsequently dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Branch 1, on the ground of failure
to prosecute.[5]

Meanwhile, the three cases for Estafa were filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, and
docketed as Criminal Case Nos. G-3611 to G-3613. On October 21, 1997, after failing to present its second witness,
the prosecution moved to dismiss the estafa cases against respondent. The prosecution likewise reserved its right to
file a separate civil action arising from the said criminal cases. On the same date, the trial court granted the motions
of the prosecution. Thus-
Upon motion of the prosecution for the dismissal of these cases without prejudice to the refiling of the civil aspect
thereof and there being no comment from the defense, let these cases be dismissed without prejudice to the refiling
of the civil aspect of the cases.
SO ORDER[ED].[6]
On December 15, 1997, petitioner filed the instant case for collection of sum of money, seeking to recover the
amount of the checks subject of the estafa cases. On February 18, 1998, respondent filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint contending that petitioners action is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Respondent further prayed that
petitioner should be held in contempt of court for forum-shopping.[7]

On March 20, 1998, the trial court found in favor of respondent and dismissed the complaint. The court held that
the dismissal of the criminal cases against respondent on the ground of lack of interest or failure to prosecute is an
adjudication on the merits which amounted to res judicata on the civil case for collection. It further held that the
filing of said civil case amounted to forum-shopping.

On June 1, 1998, the trial court denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.[8] Hence, the instant petition.

The legal issues for resolution in the case at bar are: 1) whether the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent
bars the institution of a civil action for collection of the value of the checks subject of the estafa cases; and 2)
whether the filing of said civil action violated the anti-forum-shopping rule.

An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code;[9] and (2) independent civil
liabilities, such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as felony [e.g. culpa contractual or
obligations arising from law under Article 31[10] of the Civil Code,[11] intentional torts under Articles 32[12] and
34,[13] and culpa aquiliana under Article 2176[14] of the Civil Code]; or (b) where the injured party is granted a
right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal action [Article 33,[15] Civil Code].[16] Either of
these two possible liabilities may be enforced against the offender subject, however, to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission or under
both causes.[17]

The modes of enforcement of the foregoing civil liabilities are provided for in the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. Though the assailed order of the trial court was issued on March 20, 1998, the said Rules, which took
effect on December 1, 2000, must be given retroactive effect in the instant case considering that statutes regulating
the procedure of the court are construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their
passage.[18]

Section 1, Rule 111, of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:

SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. (a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless
the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action
prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts
presenting its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.
xxxxxxxxx
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has not yet commenced, it may be consolidated
with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application is granted, the trial
of both actions shall proceed in accordance with section 2 of this Rule governing consolidation of the civil and
criminal actions.
Under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended in 1988 and under the present Rules, the civil liability
ex-delicto is deemed instituted with the criminal action, but the offended party is given the option to file a separate
civil action before the prosecution starts to present evidence.[19]

Anent the independent civil actions under Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the old rules
considered them impliedly instituted with the civil liability ex-delicto in the criminal action, unless the offended
party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the
criminal action. Under the present Rules, however, the independent civil actions may be filed separately and
prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. The failure to make a reservation in
the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles
of the Civil Code.[20]

In the case at bar, a reading of the complaint filed by petitioner show that his cause of action is based on culpa
contractual, an independent civil action. Pertinent portion of the complaint reads:

xxxxxxxxx
2. That plaintiff is the owner/proprietor to CANCIOS MONEY EXCHANGE with office address at Guagua,
Pampanga;
3. That on several occasions, particularly on February 27, 1993 to April 17 1993, inclusive, defendant drew, issued
and made in favor of the plaintiff the following checks:
CHECK NO. DATE AMOUNT
1. INTERBANK CHECK NO. 25001151 March 10, 1993 P80,000.00
2. INTERBANK CHECK NO. 25001152 March 27, 1993 P80,000.00
3. INTERBANK CHECK NO. 25001157 May 17, 1993 P30,000.00
in exchange of cash with the assurance that the said checks will be honored for payment on their maturity dates,
copy of the aforementioned checks are hereto attached and marked.
4. That when the said checks were presented to the drawee bank for encashment, the same were all dishonored for
reason of DRAWN AGAINST INSUFFICIENT FUNDS (DAIF);
5. That several demands were made upon the defendant to make good the checks but she failed and refused and still
fails and refuses without justifiable reason to pay plaintiff;
6. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay plaintiff the value of the checks, the latter
was forced to hire the services of undersigned counsel and agreed to pay the amount of P30,000.00 as attorneys fees
and P1,000.00 per appearance in court;
7. That for failure of the defendant without any justifiable reason to pay plaintiff and forcing the plaintiff to litigate,
the latter will incur litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is prayed of this Court that after due notice and hearing a judgment be
rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff as follows:
a. the principal sum of P190,000.00 plus the legal interest;
b. attorneys fees of P30,000.00 plus P1,000.00 per court appearance;
c. litigation expenses in the amount of P20,000.00
PLAINTIFF prays for other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.
x x x x x x x x x.[21]
Evidently, petitioner sought to enforce respondents obligation to make good the value of the checks in exchange for
the cash he delivered to respondent. In other words, petitioners cause of action is the respondents breach of the
contractual obligation. It matters not that petitioner claims his cause of action to be one based on delict.[22] The
nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint as constituting the cause of action.
The purpose of an action or suit and the law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its allegations and prayer for relief.[23]

Neither does it matter that the civil action reserved in the October 21, 1997 order of the trial court was the civil
action ex delicto. To reiterate, an independent civil action arising from contracts, as in the instant case, may be filed
separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal action. Under Article 31 of
the Civil Code [w]hen the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of
as a felony, [e.g. culpa contractual] such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter. Thus, in Vitola, et al. v. Insular Bank of Asia and America,[24] the Court,
applying Article 31 of the Civil Code, held that a civil case seeking to recover the value of the goods subject of a
Letter of Credit-Trust Receipt is a civil action ex contractu and not ex delicto. As such, it is distinct and independent
from the estafa case filed against the offender and may proceed regardless of the result of the criminal proceedings.

One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action.[25] In the instant case, it must be stressed that the
action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action, which remains separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution based on the same act.[26] Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal,
a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely
different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.

In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against respondent did not
amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties
for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the
cases filed by petitioner arose from the same act or omission of respondent, they are, however, based on different
causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the civil action for collection is
anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-shopping in the instant case because the law
expressly allows the filing of a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal action.[27]

Clearly, therefore, the trial court erred in dismissing petitioners complaint for collection of the value of the checks
issued by respondent. Being an independent civil action which is separate and distinct from any criminal
prosecution and which require no prior reservation for its institution, the doctrine of res judicata and forum-
shopping will not operate to bar the same.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is GRANTED. The March 20, 1998 and June 1,
1998 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 49, in Civil Case No. G-3272 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The instant case is REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

[1] Annex E, Rollo, p. 38.

[2] Annex G, Rollo, p. 47.

[3] Penned by Judge Rogelio C. Gonzales.

[4] Rollo, p. 29.

[5] Order dated May 18, 1995, Rollo, p. 33.

[6] Rollo, p. 24.

[7] Rollo, p. 30.

[8] Rollo, p. 47.

[9] Article 100. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
[10] ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or omission complained of as
a felony, such civil action may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the
latter.

[11] Bernaldes, Sr. v. Bohol Land Transportation, Inc., 7 SCRA 276, 279 [1963].

[12] ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person
shall be liable to the latter for damages;

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

(7) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(8) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(9) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures;

(10) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(11) The privacy of communication and correspondence;

(12) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(13) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;

(14) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(15) The right of the accused against excessive bail;

(16) The right of the accused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have
compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in his behalf;

(17) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt, or from
being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when the person confessing
becomes a State witness;

(18) Freedom from excessive fines, or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or inflicted in
accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(19) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a criminal
offense, the aggrieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil action for damages, and
for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal prosecution (if the latter be
instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a violation
of the Penal Code or the penal statute.

[13] ART. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any
person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be primarily liable for damages, and the city or
municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be independent of
any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such action.

[14] ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged
to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the
parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

[15] ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
[16] Vitug, Civil Law and Jurisprudence, pp. 25-26 [1993 ed.].

[17] Jarantilla v. Court of Appeals, et al., 171 SCRA 429, 436 [1989], citing Barredo v. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607
[1942]; Mendoza v. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113 [1979]; Padilla v. Court of Appeals, et al., 129 SCRA 558 [1984].

[18] Casupanan v. Laroya, G.R. No. 145391, August 26, 2002, citing People v. Arrojado, 350 SCRA 679
[2001]; Ocampo v. Court of Appeals, 180 SCRA 27 [1989]; Alday v. Camilon, 120 SCRA 521 [1983]; People v.
Sumilang, 77 Phil. 764 [1946].

[19] Ibid.

[20] Id.

[21] Annex B, Rollo, pp. 25-26.

[22] Rollo, p. 18.

[23] Dulay, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et al., 243 SCRA 220, 227-228 [1995], citing Republic v. Estenzo, 158 SCRA
282 [1988]; De Tavera v. Philippine Tuberculosis Society, 112 SCRA 243 [1982].

[24] 150 SCRA 578, 585-586 [1987].

[25] Elements of res judicata: 1) the judgment sought to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must
have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the
case must be a judgment on the merits; and (4) there must be between the first and second action, identity of parties,

subject matter and causes of action. (Quezon Province v. Honorable Abelio M. Marte, G.R. No. 139274,
October 23, 2001, citing Esperas v. Court of Appeals, 341 SCRA 583 [2000].
[26] Neplum, Inc. v. Orbeso, G.R. No. 141986, July 11, 2002.

[27] Casupanan v. Laroya, supra, citing Melo v. Court of Appeals, 318 SCRA 94 [1999]; International School, Inc.
(Manila) v. Court of Appeals, 309 SCRA 474 [1999].

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 108395. March 7, 1997]
HEIRS OF THE LATE TEODORO GUARING, JR., petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE
RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., and ANGELES CUEVAS, respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 20, which ordered respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles
Cuevas, to pay various amounts in damages to petitioners, the heirs of the late Teodoro Guaring, Jr.

This case arose from an unfortunate vehicular accident which happened on November 7, 1987, along the North
Expressway in San Rafael, Mexico, Pampanga. Involved in the accident were a Mitsubishi Lancer car driven by
Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who died as a result of the mishap, Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, driven by Angeles Cuevas,
and a Toyota Cressida car, driven by Eligio Enriquez. The Mitsubishi Lancer was heading north, at the speed of 80
to 90 kilometers per hour. Following it was the Philippine Rabbit Bus No. 415, with Plate No. CVD-584. On the
other hand, the Toyota Cressida was cruising on the opposite lane, bound for Manila.

Petitioners, heirs of Teodoro Guaring, Jr., brought this action for damages, based on quasi delict, in the Regional
Trial Court of Manila. Their evidence tended to show that the Rabbit bus tried to overtake Guarings car by passing
on the right shoulder of the road and that in so doing it hit the right rear portion of Guarings Mitsubishi Lancer. The
impact caused the Lancer to swerve to the south-bound lane, as a result of which it collided with the Toyota
Cressida car coming from the opposite direction.

With Teodoro Guaring, Jr. in the Lancer, seated beside him in front, was Bonifacio Clemente. Riding in the Toyota
Cressida driven by Sgt. Eligio Enriquez was his mother, Dolores Enriquez, who was seated beside him. Seated at
the back were his daughter Katherine (who was directly behind him), his wife Lilian, and his nephew Felix
Candelaria.

Killed in the collision were Teodoro Guaring, Jr., who was driving the Lancer, and Dolores Enriquez, who was
riding in the Cressida, while injured were Bonifacio Clemente and the occupants of the Toyota Cressida.
Private respondents, on the other hand, presented evidence tending to show that the accident was due to the
negligence of the deceased Guaring. They claimed that it was Guaring who tried to overtake the vehicle ahead of
him on the highway and that in doing so he encroached on the south-bound lane and collided with the oncoming
Cressida of U.S. Air Force Sgt. Enriquez. Private respondents claim that as a result of the collision the Lancer was
thrown back to its lane where it crashed into the Rabbit bus.

On May 16, 1990, the Regional Trial Court rendered judgment finding Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its
driver, Angeles Cuevas, at fault, and holding them solidarily liable for damages to petitioners. The dispositive
portion of its decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendants, ordering the latter
to pay the former, jointly and severally, the sum of:

1. P500,000.00 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased Teodoro Guaring, Jr.;
2. P1,000,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P50,000.00 as and for attorneys fees; and
4. Costs of suit.

From this judgment, private respondent Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. appealed, contending:

1. The lower court erred in not finding that the proximate cause of the collision was Guarings negligence in
attempting to overtake the car in front of him.

2. The lower court erred in not holding that PRBL exercised due diligence in the supervision of its employees.

3. The lower court erred in awarding the amount of P500,000.00 in favor of plaintiffs-appellees representing
Guarings loss of earning capacity.

4. The lower court erred in awarding moral damages in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

5. The lower court erred in awarding attorneys fees in favor of plaintiffs-appellees.

On December 16, 1992, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, setting aside the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila in the civil action for damages and dismissing the complaint against private respondents Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Cuevas, on the strength of a decision rendered by the Regional Trial Court at San
Fernando, Pampanga, in the criminal case, acquitting the bus driver Angeles Cuevas of reckless imprudence
resulting in damage to property and double homicide. The appellate court held that since the basis of petitioners
action was the alleged negligence of the bus driver, the latters acquittal in the criminal case rendered the civil case
based on quasi delict untenable.
Hence, this petition. Petitioners contend that

[1] EVIDENCE IN ONE CASE IS INADMISSIBLE IN ANOTHER CASE AGAINST A PERSON NOT A PARTY
IN THE FIRST CASE AND TO HOLD OTHERWISE IS VIOLATIVE OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS.

[2] THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WAS WITHOUT FACTUAL FINDINGS AND DID NOT
RESOLVE SQUARELY THE ASSIGNED ERRORS AND IS THEREFORE A VOID JUDGMENT.

[3] ACQUITTAL OF THE ACCUSED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE, WHETHER ON REASONABLE DOUBT OR
NOT, IS NO BAR TO THE PROSECUTION FOR DAMAGES BASED ON QUASI-DELICT.

The question is whether the judgment in the criminal case extinguished the liability of private respondent Philippine
Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and its driver, Angeles Cuevas, for damages for the death of Teodoro Guaring, Jr. In
absolving private respondents from liability, the Court of Appeals reasoned:[1]

Since the appellees civil action is predicated upon the negligence of the accused which does not exist as found by
the trial court in the said criminal case, it necessarily follows that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case
carries with it the extinction of the civil responsibility arising therefrom. Otherwise stated, the fact from which the
civil action might arise, that is, the negligence of the accused, did not exist.

The finding in the criminal case that accused Cuevas was not negligent and the proximate cause of the accident was
the act of deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him likewise exonerates PRB from any civil
liability.

Although it did not say so expressly, the appellate court appears to have based its ruling on Rule 111, 2(b) of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:

(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist.

This provision contemplates, however, a civil action arising from crime, whereas the present action was instituted
pursuant to Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay
for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is
called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.

It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it
the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. Thus, in Tayag v. Alcantara,[2] it was held:
. . . a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally,
to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(c), Section 3, Rule 111 [now Rule 111, 2(b)], refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the
Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. . . .

It is noteworthy that the accident in that case also involved a Philippine Rabbit bus and that, as in this case, the
acquittal of the bus driver was based on reasonable doubt. We held that the civil case for damages was not barred
since the cause of action of the heirs was based on quasi delict.

Again, in Gula v. Dianala it was held:[3]

Since the cause of action of plaintiffs-appellants is based on culpa aquiliana and not culpa criminal, thus precluding
the application of the exception in Sec. 3(c) of Rule 111 [now Rule 111, 2(b)], and the fact that it can be inferred
from the criminal case that defendant-accused, Pedro Dianala, was acquitted on reasonable doubt because of dearth
of evidence and lack of veracity of the two principal witnesses, the doctrine in Mendoza vs. Arrieta, 91 SCRA 113,
will not find application. In that case, the acquittal was not based on reasonable doubt and the cause of action was
based on culpa criminal, for which reason we held the suit for damages barred.

Even if damages are sought on the basis of crime and not quasi delict, the acquittal of the bus driver will not bar
recovery of damages because the acquittal was based not on a finding that he was not guilty but only on reasonable
doubt. Thus, it has been held:[4]

The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a declaration
that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not extinguished by acquittal
where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as only preponderance of evidence
is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability of the accused is not criminal but only
civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig, supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa,
theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332,
Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of
which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial
Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623).

In the present case, the dispositive portion of the decision of the RTC in the criminal case reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court, entertaining reasonable doubt as to his guilt, the accused is hereby acquitted, of the
offense of reckless imprudence resulting to double homicide and damage to property as charged in the Information,
without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.[5]

It was thus error for the appellate court to skip the review of the evidence in this case and instead base its decision
on the findings of the trial court in the criminal case. In so doing, the appellate court disregarded the fact that this
case had been instituted independently of the criminal case and that petitioners herein took no part in the criminal
prosecution. In fact this action was filed below before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action.
The attention of the Court of Appeals was called to the decision in the criminal case, which was decided on
September 7, 1990, only when the decision of the trial court in this case was already pending review before it (the
Court of Appeals).

The appellate court did not even have before it the evidence in the criminal case. What it did was simply to cite
findings contained in the decision of the criminal court. Worse, what the criminal court considered was reasonable
doubt concerning the liability of the bus driver the appellate court regarded as a categorical finding that the driver
was not negligent and, on that basis, declared in this case that the proximate cause of the accident was the act of
deceased Guaring in overtaking another vehicle ahead of him. The notion that an action for quasi delict is separate
and distinct from the criminal action was thus set aside.

This case must be decided on the basis of the evidence in the civil case. This is important because the criminal court
appears to have based its decision, acquitting the bus driver on the ground of reasonable doubt, solely on what it
perceived to be the relative capacity for observation of the prosecution and defense witnesses.[6] The prosecution
did not call Bonifacio Clemente to testify despite the fact that shortly after the accident he gave a statement to the
police, pinning the blame for the accident on the Philippine Rabbit bus driver. Indeed, the civil case involved a
different set of witnesses. Petitioners presented Eligio Enriquez, who was driving the Cressida, and Bonifacio
Clemente, who was a passenger in Guarings car. Thus, both had full view of the accident.

It is unfair to bind petitioners to the result of the criminal action when the fact is that they did not take part therein.
That the witnesses presented on behalf of the petitioners are different from those presented by the prosecution
should have brought home to the appellate court the fundamental unfairness of considering the decision in the
criminal case conclusive of the civil case.

Because the Court of Appeals did not consider the evidence in the civil case, this case should be remanded to it so
that it may render another decision in accordance with the law and the evidence. The issues raised by petitioners are
essentially factual and require the evaluation of evidence, which is the function of the Court of Appeals in the
exercise of its exclusive appellate jurisdiction. They cannot be decided in this Court.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and this case is REMANDED to the Court of
Appeals with instruction to render judgment with reasonable dispatch in accordance with law and the evidence
presented in Civil Case No. 88-43860.

SO ORDERED.
Regalado, (Chairman), Romero, Puno, and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Rollo, p. 60.

[2] 98 SCRA 723, 728 (1980) (emphasis added).

[3] 132 SCRA 245, 248-249 (1984).

[4] Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558, 565-566 (1984).

[5] RTC decision, p. 31; Rollo, p. 46 (emphasis added).

[6] This is apparent from the following excerpt from the decision in the criminal case which the Court of Appeals
quoted:

While Edgardo Sobrevilla was seated in the conductors seat in the front portion of the Philippine Rabbit Bus, Mrs.
Lilian Enriquez was at the back seat of the Cressida car. As between them, it is in accord with ordinary human
experience that Edgardo Sobrevilla was in a better position to see the actual occur[r]ence of the incident.

Confirmatory to the testimony of Edgardo Sobrevilla are the sketches (Exhs. A and A-1) drawn by Pat. Danilo
Gonzales, the investigating Policeman, which reveal no fallen debris on the North bound lane. Fallen debris could
have surely occur[r]ed in the North-bound lane if there was a violent contact between the Mitsubishi Lancer car and
the Philippine Rabbit bus in the North bound lane before the Lancer car left its lane to encroach on the South bound
lane. The sketches (Exh. A and A-1) reveal very clearly that fallen debris are on the concrete pavement and asphalt
shoulder of the South-bound lane, clearly indicative that the collision between the Lancer and the Cressida
occur[r]ed in the lane of the latter.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 130362. September 10, 2001]
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES (PHIL.), INC., petitioner, vs. MERLIN J. ARGOS and JAJA
C. PINEDA, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This petition assails the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 7, 1997, dismissing the petition for
certiorari and prohibition filed by herein petitioner as a consequence of the orders by the Regional Trial Court of
Pasig, Branch 166, in Civil Case No. 65026 for damages.
Petitioner International Flavors and Fragrances (Phils.) Inc., hereafter IFFI, is a corporation organized and existing
under Philippine laws. Respondents Merlin J. Argos and Jaja C. Pineda are the general manager and commercial
director, respectively, of the Fragrances Division of IFFI.

In 1992, the office of managing director was created to head the corporations operation in the Philippines. Hernan
H. Costa, a Spaniard, was appointed managing director. Consequently the general managers reported directly to
Costa.

Costa and respondents had serious differences. When the positions of the general managers became redundant,
respondents agreed to the termination of their services. They signed a Release, Waiver and Quitclaim on December
10, 1993. On the same date, Costa issued a Personnel Announcement which described respondents as persona non
grata and urged employees not to have further dealings with them.

On July 1, 1994, respondents filed a criminal complaint for libel resulting in the filing of two Informations against
Costa docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9917 and 9918 with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Taguig, Metro Manila.

On March 31, 1995, respondents filed a civil case for damages filed and docketed as Civil Case No. 65026 at the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against Costa and IFFI, in its subsidiary capacity as employer. Herein
petitioner IFFI moved to dismiss the complaint.

On October 23, 1995, the Regional Trial Court granted the motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 65026 for respondents
failure to reserve its right to institute a separate civil action.

Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, which the trial court granted in an order dated January 9, 1996.

IFFI filed a motion to reconsider said order. This was denied. Hence, IFFI elevated the case to the Court of Appeals,
reiterating the same grounds for the dismissal of the civil complaint which it invoked before the court a quo. The
appellate court dismissed the petition. The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals decision reads:

All told, the allegations of petitioner that the lower court has gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the orders complained of has not been substantiated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.[1]

IFFIs motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the present petition for review, with petitioner alleging that the
Court of Appeals:

I
...GRAVELY ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY HEREIN PETITIONER
AND IN DENYING THE LATTERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, THEREBY AFFIRMING THE
DECISION OF THE COURT A QUO CONSIDERING THAT:

A. THE COMPLAINT IS ONE TO ENFORCE THE SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY OF PETITIONER

UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE FOR THE ALLEGED LIBELOUS STATEMENTS OF ITS FORMER
EMPLOYEE.

B. AN EMPLOYER DOES NOT INCUR SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY UNDER THE CIVIL CODE, BUT
ONLY UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE. UNDER THE LATTER, AN EMPLOYER ONLY BECOMES
SUBSIDIARILY LIABLE UPON CONVICTION OF THE ACCUSED EMPLOYEE AND PROOF OF HIS
INSOLVENCY.

C. WHILE A SEPARATE CIVIL ACTION FOR DAMAGES MAY PROCEED AGAINST HERNAN H. COSTA
UNDER ARTICLE 33 OF THE CIVIL CODE, NO SUCH ACTION MAY PROCEED AGAINST PETITIONER
TO ENFORCE ITS SUBSIDIARY LIABILITY AS EMPLOYER UNDER THE SAME ARTICLE.

II

...SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING RESPONDENTS RIGHT TO FILE THE CIVIL CASE AGAINST
PETITIONER NOTWITHSTANDING THEIR ADMITTED FAILURE TO MAKE A RESERVATION AND
THEIR CONTINUED PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.

III

...FAILED TO APPRECIATE THAT RESPONDENTS FAILURE TO RESERVE AND THEIR CONTINUED

PARTICIPATION IN THE CRIMINAL CASE BAR THE FILING OF THE COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES
AGAINST MR. COSTA AND PETITIONER, CONSIDERING THAT:

A. UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF LITIS PENDENTIA, THE CIVIL ACTION TO ENFORCE PETITIONERS
SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY MUST BE DISMISSED.

B. THE CIVIL ACTION TO ENFORCE PETITIONERS SUBSIDIARY CIVIL LIABILITY MUST BE

DISMISSED TO PREVENT FORUM-SHOPPING OR MULTIPLICITY OF SUITS.[2]

Despite the foregoing formulation of alleged errors, we find that petitioner raises one principal issue for the Courts
resolution: Could private respondents sue petitioner for damages based on subsidiary liability in an independent
civil action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, during the pendency of the criminal libel cases against petitioners
employee?

In our view, respondents suit based on subsidiary liability of petitioner is premature.

At the outset, we are constrained to delve into the nature of Civil Case No. 65026, respondents complaint for
damages against IFFI. Petitioner avers that the Court of Appeals erred when it treated said complaint as one to
enforce petitioners primary liability under Article 33[3] of the Civil Code. It asserts that in so doing the appellate
court introduced a new cause of action not alleged nor prayed for in respondents complaint. Petitioner argues that a
cause of action is determined by the allegations and prayer in a complaint. Respondents in their complaint did not
allege that IFFI was primarily liable for damages. On the contrary, petitioner says the complaint was replete with
references that IFFI was being sued in its subsidiary capacity. According to petitioner, the Court of Appeals could
not, on its own, include allegations which were not in the complaint, nor could it contradict the cause of action nor
change the theory of the case after petitioner had answered. While pleadings should be liberally construed, says the
petitioner, liberal construction should not be abused. Misleading the adverse party should be avoided. Further, it
avers that where allegations in the pleading are inconsistent, the pleader is bound by those most favorable to its
opponent,[4] and consequently, respondents complaint should not be treated as one to enforce IFFIs primary
liability as the appellate court erroneously did, considering that the complaint plainly adverts to the alleged
subsidiary liability of IFFI as the employer of Costa.

Respondents, on the other hand, aver that the Court of Appeals was correct in treating the action as a civil action for
damages entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action that can proceed independently in accordance with
Art. 33 of the Civil Code.[5] It was also correct when it recognized respondents right to move directly against IFFI
as the employer of Costa, who had long fled the country, respondents added.

On this score, we find petitioners contentions persuasive and respondents position untenable. The well-established
rule is that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought determine the nature of an action.
[6] A perusal of the respondents civil complaint before the regional trial court plainly shows that respondents is
suing IFFI in a subsidiary and not primary capacity insofar as the damages claimed are concerned.

First, respondents entitled the complaint, MERLIN J. ARGOS AND JAJA C. PINEDA v. MR. HERNAN COSTA,
as former Managing Director of IFF (Phil.), Inc., AND INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND FRAGRANCES
(PHILS.), INC. ... in its subsidiary capacity, as employer of Hernan H. Costa. Although the title of the complaint is
not necessarily determinative of the nature of the action, it nevertheless indicates respondents intention.[7] The
designation of the nature of the action, or its title is not meaningless or of no effect in the determination of its
purpose and object.[8]

Second, paragraph 2 of the complaint expressed in categorical terms that respondents were suing IFFI in its
subsidiary capacity. It stated, defendant IFFI is being sued in its subsidiary capacity as employer of Hernan H.
Costa, in accordance with the pertinent provisions under the Rules of Court, the Revised Penal Code and/or the
Civil Code of the Philippines.[9]

Third, respondents described the nature of such liability in paragraph 22: ... in case of his (Costas) default,
defendant (IFFI) should be held subsidiarily liable as an employer of Hernan Costa. Defendant has the absolute and
sole power and authority in matters of company policies and management (Arts. 100, 101, 102 and 104 of the
Revised Penal Code).[10]

Lastly, the prayer of the complaint reads:

WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that after hearing, this Honorable Court renders judgment against the
defendant, Hernan H. Costa and/or against defendant International Flavors and Fragrances (Phil.), Inc., in its
subsidiary capacity (subsidiary liability) as an employer...[11]

To reiterate, nothing could be clearer than that herein respondents are suing IFFI civilly in its subsidiary capacity
for Costas alleged defamatory acts. Moreover, the appellate court could not convert allegations of subsidiary
liability to read as averments of primary liability without committing a fundamental unfairness to the adverse party.

Essential averments lacking in a pleading may not be construed into it, nor facts not alleged by a plaintiff be taken
as having no existence.[12] Justice requires that a man be apprised of the nature of the action against him so that he
may prepare his defense. A pleading must be construed most strictly against the pleader. He is presumed to have
stated all the facts involved, and to have done so as favorably to himself as his conscience will permit. So, if
material allegations were omitted, it will be presumed in the absence of an application to amend that those matters
do not exist.[13] This is a basic rule in pleadings.[14]

Given the circumstances herein, could petitioner be sued for damages because of its alleged subsidiary liability
under Art. 33 of the Civil Code? In instituting the action for damages with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig,
Branch 166, respondents seek to enforce a civil liability allegedly arising from a crime. Obligations arising from
crimes are governed by Article 1161[15] of the Civil Code, which provides that said obligations are governed by
penal laws, subject to the provision of Article 2177[16] and the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title,
on Human Relations, and of Title XVIII of Book IV of the Civil Code.

Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code is also pertinent. It provides that every person criminally liable for a felony
is also civilly liable. In default of the persons criminally liable, employers engaged in any kind of industry shall be
civilly liable for felonies committed by their employees in the discharge of their duties.[17]

Article 33 of the Civil Code provides specifically that in cases of defamation, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action proceeds
independently of the criminal prosecution and requires only a preponderance of evidence. In Joaquin vs. Aniceto,
12 SCRA 308 (1964), we held that Article 33 contemplates an action against the employee in his primary civil
liability. It does not apply to an action against the employer to enforce its subsidiary civil liability, because such
liability arises only after conviction of the employee in the criminal case or when the employee is adjudged guilty
of the wrongful act in a criminal action and found to have committed the offense in the discharge of his duties.[18]
Any action brought against the employer based on its subsidiary liability before the conviction of its employee is
premature.[19]
However, we note that by invoking the principle of respondeat superior,[20] respondents tried to rely on Art. 33 to
hold IFFI primarily liable for its employees defamatory statements. But we also find that respondents did not raise
the claim of primary liability as a cause of action in its complaint before the trial court. On the contrary, they sought
to enforce the alleged subsidiary liability of petitioner as the employer of Costa, the accused in pending criminal
cases for libel, prematurely.

Having established that respondents did not base their civil action on petitioner IFFIs primary liability under Art. 33
but claimed damages from IFFI based on its subsidiary liability as employer of Costa, prematurely, we need not
delve further on the other errors raised by petitioner. Plainly both the trial and the appellate courts erred in failing to
dismiss the complaint against herein petitioner by respondents claiming subsidiary liability while the criminal libel
cases against IFFIs employee, Costa, were pending before the metropolitan trial court. Nothing herein said,
however, ought to prejudice the reliefs that respondents might seek at the appropriate time.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals dated February 7,
1997 and August 28, 1997, respectively, are hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The civil complaint for
damages filed and docketed as Civil Case No. 65026 before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, against
herein petitioner is ORDERED DISMISSED. Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), J., no part due to personal relation to one of parties.

[1] Rollo, p. 60.

[2] Id. at 28-29.

[3] Art. 33. Civil Code: In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely
separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed
independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

[4] Rollo, p. 34.

[5] Supra, note 3.

[6] See Morta, Sr. vs. Occidental, G.R. No. 123417, 308 SCRA 167, 172 (1999); Andamo vs. Intermediate

Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74761, 191 SCRA 195, 199 (1990).

[7] See Bulao vs. CA, G.R. No. 101983, 218 SCRA 321, 325 (1993).
[8] Alilaya vs. Espaola, G.R. No. L-36208, 107 SCRA 564, 569 (1981).
[9] CA Rollo, p. 48.

[10] Id. at 53.

[11] Id. at 55. Emphasis supplied.

[12] 61A Am Jur 2d 67.

[13] Id. at 67-68.

[14] See PLEADING, 71 C.J.S. 123-134.

[15] Art. 1161, Civil Code. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses shall be governed by the penal laws,
subject to the provision of Article 2177, and of the pertinent provisions of Chapter 2, Preliminary Title, on Human
Relations, and of Title XVIII of this Book, regulating damages.

[16] Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and distinct
from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages
twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

[17] See ART. 102, RPC - Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavernkeepers and proprietors of establishments.
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations shall be
civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or
some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with violence
against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.

ART. 103, RPC - Subsidiary civil liability of other persons.The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding
article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for
felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
[18] See Yonaha vs. CA, G.R. No. 112346, 255 SCRA 397, 402 (1996); Franco vs. Intermediate Appellate

Court, G.R. No. 71137, 178 SCRA 331, 338 (1989).

[19] Joaquin, et al. vs. Aniceto, et al., 120 Phil. 1101, 1104 (1964).

[20] Libel and Slander, 50 Am Jur 2d 686.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA, accused-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.

ROMERO, J.:

In Criminal Case No. C-3217 filed before Branch 16, RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged
with Rape and eventually convicted thereof on June 19, 1991 in a decision penned by Judge Manuel E. Autajay.
Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died on February 4, 1992 at
the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to
hipato carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992
dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with
regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his
civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of
People v. Sendaydiego 1 insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction
by the lower court on which the civil liability is based.

Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the
death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil
penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo
and Ocfemia 2 which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and,
therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

We are thus confronted with a single issue: Does death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguish
his civil liability?

In the aforementioned case of People v. Castillo, this issue was settled in the affirmative. This same issue posed
therein was phrased thus: Does the death of Alfredo Castillo affect both his criminal responsibility and his civil
liability as a consequence of the alleged crime?

It resolved this issue thru the following disquisition:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is the controlling statute. It reads, in part:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

With reference to Castillo's criminal liability, there is no question. The law is plain. Statutory construction is
unnecessary. Said liability is extinguished.

The civil liability, however, poses a problem. Such liability is extinguished only when the death of the offender
occurs before final judgment. Saddled upon us is the task of ascertaining the legal import of the term "final
judgment." Is it final judgment as contradistinguished from an interlocutory order? Or, is it a judgment which is
final and executory?
We go to the genesis of the law. The legal precept contained in Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code heretofore
transcribed is lifted from Article 132 of the Spanish El Codigo Penal de 1870 which, in part, recites:

La responsabilidad penal se extingue.

1. Por la muerte del reo en cuanto a las penas personales siempre, y respecto a las pecuniarias, solo cuando a
su fallecimiento no hubiere recaido sentencia firme.

xxx xxx xxx

The code of 1870 . . . it will be observed employs the term "sentencia firme." What is "sentencia firme" under the
old statute?

XXVIII Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola, p. 473, furnishes the ready answer: It says:

SENTENCIA FIRME. La sentencia que adquiere la fuerza de las definitivas por no haberse utilizado por las partes
litigantes recurso alguno contra ella dentro de los terminos y plazos legales concedidos al efecto.

"Sentencia firme" really should be understood as one which is definite. Because, it is only when judgment is such
that, as Medina y Maranon puts it, the crime is confirmed "en condena determinada;" or, in the words of
Groizard, the guilt of the accused becomes "una verdad legal." Prior thereto, should the accused die, according
to Viada, "no hay legalmente, en tal caso, ni reo, ni delito, ni responsabilidad criminal de ninguna clase." And, as
Judge Kapunan well explained, when a defendant dies before judgment becomes executory, "there cannot be any
determination by final judgment whether or not the felony upon which the civil action might arise exists," for the
simple reason that "there is no party defendant." (I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, p. 421. Senator
Francisco holds the same view. Francisco, Revised Penal Code, Book One, 2nd ed., pp. 859-860)

The legal import of the term "final judgment" is similarly reflected in the Revised Penal Code. Articles 72 and 78 of
that legal body mention the term "final judgment" in the sense that it is already enforceable. This also brings to
mind Section 7, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court which states that a judgment in a criminal case becomes final "after
the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served,
or the defendant has expressly waived in writing his right to appeal."

By fair intendment, the legal precepts and opinions here collected funnel down to one positive conclusion: The term
final judgment employed in the Revised Penal Code means judgment beyond recall. Really, as long as a judgment
has not become executory, it cannot be truthfully said that defendant is definitely guilty of the felony charged
against him.

Not that the meaning thus given to final judgment is without reason. For where, as in this case, the right to institute
a separate civil action is not reserved, the decision to be rendered must, of necessity, cover "both the criminal and
the civil aspects of the case." People vs. Yusico (November 9, 1942), 2 O.G., No. 100, p. 964. See also: People vs.
Moll, 68 Phil., 626, 634; Francisco, Criminal Procedure, 1958 ed., Vol. I, pp. 234, 236. Correctly, Judge Kapunan
observed that as "the civil action is based solely on the felony committed and of which the offender might be found
guilty, the death of the offender extinguishes the civil liability." I Kapunan, Revised Penal Code, Annotated, supra.

Here is the situation obtaining in the present case: Castillo's criminal liability is out. His civil liability is sought to
be enforced by reason of that criminal liability. But then, if we dismiss, as we must, the criminal action and let the
civil aspect remain, we will be faced with the anomalous situation whereby we will be called upon to clamp civil
liability in a case where the source thereof criminal liability does not exist. And, as was well stated in
Bautista, et al. vs. Estrella, et al., CA-G.R.
No. 19226-R, September 1, 1958, "no party can be found and held criminally liable in a civil suit," which solely
would remain if we are to divorce it from the criminal proceeding."

This ruling of the Court of Appeals in the Castillo case 3 was adopted by the Supreme Court in the cases of People
of the Philippines v. Bonifacio Alison, et al., 4 People of the Philippines v. Jaime Jose, et al. 5 and People of the
Philippines v. Satorre 6 by dismissing the appeal in view of the death of the accused pending appeal of said cases.

As held by then Supreme Court Justice Fernando in the Alison case:

The death of accused-appellant Bonifacio Alison having been established, and considering that there is as yet no
final judgment in view of the pendency of the appeal, the criminal and civil liability of the said accused-appellant
Alison was extinguished by his death (Art. 89, Revised Penal Code; Reyes' Criminal Law, 1971 Rev. Ed., p. 717,
citing People v. Castillo and Ofemia C.A., 56 O.G. 4045); consequently, the case against him should be dismissed.

On the other hand, this Court in the subsequent cases of Buenaventura Belamala v. Marcelino Polinar 7 and
Lamberto Torrijos v. The Honorable Court of Appeals 8 ruled differently. In the former, the issue decided by this
court was: Whether the civil liability of one accused of physical injuries who died before final judgment is
extinguished by his demise to the extent of barring any claim therefore against his estate. It was the contention of
the administrator-appellant therein that the death of the accused prior to final judgment extinguished all criminal
and civil liabilities resulting from the offense, in view of Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code.
However, this court ruled therein:

We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code
of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the revised Penal Code. As
pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of
physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and
distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted
together with the criminal action still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil
action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately.

In Torrijos, the Supreme Court held that:

xxx xxx xxx

It should be stressed that the extinction of civil liability follows the extinction of the criminal liability under Article
89, only when the civil liability arises from the criminal act as its only basis. Stated differently, where the civil
liability does not exist independently of the criminal responsibility, the extinction of the latter by death, ipso facto
extinguishes the former, provided, of course, that death supervenes before final judgment. The said principle does
not apply in instant case wherein the civil liability springs neither solely nor originally from the crime itself but
from a civil contract of purchase and sale. (Emphasis ours)

xxx xxx xxx

In the above case, the court was convinced that the civil liability of the accused who was charged with estafa could
likewise trace its genesis to Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code since said accused had swindled the first and
second vendees of the property subject matter of the contract of sale. It therefore concluded: "Consequently, while
the death of the accused herein extinguished his criminal liability including fine, his civil liability based on the laws
of human relations remains."

Thus it allowed the appeal to proceed with respect to the civil liability of the accused, notwithstanding the
extinction of his criminal liability due to his death pending appeal of his conviction.

To further justify its decision to allow the civil liability to survive, the court relied on the following ratiocination:
Since Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court 9 requires the dismissal of all money claims against the defendant
whose death occurred prior to the final judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), then it can be inferred that
actions for recovery of money may continue to be heard on appeal, when the death of the defendant supervenes
after the CFI had rendered its judgment. In such case, explained this tribunal, "the name of the offended party shall
be included in the title of the case as plaintiff-appellee and the legal representative or the heirs of the deceased-
accused should be substituted as defendants-appellants."

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from Castillo to Torrijos, the rule established was that the survival
of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict.
Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely
based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al. 10 departed from this long-established principle of
law. In this case, accused Sendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru
falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego's death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his
conviction.

This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego's appeal but only to the extent of his criminal
liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively
dependent on the criminal action already extinguished. The legal import of such decision was for the court to
continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego's
conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so,
this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death
occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of
three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total
sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of
express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court). The civil action for
the civil liability is separate and distinct from the criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287;
Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil. 8).

When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336,
October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).

The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed although he has no
criminal liability (U.S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).

In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased Sendaydiego insofar as his
criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible
civil liability for the money claims of the Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained
of, as if no criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his civil liability,
Article 30 of the Civil Code . . . and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within ten (10)
days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his estate is under administration and has
a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the
civil action for the civil liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court).
Succeeding cases 11 raising the identical issue have maintained adherence to our ruling in Sendaydiego; in other
words, they were a reaffirmance of our abandonment of the settled rule that a civil liability solely anchored on the
criminal (civil liability ex delicto) is extinguished upon dismissal of the entire appeal due to the demise of the
accused.

But was it judicious to have abandoned this old ruling? A re-examination of our decision in Sendaydiego impels us
to revert to the old ruling.

To restate our resolution of July 8, 1977 in Sendaydiego: The resolution of the civil action impliedly instituted in
the criminal action can proceed irrespective of the latter's extinction due to death of the accused pending appeal of
his conviction, pursuant to Article 30 of the Civil Code and Section 21, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court.

Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:

When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal
proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be
sufficient to prove the act complained of.

Clearly, the text of Article 30 could not possibly lend support to the ruling in Sendaydiego. Nowhere in its text is
there a grant of authority to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the accused's civil liability ex delicto
when his death supervenes during appeal. What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate civil action
which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal
action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum
of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is,
preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify
the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether
civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of
his conviction. This is because whether asserted in
the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused
while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter:

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totally extinguished:

1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is
extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment;

xxx xxx xxx

However, the ruling in Sendaydiego deviated from the expressed intent of Article 89. It allowed claims for civil
liability ex delicto to survive by ipso facto treating the civil action impliedly instituted with the criminal, as one
filed under Article 30, as though no criminal proceedings had been filed but merely a separate civil action. This had
the effect of converting such claims from one which is dependent on the outcome of the criminal action to an
entirely new and separate one, the prosecution of which does not even necessitate the filing of criminal
proceedings. 12 One would be hard put to pinpoint the statutory authority for such a transformation. It is to be
borne in mind that in recovering civil liability ex delicto, the same has perforce to be determined in the criminal
action, rooted as it is in the court's pronouncement of the guilt or innocence of the accused. This is but to render
fealty to the intendment of Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable." In such cases, extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused
pending appeal inevitably signifies the concomitant extinction of the civil liability. Mors Omnia Solvi. Death
dissolves all things.

In sum, in pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a
condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the
demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability
springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an
inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This
is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the
institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego
resolution of July 8, 1977, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival
of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred
to under Article 30. Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the
conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article 30.

Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of July 8, 1977
notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:

Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of
the civil liability for which his estate would be liable. 13

In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on
whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source
of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's
civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for
Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal
action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted
therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal.

Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court was also invoked to serve as another basis for the Sendaydiego resolution
of July 8, 1977. In citing Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the Court made the inference that civil actions of the
type involved in Sendaydiego consist of money claims, the recovery of which may be continued on appeal if
defendant dies pending appeal of his conviction by holding his estate liable therefor. Hence, the Court's conclusion:
"When the action is for the recovery of money" "and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First
Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided" in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court
(Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).

The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of
First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.

Sadly, reliance on this provision of law is misplaced. From the standpoint of procedural law, this course taken in
Sendaydiego cannot be sanctioned. As correctly observed by Justice Regalado:

xxx xxx xxx

I do not, however, agree with the justification advanced in both Torrijos and Sendaydiego which, relying on the
provisions of Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, drew the strained implication therefrom that where the civil
liability instituted together with the criminal liabilities had already passed beyond the judgment of the then Court of
First Instance (now the Regional Trial Court), the Court of Appeals can continue to exercise appellate jurisdiction
thereover despite the extinguishment of the component criminal liability of the deceased. This pronouncement,
which has been followed in the Court's judgments subsequent and consonant to Torrijos and Sendaydiego, should
be set aside and abandoned as being clearly erroneous and unjustifiable.

Said Section 21 of Rule 3 is a rule of civil procedure in ordinary civil actions. There is neither authority nor
justification for its application in criminal procedure to civil actions instituted together with and as part of criminal
actions. Nor is there any authority in law for the summary conversion from the latter category of an ordinary civil
action upon the death of the offender. . . .

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can
hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the
estate of the deceased accused.

Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5,
Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego's civil liability.
"What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86, 14 are contractual money
claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real
property." 15 Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate.
These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts,
expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive
enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual
money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim
therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal
action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, we rule: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover
damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 111 16 (1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously
charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is
premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an
injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or
administrator 17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator. No action upon a
claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or
administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a
lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be
commenced against him.

This is in consonance with our ruling in Belamala 18 where we held that, in recovering damages for injury to
persons thru an independent civil action based on Article 33 of the Civil Code, the same must be filed against the
executor or administrator of the estate of deceased accused and not against the estate under Sec. 5, Rule 86 because
this rule explicitly limits the claim to those for funeral expenses, expenses for the last sickness of the decedent,
judgment for money and claims arising from contract, express or implied. Contractual money claims, we stressed,
refers only to purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort.

Conversely, if the same act or omission complained of also arises from contract, the separate civil action must be
filed against the estate of the accused, pursuant to Sec. 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court.

From this lengthy disquisition, we summarize our ruling herein:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final
judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also
be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. 19 Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other
sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

a) Law 20

b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts

d) ...

e) Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be
pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is
based as explained above.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-
offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article
1155 21 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription. 22

Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal
liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. Consequently, the appeal is hereby
dismissed without qualification.

WHEREFORE, the appeal of the late Rogelio Bayotas is DISMISSED with costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan
and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Cruz, J., is on leave.

#Footnotes

1 Nos. L-33252, L-33253 and L-33254, 81 SCRA 120.

2 No. 22211-R, November 4, 1959, 56 O.G. No. 23, p. 4045.

3 supra.

4 L-30612, April 27, 1972, 44 SCRA 523.

5 No. L-28397, June 17, 1976, 71 SCRA 273.

6 No. L-26282, August 27, 1976, 72 SCRA 439.

7 No. L-24098, November 18, 1967, 21 SCRA 970.

8 No. L-40336, October 24, 1975, 67 SCRA 394.

9 Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest
thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be
prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.

10 Supra.

11 People v. Badeo, G.R. No. 72990, November 21, 1991, 204 SCRA 122; Petralba v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. No. 81337, August 16, 1991, 200 SCRA 644; Dumlao v. Court of Appeals, No. L-51625, October 5,
1988, 166 SCRA 269; Rufo Mauricio Construction v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-75357, November 27,
1987, 155 SCRA 712; People v. Salcedo, No. L-48642, June 22, 1987, 151 SCRA 220; People v. Pancho, No. L-
32507, November 4, 1986, 145 SCRA 323; People v. Navoa, No. L-67966, September 28, 1984, 132 SCRA 410;
People v. Asibar,
No. L-37255, October 23, 1982, 117 SCRA 856; People v. Tirol, No. L-30538, January 31, 1981, 102 SCRA 558;
and People v. Llamoso, No. L-24866, July 13, 1979, 91 SCRA 364.

12 Justice Barredo in his concurring opinion observed that:

. . . this provision contemplates prosecution of the civil liability arising from a criminal offense without the need of
any criminal proceeding to prove the commission of the crime as such, that is without having to prove the criminal
liability of the defendant so long as his act causing damage or prejudice to the offended party is proven by
preponderance of evidence.

13 Supra, p. 134.

14 Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. All claims for
money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for
money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever,
except that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against
the claimants. Where an executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already
commenced by the deceased in his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the
decedent, instead of presenting them independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set
off against each other in such action; and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so
determined shall be considered the true balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly
before the court in the administration proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their
present value.

15 As explained by J. Regalado in the deliberation of this case.

16 Sec. 1. Institute of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the
recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil
action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Article 32, 33,
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused.

A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The institution of, or the reservation of the right to file,
any of said civil actions separately waives the others.

The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall be made before the prosecution starts to
present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such
reservation.

In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.

17 Justice Regalado cited the Court's ruling in Belamala that since the damages sought, as a result of the felony
committed amounts to injury to person or property, real or personal, the civil liability to be recovered must be
claimed against the executor/administrator and not against the estate.

18 Ibid.
19 Justice Vitug who holds a similar view stated: "The civil liability may still be pursued in a separate civil
action but it must be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict, except when by statutory provision an
independent civil action is authorized such as, to exemplify, in the instance enumerated in Article 33 of the Civil
Code." Justice Regalado stressed that:

Conversely, such civil liability is not extinguished and survives the deceased offender where it also arises
simultaneously from or exists as a consequence or by reason of a contract, as in Torrijos; or from law, as stated in
Torrijos and in the concurring opinion in Sendaydiego, such as in reference to the Civil Code; or from a quasi-
contract; or is authorized by law to be pursued in an independent civil action, as in Belamala. Indeed, without these
exceptions, it would be unfair and inequitable to deprive the victim of his property or recovery of damages therefor,
as would have been the fate of the second vendee in Torrijos or the provincial government in Sendaydiego."

20 See Articles 19, 20, 21, 31, 32, 33, 34, 2176 of the Civil Code; see related provisions of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, as amended, particularly Sec. 1, Rule 111.

21 Art. 1155. The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed before the court, when there is a
written extrajudicial demand by the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the debt by the
debtor.

22 As explained by J. Vitug in the deliberation of this case.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the
Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.

The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded by the Government, through the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for
the construction, operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint
with the Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019. Among those
charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly
conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.

On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among
others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of probable
cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution
finding probable cause.

Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged before the SB as follows:

On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in relation to his office and taking advantage
of the same, in conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air
Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession
Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger
Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement
substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under
Republic Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision on Public Utility
Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's
default under Article IV, Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement, which
terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government of the
Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.

On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:

The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today within which to show cause why this case should not
be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person
and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this
case.5

The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the
person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he
posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a
private person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.6

On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the Information filed against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the
show cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer
with whom he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any
official authority as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.

The prosecution filed its Opposition.8

On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution, pertinent portions of which read thus:

Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T.
Go, the lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already
deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused, the Court
grants the Motion to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby ordered quashed and dismissed.9

Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to wit:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE IN
GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090 ON THE
GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.

II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF
SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE JURISPRUDENCE, IN
RULING THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO DESPITE THE
IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISSED CRIMINAL CASE NO. 2809010

The Court finds the petition meritorious.

Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:

Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxxx

(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous
to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.

The elements of the above provision are:

(1) that the accused is a public officer;

(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and

(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.11

At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public
officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private
persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine
as enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private respondent.13

The only question that needs to be settled in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may
be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was
alleged to have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged in
the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper.

The Court is not persuaded.

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with whom respondent can
be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them
can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the
death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis
of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile
does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3
(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it not for his death, he should have been charged.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others,
is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does
not require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist
where the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted alone.

Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more
persons enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law,
the act of each of them and they are jointly responsible therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done
by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or
written by each of them and it makes no difference whether the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the
time of trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:

x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the
joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy.
So long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases of a charge for conspiracy, one
defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19

The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which is
deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in
violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal
liability incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-conspirators.

Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress
"acts of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated
if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who conspired with such public officer
in violating the Anti-Graft Law.

In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles
governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:

x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime except when the law specifically provides a penalty
therefor as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy known to the common law is not an
indictable offense in the Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a reprehensible act from the view-point of
morality, but as long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in furtherance of their malevolent design, the
sovereignty of the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public remains undisturbed.

However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme, a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the
existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In
stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that

While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the
statute specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in
many cases a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the other evidence of record, in establishing
the existence, of the consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.

Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is
anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will
actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible for the whole, the same as though performed by
himself alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts other than his own, "when two or more persons
agree or conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the acts of the others, done in furtherance of the
agreement or conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the conspirators is clearly explained in one
case where this Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate liability of each (conspirator) without
taking into consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of them with the criminal act, for the
commission of which they all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must therefore in view of the solidarity
of the act and intent which existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of the band or party created by
them, and they are all equally responsible x x x

Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene
of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn
within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out the conspiracy.

In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies
the imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as
a separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.

xxxx

x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators who acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-principals. This rule of collective
criminal liability emanates from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted action of the conspirators in
consummating their common purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for the consequences of such
criminal enterprise they must be held solidarily liable.22

This is not to say, however, that private respondent should be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is
settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left ventilated before the trial court during trial, where
respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its presence.

Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a
different case, he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with the late Secretary Enrile in violating the
same Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement (Side Agreement) which is separate
from the Concession Agreement subject of the present case. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091.
Here, the SB, through a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the Information on the ground that the SB
has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned the said SB Resolution before this

Court via a petition for review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 168919. In a minute
resolution dated August 31, 2005, this Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the part of the SB.
This Resolution became final and executory on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this Court's

resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in the instant case.

The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No.
168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a Motion for Consolidation26 in
Criminal Case No. 28091. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail
and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that
the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of
his person to the jurisdiction of the court.27

Thus, it has been held that:

When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or
otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of
the courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or
files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel.
John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)

xxxx

As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:

"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a
defendant voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so
wishes not to waive this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the purpose of objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court; otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to that jurisdiction."

Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any
other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an
appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."

Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to
the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent courts exercise of its
jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said courts jurisdiction over him. x x x.28

In the instant case, respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his
person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the
Information in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an Order requiring the prosecution to show
cause why the case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.

As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract entered into by public
officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive
original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as
enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is being charged
for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However,
by reason of the death of the latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does
not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case involving herein
respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on
the law defining its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve matters which are mere incidents in the main case and the
main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years. Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court
would further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by no means, promote respondent's right to a
speedy trial and a speedy disposition of his case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting
respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith
DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of Criminal Case No. 28090.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

No part, former counsel in related cases

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice (No part)
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice On leave
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE*
Associate Justice
On leave
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN*
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

* On leave.

1 Annex "A" to petition, rollo, p. 59.

2 Composed of Associate Justice Godofredo L. Legaspi as Chairman, with Associate Justices Efren N. De La Cruz
and Norberto Y. Geraldez (now deceased), as members.

3 G.R. Nos. 155001, 155547and 155661, May 5, 2003, 402 SCRA 612.

4 Annex "B" to petition, rollo, pp. 61-62.

5 Annex "C" to petition, id. at 64.

6 See Annex "F" to petition, id. at 74-82.

7 Annex "G" to petition, id. at 84-88.

8 Annex "H" to petition, id. at 90-101.

9 Annex "A" to petition, id. at 59.

10 Rollo, p. 27.

11 Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, 549 Phil. 783, 799 (2007).

12 Gregorio Singian, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. Nos. 195011-19, September 30, 2013; Santillano v. People,
G.R. Nos. 175045-46, March 3, 2010, 614 SCRA 164; Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, supra; Singian, Jr. v.

Sandiganbayan, 514 Phil. 536 (2005); Domingo v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 149175, October 25, 2005, 474
SCRA 203; Luciano v. Estrella, G.R. No. L-31622, August 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 769.
13 See Go v. Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, supra note 11.

14 Records, vol. 1, p. 106.

15 15 C.J.S. Conspiracy 82, p. 1115.

16 14 16 Am Jur 2d, pp. 134-135.

17 Id.

18 19 16 Am Jur 2d, pp. 137-138.

19 Villa v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 87186, 87281, 87466 snd 87524, April 24, 1992, 208 SCRA 283, 297-298,
citing U.S. v. Remigio, 37 Phil. 599 (1918). (Emphasis supplied)

20 See R.A. 3019, Sec. 1.

21 G.R. No. L-19069, October 29, 1968, 25 SCRA 759.

22 Id. at 771-777. (Italics in the original; emphasis supplied)

G.R. No. 168918, March 2, 2009, 580 SCRA 409, 432; Heirs of the late Nestor Tria v.
23 People v. Dumlao,

Obias, G.R. No. 175887, November 24, 2010, 636 SCRA 91, 116.

24 Rollo, pp. 176-180.

25 Id. at 186-192.

26 Annex "J" to petition, id. at 112.

27 Miranda v. Tuliao, 520 Phil. 907, 918 (2006), citing Santiago v. Vasquez, G.R. Nos. 99289-90, January 27, 1993,
217 SCRA 633, 643; Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, 360 Phil. 559, 581 (1998); Velasco v. Court of Appeals, 315
Phil. 757, 770 (1995).

28 Cojuangco v. Sandiganbayan, supra, at 582-583. (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 195549 September 3, 2014

WILLAWARE PRODUCTS CORPORATION, Petitioner,

vs.
JESICHRIS MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the
Decision1 dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution2 dated February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-
G.R. CV No. 86744.

The facts, as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), are as follows:

[Respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Company ([respondent] for short) filed this present complaint for damages
for unfair competition with prayer for permanent injunction to enjoin [petitioner] Willaware Products Corporation
([petitioner] for short) from manufacturing and distributing plastic-made automotive parts similar to those of
[respondent].
[Respondent] alleged that it is a duly registeredpartnership engaged in the manufacture and distribution of plastic
and metal products, with principal office at No. 100 Mithi Street, Sampalukan, Caloocan City. Since its registration
in 1992, [respondent] has been manufacturing in its Caloocan plant and distributing throughout the Philippines
plastic-made automotive parts. [Petitioner], on the other hand, which is engaged in the manufacture and distribution
of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal has its office near that of [respondent]. [Respondent] further alleged
that in view of the physical proximity of [petitioners] office to [respondents] office, and in view of the fact that
some of the [respondents] employeeshad transferred to [petitioner], [petitioner] had developed familiarity with
[respondents] products, especially its plastic-made automotive parts.

That sometime in November 2000, [respondent] discovered that [petitioner] had been manufacturing and
distributing the same automotive parts with exactly similar design, same material and colors but was selling these
products at a lower price as [respondents] plastic-made automotive parts and to the same customers.

[Respondent] alleged that it had originated the use of plastic in place of rubber in the manufacture ofautomotive
underchassis parts such as spring eye bushing, stabilizer bushing, shock absorberbushing, center bearing cushions,
among others. [Petitioners] manufacture of the same automotive parts with plastic materialwas taken from
[respondents] idea of using plastic for automotive parts. Also, [petitioner] deliberately copied [respondents]
products all of which acts constitute unfair competition, is and are contrary to law, morals, good customs and public
policy and have caused [respondent] damages in terms oflost and unrealizedprofits in the amount of TWO
MILLION PESOS as of the date of [respondents] complaint.

Furthermore, [petitioners] tortuous conduct compelled [respondent] to institute this action and thereby to incur
expenses in the way of attorneys fees and other litigation expenses in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED
THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00).

In its Answer, [petitioner] denies all the allegations of the [respondent] except for the following facts: that it is
engaged in the manufacture and distribution of kitchenware items made of plastic and metal and that theres
physical proximity of [petitioners] office to [respondent]s office, and that someof [respondents] employees had
transferred to [petitioner] and that over the years [petitioner] had developed familiarity with [respondents]
products, especially its plastic made automotive parts.

As its Affirmative Defenses, [petitioner] claims that there can be no unfair competition as the plastic-made
automotive parts are mere reproductions of original parts and their construction and composition merely conforms
to the specificationsof the original parts of motor vehicles they intend to replace. Thus, [respondent] cannot claim
that it "originated" the use of plastic for these automotive parts. Even assuming for the sake of argument that
[respondent] indeed originated the use of these plastic automotive parts, it still has no exclusive right to use,
manufacture and sell these as it has no patent over these products. Furthermore, [respondent] is not the only
exclusive manufacturer of these plastic-made automotive parts as there are other establishments which were already
openly selling them to the public.3
After trial on the merits, the RTC ruled in favor of respondent. It ruled that petitioner clearly invaded the rights or
interest of respondent by deliberately copying and performing acts amounting to unfair competition. The RTC
further opined that under the circumstances, in order for respondents property rights to be preserved, petitioners
acts of manufacturing similar plastic-made automotive parts such as those of respondents and the selling of the
sameproducts to respondents customers, which it cultivated over the years, will have to be enjoined. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds the defendant liable to plaintiff Two Million (P2,000,000.00)
Pesos, as actual damages, One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos as attorneys fees and One Hundred
Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos for exemplary damages. The court hereby permanently [enjoins] defendant from
manufacturing the plastic-made automotive parts as those manufactured by plaintiffs.

SO ORDERED.4

Thus, petitioner appealed to the CA.

On appeal, petitioner asserts that ifthere is no intellectual property protecting a good belonging to another,the
copying thereof for production and selling does not add up to unfair competition as competition is promoted by law
to benefit consumers. Petitioner further contends that it did not lure away respondents employees to get trade
secrets. It points out that the plastic spare parts sold by respondent are traded in the market and the copying of these
can be done by simplybuying a sample for a mold to be made.

Conversely, respondent averred that copyright and patent registrations are immaterial for an unfair competition case
to prosper under Article 28 of the Civil Code. It stresses that the characteristics of unfair competition are present in
the instant case as the parties are trade rivals and petitioners acts are contrary to good conscience for deliberately
copying its products and employing its former employees.

In a Decision dated November 24,2010, the CA affirmed with modification the ruling of the RTC. Relevant portions
of said decision read:

Despite the evidence showing thatWillaware took dishonest steps in advancing its business interest against
Jesichris, however, the Court finds no basis for the award by the RTC of actual damages. One is entitled to actual
damages as one has duly proven. The testimony of Quejada, who was engaged by Jesichris in 2001 to audit its
business, only revealed that there was a discrepancy between the sales of Jesichris from 2001 to 2002. No amount
was mentioned. As for Exhibit "Q," which is a copy of the comparative income statement of Jesichris for 1999-
2002, it shows the decline of the sales in 2002 in comparison with those made in 2001 but it does not disclose if this
pertains to the subject automotive parts or to the other products of Jesichris like plates.

In any event, it was clearly shown that there was unfair competition on the part of Willaware that prejudiced
Jesichris. It is only proper that nominal damages be awarded in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P200,000.00) in order to recognize and vindicate Jesichris rights. The RTCs award of attorneys fees and
exemplary damages is also maintained.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated April 15, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan
City, Branch 131, in Civil Case No. C-19771 is hereby MODIFIED. The award of Two Million Pesos
(P2,000,000.00) actual damages is deleted and in its place, Two Hundred Thousand Pesos nominal damages is
awarded.

SO ORDERED.5

Dissatisfied, petitioner moved for reconsideration. However, the same was denied for lack of merit by the CA in a
Resolution dated February 10, 2011.

Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioner raises the following issues for our resolution:

(1) Whether or not there is unfair competition under human relations when the parties are not competitors and there
is actually no damage on the part of Jesichris?

(2) Consequently, if there is no unfair competition, should there be moral damages and attorneys fees?

(3) Whether or not the addition of nominal damages is proper although no rights have been established?

(4) If ever the right of Jesichris refersto its copyright on automotive parts, should it be considered in the light of the
said copyrights were considered to be void by no less than this Honorable Court in SC GR No. 161295?

(5) If the right involved is "goodwill" then the issue is: whether or not Jesichris has established "goodwill?"6

In essence, the issue for our resolution is: whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting to unfair competition
under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

Prefatorily, we would like to stress that the instant case falls under Article 28 of the Civil Code on humanrelations,
and not unfair competition under Republic Act No. 8293,7 as the present suit is a damage suit and the products are
not covered by patent registration. A fortiori, the existence of patent registration is immaterial in the present case.

The concept of "unfair competition"under Article 28 is very much broader than that covered by intellectual property
laws. Under the present article, which follows the extended concept of "unfair competition" in American
jurisdictions, the term coverseven cases of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery of his employees,
misrepresentation of all kinds, interference with the fulfillment of a competitors contracts, or any malicious
interference with the latters business.8
With that settled, we now come to the issue of whether or not petitioner committed acts amounting tounfair
competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

We find the petition bereft of merit.

Article 28 of the Civil Code provides that "unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or industrial enterprises
or in labor through the use of force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-
handed method shall give rise to a right of action by the person who thereby suffers damage."

From the foregoing, it is clear thatwhat is being sought to be prevented is not competitionper sebut the use of
unjust, oppressive or high- handed methods which may deprive others of a fair chance to engage in business or to
earn a living. Plainly,what the law prohibits is unfair competition and not competition where the means usedare fair
and legitimate.

In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury to a
competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve acts which are characterized as "contrary to good conscience," or
"shocking to judicial sensibilities," or otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these include force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The public injury or
interest is a minor factor; the essence of the matter appears to be a private wrong perpetrated by unconscionable
means.9

Here, both characteristics are present.

First, both parties are competitors or trade rivals, both being engaged in the manufacture of plastic-made
automotive parts. Second, the acts of the petitioner were clearly "contrary to good conscience" as petitioner
admitted having employed respondents formeremployees, deliberately copied respondents products and even went
to the extent of selling these products to respondents customers.10

To bolster this point, the CA correctly pointed out that petitioners hiring of the former employees of respondent
and petitioners act of copying the subject plastic parts of respondent were tantamount to unfair competition, viz.:

The testimonies of the witnesses indicate that [petitioner] was in bad faith in competing with the business of
[respondent].1wphi1 [Petitioners] acts can be characterized as executed with mischievous subtle calculation. To
illustrate, in addition to the findings of the RTC, the Court observes that [petitioner] is engaged in the production of
plastic kitchenware previous to its manufacturing of plasticautomotive spare parts, it engaged the services of the
then mold setter and maintenance operator of [respondent], De Guzman, while he was employed by the latter. De
Guzman was hired by [petitioner] in order to adjust its machinery since quality plastic automotive spare parts were
not being made. It baffles the Court why [petitioner] cannot rely onits own mold setter and maintenance operator to
remedy its problem. [Petitioners] engagement of De Guzman indicates that it is banking on his experience gained
from working for [respondent].
Another point we observe is that Yabut, who used to be a warehouse and delivery man of [respondent], was fired
because he was blamed of spying in favor of [petitioner]. Despite this accusation, he did not get angry. Later on, he
applied for and was hired by [petitioner] for the same position he occupied with [respondent]. These sequence of
events relating to his employment by [petitioner] is suspect too like the situation with De Guzman.11

Thus, it is evident that petitioner isengaged in unfair competition as shown by his act of suddenly shifting his
business from manufacturing kitchenware to plastic-made automotive parts; his luring the employees of the
respondent to transfer to his employ and trying to discover the trade secrets of the respondent.12

Moreover, when a person starts an opposing place of business, not for the sake of profit to himself, but regardless of
loss and for the sole purpose of driving his competitor out of business so that later on he can take advantage of the
effects of his malevolent purpose, he is guilty of wanton wrong.13 As aptly observed by the courta quo, the
testimony of petitioners witnesses indicate that it acted in bad faith in competing with the business of respondent,
to wit: [Petitioner], thru its General Manager, William Salinas, Jr., admitted that it was never engaged in the
business of plastic-made automotive parts until recently, year 2000:

Atty. Bautista: The business name of Willaware Product Corporation is kitchenware, it is (sic) not? Manufacturer of
kitchenware and distributor ofkitchenware, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: And you said you have
known the [respondent] Jesichris Manufacturing Co., you have known it to be manufacturing plastic automotive
products, is it not? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir. Atty. Bautista: In fact, you have been (sic) physically become familiar with
these products, plastic automotive products of Jesichris? Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.

How [petitioner] was able to manufacture the same products, in terms of color, size, shape and composition as those
sold by Jesichris was due largely to the sudden transfer ofJesichris employees to Willaware.

Atty. Bautista: Since when have you been familiar with Jesichris Manufacturing Company?

Mr. Salinas: Since they transferred there (sic) our place.

Atty. Bautista: And that was in what year? Mr. Salinas: Maybe four (4) years. I dont know the exact date.

Atty. Bautista: And some of the employees of Jesichris Manufacturing Co. have transferred to your company, is it
not?

Mr. Salinas: Yes, sir.

Atty. Bautista: How many, more or less?

Mr. Salinas: More or less, three (3).

Atty. Bautista: And when, in what year or month did they transfer to you?

Mr. Salinas: First, November 1.

Atty. Bautista: Year 2000?

Mr. Salinas: Yes sir. And then the other maybe February, this year. And the other one, just one month ago.

That [petitioner] was clearly outto take [respondent] out of business was buttressed by the testimony of
[petitioners] witness, Joel Torres:

Q: Are you familiar with the [petitioner], Willaware Product Corporation?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Will you kindly inform this court where is the office of this Willaware Product Corporation (sic)?

A: At Mithi Street, Caloocan City, sir.

Q: And Mr. Witness, sometime second Saturday of January 2001, will you kindly inform this court what unusual
even (sic) transpired between you and Mr. Salinas on said date?

A: There was, sir.

Q: What is that?

A: Sir, I was walking at that time together with my wife going to the market and then I passed by the place where
they were having a drinking spree, sir.

Q: You mentioned they, who were they who were drinking at that time?

A: I know one Jun Molina, sir.

Q: And who else was there?

A: William Salinas, sir.

Q: And will you kindly inform us what happened when you spotted upon them drinking?

A: Jun Molina called me, sir.

Q: And what happened after that?

A: At that time, he offered mea glass of wine and before I was able to drink the wine, Mr. Salinas uttered
something, sir.

Q: And what were those words uttered by Mr. Salinas to you?

A: "O, ano naapektuhan na kayo sa ginaya (sic) ko sa inyo?"

Q: And what did you do after that, after hearing those words?

A: And he added these words, sir. "sabihin mo sa amo mo, dalawang taon na lang pababagsakin ko na siya."

Q: Alright, hearing those words, will you kindly tell this court whom did you gather to be referred to as your
"amo"?

A: Mr. Jessie Ching, sir.14

In sum, petitioner is guilty of unfair competition under Article 28 of the Civil Code.

However, since the award of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) in actual damages had been deleted and in its
place Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) in nominal damages is awarded, the attorney's fees should
concomitantly be modified and lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated November 24, 2010 and Resolution dated
February 10, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86744 are hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the award of attorney's fees be lowered to Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN*
Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

AT T E S T AT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairerson, Third Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.

ANTIONIO T. CARPIO
Acting Chief Justice

Footnotes

* Designated as Acting Member in lieu of Associate Justice Francis H. Jardeleza, per Special Order No. 1777 dated
September 1, 2014.

1 Penned by Associate Justice Fiorito S. Macalino, with Associate Justices Juan Q. Enriquez, Jr. and Ramon M.
Bato, Jr., concurring; rollo, pp. 128-135.

2 Id. at 145-146.

3 Id. at 38-39.

4 Id. at 45.

5 Id. at 134-135. (Emphasis in the original)

6 Id. at 14-15.
7 AN ACT PRESCRIBING THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CODE AND ESTABLISHING THE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY OFFICE, PROVIDING FOR ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES.

8 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 117.

9 Id. at 116-117.

10 Rollo, p. 41.

11 Id. at 133-134.

12 Id. at 44.

13 Supranote 8.

14 Rollo, pp. 41-44. (Citations omitted)

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 160600 January 15, 2014

DOMINGO GONZALO, Petitioner,

vs.
JOHN TARNATE, JR., Respondent.

DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:

The doctrine of in pari delicto which stipulates that the guilty parties to an illegal contract are not entitled to any
relief, cannot prevent a recovery if doing so violates the public policy against unjust enrichment.

Antecedents

After the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) had awarded on July 22, 1997 the contract for the
improvement of the Sadsadan-Maba-ay Section of the Mountain Province-Benguet Road in the total amount of 7
014 963 33 to his company, Gonzalo Construction,1 petitioner Domingo Gonzalo (Gonzalo) subcontracted to
respondent John Tarnate, Jr. (Tarnate) on October 15, 1997, the supply of materials and labor for the project under
the latter s business known as JNT Aggregates. Their agreement stipulated, among others, that Tarnate would pay to
Gonzalo eight percent and four percent of the contract price, respectively, upon Tarnate s first and second billing in
the project.2

In furtherance of their agreement, Gonzalo executed on April 6, 1999 a deed of assignment whereby he, as the
contractor, was assigning to Tarnate an amount equivalent to 10% of the total collection from the DPWH for the
project. This 10% retention fee (equivalent to P233,526.13) was the rent for Tarnates equipment that had been
utilized in the project. In the deed of assignment, Gonzalo further authorized Tarnate to use the official receipt of
Gonzalo Construction in the processing of the documents relative to the collection of the 10% retention fee and in
encashing the check to be issued by the DPWH for that purpose.3 The deed of assignment was submitted to the
DPWH on April 15, 1999. During the processing of the documents for the retention fee, however, Tarnate learned
that Gonzalo had unilaterally rescinded the deed of assignment by means of an affidavit of cancellation of deed of
assignment dated April 19, 1999 filed in the DPWH on April 22, 1999;4 and that the disbursement voucher for the
10% retention fee had then been issued in the name of Gonzalo, and the retention fee released to him.5

Tarnate demanded the payment of the retention fee from Gonzalo, but to no avail. Thus, he brought this suit against
Gonzalo on September 13, 1999 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Mountain Province to recover the retention
fee of P233,526.13, moral and exemplary damages for breach of contract, and attorneys fees.6

In his answer, Gonzalo admitted the deed of assignment and the authority given therein to Tarnate, but averred that
the project had not been fully implemented because of its cancellation by the DPWH, and that he had then revoked
the deed of assignment. He insisted that the assignment could not stand independently due to its being a mere
product of the subcontract that had been based on his contract with the DPWH; and that Tarnate, having been fully
aware of the illegality and ineffectuality of the deed of assignment from the time of its execution, could not go to
court with unclean hands to invoke any right based on the invalid deed of assignment or on the product of such
deed of assignment.7

Ruling of the RTC

On January 26, 2001, the RTC, opining that the deed of assignment was a valid and binding contract, and that
Gonzalo must comply with his obligations under the deed of assignment, rendered judgment in favor of Tarnate as
follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered and as prayed for by the plaintiff, John Tarnate, Jr. in his Complaint for Sum
of Money, Breach of Contract With Damages is hereby RENDERED in his favor and against the above-named
defendant Domingo Gonzalo, the Court now hereby orders as follows:

1. Defendant Domingo Gonzalo to pay the Plaintiff, John Tarnate, Jr., the amount of TWO HUNDRED THIRTY
THREE THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX and 13/100 PESOS (P233,526.13) representing the rental
of equipment;

2. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS by way of reasonable
Attorneys Fees for having forced/compelled the plaintiff to litigate and engage the services of a lawyer in order to
protect his interest and to enforce his right. The claim of the plaintiff for attorneys fees in the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) plus THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00) clearly appears to be
unconscionable and therefore reduced to Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) as aforestated making the same to be
reasonable;

3. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of FIFTEEN THOUSAND PESOS (P15,000.00) by way of litigation
expenses;

4. Defendant to pay Plaintiff the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00) for moral damages and for
the breach of contract; and

5. To pay the cost of this suit.

Award of exemplary damages in the instant case is not warranted for there is no showing that the defendant acted in
a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner analogous to the case of Xentrex Automotive, Inc.
vs. Court of Appeals, 291 SCRA 66.8

Gonzalo appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA).

Decision of the CA

On February 18, 2003, the CA affirmed the RTC.9

Although holding that the subcontract was an illegal agreement due to its object being specifically prohibited by
Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594; that Gonzalo and Tarnate were guilty of entering into the illegal contract
in violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594; and that the deed of assignment, being a product of and
dependent on the subcontract, was also illegal and unenforceable, the CA did not apply the doctrine of in pari
delicto, explaining that the doctrine applied only if the fault of one party was more or less equivalent to the fault of
the other party. It found Gonzalo to be more guilty than Tarnate, whose guilt had been limited to the execution of
the two illegal contracts while Gonzalo had gone to the extent of violating the deed of assignment. It declared that
the crediting of the 10% retention fee equivalent to P233,256.13 to his account had unjustly enriched Gonzalo; and
ruled, accordingly, that Gonzalo should reimburse Tarnate in that amount because the latters equipment had been
utilized in the project.

Upon denial of his motion for reconsideration,10 Gonzalo has now come to the Court to seek the review and
reversal of the decision of the CA.

Issues

Gonzalo contends that the CA erred in affirming the RTC because: (1) both parties were in pari delicto; (2) the deed
of assignment was void; and (3) there was no compliance with the arbitration clause in the subcontract.

Gonzalo submits in support of his contentions that the subcontract and the deed of assignment, being specifically
prohibited by law, had no force and effect; that upon finding both him and Tarnate guilty of violating the law for
executing the subcontract, the RTC and the CA should have applied the rule of in pari delicto, to the effect that the
law should not aid either party to enforce the illegal contract but should leave them where it found them; and that it
was erroneous to accord to the parties relief from their predicament.11

Ruling

We deny the petition for review, but we delete the grant of moral damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

There is no question that every contractor is prohibited from subcontracting with or assigning to another person any
contract or project that he has with the DPWH unless the DPWH Secretary has approved the subcontracting or
assignment. This is pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1594, which provides:

Section 6. Assignment and Subcontract. The contractor shall not assign, transfer, pledge, subcontract or make any
other disposition of the contract or any part or interest therein except with the approval of the Minister of Public
Works, Transportation and Communications, the Minister of Public Highways, or the Minister of Energy, as the
case may be. Approval of the subcontract shall not relieve the main contractor from any liability or obligation under
his contract with the Government nor shall it create any contractual relation between the subcontractor and the
Government.

Gonzalo, who was the sole contractor of the project in question, subcontracted the implementation of the project to
Tarnate in violation of the statutory prohibition. Their subcontract was illegal, therefore, because it did not bear the
approval of the DPWH Secretary. Necessarily, the deed of assignment was also illegal, because it sprung from the
subcontract. As aptly observed by the CA:
x x x. The intention of the parties in executing the Deed of Assignment was merely to cover up the illegality of the
sub-contract agreement. They knew for a fact that the DPWH will not allow plaintiff-appellee to claim in his own
name under the Sub-Contract Agreement.

Obviously, without the Sub-Contract Agreement there will be no Deed of Assignment to speak of. The illegality of
the Sub-Contract Agreement necessarily affects the Deed of Assignment because the rule is that an illegal
agreement cannot give birth to a valid contract. To rule otherwise is to sanction the act of entering into transaction
the object of which is expressly prohibited by law and thereafter execute an apparently valid contract to subterfuge
the illegality. The legal proscription in such an instance will be easily rendered nugatory and meaningless to the
prejudice of the general public.12

Under Article 1409 (1) of the Civil Code, a contract whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law is a void or
inexistent contract. As such, a void contract cannot produce a valid one.13 To the same effect is Article 1422 of the
Civil Code, which declares that "a contract, which is the direct result of a previous illegal contract, is also void and
inexistent."

We do not concur with the CAs finding that the guilt of Tarnate for violation of Section 6 of Presidential Decree
No. 1594 was lesser than that of Gonzalo, for, as the CA itself observed, Tarnate had voluntarily entered into the
agreements with Gonzalo.14 Tarnate also admitted that he did not participate in the bidding for the project because
he knew that he was not authorized to contract with the DPWH.15 Given that Tarnate was a businessman who had
represented himself in the subcontract as "being financially and organizationally sound and established, with the
necessary personnel and equipment for the performance of the project,"16 he justifiably presumed to be aware of
the illegality of his agreements with Gonzalo. For these reasons, Tarnate was not less guilty than Gonzalo.

According to Article 1412 (1) of the Civil Code, the guilty parties to an illegal contract cannot recover from one
another and are not entitled to an affirmative relief because they are in pari delicto or in equal fault. The doctrine of
in pari delicto is a universal doctrine that holds that no action arises, in equity or at law, from an illegal contract; no
suit can be maintained for its specific performance, or to recover the property agreed to be sold or delivered, or the
money agreed to be paid, or damages for its violation; and where the parties are in pari delicto, no affirmative relief
of any kind will be given to one against the other.17

Nonetheless, the application of the doctrine of in pari delicto is not always rigid.1wphi1 An accepted exception
arises when its application contravenes well-established public policy.18 In this jurisdiction, public policy has been
defined as "that principle of the law which holds that no subject or citizen can lawfully do that which has a
tendency to be injurious to the public or against the public good."19

Unjust enrichment exists, according to Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc.,20 "when a person unjustly retains a benefit at the
loss of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice,
equity and good conscience." The prevention of unjust enrichment is a recognized public policy of the State, for
Article 22 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "[e]very person who through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him." It is well to note that Article 22 "is part of the chapter of the Civil Code on
Human Relations, the provisions of which were formulated as basic principles to be observed for the rightful
relationship between human beings and for the stability of the social order; designed to indicate certain norms that
spring from the fountain of good conscience; guides for human conduct that should run as golden threads through
society to the end that law may approach its supreme ideal which is the sway and dominance of justice."21

There is no question that Tarnate provided the equipment, labor and materials for the project in compliance with his
obligations under the subcontract and the deed of assignment; and that it was Gonzalo as the contractor who
received the payment for his contract with the DPWH as well as the 10% retention fee that should have been paid to
Tarnate pursuant to the deed of assignment.22 Considering that Gonzalo refused despite demands to deliver to
Tarnate the stipulated 10% retention fee that would have compensated the latter for the use of his equipment in the
project, Gonzalo would be unjustly enriched at the expense of Tarnate if the latter was to be barred from recovering
because of the rigid application of the doctrine of in pari delicto. The prevention of unjust enrichment called for the
exception to apply in Tarnates favor. Consequently, the RTC and the CA properly adjudged Gonzalo liable to pay
Tarnate the equivalent amount of the 10% retention fee (i.e., P233,526.13).

Gonzalo sought to justify his refusal to turn over the P233,526.13 to Tarnate by insisting that he (Gonzalo) had a
debt of P200,000.00 to Congressman Victor Dominguez; that his payment of the 10% retention fee to Tarnate was
conditioned on Tarnate paying that debt to Congressman Dominguez; and that he refused to give the 10% retention
fee to Tarnate because Tarnate did not pay to Congressman Dominguez.23 His justification was unpersuasive,
however, because, firstly, Gonzalo presented no proof of the debt to Congressman Dominguez; secondly, he did not
competently establish the agreement on the condition that supposedly bound Tarnate to pay to Congressman
Dominguez;24 and, thirdly, burdening Tarnate with Gonzalos personal debt to Congressman Dominguez to be paid
first by Tarnate would constitute another case of unjust enrichment.

The Court regards the grant of moral damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses to Tarnate to be inappropriate.
We have ruled that no damages may be recovered under a void contract, which, being nonexistent, produces no
juridical tie between the parties involved.25 It is notable, too, that the RTC and the CA did not spell out the
sufficient factual and legal justifications for such damages to be granted.

Lastly, the letter and spirit of Article 22 of the Civil Code command Gonzalo to make a full reparation or
compensation to Tarnate. The illegality of their contract should not be allowed to deprive Tarnate from being fully
compensated through the imposition of legal interest. Towards that end, interest of 6% per annum reckoned from
September 13, 1999, the time of the judicial demand by Tarnate, is imposed on the amount of P233,526.13. Not to
afford this relief will make a travesty of the justice to which Tarnate was entitled for having suffered too long from
Gonzalos unjust enrichment.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision promulgated on February 18, 2003, but DELETE the awards of moral
damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses; IMPOSE legal interest of 6% per annum on the principal
oLP233,526.13 reckoned from September 13, 1999; and DIRECT the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Records, pp. 88-90.

2 Id. at 26-28.

3 Id. at 5-6.

4 Id. at 8.

5 Id. at 9-10.

6 Id. at 1-4.

7 Id. at 50-52.
8 Id. at 110-120.

9 Rollo, pp. 16-34; penned by Associate Justice Remedios A. Salazar-Fernando, and concurred in by Associate
Justice Ruben T. Reyes (later Presiding Justice and a Member of the Court, but already retired) and Associate
Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam (retired/deceased).

10 Id. at 36.

11 Id. at 8-12.

12 Rollo, p. 30.

13 Nool v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116635, July 24, 1997, 276 SCRA 149, 157.
14 Rollo, p. 31-32.

15 TSN, July 24, 2000, pp. 23-24.

16 Records, p. 26.

17 Rellosa v. Gaw Chee Hun, 93 Phil. 827, 831 (1953).

18 Pajuyo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146364, June 3, 2004, 430 SCRA 492, 515.

19 Avon Cosmetics, Incorporated v. Luna, G.R. No. 153674, December 20, 2006, 511 SCRA 376, 393-394.

20 G.R. No. 156364, September 3, 2007, 532 SCRA 74.

21 Id. at 96.

22 TSN, August 28, 2000, pp. 44, 64, 70, and 71.

23 Id. at 46-50.

24 Id. at 51-54.
25 Hulst v. PR Builders, Inc., supra note 20, at 94-95; Menchavez v. Teves, Jr., G.R. No. 153201, January 26,
2005, 449 SCRA 380, 398-399.

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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-56168 December 22, 1988

CARLOTA P. VALENZUELA, in her capacity as Superintendent of Banks and Authorized Representative of the
CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES in the Liquidation of the RURAL BANK OF LUCENA, INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, RUFINA TELOSA, DOLORES TELOSA, FE TELOSA, ESTELITA
TELOSA, MANUEL TELOSA, ROMULO TELOSA, and Minors ALFARO TELOSA, NESTOR TELOSA and
MARIO TELOSA, as represented by RUFINA TELOSA, respondents.

Alfredo L. Bautista, Marcelino de Leon and Jaime M. Cabiles for petitioner.

Vitaliano N. Aguirre for respondents.

PARAS, J.:

Invoking the provisions of Article 24 of the New Civil Code which states:
In all contractual, property or other relations, when one of the parties is at a disadvantage on account of his moral
dependence, ignorance, indigence, mental weakness, tender age or other handicap, the Court must be vigilant for
his protection.

the heirs of Carlos Telosa, a fisherman and farmer with a very limited education, initiated a complaint before the
Court of First Instance of Quezon seeking the nullification of the real estate mortgage executed by Carlos Telosa in
favor of the Rural Bank of Lucena and/or its reformation to state the real intention of the parties. The case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 7545.

The record discloses that on November 29, 1960 Carlos Telosa obtained a loan from the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc.
and as a security thereof, he mortgaged a parcel of land located at Bo. Amugeria, Malunay, Quezon with an area of
50,000 square meters. This parcel of land was registered in the name of the spouses Carlos Telosa & Rufina Telosa.

Several months thereafter, the Rural Bank of Lucena became a distressed bank. In a letter dated June 16, 1961 the
Acting Governor of the Central Bank apprised the stockholders of the Lucena Bank that the Monetary Board in its
Resolution No. 928 which was approved on June 13, 1961 found that its officers, directors and employees had
committed certain anomalies or had resorted to unsound banking practices which were prejudicial to the
government, its depositors and creditors.

The Monetary Board later on decided to liquidate the Lucena Bank. To implement the resolution of the Monetary
Board for the said bank's liquidation, the Central Bank pursuant to Section 29 of its charter and on the assumption
that the Lucena bank was insolvent, filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition dated March 27,1962
for assistance and supervision in the liquidation of the Lucena Bank. The case was docketed as Civil Case No.
50019 and assigned to Branch 1 thereof.

Acting on that petition, the Court of First Instance of Manila issued an order dated March 28, 1963, directing the
Lucena Bank to turn over its assets to the Central Bank's authorized representative.

The Monetary Board in its resolution No. 426 dated April 2, 1963 designated the Superintendent of Banks Carlota
P. Valenzuela or her duly authorized representative to take charge of the assets of the Lucena bank.

The Board in its resolution of November 27, 1963 ordered the Superintendent of Banks to convert the assets of the
Lucena bank to money.

Among the accounts of the Lucena bank inventoried by the Central Bank's representative was the account of Carlos
Telosa in the principal amount of P5,000.00. A demand letter was thus sent to Carlos Telosa on August 27, 1965 by
the Central Bank examiner Agapito S. Fajardo. Because Carlos Telosa knew that his obligation to the rural bank
was only P300.00 not P5,000.00, he executed an affidavit dated January 24,1966 (Exh. "D") protesting the demand.
On January 4,1966 Carlos Telosa paid the amount of P400.00 as evidenced by Official Receipt of the Rural Bank
(Exh. "F"). Carlos Telosa claimed this amount represented the principal and interest with a remaining balance of P
11.25 which was paid by Dolores Telosa on April 18, 1972 as shown by official receipt of the rural bank (Exh. "G").

Meanwhile, Carlos Telosa died on January 13,1968.

Claiming that the payments made did not fully satisfy the whole amount due because the record still showed a
balance of P9,032.22 including interest as of February 29, 1972, Napoleon R. Cruz, then authorized deputy of the
Central Bank assigned at the Lucena bank, petitioned the Deputy Provincial Sheriff of Quezon to extra-judicially
foreclose the mortgage and sell the collateral at public auction. The foreclosure sale was scheduled on April 20,
1972.

To restrain the sheriff of Quezon from proceeding with the sale, a complaint was filed on April 18, 1972, by the
widow and children (now private respondents) of Carlos Telosa, before the Court of First Instance of Quezon,
against the Rural Bank of Lucena Inc. The plaintiffs prayed for a judgment declaring the contract of mortgage
executed by Carlos Telosa in favor of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. null and void and of no further force and
effect and/or that the said contract be reformed to state the true intention and agreement of the parties with a prayer
for the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction to stop the sheriff of Quezon from proceeding with the extra-
judicial foreclosure scheduled on April 20, 1972. It was the contention of the plaintiffs (now private respondents)
that the amount of the loan obtained by Carlos Telosa was only P300.00 and that the same had already been fully
paid.

Finding that the complaint filed was not sufficient in form and substance and that the proper parties were not
impleaded, Judge Delia P. Medina of the Court of First Instance of Quezon, Branch 1, issued an Order on April 18,
1972 directing the plaintiffs within five (5) days from notice, to amend their complaint in order that all proper
parties may be impleaded.

Meanwhile, as there was no restraining order issued, the foreclosure sale took place as scheduled on April 20, 1972,
with the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., as the lone and highest bidder in the auction sale for which an award was
made in its favor The certificate of sale was thereafter issued to it and the same was registered with the Registry of
Deeds on September 11, 1972.

On May 4, 1972, the plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, this time against Carlota P. Valenzuela in her capacity
as Superintendent of Banks and authorized representative of the Central Bank in the liquidation of the Rural Bank
of Lucena, Inc., as sole defendant. In addition to the prayers in their original complaint, plaintiffs prayed in their
amended complaint that the extra-judicial foreclosure sale be annulled.

Defendant (now petitioner) moved to dismiss the amended complaint on two (2) grounds: (1) that the trial court has
no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action as the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., is in the process of
liquidation in the Court of First Instance of Manila and (2) that the plaintiffs have no cause of action against the
defendant. The motion to dismiss was denied. Thereafter, defendant filed her answer. In addition to the two grounds
relied upon in the motion to dismiss, she set up the defenses of the validity of the loan documents, reflecting in all
respects the correct amount (P5,000.00) which Carlos Telosa obtained from the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. and that
the plaintiffs' cause of action had already prescribed.

After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision in favor of the plaintiffs, the dispositive portion of which reads as
for lows

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and against the defendant:

1. Ordering the reformation of Exhibit 3-CBP so as to make it reflect a mortgage over one-half of the property
covered by Tax Declaration No. 2156, to secure a loan by Carlos Telosa in the amount of P300.00 and also to reflect
the civil status of Carlos Telosa as "married," to be signed by the plaintiffs, as heirs of Carlos Telosa, for and in his
behalf;

2. Setting aside as illegal and void the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the property covered by Tax Declaration
No. 2156, conducted by the Deputy Provincial Sheriff on April 20, 1972;

3. Ordering the defendant to deliver to the plaintiffs the property covered by Tax Declaration No. 2156, if said
defendant has caused the taking of possession thereof by virtue of the extrajudicial foreclosure; and

4. Ordering the defendant to pay the plaintiffs from the assets of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc., the amount of
P2,000.00 as moral damages, P1,500.00 as attorney's fees and P900.00, as litigation expenses.

With costs against the defendant.

SO ORDERED. (Record on Appeal, pp. 344-346).

The above decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals and in its decision 1 dated October 29,1980, said court
affirmed the decision of the lower court in toto. Hence, the instant petition for review.

Petitioner contends that (a) a separate action involving the assets, properties and record of an insolvent bank in the
process of liquidation in the Court of First Instance of Manila cannot be maintained in another court; (b) a public
instrument celebrated with all the requisites under the safeguard of a notarial certificate is evidence of a high
character and to overcome its recitals, it is incumbent upon the party challenging it to prove his claim with clear,
convincing and more than merely preponderant evidence; (c) respondent Rufina Telosa has no factual, valid and
legal basis to ask for the reformation of the real estate mortgage contract, but even assuming that she has, her cause
of action to reform had already prescribed; (d) moral damages to warrant recovery, must be alleged in the complaint
and duly proved; (e) the reason for awarding attorney's fees and litigation expenses must be stated in the decision
and (f) there is no legal and factual basis for the application of Article 24 of the New Civil Code in the instant case.
On the issue of jurisdiction, this Court ruled in the case of Hernandez vs. Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. ( G.R.
No. L-29791, January 10, 1978, 81 SCRA 75) that if there is a judicial liquidation of an insolvent bank, all
claims against the bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding.

The fact that the insolvent bank is forbidden to do business, that its assets are turned over to the superintendent of
Banks, as a receiver, for conversion into cash, and that its liquidation is undertaken with judicial intervention means
that, as far as lawful and practicable, all claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation
proceeding. The judicial liquidation is intended to prevent multiplicity of actions against the insolvent bank. The
lawmaking body contemplated that for convenience only one court, if possible, should pass upon the claims against
the insolvent bank and that the liquidation court should assist the Superintendent of Banks and control his
operations. In the course of the liquidation, contentious cases might arise wherein a full-dress hearing would be
required and legal issues would have to be resolved. Hence, it would be necessary in justice to all concerned that a
Court of First Instance should assist and supervise the liquidation and should act as umpire and arbitrator in the
allowance and disallowance of claims. The judicial liquidation is a pragmatic arrangement designed to establish due
process and orderliness in the liquidation of the bank, to obviate the proliferation of litigations and to avoid
injustice and arbitrariness. (81 SCRA 77)

With the foregoing ruling, the more proper procedure would be to set aside the decision rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Quezon and consequently dismiss the case without prejudice to the right of the private respondents
to take up with the liquidation court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, the settlement of their mortgage
obligation.

However, taking into consideration the circumstances of the case and in the interest of justice We are constrained to
deviate from this procedure. To order the private respondents to refile and relitigate their case before the liquidation
court would be an exercise in futility. It would mean another several years of trial and additional expenses to private
respondents who are admittedly living in poverty. Incidentally, the property in question is the only property of
private respondents. We have carefully reviewed the records of the case and We are convinced as were the trial
court and the appellate court that the amount of loan actually obtained by the deceased Telosa was only P300.00
and not the P5,000.00 as claimed by petitioner. This fact was established by the following evidence:

(a) Exhibit "E" the receipt signed by the deceased dated December 2, 1960 showing the amount of loan to be
only P300.00.

(b) The oral testimony of Rufina Telosa, wife of the deceased;

(c) The testimony of Ponciano Mendoza who was with the deceased at the time of the transactions and who
categorically testified that the amount of the loan was P300.00 in six P50.00 bills but that Carlos Telosa was made
to sign blank forms by the bank.
Needless to state in this regard this particular transaction was one of the fraudulent and anomalous transactions
involving the officers of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. The latter took advantage of the very limited education of
Carlos Telosa.

The records further show that private respondents made payment in the amount of P400.00 on January 4, 1966 and
P11.25 on April 18, 1972 to the Rural Bank of Lucena. This constituted full payment of the principal loan of
P300.00 and the interest thereon.

Anent the issue of prescription, suffice it to state that private respondents filed their complaint well within the ten
(10) year prescriptive period to bang an action for reformation of an instrument. After discovering the fraudulent
transaction on March 14, 1972, private respondents allowed only 14 days to pass before filing their complaint,

Petitioner alleges that the trial court did not state in its decision why it was awarding attorney's fees. The allegation
is not correct. A cursory reading of the decision would show that the reason for the award of attorney's fees is
contained in the decision, hereinbelow quoted:

As a second cause of action, plaintiffs assert that the mortgage contract in question was executed without the
knowledge and marital consent of the wife, plaintiff Rufina Telosa, hence voidable, insofar as her conjugal share is
concerned. Plaintiffs further assess moral damages in the amount of P5,000.00, attorney's fees of P2,000.00 and
litigation expenses of P75.00 per hearing of this case. (Brief for private respondents-appellees, p. 44; Record on
Appeal, p. 325).

Clearly the circumstances show that the award of attorney's fees is proper and just.

The decision also made findings that the bank acted fraudulently. It was the bank, represented by petitioner, thru its
fraudulent acts which compelled private respondents to litigate and incur litigation expenses.

Incidentally the ratification by the wife cures any defect the contract may have had.

Petitioner further alleges that moral damages should not have been granted because private respondents did not duly
allege the same in the complaint. The lower court granted the same because of private respondents' prayer for
general relief which includes moral damages. Private respondents had proven that they suffered mental anguish,
serious anxiety and moral shock as a consequence of the fraudulent act of the Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. This is
expressly allowed by Art. 2217 of the New Civil Code.

Going back to the issue of jurisdiction, it must be emphasized that at the time the present action was instituted to
enjoin the foreclosure of the real estate mortgage under consideration, what must have prompted herein private
respondents to seek redress from the Court of First Instance of Quezon was the authority of said court to exercise its
injunctive relief. The Court of First Instance having territorial jurisdiction of the acts sought to be enjoined, the
Court of First Instance of Quezon, must take cognizance of the case.
Finally, even Our ruling in the cited Hernandez versus Rural Bank case admits of exception. It says "as far as lawful
and practicable all claims against the insolvent bank should be filed in the liquidation proceeding." This case should
be one of them.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Grio-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., concur in the result.

Narvasa, J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Penned by Justice Porfirio V. Sison and concurred in by Justices Carlos L. Sundiam and Elias B. Asuncion.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 120706. January 31, 2000]

RODRIGO CONCEPCION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and SPS. NESTOR NICOLAS and ALLEM
NICOLAS, respondents.

DECISION

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion assails in this petition for review on certiorari the Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 12 December 1994 which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City ordering him to pay
respondent spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas the sums of P50,000.00 for moral damages, P25,000.00 for
exemplary damages and P10,000.00 for attorneys fees, plus the costs of suit.* Petitioner claims absence of factual
and legal basis for the award of damages. h Y

The courts a quo found that sometime in 1985 the spouses Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas resided at No. 51 M.
Concepcion St., San Joaquin, Pasig City, in an apartment leased to them by the owner thereof, Florence "Bing"
Concepcion, who also resided in the same compound where the apartment was located. Nestor Nicolas was then
engaged in the business of supplying government agencies and private entities with office equipment, appliances
and other fixtures on a cash purchase or credit basis. Florence Concepcion joined this venture by contributing
capital on condition that after her capital investment was returned to her, any profit earned would be divided equally
between her and Nestor. Jksm

Sometime in the second week of July 1985 Rodrigo Concepcion, brother of the deceased husband of Florence,
angrily accosted Nestor at the latters apartment and accused him of conducting an adulterous relationship with
Florence. He shouted, "Hoy Nestor, kabit ka ni Bing! x x x Binigyan ka pa pala ni Bing Concepcion ng
P100,000.00 para umakyat ng Baguio. Pagkaakyat mo at ng asawa mo doon ay bababa ka uli para magkasarilinan
kayo ni Bing."[1]

To clarify matters, Nestor went with Rodrigo, upon the latters dare, to see some relatives of the Concepcion family
who allegedly knew about the relationship. However, those whom they were able to see denied knowledge of the
alleged affair. The same accusation was hurled by Rodrigo against Nestor when the two (2) confronted Florence at
the terrace of her residence. Florence denied the imputations and Rodrigo backtracked saying that he just heard the
rumor from a relative. Thereafter, however, Rodrigo called Florence over the telephone reiterating his accusation
and threatening her that should something happen to his sick mother, in case the latter learned about the affair, he
would kill Florence. Chief

As a result of this incident, Nestor Nicolas felt extreme embarrassment and shame to the extent that he could no
longer face his neighbors. Florence Concepcion also ceased to do business with him by not contributing capital
anymore so much so that the business venture of the Nicolas spouses declined as they could no longer cope with
their commitments to their clients and customers. To make matters worse, Allem Nicolas started to doubt Nestors
fidelity resulting in frequent bickerings and quarrels during which Allem even expressed her desire to leave her
husband. Consequently, Nestor was forced to write Rodrigo demanding public apology and payment of damages.
Rodrigo pointedly ignored the demand, for which reason the Nicolas spouses filed a civil suit against him for
damages.

In his defense, Rodrigo denied that he maligned Nestor by accusing him publicly of being Florence's lover. He
reasoned out that he only desired to protect the name and reputation of the Concepcion family which was why he
sought an appointment with Nestor through Florence's son Roncali to ventilate his feelings about the matter.
Initially, he discussed with Nestor certain aspects of the joint venture in a friendly and amiable manner, and then
only casually asked the latter about his rumored affair with his sister-in-law.
In contesting the decision of the appellate court, petitioner Rodrigo Concepcion raises the following issues: (a)
whether there is basis in law for the award of damages to private respondents, the Nicolas spouses; and, (b) whether
there is basis to review the facts which are of weight and influence but which were overlooked and misapplied by
the respondent appellate court. Esm

Petitioner argues that in awarding damages to private respondents, the Court of Appeals was without legal basis to
justify its verdict. The alleged act imputed to him by respondent spouses does not fall under Arts. 26[2] and 2219[3]
of the Civil Code since it does not constitute libel, slander, or any other form of defamation. Neither does it involve
prying into the privacy of anothers residence or meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relation of
another. Petitioner also insists that certain facts and circumstances of the case were manifestly overlooked,
misunderstood or glossed over by respondent court which, if considered, would change the verdict. Impugning the
credibility of the witnesses for private respondents and the manner by which the testimonial evidence was analyzed
and evaluated by the trial court, petitioner criticized the appellate court for not taking into account the fact that the
trial judge who penned the decision was in no position to observe first-hand the demeanor of the witnesses of
respondent spouses as he was not the original judge who heard the case. Thus, his decision rendered was flawed.
Esmsc

The Court has ruled often enough that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Revised Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the factual findings complained
of are devoid of support by the evidence on record or the assailed judgment is based on misapprehension of facts.
[4] The reason behind this is that the Supreme Court respects the findings of the trial court on the issue of
credibility of witnesses, considering that it is in a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses
themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.[5] Thus it accords the highest
respect, even finality, to the evaluation made by the lower court of the testimonies of the witnesses presented before
it. Esmmis

The Court is also aware of the long settled rule that when the issue is on the credibility of witnesses, appellate
courts will not generally disturb the findings of the trial court; however, its factual findings may nonetheless be
reversed if by the evidence on record or lack of it, it appears that the trial court erred.[6] In this respect, the Court is
not generally inclined to review the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals unless its findings are erroneous,
absurd, speculative, conjectural, conflicting, tainted with grave abuse of discretion, or contrary to the findings
culled by the trial court of origin.[7] This rule of course cannot be unqualifiedly applied to a case where the judge
who penned the decision was not the one who heard the case, because not having heard the testimonies himself, the
judge would not be in a better position than the appellate courts to make such determination.[8]

However, it is also axiomatic that the fact alone that the judge who heard the evidence was not the one who
rendered the judgment but merely relied on the record of the case does not render his judgment erroneous or
irregular. This is so even if the judge did not have the fullest opportunity to weigh the testimonies not having heard
all the witnesses speak nor observed their deportment and manner of testifying. Thus the Court generally will not
find any misapprehension of facts as it can be fairly assumed under the principle of regularity of performance of
duties of public officers that the transcripts of stenographic notes were thoroughly scrutinized and evaluated by the
judge himself.

Has sufficient reason then been laid before us by petitioner to engender doubt as to the factual findings of the court
a quo? We find none. A painstaking review of the evidence on record convinces us not to disturb the judgment
appealed from. The fact that the case was handled by different judges brooks no consideration at all, for
preponderant evidence consistent with their claim for damages has been adduced by private respondents as to
foreclose a reversal. Otherwise, everytime a Judge who heard a case, wholly or partially, dies or lives the service,
the case cannot be decided and a new trial will have to be conducted. That would be absurb; inconceivable. Esmso

According to petitioner, private respondents evidence is inconsistent as to time, place and persons who heard the
alleged defamatory statement. We find this to be a gratuitous observation, for the testimonies of all the witnesses for
the respondents are unanimous that the defamatory incident happened in the afternoon at the front door of the
apartment of the Nicolas spouses in the presence of some friends and neighbors, and later on, with the accusation
being repeated in the presence of Florence, at the terrace of her house. That this finding appears to be in conflict
with the allegation in the complaint as to the time of the incident bears no momentous significance since an
allegation in a pleading is not evidence; it is a declaration that has to be proved by evidence. If evidence contrary to
the allegation is presented, such evidence controls, not the allegation in the pleading itself, although admittedly it
may dent the credibility of the witnesses. But not in the instant case. Msesm

It is also argued by petitioner that private respondents failed to present as witnesses the persons they named as
eyewitnesses to the incident and that they presented instead one Romeo Villaruel who was not named as a possible
witness during the pre-trial proceedings. Charging that Villaruels testimony is not credible and should never have
been accorded any weight at all, petitioner capitalizes on the fact that a great distance separates Villaruels residence
and that of private respondents as reflected in their house numbers, the formers number being No. 223 M.
Concepcion St., while that of the Nicolas spouses, No. 51 along the same street. This being so, petitioner concludes,
Villaruel could not have witnessed the ugly confrontation between Rodrigo and Nestor. It appears however from
Villaruels testimony that at the time of the incident complained of, he was staying in an apartment inside the
compound adjacent to that of the Nicolas spouses. Whether his apartment was then numbered 223 is not stated.
What is definite and clear is his statement that he and Nestor Nicolas were neighbors on 14 July 1985.

There are other inconsistencies pointed out by petitioner in the testimonial evidence of private respondents but these
are not of such significance as to alter the finding of facts of the lower court. Minor inconsistencies even guarantee
truthfulness and candor, for they erase any suspicion of a rehearsed testimony.[9] Inconsistencies in the testimonies
of witnesses with on minor details and collateral matters do not affect the substance of their testimonies.[10]

All told, these factual findings provide enough basis in law for the award of damages by the Court of Appeals in
favor of respondents. We reject petitioners posture that no legal provision supports such award, the incident
complained of neither falling under Art. 2219 nor Art. 26 of the Civil Code. It does not need further elucidation that
the incident charged of petitioner was no less than an invasion on the right of respondent Nestor as a person. The
philosophy behind Art. 26 underscores the necessity for its inclusion in our civil law. The Code Commission
stressed in no uncertain terms that the human personality must be exalted. The sacredness of human personality is a
concomitant consideration of every plan for human amelioration. The touchstone of every system of law, of the
culture and civilization of every country, is how far it dignifies man. If the statutes insufficiently protect a person
from being unjustly humiliated, in short, if human personality is not exalted - then the laws are indeed defective.
[11] Thus, under this article, the rights of persons are amply protected, and damages are provided for violations of a
persons dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind. Exsm

It is petitioners position that the act imputed to him does not constitute any of those enumerated in Arts 26 and
2219. In this respect, the law is clear. The violations mentioned in the codal provisions are not exclusive but are
merely examples and do not preclude other similar or analogous acts. Damages therefore are allowable for actions
against a persons dignity, such as profane, insulting, humiliating, scandalous or abusive language.[12] Under Art.
2217 of the Civil Code, moral damages which include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury, although incapable of
pecuniary computation, may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendants wrongful act or
omission.

There is no question that private respondent Nestor Nicolas suffered mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings and social humiliation as a proximate result of petitioners abusive, scandalous and insulting
language. Petitioner attempted to exculpate himself by claiming that he made an appointment to see Nestor through
a nephew, Roncali, the son of Florence, so he could talk with Nestor to find out the truth about his rumored illicit
relationship with Florence. He said that he wanted to protect his nephews and nieces and the name of his late
brother (Florences husband).[13] How he could be convinced by some way other than a denial by Nestor, and how
he would protect his nephews and nieces and his familys name if the rumor were true, he did not say. Petitioner
admitted that he had already talked with Florence herself over the telephone about the issue, with the latter
vehemently denying the alleged immoral relationship. Yet, he could not let the matter rest on the strength of the
denial of his sister-in-law. He had to go and confront Nestor, even in public, to the latter's humiliation. Kyle

Testifying that until that very afternoon of his meeting with Nestor he never knew respondent, had never seen him
before, and was unaware of his business partnership with Florence, his subsequent declarations on the witness stand
however belie this lack of knowledge about the business venture for in that alleged encounter he asked Nestor how
the business was going, what were the collection problems, and how was the money being spent. He even knew that
the name of the business, Floral Enterprises, was coined by combining the first syllables of the name Florence and
Allem, the name of Nestors wife. He said that he casually asked Nestor about the rumor between him and Florence
which Nestor denied. Not content with such denial, he dared Nestor to go with him to speak to his relatives who
were the source of his information. Nestor went with him and those they were able to talk to denied the rumor.
Kycalr

We cannot help noting this inordinate interest of petitioner to know the truth about the rumor and why he was not
satisfied with the separate denials made by Florence and Nestor. He had to confront Nestor face to face, invade the
latters privacy and hurl defamatory words at him in the presence of his wife and children, neighbors and friends,
accusing him - a married man - of having an adulterous relationship with Florence. This definitely caused private
respondent much shame and embarrassment that he could no longer show himself in his neighborhood without
feeling distraught and debased. This brought dissension and distrust in his family where before there was none. This
is why a few days after the incident, he communicated with petitioner demanding public apology and payment of
damages, which petitioner ignored. Calrky

If indeed the confrontation as described by private respondents did not actually happen, then there would have been
no cause or motive at all for them to consult with their lawyer, immediately demand an apology, and not obtaining a
response from petitioner, file an action for damages against the latter. That they decided to go to court to seek
redress bespeaks of the validity of their claim. On the other hand, it is interesting to note that while explaining at
great length why Florence Concepcion testified against him, petitioner never advanced any reason why the Nicolas
spouses, persons he never knew and with whom he had no dealings in the past, would sue him for damages. It also
has not escaped our attention that, faced with a lawsuit by private respondents, petitioner sent his lawyer, a certain
Atty. Causapin, to talk not to the Nicolas spouses but to Florence, asking her not to be involved in the case,
otherwise her name would be messily dragged into it. Quite succinctly, Florence told the lawyer that it was not for
her to decide and that she could not do anything about it as she was not a party to the court case.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing premises, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the
judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Br. 167, holding Rodrigo Concepcion liable to the spouses
Nestor Nicolas and Allem Nicolas for P50,000.00 as moral damages, P25,000.00 for exemplary damages,
P10,000.00 for attorney's fees, plus costs of suit, is AFFIRMED. Mesm

SO ORDERED.

Mendoza, Quisumbing, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

* Decision penned by Judge Alfredo C. Flores, RTC-Br. 167, Pasig City.

[1] Translation: " Nestor, you are Bings paramour! So she gave you P100,000.00 which you, together with your
wife, brought to Baguio and you came back leaving your wife behind so that you and Bing could spend all the time
together for your immoral purposes."
[2] Art. 26. - Every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and
other persons. The following and similar acts, though they may not constitute a criminal offense, shall produce a
cause of action for damages, prevention and other relief: (1) Prying into the privacy of anothers residence; (2)
Meddling with or disturbing the private life or family relations of another; (3) Intriguing or humiliating another on
account of his religious beliefs, lowly station in life, place of birth, physical defect, or other personal condition.
[3] Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense
resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; (3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other
lascivious acts; (4) Adultery or concubinage; (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest; (6) Illegal search; (7) Libel,
slander or any other form of defamation; (8) Malicious prosecution; (9) Acts mentioned in Art. 309 (referring to
disrespect for the dead or wrongfully interfering in a funeral); (10) Acts or actions referred to in Arts. 21, 26, 27, 28,
29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 x x x x
[4] Congregation of the Religious of the Virgin Mary v. CA, G.R. No. 126363, 26 June 1998, 291 SCRA

385; Sarmiento v. CA, G.R. No. 110871, 2 July 1998, 291 SCRA 656.
[5] People v. Aquino, G. R. No. 125906, 16, January 1998, 284 SCRA 369.
[6] People v. Lagao, G. R. No. 120279, 27 February 1998, 286 SCRA 610.
[7] Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 96412, 24 August 1998, 294 SCRA 512.
[8] People v. Gecomo, G.R. Nos. 115035-36, 21 February 1996, 254 SCRA 82.
[9] People v. Obello, G. R. No. 108772, 14 January 1998, 284 SCRA 79.
[10] People v. Ebrada, G. R. No. 122774, 25 September 1998, 296 SCRA 353.
[11] Report of the Civil Code Commission, p. 32.
[12] Caguioa, Eduaro, P., Comments and Cases on Civil Law, Vol. I, 1959 Ed., p.41.
[13] TSN, 4 March 1988, p. 14.

THIRD DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 125704. August 28, 1998]
PHILEX MINING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, COURT OF
APPEALS, and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:

Petitioner Philex Mining Corp. assails the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on April 8, 1996 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 36975[1] affirming the Court of Tax Appeals decision in CTA Case No. 4872 dated March 16, 1995[2]
ordering it to pay the amount of P110,677,668.52 as excise tax liability for the period from the 2nd quarter of 1991
to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from August 6, 1994 until fully paid pursuant to Sections 248
and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977.

The facts show that on August 5, 1992, the BIR sent a letter to Philex asking it to settle its tax liabilities for the 2nd,
3rd and 4th quarter of 1991 as well as the 1st and 2nd quarter of 1992 in the total amount of P123,821,982.52
computed as follows:

PERIOD COVERED BASIC TAX 25% SURCHARGE INTEREST TOTAL EXCISE

TAX DUE

2nd Qtr., 1991 12,911,124.60 3,227,781.15 3,378,116.16 19,517,021.91

3rd Qtr., 1991 14,994,749.21 3,748,687.30 2,978,409.09 21,721,845.60

4th Qtr., 1991 19,406,480.13 4,851,620.03 2,631,837.72 26,889,937.88

------------------- ----------------- ----------------- ---------------------

47,312,353.94 11,828,088.48 8,988,362.97 68,128,805.39

1st Qtr., 1992 23,341,849.94 5,835,462.49 1,710,669.82 30,887,982.25

2nd Qtr., 1992 19,671,691.76 4,917,922.94 215,580.18 24,805,194.88

43,013,541.70 10,753,385.43 1,926,250.00 55,693,177.13

90,325,895.64 22,581,473.91 10,914,612.97 123,821,982.52

========== ========== =========== ===========[3]

In a letter dated August 20, 1992,[4] Philex protested the demand for payment of the tax liabilities stating that it has
pending claims for VAT input credit/refund for the taxes it paid for the years 1989 to 1991 in the amount of
P119,977,037.02 plus interest. Therefore, these claims for tax credit/refund should be applied against the tax
liabilities, citing our ruling in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc.[5]

In reply, the BIR, in a letter dated September 7, 1992,[6] found no merit in Philexs position. Since these pending
claims have not yet been established or determined with certainty, it follows that no legal compensation can take
place. Hence, he BIR reiterated its demand that Philex settle the amount plus interest within 30 days from the
receipt of the letter.

In view of the BIRs denial of the offsetting of Philexs claim for VAT input credit/refund against its exercise tax
obligation, Philex raised the issue to the Court of Tax Appeals on November 6, 1992.[7] In the course of the
proceedings, the BIR issued a Tax Credit Certificate SN 001795 in the amount of P13,144,313.88 which, applied to
the total tax liabilities of Philex of P123,821,982.52; effectively lowered the latters tax obligation of
P110,677,688.52.

Despite the reduction of its tax liabilities, the CTA still ordered Philex to pay the remaining balance of
P110,677,688.52 plus interest, elucidating its reason, to wit:

Thus, for legal compensation to take place, both obligations must be liquidated and demandable. Liquidated debts
are those where the exact amount has already been determined (PARAS, Civil Code of the Philippines, Annotated,
Vol. IV, Ninth Edition, p. 259). In the instant case, the claims of the Petitioner for VAT refund is still pending
litigation, and still has to be determined by this Court (C.T.A. Case No. 4707). A fortiori, the liquidated debt of the
Petitioner to the government cannot, therefore, be set-off against the unliquidated claim which Petitioner conceived
to exist in its favor (see Compaia General de Tabacos vs. French and Unson, No. 14027, November 8, 1918, 39
Phil. 34).[8]

Moreover, the Court of Tax Appeals ruled that taxes cannot be subject to set-off on compensation since claim for
taxes is not a debt or contract.[9] The dispositive portion of the CTA decision[10] provides:

In all the foregoing, this Petition for Review is hereby DENIED for lack of merit and Petitioner is hereby
ORDERED to PAY the Respondent the amount of P110,677,668.52 representing excise tax liability for the period
from the 2nd quarter of 1991 to the 2nd quarter of 1992 plus 20% annual interest from August 6, 1994 until fully
paid pursuant to Section 248 and 249 of the Tax Code, as amended.

Aggrieved with the decision, Philex appealed the case before the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. CV No.
36975.[11] Nonetheless, on April 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Court of Tax Appeals observation. The
pertinent portion of which reads:[12]

WHEREFORE, the appeal by way of petition for review is hereby DISMISSED and the decision dated March 16,
1995 is AFFIRMED.

Philex filed a motion for reconsideration which was, nevertheless, denied in a Resolution dated July 11, 1996.[13]

However, a few days after the denial of its motion for reconsideration, Philex was able to obtain its VAT input
credit/refund not only for the taxable year 1989 to 1991 but also for 1992 and 1994, computed as follows:[14]

Period Covered By Tax Credit Certificate Date Of Issue Amount

Claims For Vat Number
refund/credit
1994 (2nd Quarter) 007730 11 July 1996 P25,317,534.01

1994 (4th Quarter) 007731 11 July 1996 P21,791,020.61

1989 007732 11 July 1996 P37,322,799.19

1990-1991 007751 16 July 1996 P84,662,787.46

1992 (1st-3rd Quarter) 007755 23 July 1996 P36,501,147.95

In view of the grant of its VAT input credit/refund, Philex now contends that the same should, ipso jure, off-set its
excise tax liabilities[15] since both had already become due and demandable, as well as fully liquidated;[16] hence,
legal compensation can properly take place.

We see no merit in this contention.

In several instances prior to the instant case, we have already made the pronouncement that taxes cannot be subject
to compensation for the simple reason that the government and the taxpayer are not creditors and debtors of each
other.[17] There is a material distinction between a tax and debt. Debts are due to the Government in its corporate
capacity, while taxes are due to the Government in its sovereign capacity.[18] We find no cogent reason to deviate
from the aforementioned distinction.

Prescinding from this premise, in Francia v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[19] we categorically held that taxes
cannot be subject to set-off or compensation, thus:

We have consistently ruled that there can be no off-setting of taxes against the claims that the taxpayer may have
against the government. A person cannot refuse to pay a tax on the ground that the government owes him an amount
equal to or greater than the tax being collected. The collection of tax cannot await the results of a lawsuit against the
government.

The ruling in Francia has been applied to the subsequent case of Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. Commission on Audit,
[20] which reiterated that:

x x x a taxpayer may not offset taxes due from the claims that he may have against the government. Taxes cannot be
the subject of compensation because the government and taxpayer are not mutually creditors and debtors of each
other and a claim for taxes is not such a debt, demand, contract or judgment as is allowed to be set-off.

Further, Philexs reliance on our holding in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc., wherein
we ruled that a pending refund may be set off against an existing tax liability even though the refund has not yet
been approved by the Commissioner,[21] is no longer without any support in statutory law.

It is important to note that the premise of our ruling in the aforementioned case was anchored on Section 51(d) of
the National Revenue Code of 1939. However, when the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 was enacted, the
same provision upon which the Itogon-Suyoc pronouncement was based was omitted.[22] Accordingly, the doctrine
enunciated in Itogon-Suyoc cannot be invoked by Philex.

Despite the foregoing rulings clearly adverse to Philexs position, it asserts that the imposition of surcharge and
interest for the non-payment of the excise taxes within the time prescribed was unjustified. Philex posits the theory
that it had no obligation to pay the excise liabilities within the prescribed period since, after all, it still has pending
claims for VAT input credit/refund with BIR.[23]

We fail to see the logic of Philexs claim for this is an outright disregard of the basic principle in tax law that taxes
are the lifeblood of the government and so should be collected without unnecessary hindrance.[24] Evidently, to
countenance Philexs whimsical reason would render ineffective our tax collection system. Too simplistic, it finds no
support in law or in jurisprudence.
To be sure, we cannot allow Philex to refuse the payment of its tax liabilities on the ground that it has a pending tax
claim for refund or credit against the government which has not yet been granted. It must be noted that a
distinguishing feature of a tax is that it is compulsory rather than a matter of bargain.[25] Hence, a tax does not
depend upon the consent of the taxpayer.[26] If any payer can defer the payment of taxes by raising the defense that
it still has a pending claim for refund or credit, this would adversely affect the government revenue system. A
taxpayer cannot refuse to pay his taxes when they fall due simply because he has a claim against the government or
that the collection of the tax is contingent on the result of the lawsuit it filed against the government.[27] Moreover,
Philex's theory that would automatically apply its VAT input credit/refund against its tax liabilities can easily give
rise to confusion and abuse, depriving the government of authority over the manner by which taxpayers credit and
offset their tax liabilities.

Corollarily, the fact that Philex has pending claims for VAT input claim/refund with the government is immaterial
for the imposition of charges and penalties prescribed under Section 248 and 249 of the Tax Code of 1977. The
payment of the surcharge is mandatory and the BIR is not vested with any authority to waive the collection thereof.
[28] The same cannot be condoned for flimsy reasons,[29] similar to the one advanced by Philex in justifying its
non-payment of its tax liabilities.

Finally, Philex asserts that the BIR violated Section 106(e)[30] of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977,
which requires the refund of input taxes within 60 days,[31] when it took five years for the latter to grant its tax
claim for VAT input credit/refund.[32]

In this regard, we agree with Philex. While there is no dispute that a claimant has the burden of proof to establish
the factual basis of his or her claim for tax credit or refund,[33] however, once the claimant has submitted all the
required documents, it is the function of the BIR to assess these documents with purposeful dispatch. After all,
since taxpayers owe honesty to government it is but just that government render fair service to the taxpayers.[34]

In the instant case, the VAT input taxes were paid between 1989 to 1991 but the refund of these erroneously paid
taxes was only granted in 1996. Obviously, had the BIR been more diligent and judicious with their duty, it could
have granted the refund earlier. We need not remind the BIR that simple justice requires the speedy refund of
wrongly-held taxes.[35] Fair dealing and nothing less, is expected by the taxpayer from the BIR in the latter's
discharge of its function. As aptly held in Roxas v. Court of Tax Appeals:[36]

"The power of taxation is sometimes called also the power to destroy. Therefore it should be exercised with caution
to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly, lest the
tax collectot kill the 'hen that lays the golden egg.' And, in the order to maintain the general public's trust and
confidence in the Government this power must be used justly and not treacherously."

Despite our concern with the lethargic manner by which the BIR handled Philex's tax claim, it is a settled rule that
in the performance of governmental function, the State is not bound by the neglect of its agents and officers.
Nowhere is this more true than in the field of taxation.[37] Again, while we understand Philex's predicament, it
must be stressed that the same is not valid reason for the non- payment of its tax liabilities.
To be sure, this is not state that the taxpayer is devoid of remedy against public servants or employees especially
BIR examiners who, in investigating tax claims are seen to drag their feet needlessly. First, if the BIR takes time in
acting upon the taxpayer's claims for refund, the latter can seek judicial remedy before the Court of Tax Appeals in
the manner prescribed by law.[38] Second, if the inaction can be characterized as willful neglect of duty, then
recourse under the Civil Code and the Tax Code can also be availed of.

Article 27 of the Civil Code provides:

"Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects,
without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter,
without prejudice to any disciplinary action that may be taken."

More importantly, Section 269 (c) of the National Internal Revenue Act of 1997 states:

"xxx xxx xxx

(c) wilfully neglecting to give receipts, as by law required for any sum collected in the performance of duty or
wilfully neglecting to perform, any other duties enjoined by law."

Simply put, both provisions abhor official inaction, willful neglect and unreasonable delay in the performance of
official duties.[39] In no uncertain terms must we stress that every public employee or servant must strive to render
service to the people with utmost diligence and efficiency. Insolence and delay have no place in government
service. The BIR, being the government collecting arm, must and should do no less. It simply cannot be apathetic
and laggard in rendering service to the taxpayer if it wishes to remain true to its mission of hastening the country's
development. We take judicial notice of the taxpayer's generally negative perception towards the BIR; hence, it is
up to the latter to prove its detractors wrong.

In sum, while we can never condone the BIR's apparent callousness in performing its duties, still, the same cannot
justify Philex's non-payment of its tax liabilities. The adage "no one should take the law into his own hands" should
have guided Philex's action.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated April 8, 1996 is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Kapunan and Purisima, JJ., concur.

[1] Penned by Justice Artemon D. Luna, concurred in by Justice Ramon A. Barcelona and Portia Alino-
Hormachuelos.
[2] Penned by Associate Judge Manuel K. Gruba, concurred in by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta and Associate
Judge Ramon O. De Veyra.
[3] CTA Records, pp. 34-35.
[4] Rollo, pp. 172-174.
[5] 28 SCRA 867 (1969)
[6] Id., pp. 175-176
[7] Docketed as Case No. 4872, Rollo, pp. 177-187.
[8] Rollo, p. 55.
[9] CTA Decision, Rollo, p. 59.
[10] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[11] Rollo, pp. 87-101
[12] Rollo, p. 45.
[13] Rollo, p. 48.
[14] Rollo, pp. 112-116.

[15] Memorandum, Rollo, pp. 307-308.

[16] Ibid.
[17] Cordero v. Gonda, 18 SCRA 331 (1966).
[18] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Palanca, 18 SCRA 496 (1966).
[19] 162 SCRA 753 (1988).
[20] 208 SCRA 726 (1992).
[21] Rollo, p. 33.
[22] Aban, Law on Basic Taxation, 1994, p. 19.
[23] Memorandum, Rollo, p. 389.
[24] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Algue, Inc., 158 SCRA 9 (1988).
[25] I Cooley, Taxation, 22.
[26] Ibid.
[27] Supra, note 19.
[28] Republic v. Philippine Bank of Commerce, 34 SCRA 361 (1970).
[29] Jamora v. Meer, 74 Phil. 22 (1942).
[30] (e) Period within which refund of input taxes may be made by the Commissioner - The Commissiioner shall
refund input taxes within 60 days from the date the application for refund was filed with him or his duly authorized
representative. No refund of input taxes shall be allowed unless the VAT-registered person files an application for
refund within the period prescribed in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) as the case may be.
[31] Rollo, pp. 32-33.
[32] This provision has been amended by Section 112 (D) of Republic Act 8424 entitled the "National Internal
revenue Act of 1997."

"(D) Period within which Refund or Tax Credit of Input Taxes shall be Made. - In proper cases, the Commisioner
shall grant a refund or issue the tax credit certificate for creditable input taxes within one hundred twenty (120)
days from the date of submission of complete documents in support of the application filed in accordance with
Subsections (A) and (B) hereof.
In case of full of partial denial of the claim for tax refund or tax credit, or the failure on the part of the
Commissioner to act on the application within the period prescribed above, the taxpayer affected may, within thirty
(30) days from the receipt of the decision denying the claim or after the expiration of the one hundred twenty day-
period, appeal the decision or the unacted claim with the Court of Tax Appeals."
[33] Commisioner of Internal Revenue v. Tokyo Shipping Co. Ltd., 244 SCRA 332 (1995).
[34] Ibid.
[35] Citibank of N.A v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 107434, October 19, 1997.
[36] 23 SCRA 276 (1968).
[37] Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Proctor and Gamble PMC, 160 SCRA 560 (1988).
[38] Insular Lumber Co. v. Court of Appeals, 104 SCRA 721 (1981); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Victoria
Milling Co., Inc., 22 SCRA (1968).
[39] Tolentino, Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, 1983, p. 117.

SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. 107125. January 29, 2001]
GEORGE MANANTAN, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS and
MARIA NICOLAS, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision dated January 31, 1992 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
19240, modifying the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Santiago, Isabela, Branch 21, in Criminal Case No.
066. Petitioner George Manantan was acquitted by the trial court of homicide through reckless imprudence without
a ruling on his civil liability. On appeal from the civil aspect of the judgment in Criminal Case No. 066, the
appellate court found petitioner Manantan civilly liable and ordered him to indemnify private respondents
Marcelino Nicolas and Maria Nicolas P104,400.00 representing loss of support, P50,000.00 as death indemnity, and
moral damages of P20,000.00 or a total of P174,400.00 for the death of their son, Ruben Nicolas.

The facts of this case are as follows:

On June 1, 1983, the Provincial Fiscal of Isabela filed an information charging petitioner Manantan with reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide, allegedly committed as follows:

That on or about the 25th day of September 1982, in the municipality of Santiago, province of Isabela, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then the driver and person-in-charge of
an automobile bearing Plate No. NGA-816, willfully and unlawfully drove and operated the same while along the
Daang Maharlika at Barangay Malvar, in said municipality, in a negligent, careless and imprudent manner, without
due regard to traffic laws, regulations and ordinances and without taking the necessary precaution to prevent
accident to person and damage to property, causing by such negligence, carelessness and imprudence said
automobile driven and operated by him to sideswipe a passenger jeep bearing plate No. 918-7F driven by Charles
Codamon, thereby causing the said automobile to turn down (sic) resulting to the death of Ruben Nicolas a
passenger of said automobile.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[1]

On arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecutions evidence, as summarized by the trial court and adopted by the appellate court, showed that:

[I]n the morning of September 25, 1982, Fiscal Wilfredo Ambrocio decided to catch shrimps at the irrigation canal
at his farm. He invited the deceased who told him that they (should) borrow the Ford Fiera of the accused George
Manantan who is also from Cordon. The deceased went to borrow the Ford Fiera butsaid that the accused also
wanted to (come) along. So Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased dropped by the accused at the Manantan Technical
School. They drank beer there before they proceeded to the farm using the Toyota Starlet of the accused. At the
farm they consumed one (more) case of beer. At about 12:00 oclock noon they went home. Then at about 2:00 or
3:00 oclock that afternoon, (defense witness Miguel) Tabangin and (Ruben) Nicolas and the accused returned to the
house of Fiscal Ambrocio with a duck. They cooked the duck and ate the same with one more case of beer. They ate
and drank until about 8:30 in the evening when the accused invited them to go bowling. They went to Santiago,
Isabela on board the Toyota Starlet of the accused who drove the same. They went to the Vicap Bowling Lanes at
Mabini, Santiago, Isabela but unfortunately there was no vacant alley. While waiting for a vacant alley they drank
one beer each. After waiting for about 40 minutes and still no alley became vacant the accused invited his
companions to go to the LBC Night Club. They had drinks and took some lady partners at the LBC. After one hour,
they left the LBC and proceeded to a nearby store where they ate arroz caldoand then they decided to go home.
Again the accused drove the car. Miguel Tabangin sat with the accused in the front seat while the deceased and
Fiscal Ambrocio sat at the back seat with the deceased immediately behind the accused. The accused was driving at
a speed of about 40 kilometers per hour along the Maharlika Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, at the middle
portion of the highway (although according to Charles Cudamon, the car was running at a speed of 80 to 90
kilometers per hours on [the] wrong lane of the highway because the car was overtaking a tricycle) when they met a
passenger jeepney with bright lights on. The accused immediately tried to swerve the car to the right and move his
body away from the steering wheel but he was not able to avoid the oncoming vehicle and the two vehicles collided
with each other at the center of the road.

xxx

As a result of the collision the car turned turtle twice and landed on its top at the side of the highway immediately at
the approach of the street going to the Flores Clinic while the jeep swerved across the road so that one half front
portion landed on the lane of the car while the back half portion was at its right lane five meters away from the
point of impact as shown by a sketch (Exhibit A) prepared by Cudamon the following morning at the Police
Headquarters at the instance of his lawyer. Fiscal Ambrocio lost consciousness. When he regained consciousness he
was still inside the car (lying) on his belly with the deceased on top of him. Ambrocio pushed (away) the deceased
and then he was pulled out of the car by Tabangin. Afterwards, the deceased who was still unconscious was pulled
out from the car. Both Fiscal Ambrocio and the deceased were brought to the Flores Clinic. The deceased died that
night (Exhibit B) while Ambrocio suffered only minor injuries to his head and legs.[2]

The defense version as to the events prior to the incident was essentially the same as that of the prosecution, except
that defense witness Miguel Tabangin declared that Manantan did not drink beer that night. As to the accident, the
defense claimed that:

The accused was driving slowly at the right lane [at] about 20 inches from the center of the road at about 30
kilometers per hour at the National Highway at Malvar, Santiago, Isabela, when suddenly a passenger jeepney with
bright lights which was coming from the opposite direction and running very fast suddenly swerve(d) to the cars
lane and bumped the car which turned turtle twice and rested on its top at the right edge of the road while the jeep
stopped across the center of the road as shown by a picture taken after the incident (Exhibit 1) and a sketch (Exhibit
3) drawn by the accused during his rebuttal testimony. The car was hit on the drivers side. As a result of the
collision, the accused and Miguel Tabangin and Fiscal Ambrocio were injured while Ruben Nicolas died at the
Flores Clinic where they were all brought for treatment.[3]

In its decision dated June 30, 1988, promulgated on August 4, 1988, the trial court decided Criminal Case No. 066
in petitioners favor, thus:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused NOT GUILTY of the crime
charged and hereby acquits him.

SO ORDERED.[4]

On August 8, 1988, private respondents filed their notice of appeal on the civil aspect of the trial courts judgment.
In their appeal, docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, the Nicolas spouses prayed that the decision appealed from be
modified and that appellee be ordered to pay indemnity and damages.

On January 31, 1992, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 in favor of the Nicolas spouses, thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED in that defendant-appellee is hereby held civilly liable
for his negligent and reckless act of driving his car which was the proximate cause of the vehicular accident, and
sentenced to indemnify plaintiffs-appellants in the amount of P174,400.00 for the death of Ruben Nicolas,

SO ORDERED.[5]
In finding petitioner civilly liable, the court a quo noted that at the time the accident occurred, Manantan was in a
state of intoxication, due to his having consumed all in all, a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of beerbetween 9
a.m. and 11 p.m.[6] It found that petitioners act of driving while intoxicated was a clear violation of Section 53 of
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A. No. 4136)[7] and pursuant to Article 2185 of the Civil Code,[8] a
statutory presumption of negligence existed. It held that petitioners act of violating the Traffic Code is negligence in
itself because the mishap, which occurred, was the precise injury sought to be prevented by the regulation.[9]

Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the appellate court in its resolution of August 24, 1992 denied the motion.

Hence, the present case. Petitioner, in his memorandum, submits the following issues for our consideration:

FIRST THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT ACQUITTING THE PETITIONER OF THE CRIME OF
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO HOMICIDE FORECLOSED ANY FURTHER INQUIRY ON THE
ACCUSEDS (PETITIONERS) NEGLIGENCE OR RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE BECAUSE BY THEN HE WILL
BE PLACED IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY AND THEREFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN PASSING
UPON THE SAME ISSUE AGAIN.

SECOND THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO AWARD DAMAGES AND
INDEMNITY TO THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING THAT THE NON-DECLARATION OF ANY
INDEMNITY OR AWARD OF DAMAGES BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ISABELA, BRANCH
XXI, WAS ITSELF CONSISTENT WITH THE PETITIONERS ACQUITTAL FOR THE REASON THAT THE
CIVIL ACTION WAS IMPLIEDLY INSTITUTED WITH THE CRIMINAL ACTION AND THERE WAS NO
EXPRESS WAIVER OF THE CIVIL ACTION OR RESERVATION TO INSTITUTE IT SEPARATELY BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THE TRIAL COURT.

THIRD THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE
CASE CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 ENTITLED: SPOUSES MARCELINO NICOLAS AND MARIA NICOLAS v.
GEORGE MANANTAN, AND RENDER THE DECISION SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED WHEN THE SAME
WAS PROSECUTED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS IN THEIR PERSONAL CAPACITIES AND THE
FILING FEES NOT HAVING BEEN PAID, THUS VIOLATING THE MANCHESTER DOCTRINE.

In brief, the issues for our resolution are:

(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his negligence or
reckless imprudence?

(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that petitioners acquittal did not extinguish his civil liability?

(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine to CA-G.R. CV No.
19240?
On the first issue, petitioner opines that the Court of Appeals should not have disturbed the findings of the trial
court on the lack of negligence or reckless imprudence under the guise of determining his civil liability. He argues
that the trial courts finding that he was neither imprudent nor negligent was the basis for his acquittal, and not
reasonable doubt. He submits that in finding him liable for indemnity and damages, the appellate court not only
placed his acquittal in suspicion, but also put him in double jeopardy.

Private respondents contend that while the trial court found that petitioners guilt had not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt, it did not state in clear and unequivocal terms that petitioner was not recklessly imprudent or
negligent. Hence, impliedly the trial court acquitted him on reasonable doubt. Since civil liability is not
extinguished in criminal cases, if the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, the Court of Appeals had to review the
findings of the trial court to determine if there was a basis for awarding indemnity and damages.

Preliminarily, petitioners claim that the decision of the appellate court awarding indemnity placed him in double
jeopardy is misplaced. The constitution provides that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.[10] When a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by
acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged
with the same or identical offense.[11] This is double jeopardy. For double jeopardy to exist, the following elements
must be established: (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have
terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as the first.[12] In the instant case, petitioner
had once been placed in jeopardy by the filing of Criminal Case No. 066 and the jeopardy was terminated by his
discharge. The judgment of acquittal became immediately final. Note, however, that what was elevated to the Court
of Appeals by private respondents was the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066. Petitioner was not charged anew
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 with a second criminal offense identical to the first offense. The records clearly show
that no second criminal offense was being imputed to petitioner on appeal. In modifying the lower courts judgment,
the appellate court did not modify the judgment of acquittal. Nor did it order the filing of a second criminal case
against petitioner for the same offense. Obviously, therefore, there was no second jeopardy to speak of. Petitioners
claim of having been placed in double jeopardy is incorrect.

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an
acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes
the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot
and can never be held liable for such act or omission.[13] There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict
complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.[14] The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not
been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.[15] This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the Civil Code,[16] where the civil action for
damages is for the same act or omission. Although the two actions have different purposes, the matters discussed in
the civil case are similar to those discussed in the criminal case. However, the judgment in the criminal proceeding
cannot be read in evidence in the civil action to establish any fact there determined, even though both actions
involve the same act or omission.[17] The reason for this rule is that the parties are not the same and secondarily,
different rules of evidence are applicable. Hence, notwithstanding herein petitioners acquittal, the Court of Appeals
in determining whether Article 29 applied, was not precluded from looking into the question of petitioners
negligence or reckless imprudence.

On the second issue, petitioner insists that he was acquitted on a finding that he was neither criminally negligent nor
recklessly imprudent. Inasmuch as his civil liability is predicated on the criminal offense, he argues that when the
latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded. He concludes that his acquittal bars any civil action.

Private respondents counter that a closer look at the trial courts judgment shows that the judgment of acquittal did
not clearly and categorically declare the non-existence of petitioners negligence or imprudence. Hence, they argue
that his acquittal must be deemed based on reasonable doubt, allowing Article 29 of the Civil Code to come into
play.

Our scrutiny of the lower courts decision in Criminal Case No. 066 supports the conclusion of the appellate court
that the acquittal was based on reasonable doubt; hence, petitioners civil liability was not extinguished by his
discharge. We note the trial courts declaration that did not discount the possibility that the accused was really
negligent. However, it found that a hypothesis inconsistent with the negligence of the accused presented itself
before the Court and since said hypothesis is consistent with the recordthe Courts mind cannot rest on a verdict of
conviction.[18] The foregoing clearly shows that petitioners acquittal was predicated on the conclusion that his guilt
had not been established with moral certainty. Stated differently, it is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt and a
suit to enforce civil liability for the same act or omission lies.

On the third issue, petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals erred in awarding damages and indemnity, since
private respondents did not pay the corresponding filing fees for their claims for damages when the civil case was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. Petitioner submits that the non-payment of filing fees on the amount of
the claim for damages violated the doctrine in Manchester Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 149
SCRA 562 (1987) and Supreme Court Circular No. 7 dated March 24, 1988.[19] He avers that since Manchester
held that The Court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon payment of the prescribed docket fees, the
appellate court was without jurisdiction to hear and try CA-G.R. CV No. 19240, much less award indemnity and
damages.

Private respondents argue that the Manchester doctrine is inapplicable to the instant case. They ask us to note that
the criminal case, with which the civil case was impliedly instituted, was filed on July 1, 1983, while the
Manchester requirements as to docket and filing fees took effect only with the promulgation of Supreme Court
Circular No. 7 on March 24, 1988. Moreover, the information filed by the Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela did not
allege the amount of indemnity to be paid. Since it was not then customarily or legally required that the civil
damages sought be stated in the information, the trial court had no basis in assessing the filing fees and demanding
payment thereof. Moreover, assuming that the Manchester ruling is applied retroactively, under the Rules of Court,
the filing fees for the damages awarded are a first lien on the judgment. Hence, there is no violation of the
Manchester doctrine to speak of.

At the time of the filing of the information in 1983, the implied institution of civil actions with criminal actions was
governed by Rule 111, Section 1 of the 1964 Rules of Court.[20] As correctly pointed out by private respondents,
under said rule, it was not required that the damages sought by the offended party be stated in the complaint or
information. With the adoption of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure, and the amendment of Rule 111, Section 1
of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure by a resolution of this Court dated July 7, 1988, it is now required that:

When the offended party seeks to enforce civil liability against the accused by way of moral, nominal, temperate or
exemplary damages, the filing fees for such civil action as provided in these Rules shall constitute a first lien on the
judgment except in an award for actual damages.

In cases wherein the amount of damages, other than actual, is alleged in the complaint or information, the
corresponding filing fees shall be paid by the offended party upon the filing thereof in court for trial.

The foregoing were the applicable provisions of the Rules of Criminal Procedure at the time private respondents
appealed the civil aspect of Criminal Case No. 066 to the court a quo in 1989. Being in the nature of a curative
statute, the amendment applies retroactively and affects pending actions as in this case.

Thus, where the civil action is impliedly instituted together with the criminal action, the actual damages claimed by
the offended parties, as in this case, are not included in the computation of the filing fees. Filing fees are to be paid
only if other items of damages such as moral, nominal, temperate, or exemplary damages are alleged in the
complaint or information, or if they are not so alleged, shall constitute a first lien on the judgment.[21] Recall that
the information in Criminal Case No. 066 contained no specific allegations of damages. Considering that the Rules
of Criminal Procedure effectively guarantee that the filing fees for the award of damages are a first lien on the
judgment, the effect of the enforcement of said lien must retroact to the institution of the criminal action. The filing
fees are deemed paid from the filing of the criminal complaint or information. We therefore find no basis for
petitioners allegations that the filing fees were not paid or improperly paid and that the appellate court acquired no
jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CV No. 19240 promulgated on January 31, 1992, as well as its resolution dated August 24, 1992,
denying herein petitioners motion for reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] CA Rollo, pp. 53-55.

[3] Id. at 56-57.

[4] Records, p. 429.

[5] CA Rollo, p. 60.

[6] Id. at 57.

[7] SEC. 53. Driving while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug. No person shall drive a motor vehicle
while under the influence of liquor or narcotic drug.

[8] CIVIL CODE, ART. 2185. Unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor
vehicle has been negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic regulation.

[9] Supra note 6, at 58.

[10] CONST., Art. III, Sec. 21.

[11] Melo v. People, 85 Phil. 766, 768 (1950).

[12] People v. Bocar, 138 SCRA 166, 171 (1985).

[13] Almeida, et al. v. Abaroa, 8 Phil, 178, 181 (1907). See also Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, 40 Phil.
1056 (1910), 218 US 476, 54 L. Ed. 1116 (1910); Wise & Co. v. Larion, 45 Phil. 314 (1923), Francisco v. Onrubia,
46 Phil. 327 (1924). Article 29 of the Civil Code serves only to limit and qualify the application of the Almeida
doctrine.

[14] Rules of Court, Rule 111, Sec. 2. Institution of separate civil action.

xxx
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. (stress supplied)

[15] Manahan, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 202, 214 (1996), citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA
558 (1984).

[16] CIVIL CODE, Art. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has
not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted
(stress supplied). Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the defendant, the court
may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for damages in case the complaint should be found to be
malicious.

If in a criminal case, the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court shall so declare. In the
absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal
is due to that ground.

[17] Almeida Chantangco and Lete v. Abaroa, supra note 13, at 1061.

[18] Supra note 4.

[19] The subject of which reads: ALL COMPLAINTS MUST SPECIFY THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES
SOUGHT NOT ONLY IN THE BODY OF THE PLEADINGS, BUT ALSO IN THE PRAYER IN ORDER TO BE
ACCEPTED AND ADMITTED FOR FILING. THE AMOUNT OF DAMAGES SO SPECIFIED IN THE
COMPLAINT SHALL BE THE BASIS FOR ASSESSING THE AMOUNT OF THE FILING FEES.

[20] Sec. 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his right to institute it separately.

[21] People v. Escano, Jr., 193 SCRA 662, 665 (1991).

SECOND DIVISION

EMMA P. NUGUID, G.R. No. 150785

Petitioner,
Present:

PUNO, J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
CLARITA S. NICDAO,[1]
Respondent. Promulgated:

September 15, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, Emma P. Nuguid assails the decision of

the Court of Appeals (CA) dated October 30, 2001 in CA- G.R. No. 23054:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED and the Assailed Decision dated May 10, 1999 of the
Regional Trial Court [RTC], Branch 5, Bataan, affirming the Decision dated January 11, 1999 of the First
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan-Hermosa, Bataan is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

The petitioner CLARITA S. NICDAO is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged. NO COSTS.

SO ORDERED.[2]

Petitioner seeks a review of the decision with respect to the alleged lack of civil liability of respondent Clarita S.
Nicdao. Stemming from two cases of violation of BP 22,[3] this petition involves the following facts:

xxx xxx xxx

Accused Clarita S. Nicdao is charged with having committed the crime of Violation of BP 22 in fourteen (14)
counts. The criminal complaints allege that sometime in 1996, from April to August thereof, [respondent] and her
husband [,] of Vignette Superstore [,] approached [petitioner] and asked her if they [could] borrow money to settle
some obligations. Having been convinced by them and because of the close relationship of [respondent] to
[petitioner], the latter lent the former her money. Thus, every month, she was persuaded to release P100,000.00 to
the accused until the total amount reached P1,150,000.00.

As security for the P1,150,000.00, [respondent] gave [petitioner] the following open dated Hermosa Savings Bank
(HSLB) (sic) with the assurance that if the entire amount is not paid within one (1) year, [petitioner] can deposit the
check:

Check No.
Amount
7277
P100,000.00 (Exhibit A)
7348
150,000.00 (Exhibit A)
12118
100,000.00 (Exhibit A)
8812
50,000.00 (Exhibit A)
12102
100,000.00 (Exhibit A)
7255
100,000.00 (Exhibit A)
2286
50,000.00 (Exhibit A)
8128
100,000.00 (Exhibit A)
7254
50,000.00 (Exhibit A)
7278
100,000.00 (Exhibit A)
4540
50,000.00 (Exhibit A)
4523
50,000.00 (Exhibit A)
12103
50,000.00 (Exhibit A)
7294
100,000.00 (Exhibit A)

P1,150,000.00

In June 1997, [petitioner] together with Samson Ching demanded payment of the sums [above-mentioned], but
[respondent] refused to acknowledge the indebtedness. Thus, on October 6, 1977, [petitioner] deposited all
aforementioned checks in the bank of Samson Ching totaling P1,150,000.00 since all the money given by her to
[respondent] came from Samson Ching. The checks were all returned for having been drawn against insufficient
funds (DAIF).
A verbal and written demand was made upon [respondent] to pay the amount represented by the bounced checks,
but [to] no avail. Hence, a complaint for violation of BP 22 was filed against the [respondent]. [4](Citation omitted)

After petitioner instituted 14 criminal cases[5] (docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471) for violation of BP 22
involving the sum of P1,150,000, corresponding warrants of arrest were issued against respondent. On November
12, 1997, respondent was arraigned. She pleaded not guilty and trial ensued.

In a decision dated January 11, 1999, Judge Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Dinalupihan,
Bataan found respondent guilty of the charges against her. Respondent was sentenced to pay P1,150,000, plus
interest, and to suffer imprisonment equivalent to one year for each violation of BP 22, or a total of 14 years of
imprisonment.

On appeal, the decision was affirmed in toto by the Regional Trial Court of Dinalupihan, Bataan. Respondent
elevated the case to the CA. On October 30, 2001, the CA reversed the decision of the lower courts and acquitted
respondent. According to the CA, certain substantial facts were

overlooked by the trial court. These circumstances, if properly considered, justified a different conclusion on the
case.[6]

Petitioner now comes to us, raising this main issue: whether respondent remains civilly liable to her for the sum of
P1,150,000. In this connection, she asserts that respondent obtained loans from her in the aggregate amount of
P1,150,000 and that these loans have not been paid.

From the standpoint of its effects, a crime has a dual character: (1) as an offense against the State because of the
disturbance of the social order and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it
involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others (wherein no civil liability arises on the part
of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the
crime[7]). What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the
damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentionally or negligently and whether
or not punishable by law.[8]

Extinction of penal action does not carry with it the eradication of civil liability, unless the extinction proceeds from
a declaration in the final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.[9]

On one hand, as regards the criminal aspect of a violation of BP 22, suffice it to say that:

[t]he gravamen of BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment [and] the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its
payment within 5 banking days from notice of dishonor. The act is
malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Laws are created to achieve a goal intended to guide
and prevent against an evil or mischief. Why and to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining
culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance of the checks are also irrelevant.[10]

On the other hand, the basic principle in civil liability ex delicto is that every person criminally liable is also civilly
liable, crime being one of the five sources of obligations under the Civil Code.[11] A person acquitted of a criminal
charge, however, is not necessarily civilly free because the quantum of proof required in criminal prosecution
(proof beyond reasonable doubt) is greater than that required for civil liability (mere preponderance of
evidence[12]). In order to be completely free from civil liability, a persons acquittal must be based on the fact that
he did not commit the offense.[13] If the acquittal is based merely on reasonable doubt, the accused may still be
held civilly liable since this does not mean he did not commit the act complained of.[14] It may only be that the
facts proved did not constitute the offense charged.[15]

Acquittal will not bar a civil action in the following cases: (1) where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as
only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; (2) where the court declared the accuseds liability is not
criminal but only civil in nature and (3) where the civil liability does not arise from or is not based upon the
criminal act of which the accused was acquitted.[16]

In this petition, we find no reason to ascribe any civil liability to respondent. As found by the CA, her supposed
civil liability had already been fully satisfied and extinguished by payment. The statements of the appellate court
leave no doubt that respondent, who was acquitted from the charges against her, had already been completely
relieved of civil liability:

[Petitioner] does not dispute the fact that payments have already been made by petitioner in [the stated] amounts but
argues that the Demand Draft represented payment of a previous obligation. However, no evidence of whatever
nature was presented by the prosecution to substantiate their claim that there was indeed a previous obligation
involving the same amount for which the demand draft was given. Except for this bare allegation, which is self-
serving, no documentary evidence was ever adduced that there were previous transactions involving the subject
amount.

Likewise, [petitioner] admitted having received the cash payments from petitioner on a daily basis but argues that
the same were applied to interest payments only. It however appears that [petitioner] was charging [respondent]
with an exorbitant rate of intereston a daily basis. xxx In any event, the cash payments [made] were recorded at the
back of the cigarette cartons by [petitioner] in her own handwriting as testified to by [respondent] and her
employees, Melanie Tolentino and Jocelyn Nicdao. Indeed, the daily cash payments marked in evidence as Exhibits
7 to 15 reveal that [respondent] had already paid her obligation to [petitioner] in the amount of P5,780,000.00 as of
July 21, 1997 and that she stopped making further payments when she realized that she had already paid such
amount.
From the foregoing, it would appear that [respondent] made a total payment of P6,980,000.00, inclusive of the
P1,200,000.00 Demand Draft, which is definitely much more than P1,150,000.00, the amount she actually
borrowed from [petitioner]. These facts were never rebutted by [petitioner].

Moreover, we find no evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that there was a stipulation in writing that
interest will be paid by [respondent] on her loan obligations [as required under Article 1956 of the Civil Code].

xxx xxx xxx

By and large, the obligation of [respondent] has already been extinguished long before the encashment of the
subject checks. A check is said to apply for account only when there is still a pre-existing obligation. In the case at
bench, the pre-existing obligation was extinguished after full payment was made by [respondent]. We therefore find
the clear and

convincing documentary evidence of payment presented by [respondent] worthy of credence.[17] (emphasis

supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The October 30, 2001 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-

G.R. No. 23054 is AFFIRMED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA
Associate Justice

AT T E S T AT I O N

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to
the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice

[1] The Court of Appeals was impleaded as a respondent but we have excluded it pursuant to Section 4 of Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A.
Jacinto (retired) and Eloy R. Bello, Jr., of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals; rollo, p. 53.
[3] Anti-Bouncing Checks Law.
[4] CA Decision, rollo, pp. 39-40; MCTC Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 9458-9471, id., pp. 68-69. See also
Petition, id., pp. 21-22.
[5] Samson Ching, petitioners partner, had earlier instituted a criminal case for eleven counts of violation of BP 22
against Nicdao, this time involving the sum of P20,950,000. It was docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 9433-9443.

In Criminal Case Nos. 9433-9443, Hon. Manuel M. Tan of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court found Nicdao guilty of
the charges.

Nicdao filed two separate petitions for review with the CA. The petition for review of the RTC decision on

G.R. No. 23055. Meanwhile, the petition

Criminal Case Nos. DH-848-99 to DH-858-99 was docketed as CA-

involving Criminal Case Nos. DH-859-99 to DH-872-99, docketed as CA- G.R. No. 23054, is the subject
matter of this petition.

The Office of the Solicitor General filed a motion for consolidation of the two petitions on October 13, 1999
pursuant to Section 7 (b) (1) of the 1988 Revised Rules of the CA.

Without resolving and acting on the motion for consolidation, the CA, through Associate Justice Artemio G.

Tuquero, decided CA- G.R. No. 23055 on November 22, 1999. The CA reversed and set aside the RTC
decision and acquitted Nicdao.

Samson Ching questioned the civil aspect of the CA decision by way of petition for review on certiorari before this

Court. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 141181. At the time of the filing of the present petition, G.R.
No. 141181 was allegedly still pending with the Courts First Division.
[6] Rollo, p. 52.
[7] Reyes, THE REVISED PENAL CODE: CRIMINAL LAW 1 (2001), p. 876. Citation omitted.
[8] See also Occena v. Icamina, G.R. No. 82146, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 328, 333.
[9] Reyes supra note 7, at 878, citing Sec. 2, par. 4, Rule III, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
[10] Boado, NOTES AND CASES ON THE REVISED PENAL CODE AND SPECIAL PENAL LAWS (2002), p.

692. Citations omitted. See also Ngo v. People, G.R. No. 155815, 14 July 2004, 434 SCRA 522, 530-533;
King v. People, 377 Phil. 692 (1999); Navarro v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 112389-90, 1 August 1994, 234
SCRA 639.
[11] Id., p. 298. CIVIL CODE, Art. 1156.
[12] Id.
[13] Id.
[14] Id.
[15] Id.
[16] Id., p. 302. See also Reyes, supra note 7, at 879.

Civil liability may exist, although the accused is not held criminally liable, in the following cases:
1. Acquittal on reasonable doubt (CIVIL CODE, Art. 29)
2. Acquittal from a cause of nonimputability (REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 101)
3. Acquittal in the criminal action for negligence (CIVIL CODE, Art. 2177)
4. When there is only civil responsibility (De Guzman v. Alva, 51 O.G. 1311)
5. In cases of independent civil actions (CIVIL CODE, Arts. 31-34).
[17] CA Decision, rollo, pp. 48-52. Citations omitted.

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

G.R. No. 177751

Appellee,

Present:
- versus -

CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
FLORENCIO AGACER,

BERSAMIN,
EDDIE AGACER,

DEL CASTILLO, and

ELYNOR AGACER,

VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

FRANKLIN AGACER and

ERICC AGACER,

Promulgated:
Appellants.

December 14, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This case involves a man who was killed by his own relatives. Convicted for the crime of murder by the lower
courts, the indicted relatives are now before us assailing their guilty verdict.

Factual Antecedents

This is an appeal from the November 17, 2006 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No.
01543, affirming with modification the August 7, 2001 Decision[2] of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri,
Cagayan which found appellants Florencio Agacer (Florencio), Franklin Agacer (Franklin), Elynor Agacer (Elynor),
Eric Agacer (Eric) and Eddie Agacer (Eddie), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the killing
of Cesario Agacer (Cesario).
As mentioned, all the appellants were related to Cesario. Florencio was Cesarios nephew and is the father of
Franklin while the brothers Elynor, Eric and Eddie are his nephews.

On March 2, 1999, an Information[3] for Murder was filed against the five appellants, the accusatory portion of
which reads as follows:
That on or about April 2, 1998, in the municipality of Sta. Ana, Province of Cagayan, and within the jurisdiction
[of] this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with a long firearm, a bow and arrow, a bolo and
stones, with intent to kill, with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and helping one
another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stone and shoot one Cesario Agacer,
inflicting upon the latter [bruises] and multiple gunshot wounds in his body which caused his death.

That the killing was aggravated by the use of an unlicensed firearm.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]

On October 14, 1999, Florencio, Elynor, Franklin and Eric entered separate pleas of not guilty during their
arraignment.[5] On January 11, 2000, Eddie likewise pleaded not guilty.[6] Thereafter, trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

The prosecutions version of the events is as follows:

Cesario was a 55-year old farmer and owner of a ricefield situated in Dungeg, Santa Ana, Cagayan. On April 2,
1998, at around 9:00 a.m., he was clearing a section of his farm and preparing the beddings for the rice seedlings
intended for the coming planting season. Farm laborers Genesis Delantar (Genesis), his brother Andy, Rafael
Morgado and brothers Roden (Roden) and Ric (Ric) Vallejo were nearby in a separate section of the same ricefield
harvesting Cesarios palay.

According to prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden, it was at that moment while Cesario was tending to his
farm when appellants suddenly emerged from a nearby banana plantation and surrounded Cesario. Visibly
intimidated, Cesario moved backwards and retreated to where the other farm laborers were working. However,
Franklin set afire the rice straws that covered Cesarios rice seedlings. This prompted Cesario to return to put out the
fire and save his rice seedlings. At this point, Franklin and Eric started throwing stones at Cesario which forced the
latter to retreat again. Thereafter, Florencio, while standing side by side with Eric, signaled Cesario to come closer.
Cesario obliged but when he was just around five meters away from the group, Eddie suddenly pulled out a gun
concealed inside a sack and, without warning, shot Cesario hitting him in the left portion of his chest. Almost
simultaneously, Elynor took aim at Cesario with his bow and arrow but missed his mark. As Cesario fell, appellants
fled towards the irrigation canal, where another gunshot rang. Thereafter, a short firearm was thrown from where
the appellants ran towards the direction of Cesarios fallen body. Appellants then immediately left the scene of the
crime onboard a hand tractor and a tricycle.

After these events unfolded, Genesis and the other farm laborers scampered away in different directions. Genesis
then reached Barangay Capanikian and informed Cesarios son, Neldison Agacer (Neldison), of the death of his
father. At around 3:00 p.m., Cesarios friends in said barangay went to the scene of the crime and retrieved his
corpse. During the autopsy, a total of eight entrance wounds were found, mostly on the chest of Cesarios cadaver.
According to the Medico-Legal Officer, the fatal gunshot wounds were inflicted by the use of a firearm capable of
discharging several slugs simultaneously.

Version of the Defense

The appellants denied the accusations against them and claimed that Florencio only acted in self-defense and in
defense of relatives. As proof, appellants presented Florencio who testified that on April 2, 1998, he proceeded to
Dungeg, Sta. Ana, Cagayan, from his residence in Merde, also in Sta. Ana, Cagayan, to prepare seed beddings in
the ricefield over which he and his uncle Cesario had an existing dispute. At around 8:00 a.m., he claimed that
Cesario attempted to prevent him from preparing the seed beds. When Florencio persisted and argued that he
inherited the land from his father, Cesario departed through a cogonal area. Moments later, Cesario returned and
shouted at him not to continue working on the land. At that time, Florencio noticed that Cesario was holding an
object. Suspecting that Cesario may be armed, he shouted to Eric, Franklin, Eddie and Elynor, who had just arrived,
to run away. The four heeded his warning and scampered in different directions. Cesario then chased Florencio who
ran and jumped into the irrigation canal to hide in the tall cogon grasses. However, Cesario was not deterred and
continued to search for him. When Florencio saw that Cesario was already close, he suddenly grabbed Cesarios
buckshot gun and successfully disarmed him. Thereupon, Cesario drew another firearm and shot Florencio several
times. As Cesario was shooting him, Florencio also fired the gun he earlier grabbed from Cesario and hit the latter.
Finding out that he too was hit in the arm, he shouted to his nephews for help. They responded by taking him to a
hospital for treatment. On April 16, 1998, he went to the police to surrender.

Elynor and Eddie corroborated this version in their respective testimonies.[7]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The trial court found the prosecutions evidence sufficient to prove

appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It held that appellants acted in conspiracy in inflicting upon Cesario, in a
treacherous manner, multiple gunshot wounds. However, the trial court did not appreciate evident premeditation as
a qualifying aggravating circumstance for failure to establish its elements as clearly as the criminal act itself. It also
did not consider as aggravating circumstance the use of an unlicensed firearm since the firearm used in the killing
was not presented in evidence.

The dispositive portion of the trial courts Decision[8] of August 7, 2001, reads:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds all the accused FLORENCIO AGACER, EDDIE AGACER, ELYNOR AGACER,
FRANKLIN AGACER and ERIC AGACER GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER qualified
[by] treachery and hereby sentence[s] them to:

1. suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory penalties;
2. indemnify the heirs of the victim, the amount of P75,000.00 as death indemnity; the amount of
P40,000.00 as actual damages and the amount of P30,000.00 as and by way of Attorneys fees.

3. pay the costs of litigation.

SO ORDERED.[9]

Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal,[10] which was approved by the trial court in its Order[11] of August 17, 2001.
Pursuant thereto, the records of the case were elevated to this Court. However, in view of the Courts ruling in
People v. Mateo[12] allowing an intermediate review by the CA where the penalty involved is death, reclusion
perpetua as in this case, or life imprisonment, the case was transferred to said court for appropriate action and
disposition.[13]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court in all respects. It also awarded moral damages pursuant to the rule laid
down in People v. Dela Cruz[14] and People v. Panela.[15] The dispositive portion of the November 17, 2006
Decision[16] of the CA reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered DENYING the instant appeal, and accordingly
AFFIRMING in toto the herein impugned August 7, 2001 Decision of the RTC, Branch 08, of Aparri, Cagayan.
Additionally, the amount of P50,000.00 is hereby awarded in favor of Cesario Agacers surviving heirs as and by
way of moral damages pursuant to the doctrine in the cases of Dela Cruz and Panela, as heretofore stated.

SO ORDERED.[17]

Hence, the present appeal.

Assignment of Errors

In their Brief,[18] appellants assigned the following errors:

I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CONSPIRACY EXISTED [AMONG] THE HEREIN
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN THE KILLING OF CESARIO AGACER.

II
THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN FINDING THAT
TREACHERY AS A QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE ATTENDED THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME.
III
THE LOWER COURT FINALLY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILT HAS
BEEN PROVED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[19]
Appellants contend that both lower courts erred in finding that they conspired to kill Cesario. They argue that there
was no evidence sufficient to establish their intentional participation in the crime to achieve a common purpose.
Thus, they claim that the criminal culpability arising from their acts, even if the same were all directed solely
against one victim, is individual and not collective. Put differently, each of them is liable only for his own acts.

Appellants also contend that treachery did not attend the commission of the crime. They assert that treachery cannot
be appreciated when an altercation precedes the killing. Here, Cesario already had a previous heated altercation
with Florencio. Appellants aver that Cesario had only himself to blame for obliging when Florencio summoned him
to come near considering that they just had a heated argument. According to them, Cesario literally courted danger
by approaching Florencio instead of running away from him.

Lastly, appellants posit that they cannot be held guilty of murder since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was
not alleged with clarity nor specified in the Information as required by Sections 8 and 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court.

In its Brief,[20] the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) maintains that
there was conspiracy among the appellants as shown by their collective acts before, during, and after the
perpetration of the crime. Their specific acts are in fact indicative of a common design and intent to ensure the
commission of the crime.[21] The OSG also belies the assertion of the appellants that treachery does not exist in
this case. It insists that their attack on Cesario was sudden and unexpected, thereby depriving him of a chance to
defend himself and ensuring its commission without risk to the appellants and without the slightest provocation on
the part of the victim.[22]

Our Ruling

The appeal is unmeritorious.

Conspiracy was sufficiently established

Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it.[23] In conspiracy, it is not necessary to adduce direct evidence of a previous agreement to
commit a crime.[24] It may be shown through circumstantial evidence, deduced from the mode and manner in
which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when such lead to a joint
purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.[25] Proof of a previous agreement and decision to
commit the crime is not essential but the fact that the malefactors acted in unison pursuant to the same objective
suffices.[26]
Here, while there is no proof of any previous agreement among appellants to commit the crime and while it was
established during trial that Eddie alone shot Cesario, the acts of all appellants before, during and after the incident
establish the existence of conspiracy to kill Cesario beyond reasonable doubt. First, all of them emerged at the same
time from a banana plantation beside the ricefield. Second, they surprised Cesario by immediately surrounding him.
Third, all of them were armed at the time of the incident. Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack, Florencio was
armed with a bolo, Elynor had a bow and arrow, while Eric and Franklin had stones in their hands. Fourth, Eric and
Franklin struck Cesario with stones moments before the shooting. Fifth, Eddie immediately shot Cesario at close
range while the latter was approaching the group of appellants upon being summoned by Florencio. Sixth,
Florencio, Franklin, Eric and Elynor stood just a meter away from Eddie when he shot Cesario, but did not do
anything to stop or dissuade Eddie from the assault. Seventh, after Cesario was shot, all appellants departed from
the scene of the crime together.

Undoubtedly, the acts of the assailants constitute proof of their unanimity in design, intent and execution.[27] They
performed specific acts with closeness and coordination as to unmistakably indicate a common purpose and
design[28] to ensure the death of Cesario. We thus uphold the lower courts finding that appellants conspired to
commit the crime of murder against Cesario.

Having established conspiracy, appellants assertion that each of them can only be made liable for his own acts
deserves no merit. Evidence as to who among the appellants delivered the fatal blow is therefore no longer
indispensable since in conspiracy, a person may be convicted for the criminal act of another.[29] In a conspiracy,
the act of one is deemed the act of all.[30]

Essence of Treachery; Elements

We are also unimpressed with appellants contention that both the trial and appellate courts erred in ruling that
treachery qualified the killing of Cesario to murder. They maintain that since the attack on Cesario was frontal,
there was therefore no element of surprise on the victim or suddenness of the assault that characterizes treachery.

There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against the person, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself
arising from any defense which the offended party might make.[31] Two conditions must concur for treachery to be
appreciated. First, is the employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or to retaliate. Second, the means of execution was deliberate or consciously adopted.[32] The essence of
treachery is the sudden attack by an aggressor without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim, depriving
the latter of any real chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the commission of the crime without risk to the
aggressor. [33]

In this case, treachery is evident from the same circumstances we have already discussed above. From the facts,
Cesario could not have been aware that he would be surrounded, attacked and killed by the appellants who were all
related to him. He could not have also been aware that Eddie had a shotgun concealed in a sack because if he was,
he would not have casually approached Florencio when the latter summoned him. Unfortunately, while Cesario was
advancing towards Florencio, Eddie shot him at close range without any warning whatsoever. Evidently, the crime
was committed in a manner that there was no opportunity for Cesario to defend himself. Also, the mode of attack
did not spring from the unexpected turn of events but was clearly thought of by the appellants. Hence, it no longer
matters that the assault was frontal since its swiftness and unexpectedness deprived Cesario of a chance to repel it
or offer any resistance in defense of his person.[34]

Appellants contention that treachery was not alleged with certainty in the Information is also devoid of merit. In
People v. Villacorta[35] the Court appreciated treachery as an aggravating circumstance, it having been alleged in
the Information and proved during trial that the x x x accused, armed with a sharpened bamboo stick, with intent to
kill, treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there willfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab with
the said weapon one DANILO SALVADOR CRUZ x x x.

Similarly, we hold that treachery was sufficiently alleged in the Information when it reads, viz:

x x x the above-name[d] accused, armed with a long firearm, a bow and arrow, a bolo and stones, with intent to kill,
with evident premeditation and with treachery, conspiring together and helping one another, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, stone and shoot one Cesario Agacer, inflicting upon the latter
[bruises] and multiple gunshot wounds in his body which caused his death.[36] (Emphasis supplied.)

Well-settled is the rule that when x x x treachery x x x is present and alleged in the Information, it qualifies the
killing and raises it to the category of murder.[37]

Appellants failed to discharge their burden to prove Florencios claim that he acted in self-defense and in defense of
relatives.

Florencio admits that he shot Cesario but invokes defense of himself and of his relatives to escape criminal liability.

The Court is not convinced.

While it is the burden of the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, this burden
shifts when the accused admits the killing and pleads self-defense by way of justification. It therefore becomes vital
for the accused to show clear and convincing evidence that he acted in self-defense. In so doing, he must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions evidence.[38]
The accused must also prove the following elements of self-defense: (1) there was unlawful aggression on the part
of the victim; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) the
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.[39] In the justifying circumstance of self-
defense, unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non.[40] Self-defense, complete or incomplete, cannot be
considered a justification, unless the victim commits an unlawful aggression against the person defending himself.
[41]

Here, Florencio failed to prove that he defended himself against the unlawful aggression of Cesario. He failed to
present any evidence to substantiate his claim that there was an actual or imminent peril to his life or limb. Aside
from his unreliable and self-serving claim, there is no proof that Cesario assaulted and shot him with a firearm
during their struggle or, if at all, that there was indeed a struggle between them. On the other hand, the separate
testimonies of prosecution witnesses Genesis and Roden negate Florencios claim of unlawful aggression. The
testimonies of these witnesses established that it was the appellants who emerged from a nearby banana plantation;
that they surrounded Cesario and set to fire the rice straws covering his rice seedlings; that appellants were armed
with different kinds of weapons, while Cesario was not; that Franklin and Elynor cast stones upon Cesario; and, that
the one who pulled a gun from a sack and shot Cesario was Eddie, not Florencio. We thus hold that if there was
unlawful aggression here, it came from appellants end and not from Cesario. Hence, there being no unlawful
aggression on the part of Cesario, Florencios claim of self-defense must fail.

Another basis for appellants conviction is the finding of the medico-legal expert that the cause of Cesarios death
was multiple gunshot wounds found mostly at the infero-lateral portion of the anterior chest, right side. This
corroborates the testimonies of Genesis and Roden that Cesario was shot in his chest. These dovetailing findings of
the medico-legal expert and the eyewitness accounts of Genesis and Roden also deserve more credence than the
unsubstantiated claim of self-defense of Florencio, who, interestingly, gave contradictory testimony. Florencio
claimed that he could not see the gun used by Cesario in shooting him as tall cogonal grass obstructed his view, yet
he could clearly recall that he saw the bullet-riddled Cesario fall.[42] These contradictory statements of Florencio
all the more convince us to believe the testimonies of prosecution witnesses that no exchange of gunfire actually
transpired between Cesario and Florencio. Rather, it was only Eddie who wielded a gun and shot Cesario.

Florencio also invokes the justifying circumstance of defense of relatives, which has three elements, to wit, (1)
there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed
to prevent or repel it; and (3) in case of provocation given by the person being attacked, the person making defense
had no part therein.[43] Like in the case of self-defense, unlawful aggression is also an indispensable element in
defense of relative. As discussed, there is no unlawful aggression on the part of Cesario. Hence, Florencios reliance
on this justifying circumstance is likewise unavailing.

Similarly, Florencios subsequent presentation of himself at the police station cannot be considered as a voluntary
surrender which would mitigate the penalty imposed. A surrender to be voluntary must be spontaneous, showing the
intent of the accused to submit himself unconditionally to the authorities either because (a) he acknowledges his
guilt or (b) he wishes to save them the trouble and expense necessarily incurred in his search and capture.[44] Here,
Florencio cannot be considered to have surrendered voluntarily since his act did not emanate from a natural impulse
to admit the killing of Cesario or to save the police officers the effort and expense that would be incurred in his
search and incarceration. Although he submitted a medico-legal certificate purportedly to show that his injuries
prevented him from immediately surrendering to the authorities, same, however, does not certify as to the period of
his incapacity or the period during which he required medical attendance. Thus, there can be no explanation why he
surrendered only on April 16, 1998 or 14 days after the commission of the crime. To us, Florencios surrender was a
mere afterthought undeserving of any consideration. Indeed, the failure of Florencio to immediately surrender
militates against his claim that he killed Cesario in self-defense and in defense of relatives since an innocent person
will not hesitate to take the prompt and necessary action to exonerate himself of the crime imputed to him.

All told, we find no reason to disturb the conclusion of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA. The testimonies of the
eyewitnesses presented by the prosecution were given in a clear, natural and spontaneous manner. Their positive
identification of the appellants as the persons responsible for the death of Cesario has been clearly, categorically
and consistently established on record. Moreover, we note that no evidence was presented to establish that these
eyewitnesses harbored any ill-will against the appellants or that they have reasons to fabricate their testimonies.[45]
These kinds of testimonies are accepted as true for being consistent with the natural order of events, human nature
and the presumption of good faith.[46]

The Proper Penalty

Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. As
correctly imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the CA, appellants must suffer the prison term of reclusion
perpetua, the lower of the said two indivisible penalties, due to the absence of an
aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime.

The Civil Liability

For the victims death resulting from the crime, the heirs are entitled to the following awards: (1) civil indemnity ex
delicto for the death of the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary
damages; and (5) temperate damages.[47]

Civil indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00 is mandatory and is granted without need of evidence other than the
commission of the crime.[48] Moral damages in the sum of P50,000.00 shall be awarded despite the absence of
proof of mental and emotional suffering of the victims heirs.[49] As borne out by human nature and experience, a
violent death invariably and necessarily brings about emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victims family.
[50] Also under Article 2230 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages may be imposed when the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances, like treachery,[51] as in this case. Thus, the award of
P30,000.00 for exemplary damages is in order.[52]

As regards actual damages, the son of Cesario, Neldison, testified that the sum of P40,000.00 was spent for the
coffin of his father but was unable to present receipts to substantiate such claim. Where the amount of actual
damages for funeral expenses cannot be ascertained due to the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate
damages in the sum of P25,000.00 may be granted, as it is hereby granted, in lieu thereof.[53] Under Article 2224
of the Civil Code, temperate damages may be recovered as it cannot be denied that the heirs of the victim suffered
pecuniary loss although the exact amount was not proved.[54]
The heirs of Cesario are also entitled to an interest on all the amounts of damages we have awarded at the legal rate
of 6% from the date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.[55]

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the November 17, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 01543 which affirmed the August 7, 2001 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8, Aparri,
Cagayan, finding appellants Florencio, Franklin, Elynor, Eddie and Eric, all surnamed Agacer, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, with the following modifications:

(1) actual damages is DELETED;

(2) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer P25,000.00 as temperate damages; and

(3) the appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Cesario Agacer interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%)
per annum on all the amounts of damages awarded, commencing from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.

Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Chairperson

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

C Also spelled as Erick in some parts of the records.

[1] CA rollo, pp. 143-160; penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by Associate
Justices Renato C. Dacudao and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe (now a member of this Court).
[2] Records, pp. 267-284; penned by Presiding Judge Conrado F. Manauis.
[3] Id. at 1-2.
[4] Id.
[5] Id. at 103.
[6] Id. at 145.
[7] TSN dated June 15, 2000 and August 15, 2000.
[8] Supra note 2.
[9] Records, pp. 283-284.
[10] Id. at 295.
[11] Id. at 296.
[12] G.R. Nos. 147678-87, July 7, 2004, 433 SCRA 640.
[13] See Minute Resolution dated August 30, 2004, CA rollo, pp. 140-141.
[14] 402 Phil. 138, 151-152 (2001).
[15] 400 Phil. 107, 119 (2000).
[16] Supra note 1.
[17] CA rollo, p. 159.
[18] Id. at 54-68.
[19] Id. at 60-61.
[20] Id. at 107-123.
[21] Id. at 112-117.
[22] Id. at 118-120.
[23] REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 8.
[24] People v. Perez, G.R. No. 179154, July 31, 2009, 594 SCRA 701, 714.
[25] Id. at 714-715.
[26] People v. Amodia, G.R. No. 173791, April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 518, 541.
[27] People v. Perez, supra note 24 at 715.
[28] Id.
[29] People v. Dacillo, 471 Phil. 497, 508 (2004).
[30] People v. Caballero, 448 Phil. 514, 529 (2003).
[31] REVISED PENAL CODE, Article 14(16).
[32] People v. Lacaden, G.R. No. 187682, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 784, 800.
[33] People v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 188610, June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 548, 560.
[34] People v. Suelto, 381 Phil. 851, 869 (2000).
[35] G.R. No. 186412, September 7, 2011.
[36] Supra note 3.
[37] People v. Lab-eo, 424 Phil. 482, 496 (2002).
[38] People v. Bracia,G.R. No. 174477, October 2, 2009, 602 SCRA 351, 369.
[39] People v. Comillo, Jr., G.R. No. 186538, November 25, 2009, 605 SCRA 756, 771.
[40] Id.
[41] People v. Bracia, supra note 38 at 370.
[42] TSN, August 22, 2000, pp. 9-11.
[43] People v. Aleta, G.R.No. 179708, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 578, 587.
[44] People v. Rabanillo, 367 Phil. 114, 128 (1999).
[45] People v. Amodia, supra note 26 at 534.
[46] Id.
[47] People v. Asis, G.R. No. 177573, July 7, 2010, 624 SCRA 509, 530.
[48] Id.
[49] Id.
[50] Id. at 530-531.
[51] Art. 2230. In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of the civil liability may be imposed when the
crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct from
fines and shall be paid to the offended party.
[52] People v. Asis, supra at 531.
[53] Id.
[54] People v. Campos, G.R. No. 176061, July 4, 2011.
[55] Id.

FIRST DIVISION

SONNY ROMERO Y G.R. No. 167546

DOMINGUEZ,
Petitioner, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

CARPIO,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO and
BERSAMIN, JJ.
PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, ISABEL
PADUA, REGINA BREIS,
MINERVA MONTES and
OFELIA BELANDO BREIS,[1]
Respondents. Promulgated:
July 17, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:

On April 1, 1999[2] at around 12:00 noon, the JC Liner[3] driven by petitioner Sonny Romero and the Apego
Taxi[4] driven by Jimmy Padua figured in a head-on collision along Governor Jose Fuentebella Highway at
Barangay Hibago, Ocampo, Camarines Sur. The bus was bound for Naga City while the taxi was going in the
opposite direction of Partido Area. The collision resulted in the death of Gerardo Breis, Sr.,[5] Arnaldo Breis,[6]
Gerardo Breis, Jr.,[7] Rene Montes,[8] Erwin Breis[9] and Jimmy Padua.[10] Luckily, Edwin Breis and his son
Edmund Breis survived although they sustained serious injuries.
As a consequence, petitioner was charged with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in multiple homicide and
multiple serious physical injuries with damage to property in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Ocampo,
Camarines Sur.

After trial on the merits, the MTC acquitted petitioner of the crime charged in a decision[11] dated November 9,
2000. Petitioner was, however, held civilly liable and was ordered to pay the heirs of the victims the total amount of
P3,541,900 by way of actual damages, civil indemnity for death, moral damages, temperate damages and loss of
earning capacity.

Petitioner appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pili, Camarines Sur, claiming that the MTC erred in
holding him civilly liable in view of his acquittal. On July 17, 2001, the RTC affirmed the MTC judgment in toto.
[12]

Refusing to give up, petitioner appealed[13] to the Court of Appeals (CA). On March 3, 2005, the CA rendered the
assailed decision[14] affirming the RTC.

Left with no other recourse, petitioner now argues[15] that his acquittal should have freed him from payment of
civil liability. He also claims that he should be totally exonerated from any liability because it was Gerardo Breis,
Sr., not the regular driver, Jimmy Padua, who was actually driving the taxi at the time of the accident, which was
clearly in violation of insurance and transportation laws.

We disagree.

The rule is that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable.[16] Criminal liability will give rise to civil
liability only if the felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate
cause thereof.[17] Every crime gives rise to (1) a criminal action for the punishment of the guilty party and (2) a
civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the damage, and indemnification for the losses.[18]

However, the reverse is not always true. In this connection, the relevant portions of Section 2, Rule 111 and Section
2, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court provide:

Sec. 2. When separate civil action is suspended.xxx

The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil action. However, the civil action
based on delict shall be deemed extinguished if there is a finding in a final judgment in the criminal action that the
act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. (emphasis supplied)

Sec. 2. Contents of the judgment.xxx

In case the judgment is of acquittal, it shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove
the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment
shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, the rule is that the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged will not necessarily extinguish his civil
liability, unless the court declares in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not
exist.[19] Courts can acquit an accused on reasonable doubt but still order payment of civil damages in the same
case.[20] It is not even necessary that a separate civil action be instituted.[21]

In this case, the MTC held that it could not ascertain with moral certainty the wanton and reckless manner by which
petitioner drove the bus in view of the condition of the highway where the accident occurred and the short distance
between the bus and the taxi before the collision. However, it categorically stated that while petitioner may be
acquitted based on reasonable doubt, he may nonetheless be held civilly liable. [22]
The RTC added that there was no finding by the MTC that the act from which petitioners civil liability may arise
did not exist. Therefore, the MTC was correct in holding petitioner civilly liable to the heirs of the victims of the
collision for the tragedy, mental anguish and trauma they suffered plus expenses they incurred during the wake and
interment.[23]

In view of the pronouncements of the MTC and the RTC, we agree with the conclusion of the CA that petitioner
was acquitted not because he did not commit the crime charged but because the RTC and the MTC could not
ascertain with moral conviction the wanton and reckless manner by which petitioner drove the bus at the time of the
accident. Put differently, petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. However, his civil liability for the death, injuries and damages arising from the collision is
another matter.

While petitioner was absolved from criminal liability because his negligence was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, he can still be held civilly liable if his negligence was established by preponderance of evidence.[24] In other
words, the failure of the evidence to prove negligence with moral certainty does not negate (and is in fact
compatible with) a ruling that there was preponderant evidence of such negligence. And that is sufficient to hold
him civilly liable.

Thus, the MTC (as affirmed by the RTC and the CA) correctly imposed civil liability on petitioner despite his
acquittal. Simple logic also dictates that petitioner would not have been held civilly liable if his act from which the
civil liability had arisen did not in fact exist.

Anent the second issue, it would be well to remind petitioner of the time-honored doctrine that this Court is not a
trier of facts.[25] The rule finds greater relevance in this case because the MTC,[26] the RTC[27] and the CA[28]
uniformly held that it was Jimmy Padua, and not Gerardo Breis, Sr., who was driving the taxi at the time of the
accident.
There are of course instances[29] when this Court can embark on a re-examination of the evidence adduced by the
parties during trial. Sad to say, none of those instances is present here.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

C E R T I F I C AT I O N

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above resolution had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
[1] The surnames of respondents Regina Breis and Ofelia Belando Breis were erroneously stated as Bries in the
caption of the petition.
[2] Erroneously indicated as April 21, 1999 by the Court of Appeals.
[3] With Plate No. EAW-533 and Body No. 1019.
[4] With Plate No. PVZ-345.
[5] 36 years old.
[6] 13 years old.
[7] 9 years old.
[8] 14 years old.
[9] 7 years old.
[10] 41 years old.
[11] Penned by Judge Manuel E. Contreras. Rollo, pp. 24-36.
[12] Decision penned by Judge Martin P. Badong, Jr. Id., pp. 37-42.
[13] Under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court.
[14] Penned by Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos (deceased) and concurred in by Justices Eugenio S. Labitoria
(retired) and Arturo D. Brion (now a member of the Supreme Court). Rollo, pp. 43-48.
[15] Petitioner appealed to this Court via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
[16] Revised Penal Code, Art. 100. Underlying the principle that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable
is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the State
because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime
unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others where no civil liability arises on
the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured

by the crime. Occena v. Icamina, G.R. No. 82146, 22 January 1990, 181 SCRA 328, 333, citing H. Jarencio,
Torts and Damages, 1983 ed., p. 237. In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused by another by reason of his act or omission,
whether done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. Id., citing C. Sangco, Philippine
Law on Torts and Damages, Revised Edition, pp. 246-257.
[17] Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., G.R. Nos. L-78911-25, 11 December 1987, 156 SCRA 325.
[18] United States v. Bernardo, 19 Phil. 265 (1911).
[19] Bautista v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 46025, 2 September 1992, 213 SCRA 231, 236; Calalang v. IAC,
G.R. No. 74613, 27 February 1991, 194 SCRA 514.
[20] Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-39999, 31 May 1984, 129 SCRA 558, 567. There appear to be
no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts to be proved in the civil
case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was acquitted. xxx To require a
civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean clogging of court dockets and unnecessary
duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all concerned. See also
People v. Jalandoni,G.R. No. L-57555, 28 August 1984, 131 SCRA 454; Maximo v. Garuchi, G.R. Nos. L-
47994-97, 24 September 1986, 144 SCRA 326; Vizconde v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. L-

74231, 10 April 1987, 149 SCRA 226; People v. Ligon, G.R. No. L-74041, 29 July 1987, 152 SCRA 419.
[21] Id.
[22] Rollo, p. 31.
[23] Id., pp. 41-42.
[24] In that case, his civil liability remains to be ex delito. (See Manantan v. CA, 403 Phil. 298 [2001].)
[25] Vicente Delos Santos, et al. v. Fred Elizalde, G.R. Nos. 141810 & 141812, 2 February 2007, 514 SCRA 14.
[26] Rollo, p. 24.
[27] Id., p. 39.
[28] Id., p. 45.
[29] It is a settled rule that in the exercise of the Supreme Courts power of review, the Court is not a trier of facts
and does not normally undertake the re-examination of the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case considering that the findings of facts of the CA are conclusive and binding on the Court. However,
the Court had recognized several exceptions to this rule, to wit: (1) when the findings are grounded entirely on
speculation, surmises or conjectures; 2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3)
when there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the
case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they
are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are not
disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and
contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant
facts not disputed by the parties, which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion. Sampayan v.
CA, G.R. No. 156360, 14 January 2005, 448 SCRA 220, 229.